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
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# E X T R A C T S

FROM

Colonel TEMPELHOFF's HISTORY

OF THE

SEVEN YEARS WAR:

His REMARKS on General LLOYD:

On the SUBSISTENCE of ARMIES; and

On the MARCH of CONVOYS.

ALSO

A TREATISE on WINTER POSTS.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

A Narrative of EVENTS at St. LUCIE and GIBRALTAR,

AND OF

JOHN Duke of MARLBOROUGH's  
March to the DANUBE,

With the Causes and Consequences of that Measure.

——— *Forſan et hæc olim meminiffe juvabit.* VIRG.

By the Honourable COLIN LINDSAY,

Lieutenant Colonel of the 46th Regiment.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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L O N D O N:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.

MDCXCIII.







# EXTRACT

FROM

Colonel TEMPELHOFF'S HISTORY

OF THE

SEVEN YEARS' WAR

HIS REMARKS ON THE

On the SUBJECT OF

On the MARCH

A TREATISE

A Narrative of the

JOHN

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It is now dedicated to your Royal Highness with the most perfect respect, and with the strongest attachment to your person, as the Patron of our Military Men, the faithful servants of their King and Country.

Should it appear that the nerve of German idiom, of which you are so perfect a judge, is not entirely lost in the Translation, and should the manner in which your favourite study is discussed in the following criticisms and extracts be found in any degree to deserve your approbation, it will be considered as a most flattering circumstance, and will highly gratify,

S I R,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS'S

Most faithful, and

Most obedient humble Servant,

COLIN LINDSAY.

# C O N T E N T S

## OF THE

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INTRO-

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## INTRODUCTION.

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SOME time ago, the editor of this publication had the good fortune accidentally to meet with Colonel Tempelhoffe's History of the Seven Years War, written in the German language, which he acquired in the course of his services in America and Gibraltar with the Hessian and Hanoverian forces, and the knowledge of which he has with pleasure continued to cultivate. He was struck with the nature of the work; to have the operations not only of the King of Prussia, but of Duke Ferdinand, in their full extent, the object of meditation, given in language worthy of the subject; to have the accuracy of detail embellished with theoretical discussion of many of the most important questions of the military art, where science was seen surmounting numbers of the greatest disproportion; the how, the where, the wherefore, placed before the eyes—this was indeed a treasure.

A possession of so much value, was not to be made a property by hoarding it. The editor soon resolved upon participation; and in the leisure of

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his country quarters, proceeded, to the best of his abilities, to give this work an English dress, as being highly worthy the attention not only of his fellow-soldiers, but of his country in general.

“ When war is carried on between nations  
 “ whose improvement is in any degree similar,  
 “ the means of defence bear some proportion to  
 “ those of the attack ; and, in this equal contest,  
 “ such efforts must be made, such talents are displayed, and such passions roused, as exhibit  
 “ mankind in a situation no less striking than interesting. Hence the operations of war, and the  
 “ struggles of contending states, have been deemed  
 “ by historians, ancient as well as modern, a capital and important article in the annals of human actions\*.”

Military writers have been said by General Lloyd to be of two descriptions, didactic and historical ; but he appears to have misapplied these terms, if we are to understand the first as scientifically teaching, the other as employed in relating events. Cæsar, in his dignified narrative of his own actions, is historical ; we could have wished that he had been more didactic. Polybius is both didactic and historical. Tempelhoffe is eminently both, uniting, with much theory, Lloyd's false definition of the historical class of writers ; the having had great practice in the art on which he treats, as well as perfect knowledge of his subject.

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\* Robertson's History of America.

He served in every campaign during the war of which he writes the history ; and must obtain the preference even over the great names of ancient times in this respect, that in the present state of war, which has become much more complicated since the invention of gunpowder, his works are now of more utility. We may learn from them to foresee, yet not to be prevented by an obstacle ; and that by the previous discernment of probable impediments, we are the best enabled to provide the means of surmounting them.

Were the translation of this work now actually making its appearance, this might be construed into an unwarrantable attempt to anticipate the judgment of the reader ; but the best endeavours to excite the attention of the public to the means of publishing the book, have proved ineffectual. The proposals, dated February 20th 1790, and the advertisements inserted in the newspapers, have been found inadequate. The Hibernian school, where several hundreds of soldiers children are maintained, educated, and apprenticed or enlisted, was to receive the profits of the work ; and this was signified in the proposals. Several instances of late have clearly proved that any other method or publishing a military book in this country than by subscription, is a hazardous attempt ; and there are few military men whose fortunes are equal to the expence of such experiments.

To whatever cause the failure of the design may be attributed, the editor found it necessary to abandon it ; and, on being ordered for foreign ser-

vice lately when war with Spain was expected and every preparation for immediate enterprise had been made, he withdrew his proposals through the same channel by which they had been signified. In compliment to eighty-one subscribers, and in his own vindication, having given his name to the public perhaps somewhat rashly, the editor now publishes a part of the work proposed in the criticisms on General Lloyd's History of the Two First Campaigns. The rest of the work consists of the continuation of the history, from the commencement of the third campaign in the year 1758\*.

Among the few military authors which this country has produced, Lloyd is generally ranked in the highest class. His work is in many hands, and has been read with great avidity. "Mankind," Colonel Tempelhoffe says, "feel a sort of satisfaction and a comfort, when they find a heart so stout as to attack superior talents of decided eminence, and then are very ready to bestow applause." It is well known, that General Lloyd's book consists of very free observations on the King of Prussia; of the full value of which, those who read the following pages will be enabled

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\* The above-mentioned circumstance must serve as an apology for publishing the remarks on Lloyd's history without plans; and should the reader find the description in any part not sufficiently clear, (which it is apprehended will not frequently happen,) he must necessarily be referred to the plans in Lloyd's book, which is in the hands of most military men.

to form a more accurate judgment, than they could have done before from any thing which has ever appeared in the English language.

Lloyd, in his PREFACE, has advanced various opinions. It is greatly to be wished that the German author had taken them likewise into consideration. It may not be amiss here to bestow a few thoughts upon some of them. His preliminary discourse is universally allowed to be written with great ability.

Lloyd seems to have been possessed of strong attachment to his native country. Many of his general military observations appear to have been formed with a particular view to the well-being of our troops; yet he might have spared a certain ridicule which he attempts to cast on part of the necessary occupation of military men. When he speaks with contempt of the adjusting the button of a hat, &c. &c. he ought to have recollected, what he certainly must have known, that the duty of an officer consists in assiduous and minute attention, as well as frequent strenuous exertion. As he has written on what he calls the philosophy of war, under the denomination of the second part of his first volume, he might perhaps, under that head, have explained why it is that the moment a soldier becomes careless of his dress or arms, he is no longer to be depended upon; he loses all taste for his profession, and he deserts. The whole is composed of many parts; the work of twenty years may be undone by six months inattention. If young men, when they come into the service,

do not determine upon a scrupulous and conscientious observance of orders, so as that their duty shall become a habit, or a sort of second nature; if the soldiers under their command, if their pay, their lodging, food and exercise, their discipline, their conduct and behaviour to each other and their fellow-citizens are not constantly attended to, there can be no army; or what is worse, there will be a very bad one.

If General Lloyd really had the well-being of our troops at heart, why did he not propose some better method of recruiting the army? why did he not recommend a very obvious, and ultimately a very economical measure for that purpose, as well as for the prevention of desertion? namely, a small increase of the soldiers pay, so as to render it possible for him to exist upon it\*; instead of the puerilities he speaks of, when he says, that there can be no compact body of troops without music. It is long since the Prussians have laid aside music for regulating the movement of bodies of troops, having discovered that it destroyed the very end that it was intended to promote; and that the cadenced march, which Marshal Saxe recommends, and which is of the greatest importance, was only to be obtained without music. Their example

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\* This has actually been done since this part of our introduction was written; and officers, who may well be supposed to have the interests of the soldiers more at heart than any other description of persons, are now satisfied that their allowances are amply sufficient.

in that respect has been followed lately in the British service.

Nothing but Prussian will go down, says Lloyd; short cloaths, little hats, an infinite number of useless motions in the exercise and evolutions have been introduced, without any other reason than their being Prussian. Had Lloyd been a native Austrian, he could not have had a greater hatred than he seems to have imbibed in the Austrian service for the Prussians, and all that belongs to them, being very unwilling to adopt the "*Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*" As to the short cloaths, he seems to forget that a soldier upon service always carries a blanket upon his knapsack, (which if made in the form of a great coat, is so much the more useful,) and that this compensates for his coat being made as all European coats are. We shall hardly wish to have the customs of the east introduced among us, and to see our soldiers dressed in flowing robes.

As to the hat, had Lloyd been now alive, he probably would have been an advocate for it, as the Prussians have lately left off the use of it; at least in the form in which it formerly was made. It has always been a complaint, that in close order, the soldier's hat, being triangular, is very much in the way, both of his own firelock and of those of his comrades. It has also been a complaint, that considering the coarse materials of which it is made, the hat is apt to lose its shape, especially in camp, so as to become far from ornamental. That it was ever useful, whether against



rain, sun, or wind, no officer ever supposed. Accordingly, the Prussians have lately made the hat into a cap, which is not liable to any of the objections: but we agree with General Lloyd, that a far better covering for the soldiers head might be made of leather; for example, such as the caps of the light dragoons, with some little alteration.

With respect to the Prussian evolutions, the application of them, in the course of Colonel Tempelhoffe's history, is seen to produce such effects as cannot fail to strike the reader with astonishment, till he proceeds to the explanation of the principles on which they were conducted, when the wonder ceases.

When Lloyd quotes an expression of the King of Prussia, as to the impossibility of platoon firing in action, he ought, at the same time, to have informed us, that the king added, that more than two rounds could not easily be fired in that manner. The troops, says Lloyd, must be three deep at least, yet the front rank must not kneel; and he would have our arms two feet longer than they are at present. This last proposition must be very amusing, since it is plain that a middle-sized man in the ranks could not load his firelock were it longer than the length at present in use in the British service, of three feet six inches in the barrel.

Before the invention of gunpowder, the first object was to prevent the line from being penetrated, or to penetrate that of the enemy. With these

these views, the phalanx was sixteen men in depth; the legion varied at different times. Whether this be now the first object or not, it is certainly a very important one. Some may conceive, that the out-flanking your enemy, by extending your files and diminishing your depth, is more material. There is indeed no question upon which military men are more divided. It was certainly put fairly to the test at the battle of Prague, where the King of Prussia had nearly lost the day; but with that intuitive glance which catches the decisive moment, having observed an interval in the Austrian army, he penetrated, and established batteries to enfilade their line, which had all the effect of gaining a flank. In fact, the turning a flank, is not so easily effected, (if your enemy be vigilant and skilful,) as the breaking through a thin line of infantry.

At the time General Lloyd wrote, the Austrian army were four deep, which they continued to be till after the battle of Kollin. It is strange, how long custom will sometimes prevail in defiance of reason. It was long after the invention of gunpowder that Gustavus Adolphus departed from the order of depth; and his forming his troops only six deep, was reckoned an innovation, which nothing but his success could justify. Tilly and Walsstein, his opponents, drew up their infantry in solid masses, thirty deep.

At this time when experimental exercises are practising previous to positive regulation, it may be highly proper for an individual officer to communicate

municate his thoughts. At Berlin, where the existence of the state depends upon their military institutions, there has been for many years a monthly military publication, wherein every proposition finds a place. The examination of some of General Lloyd's opinions in his preface, leads the editor to the following considerations

ON THE FIRE OF MUSQUETRY THREE DEEP.

The drawing up of troops two deep is peculiar to the British service; but there is now every reason to hope that this practice will be discontinued. There may be times and circumstances when it may be proper; but it seems that upon no account for the sake of making a shew upon a review day, should this be permitted; for this plain reason, that troops who can act three deep, can at any time act two deep against an irregular enemy, or in woods; but the contrary does by no means follow: and as it is the grand object of military science to bring the many to act against the few, and that men drawn up two deep in the beginning of an action, will soon be in a rank entire; not to mention the impossibility of conveying orders with effect to a line extending a considerable distance\*; for these reasons it is expected that the general system throughout the British service will, from authority, be that of three deep, like that of all the other troops in Europe.

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\* Major General Dundas's Principles of Military Movements.

An officer in the service of France, Guibert, contrived by his writings to bring about the disuse of the front rank kneeling, in the platoon firing three deep. The French, after persevering during twelve years in the attempt of firing three deep with the front rank standing, in their exercises during peace, found it necessary some years ago to return to their former method of kneeling; that they ever quitted it, was owing to the misapprehension of a fact. Guibert asserts, page 80, vol. i. *Essai Generale de Tactique*, that he saw the regiment of Deux-ponts fire three deep standing, in the battle of Felinghausen, “*sans accident, et sans inconvenient, dans un combat tres vif et sous le feu de l'ennemi.*” A Lieutenant-colonel in the British service lately met with the very officer who commanded that regiment upon that occasion; and in the course of conversation upon a variety of military topics, he informed him, that Guibert had mistaken the fact; for that his third rank did not fire, but were employed in loading and handing the arms to the center rank.

It may be of considerable importance to give this proposition a fair trial. It has been adopted in the French service by an ordonnance *de par le Roi* in the year 1788. The editor has practised this method for some time past with the regiment which he has the honour to command; and must acknowledge, that he entertains the very best opinion of it. That method will be found the best, which is liable to the fewest objections.

Now if we are to fire regular discharges of musquetry, whether by platoons, wings, or battalions,  
any

any farther thoughts upon this subject were unnecessary; but many officers of great experience are of opinion, that in action, after the first discharge or two, it is impossible. Do what we may, the regular discharges will degenerate into file-firing. The kneeling of the front rank would then be attended with the worst consequences, as the center or rear rank man might be presenting his piece at the very moment that the front rank man is rising.

Shall we then attempt to fire the three ranks standing? We are firmly persuaded that the very worst consequences would ensue.

Let us first consider that the ranks take up much more space with the knapsacks on. The extreme reluctance of a soldier to part with his knapsack, even when going into action, is well known. It contains all that he has to trust to for comfort and health during a campaign, and he is not sure of seeing it again. From the same cause the officer will not insist upon his quitting it, unless an extraordinary case occurs. The Hessians moved on to the storm of Red Bank redoubt with their knapsacks on; an example which it is by no means intended to praise. At Brandewine the army fought with their knapsacks on. Let us consider how much more difficult it is for the arms of the rear rank to clear the front rank in rugged ground, firing ball, and exposed to an enemy, than on a smooth field of exercise; and we may perhaps not be the advocates for the firing of the third rank. It may be a question whether the loss of the fire of the third rank would not be compensated

compensated by the confidence which the front ranks would acquire, and their being thereby enabled to level their musquets better by their being free from apprehensions of destruction from the rear rank. When it is also recollected that in the best disciplined army not one musquet shot perhaps in five hundred takes place (the reasons of which we have considered elsewhere in some experiments); when it is also recollected how very soon the ammunition is often fired away, and the difficulty of replacing it, and that the rear rank man thus, though he did not fire, would carry a supply; perhaps the question might be reduced to this, “Whether it is better to fire one third fewer shots, with  
“ ten times more certainty \* ?”

We cannot help forming the most strenuous wishes that we may never see in the British service the attempt made to fire three ranks with the front rank standing, whether by files or regular discharges, and the writer must own that his own practice with his regiment, unless ordered otherwise, would be to give the two first rounds in regular discharges by word of command, with the front rank kneeling, after which he would commence the file-firing

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\* Three years after this was written, we learn, that the Prussians have lately discontinued the practice of firing the third rank upon any occasion whatsoever, and prefer that the men of that rank should stand totally unemployed, which we conceive to be injudicious; and it remains to be proved whether any of the late institutions in the Prussian or Austrian armies deserve imitation.



above mentioned ; but as nothing is more difficult than to stop file-firing, and the critical moment for advancing may be lost, he would make it an invariable rule that when the front rank had fired three shots, (by which time the center rank will with ease have fired five) the whole should come to the shoulder, and wait for orders whether to move or continue the fire.

Now, that we see a Prince of the Royal House high in command, who draws his knowledge from the right source, we may congratulate ourselves with the hope that we shall see restored to the British infantry their pristine order, as when they moved to victory in the fields of Blenheim and of Minden.

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Of the Prussian evolutions, the only one upon which General Lloyd has given his opinion, is their forming their line by conversion ; and his censures arise from the different method practised by the Austrians in forming, after passing a defilé.

By a defilé must be understood all places where troops must cease to move in ranks, and are under the necessity of filing off. The Prussians instantly form up the first body, which has passed such defilé or obstacle, and halt it. Suppose it a company ; the next company forms up close behind it, wheels to the right or left, and marches to occupy its place in line at right angles to that line ; conversion being another word for wheeling. The Austrians, on the contrary, cause the first company  
to

to march a considerable way in front of the *defilé*, and the companies which follow march obliquely off to the right or left, and move into their place in line by the oblique step. General Lloyd considers the circumstance of keeping a front to the enemy all the time of moving to form up as of the very greatest consequence, and from thence praises the Austrian method, and in the same proportion depreciates that of the Prussians.

Now if we suppose a whole army filing off in either of these methods, and forming up in presence of an enemy posted in force before the mouth of the *defilé*, certain destruction would be the consequence of the attempt whichever of the methods were employed. Such absurdities have scarcely been practised since the days of Cressy or of Agincourt. We certainly rather would endeavour to surmount the most arduous declivities to our right or left, and gain the eminence, or we would return back, and such *defilé* or *pass*, as in this instance it would more properly be called, would be the greatest friend to our retreat, if the enemy were not master of the heights.

We are rather to suppose that the case alludes only to a part of the line obliged to file off by such inequalities of surface, as will most commonly occur in fields of battle. If such parts be considerable and numerous, a short halt would be made, whether by Prussians or Austrians, till order was restored, rather than advance in a state of weakness and disunion; but with regard to the oblique step, that most unnatural of all gestures, it is now but  
little

little practised. Some officer of intelligence discovered, to the great comfort of the foldier, that by wheeling the flank of each division a few paces they could march streight forward to the point they were to occupy. The only use now made of the oblique step is, to cause a regiment to swerve a few paces to the right or left to correct an interval in line.

There are officers who have asserted with an air of triumph, that the peculiar characteristic of British troops is, that they will advance, no matter in what disorder; but they would have no cause to triumph if their men arrived in disorder, in presence of an enemy regularly drawn up. This was exactly what happened at the battle of Monmouth, where all became confusion, and where the day ought to have ended very fatally to the British, if the Americans had profited as they might have done. Troops which rush headlong forwards in this manner may sometimes be successful; but on the first check from a spirited enemy, the consequences may be dreadful, and nothing short of annihilation. Had Frederic ever suffered his troops to have acted thus, his resistance to his numerous host of enemies would have been of short duration. A single defeat would have operated his ruin.

Our troops are brave; but were there more system, more dependance upon mutual effort among us, which we are now in the fair way of attaining, the very foldiers would learn to know the difference between bravery and rashness. Let not officers praise such misconduct in a line of battle.

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The nature of our service cannot admit of our assembling in large bodies in time of peace; and yet it is scarcely possible for those who have not seen it, to conceive the difference between acting with a single regiment and with an army. In the former, what to an ordinary observer would seem slow and tedious, would in the motion of all the wheels of the machine be found to be quickness and precision. Constant and almost daily practice occurs in every profession but that of an officer. Yet peace has been said to be the time for studying war; while almost the only means we have for that purpose is by travelling, for officers whose fortunes can enable them to do so, and considering, in the large armies on the continent, the military customs of other countries, or by having recourse to the best military authors.

It has always been acknowledged that the very best materials are to be found in the British service; and that the officers are ready and willing to contribute their utmost to put in practice every regulation, nothing more being necessary than that their superior officers shall shew them clearly what they are to do. Experience has shewn that their strictest attention and obedience will not be wanting. A gentleman can never want a task-master, and will always be upon the watch to spare his superior the disagreeable office of expressing disapprobation.

Having expressed an opinion upon part of General Lloyd's preface, we must now declare our respect for his genius and abilities. We conceive  
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that military men are under great obligations to that officer, for introducing a mode of investigating military subjects tending to elucidation; nor is it the least of our obligations to him, that he gave rise to such a writer as Tempelhoffe. In the controversy between those gentlemen some asperities may appear, which will excite little surprise or regret. The collision of hard inestimable substances (inestimable if we judge from utility) must produce not only heat but light.

The name of Daun has long been considered with high respect in this country; and it is not impossible that our author's remarks upon the conduct of that commander may often at the first view be deemed somewhat improper. But it must be recollected that Lloyd, an Austrian General, hazarded an attempt to depreciate the King of Prussia. To repel the attack, Tempelhoffe, in the true spirit of his great master, would not remain merely on the defensive, but turned his whole artillery upon the leader of the Austrian army. Nor was the king ungrateful to his champion. He not only, as we are informed, shewed him great personal consideration, but also promoted him in the army for his uncommon military talents.

Whether from General Lloyd's own reflections, or in consequence of Tempelhoffe's reply, we know not; but his second part, published in 1781, fifteen years after the first, is written in a very different tone and spirit. Instead of censures on the King of Prussia, for not rapidly over-running all Bohemia, and for not driving his enemies to the Danube,  
or

or beyond it, &c. &c. Lloyd gives into the opposite extreme, and tells us of the IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACTING ON A LONG LINE OF OPERATION. Gustavus Adolphus, and in later times the Duke of Marlborough, both penetrated to the Danube. The army of the latter commander consisted of upwards of eighty thousand men, including the Imperial troops. He moved from Mæstricht in Dutch Brabant, on the 11th of May 1704, and formed the junction of his columns at Wester Stetten near Ulm on the Danube, on the 22d of June. It is somewhat surprising that we can meet with scarce any complete details in the English language, and but little in any other that is satisfactory in any *one* author, upon the subject of this extraordinary march of our great British General. Forty-four pieces of cannon, four hawbitz, and twenty-four pontoons accompanied the army\*; but they took ninety-seven pieces of cannon, and thirty mortars or hawbitz from the French and Bavarians in the battle of Blenheim, who were there more than four thousand men superior in numbers, and the French had moved with equal rapidity. We also know that the design was kept profoundly secret. Were there no magazines established in THIS LONG LINE OF OPERATION, which might have betrayed that secret? Did he not draw great resources from Bavaria, an enemy's country? Can it be that the addition of twice, or perhaps three times the number of artillery is the

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\* Returns of the army.



only cause of the present tortoise-like movement of armies in comparison with that of Marlborough? Where forty-four pieces of cannon could move, may we not infer that a greater train might follow? Is the solution of this question, on the change of the modern circumstance of war, to be found only in the mortifying idea of *tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis*? Is it that the principles of defensive war are now better understood, and that the great standing armies since kept up render it more difficult to invade a country? Or are we now more solicitous upon the consideration of subsistence, bent upon reducing all to certainty, and forgetting that great success without ~~fort~~ risk cannot be expected in human affairs? Must the European armies of the present day have recourse to Asia for an illustrious example from Lord Cornwallis and his indefatigable troops? Or shall we patiently and passively live to see and suffer a renewal of that calamitous, deplorable period of history, when the structure raised by the arts and arms, by the policy and wisdom of a long series of preceding ages, was crumbled into dust? When numerous hordes of desperate Barbarians, actuated by no enthusiasm \* but that of rapacity, having, by their ignorance or con-

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\* Atque haud scio an, pietate adversus Deos sublatâ, fides etiam et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus justitia, tollatur.

CICERO *de Natura Deorum*, liber primus.

“ And I am inclined to think, that if religion were destroyed,  
 “ all good faith among men would vanish, there would be no  
 “ longer any justice, nor could society exist.”

tempt

tempt of all salutary institutions, converted their own countries into one vast desert, burst forth from thence to overspread with devastation and with darkness the whole polished world. Then was discovered the melancholy truth, that long uninterrupted peace enervated both mind and body; when the courage and vigour of the proud imperial legions seemed to have been struck at once with palsy and astonishment.

Fortunately, whatever general resemblance may be found between the crisis of ancient times and the present moment, the particular difference is considerable. Europe is now divided into a number of distinct and separate states and kingdoms, each possessing their own vital energetic principle; and when one, whom could we ever have esteemed we were not disinclined to love, is unfortunately seized with madness of the canine and infectious sort, exerting in his paroxysm an unnatural degree of strength, to the danger of his own existence, and that of every one around him, should two of his powerful neighbours be found incompetent for a time to restrain his fury even in their own defence, others will repair to their assistance, for their own sakes, and for the common benefit of all mankind, deploring the occasion, and revolving in their minds with awe and reverence, the mysterious and inscrutable ends and means of the all-ruling Providence. We hope that this train of ideas will not appear altogether foreign to the subject of military operations, under which head the question is about to be debated with the arguments of the

*ultima ratio*; and before the Introduction is concluded, there yet remain a few words to be added relative to this publication.

The papers forming the third part are extracted from a correspondence which the editor continued during our last war with Sir Adolphus Oughton, commander in chief in Scotland, of much respected memory, and with the Earl of Balcarres, whose services at the head of the British light infantry in Canada are well known; nor is he here prevented from alluding to them by any fear of its being imputed to the partiality of a friend and relation. In a military publication of a miscellaneous nature, to include no part of the transactions of our own country and our own times, might justly be deemed an omission. This consideration caused an alteration from the original design, and now serves as a motive for submitting those papers to the public eye, imperfect as they may be found. They were written at the time when the events took place, and it is not impossible their defects may pass unnoticed in the importance of the subject.

The second part is a translation of a work in the German language on a very important branch, which no author had before treated methodically; namely a Treatise on Winter Posts, which has obtained considerable reputation in Germany, and contains much military knowledge. It is said, that soon after its appearance in 1785, it was prohibited by the Great Frederick, as disclosing principles and practices which he was desirous should remain peculiar to his own service. Officers of experience

perience will not be displeased in the perusal of it, to trace the image of things which are past, and of many scenes which it will recall to their memory. Young officers will study with attention the rules and maxims which it contains, for their conduct in such events as are most certainly to come.

“ The idea of perpetual peace among mankind  
 “ is no doubt more chimerical than the project of  
 “ an universal language. It is but too true, that  
 “ war is the scourge of human nature, and con-  
 “ trary to the precepts of almost every religion;  
 “ yet it is a scourge co-eval with that human nature,  
 “ and anterior to all religion. Different countries  
 “ are governed by Kings, or by Senators, by  
 “ Bishops, by Electors, or by Burgo-masters, who  
 “ have certain territories to defend, and it would  
 “ be as difficult to hinder men from making war  
 “ with each other as to prevent the wolves from  
 “ preying on the lambs\*.”

We may add to this quotation, that while we certainly have no desire to be the wolves, we have as little inclination to become the lambs. It is then presumed that even those who are not immediately of the military profession will not be averse from contemplating at their hours of leisure, the possible improvements of an art by which the possessions of our widely-extended empire are maintained, by which our commerce is protected, and which give security and permanency to their more

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\* Voltaire, notes sur la tactique.

tranquil occupations. To repel invasion, every man in this free country would become a soldier; but shall we delay until we hear, "*The Gauls are at the gates,*" and upon all other occasions hold implicitly the same opinion with the poet?

Suave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis,  
E terrâ magnum alterius spectare laborem;  
Non quia vexari quemquam 'st jucunda voluptas,  
Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave 'st.  
Suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri,  
Per campos instructa, tuâ sinè parte pericli.

LUCRETIVS *de Natura Rerum*, lib. 2.

Safe on the shore, when furious surges boil,  
Well pleased we view the struggling sailor's toil;  
Not that another's peril can be joy,  
Our own security our thoughts employ.  
And front to front, when striving nations war,  
We gladly hear the clangor——from afar.

Unmanly thought! if employed in any instance where the well-being of our own country is in question; and if these Latin lines could admit of such interpretation, they would never have been admired within our realms, nor have been here attempted in the English language.

The editor is certain that little praise can fall to his share from the very nature of this publication, but to thus much he would willingly aspire; to that of having tasted military knowledge at the purest fountains, to that of having stood forth to point the way to others who may drink deeper of the stream; and he must indulge the hope that not only he himself, but many of his countrymen, may derive new strength from thence against some future  
time

time of need. Whenever it arrives, may the scene be distant from the happy countries of Great Britain and Ireland; and when it becomes necessary again to check excessive insolence, or curb inordinate ambition and malevolence, may all degrees of men again crowd forward to the standards, and may there be such conduct then displayed as shall serve to add a few more proud days to grace our calendar.

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The following short statement of facts may perhaps be not altogether unsatisfactory to such of our readers as may not immediately have access to the authorities we have consulted since the queries in the preceding pages presented themselves, and since the subsequent part of this book was printed:—*Biographia Britannica*, Tindal, *Voltaire*, *Feuquieres*, *Quincy*, *McPherson's History and State Papers*, *Kane's Campaigns*, and *Cunningham's History of England*. The last named author was a gentleman who wrote at that time in Latin, and had ample means of information. His book has been lately translated and published.



OF  
JOHN Duke of MARLBOROUGH's  
March to the DANUBE,  
AND THE  
Causes and Consequences of that Measure.

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JOHN Churchill, Earl, and soon afterwards Duke of Marlborough, was chosen to command the forces of the confederates at a most important juncture, almost immediately after the death of William the Third, King of Great Britain.

That sovereign, while Prince of Orange, had for seventeen years strenuously opposed the unbounded ambition and injustice of the French. While he was yet an infant, and an unprotected orphan, they had seized upon the Principality of Orange; and some years afterwards, in like manner, without a shadow of pretext, and without deigning to assign any reason for the measure, but that it redounded to the glory of their Monarch, they suddenly invaded and rapidly overran the United Provinces.

1660.

Charles



Charles the Second and his brother James had been gained over to the designs of France by means of benefits conferred upon them, not without self-interested views, while they were yet in exile. Charles continued to receive the gold of France when seated on the throne of England, and employing the forces of the British nation as far as he had power, in contradiction to every principle of established policy, he co-operated in this system of iniquity. He sent six thousand troops against the Low Countries, under the command of his natural son the Duke of Monmouth. Mr. Churchill, at that time a captain, served in this army. He was soon distinguished by his valour and conduct, and received from Marshal Turenne the appellation of the handsome Englishman, by which he was generally known in the French army at that time.

The object of this expedition was nothing less atrocious, than either to bend beneath the yoke of foreign power, a people, who after an arduous struggle for sixty-one years, had rescued their lives and liberties from the tyranny of Spain and the holy inquisition; or to force them to break down the barriers which their surprising industry had raised, and again resign their country to the mercy of the ocean, or of France\*.

But

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\* " Against Turenne, Condé, Luxemburg, Vauban, a hundred and thirty thousand combatants, a prodigious artillery, and the engines of money and corruption, Holland had nothing

But William having now attained to manhood, his country at length forgot for a time the internal animosities and storms of a republican form of government, and raised him to the dignity of Stadtholder, vested with which his forefathers, by their wisdom and valour, had founded and established the independence of that state which he now rescued from destruction. Having retaken Narden, he boldly marched up the Rhine, cut off the supplies of the French army, and taking Bonne, opened to the Imperial troops under Montecuculi a passage into Flanders. 1673:

The French were now compelled to abandon their conquests, but not until they had shewn the use they were disposed to make of their victories. The dykes which kept out the sea were actually broken down. The whole country and all the towns and villages round Amsterdam were drowned by the inhabitants, who saved themselves within that city; but who preferred the destruction of their farms and flocks, rather than endure a continuation of cruelty and extortion. They sustained the greatest hardships without murmuring. The scarcity of provisions had become great, and fresh water was sold at threepence a quart; but this extremity of distress appeared a lesser evil in their minds than that of slavery. The French in their

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“ thing to oppose but a young prince of a weak constitution,  
 “ who had never seen a battle or a siege, and about five-and-  
 “ twenty thousand infantry.”

VOLTAIRE, *Siecle de Louis XIV.*

retreat

retreat gave farther proofs of their malice, by setting fire to several villages, and delivering over the inhabitants to the pillage and debauchery of their soldiers. These transactions the Hollanders related to their children, and the hatred of the French name lives by tradition in that country, even to this day.

By these means William obliged his enemies to abandon the provinces of which they had possession, and resisting the arts as well as arms of France, he purchased a species of neutrality from Charles, despised the offers of aggrandisement to his family at the expence of his country \*, and fought the bloody and well-contested battle of Seneffe, in which the doubtful palm of victory was equally claimed by the troops of William, when he was yet but four-and-twenty, and those of the veteran and renowned commander the great Condé.

1674. England, Holland, Denmark, and the Empire of Germany, now considered William as the Champion of Europe, and of the Protestant religion; for the arrogance of France had already in idea extended her dominion, not only over the liberty and property, but over the religious opinions of the rest of mankind. England for some time took little part in this contest, to which her Monarch was secretly averse; but, what must have been fully as surprising at the time, the bigotry of Spain giving

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\* They offered to make him King of Holland, provided he would be contented to depend upon them.

Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE, page 21.

way to her apprehension for her dominions in the Netherlands, she concluded an alliance, dictated by mutual policy, with the Heretics of the seven Provinces, whose extermination she had so long in vain laboured to accomplish.

The events that occurred in the progress of this war, proved very different from those of its commencement; and it became apparent, that armies under the direction of one head, and managed by single and immediate orders, had great advantage over those, who, acting in confederacy, met with a thousand delays and obstructions. Before the allies had fully assembled, the French already had entered Franche Comté with two great armies, and in a short time took possession of Besançon, Dole, Salines, and the whole province. The next year, having provided sufficient magazines during the winter, they began their operations against Flanders, and also penetrated into Germany; where, for the first time during this war, they commenced their essay, which they afterwards extended to a dreadful degree, in burning and desolating defenceless towns and villages; intending by an absolute ruin of the country, to cut off the Imperialists from all subsistence, if they should march into Alsace to form a diversion.

Notwithstanding various enterprises on the part of the confederates, and the battles of Moncassel and Mons, the progress of the French, particularly in Flanders, seemed scarcely to suffer any interruption, till the Prince of Orange found means to interest and to alarm the whole British nation;

but unfortunately, this salutary alarm did not take place until the enemy had greatly extended their dominions. The Spaniards now employed their menaces against our trade, and Charles, conscious that he had given but too much reason for the universal discontent which prevailed among his subjects, considered the measure of assembling the militia to defend the coasts, as more dangerous to his authority than an invasion. When he had dissipated his foreign treasures, he was at last compelled by necessity to call a parliament.

The most general dissatisfaction had existed throughout the kingdom during the two Dutch wars; in which our sailors fought without heart, and apprehended almost as much from their friends as from their enemies. The French fleet under Count D'Etrees, having kept aloof, it was generally supposed, that he had received secret orders not to expose his master's ships too much, but to leave the English and Dutch fleets to destroy each other. Accordingly, that of the Dutch was at length nearly ruined; and while the English ships had sustained considerable damage in the various stubborn engagements, those of the French remained entire.

William having with much difficulty, and by the good offices of his friends in England, accomplished an alliance with his first-cousin the Princess Mary, daughter of James Duke of York\*, the king now recalled his forces from the service of

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\* King James the Second.

France.

France. The commons voted his majesty thanks for the care he had taken of the protestant religion, by marrying his niece to a protestant prince; and also passed a vote to equip a fleet of ninety men of war, and to raise an army of thirty thousand men. But the Dutch, from a rational want of confidence in Charles, from terror at the progress of the French, and from injurious suspicions of the Prince of Orange, created and fomented by the French since his late alliance, suddenly resolved to listen to the terms of peace dictated by France, with all the insolence of that nation when her arms are victorious. The peace was concluded at Nimeguen; where negotiations, begun and carried on without sincerity, had been protracted for nearly four years; amusing the Spaniards, and slackening their efforts, until the fruitless mediation of England received an unexpected energy from her vigorous and warlike preparations. By these, she had already caused the French to withdraw their troops from Sicily, in order to reinforce their armies in Flanders and upon the Rhine. 1678.  
August  
10.

In this peace, the interests of none of the warring powers seem to have been in any degree considered, excepting those of the Dutch, with an insidious view of withdrawing their force from the confederacy; and France confirmed the unjust usurpations which she had effected in this and the former war over Lorraine, Alsace, Franche Comté, and that extent of country since known by the name of French Flanders.

William opposed this peace by every argument, and by various means, but without success, and what this Prince foresaw and foretold soon came to pass; for the French quickly began their encroachments, and claimed whole provinces under the name of dependencies upon the conquests ceded by the late treaty: under this pretence, they seized upon  
 1683. Straßburg, and laid siege to Luxemburg. The Prince, with his usual foresight, had made an early proposal to the States, to levy 16,000 men; to which, by means of the artifices of the French Embassador, they had paid no regard; and although their rejection of that proposal had defeated the Prince's measures, it did not affect his courage. He took the field with the few troops he had, though to little purpose, the Spaniards being as weak and helpless as the French were powerful; so that Luxemburg surrendered, and at a Congress held at the Hague, the confederacy submitted to farther usurpations.

June 29,  
1684.

The French King, released from the toils of war, began to disturb the peace of his own subjects of the Protestant religion, by the most dreadful persecution and most shocking cruelty. Many Protestants of great worth and honour, having taken refuge in the principality of Orange, he sent an armed force to live at free quarters on the inhabitants, to blow up the fortifications, and by these means to enforce a compliance with the bigotry of the Church of Rome. The States General complained of these proceedings, although the principality of Orange was not within their dominions;

minions; and the Prince submitting his private losses to the interest of his country, despised these violences as mean revenge. The French troops were withdrawn; but Louis insisted he had reason for what he did. This answer was given at a time when the Turks were invading Hungary with a powerful force; a measure to which they had been instigated by the intrigues of France, with a view to secure impunity to her new infractions of peace, and violation of the rights of mankind; and by employing the forces of the Emperor of Germany, to facilitate her farther designs of conquest.

So much injustice, and injuries so widely complicated, could hardly fail to make a deep impression on the mind of the Prince of Orange. Accordingly he is represented as having at this time fallen into the most profound melancholy, from which he derived some temporary relief in the avocations of his government at Utrecht. But the hope of humbling France became the ruling passion of his life, and certain circumstances in the state of Great Britain now served to keep alive that hope.

James the Second had ascended an unstable throne upon the death of his brother, and in a short time it became apparent that, notwithstanding the vices of the former reign, the country had by no means benefited by the change. His understanding and his principles had, if possible, been more completely perverted and corrupted than those of his brother during their abode in France; and he was moreover the greatest bigot, even of



that age, in whatever concerned the Roman Catholic religion, to which his people felt an insurmountable abhorrence. These and other causes produced the Revolution; and James having fled to France, William Prince of Orange was seated on the throne of Great Britain.

King William's first endeavours were earnestly directed to the settlement of the state, but in his first speech to his Parliament, after general assurances "that he should never do any thing that might justly lessen their good opinion of him," he proceeded to say, "I think it necessary to acquaint you, that the condition of our allies abroad, and particularly that of Holland, is such, that unless some speedy care be taken of them, they run a greater hazard than you would have them exposed to. You must also be sensible that the state of Ireland is such, that the dangers are grown too great to be obviated by any slow methods."

After Lord Dundee was killed, and Edinburgh castle had surrendered in consequence of the death of that illustrious officer, the whole island of Great Britain acknowledged the sovereignty of King William within twelve months after his landing; but Ireland was far from following that example, and it was more than two years before that kingdom was entirely reduced to acknowledge the British Revolution. King William having in person taken the field early in the second campaign, informed his troops, "*that he was not come over to suffer the grass to grow beneath their feet;*" and having  
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ing gained the battle of the Boyne, he derived this immediate advantage from that victory, that James once more withdrew to France, leaving his friends and his French allies in Ireland. So abrupt a retreat seemed to argue a degree of timidity, very inconsistent with that character for courage which he had justly obtained by his naval conduct upon former occasions\*.

In

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\* His animal spirits had been much impaired by violent bleedings at the nose, to which he had been subject for some time before. This is mentioned in certain memoirs, a mutilated copy of which got into print in the year 1714, written by Colin Earl of Balcarres, an honourable and worthy man. He had married Mademoiselle Beverwaert, King William's first cousin, and had frequently received civilities from him, even after his landing; but nothing could prevail upon him to forsake his old master, having formed an opinion very different from what is now received of James's principles. He arrived in London the day after King James returned from Feversham, and with his friend Lord Dundee went to him early next morning. He was received affectionately, but observed there was none with him but some of the gentlemen of his bed-chamber. The King said it was a fine day, he would take a walk. None attended him but the persons above-mentioned. When he was in the garden of St. James's, he stopped and looked at them, asked how they came to be with him when all the world had forsaken him, and had gone to the Prince of Orange. Balcarres said, their fidelity to so good a master should always be the same; they had nothing to do with the Prince of Orange. Lord Dundee also expressed himself in terms of attachment. "Well, " I see you are the men I always took you to be. You shall " know all my intentions. I can no longer remain here but " as a cypher, or as a prisoner to the Prince of Orange, and " there is but a small distance between the prisons and the

1688.

In the mean time France was exerting herself in promoting discord, treachery, and bloodshed; and with a view of giving ample occupation for a length of time to the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland, in which she most fortunately was disappointed, she had granted to James the aid of only five thousand troops, and with the whole force of her overgrown

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“ graves of kings ;—therefore I go for France immediately.  
 “ When there, you shall have my instructions. You, Lord Balcarres, shall have a commission to manage my civil affairs,  
 “ and you, Lord Dundee, to command my troops in Scotland.”

After the King was gone, Balcarres waited upon the Prince of Orange, who told him, that he doubted not his attachment to him at the ensuing convention, and twice thereafter spoke to him upon the same subject, telling him at length, that notwithstanding his former kindness for him, he desired him to beware how he behaved himself; for if he transgressed the law, he should be left to it. Balcarres, after great exertions in Scotland, and the discovery of the plot called Skelmurley's, carried on by his means, contrived to escape to France. After King James's death, his estate was restored to him by the good offices of John Duke of Marlborough, and his eldest son Lord Cumberland was aid-de-camp to the Duke. He had been greatly injured by Charles the Second, notwithstanding his father had been Secretary of State to that Monarch in Scotland, had gone abroad with him, was attached to him all the time he was in exile, and is spoken of in terms of great approbation in letters of Charles the Second which are extant. But it was that Monarch's maxim, that his enemies must be gained at all hazards, even at the expence of his friends. The length of this note, which, except the first sentence, is perhaps foreign to the subject, certainly requires an apology from the writer, who trusts he will be excused for paying this tribute to the memory of a respectable ancestor.

armies

armies suddenly invaded the Palatinate. Were we here to attempt a detail of the circumstances of the complete destruction of that populous and extensive district, we should fill our readers minds with horror and detestation at those who could plan, as well as those who could execute, such cruel and unprovoked atrocities. 1688.

The diet of Ratisbon, justly incensed at this invasion, unanimously resolved "to make a vigorous war upon this enemy, not only of the empire, but of all Christendom, and even greater than the Turk himself, with whom he was joined in league." This declaration of war was quickly followed by that of Holland, of Spain, of Denmark, and of England, and afterwards of the Duke of Savoy.

Notwithstanding the renewal of the confederacy, France was not discouraged from pursuing her ambitious designs; but the campaign in Flanders did not favour her next year, and it now seemed as if the allies were at length to stem the tide of French success.

A small body of English forces were sent by King William to join the confederacy, under the command of the Earl of Marlborough. The French army, consisting of about fourscore thousand men, was commanded by Marshal D'Humières, while that of the confederates under the Prince of Waldeck did not exceed sixty thousand. The two armies passed the summer without any remarkable action till the battle of Walcourt. The cavalry of the confederates being for the most part abroad. 1689. Aug. 15.

1689.

abroad for forage, the Duc de Joyeuse, Lieutenant-general of the day, fell upon and defeated them; and either he or Marshal D'Humieres were so heated by this small success, that they resolved to push the affair as far as it would go, and at length attacked the little town of Walcourt, which, though not regularly fortified, had a very good wall, and was strong by situation, lying at the distance of about half a mile from the Prince of Waldeck's camp. A numerous body of infantry in the town kept up a smart fire on the enemy in front, who were also galled by a battery of twelve pieces of cannon. The Earl of Marlborough, at the head of two regiments of horse, and the guards, kept possession of the place, and was a calm spectator of the attack; for seeing the infantry of the confederates well covered by the wall, he would give the enemy no disturbance; but when, after a furious attack which lasted an hour and a half, the enemy had found it impossible to prevail, and the Marshal had sent orders to retreat, Marlborough fell in upon their flank as soon as they began to move, and did great execution. The French retired with the loss of about two thousand men, while that of the confederates was not above three hundred.

In Germany the French by their sudden invasion had made themselves masters of almost all the three ecclesiastical Electorates. In the Palatinate nothing was to be seen but the lamentable effects of their avarice, their fury, or their fears. In Heidelberg, the capital, the fortifications were blown up, and half the city burnt. They had destroyed  
Manheim:

Manheim: Worms and Spiers were also reduced to ashes, and Frankendhal was demolished. Four cities, eight and twenty towns and villages, and the whole open country were in flames. These conquests and trophies were covered by numerous armies, commanded by generals of great reputation; nevertheless the arms of France did not prevail this summer. The Duke of Loraine, at the head of the Imperial troops, after a siege of about two months, took Mentz by capitulation, and Franconia, which before lay exposed, was thereby covered and protected. Keiserwert and Bonne were also retaken, with which events that campaign was concluded. 1689.

The British troops were not employed upon the continent during the following year; towards the conclusion of which, Marlborough besieged and reduced Cork and Kinsale. In Flanders the Prince of Waldeck lost the battle of Fleurus, which was very bloody on both sides, and had the Dutch cavalry behaved as well as their infantry, the victory would certainly have been on their side, notwithstanding their inequality of numbers. The affairs of the allies by sea were still more unsuccessful. 1690.

Positive orders to fight having been sent to the Admiral, Herbert Lord Torrington, notwithstanding the superiority of the French, the combined fleet of Dutch and English ships, consisting of fifty sail, came to an engagement with that of the enemy of seventy ships off Beachy Head. The Dutch suffered considerably, and their whole fleet would have perished, if their Admiral, Calembourg, June 30.

1690.

The French  
masters at  
sea.

had not caused them suddenly to drop anchor with all their sails set, while the French fleet fell to leeward with the tide and current. The Dutch lost many men, and sank some of their own ships which had suffered most, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands. It was a general opinion, that could our whole fleet have come up to a close fight, we must have beat the French; but the English fleet was in a bad condition, and divided into factions. The effects were then severely felt, of what had been before sufficiently notorious, that after the Restoration, the public revenue had been constantly embezzled, and immense sums very often been sunk without being applied to the uses to which they were granted. A member of the House of Commons, about the end of Charles the Second's reign, observed in his place, "that eleven hundred thousand pounds had been given for building ships, yet not one built; above two millions had been given for the support of the triple league, which was presently employed for the breaking of it; and twelve hundred thousand pounds had been given for an actual war with France, yet peace had continued."

The French forces were so entirely occupied in Germany and Flanders, and had suffered so much in the battle of Fleurus, that they could not attempt any thing of consequence against England, while they were masters at sea; but they made a descent on the village of Teignmouth, which they burnt with a few fishing boats. They published an account of this in their  
Gazettes

Gazettes with much pomp, as if it had been a great trading town that had many ships with some men of war in port. This both rendered them ridiculous, and served to raise the hatred of the nation against them; for every town on the coast saw what they must expect if the French had prevailed. The militia was raised, and though the harvest drew on, so that it was not convenient for the people to be long absent from their labour, yet they did not murmur, but on the contrary expressed great zeal and affection for the government.

In Germany, the confederacy sustained a considerable loss in the death of the Duke of Lorraine. He had lately published a manifesto against France, declaring how unjust it was in Louis to detain his territories from him under false and frivolous pretences. This brave prince was suddenly seized with illness of which he died, not without strong suspicions of poison; for he was shortly to have entered Lorraine at the head of forty thousand men, where his subjects were preparing to assist him in regaining his ancient patrimony. The Elector of Bavaria succeeded him in the command of the Imperial army.

Some faction began to appear in Britain, and there were men who endeavoured to infuse into the minds of the people an opinion, that since the war in Ireland was happily terminated, there was now no need of keeping up a great land army. Many persons who did not understand the nature of foreign affairs, were drawn into this notion, not considering that if Flanders were lost, Holland must submit,



1690. submit, and take the best terms they could get; and that the conjunction of those two great powers at sea must soon ruin our trade, and in a little time subdue us entirely; but to the surprise of all men
1691. the Earl of Marlborough was suddenly disgraced, and his country was deprived of his services during the remainder of that war.

King William took the field early this year, in time to cover Brussels and to relieve Liege, which had been bombarded for two days. The French were not so effectually restrained in Italy, where Marshal Catinat took Villa Franca, Montauban, Carmagnola, and Nice, and the French boasted that they would dispossess the Duke of Savoy of all his dominions this campaign; but Duke Schomberg checked their progress, and the German succours soon after arriving under the Duke of Bavaria, Prince Eugene retook Carmagnola in eleven days, and the French who lately had threatened to besiege Turin now repassed the Po. The Spaniards lost Mons in Flanders, and received a more sensible mortification nearer home. For the Duc de Noailles, who commanded the French forces, penetrated into Catalonia, took Belver, nor could the Duke de Medina Sidonia dislodge them. The Spaniards did not make a better figure by sea than by land, since they could not prevent Admiral D'Etrées from bombarding Barcelona for three days, and making a terrible desolation in that city.

1692. England was at this time in great danger from want of intelligence. King James with fourteen thousand English and Irish, and Marshal Belfond with

with three thousand French, were to sail in April from Cherbourg and La Hogue, and some other places in Normandy, and to land in Suffex, intending from thence to march to London. Had the winds favoured the French, they themselves would have brought the first news of the design. They were to bring only a small number of horses; for the Jacobites undertook to supply them at their landing. But there happened for a whole month together such stormy weather, and so contrary a wind, that it was not possible for them to come out of their ports.

1692.

The English and Dutch fleets happily effected a junction, and Admiral Russel defeated Tourville at La Hogue, where one and twenty of the largest ships were destroyed, without the loss of a single ship on the part of the allies. This battle, with all its circumstances, will live for ever in the minds of Britons.

Many circumstances concur to give credit to a report, that before the expedition failed, a secret treaty had been concluded between James and the French King, by which among other articles it was stipulated, that when James was restored to his kingdoms, he was to resign the sovereignty of the narrow seas, and the honours of the flag, to make no treaty or alliance without the consent of France, to keep in his pay ten thousand French, to yield up Ireland to Louis; and for the performance of these conditions the French were to have strong garrisons in Portsmouth and Plymouth, and in Dover Castle.

The

1692.

The French King had marched with a great army into Flanders, at the same time that his fleet was preparing to sail, and publicly had said, that he was going to make an end of the war. King William had passed over into Holland in the spring, and having learnt that Louis in person had invested Namur with a large army, he advanced with the forces of the confederates, in order to relieve that city, a design in which he unfortunately did not succeed. The taking of Namur was reckoned the greatest action in the French King's life; that notwithstanding such a defeat at sea, he yet supported his measures so as to make himself master of that important place in the view of a great army. Contenting himself with the glory of that exploit, he left the command to Marshal Luxembourg, and returned to Paris.

June 21.

The battle of Steenkirk was fought soon afterwards, where the confederates were defeated; but King William conducted the retreat with admirable order. The English troops covered the rear, and the French, except the honour of remaining masters of the field, had not much reason to boast of any advantage. Nothing of consequence was done upon the Rhine, and the Emperor was sufficiently employed in Hungary with the Turks. In Italy the French were obliged to relinquish all they had gained in the former year, and the Duke of Savoy at the head of twenty thousand men, chiefly Germans, marched into Dauphiny in the month of July, where the Germans pillaged and burnt near eighty villages and country houses, in retaliation

retaliation for the laying waste the Palatinate. 1692.  
 The Duke of Savoy having been seized with the small-pox, from the effects of which he remained in a languid state, the advantage obtained in that quarter was not pursued, and the country being so ruined that it was impossible to maintain the troops, he thought proper, on the setting in of winter, to retire. Whether he could have restrained the licentiousness of the German troops upon this occasion, may be a question; but surely the avenging the ravages of the Palatinate upon the innocent inhabitants of Dauphiny, was a measure impossible to be justified upon any principle of equity or policy.

King William returned to Holland early in 1693.  
 April, and fought the battle of Landen or Nerwind, the event of which was unfavourable. July 29. The French under Luxemburg were almost double his numbers, and the King was censured for fighting in those circumstances. The confederates lost about seven thousand men, sixty pieces of cannon, and nine mortars. Lieutenant-general Talmash brought off the English foot with great bravery and conduct; but some of the English cavalry, it was thought, were too precipitate in their retreat, after this battle was lost.

The King was seen every where, acting the different parts of a general and a private soldier, in the midst of the most imminent dangers. Many fell by his side. He himself received three musquet balls in his cloaths; and by his conduct as well as courage in the course of the engagement, gained

1693.

gained the respect and admiration even of his enemies. They themselves had suffered so much, that they were not able to pursue the victory, and Luxemburg continued fifteen days after the battle without attempting any thing. He then attacked Charleroy, where the garrison made so vigorous a resistance, that though they had little or no prospect of relief, yet they held out six and twenty days from the opening of the trenches, though the attack was conducted with great fury.

Upon the Rhine the Germans were so slow, and the French so forward, that the latter passed the river about the middle of May at Philippsburg, invested Heidelberg, and drove the besieged with so much fury to the castle gates, that about six hundred of their soldiers who were left without were all put to the sword; the governor was so intimidated by this act of barbarity, that he immediately capitulated. Flushed with this success, De Lorges the French commander advanced towards the Neckar, with a design to attack the Prince of Baden, who lay encamped with his army on the other side of the river, which the French twice endeavoured to pass, but were forced to abandon their enterprise with a loss of near a thousand men. Some time after, the Dauphin in person joined the army, which consisted of near seventy thousand men; and having crossed the Neckar, made a shew of attacking the Prince of Baden, but found his highness so well posted, that he repassed the river, and nothing farther was attempted that campaign.

In

1693.

In Italy, the Duke of Savoy was no sooner recovered of his long indisposition, than he put himself at the head of the army, which being of considerable strength, made the inhabitants of Dauphiny apprehensive of a second irruption into their country; but the confederates seemed now chiefly to aim at the driving of the French out of Italy, which however they could not accomplish. Whilst the allies were deliberating, Catinat, being considerably reinforced, descended into the plain. The Duke of Savoy's army was presently drawn up. Prince Eugene commanded the center. Leganez commanded the left wing, composed of the King of Spain's troops. The Duke of Savoy commanded the right. Duke Schomberg being denied the post due to him, resolved to fight on foot at the head of his own regiment. In this battle of Marfaglia, the troops fought with great courage on both sides, and his Britannic majesty's forces, which were posted in the main battle, particularly distinguished themselves: Duke Schomberg their general was desired by the Count de las Torres, after the enemy's third attack, to take upon him the command, and cause a retreat to be made by a body of foot and the right wing. But resenting the usage that he had met with, the Duke told him, that it was necessary first to have his royal highness the Duke of Savoy's order, and that till it came he would bear the enemy's fire; adding, that he found things were gone too far, that they must now either conquer or die. The confederates were at last forced to abandon the field of battle, and to retire

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1692. retire with the loss of the greatest part of their cannon, and of seven or eight thousand men. Duke Schomberg having fought with great valour, received a wound in his thigh, of which he died not many days after, to the regret of all gallant men; but if the circumstance of his conduct recorded by our annalist \* be well founded, we cannot think he acted from the most praise-worthy motives. Indeed, from his character as a worthy man, which he possessed in an eminent degree, the story is improbable; nor do we believe that he suffered his resentment, at the personal ill-treatment he had received, to influence his behaviour upon so critical an occasion as that of covering a retreat.

Our affairs at sea were not more fortunate than by land. Sir George Rooke, with twenty-three men of war and the Turkey fleet, fell in with the enemy's whole fleet under Tourville, consisting of eighty sail, within sixty leagues of Cape St. Vincent, and lost three Dutch men of war; two of which were commanded by the Captains Schreyer and Vanderpoel, who for five hours together bravely fought, and resisted first eleven, and afterwards seven of the enemy's men of war. The French proceeded to capture a number of our merchant ships in the Mediterranean; and several having sought protection under the guns of the Spanish garrison of Gibraltar, Monsieur Coetlogon, a French captain of a squadron, burnt or sunk four, and took seven of them.

\* Tindal.

But

But while France was thus triumphing every where over the allies, she had a more dangerous enemy to encounter. That enemy was famine. After all possible care to alleviate the misery, great multitudes perished for want; and the whole kingdom fell under extreme poverty. This dreadful lesson might have taught her wisdom; and seemed strongly to inculcate, that even all the pride and pomp of victory can but little counterbalance the calamity of the multitude arising from the neglected cultivation of the earth. They now tried every possible method for bringing about a general peace; or if that failed, a separate peace with some of the confederates. But they had too much exasperated the minds of mankind; there was now no disposition in any to hearken to them, nor could they engage the northern crowns to offer their mediation. The demands of the French were still so high, that there was no prospect of a just peace, and their offers were rejected. 1693.

No remarkable event took place next year in Flanders, except the surrender of Huy to King William; by which conquest, the French were expelled from the bishopric of Liege. 1694.

The French arms were more successful in Spain. Marshal Noailles penetrated into Catalonia with thirty thousand men, and forced a passage by a ford across the river Ter, notwithstanding the Spaniards were entrenched on the other side. The Spanish cavalry shewed more than ordinary valour in covering the retreat of their foot. The French laid siege to Palamos, stormed the covered way,



1694. entered the town at two narrow breaches, plundered it, and put all they met to the sword. Gironne, a well fortified town, surrendered after a short siege upon ignominious terms. Flushed with these successes, the French threatened no less than the besieging of Barcelona. The court of Madrid felt their weakness, and saw their danger so visibly; that they were forced to implore the protection of the English fleet. Admiral Russel was ordered to sail into the Mediterranean with threescore great ships. He was so long delayed by contrary winds, that the French, if they had pursued their advantages, might have completed the conquest of Catalonia. But as they were resolved not to hazard their fleet, it was brought back to Toulon, long before Admiral Russel could get into the Mediterranean. The intentions of the enemy of attacking Barcelona by sea and land were thus prevented; and Admiral Russel with his fleet wintered at Cadiz, which produced good effects. In Piedmont, a secret negociation was carrying on, which rendered the Duke of Savoy inattentive, and little was done there this year.

The Imperialists, headed by the Prince of Baden, lying encamped near Hailbron, Marshal de Lorges with the French army passed the Rhine, and marched towards them. The Prince believing the enemy had an inclination to fight, went on to meet them, but the French retreated, passed the Neckar, burnt the town of Laudenburg, and ruined the open country. This so incensed the Prince of Baden, that though he  
was

was not yet reinforced, he advanced and drove the enemy from an advantageous post at Wiselock, after a sharp rencounter. Upon this, De Lorges repassed the Rhine. The Prince soon after followed him, of which the French general was no sooner informed, than he retired to Landau. The Prince advanced, and made himself master of several small places; and it was confidently expected, that now the Germans would either force the French to a battle, or secure winter-quarters on that side the Rhine. But neither of these events happened; for in a few days the Imperialists repassed the Rhine, bringing away with them fourteen thousand head of cattle, and having destroyed a great quantity of forage in the country, and some magazines of the French. Thus ended the campaign.

1694.

King William, sensible that the power of France was on the decline, and that the allies were daily increasing in strength, resolved to undertake some considerable enterprize. And here we may be allowed to regret, that the nature and scope of this work\* will not admit of a more enlarged detail of those able and extensive operations by which the king drew all the enemy's forces to one quarter; and in the presence of the large army commanded

1695.

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\* Thus far the writer claims no further merit than that of having made a short and faithful abridgment from Tindal's Continuation of Rapin; a work, which though unadorned by any of the artificial elegancies of style, possesses the chief requisite in history, of strict impartiality, and an inviolable regard for truth.

1695.

July 3.

by Marshal Villeroi, was enabled more suddenly and completely to invest the strong city of Namur. The difficulties of the siege, and the strength of the place were great, and the French were so confident that they had rendered this town impregnable, that they placed this inscription on one of the gates, *Reddi quidem, sed vinci non potest*: intimating, that this town might indeed be restored, but not taken. But all their immense preparations, and apparently invincible obstacles, could not shake King William's resolution: they served only to make him concert effectual measures to surmount all difficulties; and to his immortal glory, the astonishment of his enemies, and the admiration of all Europe, he forced the governor Count

August 6. Guiscard to surrender the place, and to capitulate for his numerous garrison within the space of five weeks. All the troops of the different nations behaved with intrepidity; and it was remarked, that the English were the most bold and pressing, the Bavarians the most firm, and the Brandenburgers the most successful; but the British grenadiers under Lord Cutts were particularly distinguished. During the siege, Villeroi had suddenly fallen on the towns of Dixmuyde and Deynse, which had been obliged to capitulate; and the French having broken the capitulation, Marshal Boufflers was arrested by King William, until the French king sent back those garrisons.

In Italy, Casal surrendered to the arms of the Confederates. Nothing was transacted this year in Germany or Spain. We have omitted to include

clude in our short abridgment, an account of several descents projected against the coast of France. After the victory at La Hogue, about seven thousand men that were encamped near Portsmouth, were shipped there, on the 25th of July 1692, under the command of the Duke of Leinster, against St. Maloes, Brest, or Rochford; who returned, to the general disappointment of the nation, without making any attempt; their council of war having determined that something might have been tried at one of those places with probability of success, were not the season of the year so far spent as not to admit of the fleets going thither with safety. They were saved the shame of landing in England after this failure, and arrived in Flanders on the 22d of August. Two years afterwards an expedition failed against Brest, the execution of which was committed to Lieutenant-general Talmash. It proved unsuccessful; nor was it possible it could be otherwise, the design having been the town-talk of London for some months before it was put in execution. It cost the life of the brave Talmash, and of above one thousand men\*. Dieppe, Havre de Grace, and Dunkirk, were afterwards bombarded and considerably damaged. The action seemed inhuman; but the French, who had bombarded Genoa without a previous declaration of war, and who had so often put whole countries under military execution, even after they had paid the contributions which had been laid on them,

1695.

June 7,  
1694.

\* Tindal.

1695.

had no reason to complain of this way of carrying on the war, which they themselves had first begun.

The celebrated Vauban commanded in the town of Brest, which was furnished with a powerful artillery and every means of defence. Before the attack commenced, it was evidently seen that the enemy had been reinforced, and that their numbers were more than those of the assailants; yet the General could not be persuaded, by the unanimous voice of the council of war, to relinquish the design. He seems to have been less afraid of death, than of the petulance of ill-founded ridicule; and possibly the failure of the former expedition, caused this officer to sacrifice his own life, and that of many other brave men, without necessity or use, to the want of due discrimination in the circumstances.

At this time, there was a great deal to fear from the discontented at home; for while the nation was involved in a burthenome war with a formidable monarch, who, having espoused the quarrel of the abdicated king, was endeavouring to forward his own ambitious views, and those of his people, under that pretence, a considerable number, partly from principle and partly from interest, were impatient of their deliverance; which, according to their opinion or discourse, was accomplished by unjustifiable means. The body of the nation were however satisfied with the Revolution. Many dark and secret practices were certainly at work, which were

were resumed and laid aside at different intervals during the remainder of this reign; and particularly towards the end of that which followed. Of such practices, the most incontrovertible evidences have been discovered to the world, at the distance of a century; but many accusations have been brought forward against the highest characters, resting upon little better evidence than that of Barillon the French ambassador; who was entrusted with immense sums by France, in order to corrupt our councils and parliament.

The French, after the taking of Namur, grew very doubtful of the issue of the war; and could not but foresee, that if King William could appear in the field next summer in the same circumstances as he did the last, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to oppose his arms. To prevent this, they had two things to wish and promote; one was to embroil the affairs of the nation, by creating animosities at home; the other, to ruin its credit, on pretence of the impaired state of the silver coin. We shall not here detain the reader with an account of their secret machinations; which, by the well-timed vigilance of government, were happily detected, and some of the conspirators suffered the punishment due to their crimes.

Disappointed in these expectations, France was very uneasy under so long and so destructive a war. The country was exhausted, and they had neither men nor money; their trade was sunk to nothing, and public credit was lost. In these circumstances,  
had

1696. had England acted with perseverance, France might have been humbled; but many were discontented at the continuance of the war; alleging, that although the rest of the confederacy furnished their quota of troops, yet, that England and Holland alone defrayed the expences of the war. The summer passed over, both in Flanders and on the Rhine, without any action. Next year, the French took Barcelona. King William had no money to pay his army, so they were in great distress, which they bore with wonderful patience; and though it was plain by the event, that the nation had treasure enough to support a war, yet the ways of coming at it were grown very difficult. Great taxes had necessarily been laid upon the people; of which the discontented took advantage, and represented every where, that the government must of necessity sink under its own weight; and that these heavy taxes, by reducing the nation to poverty, would inevitably prove its destruction. They never ceased declaiming on this popular subject, in hopes of making the people weary of a government, which was represented as so burthensome; and at last, of persuading them rather to let in the deluge, than be at the expence of maintaining their banks. That numerous and wealthy body of men, constituting the trading part of the nation, had become impatient of the temporary interruption of their commerce; an impatience which was the cause of a new war in less than three years. Peace was now concluded at Ryswick, as if we had been unwilling to take advantage of the exhausted

1697.  
Sept. 20.

exhausted state of France, and chose to give her time for binding up her wounds, and collecting new vigour and resources, to swell the glory of the triumph, which, after new exertions, and a farther expenditure of blood and treasure, Great Britain was at length destined to accomplish. 1697.

Even at the moment of signing the treaty, France was meditating new scenes of perfidy. The King of Spain's illness, and the succession to his dominions, to which the French king had an eye, was the principal cause of his desiring peace. He knew, that as long as the war continued, and the grand confederacy remained entire, his designs could not be accomplished; and therefore he hastened the conclusion of the treaty, that he might have his hands free to fall upon Spain and Flanders the moment his Catholic Majesty died, and before a new league could be formed against him. Accordingly, as the King of Spain's sickness increased, the French king offered advantageous terms; and would have offered still more, if all the allies had been of the Emperor's mind, to require a greater number of restitutions. As for England and Holland, they took no other concern in the treaty, than to secure their allies, to settle a barrier in the Netherlands, and to procure the recognition of William's title. The French gained nothing by a war which they had most perfidiously begun; and King William had the glory at least of having stopped the progress of their arms. Some time afterwards, as one of the French king's officers was conducting Mr. Prior,



1697. Prior, secretary to the British embassy, through the apartments of Versailles, among other curiosities he shewed him those fine paintings of Le Brun, which represented the French king's victories; and asked him, whether King William's actions were also to be seen in his palace? "No," "Sir," replied Mr. Prior, "the monuments of my master's actions are to be seen every where but "in his own house."

After the peace of Ryfwick, the King of Spain unexpectedly recovered, to the great joy of France, who was not yet in a condition to enforce her designs of universal dominion. But two years afterwards, he relapsed into a dangerous state of health. 1700. Louis found means to enter into a treaty of partition of the Spanish dominions, with some of the chief potentates of the late confederacy, and secretly to shew that treaty to the King of Spain; which so exasperated the feeble monarch, that the French emissaries found means to mould his feelings to their purposes. The Emperor also loudly declared against it; that he was astonished any disposition should be made of the Spanish monarchy during the life, and without the consent, of the present possessor; and that, contrary to justice and decorum, himself, who was the rightful heir to the whole, was to be compelled to accept of a part within three months, under the penalty of forfeiting his share to a person not yet named.

In Spain, the mismanagements of the present reign, and the rapacious and violent carriage of the Queen

Queen Mariana, had entirely alienated the hearts of the whole nation from the Germans; and they were disposed to receive with open arms a grandson of Louis, provided they were assured of never becoming a province to France. Nor did the reflection, that a Prince of the Austrian line must owe his chief support to heretics, carry a small weight with it in the minds of a superstitious people.

17co.  


When the secret of the partition was divulged in England, it was presently written and talked into an unpopular measure; though visibly the only one that could be taken to prevent a new war, in which the nation then seemed unwilling or unable to engage.

King William had long foreseen the approaching storm, and had always considered it essentially necessary to keep up a strong naval and land force, being apprehensive that the circumstance of England being entirely disarmed, would afford too great a temptation to the ambition of France to break treaties and to forget engagements. The ministers represented to him, that the parliament would probably agree to the keeping up a land force of ten or twelve thousand men, but would object to a larger establishment. The king, who certainly understood the politics of Europe, justly thought that so small a force would be of little avail, therefore would not authorise his ministers to make the proposal. The parliament, so far from agreeing with the prudent intention of the king, ordered a bill to be brought in for reducing the

1700.




the army. The king was greatly hurt at a measure which bore not only the appearance of slight to himself, but of indifference to the national honour and interest. He was more particularly hurt at being obliged to send away his Dutch guards; a regiment which had faithfully attended his person from his earliest years, and to which, besides innumerable other services, he considered himself as much indebted, for greatly contributing to gain his victory at the Boyne. In his deep chagrin he had serious thoughts of abandoning the government, and had actually composed a speech for the occasion. Finding that both houses concurred in the same opinion as to the disbanding of the army, he gave effectual orders for reducing it to seven thousand men, to be maintained in England under the name of guards and garrisons. But on account of the superior utility of cavalry upon any sudden exigency, the king took care that of the seven thousand, four thousand were horse and dragoons. The regiments were also reduced to so small a number of soldiers, that it was said we had now an army of officers; but this model was much approved by proper judges, as the best into which so small a number could have been brought.

All Europe was alarmed with the accounts of the desperate state of the King of Spain's health. When the news came to the court of France, that he was in the last agony, De Torcy, the French secretary of state, was sent to the Earl of Manchester, the British ambassador, desiring him to communicate the intelligence to his master,

master, and to signify to him that the French king hoped that he would be prepared to execute the treaty of partition ; and in his whole discourse he expressed a fixed resolution in the French councils to adhere to it. A few days after, the news of the King of Spain's death arrived, which happened on the 1st of November ; and a will was produced, dated October the 2d, declaring Philip Duke of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin, the universal heir of the Spanish monarchy. 1700.

The Pensionary, or President of the States of the United Provinces, made strong, but fruitless remonstrances ; and a long answer to their memorial was dispatched to all the courts in Europe, with the King of France's resolution ; affirming, that he had considered chiefly what was the principal design of the treaty, namely to maintain the peace of Europe ; and therefore to pursue this, he departed from the words of the treaty, but adhered to the spirit and intent of it. This infamous excuse for so notorious a breach of faith, seemed to be an equivocation of so gross a nature, that it looked like the invention of a Jesuit confessor, adding impudence to perjury.

During these transactions, the Spaniards seeing themselves threatened with a war from the Emperor, who declared both against the partition treaty and the will, and apprehending that the empire, together with England and the United Provinces, might be engaged to join in the war, gave themselves up to France. Hereupon both the Spanish Netherlands and the Duchy of Milan received the

1700. the French garrisons. The French fleet came to  
 Cadiz, and a squadron was sent to the West Indies; so that the whole Spanish empire fell without a blow under the power of France. This accession of dominion was the more alarming, on account of the Duke of Burgundy having no children; a circumstance that afforded a probability of the succession of the King of Spain to the crown of France.

King William, upon the news of the French king's resolution to accept the will, and to recede from the treaty, was full of indignation to find himself so much deceived; but he appeared perfectly the contrary; in so much, that his cold and reserved manner upon so high a provocation, made some conclude he was in secret engagements with France; and that he was resolved to acknowledge the new King of Spain, and not to engage in another war. This seemed so different from his own inclinations, and from all the former parts of his life, that many concluded it was owing to his ill state of health, the swelling of his legs being much increased; and that this might have such effects as to make him less warm and active, less disposed to involve himself in new troubles, and that he might think it too inconsiderate a thing to enter into a new war that was not likely to end soon, when he felt himself in a declining state of health. But the true secret of this unaccountable behaviour in the king proceeded from a very different cause.

Some

1700.

Some of the most considerable of the English having been disappointed in those rewards and employments to which they thought themselves entitled from their merits and services at the revolution, had entered into deep designs against William's government; who being informed of the measures in which they were engaged, formed his resolution after much deliberation. Believing they had acted from motives of ambition, rather than from personal disaffection, (which appeared afterwards to have actually been the case,) he not only forgave them, but put them in possession of all the great offices of state. This account of Colin Earl of Balcarres was afterwards confirmed to his son James by Lord Bolingbroke and Lord Stair; with this farther circumstance, that Lord Sunderland was sent by the king with the seals of secretary of state to the Duke of Shrewsbury, head of the party; who told him, that the king was fully informed of all he was doing, yet, not only forgave him, but sent him the seals as secretary of state. He declined accepting them till he had consulted his friends. He was told there was no time for hesitation, and that he was either to accept the same instantly, or a colonel of the guards was attending to carry him to the Tower. The last alternative he did not chuse \*. Much were it to be wished, for the dignity of our country, that King William had from the beginning trusted

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\* Manuscript Memoirs of James Earl of Balcarres.

1700.

those men, to whom in part he owed his elevation, and who most probably were in that instance influenced by virtuous and patriotic motives: but afterwards, finding they had not the confidence of the king, that his health was declining, that he had no issue, and that the offspring of the Princess Anne had all been cut off in early youth; began, in contradiction to all their former principles, to turn their views to the event of William's death, and the restoration of James.

A design was laid in the House of Commons to open the session with an address to the king, that he would acknowledge the King of Spain. The matter was so far concerted, that they had agreed upon the words of the vote, and seemed not to doubt of the concurrence of the house. But Mr. Monckton opposed it with great heat, and among other things said, that if this vote were carried, he should expect that the next vote would be for recognizing the pretended Prince of Wales.

In the House of Lords an address was voted, requesting his majesty to engage in such alliances abroad as he should think proper for preserving the balance of Europe, assuring him, that they would readily concur with whatever should be conducive to the honour and safety of England, the preservation of the Protestant religion, and the peace of Europe. A similar address was voted in the House of Commons.

1701.

The French, considering the demands of the English and Dutch to be greater than they ought to have been, set all their engines at work to involve the English

lish in such contentions as should disable them from attending to foreign affairs, as well as to make the rest of Europe conclude that nothing considerable was to be expected from their influence. It is certain that great sums came over this winter from France; the packet-boat seldom arrived without ten thousand louis d'ors; it often brought more. The nation was filled with them, and in six months time, a million of guineas was coined out of them. Some merchants endeavoured to account for it by the balance of trade; but upon the departure of the French Embassador a very visible alteration ensued; for which reason it was concluded, that great remittances had been made to that minister for the purposes of corruption. Certainly considerable dissensions appeared in the parliament, but the honest part of the nation prevailed.

King William endeavoured to conceal the decay of his constitution, even from his most confidential favourites, lest the report should have been fatal to the intended confederacy.

He gave the command of the British troops that were ordered to Holland to the Earl of Marlborough. That nobleman had been restored to favour some years before, and had been appointed governor to the Prince of Gloucester. "Make him but like yourself," said King William, "and I cannot desire more:" but that promising young prince soon after died.

It was thought by some that the king seemed this winter in a fair way of recovery; but as he was riding from Kensington, and putting his horse



1702. to the gallop, the horse fell with him and broke his  
 collar-bone. After languishing for three weeks, his  
 March 8. enfeebled constitution sank under the accident. He  
 expired in the 52d year of his age and 14th of  
 his reign; and the best panegyric on his military  
 fame, was the very general and indecent joy expressed  
 in France upon his death.

Queen Anne immediately sent the Earl of Marl-  
 borough to Holland, in the character of Ambassador  
 and Plenipotentiary; for even at this time his repu-  
 tation was eminent, not only as a soldier, but as one  
 who knew the arts of living in a court beyond any  
 other man. He had a noble and graceful ap-  
 pearance, a solid and clear understanding, with a  
 constant presence of mind. He caressed all people  
 with an obliging deportment, and was always ready  
 to exert himself in favour of those whom it was  
 his duty or interest to serve. His stay in Holland,  
 though but for a few days, was to good purpose.  
 May 4. The declaration of war against France and Spain was  
 solemnly proclaimed before the gates of St. James's  
 Palace, and in the other usual places, as it was on  
 the same day by the Emperor and the States General.  
 The first step that was taken was by the House of  
 Hanover against the Duke of Wolfenbuttle, who,  
 in opposition to that House, entered into the in-  
 terests of France. The old Duke of Zell, and  
 his nephew the Elector of Brunswick, entered  
 his country with an army, while his troops  
 were dispersed. In conjunction with him, the  
 Duke of Saxe Gotha had entered into engagements  
 with France; but they were both forced to accede  
 to

to the common interests of the Empire. All Germany was now united, except the two brothers of Bavaria. The Elector of Cologne put Liege and all the places he possessed upon the Rhine, except Bonne, into the hands of the French. France also found means to strengthen her system by an alliance with Sweden and the Duke of Savoy; and the Spanish Monarchy was entirely under her direction; so that the confederates seemed to begin the war under many and great disadvantages. The Emperor had sent his veteran troops under Prince Eugene to keep the French at bay in Italy. But by the wise and steady counsels of England, the prudent management of their public treasury, the just measures concerted by Marlborough, the bravery and patient resolution of the confederate troops, and the experience and good conduct of their commanders, early and reasonable hopes were entertained that the cause of the allies would in the end prove successful.

1702.

Marlborough left England on the 12th of May, and on his arrival at the Hague was appointed Generalissimo of the Dutch forces. Before his arrival Keiserswaert was besieged by the Prince of Nassau Saarburch, one of the Emperor's generals; and after an obstinate defence the French garrison capitulated.

June 15.

The French had made an attempt upon Nimeguen; but the Earl of Athlone came to its assistance, though with numbers very inferior to those of the enemy; but getting under the cannon of the place, the Burghers signified themselves upon

1702.

this occasion; for though they had not a gunner in the town, they managed the artillery with great success, and the parties that were engaged against the Earl of Athlone were defeated in every action.

The French army in Germany being but weak, and drawing together slowly under the command of Catinat, the Germans had an opportunity of laying siege to Landau\*. This was the great magazine, where the French, after they had plundered most of the towns of the palatinate, laid up the booty, all which was burnt by an accidental fire. The siege was stopped for some weeks for want of ammunition, but at last the city surrendered. Prince Lewis of Baden had carried on the siege, but the King of the Romans, the Emperor's eldest son, arrived in the camp before it was ended.

This was the state of the campaign when Marlborough arrived. Having taken the field on the eighth of July, with about sixty thousand men, sixty-two cannon, eight mortars and hawbitz, and four-and-twenty pontoons, and finding his force superior to that of the Duke of Burgundy, he passed the Maese, and encamped near Grave, within two leagues and a half of the enemy who had entrenched themselves between Goch and Genep. The Earl of Marlborough was desirous of a decisive action, for which end the whole army was ordered to their

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\* A strong city upon the confines of the palatinate, once Imperial; but yielded to the French by the treaty of Munster.

arms

arms early the next morning. But the Dutch were afraid to put things to such a hazard, and would not consent to it. According to the constitution of the United Provinces, the States assumed the power of sending deputies to represent them in the field, and even to controul the Stadtholder or General of the Union in his military operations.

1702.  
Aug. 3.

Those who pretended to be judges thought that if Marlborough's advice had been followed, matters might have been brought to a happy decision, and the rather as it afterwards appeared that little more than half of the French army had reached their camp, greatly fatigued by an almost continual march of two days and two nights, and in the greatest consternation. The Duke of Burgundy, finding himself obliged to retreat, thought this was not suitable to his dignity, and therefore left Marshal Boufflers to command, and their first campaign ended very ingloriously.

The Dutch, who were so lately in a state of alarm, upon the retreat of their army under the cannon of Nimeguen before Marlborough's arrival, had now the satisfaction of seeing the French fly in their turn; and the deputies represented, that it was for the advantage of Holland to dispossess the enemy of the places they held in Spanish Guelderland, which interrupted the free navigation of the Maese, and in a manner blocked up the important town of Maastricht. He therefore disposed all things for the siege of Venlo. In the mean time, General Schultz was ordered to re-  
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1702:

duce the town and castle of Wertz, which capitulated after a short resistance.

On the 7th of September the trenches were opened on both sides the Maese; and the town of Venlo surrendered on the 25th of the same month, after Fort St. Michael had been stormed and taken by the English, under the command of Lord Cutts, who with several other officers of that nation, particularly the young Earl of Huntingdon, shewed much bravery on that hazardous occasion. Ruremonde, the second city of Guelderland, was next invested, and after a very vigorous siege surrendered.

Marshal Boufflers thought it high time to provide for the security of Liege. When the confederates came before it, they found the suburbs of St. Walburgh set on fire by the French garrison, who had retired, part into the citadel, and part into the Chartreuse. Six days after, the trenches were opened against the great citadel, which was taken by storm, notwithstanding De Violaine the governor five days before, upon a summons to surrender, sent the Earl of Marlborough word, "that it would be time enough to think of that six weeks hence." The assailants having exerted great courage in this attack, put most of the garrison to the sword, and gained great honour and a considerable booty; for there were three hundred thousand florins in gold and silver, and notes for one million two hundred thousand florins upon substantial merchants at Liege, which were all accepted and turned into ready money. This victory was soon after completed by the surrender of the

the Chartreuse, and the garrison was escorted, according to capitulation, to Antwerp.

1702.

Upon the breaking up of the army in November, an accident happened that had nearly lost all the advantages and honour gained in this campaign. The Earl of Marlborough was taken prisoner in a boat endeavouring in the night to pass the town of Gueldres, the only possession left to the French in Spanish Guelderland; but with great presence of mind he produced a passport which had been obtained for his brother some time before, and after being a prisoner about four hours, and plundered of his baggage, he was permitted to pursue his journey.

In Germany, the Elector of Bavaria declared for France\*, after having surprised Ulm. The neighbouring circles were so much alarmed, that they called away their troops from the Prince of Baden to their own defence, by which means his army was much diminished; but with the troops that were left him, he endeavoured to cut off the communication between Strasbourg and Ulm, the French line of operation between the Rhine and the Danube. The French having taken the little town of Neuenberg on the Rhine, the Prince

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\* This Prince possessed many amiable qualities, was highly esteemed by his subjects, and had acquired great military reputation; but he had suffered the French to persuade him that he was more powerful than all the Princes of Germany, and he determined to compel them to revolt from the common cause of the Empire. He had been confirmed in these resolutions by a personal quarrel with the King of the Romans.

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1702. of Baden became uneasy for Brisac, especially as his force was so much weakened by detachments, that he had not above eight thousand men in his camp. Marshal Villars advanced from Strasbourg, and a battle was fought near Friedlinguen. The French were much superior in numbers, and in truth gained the victory; yet the Prince of Baden thought proper to lay claim to it.

Oct. 14.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that such a victory as this could be attended with few consequences, nor could we decide which party gained it, had not the French next day taken the fort of Friedlinguen, and proceeded to make some farther conquests. The Prince of Baden having been reinforced, advanced against Villars, who did not think fit to engage again.

The latter end of October Count Tallard advanced with eighteen thousand men, and took Treves and Traerbach, which latter place made a stout resistance. On the other side, the hereditary Prince of Hesse Cassel, marching from Liege with nine thousand Hessians, and finding that the French had possessed themselves of Zinch, Lintz, Brisac, and Andernach, retook those places.

King Philip of Spain having taken the resolution of going to Italy to possess himself of Naples, and to put an end to the war in Lombardy, wrote to the Duke of Vendosme not to fight Prince Eugene till he could join him; but though the prince was miserably abandoned by the court of Vienna, owing as it was thought to French corruption, yet he managed the force he had with such skill

skill and conduct, that with five-and-twenty thousand men he gained the victory of Luzzara over the French and Spanish army of forty thousand. They rallied several times by favour of the ground and superiority of numbers; but the Imperialists encamped upon the field of battle, and had various other trophies of victory. King Philip returned to Spain at the end of an inglorious campaign, when the grandees began to be disgusted at seeing their affairs wholly conducted by French counsels.

1702.  
Aug. 15.

The French tried this summer all possible means to engage the Turks in a new war with the Emperor; and it was believed that the Grand Vizier was entirely gained, though the Mufti and all who had any credit were against it. But the Grand Vizier being strangled, the design was prevented.

The confederate fleet of fifty sail having fourteen thousand forces on board, formed an expedition against Cadiz under the Duke of Ormond. A squadron was detached under Sir John Munden against a French fleet under M. De Casse. Though he came up with this fleet, and was superior in force, yet he neither hindered the French from getting into the Groyne, nor fought them when there. He was acquitted by a Court Martial on the ground of error of judgment; the English nation was clamorous, and said he deserved to die: but the Queen only dismissed him from the service. Sir George Rooke sailed on the first of July from St. Helens, and anchored two leagues from the city of Cadiz on the 12th of August. He soon found that he had false accounts of the state of the place, and that the garrison was much stronger,



1702.

stronger, and the fortifications in a much better condition than had been represented. The English landed and plundered Fort St. Mary's; and as the Duke of Ormond had published a manifesto, inviting the Spaniards to submit to the Emperor as their true and lawful master, and had offered his protection to all that came in; this conduct appeared but a bad commentary upon that text. It certainly was a point of the greatest importance to insinuate to the Spaniards by his proceedings, that he came not as an enemy to Spain, but to deliver them from the dominion of France. To compensate in some measure for this disgrace upon our arms, Sir George Rooke having accidentally obtained information of the arrival in the harbour of Vigo of the French squadron and Spanish galleons, resolved to attempt the destroying of them. Accordingly the fleet came to an anchor on the 11th of October against that place, almost unperceived by reason of the hazy weather. The Duke of Ormond having landed 2500 men, ordered the grenadiers to advance to the fort at the entrance of the harbour, when the commander, M. Sorel, despairing of holding the place, attempted to fight his way through the English sword in hand; but the grenadiers rushing in, made themselves masters of the castle and garrison of three hundred men, and before they attacked the fort, they had taken a battery of thirty-eight cannon.

The fleet having forced through a boom by cutting it, for the wind was not sufficiently strong for the ships to break it by the force of their way, and

1702.

and having got rid of some fire ships which had almost been fatal to Vice Admiral Hopson's ship, the enemy began to destroy their vessels ; but the English found means to preserve several. They took and brought home four ships, carrying two hundred and eighty-four guns. The Dutch took six carrying three hundred and forty-two guns. Six galleons were taken by the English, and five taken and six sunk by the Dutch. Without including galleons, there were taken or destroyed twenty-one ships, carrying nine hundred and sixty guns. There was a quantity of merchandize and money on board, most of which the enemy themselves destroyed ; a considerable booty however was made. The Spaniards appeared at some distance in a great body, but did not offer to enter into any action with the Duke of Ormond. And it appeared that the resentments of that proud nation, which was now governed by French counsels, were so high, that they would not incur any danger or trouble even to save their own fleet when it was in such hands. The fleet returned to England, and the Duke of Ormond was received with great marks of favour by the Queen and the loud acclamations of the people, the success at Vigo having silenced the clamours occasioned by the miscarriage at Cadiz ; but several officers were put under arrest for having, by their example, promoted and encouraged the plunder. Sir Henry Bellasis, the Lieutenant-general who commanded the troops, was found guilty and dismissed the service.

The French under Marshal Villars passed the Rhine, and invested Fort Kehl, opposite Strasbourg, which

1703.

**1703.** **March 9.** which was not well provided with ammunition ; so that when a general storm was preparing, the governor capitulated ; and the garrison, consisting of two thousand four hundred men, were permitted to retire to Philipsburg. Count Stirum, one of the Emperor's generals, defeated a party of Bavarians, and took Neumark and Amberg, cities of Bavaria. Count Shlick, another of the Emperor's generals, broke into the Bavarian lines by way of Saltzburg, defeated the militia, and made himself master of Riedt and other small places. The Elector informed of this, advanced with twelve thousand men, and entirely defeated the Imperialists in the battle of Skardigen ; and being informed that the head quarters of the Saxon troops were not above two leagues farther, he marched directly to them, and entirely defeated them. The Bavarians two days afterwards took Neuburg on the Inn, and the garrison was conducted to Passau. The Imperialists, after some farther efforts, in which the Prince of Brandenburg Anspach was slain, retreated. The Elector of Bavaria, notwithstanding his solemn assurances that he would not molest the city and Imperial Diet of Ratisbon, suddenly advanced and took possession of that place. The Empire being thus in a declining condition, Marshal Villars, in consequence of positive orders from the King, and with a view to join the Elector of Bavaria, endeavoured to force the Prince of Baden's lines at Stollhoffen ; but although he was reinforced by Marshal Tallard, and though his army was more than double the Prince's numbers, yet the French attack was repulsed with great loss, chiefly by the

**April 8.**

the courage of the Dutch. Villars, however, perceiving that the passes through the Black Forest were but ill guarded, from the supposition that it was impassable in that wet season, overcame all difficulties, penetrated that way, and joined the Elector near Dutlingen.

1703.

While the French succeeded thus in Germany, the affairs of the confederates upon the Lower Rhine and in Flanders were in a more prosperous situation. Rhinberg was blockaded by the Prussian forces, and surrendered. The Duke of Marlborough caused Bonn to be invested, which capitulated after a very gallant defence. While the greatest part of the confederate army was employed at Bonn, the French fell suddenly upon Tongeren, where the battalions of Elliot and Portmore were quartered, who, after a brave resistance of twenty-eight hours, were forced to surrender. The Duke of Marlborough having joined the army, the French abandoned Tongeren, after blowing up the walls and tower. The French drew up in order of battle; but as soon as their baggage had been drawn off, they retired. Marlborough determined to force their lines near Antwerp, and appointed Baron Spaar and General Coehorn to command detachments to come upon their flanks, while the main body under Opdam menaced their center. Spaar made a feint as if he was marching to Bruges; but returning, advanced directly to the lines, and forced them after an obstinate contest: General Coehorn also forced them at another point. The confederates hoped that Antwerp was about  
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April 24.

May 16.

1703.  
June 28.

to fall into their hands, but met with a small check at Eckeren. A detachment of the army commanded by the Dutch General Opdam was suddenly attacked and thrown into confusion, on a Sunday, while the Dutch were at their devotions. Opdam fled from the field, and wrote a letter which alarmed the States; but after he was gone, the Dutch rallied, and obliged the French to retire. In return, an attack was projected upon the French, who were at this time commanded by Marshal Villeroi, and had encamped at St. Job. The Dutch General Schlangenberg, with a large corps, marched all night; and in the morning the Duke having advanced, fired four cannon as a signal to begin the attack; but Villeroi set fire to his camp, and retired within his lines. A large party advanced to reconnoitre them, and the English royal regiment of dragoons drove in the enemy's cavalry, which gave ample opportunity of seeing all that was necessary. The Duke formed his dispositions of attack, but the Dutch deputies interfered. Huy, Limburg, and Gueldres were then taken by the confederates.

The affairs of the allies did not succeed so well upon the Upper Rhine. The Elector, soon after he was joined by Villars, marched into the Tyrol, and took possession of Inspruck. The Emperor's forces were so broken into small armies, that he had not one good army any where, and many aspersions were cast upon the Prince of Baden by those who were not competent judges; for his army was both weak and ill furnished in all respects. The Duke of Vendosme was ordered to march

1703.

march from the Milanese into the Tyrol, and join the Elector of Bavaria. Had this junction been effected, the ruin of the House of Austria would probably have followed. But the peasants in the Tyrol rose, and so much incommoded the Elector's quarters that he thought proper to retire, so that the Duke de Vendosme came too late. To make amends for this, the Elector resolved to seize on Augsburg, but was prevented by the Prince of Baden, who had crossed the Danube, and encamped near that city. He and Villars retired before the Prince; Villars on the north, and Count D'Arco, the Elector's general, on the south side of that river. The latter having crossed the Lech abandoned Friedburg, which place was surrendered to the Imperialists. The Prince detached Count Stirum to the same side of the river with the Elector, who laid a plan with Villars to attack him. Villars crossed at Donawert. They were to attack Count Stirum upon both flanks, while the Marquis D'Usson, upon a certain signal, was to advance from Lavingen, and fall upon him in the rear. Stirum, as soon as he heard the firing of six guns; comprehended the meaning of the signal, and instantly marched and attacked the Marquis before the Elector and the Marshal could come up, and entirely broke and defeated his cavalry, taking twenty standards. D'Usson's foot would have been all killed or taken had not the Elector and the Marshal come up. The numbers were then very disproportionate; Stirum probably did not know that Villars had crossed the Danube; and after some resistance,

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Sept. 20.

1703. the Imperialists were totally defeated, losing, besides their cannon and baggage, above twelve thousand men out of twenty. The French call this the first battle of Hochstett. It is difficult from the variety of accounts to ascertain whether Stirum was ever upon the same side of the river with the Prince of Baden, or whether he was not rather advancing in order to effect a junction. Augsburg was then taken by the Elector; and to add to the Emperor's misfortunes, a rebellion broke out in Hungary. Upon the Upper Rhine Count Tallard and the Duke of Burgundy laid siege to Brisac, where the operations were conducted by the celebrated Vauban. The Governor surrendered in fifteen days, and was sentenced to be beheaded. Landau was also besieged by the French. The Prince of Hesse marched from the Netherlands to relieve the place. Mons. Pracontal with ten thousand men followed him from that country, and joined Tallard before the confederates had any intelligence. They had prepared all things to attack the French in their lines, and learnt very unexpectedly that they were marching towards them. The battle of Spirebach was fought, the Prince of Hesse was defeated, and Landau surrendered. The Duke of Savoy apprehending the danger he should incur if France should accomplish her purpose of extending her dominions, offered to return to the confederacy. The French, suspecting his designs, persuaded the Elector of Bavaria to write to him, and pretend that he severely repented having put himself into their hands. The Duke, suspecting nothing, in his answer

Nov. 4.

1703.

answer frankly acknowledged his designs, and encouraged the Elector to follow his plan. The French seized the messenger, and the Duke of Vendosme was ordered privately to disarm the troops of Savoy that were in his army, being twenty-two thousand. This was accordingly done before any suspicion could arise. The officers were imprisoned, and the soldiers were compelled to enlist in French regiments. The French Ambassador behaved in a most arrogant manner at Turin, in the presence-chamber, to the Duke. The whole Court resented the affront, and swore to live and die with their Sovereign. The confederates determined to send him every aid they could. Count Staremberg, one of the Emperor's generals, sent him a detachment of one thousand five hundred horse, commanded by Visconti, the greater part of which was cut off; but he himself, in consequence of farther orders from the Emperor, followed with fifteen thousand men from the Secchia, through the enemy's country. This march is supposed to have been the best planned, and the best executed of almost any during that war. He marched from the Modenese in the worst season of the year, by roads that seemed impassable, having in many places the French both before and behind him. He joined the Duke of Savoy at Canelli, which saved his country. Portugal also acceded to the confederacy, upon condition that the Arch-duke Charles, second son of the Emperor, should be declared King of Spain; and it was certain that a large party in that country were decidedly favourable to the House of Austria, in preference to that of Bourbon;



1703.

bon; also that the whole nation was averse to becoming a province either to France or to the Empire, and chose to have a King of their own.

Nov. 27.

About this time a dreadful storm happened at sea, and had it not been a spring tide, the consequences might have been fatal to the English, as nearly their whole navy was out of port. The loss was however very considerable. Fourteen men of war were cast away, many of them at anchor, and some of them without their complement of men on board. One thousand five hundred seamen perished; but few merchant-men were lost. An event almost as much to be regretted, happened in the West Indies. Admiral Bembow fell in with a French squadron near Carthage, on the 19th of August 1702. In a running battle, which was renewed at intervals for several days, the enemy, though inferior in numbers and strength, made a safe retreat. On the 6th of October, a commission was issued for the trial of Captains Kirby and Wade. They were found guilty of cowardice, breach of orders, and neglect of duty; and being sent to England under sentence, they suffered death at Plymouth; orders having been sent to all the ports that no delay in their execution should take place at whatever port they arrived. Admiral Bembow died of his wounds, expressing, in his last moments, his conviction of their treachery or cowardice.

Dec. 26.

The new King of Spain, Charles the Third, came to England, and was treated with great magnificence. His manners were noble and

obliging.

obliging. At his first meeting with the Duke of Marlborough, he took his sword from his side and gave it to the duke, saying, "I have only my cloak and my sword; the latter may be of some use to your grace, and I hope you will not think it the worse for my having worn it one day." 1703.

Thus stood affairs at the end of the Duke of Marlborough's second campaign.

The affairs of the Empire were in the beginning of the third campaign in a desperate condition. The Emperor was reduced to the last extremity. The Elector of Bavaria was master of the Danube as far as Passau, and the rebellion in Hungary was making formidable progress. The Emperor was not in a condition to maintain a defensive war long on both sides, nor was he able to make any opposition at all against them, should they ever come to act in concert. Vienna was in apparent danger of being besieged on both sides, and was not capable of making a long resistance; so that the house of Austria seemed lost beyond all prospect of recovery. Prince Eugene wisely proposed that the Emperor should implore the protection of the Queen of Great Britain, which was agreed to; and Count Wratislaw managed the affair at the court of England with great application and secrecy. The Duke of Marlborough saw the necessity of undertaking the Emperor's relief, and resolved to use all possible endeavours to put it in execution. When he went into Holland in the winter, he proposed it to the Pensionary only, or, as others say, also to one of the Deputies. 1704.

1704. design was approved of, but it was not advisable to propose it to the States, since at that time many would not have thought their country safe if their army should be sent so far from them. Nothing could be long a secret which was proposed to such an assembly, agitated by frequent disagreement, and mutual distrust; whereas the main hope of succeeding in this design lay in the secrecy with which it was conducted. Therefore, under the pretence of carrying the war into France by the river Moselle, every thing was prepared that was necessary for executing the true design.

The success of the two last campaigns having rendered the confederates masters of the Maese and Spanish Guelderland, such a strong barrier had been formed on the side of Flanders, that a small number of forces were deemed sufficient to protect the frontiers of the States. Four corps were appointed for that purpose, under the command of General Auverkerque; but three of the seven States objected to the measure of marching the troops even to the Moselle.

The British, Dutch, and Danish forces, having been drawn together from their winter-quarters in the Netherlands, had formed a camp under General Cadogan at Mæstricht. The Duke of Marlborough arrived there on the 10th of May, and the troops marched the day following. They moved through Bedburg, Kerpenord, and Kalfecken. Here the Duke received an express from the Prince of Baden with some intercepted letters; by which it appeared, that the French intended to  
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force their passage from Strasbourg through the Black Forest, and after joining the Bavarians, to march directly to Vienna. About the same time, the Duke received advice from the Netherlands, that the court of France had sent positive orders to Villeroi to march towards the Moselle with five-and-thirty battalions, and six-and-forty squadrons; being still firmly persuaded that the Duke would act on that side. He some days afterwards received farther intelligence that the recruits for the French army in Bavaria had joined the Elector at Dillinghen; but learning that Marshal Tallard had returned from thence with a corps to the Rhine, he concluded that the enemy had not yet penetrated into his real design. 1704.

When the army had moved two days through the territories of Cologne, the people of Treves and Mentz were in the utmost consternation; but pursuing their march, they arrived at Coblentz, on the fourteenth day. They had suffered no interruption or delay. Parties of dragoons had been sent out to bring in cattle, corn, and forage, from the neighbouring countries, and to defend those who were incumbered with the baggage and ammunition. The Duke here formed a junction with the Hanoverian and Hessian forces, who had a camp at Coblentz; and as that city stands at the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle, the enemy thought they should now certainly discover the object he had in view. In the mean time, the Emperor commanded the States of Franconia and Swabia to recommend the confederate forces to

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1704. their countrymen, and to supply them with all necessaries. The Duke's forces amounted to forty thousand, whereof fourteen thousand three hundred and four effective men were of the British troops.

The transports having come up the Rhine to Coblenz, the guns and baggage were immediately embarked; and the Duke of Marlborough, for the sake of expedition and convenience, marched in two columns, one on each side of the Rhine, the vessels moving between them; on board of which were also such sick or wearied soldiers as were not able to endure the march. When the confederates had drawn up their ships beyond the Mouse Tower, Bacharach, and Bingen, there opened to them a large plain, where the whole army was seen at one point of view, making a glorious appearance, in new and handsome clothing, and with arms highly polished. Marshal Villeroi in the mean time being in great suspense, lost by delay the opportunity of attacking the confederates; and finding it impossible to recover it by forced marches, stopped his pursuit. The Elector of Mentz waited the arrival of the army, having provided every thing necessary for their refreshment; and at the city of Mentz the left-hand column which had crossed the Lohn, now passed the river Maine. The enemy had not yet penetrated into the true design, but thought it probable it was against their possessions on the Upper Rhine; and for that reason Marshal Tallard still remained with his corps near Strasbourg.

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1704-

Continuing his route along the Banks of the Rhine 'till he came to the Neckar, the Duke passed that river at Heidelberg \*. Here he was obliged to halt four days, till the courier came back which he had sent to the States, to acquaint them that he had the Queen's orders to move to the relief of the Empire; adding, that he hoped they would allow him to march their troops to share the honour of that expedition. He at length received their answer, by which they approved of the design; so that he had now the whole army at his own disposal. The Duke now threw off the mask. His right-hand column crossed by a bridge † at Philipsburg; the artillery and stores were disembarked; the army wheeled off to the left, and quitted the Rhine.

Making an expeditious march through Franconia towards the Danube, he sent Colonel Tatton before, who thoroughly understood how to provide for an army. He appointed General Cadogan and Colonel Ivers to the charge of the encampments, who were men of great dexterity and skill in every thing relating to that business. After these, the Duke of Marlborough with all possible speed moved with the horse, and left the foot behind, which his brother, General Churchill, brought up by proper marches. The soldiers observed so exact a discipline, and were so far from offering any injury wherever they came, that they were welcome guests to the inhabitants, as they paid for every thing in ready money.

\* Kane.

† Cunningham.

1704. { The enemy were struck with astonishment. With all the speed they could, they passed through the country of Mentz without having made the least attempt on Brabant or the district of Liege, and came at length to the Upper Rhine. The Prince of Wirtemberg brought up seven battalions and twenty troops of the confederates out of Brabant with incredible speed, and joined the Duke; having outstripped the report and expectation of his coming.

Some days after Marlborough had passed the Neckar, Prince Eugene came to meet him; and after a conference about the great measures of the war, he made this request to the Duke, that he would agree with the Prince of Baden about the command of the army, when the Imperial forces, now upon their march, should join; and as to himself, he only desired leave to serve under him as a volunteer. The Duke returned his compliment with no less gallantry; and they contracted such an entire friendship, as was not only mutually pleasing to themselves, but undoubtedly of great advantage to the allies throughout the whole war. Whenever these superior men met, they never failed to be of one sentiment. What the old Prince of Waldeck had said of Marlborough at an early period, was probably as applicable to Eugene: "That he saw more into the art of war in one day than many others did in a number of years." The judgment of both appears to have been of that nature, which points out at once what is right and fit, setting aside all doubt

doubt and hesitation. Far above all foolish jealousies, they desired that nothing but good sense should predominate; and the general good was their supreme rule of conduct.

1704.

The Prince of Baden a few days afterwards, leaving his forces, came to congratulate the Duke of Marlborough on his arrival; and the infantry of the Duke's army having arrived, both Prince Eugene and the Prince of Baden expressed how much they were delighted with the spirit which they saw in the looks of the whole army, promising the most complete success. These three great men then entered into a consultation, at which it was agreed, that the Prince of Baden and the Duke of Marlborough should command the army on the Danube every day alternately. This expedient was probably suggested by the Duke, who had formerly made a similar arrangement with the Duke of Wirtemberg, when he came before Cork and Kinsale. As to Prince Eugene, it was determined that he should command the army on the Rhine, being the most proper person to watch the motions of Villeroy; to whose humour and conduct in war he was no stranger, having taken him prisoner at Cremona two years before. The next day the Prince of Baden returned to his own camp, and Prince Eugene rode post to Philipsburg, (where the Rhine is distant from the Danube about one hundred and fifty miles,) to draw together there all the forces he could, with a view to seize the passes, and hinder Marshal Tallard from penetrating through the Black Forest, as well as to observe



1704.

observe the motions of Villeroy. From whence this corps was drawn, or of what troops it was constituted, is not ascertained; but they are represented as having been in great want of every thing. The service assigned to Prince Eugene at the consultation, was indeed a hard one; but it was necessary to form their resolutions according to the situation of affairs, and the greatness of the danger.

On the 22d of June, the Duke and Prince of Baden joined their forces; and the united army proceeded to the banks of the Danube. A few days afterwards, Lieutenant-General Bulaw, Commander of the Hanoverians, was sent out with two thousand horse towards Dillinghen, where the Elector of Bavaria was posted; and on the first of July the Duke brought his army in sight of the enemy without any interruption, and encamped at Amerdingen. Being informed here that the enemy were fortifying their camp at Donawert, and that the Elector of Bavaria had sent a detachment of foot to reinforce the Count D'Arco; on the 2d of July, being the Duke's turn to command, it was resolved in a council between him and the Prince of Baden, to march directly towards the enemy, and to attack their camp at Donawert, before the Elector of Bavaria could join them, or the Count D'Arco could finish his entrenchments. The tents therefore being struck, and the baggage sent to Norlinguen, both the armies began their march immediately; the Duke moving by the higher ground,

ground, and the Prince of Baden by the lower ; 1704.  
but the difficulty in passing the river Wernitz greatly retarded their progress. The army reached this river about noon, but much time was lost before the bridges could be finished, and the artillery got over. When this was accomplished, the confederates came in sight of the enemy, who were fortifying their camp at Schellemburg with a double entrenchment.

Schellemburg is a post upon a rising ground, a mile and a half from the Danube ; through the middle of the hill there is a public road very deep, with banks on each side twelve feet high, passing through the village of Schellemburg, where, on the top of the hill, stands a church, with a churchyard, which was encompassed, together with the camp, by the enemy's entrenchments. Towards the east there is a ridge of hills covered by thick woods, frequented by robbers, and at this time well calculated for an ambuscade. Count D'Arco's forces consisted of thirty-two thousand men, all select troops ; and under his command were two Bavarian and two French Lieutenant-Generals.

The Duke of Marlborough keeping the upper road, Lieutenant-General Gore, at five o'clock in the afternoon, began the attack with the British foot guards and the regiments of Orkney and Ingoldsby, before the Imperialists could arrive at their point of attack ; for they were ordered to move by the lower way round the skirts of the hills. Notwithstanding great impetuosity, the confederates

1704. federates were twice repulsed with considerable loss, and Lieutenant-General Gore was among the number of the slain. Soon after, the Imperialists came up very seasonably, and being led on in good order by the Prince of Baden, advanced to the enemy's works without once firing, threw their fascines into the ditch, and passed over with inconsiderable loss. The enemy's horse charged them vigorously, but were repulsed; when the Imperial cavalry entering the intrenchments, the British and Dutch broke in about the same time, and the confederates made a great slaughter.

The enemy's loss in this engagement was about six thousand men, and a great many deserters came in after it, of whom the Bavarians only were taken into the service of the confederates, and incorporated into the regiments; but the French deserters were rejected. The town of Donawert interrupted the pursuit of the flying enemy: They quitted the place by night, and retired to other Bavarian quarters. The conquerors did not deliberate long how to improve their victory; but next day entered the town of Donawert, which was undefended. The magazines there had been set on fire by order of the Elector of Bavaria before his troops retreated, but the inhabitants extinguished the flames and threw open their gates. Here were found a great quantity of corn and ammunition, and sixteen pieces of cannon.

The Elector of Bavaria immediately quitted his strong camp between Dillinghen and Lavingen, crossed the Danube, moved towards the river Lech, and,

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and, in order to prevent the necessity of fighting against his will, made a long march to Augsburg, where he strongly entrenched himself, in expectation of the arrival of the French succours. On this the Prince of Baden and the Duke of Marlborough left some forces in Donawert, and passed the Danube. When they came to the Lech, which was before celebrated in history from a battle fought upon its banks by Gustavus Adolphus, they received intelligence that Newburg was evacuated: A detachment was therefore immediately sent thither, whereby they not only secured to themselves a retreat, but the power of obtaining provisions from Suabia and Franconia, which, in an enemy's country, was a great advantage.

It is difficult to discover why the Elector of Bavaria divided his army in the manner above stated, in the words of an historian who lived at that time\*; nor has any other author explained the grounds upon which the two important towns above mentioned were so easily abandoned. It also appears extraordinary that no preparations had been made by the Emperor upon the Danube; for it might naturally have been expected that a train of battering cannon as well as magazines should have been ready at Passau, by which means Munich, the capital of Bavaria, might have been immediately reduced; but so entirely was that army neglected at Vienna, that when the battle of Blen-

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\* Cunningshame's History of England.

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heim was fought, they had not one half the number of artillery which the enemy had, and by much the greater part of these were brought by the Duke of Marlborough's army. It was strongly suspected that the President of the Council of War at Vienna had been corrupted with French gold\*: Prince Eugene had effected his removal a short time before he marched; nor do his successors appear to have been less deserving of that severe imputation. Such were the constant practices of the French. The celebrated author who has prostituted his talents in writing the panegyric of Louis XIV. informs us, that in every cabinet in Europe he had traitors in his pay; that the French, more gay than other nations, were also more dangerous, carrying into every family, in which they were admitted, their love of pleasure and debauchery, mixed with insolence and contempt for their entertainers †. We are not always to place implicit credit in this French historian's assertions, who rounds this period with an observation from which he seems to derive peculiar satisfaction, that his countrymen were feared every where.

Whether from the strength of the Elector's post at Augsburg, or from the negotiations into which he entered at this time (as it appeared) without

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\* Tindal.

† Les François, plus gais que les autres, mais plus dangereux, portoient dans toutes les maisons les plaisirs avec le mepris, et la debauchee avec l'insulte.— Ils estoient craint partout.

VOLTAIRE, *Siecle de Louis XIV.* Ch. 7.

sincerity,

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sincerity, no attempt was here made by the confederates; but the generals, finding that the French were approaching, and that the Elector of Bavaria had contrived to amuse them for the sole purpose of lengthening the treaty, sent a detachment of the Imperial troops under Counts Frize and De la Tour into Bavaria. The cruelties practised in the Palatinate by the French were once more retaliated upon the unoffending people of another country; but Marlborough's troops took no part in this measure; and when the inhabitants in the greatest consternation sent deputies to the Duke of Marlborough, offering to pay large sums to prevent military execution, the Duke replied, "That the forces of the Queen of Great Britain were not come into Bavaria to get money, but to bring their Prince to reason." The whole country from the Danube to the very walls of Munich was laid waste, on the pretence, that by this dreadful spectacle, the Elector, in compassion to his people, or from want of subsistence, might be induced to sue for peace; but Marshal Marfin, who was a man of active genius, and other Frenchmen, constantly represented to him that it would be dishonourable in him to deceive the French King who was now his ally, so that nothing could prevail upon him to change his measures.

When the confederates had crossed the Lech, they received advice from Prince Eugene, that the Marshals Villeroy and Tallard had passed the Rhine. Upon this a reinforcement was immediately

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diately detached to the Prince of thirty squadrons of the Imperial horse, under the command of Prince Maximilian of Hanover, justly renowned for his courage and military conduct, and they themselves advanced directly to Rhain, a garrison of the Bavarians, which surrendered the next day, after the opening of the trenches. On the 28th of July they attacked Aicha, which they took by storm; and the Bavarian garrison, consisting of eight hundred men, were all either killed or made prisoners.

The Elector, unmoved by the threats or actions of the confederates, marched from Augsburg on the 22d of July, leaving a garrison there of eight French battalions, and making a circuit of twenty miles, hastened by the way of Mindelheim, to cross the Danube, and meet Marshal Tallard at Lavingen, where he had arrived with twenty-two thousand men. Prince Eugene avoiding the enemy, left his army and came privately with all speed to the Duke of Marlborough's quarters. The Duke and the Prince of Baden, apprehensive of being cut off from a retreat and from their provisions, returned to the neighbourhood of Donawert, where Prince Eugene's army lay. These commanders came to a resolution immediately to form the siege of Ingoldstadt, and the Prince of Baden took upon himself the charge of carrying it on. Having sent thirty-nine battalions to Prince Eugene's camp, he passed through Neuburg with about twenty thousand of the German troops. The army of the confederates,

federates, after the Prince was detached, consisted of <sup>1704.</sup> one hundred and eighty-one squadrons, and sixty-seven battallions, whereof nineteen squadrons and fourteen battallions were British troops. The united force of the French and Bavarians amounted to one hundred and sixty-three squadrons, and eighty-three battallions; in all about eighty thousand men.

Ingolstadt was scarcely invested when Marlborough received intelligence that Villeroi with his army had arrived on the Upper Rhine, either with a view to the cutting off the supplies of the confederates, the greater part of which they still received by the Rhine, from whence they were conveyed to Norlingen\*; or perhaps with an intention of joining the Elector's army, already superior in numbers by about four thousand men. Being therefore thus straitened both in time and circumstances, it was resolved, that if an opportunity could be found, the confederates should immediately risk a battle. They who think that Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough took this resolution, either for their own glory, or out of pique to the Prince of Baden, are utterly ignorant of the condition they were in at that time, as well as of the state of the war †; for in truth they were under the necessity of fighting, lest they should be reduced to the want of provisions.

\* Feuquieres.

† Cunninghame,



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The army having moved to the village of Munster, not far from Donawert, the commanders took a view of the enemy's camp from a high tower, and resolved to attack it without loss of time, lest they should fortify themselves the next day at the village of Blenheim. The generals then went and viewed the enemy nearer, taking with them an escort of eight and twenty squadrons, and took notice that their advanced troops, which were in motion towards the allies, stopped short after they had perceived them.

Aug. 13. In a council of war the resolution prevailed for fighting, and orders were accordingly given to march the next morning by break of day, at which time they moved in nine columns by the right, leaving their tents standing.

The field of battle was a vast plain of twelve miles in extent, very level, surrounded with a large ridge of hills rising from the Danube in the form of a circle. The enemy had the Danube and the village of Blenheim on their right, and on their left was the village of Lutzinghen, and a long ridge of steep hills covered with woods. The first-named village was somewhat in front, the latter rather in the rear. They had strengthened the village of Blenheim, as much as the shortness of the time would permit, with felled trees, and a sort of palisade work surrounding it, and had posted a strong body of troops there, consisting of twenty-eight battalions and thirteen squadrons. A strong corps was also posted in Lutzinghen. The ground in the enemy's front had a sloping ascent, and at the bottom

tom there was a large spring, which, before it reaches Blenheim, increases to a sort of river; and, mixing itself with the oozy soil, overflows the meadows, and renders the ground so marshy as to give it the appearance of being unfit for a field of battle. No farther disposition appears to have been made by the French and Bavarians than turning out their line in front of their encampment; and Marshal Tallard, who commanded their right wing, seems to have concluded, that the marshy ground in front was impassable, yet he had taken the precaution of damming up the water so as to make broad pools in several places; nor did he use any other means to oppose our army in the passage than a continual discharge of his cannon.

In the mean time the Duke of Marlborough, observing that the enemy had weakened their army by the detachment sent into Blenheim, and that his men were eager to engage, waiting only for the signal, ordered that each horseman should provide himself with a large fascine, in order to fill up the marsh and render it passable. This having been obeyed, the whole army with their natural alacrity pressing onward to pass the rivulet, in defiance of the enemy's cannonade, proceeded to the fords according to their orders. The general attack then began about one o'clock. Prince Eugene and the Imperialists were on the right. General Churchill, Lord Cuts, Lieutenant General Lumley, Lord Orkney, Lord North and Grey, and Lieutenant General Ingoldsby, with the British, Dutch, and other forces, were upon the left. Marlborough

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was in the center of the whole first line, for there were two lines and a reserve.

Major General Wilks made the first onset with five British battalions, of Howe, Ingoldsby, Marlborough, Rowe, and North and Grey, and four battalions of Hessians, supported by Lord Cutts and Major General St. Paul, with eleven other battalions and fifteen squadrons of horse, under the command of Major General Wood. The five battalions, led on by Brigadier Rowe, who charged on foot at the head of his own regiment, assaulted the village of Blenheim, advancing to the muzzles of the enemy's muskets, and some of the officers exchanging thrusts of swords with the French through the palisadoes: but being exposed to a fire much superior to their own, they were obliged to retire, leaving behind them one third of their men killed or wounded, and the brigadier who commanded them, who afterwards died of his wounds.

In this retreat they were pursued by thirteen squadrons of the French Gendarmerie and Carabiniers, who would have entirely cut them to pieces, had not the Hessian infantry stopped their career by the great fire they made upon them. The French being repulsed and forced to fly in their turn, were chased by five squadrons of English horse, who by this time had passed the rivulet; but while the enemy were rallying, some fresh brigades arrived to their assistance; the assailants were charged with great vigour by superior numbers, and were many of them obliged to repass the rivulet with great precipitation. Here again the Hessian foot performed

formed signal service, putting the French to the route by their continual fire, and regaining the colours which they had taken from Rowe's regiment; but after several farther attempts it was found impossible to force the enemy in that post without entirely sacrificing the confederate infantry.

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The British foot having thus begun the engagement on the left, the horse of the left wing passed the rivulet opposite the enemy's center, as did likewise that of the right wing, which had made several passages with divers pieces of wood. After having crossed, they drew up in order of battle, the French and Bavarians giving them all the time that could be desired for that purpose, keeping themselves quiet on the hills, without descending into the meadows towards the rivulet, so that even the second line of the horse had time to form themselves. This neglect is said to have proceeded from an ill-timed haughtiness and presumption of Marshal Tallard, who is reported to have said, "Let them pass, the more that come over, the more we shall have to kill and make prisoners." But, on the other hand, it is alleged by some, that he had given positive orders not to let the enemy cross the rivulet, but to charge them as they passed, which orders however were not executed.

At length the Duke's cavalry moving towards the hill, that of Marshal Tallard came down and charged them with great fury; the French infantry which were posted at Blenheim gave at the same time a warm fire from behind some hedges on their flank, which was advanced too near to that

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village, and the first line was put into such disorder, that part of them retired beyond the rivulet. Upon this the duke gave orders to Lieutenant General Bulaw, commander of the Hanoverian forces, to bring up his own regiment of dragoons, and two others, which charged the enemy's horse with so much vigour, that they broke them and drove them beyond a second rivulet, called Meul-Weyer, and from thence to the very hedges of the village of Blenheim. This gave time to those who had given ground to repass the rivulet, and to form behind those regiments of dragoons, and some others that had joined them; so that those dragoons remained in the first line during the rest of the action.

The cavalry of the left wing having by this success gained the advantage of forming themselves entirely in order of battle, advanced leisurely to the top of the hill, and several times charged the enemy's horse, who were always routed, but who nevertheless rallied every time, though at a considerable distance, and thereby gave the confederates an opportunity of gaining ground. As the Duke of Marlborough was now in person among them, preparing a fresh attack, Marshal Tallard caused ten of his battalions to advance to fill up the intervals of his cavalry, in order to make a last effort, which the duke perceiving, caused three battalions of the Hanoverians to come up and sustain the horse: Then the Prince of Hesse Cassel, General of the Horse, and the Lieutenant-Generals Lumley, Bulaw, Hompesch, and Ingoldsby, returned with their troops to the charge; but the superior fire of the

the enemy's infantry put their first line into disorder, so that it shrunk back and remained for some time at about one hundred paces distant from the enemy, neither party advancing against the other. At length the confederates pushed forward with so much bravery and success, that having broken and routed the enemy's horse, the ten battalions, who found themselves abandoned by them, were cut to pieces, none escaping but a very few soldiers, who threw themselves on the ground as dead, to save their lives. The British soldiers had in the various rencounters often employed the butt-end of their musquets, and being stronger than the French, repulsed them as they advanced in their ranks, and slew those who resisted them by whole battalions together. The enemy was not able to bear the broad-swords of our dragoons, or the impetuosity and strength of our horse.

Marshal Tallard rallied his broken cavalry behind some tents which were still standing in his camp, and seeing things in this desperate condition, resolved to draw off his dragoons and infantry from the village of Blenheim. He therefore sent one of his aid-de-camps to Marshal Marfin, who, with the Elector of Bavaria, commanded on their left, to desire him to detach some forces to amuse the enemy, in order to favour the retreat of the troops in Blenheim: but Marfin represented to the messenger that he had too much business in the front of his own post, which was by this time attacked by the Duke of Marlborough, who had come to the assistance of the right wing.

The

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The battle had been still more strongly contested in that quarter. The Imperialists were twice driven back into the woods, and many of them were slain by the Bavarians. Why the enemy, when they saw the Imperialists extending their line out of the woody hills, should have mistaken them for their friends, can only be accounted for from this reason, that men are apt to believe what they wish; they thought it was Marshal Villeroi's army coming to their assistance.

While Prince Eugene was encouraging his men to make a third attack, he received advice of the success on the left. The British troops had now the good fortune of repaying to the Imperialists the compliment of support, which they themselves had received from them at Schellemburg. The body of reserve, which had not yet been engaged, also marched to their assistance; and towards the evening the Imperialists, together with this reinforcement, sallied out of the woods, and the battle was renewed. The Duke of Marlborough forced the enemy to give ground; and when they would have rallied again, the confederates, taught experience by the former engagements, attacked some of their battalions in front, some on the flank, and endeavoured to come up with others of them in the rear. Thus a general assault ensuing, the enemy were put to flight: the Duke improving the advantage, quickly penetrated, with a view of cutting off the troops posted in the village of Blenheim; and some of the general officers on the other side advancing

at

at the same time, and with the same intentions, that purpose was effected.

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Marshal Tallard was very near-sighted, (a most unfortunate defect in a general officer,) and with a view to rally a body of men that he thought were his own troops, he galloped into the midst of some Hessian cavalry, and was taken prisoner. The French were now completely routed, and such was their consternation, that whole multitudes, officers and soldiers, when they had gained the banks of the Danube, without knowing what they did, threw themselves into the river, and almost all perished. Not one of their general officers gave any orders for the retreat. Every one of them forgot the twenty-eight battalions and twelve squadrons of the best and oldest troops of France shut up within the village, who had no orders of any sort. They consisted of eleven thousand effective men. There are several examples of smaller numbers having defied fifty thousand, or of having made glorious retreats. The Prince of Wales, surnamed the Black Prince from the colour of his armour, with eight thousand men entirely defeated the French army at Poitiers, which, according to their own historians\*, consisted of sixty thousand, and pursued his march to Bourdeaux through several provinces, bearing captive the French king and the prime of his nobility.

Much however must depend upon a post. It would have been difficult for the troops to have

\* Froissart.—Montfaucon.

moved



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moved by files \* out of the narrow streets of the village of Blenheim, and to have taken up an order of battle in presence of a victorious army, who would have mowed them down with their musquetry and artillery, directed to the only point where they could form; and the confederates had now not only their own cannon, but those of the vanquished army.

Brigadier Sivieres, who was posted in the village, made an attempt to break through with the regiments of Artois and Provence. They sallied forth as from a besieged town, but were driven back. A French officer, of the name of Nonville, came a moment afterwards into the village with Lord Orkney: "What, have you brought us an English prisoner?" said the French officers. "No, gentlemen," he replied, "I am myself a prisoner; I am come to tell you all, that you have nothing left to do but to surrender; and here is Lord Orkney, who will receive your capitulation." The feelings of old soldiers upon such an occasion may be more easily imagined than described. The regiment of Navarre tore their colours and buried them in the ground. They were obliged to surrender without firing a shot. The troops in the other village found means to escape in the confusion; but the Bavarians made a respectable retreat in three columns.

\* This is Voltaire's remark; but every military man will make his own comment on this extraordinary transaction. We are not informed what general officer had the immediate command of the body of troops in the village.

This

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This defeat cost the enemy, by their own accounts in several intercepted letters, forty thousand men, in which number they included four or five thousand lost in their precipitate retreat to the black forest, either by desertion or the pursuit of the hussars or peasants, who made a great slaughter of the stragglers. This computation does not seem improbable, considering the number of prisoners taken, which exceeded thirteen thousand, of whom above one thousand two hundred were officers: ten French battalions on their right were cut in pieces; above thirty squadrons of horse and dragoons were forced into the Danube, where most of them were drowned: their left wing suffered much, especially the foot. In Höchstet, Dillinghen, and Lavingen, ninety-five wounded officers were found, and above seven thousand wounded men were in Ulm when that city was surrendered. The confederates gained above one hundred pieces of cannon, twenty-four mortars, one hundred and twenty-nine colours, one hundred and seventy-one standards, seventeen pair of kettle-drums, three thousand six hundred tents, thirty-four coaches, three hundred laden mules, two bridges of boats, twenty-four barrels and eight casks of silver. This success cost them four thousand four hundred and eighty-five men killed, seven thousand five hundred and twenty-four wounded, and two hundred and seventy-three made prisoners.

Marshal Tallard was received and treated with great politeness by the Duke of Marlborough; but observing to his Grace, "That he had that day  
" conquered

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“conquered the finest troops in the world,”—“You will at least permit me to except those who have conquered them,” replied the Duke.

The next day the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene bestowed great commendations upon the whole army. Among the dead were the Prince of Holstein-Beck, Brigadier Rowe, Lieutenant Colonel Dormer, Major Cornwallis, Major Creed, the Lord Forbes, and others, whose gallant actions were worthy of lasting honours. Among the wounded were the Lord North and Grey, and the Lord Mor-daunt, two young gentlemen not less ennobled by their virtues than their birth, Colonel Hamilton and Lieutenant Colonel Britton.

After the battle, deputies came from many places to the camp, imploring the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene to pardon their people for having submitted to the Elector of Bavaria, saying, they were so situated that they had none of the Emperor's garrisons to defend them; and urging farther that they were not competent judges of the differences between great princes; but were under the necessity of obeying the powers which had prevailed when the Elector of Bavaria had taken possession of Ulm, and had overrun all Swabia. The generals answered, that the Emperor would consider of these things; and sent them all away in safety. The city of Augsburg returned again under the Emperor's obedience and protection. Some Bavarians also, who were sent thither in the name of the Electress, promised that they would put the Emperor in possession of the cities of Bavaria on certain reasonable

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ble terms, which were referred to the Emperor; and the Bavarians submitted themselves without delay. The Electress herself also received a letter from her husband, sent by express through the hands of the Duke of Marlborough, in consequence of which she immediately implored the Emperor's compassion; and as a proof of her sincerity, she yielded up to the Emperor Ingoldstadt and Munich. After this the Imperialists having reduced all Bavaria, domineered over the people with great rigour.

Such were the effects of the Elector of Bavaria having obstinately adhered to his own opinions, and blindly followed the dictates of his passions. Marshal Marfin had in vain represented to him that he had only to avoid a battle a few days longer, as the confederates could not remain in that country for want of provisions; but this Prince's mind was wound up to the highest pitch of resentment at the devastation of his country; a calamity occasioned in the first instance by his imprudence in forming an unnatural alliance, and increased ten-fold by his blind impatience for revenge.

On the news of this great victory, nothing was to be seen or heard in England but bonfires, ringing of bells, firing of guns, and other demonstrations of joy. On the contrary, the whole French nation was in dismay; and every town upon their frontier took up arms to guard its walls. The Emperor made great acknowledgments to the Duke of Marlborough for this signal service, and offered

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offered to create him a Prince of the Empire ; which the Duke said he could not accept till he knew the Queen's pleasure. Upon her Majesty's consenting to it, he was accordingly so created ; and Mindelheim was assigned to him as a principality.

The queen and parliament of Great Britain, not only bestowed upon the Duke the high reward of their approbation of his conduct, and of that of his army, but also conferred upon him the noble estate of Woodstock, giving orders at the same time that a palace should be built within the park, called Blenheim-house. It was accordingly erected by Sir John Vanbrugh, of peculiar architecture, of great extent, stability, and grandeur. The gift was worthy the splendour of the nation ; and even in Germany the name of Prince of Mindelheim was lost in that of Marlborough.

A few days after the battle, the confederates having celebrated a solemn thanksgiving in their camp, and having disposed of their prisoners by sending them to Frankfort and other places, moved on the 21st of August into the neighbourhood of Ulm. From thence they began their march towards the Rhine on the 25th, and twenty-four battalions and ten squadrons were left under the command of General Thungen, with orders to besiege Ulm. This he executed with such expedition, that Prince Eugene, soon after his arrival on the Rhine, received advice of the surrender of that city, with two hundred and twenty-two pieces of cannon, and a vast quantity of military stores

Sep. 14.

and ammunition. The French, ruined, broken, and dispersed, left a free and uninterrupted march to the confederates from the Danube to the Rhine. The remains of an army, that at the beginning of the year had spread terror to the gates of Vienna, were now forced to take shelter within the limits of France. 1704.

The confederates reached Bruchsal near Philippsburg on the 9th of September, when a party of Imperial horse having met some squadrons of the enemy commanded by the Duc de Montfort, a major-general, who had been conducting four battalions and a sum of money into Landau, fell upon them with great vigour and routed them. The siege of Landau was now resolved upon, a measure asserted to have been against the opinion and the wishes of the Duke of Marlborough; but upon what grounds we cannot discover, nor why our English writers, with much abuse upon the gallant Prince of Baden, have ascribed that enterprise, and the failure of a subsequent design, to most unworthy motives in that commander.

The siege of Landau seems to have been perfectly consistent with the full scope of Marlborough's future views of penetrating into France. It was not only agreeable to sound policy to soothe and satisfy the Germans, who thought that conquest necessary for securing the Circles, and particularly Swabia, from the incursions of that garrison, but it seems to have been necessary to his own design. The enterprises of the French from Landau,

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dau,

1704. } dau, were still more to be apprehended on the side of the Moselle; and might, according to all probability, have occasioned serious consequences, by interrupting the Duke's future communication with the Rhine. Accordingly, while his army covered the operations before that place, he detached the Prince of Hesse to lay siege at the same time to Traerbach, a strong town upon the Moselle, not far from Treves; which having been reduced after a desperate defence, by dint of valour and perseverance, large magazines were established there during the winter.

Dec. 30. When the Prince of Baden, after an obstinate siege, had entered for the second time as conqueror the strongly-fortified city of Landau, the Duke of Marlborough returned thanks to the troops for all their "good services" during that campaign; and when he had seen them march off to embark in boats and fall down the Rhine to their last year's winter-quarters, he himself repaired to Vienna, there to regulate with the Imperial court the measures for the design of the ensuing year.

" About this time came an express to London  
 " from Sir George Rooke to the queen, with the  
 " news of a sea-fight off Malaga; notifying, that  
 " he had taken Gibraltar, and defeated the French  
 " fleet. The marines under the command of the  
 " Prince of Hesse D'Armstadt, made an unexpected attack upon Gibraltar. The forces in  
 " garrison were few, and not much upon their  
 " guard. The citizens also, thinking the faints  
 " were

“ were guardians of their city, had gone that day, 1704.  
 “ being a festival, to a chapel out of town, and  
 “ were busy at their devotions. On intelligence  
 “ of this, the marines mounted the rocks with  
 “ scaling ladders, and with great resolution took  
 “ the city. Admiral Rooke being informed that  
 “ the Count de Thoulouse \* with forty ships,  
 “ followed by thirty galleys, had come out of  
 “ Toulon, and was under sail towards him, pre-  
 “ pared to meet him. As the English ships had  
 “ been long at sea, they were not able to sail so  
 “ fast as the French, neither had they any dock on  
 “ those coasts where they could be cleared or refitted,  
 “ nor even materials proper for refitting them.  
 “ Besides all this, a great deal of their ammuni-  
 “ tion was spent in the taking of Gibraltar. In  
 “ the mean time, the enemy’s fleet appeared in  
 “ fight on the 2d of September. Upon this, the  
 “ Admirals Rooke, Shovel, and Wassenauer, re-  
 “ solved to engage, though eight of the Dutch  
 “ ships had left the fleet the day before, as a con-  
 “ voy to some trading vessels. The French man-  
 “ ner of fighting at sea is different from that  
 “ of the English; the latter point their guns  
 “ against the vessels themselves, the former aim  
 “ their shot at the masts, sails, and rigging. When  
 “ the confederates perceived the enemy attempt-  
 “ ing to cut off their van, they contracted their  
 “ line, and prepared to bear down upon them be-  
 “ fore the wind, which had now shifted so far as

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\* Natural son to Louis XIV.



1704.

“ to favour this design. The Count de Thoulouse perceiving this, lest the confederates should come to close action and grapple with his ships, or board them by an overbearing force, or destroy his galleys, gave the signal for tacking about. The confederates at this critical juncture began to be in want of powder; and, as it often happens in sea-fights, since the invention of gunpowder, there came on also a sudden calm. On these accounts, they could not pursue the retreating enemy. The French in this retreat derived great service from their galleys, which afforded conveniency for healing the wounded marines; and by means of which they were enabled with their oars and cables to tow the disabled ships out of sight, and to lay them up in the dry-dock in Malaga, where they left them stripped of all their military stores. After this, the rest of the French fleet made back for the port of Toulon: the confederate fleet returned to Gibraltar: and thus this naval engagement ended without one ship being taken or sunk on either side. Each fleet claimed the victory, and Te Deum was sung both at London and Paris.

“ The poets of London, a sort of people not very well affected to the sailors, out of prejudice against Sir George Rooke, ridiculed in their lampoons the conduct of this engagement, as if victory had fled from one who followed her, and followed him who fled from her. But the-Oxford muses magnified this, as if Rooke  
“ by

“ by his naval exploits had shaken the pillars of  
 “ Hercules and the foundations of the dominions 1704.  
 “ of France; or, by the reduction of Gibraltar,  
 “ had obtained possession of the Hesperian or-  
 “ chards, which produced golden apples; and  
 “ thus what was highly celebrated in the poems  
 “ and writings of one party, was as much ridiculed  
 “ in the lampoons of the other; for London was  
 “ at this time full of scribbling petty poets, who  
 “ with their tiresome and disgusting babbling, en-  
 “ deavoured to bring disparagement on the greatest  
 “ characters \*.

The power of Great Britain had been conspicu-  
 ously displayed the year before. That nation  
 had equipped a mighty fleet of ships of war and  
 transports, containing a considerable land force,  
 with a view to place the Austrian Prince upon the  
 throne of Spain, supplying him at the same time  
 with large sums of money. The force of benefits  
 conferred, and all this visible superiority, could not  
 prevail upon the Emperor to give the title of ma-  
 jesty to Queen Anne his benefactress. In the letter  
 which his son the Arch-duke presented, he styled  
 her *Your Serenity*, in the phrase of the court of Vi-  
 enna, which they continued to employ to other  
 sovereigns, till their pride was bent beneath ne-  
 cessity. After the battle of Blenheim, we believe  
 that this title never was employed by them to-  
 wards the sovereigns of Great Britain. The year

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\* Extract from Cunningham's History of England, written at that time.

1704. after the British forces had taken Gibraltar, they not only reduced Barcelona, but conquered the kingdom of Valencia and Catalonia for the Arch-duke Charles. They were commanded by the Earl of Peterborough, a man of uncommon talents. Carthage and part of Grenada were next subdued. The British army entered Madrid, and there proclaimed the Arch-duke Charles King of Spain. Philip formed the design of retiring to the Spanish dominions in America, but the Earl of Peterborough was recalled; the conduct of that war fell into less able hands; Charles the Third of Spain, on the death of his father, and soon after of his elder brother, became Emperor of Germany; and Peru and Mexico were not dismembered from the monarchy of Spain.

Although it cannot fall within the compass of this short abstract to include all the memorable transactions which happened in Spain during this war, yet those at Alicant are too extraordinary to be omitted. That castle had been blocked up more than four months. The garrison consisted only of Hotham's and Syburg's regiments, which were not above half complete when left there two years before. They held out with great resolution all the winter, notwithstanding the severity of the weather, the scarcity of provisions, and the annoyance of the enemy's bombardment. The Spaniards finding all other means ineffectual to reduce that important fortress, resolved at last to blow up the rock on which the castle stands, by a great mine;

1704.

mine; the several chambers of which being prepared with incredible labour and industry, the Chevalier D'Asfeldt caused fifteen hundred barrels of gunpowder to be lodged in them, summoned Colonel Syburg the governor to surrender; and to induce him to his measure, gave him leave to send out two of his officers to see the condition of the mine. This offer was readily accepted. Asfeldt went himself with the officers to the mine; and told them he could not bear to let so many brave men perish under the ruins of a place they had so gallantly defended, and gave them twenty-four hours to consider of it. But the Governor being immovable in his resolution, the mine was ordered the next day to be fired; which the sentinels posted on the side of the hill to give notice of it perceiving, they made the appointed signal. Upon this, the Governor with several officers walked to the parade, and ordered the guards to retire; which they had scarcely done, when the mine was blown up; and with little or no noise made an opening in the rock on the very parade, of some yards in length, and about three feet wide; into which the Governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Thornicroft, Major Vignolles, and other officers, fell, and the opening instantly closing upon them, they all perished. Notwithstanding this accident, Lieutenant-Colonel D'Albon of Syburg's regiment, the surviving commander, resolved to hold out as long as he had any provisions; but the spring which supplied them with water having been dried up by the shock, the besieged were obliged to surren-

1704.



der the place at the very time when Major General Stanhope was come on board the fleet to relieve them. Pursuant to capitulation, they marched out on the 18th of April 1709, having been besieged since the 1st of December; and with two pieces of cannon, and all other marks of honour, they embarked on board the fleet, and were landed in Minorca, which, as well as Ivica and the kingdom of Sardinia, the English under General Stanhope had taken and ceded to King Charles the Third.

The French and Spaniards having laid siege to Gibraltar, that place was defended with great bravery and resolution. Admiral Sir John Leake came from Lisbon unexpectedly with his fleet, burnt two French frigates and took one, and having reinforced the garrison with two thousand men, returned to Lisbon. In the end of February following, Sir John Leake received advice that Pointis the French Admiral had again arrived in the bay of Gibraltar, with fourteen men of war, and two fire ships. Quitting Lisbon for the relief of that garrison, in his way he met Admiral Dikes, who had sailed from England to increase his force. By this addition he had a fleet of thirty men of war; and holding on his course with the utmost expedition, he discovered five sail of the enemy making out of the bay to follow the rest of their squadron, which went off upon the first notice of his approach. He immediately gave chase, and soon took three of their ships, the Arrogant of sixty guns, the Ardent of sixty-six, and the Marquise of fifty-six: the Magnanima of seventy-four, and the Lis of eighty-six guns, were run ashore, and burnt by the enemy themselves

themselves near Marbella. The Spaniards losing 1704.  
all hope of taking Gibraltar raised the siege.

This was the last effort of the French navy, and it was near half a century before they could again appear upon the ocean to yield new triumphs to the British flag.

The resources of France were never more conspicuously manifested than after their defeat at Blenheim. The passion which the people of that country entertain for military glory, had been gratified and strengthened during the former war. The whole force of that numerous people, their lives, their fortunes, were at the entire disposal of their King, and new armies started up on every side.

The Duke of Marlborough took the field early in April, with nearly the same number of forces with which he moved from Maastricht in the former year. The States approved of his designs, and consented to a defensive system on their own frontier.

The proposed line of operation for this year appears to have been the same as that by which the great Austrian and Prussian armies lately endeavoured in 1792 to forward their views in France. The reasons of their failure the world has yet to learn; but the causes why the Duke of Marlborough's plan was never fairly brought to trial, were sufficiently apparent even at that time. He was disappointed in his well-founded hopes of being joined by the German troops, not only by most of those of the circles and Princes of the Empire, but also by the Imperialists. So much reliance had the Duke upon their acting with the same vigour and fidelity to the common cause as they had done the former

1705. former year, that he advanced to the Moselle, quitted the Rhine, and led his army on to Traerbach. Here the Duke left the army, and went to Raftadt, to have an interview with the Prince of Baden, who had fallen sick there upon his way to join the Duke ; possibly from vexation that it was not in his power to co-operate in the manner he expected. The following letters \* will throw some light upon this subject:

*The Duke of Marlborough to the Elector of Hanover,  
afterwards George I. King of England.*

Translation.

“ Sir,

CRUSENACH, May 24. 1705.

“ I would have done myself the honour of  
“ writing sooner to your Electoral Highness; but  
“ I could tell you nothing positive, until I had  
“ conversed with the Prince of Baden; and he  
“ having been indisposed, I was obliged to go as  
“ far as Raftadt, from whence I have just now  
“ returned; and I propose to be to-morrow at  
“ Treves.

“ The principal design of my journey was, to  
“ know exactly the number of troops which he  
“ could bring to act in concert with us on the  
“ Moselle; and I acknowledge to your Electoral  
“ Highness that I am but little satisfied with my  
“ success; for all that the Prince could furnish  
“ does not amount to eleven or twelve battalions,

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\* From Mr. Pherson's State Papers.

“ and

“ and twenty-eight squadrons, who are to march  
 “ in four days. It is true he makes me hope that 1705.  
 “ they will be augmented in time to twenty batta-  
 “ lions and forty squadrons, which is still far from  
 “ what was promised to me this winter at Vienna ;  
 “ so that instead of two armies, I shall be obliged to  
 “ act with one corps. The greatest difficulty will  
 “ be to open a way from Treves, the enemy hav-  
 “ ing seized on all the passages of the rivers ; but  
 “ by the valour of the troops, under the blessing  
 “ of Heaven, I have no doubt of accomplishing  
 “ this end. My design is then to attack Saar  
 “ Louis ; and I shall be very happy to have your  
 “ Electoral Highness’s approbation of this mea-  
 “ sure, and your advice concerning our motions ;  
 “ and I entreat you to continue to me the honour  
 “ of your good graces, and to be persuaded of the  
 “ inviolable attachment and profound respect with  
 “ which I shall always be, &c.

“ Prince and Duke of MARLBOROUGH.”

*Answer to the preceding.*

*The Elector of Hanover to the Duke of Marlborough.*

Translation.

“ My Lord, BRUCKHAUSEN, June 4th, 1705.

“ I am much obliged to you for the letter you  
 “ wrote to me from Creutzenach the 24th of  
 “ May, and of the trouble which you take to in-  
 “ form me of the result of your conference with  
 “ the Prince of Baden, and of the projects which  
 “ you have formed for this campaign. I think  
 “ them



1705.

“ them worthy of your prudence, and perfectly  
“ conformable to the interests of the common  
“ cause; and the more so, that after having taken  
“ Saar Louis, you may go straight to Metz, with-  
“ out being obliged to take Thionville. I have  
“ nothing farther to say, but wish you success, and  
“ as glorious a campaign as the last. No one in-  
“ terests himself more than I do in what concerns  
“ you, or is more sincerely than I am, &c.”

After an unsatisfactory interview with the Prince, the Duke on the 26th of May returned to the army, which crossed the Saar at Consaarbruck on the third of June. From thence, after a march of eight hours, they came within a quarter of a league of Sierques, near which place Marshal Villars was encamped with an army of seventy thousand men.

It being too late to encamp, the troops lay on their arms all that night. The next morning they encamped at Elft, the right being at Perle near Sierques on the Moselle, and the left at Hollendorp, within sight of the enemy's army. Upon the appearance of the confederates the day before, the enemy immediately prepared for a retreat, which they now put in execution, and marched from Sierques towards Conigsmacheren, possessing themselves of a very advantageous camp, which they made yet stronger by felling trees and casting up intrenchments. These must have been substantial indeed! since the traces of them are still existing, and were observed last autumn (1792) by a gallant English

English officer who attended the army of the emigrants \*. 1705.

In the mean time the enemy being willing to make the best use of the Duke of Marlborough's absence from the Netherlands, invested and took the castle of Huy, while the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villeroi laid siege to Liege. This disagreeable news had no sooner reached the Duke's army, than he received a letter from the States, confirming the intelligence, representing the threats of the enemy that they would recover the former conquests of the allies, and urging the necessity of returning with his army to the Maese.

The Duke when he found that the Court of Vienna had receded from her engagements, and that the few German troops which had actually received orders to join the confederacy advanced but slowly, abandoned his favourite design of besieging Saar Louis, an enterprize which was therefore never attempted. In the mean time the people of Lorraine, who had long since received French troops, and whose towns were held by force, had conceived great hopes from the Duke of Marlborough's march, that he would either have put a stop to their sufferings, or that they should now have an opportunity to assert their liberty: but their hopes were disappointed in the manner we have related. Of all the German forces those under the Prince of Hesse and Duke of Wirtemberg alone had joined

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\* Captain Malcolm of the 65th, lately the Earl of Harrington's regiment.

1705.

the army, which began to suffer want; for the Germans had also failed in supplying provisions as they had promised. The corn was not yet ripe in the fields, nor was there any to be brought from any other quarters. But the soldiers bore the want of bread with extraordinary patience, and for want of forage were forced to feed their horses on the leaves of trees\*. The Germans said all things were prepared, were coming, were just at hand, but they performed nothing. At last they notified the death of the Emperor Leopold, which they pretended was the cause of their delay. The Duke, now finding the difficulty of subsisting an army in a ruined country, and the impracticability of attacking Marshal Villars, who, besides his superiority of numbers, was posted in an inaccessible camp, resolved at last to march to the relief of Liege. He decamped on the 17th of June, and moved towards Traerbach; where it was resolved in a council of war, that the forces under his command should move back to the Maese; and leaving seven thousand of the troops of the palatinate in the pay of England and Holland, for the security of Traerbach, under the command of Lieutenant-general Aubach, the army marched back, and raised the siege of the citadel of Liege. General Aubach, as if he meant to put it out of the Duke's power to resume the design of penetrating into France that way, burnt all his magazines upon the first motion of the French towards him without waiting for orders†, and the Duke of Marlborough sent fruitless complaints to the Court of Vienna.

\* Cunningham.

† Biograph. Brit.

It may now be worthy of our consideration upon what grounds the English historians have almost universally imputed to the Prince of Baden the failure on the part of the Germans. There appears no reason to suppose that this excellent executive officer had any influence in the cabinet of the Imperial Court. May we not find a more easy and more natural solution of the question, in the circumstance of Prince Eugene being a native of Italy? That country, even in its modern state of degradation, produces a general from time to time, to remind the world of ancient Rome. Montecuculi was one of those few, and to him succeeded Prince Eugene. He was a grandson of Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy; and this great man, who, in conjunction with the Duke of Marlborough, rescued the House of Austria from imminent danger, who afterwards singly confirmed the power of the Imperial scepter, and shook the empire of the Ottomans even to its center, seems not to have been exempted from the almost exclusive predilection for his own country, which Italians generally possess. We have seen what influence *he* exerted in the Imperial cabinet. We have seen that he had power to remove the President of the Council of War at Vienna; and we know that for a considerable time he diverted almost the whole Austrian force after the death of the Emperor Leopold to the Italian dominions of the new Emperor Joseph. In consequence of the victory which the Duke of Marlborough gained at Ramillies the following year, the success of Prince Eugene at Turin, and the farther

1705.

1705.

farther efforts of the confederates, not only Savoy, Eugene's native country, but the whole of Italy was completely cleared of the French. We shall neither attempt to censure nor to justify Eugene, nor shall we do more than barely enumerate the leading features of the great events which happened in the farther prosecution of the war.

July 18.

Huy was retaken on the 12th of July, and the Duke, against the opinion of the Dutch Generals, attacked and forced the French lines of Tirlemont at Heigelsheim. The French troops fled with precipitation; twelve hundred of them were killed, and two thousand taken. The Duke followed their army to the new camp upon the river Ische, but was prevented by the Dutch deputies from attacking them again. He wrote to the States, complaining of their want of confidence; and the season elapsed without any farther material event.

1706.  
May 23.

Next year Marshal Villeroi had encamped his army near the river Maine, not far from Tirlemont, at Ramillies, a village which became as famous as that of Blenheim. He prevented the Duke's design of forcing his camp, and drew up his army, consisting of seventy-six battalions, and one hundred and thirty-two squadrons. His disposition has been much censured. His left was behind a marsh where they could not act. Marlborough immediately saw the fault, drew a considerable body from his right to reinforce his left wing, and attacked the right of the French army. The French did not resist half an hour; they were totally routed. The confederates had not two thousand men killed and

and wounded; but the French lost twenty thousand. All Bavaria and the Electorate of Cologne had been the fruit of the victory at Blenheim, and the whole of the Spanish Netherlands fell in consequence of that of Ramillies. The cities of Louvain, Mechlin, Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and many lesser places submitted; and King Charles of Spain was proclaimed in all of them. Ostend also surrendered after a short siege. In the former age it had held out three years. Menin was invested; a place where nothing was wanting that art could contrive to make it impregnable; it was defended by six thousand men, and notwithstanding a vigorous resistance, the confederates made themselves masters of it in eighteen days from the opening of the trenches. The allies had become very expert in carrying on sieges, and spared no cost that was necessary for dispatch. Dendermonde and Ath were also besieged and taken. Proposals of peace were made by the French, who tried to prevail upon Charles XII. of Sweden to be a mediator. He replied, that if the confederates would also apply to him, he would use his endeavours: but they would not listen to the terms of France through any channel.

1706.

An expedition was fitted out consisting of no less than ten thousand infantry, whereof one half were troops from Ireland, composed of French refugees, (at least the officers were entirely of that description,) with twelve hundred cavalry, and a great train of artillery. The Dutch ships having joined near Plymouth on the 13th of August, next day the whole fleet of one hundred and fifty sail was

1706. forced into Torbay, where a council of war was held on board the ship of the Admiral, Sir Cloudesly Shovel. The land forces were commanded by Savage Earl of Rivers, who found, on opening his orders, that he was authorised to examine a certain French Marquis of the name of Guiscard, at whose suggestion the expedition was undertaken, the object of which even at this day remains a mystery. It is said that this enthusiastic Frenchman had persuaded Mr. Henry St. John, the secretary at war, afterwards Lord Bolingbroke, (who had but too much influence in the cabinet of Queen Anne's government,) that a powerful body of protestants were ready in France to join the English forces. The council of war, to their great surprise, found that he was in possession of no substantial documents, and could produce nothing but a few vague correspondencies, in no degree sufficient to justify the undertaking. It seems strange indeed, that England and Holland should have made so great an armament upon so weak a foundation. The refugees were disembarked, the rest were sent to Spain. Whatever were the views of Guiscard, he was disappointed, for he had received the commission of Lieutenant-general of the forces destined for that expedition; and having been apprehended some time afterwards in London for corresponding with the enemy, he stabbed Mr. Harley the secretary of state with a penknife in the breast, but not mortally, as he was interrogating him in the council chamber. He had first desired to speak in private with Mr. St. John, who was present in the council; and

and when his request was refused, he made his blow at Mr. Harley, saying, *J'en veux donc a toi*, "Have at you then." The blade of the knife broke upon his breast-bone, and the assassin some days after died of the wounds he received in the scuffle to secure him. He enjoyed a pension of three hundred pounds a year from the British government at the time when this transaction took place; and the only cause of dissatisfaction he had with Mr. Harley was, that he had refused to apply for a larger pension for him. Mr. Harley was soon afterwards created Earl of Oxford.

1706.

The great success of the confederates in the memorable campaign of the former year, and the many misfortunes of the French, raised great expectations that the time was come when their perfidy and cruelty were about to suffer the punishment which they merited; but the events of this year's campaign produced a contrary effect, and proved unfortunate to the confederates. The French suddenly evacuated the Milanese, sending from thence a considerable body of veteran troops into Spain to the assistance of King Philip, whose army thereby had the superiority, and gained the battle of Almanza, where the French and Spaniards were commanded by Marshal Berwick, natural son of James the second, a general whose talents have been compared to those of Marlborough, to whom he was nearly related.

1707.

In Flanders the French, under the Duke of Vendosme, prudently avoided an action, and managed their motions so well, that they furnished the



**1707.** Duke with no opportunity of attacking them. The Imperialists conquered Naples: their expedition thither occasioned the failure of that against Toulon, where the troops, which were of the Imperial army only, were commanded by Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy. Sir Cloudesly Shovel, admiral of the fleet, was lost on the rocks of Scilly on his return, with his whole ship's crew, and those of two others of his fleet: the rest had a narrow escape.

**1708.** An attempt somewhat extraordinary was made by the French in the beginning of the following year:—An endeavour to carry the war into Great Britain, when they found it difficult to support it elsewhere, had an air of grandeur much to the taste of that people. Their design was to land the Pretender at Leith with twelve battalions. General Cadogan brought ten battalions from Ostend to England, and began his march to Scotland, which proved unnecessary. Sir George Byng gave chase to their fleet, and took one of them, called the Salisbury, of sixty-four guns: the rest made their escape to Dunkirk.

The advantages gained by the French the year before, prompted them to make still greater efforts to recover their former superiority; and indeed their forces in this year seemed to be more numerous than ever, especially in the Netherlands. The Duke of Burgundy was appointed generalissimo, with the Duke of Vendosme to act under him. The Duke of Berry and the Pretender accompanied him. The Duke of Marlborough met Prince Eugene early this year at the Hague, and went from

from thence to the army, which he joined at Andernach near Brussels, where he employed some days in reviewing the troops. He had the satisfaction to find that the respective bodies were all complete, the men in excellent order, animated with the remembrance of their former victories, and eager to engage an enemy that had become despicable in their eyes. 1708.

The French had certainly in view the recovery of what they had lost; but it was by their usual method of treachery; and they found means to practise upon some of the chief inhabitants of Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp, who promised to open their gates to France and Spain as soon as they had an opportunity. They accordingly took possession of Ghent and Bruges, which the Burghers had undertaken to defend. They hoped to have met with the same success at Damme; but this place being fortified and garrisoned, they were obliged to retire.

This small advantage, and the defence of the weak citadel of Ghent by Sir Richard Tempelton's regiment under Major Labene, which detained their army three days, proved the occasion of their own much greater loss. They likewise supposed they might surprise or reduce Oudenarde, the only pass the confederates had now on the Scheld, before Prince Eugene could join the Duke. But the Prince arrived with a small escort, and contrary to their expectations, the Duke did not wait for the arrival of the Imperial forces; but although the enemy had a superiority of twelve thousand, he attacked them at

1708.  
July 11.

Oudenarde. The battle was brought on by a variety of able movements; for the French had no design to engage. The Duke of Vendosme was against fighting, but was obliged to yield in all things to the Duke of Burgundy, a Prince of the blood, who had no experience, and who, notwithstanding the interposition of the court, made it a point to thwart Vendosme in every thing \*. It was in this battle that the Electoral Prince of Hanover, afterwards King George the second, gave distinguished proofs of his early valour, charging sword in hand at the head of a squadron of his father's dragoons, and breaking to pieces the French regiment of infantry of la Bretesche. The French fought better than they had yet done.

They endeavoured to palliate their defeat, and affected in their accounts to represent it as a drawn battle, for which they had no other pretence than that of having saved their baggage: a ridiculous subterfuge, since it had been sent away before the engagement. Seven hundred of the enemy's officers and seven thousand privates made prisoners, one hundred standards or colours, ten kettle drums taken, and the field of battle of which the confederates remained masters, were evidences on their part of an indisputable victory. The lowest calculation given by the French themselves, allows their loss to have been ten thousand men; but others make it amount to nineteen thousand four hundred. Prince Eugene expressed great satisfaction in leading on the British troops, whom he saw perform wonders.

• Voltaire.

While

1708.

While the confederates expected their heavy cannon to undertake an important siege, several of their detachments laid the countries of Picardy and Artois under contribution. They fell in with eight hundred horse near Lens, part of the army from Alsace advancing under the Duke of Berwick, and killed or took the greater part of them. On the other side, the French made an incursion into Dutch Flanders, and plundered and burnt above a hundred houses belonging to the farmers and peasants.

Eugene's army having formed their junction with Marlborough, that of the Duke of Burgundy was also greatly reinforced, and not only France but all Europe was surprised to hear that the confederates had now undertaken the siege of Lisle. That extensive and strongly-fortified city was filled with every thing necessary for a long and vigorous defence. Marshal Boufflers commanded twenty-one battalions of the best troops of France within the place, amounting to fourteen thousand men. The loss of Ghent had cut off the communication of the confederate army with their great magazines at Antwerp; and Vendosme said, he did not think that such generals as Marlborough and Eugene would venture upon so rash an enterprise in presence of an army superior in numbers to their own. The confederates having brought a great convoy of provisions and warlike stores from Brussels to Menin, Lisle was invested by fifty battalions, Aug. 13: whereof six were Imperialists, nine were of the Palatinate, five Hessian, and thirty British and Dutch. Prince Eugene came before the place on one side, and

1708.  
Aug. 23. and the Prince of Orange on the other. Four thousand workmen opened the trenches, and worked for two hours, without being discovered, with such expedition, that when the enemy opened their batteries upon them, they were already so well covered, that only fifteen men were killed or wounded.

So great was the misunderstanding among the French commanders, or such their awe of the confederates, that they formed no enterprize of importance against the large convoys coming to the siege, except upon one from Ostend, which General Webb repulsed with great conduct at Wynendale. Two other convoys afterwards arrived from thence without interruption. No attack was made upon the lines of the confederates, nor upon the covering army of the Duke of Marlborough. The Duke of Burgundy at length quitted the siege, and Vendosme cut off the communication with Ostend, by breaking down the dykes at Lessinghen, and laying the country under water. He also destroyed the intercourse with Brussels; but it was now too late.

The batteries of the besiegers, consisting of fifty pieces of cannon and twenty mortars, are said to have opened their fire on the 26th of August\*; but this we deem to have been impossible; nor can we learn from any information that has fallen in our way, at what distance the besiegers first broke ground. It is most probable that only a few guns opened on that day, a mode of attack which has since been exploded; it being now considered as impru-

\* Tindal.

dent to accustom the enemy gradually to your fire. 1708.

On the seventh of September the counterscarp was attacked, and carried by storm, notwithstanding there were two hundred men from each regiment of the garrison posted in it. The besiegers lodged themselves in the covert way, although the enemy's fire, and three mines which they sprang, killed and wounded no less than one thousand men. In the night between the 10th and 11th of September, the garrison made a sortie, which was repulsed with considerable loss. Prince Eugene was wounded by a musquet ball, which pierced his hat and grazed his left eye. The Duke, together with Augustus King of Poland, visited the Prince in his quarters, and with difficulty prevailed upon him to keep his chamber for a few days; during which time the Duke sustained the weight of command, both of the siege and of his own army.

Marshal Bouffiers having found means to acquaint the Duke of Vendosme that his ammunition was much diminished in quantity in consequence of the expenditure, this pressing necessity caused the enemy to venture on a bold attempt. The Chevalier de Luxemburg and Monsieur Tournefort advanced in the night of the 28th of September, with a body of horse and dragoons, each man having behind him a bag of forty pounds of gunpowder. They moved along the causeway from Doway, and were challenged by an out-guard of one hundred horse. They answered that they belonged

1708.

belonged to the allies, and were conducting prisoners to their camp. A subaltern officer advancing to examine them, they judged it impossible to conceal themselves longer, and therefore rode full gallop along the causeway towards the town so closely pursued, that the besieged were cautious of opening the barrier. A contest ensued; and either from the musquetry, or from the horses feet striking sparks from the pavement, fire was communicated to several of the bags of powder, and upwards of one hundred men perished by the explosion. Three hundred got safe into the town with their seasonable supply, while a number, who could not gain admission, threw down their bags; at which time it is supposed the horses shoes striking upon the causeway occasioned the accident of setting fire to the gunpowder, different explosions having been heard at some distance of time. About forty of these gallant soldiers were taken prisoners.

Oct. 22.

On the 21st of October, the besiegers opened all their batteries with so much success, that next day the garrison capitulated for the town. The governor and four thousand five hundred men retired into the citadel, against which a new siege was commenced. In the town there were found about two thousand sick and wounded, so that the enemy's loss was supposed to have been near to seven thousand men. That of the allies is mentioned at eight thousand. Both parties had expended nearly all their ammunition. The approaches

proaches were now carried on by sap and mining; and on the 14th of November the besiegers made themselves masters of the counterscarp. The French had given it out every where, that the confederates would be obliged to decamp for want of provisions, and that they certainly would not find it possible to reduce the citadel. The assailants now erected their batteries upon the first counterscarp, but without intending to fire from thence until they gained the second; which having done, after draining the ditch, the governor, whose ammunition was almost exhausted, surrendered before the batteries began to fire, on the eighth of December. This was the severest winter in the memory of man, yet the soldiers did their duty in the trenches in the frost and snow with admirable patience. 1708.

In the mean time the Elector of Bavaria formed an attack upon Brussels. Having summoned the governor, General Paschal, he replied, "that he was sorry he had not the honour of being known to his Electoral Highness; that he durst assure him he would do all that a man of honour ought to do, and that he was satisfied with his garrison." A cannonade and bombardment then commenced. Marlborough and Eugene, leaving the citadel of Lisle, obliged the Elector to decamp. They afterwards retook Ghent and Bruges, with which events the operations of this year concluded. Dec. 8.

During the winter a congress was opened at the Hague by all the belligerent powers, to treat of peace; and after much discussion, the French seemed to 1709.



1709.

to comply with every one of the articles insisted upon by the confederates—to restore the whole Spanish monarchy and all the places in the Netherlands except Cambray and St. Omers; to yield Dunkirk to England, or to demolish the fortifications; to give up what they possessed of Newfoundland; to abandon the Pretender; to resign to the Emperor Alsace and all claims to Landau. In England, at this time, the foundation of Marlborough-house was laid near St. James's Palace, by order of the Duchess, and a broad stone was built in the front of it, with the words *anno pacifico*, cut upon it in large letters. The inscription confirmed many people in the hope of a speedy peace; but when it was discovered neither to be good Latin, nor truth, it was ordered to be obliterated\*.

Many reasons have been assigned why these conditions did not receive the ultimate consent of France. It has been alleged, that Louis never was sincere, but had given way to one demand after another merely to encourage the further pretensions of the confederates. Nothing could exceed the distress of France at this time; but the court representing the terms prescribed by the confederates as scarcely less ruinous and disgraceful than the evils apprehended from a continuance of hostilities, made the whole negotiation public, and found means to remove the despair of the people, by touching their pride: they prepared for a renewal of the war.

\* Cunningham.

1709.

We cannot here enter into the accusations with which the two parties in England, of the Whigs and Tories, have blackened each other; nor is it easy to comprehend how any motives could produce so great a degree of animosity, as to make public men lose sight of all considerations but those of personal interest and ambition.

The battle of Malplaquet was fought this year; Sept. 11. one of the most bloody in modern history; in which the confederates had six thousand five hundred men killed, and above twelve thousand wounded. It was the last stake of the French, and despair made them fight like men. Marshal Villars, who commanded the French army, was the best officer beyond all question among their troops during that war. It is true, that they had somewhat fewer men killed and wounded than the allies; but they lost sixteen cannon, forty-six colours or standards, and several thousand prisoners. After the battle, the confederate generals, upon viewing the advantageous posts and strong works from whence they had driven the enemy, were themselves astonished to see what difficulties they had surmounted. Tournay and Mons were taken; the former place was looked upon as one of the strongest fortresses in the Low Countries, and the citadel was the masterpiece of Surville, the officer appointed to defend it. The trenches were opened in the night of the 27th of June; and though Marshal Villars made several attempts before the battle, either to succour the place or to raise the siege, they proved ineffectual;

1709. { festual; so that on the 20th of July the town was surrendered, and the garrison retired into the citadel. Upon this a negotiation was set on foot, with a view to gain time, for which reason the Duke would grant no terms, and they were obliged to surrender prisoners of war on the 10th of August. The trenches were opened before Mons on the 15th of September, and the place capitulated on the 10th of October.

1710. The treatment which the Duke experienced in England at this time did not render his stay there agreeable to him; and as soon as all things could be settled, he went to the Hague towards the latter end of February, where he met Prince Eugene, and soon after set out for the army near Tournay. The first movement of importance was the entering of the French lines, and this was done without any loss. The siege of Doway was next resolved upon, and the place was invested on the 12th of April. It was naturally strong, had been fortified with great skill, was well provided with every thing, had a garrison of eight thousand good troops, commanded by the Marquis of Albergotti, an Italian nobleman of great merit and long service. There was no place better defended during the whole war; and notwithstanding that the siege was often interrupted by an army under Marshal Villars, the place was forced to surrender on the 22d of June. The French then retired within their new lines, and Prince Eugene invested Bethune on the 4th of July. The place was strong, the garrison numerous,

rous, and the governor a man of experience and valour, who defended it till the 17th of August. 1710.  
 The enemy still continuing to decline an engagement, the army invested Aire and St. Venant in one day. The trenches were opened before the latter on the 5th of September; and though it was remarkably well protected by nature, lying in a morass, and defended by a numerous garrison, yet it also capitulated on the 18th. The siege of Aire was a work of greater difficulty. The garrison, consisting of eight thousand men, was commanded by Lieutenant-general Guebriant, who had under him a major-general and seven brigadiers, sustained the attack till the 30th of October, and surrendered upon honourable conditions. The army then went into winter-quarters, after having suffered great loss in these four sieges, and the Duke returned to England.

An exterior civility, which had the appearance of a good understanding, being established between the Duke and the new ministry, and the Queen having written to the States General in very gracious terms concerning the confidence she reposed in him; he went over soon after to the Hague, and there met Prince Eugene, with whom he returned to the army, resolved to convince all Europe that no personal resentment should prevent his supporting the common cause, and prosecuting the war with vigour and effect so long as he continued at the head of the confederates. Villars again commanded the French army. The Duke, from the first opening of the campaign, proposed to himself the getting within the French lines, which

1711. Villars declared to be impenetrable; he proposed also to offer the enemy battle; and if it were found impossible to force them to fight, to reduce by siege that fortress, which would contribute most to open a passage into France. It was with these intentions that he attacked and made himself master of the little post of Arleux, marching the confederate army through the plains of Lens, that if the enemy had any intention of fighting, they might have a fair opportunity: but both schemes were disappointed; for Villars would not hazard a battle, nor did the possession of Arleux answer the purpose expected from it. Marlborough however contrived to beat him in his own way, by stratagem. In other campaigns he had excelled all other generals; but foreseeing it would be his last, in this he excelled himself. Seeming to abandon his design, he ordered fascines to be cut, went himself with all the general officers to view the enemy's dispositions, and made his own in such a manner, that there was not a man in his army who did not expect a battle the next morning; but at the close of the evening on the 24th of July, he marched off without beat of drum or sound of trumpet, having before ordered General Cadogan to pass the Sensett at Arleux with twenty-three battalions and seventeen squadrons. This feint caused Marshal Villars to recall every one of his detachments, from the apprehension of being attacked in his camp, as he was at Malplaquet: but as soon as he was informed of the march of the confederates, he perceived the deceit. The Duke gained his object, which was the

the investing of Bouchain. This he did contrary 1711.  
 to the sentiments of all that were about him, who  
 thought it impossible that he should take a fortress,  
 strong by situation, well garrisoned as well as ex-  
 cellently fortified, and with which it was hardly pos-  
 sible to cut off the enemy's communication. The  
 Duke however was determined, and the place was  
 invested on the 1st of August. This siege was  
 apparently a trial of skill between the two generals,  
 and it must be allowed that Marshal Villars gave  
 the clearest proofs of his capacity in the course of  
 it; but the bravery of the troops of the confede-  
 rates, animated by the presence of their general,  
 who was every where in person, carried all before  
 them; and, contrary to the expectation both of  
 friends and enemies, the place was yielded up on  
 the 17th of September, and upon the worst terms  
 possible, for the Duke would grant no other than  
 that of surrendering at discretion.

This was the last enterprize of the Duke of  
 Marlborough, who never fought a battle that he  
 did not gain, nor ever besieged a town which he  
 did not take.

And now when the French were reduced to the  
 last extremity, when almost every barrier of their  
 kingdom was taken, Marlborough was ignomi-  
 niously traduced at home, deprived of the com-  
 mand of the army, and even forced to fly his coun-  
 try, of which he had been the ornament and de-  
 fence: this was done by a set of profligate men,  
 who had insinuated themselves into the favour of  
 their Queen, now fallen into a declining state of  
 k mind

1711. mind and body, while they were at this time carrying on a scandalous underhand treaty with the enemy and disturber of the peace of Europe\*.

The grand question which divided the two political parties was nothing less than whether the brother of Queen Anne should be restored at her death. It is certain that the Queen herself was not averse to this arrangement, although there is no doubt that he was as bigotted a Roman Catholic as his father, and was certainly under the dominion and controul of France. How this question came to be blended with that of the war, it would be difficult to explain. Prince Eugene came to England to take measures for the prosecution of hostilities. He fairly spoke his mind of the whole of the leading men. That they seemed to him like those vain people of old, who had employed themselves in building the Tower of Babel; that there were not three among them that agreed either in sentiment or language; and that he perceived the greatest number of them looked only for power and emolument. These political men had the misfortune of living at a conjuncture when the

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\* It was to those very men that the following lines of the satyrist alluded :

Did they, Britannia's safety to ensure,  
Expose her naked to be most secure ?  
Did they make parties opposite unite  
In monstrous leagues of amicable spite  
To curse their country ; while their common cry  
Was freedom ? but their aim the Ministry.

GARTH'S *Dispensary*, Canto v.

broad

broad line of their duty perhaps did not lie quite 1711. straight before them.

A new congress for peace had been held at Gertruydenberg. The Dutch affected to treat the Embassadors of France with great contempt. They chose that their first conferences should be held in one of those very villages, which, with so much wanton cruelty, had been burnt and pillaged by the French during the former war, and, as if studying to insult them, they obliged the king's first minister to repair to them in person. There are few examples of so much pride meeting with so much humiliation. After some time passed in negotiating, the French in good earnest yielded to every one of the terms proposed in the former congress. Their king not only consented to withdraw his forces from the Spanish dominions, and to give up the Netherlands, and comply with all the other demands, but even to pay to the confederates a subsidy of a million of livres per month, till his grandson Philip should be driven from Spain. The demands of the confederates, particularly of the Dutch, still rose. It was insisted that the French forces should be employed in conjunction with those of the confederates for that purpose. The king, with a becoming spirit, at length replied, That he would rather make war against his enemies than against his own children, and would sooner assemble his nobles, and perish at their head.

Had either the confederates or the French possessed the least suspicion that Marlborough would be recalled, such demands on one side would not



1711. have been made, nor such concessions granted on the other. At this time an obscure man came from London to Paris, got admission to the minister, said he came privately from the court of London, and asked if the king and the French nation wished for peace? This, as a French historian expresses it, was like asking a dying man if he wished to live\*.

The Duke of Marlborough having suddenly received his dismissal, wrote the following letter to Queen Anne :

“ Madam,

“ I am very sensible of the honour your Majesty does me in dismissing me from your service by a letter from your own hand, though I find by it that my enemies have been able to prevail with your Majesty to do it in the manner that is most injurious to me. And if their malice and inveteracy against me had not been more powerful with them, than the consideration of your Majesty’s honour and justice, they would not have influenced you to impute the occasion of my dismissal to a false and malicious insinuation, invented by themselves, and made public when there was no opportunity for me to give in my answer, which they must needs be conscious would fully detect the falsehood and malice of their aspersions, and not leave them that handle for bringing your Majesty to such extremities against me.

“ But I am much more concerned at an expression in your Majesty’s letter, which seems to complain of the treatment you had met with. I know not how

\* Voltaire.

“ to

“ to understand that word, nor what construction  
 “ to make of it. I know I have always endea- 1711.  
 “ voured to serve your Majesty faithfully and zea-  
 “ lously, through a great many undeserved mor-  
 “ tifications. But if your Majesty does intend by  
 “ that expression to find fault with my not coming  
 “ to the cabinet council, I am very free to ac-  
 “ knowledge that my duty to your Majesty and  
 “ my country would not give me leave to join in  
 “ the counsel of a man who in my opinion puts  
 “ your Majesty upon all manner of extremities.  
 “ And it is not my opinion only, but the opinion  
 “ of all mankind, that the friendship of France  
 “ must needs be destructive to your Majesty; there  
 “ being in that court a root of enmity irreconcil-  
 “ able to your Majesty’s government, and the  
 “ religion of these kingdoms. I wish your Ma-  
 “ jesty may never find the want of so faithful a  
 “ servant as I have always endeavoured to ap-  
 “ prove myself to you. I am with the greatest  
 “ duty and submission,

“ Madam,

“ Your Majesty’s most dutiful,

“ And obedient subject,

“ MARLBOROUGH.”

The insinuations to which the Duke alluded in the foregoing letter, related to a clamour which had been industriously raised on account of certain perquisites paid by the contractors of the confederate army to the Commander in Chief: whether

1712.

strictly justifiable or not, it was no new custom, but had always been paid to whoever commanded the army of the states. This accusation was a mere handle and pretence, but the party gave it quite a different colour.

The Duke thought proper to retire soon afterwards from a country where his enemies and those of the state had at this time obtained the ascendancy. Upon the accession of his Majesty King George the First, in little more than two years, contrary to the designs of that party, his enemies were obliged to fly; and the Duke of Marlborough was again restored to all his dignities, of Captain General and Commander in Chief of all the Land Forces, Colonel of the First Regiment of Foot Guards, and Master-general of the Ordnance.

Had the party, which prevailed when the Duke was superseded, possessed the smallest spark of love for their country, at least they would have made peace before that event; but the Duke of Ormond succeeded in the command of the army, with orders that tied his hands. Nothing was done; and when Prince Eugene came with a larger body of Germans than any that had yet appeared in the field, the British troops were suddenly called home, and that too at a time when an engagement was expected with the French under Villars. The death of the Emperor Joseph, furnished a plausible pretence, as Charles the Third King of Spain was now become Emperor of Germany. Those German troops who were in the pay of Britain, refused

refused to obey the Duke of Ormond when he ordered them to withdraw with him. They remained with Prince Eugene. The battle of Denain was fought soon afterwards. The confederates were beaten, with the loss of near four thousand men; which saved France, and gave a different turn to the war. It dragged on for some time, till peace was concluded at Utrecht; in which Great Britain was the sole arbitress. It was in her power to have clipped the wings of the bird of prey in such a manner that she never could again have disturbed the peace of the world.

1712.

July 24.

1713.

March 31.

Thus much at least was gained:—the King of Spain was obliged to relinquish all pretensions of succeeding to the throne of France, and of uniting those two great monarchies. The dominion of the Mediterranean was secured to Great Britain, by obtaining Gibraltar and Minorca. She forced France to relinquish all pretensions to Newfoundland, to cede Hudson's Bay, Nova Scotia, and the Island of St. Christopher's. She obliged the French king to acknowledge the protestant succession; and not only to cease to protect, but even to abandon the Pretender. She reduced him to the humiliating necessity of destroying Dunkirk, whose very ruins were to remain as a monument of his disgrace. As the last triumph over his pride, she terrified him into concessions to the Duke of Savoy, whom of all the allies he hated the most.

The Emperor chose to continue the war some time longer, and lost Landau, which Marshal Villars retook; and Strasbourg, which he might have

1713. have obtained, had he acceded to the peace of Utrecht. He at length concluded a treaty at Rastadt; by which the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne had their dominions restored to them; but Spain was deprived of all her possessions in the Netherlands. France was forced to submit to the farther mortification of seeing those rich provinces dismembered from the territories of her favoured ally, and of beholding the aggrandizement of her enemy the Emperor, who obtained the greater part of them.

Thus much also was gained, that France, humbled to the dust, gasping for breath, and bleeding at every pore, was for many years deprived of the ability, if not of the inclination, of setting Europe in a ferment. It cannot fall within the limits of this sketch to trace that ambitious nation through her succeeding wars with England, in which France was constantly the unprovoked aggressor, and generally suffered severely in the contest. She has never failed to seize on every occasion of fomenting our divisions, and of endeavouring to dismember our empire; while Great Britain, by following an undeviating line of rectitude, attentive to her own concerns, without interfering with those of other nations, has risen to a pitch of grandeur and prosperity which no nation ever has exceeded; but which renders her still more the object of envy to her natural enemies.

France, in the midst of her enmity, could not do otherwise than regard our constitution with those sentiments of admiration which are the involuntary

luntary tribute paid by mankind to whatever is intrinsically excellent, but with a vanity consonant to her natural character, has supposed she could surpass in a moment the wisdom of laws perfected by the slow progression of ages. Conscious of a defective government, she sought for a change, and so far was justifiable, and even worthy of praise: but rejecting with disdain the temperate means held out to her by the unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth, from whose candour and benevolence every thing good was to be expected, she has preferred to wade through violence and bloodshed in her pursuits of liberty and happiness. In the beginning of her career, the urbanity of her professions to mankind at large, disclaiming all other views but those of internal regulation, were such, that all good men hoped the end might in some measure atone for the means; that blessed as she is with the gifts of Providence in her situation and climate, she would at length, under the auspices of better laws, bid adieu to her former system of crooked policy; and giving herself up to the cultivation of the arts of peace, her agriculture and commerce, would seek in them the only permanent sources of the happiness of nations.

The recent conduct of France proves what credit should be given to her professions, and how little the people of Great Britain ought to rely on those protestations of good-will and esteem with which she seeks to lull them into security, while by every underhand means she endeavours to disseminate among them principles at once destructive  
of

of all religion and of all government. She looks with an anxious eye for the moment when the seeds of mischief sown by herself in this now happy land shall have had time to ripen; well knowing that, while England remains true to her own interests, France will find it an impracticable task to subdue her.

From the foregoing pages, one great truth is to be deduced, a truth also existing in the annals of France: That in the zenith of her power, when considered by herself and the world as a nation of conquerors, the boundless ambition of her views was curbed; her vain endeavours to reduce these kingdoms to a province under her dominion, were defeated; she was compelled to relinquish the encroachments she had made; to retire within her own just boundaries; and her designs of universal empire were destroyed. Such were the effects produced by the indefatigable and invincible efforts of Great Britain and her allies, under King William and the Duke of Marlborough.

# **E X T R A C T S,**

**TRANSLATED FROM THE**

**GERMAN of G. FR. TEMPELHOFF,**  
**A COLONEL in the SERVICE of his**  
**PRUSSIAN MAJESTY.**





# R E M A R K S

O N

## General LLOYD's History.

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### CAMPAIGN OF 1756.

**T**HE King of Prussia is blamed by the Author for not having formed alliances, to counter-balance the confederacy raised against him; and for not beginning the war sooner, when he must have perceived it to be unavoidable. The examination of these opinions may perhaps belong more properly to the science of politics than to that of war; and while we are far from assuming a decisive tone, we may be permitted to submit our thoughts upon the subject to the judgment of the Reader.

The King was well acquainted with the dispositions of the European Powers; but a confederacy, formed many years before, might, with the lapse of time, be liable to change. The treaty of Peterburgh was signed in the year 1746. Suppose the war had not begun till 1762, or that the Empress  
\* B Elizabeth

Elizabeth had died some years before: in either of these events, the circumstances with respect to Russia would have been completely changed.

To counteract the alliance of Austria, Saxony, and Russia, it may be alleged that France and England might have been gained; but there appeared no cause for such precipitation; on the contrary, had the King endeavoured to form a close connection with either of these Powers, the Court of Vienna would not have failed to have called the attention of Russia to an alliance, which might easily have been supposed to be formed for no other purpose than that of offence. Contented with having asserted his right to Silesia, it had become the King's principal care and occupation to bring the arts of peace in that newly conquered country to perfection, and to frame such institutions as might repair the calamities of war. The greatness of mind with which he gave up so many conquests at the peace of Dresden to promote the tranquillity of Germany, furnishes, in our opinion, an ample proof that he wished for peace, that he sought after it, and as long as it depended upon him, that he was intent upon preserving it.

When the General considers as a false step, the not having begun the war in 1755, it seems to be his opinion that the King ought to have done this as soon as he obtained intelligence of the alliance formed against him. Although it is certainly true that a campaign should be begun as soon as possible, yet it does not follow from this principle, that you must declare war against your neighbour as soon

soon as you learn that he has formed an union with another Power for his security: treaties of peace would then indeed become an empty form. The King did all that a Prince in such a case could do; he was perfectly prepared for every event: even then it was necessary to remain inactive, till the intentions of his enemies and the nature of their confederacy could be more fully discovered, particularly as to the contents of the secret article of the alliance with the Court of Petersburg.

But it would have been a false and hasty step indeed, if the King had begun the war even in April 1756; for at that time his alliance with England went no farther, than that no foreign troops should be suffered to enter the Empire. So that we cannot perceive how an Author of so much penetration could have been led to think that these were faults. Whether the King confided too much in himself, appears a question, to decide on which required far greater knowledge of his Majesty, than the General seems to have possessed. His bold assertion has been formed from some events of the campaign, too inconsiderable for the establishment of any principle, in speaking of the eccentricities of a King of Prussia. It is not necessary that the scale of operations for an Alexander, or a Cæsar, should be the same as that for a Darius, or a Pompey.

It is needless to dwell longer upon a subject on which the world has long since had the fullest information. When the King saw himself surrounded by inveterate enemies on every side, he never

lost that self-collected dignity peculiar to great minds on great occasions ; and never could he stoop to solicit friendships which would exact the tribute of humiliation.

In the opinion of General Lloyd, the following ought to have been the objects of the campaign of 1756: To take possession of Saxony ; to leave 20,000 men behind to observe the army of the King of Poland in their camp at Pirna ; with the remaining force to move to Bohemia, to drive the Austrians to the Danube, or perhaps beyond it ; and conclude with conquering Prague and Olmutz.

It appears to him that nothing could be easier than to accomplish these purposes, because there was no strong army in Bohemia, and because such of the Austrian troops as were actually there would have immediately fallen back ; and that the King would have found the country totally unoccupied.

What the General says, has had so much weight, that the Austrians, in the war of 1778, adopted his ideas and principles in many particulars, so that his thoughts merit the greatest attention. But before we enter into this circumstantial examination, to enable us to form a just conception of the operations of the King, which the General takes upon him to condemn, we must turn our attention to the actual state of the Prussian army.

The King had divided his army into several corps, in Saxony, Silesia, Prussia, Pomerania, and Westphalia.

The

The army in Saxony consisted of 70 battalions of infantry, 41 squadrons of cuirassiers, 25 squadrons of dragoons, and 30 squadrons of hussars.

The army in Silesia consisted of 27 battalions of infantry, 20 squadrons of cuirassiers, 10 squadrons of dragoons, and 20 squadrons of hussars.

In Pomerania were 11 battalions of infantry, 5 squadrons of dragoons, and 10 squadrons of hussars.

In the garrison of Wesel 3 regiments were left, which afterwards joined the allied army, where they were known by the name of the Prussian Brigade\*.

In order to form an estimate of the strength of these several corps, it is necessary to observe, that a regiment of infantry at that time consisted of ten companies, forming two battalions, without reckoning the inferior staff-officers; containing

A regiment of musqueteers.

42 officers

100 under-officers

32 drummers

6 hautbois

1,220 musqueteers

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1,400 men.

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\* The names of all the corps are given in the original.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1756.

## A battalion of grenadiers.

17 officers  
 36 under-officers  
 20 musicians  
 28 carpenters  
 520 grenadiers

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621 men.

## A regiment of cuirassiers.

37 officers  
 70 under-officers  
 12 trumpeters  
 720 horsemen

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847 men.

## A regiment of dragoons.

37 officers  
 70 under-officers  
 20 musicians  
 720 dragoons

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847 men

## A regiment of hussars.

51 officers  
 110 under-officers  
 10 trumpeters  
 1,320 hussars

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1,491 men.

There

There were then

IN SAXONY,

55 battalions of musqueteers,	38,500
15 battalions of grenadiers,	9,315
6 companies of artillery,	900
8 regiments of cuirassiers,	6,712
1 squadron of garde du corps,	2,150
4 regiments of dragoons,	4,235
3 regiments of hussars,	4,473

Total	<u>64,285</u>
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IN SILESIA,

20 battalions of musqueteers,	14,000
7 battalions of grenadiers,	4,347
2 companies of artillery,	300
4 regiments of cuirassiers,	3,356
2 regiments of dragoons,	1,694
2 regiments of hussars,	2982

Total	<u>26,679</u>
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IN PRUSSIA,

10 battalions of musqueteers,	7,000
4 battalions of grenadiers,	2,484
2 companies of artillery,	300
30 squadrons of dragoons,	5,080
20 squadrons of hussars,	2,984

	<u>17,848</u>
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## In POMERANIA,

11 battalions of musqueteers,	5,600
3 battalions of grenadiers,	1,863
artillery,	100
5 squadrons of dragoons,	847
10 squadrons of hussars	1,491
	<hr/>
	9,901
	<hr/>

## In WESTPHALIA,

6 battalions of musqueteers,	4,200
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So that the whole Prussian army consisted of 122,913 men; of which number 90,964 were in Saxony and Silesia.

With respect to the numbers of the Austrian army, we must be guided by the public papers of the times; from which it appears, that in the month of August there were under Marshal Brown in Bohemia, and Prince Piccolomini in Moravia, 24 regiments of infantry of three battalions, 48 companies of grenadiers, 20 regiments of cuirassiers and dragoons, and 6 regiments of hussars, with a considerable corps of Croats, Sclavonians, and other light Hungarian troops. These, by the Austrian account, amounted to

67,424	infantry,
10,569	cuirassiers,
5,691	dragoons,
3,660	hussars,
12,241	light infantry,
<hr/>	

In all 99,585 men.

But

But even were we to suppose that the Austrian army consisted only of 70,000, which would be deducting almost 30,000, it will yet plainly appear that the General errs, when he asserts that there was no considerable army in Bohemia, and on that supposition proceeds to build his criticism on the conduct of the King. We may farther add, that the regiments in Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands, had already received orders to march to Bohemia, and that part of them were in motion with this intent. On a very moderate computation, the Austrian main army there, would in a very short time, that is at farthest by the month of December, have increased to 100,000 men. Had the Austrian troops in Bohemia been so few in number, and so badly furnished with all the implements of war, as the General seems to insinuate, the King most probably would not have been obliged to demand an explanation of the great preparations which were made.

One of the most important qualifications of a General, says Lloyd in another place, is not to indulge too strongly *a passion for a favourite project*. To this we give our perfect assent, and believe that this rule can no where so properly have its application as in the plan of a campaign. To abandon measures once determined, may be attended with some difficulty; but it is still more difficult to form designs so perfectly complete, that they shall stand thoroughly the proof on every change of politics or war. To what must not a General extend his views? What force of mind, what strength  
of

of imagination are not requisite to foresee and provide for the various events of a campaign? What depth of thought for the invention of measures, and the discovery of means to execute them? A General must not only know what he himself can do, but must also penetrate into the designs of his enemy, and with an eye piercing deep into futurity, anticipate each step which his opponent may probably take to counteract his measures. The knowledge of policy, of finance, and of mankind, must be combined with local knowledge, military science, and long experience.

When the King had entered on a war which can scarcely be paralleled in ancient or modern times, could he have discerned a possibility of conquering Bohemia in the few months which still remained of 1756, he certainly would not have neglected the attempt. But he knew the distinction between dazzling objects and such as had a true solidity, nor would he indulge *a passion for a project* which would probably have been attended with the most serious consequences.

In Lloyd's opinion, the King should have only left behind a corps of 20,000 men, to watch the Saxons. Then, as his army in Saxony would have consisted of 64,000 men, 44,000 would have remained to conquer Bohemia, and to drive the Austrians to the Danube: yet some thousands more must have been deducted, as he had Dresden, and his magazines along the Elbe, to occupy with troops. He then would have had 40,000 men, supposing his regiments all complete.

plete. The army under Marshal Schwerin was at most 26,000. Suppose that there was no necessity for his leaving any troops behind for the protection even of the Silesian frontiers, the King's whole force, with which he was to have advanced into Bohemia, would have been 66,000 men; 70,000 would have been opposed to them, which they must have beat completely in the field, before they could retain possession of Bohemia as their winter-quarters. Men of intelligence will readily decide how far this could have been practicable.

But farther: Is it probable that the Saxons, who were at least 15,000 strong, would have surrendered to 20,000? The Prussians had a great extent of ground to occupy, and their posts were necessarily too far asunder to invest the camp completely, especially as both banks of the Elbe must have been occupied. Let these 20,000 men have been posted how they would, the Saxons at every point of the circumference must have had a complete superiority: that they neither wanted courage nor inclination to attempt the breaking through, is evident from the efforts which they made in far less favourable circumstances.

It is erroneous to say, that Prince Maurice had only 20,000 men when the Saxons actually did surrender; this Lloyd asserts, to give his thoughts an air of probability. We have shewn that the Prussian army in Saxony consisted of 64,000 men, of which number 24,000 were detached to Bohemia,

hemia, consequently 40,000 remained on the two sides of the Elbe to block up the Saxons in their camp. Suppose the Saxons had escaped the King, the fruit of all his wisely-ordered dispositions would have been lost in the pursuit of a shadow.

We appeal to all who understand the art of war, to all who have ever served in Bohemia, nay to Lloyd himself, if the conquest of Bohemia could be so easily effected, while there was an army there, especially at such a season of the year, and in a country where nature has opposed so many obstacles to military operations. The event of a battle is ever uncertain, even when brought on by master-strokes of art; nor will a General be lightly moved to such a risk as may lead to the decision of a whole campaign, perhaps of a whole war.

Let us now suppose with Lloyd, that the Austrian army were driven back to the Danube: could the King then have taken up his winter-quarters in Bohemia? Marshal Brown would have fallen back for no reason but to draw his reinforcements to him, which were on the way, and furnished with every necessary implement of war. Nothing could have then prevented him from making head anew to harass the Prussians in their quarters; and supposing him to proceed in the design with tolerable prudence, it is very far from improbable that the King must in the depth of winter have abandoned all his conquests: his army harassed, and consequently weakened, could not  
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early have commenced the next campaign, to execute with energy the future operations.

But when Lloyd pursues the supposition, that the King might have begun in Moravia or on the Danube, with besieging or blocking up Vienna; that without the least danger he could have sent a considerable corps to the borders of Hungary, and have moved the army appointed to cover Saxony into the Empire, between the main and upper Danube: these giant strides appear to us only possible to be represented upon paper. It would have been just as easy to have added, that after the King had conquered Vienna, he might have sent a strong corps into the Ukraine, and have over-run that country without difficulty, *because it was open and unprotected by troops*; from thence he might have bent his course to Moscow, and after taking that capital, have been joined by troops from Prussia, and have conquered Lapland.

Such projects seem to appertain more to the ages of knight-errantry; for in these times it is not so easy to find any one who has an inclination to imitate Charles the Twelfth. The great Gustavus, it is true, did penetrate to the Danube; but could he then maintain his conquests? Having reached Saxony on his return, he came to Lutzen, there to conquer, and to die.

From the description which I have formed of the battle of Lowositz, partly from the public information, particularly that which has lately appeared at Dresden, entitled *The Prussian Campaigns*; and partly from narratives which I received not only

only from officers, but private soldiers, who were on the spot; I find little material alteration to be made in Lloyd's description of this battle, which is the best in his whole book. He is however mistaken, when he says that the Prussians came down the hill to attack; on the contrary, they were attacked. That they afterwards discerned their advantage, and advanced with impetuosity, must be attributed solely to their valour.

Lloyd seems to have spoken on a hasty view, when he condemns the circumstance of the cavalry not having been posted from the beginning in the center of the first line: at least it is a very strange opinion. It is certainly an universally acknowledged principle in the formation of an order of battle, that the component parts shall be in close connection with each other, conferring strength and firmness upon the whole. This can be accomplished by infantry and artillery alone. In camps and posts when we expect an enemy, cavalry are now generally employed for the support of infantry, and not for the defence of posts; especially as the custom of dismounting the dragoons is now rarely practised but on some extraordinary occasions. They are therefore to be considered as an auxiliary, to be employed with the greatest efficacy when the infantry have led the way to victory, which the cavalry will complete. Nothing can be more distant from my thoughts, than to deny to cavalry their proper praise. At Prague, at Rossbach, at Lissa, and at Zornsdorff, the cavalry gained the victories, and at Hochkirch they saved  
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our broken infantry ; but I believe it still to be improper to fix them at the commencement of a battle in a post which is obviously unfitted for the nature of their service. The strength of cavalry consists in motion and rapidity, but I cannot think the shock of cavalry must always be decisive. In the campaign of 1762, I was witness of a shock which the greatest part of the Prussian cavalry made upon a superior number of the Austrian cavalry. The consequence was, some hundreds were wounded and taken on both sides. Not a single man lay dead upon the place of action. The infantry of each army remained exactly in the same situation they were before. Still less opinion should we entertain of that which the French call *Impetuosité du Choc*, and of which all their Authors are so full. At Rosbach a regiment came down upon the French, whether it was that of Pomerania or Mark I am not certain, but they called out to their companions in broad German, *Brüderken gab tob*, (i. e. go on ) A French officer who was ridden over, observed, in a letter sent to Paris, that the affair would have taken quite another turn but for that regiment de Gatteau, and the *impetuosité du choc* of the regiment de Gatteau became an object of speculation at Paris.

Without entering into farther discussion, why cavalry can be of little service in the center of the foremost line of battle, we shall only beg to cite experience. At the battle of Blenheim, the French and Bavarian cavalry were in the cen-



ter \*. Marlborough routed them with little difficulty, and in consequence the infantry posted in the village of Blenheim were obliged to ground their arms without a shot. At Minden, the French cavalry were in the center, and the English infantry advanced with intrepidity against them: the consequence was victory.

The experience of ages has rendered it now almost an axiom, to place the cavalry upon the wings. When it is intended to attack, and when the ground is plain, this may perhaps be subject to alteration; but in every camp where an enemy is expected, it seems to be most advisable to place the cavalry behind the infantry, in whatever mode the ground shall otherwise be occupied. The impropriety of parallel attacks, wherein cavalry are opposed to cavalry, and infantry to infantry, begins to be discovered. The object at present is to find the enemy's weak points, and then to fall upon him with superior force. Artillery, infantry, and cavalry, are then combined to aid each other in making an impression, and in completing the success. Suppose an army encamped or posted with their cavalry in front in any part; the enemy ad-

\* These nations drew up their troops independently, by which means the right of the one and left of the other brought their cavalry together in the center. The term of *alæ* or wings, in its original signification as used by Cæsar, implied the presence of cavalry, and was descriptive of their celerity on the flanks. The phrase of *cornu-dexter*, or *cornu-sinister*, denoted the divisions of an army, which we call right-wing or left-wing.

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vances, draws out a couple of batteries of heavy cannon, supports these with infantry, which shall attack in lines, and with their cavalry behind them. The artillery begins a heavy fire upon the cavalry in front. I ask, supposing them to be the bravest men in Europe, can they keep their ground? They must unquestionably fall behind their infantry: the enemy then finds an empty space, they move with redoubled steps, and come upon the infantry in flank. In the very few camps in which the King has ever placed the cavalry in front of his flanks, it was when he was certain he could not be attacked. There may be cases which are not examples, but in the present instance the opinion ought to be decisive on the subject. The use of cavalry was never better understood than by the King, and before his time very false ideas were formed of its powers. This appears by reading the best military authors upon the subject; even when they themselves were soldiers. Puysegur speaks with less intelligence upon it than any Prussian subaltern, and Folard carries his whims so far as to call them useless lumber; but the King of Prussia has convinced the world, that by them battles may be won.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1757.

The observations of General Lloyd, with respect to the operations of the Austrians on the commencement of this campaign, are all grounded on the supposition that they chose the system of defence.

fence. He draws this conclusion from the circumstance of their having retired before the Prussians to Prague, without examining whether they were not obliged to take this step as most consistent with their plan of operations.

But when the position of the Austrians in their winter-quarters is considered, and the disposition of their magazines, it will appear more probable that their design was the offensive; and that by the King's rapidity the contrary became a matter of necessity. Their most considerable magazines were in Jung-Buntzlau and Budin; the lesser in Toplitz, Commottau, Welwarn, Auffig, and Reichenberg; the remainder in Prague, and in the interior parts of the country. The first mentioned magazines were so near the borders, that it was evident they would fall into the hands of the enemy if he advanced.

It is therefore much more likely that the Austrians imagined that the King would in the year 1757 remain totally on the defensive; that he either would abandon Saxony, or confine his operations to its defence. The preponderance of their confederacy perhaps gave birth to these opinions. At a time when they were bent on attacking the King's dominions on every side, it scarcely occurred to them that he himself would think of making conquests. Their having a corps in Moravia, where, as Lloyd justly observes, they proved of not the smallest use; and their having moved Count Koningsegge so far in front, are plain indications that their purpose was attack. The  
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former corps was certainly meant to advance into Upper Silesia, and the second into Saxony, while their main army, under Marshal Brown, should endeavour to drive the King from Dresden. It is not probable that the Austrians would remain on the defensive till their allies should appear in the field; as the smallest reflection must have convinced them that the burden of the greatest part of this campaign was certainly to be sustained by them. It was obvious, for many reasons, that the Russians would make no great progress in the course of this campaign, not only on account of their distance, but from their circumstances in respect to magazines. As to the French, a numerous army was opposed to them in Hanover, which, had it been in the beginning commanded by Duke Ferdinand, would most probably have prevented them from making any progress.

As to the assistance to be derived from the army of the Empire, history has shewn that they never were in haste to bring their contingent to the field. But did it thence follow that the Austrians were to chuse the system of defence, in opposition to the constant practice in their wars against France, and in the first and second Silesian wars? That their system should afterwards have been changed by Daun, was possibly the result of experience, which by that time had sufficiently shewn that it was dangerous to approach the King too near; but at the beginning of the war the Austrians had certainly no small opinion of their troops. Their haughty way of speaking of the Prussians after the

battle of Breslaw, *The guard Parade of Berlin*, as they called them, is hardly to be credited. It was bold as well as unbecoming to attempt to scoff away the merits of a nation. What man who is not prejudiced can bear such affected jargon without disgust? This I do not say because I am a Prussian; I am convinced that every reasonable Austrian must hold the same opinion.

#### BATTLE OF REICHENBERG.

When a military Author writes from his own observations, his work may prove instructive: when he gives his opinions to the world, as he then assumes in some degree the office of a judge, he should be very careful to obtain most perfect information, that facts may be represented as they are, and the behaviour of officers and soldiers be placed in a true point of view. He should therefore be a true Philosopher and Citizen of the World, and never should forget the *suum cuique tribuere*. Yet there are several great mistakes in the account which Lloyd has thought proper to give of this battle.

The Prince of Bevern having received intelligence that General Macguire had marched at the head of a considerable corps, with a view of cutting off a large convoy on its way to join him at Zittau, with the provisions and stores necessary for his progress into Bohemia, sent off a strong detachment to frustrate his intentions, and retained fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons.

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The Prince had made every necessary disposition to pass the Neisse at Passdorff at break of day, in which attempt he possibly would not have been interrupted even without any precaution, as the enemy shewed no inclination to leave their intrenchments. The only inference to be drawn from thence is, that the Prince adopted as his principle, that there are rules which must not be dispensed with in the field, even when there is a probability that the enemy can have no opportunity to take advantage of the negligence. By such conduct a commander forms his troops to constant vigilance, and creates such habits as must prove of great utility in the execution of the most arduous undertakings.

Officers and soldiers then perceive that the lessons which they have received in times of peace, are neither without utility, nor merely calculated to employ them on the place of exercise.

During the passage of the army, the Prince was employed in reconnoitring the enemy, and soon perceived, from the position of their cavalry and croats, that the wood on their left flank, at the foot of the mountain of Jesken, was most probably occupied with infantry. He must have been a novice indeed not to have perceived the enemy's intentions. It was obvious that they were to be attacked only on their left, and that he must begin by driving the infantry posted in the wood from their strong hold. The grenadier battalions of Kahlden and Alt-Billerbeck accordingly received orders to attack the enemy behind their abbatis,

and the Prince of Prussia's regiment to be in readiness to support and relieve them, should their attack be unsuccessful; but the grenadiers advanced with so much intrepidity, that the enemy, after a general discharge, drew back behind their second abbatis. As soon as the Prince perceived that the attack was prosperous, he gave orders to the fifteen squadrons of dragoons to attack the enemy's cavalry, which they completely routed. In the pursuit they fell into the fire of the infantry which had retired behind the second abbatis. Their right being exposed, they sustained considerable loss, and were thrown into disorder, whereby the enemy had time once more to set themselves in order, and to attack the cavalry, whom they drove back. The consequences might have been very serious, had not the hussars, posted in a hollow, advanced at that critical moment, and come upon the enemy's cavalry in flank. Our dragoons then rallied in their turn, attacked the enemy anew, and put them totally to flight. The enemy seeing that their cavalry were beat, that those of the Prussians could now fall on their left and on their rear, while they might be attacked by the infantry in front, thought proper to abandon their camp, which was entrenched by all the rules of art, and thought of nothing but their safety. Their retreat was certainly very far from being made in good order, except by the corps under General Laschy, which, not having been attacked, could hardly fail to draw back in the best order possible.

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From this description many of the faults imputed to the Prince of Bevern fall to the ground. He was either to attack the enemy, or to draw back. He chose the first, as the most consistent with the honour of his sovereign; and he was right. The Austrians were divided into several corps, and I cannot perceive why any one of them was not to be attacked where there was a possibility of victory, when the Prussian affairs required the most vigorous exertions; especially when, by driving back this corps under Count Koningsegge towards Marshal Schwerin, who he knew was advancing, he exposed them to the greatest danger of being cut off.

As to the attack with the cavalry, it was well conducted; Lloyd blames it only from the false intelligence he has received. While the enemy had infantry in the wood, the cavalry did not attack until that wood was cleared; but when circumstances are confounded, and when Lloyd puts first what should be last, materials upon which to frame his censures never can be wanting.

Nor are the faults imputed to the Austrians so great as represented. By posting their infantry in the wood and their cavalry behind, they shewed that they understood how troops ought to support each other. Their great fault most probably was in not advancing from their works to interrupt the passage of the Prince across the river. It has been often said, that if you are desirous of being defeated, you will entrench yourself. I shall not here express my sentiments on the subject, but history



affords more examples in support of this opinion than against it. The soldier in an entrenched camp, it certainly appears, has every advantage on his side. Why is it not really so? I may perhaps endeavour to unfold the cause some other opportunity.

Lloyd rather goes too far in his decisions on the conduct of commanders, which of all subjects ought to be treated with the greatest caution. If a decisive, well-grounded, just opinion be expected of the merits of a General in the conduct of a war, of a campaign, or of a battle, the historian should have something more than general knowledge of the military art, and of the plan of operations: he must weigh each circumstance minutely, and know whether the General acts from himself, or executes the plans of the cabinet; for it would be unjust in the extreme to reproach him with measures which were possibly against his judgment. In such a case the General must resign his understanding. Honor he cannot obtain, though he may perhaps avoid disgrace; at least it must be owned that while his hands are tied, his genius never can be free.

Nothing can be more fallacious than deducing consequences as to a General's abilities from the event of a battle. The preparatory steps must be well considered, before we conclude that he deserved censure or praise. From them we can perceive with what degree of vigour he provided for events, and how far he issued instructions as to what might happen. When the battle once begins,

begins, much must depend on the subordinate generals, on the commanders of battalions, on the officers, and even on the private soldier. If these do not perform their various parts, how often will the whole be lost. It then most certainly follows, that in the whole military system, there can be nothing of so much consequence as conjoint attention and obedience in every rank. This is the true basis of all military strength.

But as no commander can possess omniscience, or be present every where, it must frequently be left to the discretion of inferiors to add to, or diminish from, the letter of command, in compliance with the whole scale of the design: for the peculiarities of ground and of the enemy's position may be comprehended by the eye as far as the front of a battalion or brigade, when with a whole army this shall be impossible. The ground is often known only by the chart, which, however just, can never be exact to that degree which may be necessary. The eye must gain the instant information. But is this always possible? Frequent interruptions intervene; what seems a plain, proves broken ground cut through with defilés; one hill seems to command another; the contrary is often found to be the fact; nor can it be supposed that an enemy will allow a near approach, to ascertain the point of fight. A battle therefore can only be preconceived in the grand outline, and many heads and hands combine to finish it.

Besides, there is some difference between drawing up the lines upon the field of battle, conceiving,

ing, preparing, improving, and rejecting, when all the passions are afloat, and human nature, if I may use the expression, is wound up to the highest pitch; between this and setting at a writing table, and in cool blood examining what may or might have come to pass. When we go upon the ground and scrutinize it with attention, when we consider the position of both armies before and during the contending shock, and from various intelligence have formed complete ideas of the whole event, then we see with other eyes; the true question still remains the same: we must revolve every circumstance in which the General was placed. I would bring the critic to the spot, before he heard a syllable, and listen to his propositions. Is he silent then? *Ne futor ultra crepidam.*

Nor would Bohemia have been covered by the operations pointed out by Lloyd on the supposition of the Austrians having chosen the defensive. The King of Prussia would still have found it practicable to penetrate into that country. Even by Lloyd's own description of the theatre of war, he was himself of this opinion, when he says that this object could only be gained by erecting fortresses. Now there were no fortresses; and if there had been any, there still appear well-grounded reasons why the Prussians even then could not have been resisted.

It is not easy to protect a frontier, especially when, like Bohemia, a chain of gradually rising heights extend into the neighbouring countries. Bohemia has an infinity of roads which proceed from Prague, as from a center, over mountains,  
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into Saxony, Silesia, and Moravia. If you would prevent an enemy from entering, you must occupy them all, nor will a few battalions be sufficient. A considerable corps will be requisite. The main army will be weakened, and perhaps no great degree of strength be gained at any point. But an enemy who moves to the attack is in no respect so situated. He can keep his force together if he chuses, or can detach his troops when he thinks proper, and it appears for his advantage. His opponent cannot venture weakening one place to reinforce another, from the apprehension that the first will be surpris'd by an active and observant enemy, who, by exerting his force at any point, will probably obtain his end. When the enemy thus penetrates at any part in countries that are mountainous, then, generally speaking, all your other posts will find it expedient to draw back into the interior of the country from the fear of being cut off or beaten in detail. The roads which pass through mountains from the center of a country are commonly without communication, there seldom being any towns of consequence to give rise to such convenience. At least this is the case in Bohemia; whereas in Saxony, the contrary occurs. In the latter, the roads from one town to another are as good as can be expected in a mountainous country, and an army there can easily proceed along the frontier to support their various posts.

When a country is to be defended, it appears necessary to have the means of passing freely along the frontier on every side, unless you can take up  
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such a camp with your army, that the enemy cannot turn your flanks without the danger of being cut off from his own country and magazines, and at the same time when there shall be no possibility of his attacking you with any prospect of success, or driving you from your post. Such camps however are rarely, if ever to be met with; and, therefore, generally speaking, an active, determined, and inventive enemy, with an army accustomed to skilful and rapid manœuvres, will finally, at least with his infantry, find means of breaking through and turning your flank either with a corps, or perhaps with his whole army. The possibility of this the King has demonstrated on several occasions in the present war.

But the protection of this or that particular village, town, or district, is not the general question. The object of defensive war must ever be to counteract the enemy in such a way as shall best prevent the attainment of his general design, and by the chain and connection of operations oblige him at the end of a campaign to measure back his steps.

In Lloyd's opinion, the defence of Bohemia on the left side of the Elbe was to have been effected by the following position. To have occupied the defilés at Palsberg, the Duke of Ahremberg, with all the light troops and some battalions of infantry, ought to have been posted at Commottau, and the main army drawn together behind the Eger, in such a manner as that Marshal Brown might have had it in his power to have moved to Auffig, behind the Bila, in one day's march.

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It would have been very difficult for the Marshal in one day to have crossed a river with a considerable army, and afterwards to have marched twenty miles in a mountainous country to take up a new camp. And why should he have drawn his army behind the Eger, and not rather before it in the district of Leutmeritz? Then this had been possible in one day's march.

But suppose Marshal Brown had taken up his camp behind the Bila at Auffig, it does not follow that he was not to be driven from thence. The light troops which he could have posted behind the defilés at Gishübel and Gottleubein, would have been obliged to have drawn back; the King would have got round the Marshal's left flank, and soon have forced him to retire. The Marshal durst not have waited for this, as it would either have broken the communication with his magazines, or obliged him to attack the King. For this last measure it afterwards appeared that Marshal Brown had no inclination. As Lloyd made the campaign of 1760 with the Austrian army, it cannot be unknown to him that the King turned the flank of Marshal Daun's army on the 17th of December, in the mountains of Hohen-Giersdorf, notwithstanding that his position was far more advantageous than that of Auffig; that the whole Austrian army was there, and the King very weak in numbers.

On the whole, this and the other position which Lloyd has proposed, namely, That the whole Austrian army should have taken post behind

hind the defilés of Gishübel, must have been grounded on the supposition that the Prussians were to have been the passive spectators of all the movements of the enemy to accomplish this design. It is indeed surprising that Lloyd was so little acquainted with the King's activity, especially as he says, in his description of the commencement of the campaign, that the King had resolved to attack the Austrians with his whole force as soon as possible. How could he suppose that the King would have allowed Marshal Brown to have approached so near to the borders of Saxony? Gishübel and Gottleuben lay in the chain of the Prussian winter-quarters, so that thirty battalions could have moved in one day's march and have taken up a camp behind these defilés, and by a second day's march have taken post upon the heights of Nollendorf; so that they could have frustrated the Austrians in every attempt.

But would the position at Auffig and behind the defilés of Gishübel have barred the entrance into Bohemia, if the Austrians had, according to the plan which Lloyd finds so very proper and wise, remained on the defensive? I will suppose for a moment, that the army in Moravia had drawn together behind the Elbe at Schurtz, to prevent Marshal Schwerin from penetrating into the country. The King's army in Saxony at that time consisted of seventy-four battalions and one hundred and seventeen squadrons, and as in the autumn of 1756, seven battalions under General Wintersfeldt had been detached to Silesia, the

corps in Pomerania, which was afterwards drawn to Saxony, consisted of eleven battalions and fifteen squadrons. The King therefore would easily have left behind an army of twenty-six battalions and forty squadrons in the district of Gishübel and Gottleuben to cover Saxony on that side. With the remainder he might have advanced, by different roads, through Romberg and Georgenthal, and through Hohenstein, Nicholsdorf, Krewitz, Kämnitz; also through Zittau, Crottau, Gabeln, &c. The troops posted under General Macguire and Count Koningssegge could not have defended their posts, because the King would then have come upon their flanks and in their rear. They must have drawn back to their army, supposed at Schurtz, or the latter must have left their posts on the Elbe and have moved towards the Iser, and joined their corps on the borders of Lusatia. In both cases they would have been shut in between the King's army and that of Marshal Schwerin, and have been cut off from the army under Marshal Brown. To regain their communication, they must have drawn back along the Iser to Prague to cover that capital, and also protect their magazines. Marshal Schwerin would then have been enabled to form a junction with the King.

When the rapidity of the King's movements is considered, it is probable that he would have driven the enemy to the gates of Prague. Marshal Brown must necessarily have quitted his position on the left of the Elbe at Leutmeritz, and have drawn



drawn the corps of Macguire and Koningslegge to him there. The army which the King had left in Saxony would then have gained the opportunity of likewise penetrating into Bohemia, and it would have been a matter of no great difficulty for the King to have formed a junction with them.

I believe what I have said will by no means be considered as an impossibility. I could give my thoughts a greater weight by various reasons in support of them, but experience has since rendered any other species of illustration superfluous. In the short war of 1778, the irruption of Prince Henry into Bohemia was regulated in the manner above described, and the Austrians were obliged to abandon both banks of the Elbe: the roads which the army must have taken in these operations are certainly full of obstacles; but during the whole seven years war, every campaign of which I served, I never saw the Prussian army intimidated by bad roads.

Nor does it appear that if the Austrian army had been assembled at Prague, it would have been advantageous for them to have attacked the King or Marshal Schwerin. If they were to have attacked the King, it must have been before he crossed the Moldau. This he did on the 1st of May, at which time the corps of Macguire and Koningslegge had not yet joined their army, consequently they were not so superior to the King as Lloyd would represent them. After they had effected this junction on the 2d and 3d of May,  
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it then may seem as if they might have attacked either the King or Marshal Schwerin; but to form a proper judgment on the subject, we must first consider the position of the three armies.

The King, with his army, was encamped on the 2d of May at Weleslawin, with his right extending behind the convent of Margareth, and his left to the Moldau near Podhaba. In this camp the army halted on the 3d.

As to Marshal Schwerin, he had crossed the Iser on the 1st of May, and had taken up a camp at Sliwno. He remained there with his army on the 2d and 3d, and detached General Wartenberg with a small corps to advance nearer his enemy, and reconnoitre their position. The Austrian army were encamped in the position in which they afterwards were attacked.

Had they chosen to attack the King, they must have either recrossed the Moldau, or have moved through Prague. Either of these attempts must have been made in the presence of the King, who scarce could have failed to interrupt the execution. I hardly know what Lloyd means by saying, "They ought to have attacked him before he passed;" as if it were so trifling a circumstance to march out of a town in sight of an enemy, or cross a river, and take up a line of battle.

With as great difficulties would the attack on Marshal Schwerin's army have been attended. When the Austrians had united with the corps of Koningsegge, they certainly would have been

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stronger than the Marshal; but as they could not have moved against him with their whole army, but must have left a strong corps at Prague to observe the King, or, as Lloyd would have it, to prevent his passage across the Moldau, they could have been but little stronger than the Marshal. But the latter was drawn up behind the Elbe, and had the Iser on his left. To attack him, Prince Charles with his army must have passed the Elbe at Brandeis, or between that place and Kosteletz; but this could not have been effected sooner than on the 4th, as he could not have moved from Prague till the 3d, and could only have reached the Elbe by a very forced march. The Marshal had occupied Alt-Buntzlau on the 3d, and General Winterfeldt was posted with his corps at Bischitz. The Austrians must have crossed the Elbe in presence of the Marshal, and instantly have attacked him. According to every appearance he would have come before, and either have attacked them during the passage, or at least before the completion of their manœuvres; or it would have been perfectly in his power to have engaged, or not, as he thought fit: he could have drawn back without the least disadvantage; and have taken up an advantageous position where they durst not have attacked him. The King would thus have gained time to cross the Moldau, and to cut off not only the corps at Prague from the main army, but the main army itself from Prague. That army would have been placed between

tween the King's and that of Marshal Schwerin. In all human probability, had the Austrians taken this step, they would have made the King a present of advantages, which, in the event, he was obliged to purchase with the blood of numbers of brave men.

Lloyd cannot seriously believe that a small corps would have been sufficient to prevent the King from passing the Moldau, on the intelligence that the efforts of the main army were directed against Marshal Schwerin. To guard the passage of a river, unless it is of extraordinary breadth, is certainly extremely difficult if the enemy does not declare the very place where he intends to pass. He has perfect freedom on his side to move as he thinks fit, and can easily find means to elude his opponent. Marshal Brown thought more justly on this subject. The moment that the King had passed the Moldau, his junction with Marshal Schwerin might have been considered as effected, nor would he have delayed a moment to have moved against Prince Charles, and to have attacked him. The King would have built no golden bridge for his retreat, but, in conjunction with Marshal Schwerin, would have pursued him close; and if his army and the battalions in Prague had not withdrawn to Marshal Daun's army, he would have cut them off. Prince Charles shewed superior abilities, by remaining firm in his strong camp. Lloyd considers it as a fault in Prince Charles, *that he gave the King no interruption in the passage of the Moldau, and suffered him, after the passage,*

*to remain a day and night on the same side of the river, with a very considerable body of troops, in comparison of those of the Austrians, without attacking him.* This decision is founded partly upon the miserable intelligence on which he grounds his history, which he appears to have collected from the common newspapers, and partly proceeds from not bestowing due consideration on the subject. Had he called in military calculation to his aid, he would have praised this passage, effected with so much ability by the King's great skill, and at the same time have rendered justice to Prince Charles.

Let us consider that the King had blockaded Prague on the left side of the Moldau, and that on the same day Marshal Schwerin had moved on the right side of the Elbe, and had taken possession of the town of Alt-Buntzlau and Melnick; the King decided to pass the Moldau with a corps of twenty battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, and to join Marshal Schwerin. This corps, with this intention, was set in motion on the afternoon of the 4th, and marched into the district of Seltz and Podhaba, where they lay upon their arms during the night. The same day Marshal Schwerin crossed the Elbe at Alt-Buntzlau and Brandeis, and encamped at Prassin, while Lieutenant General Winterfeldt fell back to Kosteletz with six battalions and twenty-five squadrons, and very early on the 4th encamped at Mischitz nearer the Moldau. This movement most completely secured the communication with the King, who now had it in his power even  
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in the very sight of the enemy, early on the morning of the 5th, to throw a bridge of boats across the Moldau; because this attempt would now receive protection from the position of the Marshal's army. When this bridge was ready, the King without precipitation passed over in the afternoon, near four o'clock, and took up his camp at Tchimitz. The Prussian army there formed a chain from Brandeis to the Moldau, and from the other side of that river to Prague. The junction with Marshal Schwerin was effected, although perhaps every regiment did not encamp in a continued line. Whoever takes up any tolerable map of Bohemia, will be immediately convinced of the justice of my assertion.

Had Prince Charles attacked the King, he might have been shut in between the King's army and that of Marshal Schwerin. All his motions could have been discerned from the high ground on which the King stood, unless he had made a very great circuit attended with important loss of time, and unless the King chose to remain a passive spectator; the army of Marshal Schwerin could have joined the King at any time in three or four hours: he certainly would have moved whenever the enemy did; he would have interrupted their preparations for attack, and would have come upon their rear. Prince Charles's army would have been exposed to a complete defeat. No retreat to Prague would have been practicable; at least it would have been extremely difficult from the very strong  
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ground in front of his camp, by which he must have withdrawn; and on the other side the cavalry of Schwerin's army would have completely barred the way to Bomisch-brodt.

#### OPERATIONS PREVIOUS TO THE BATTLE OF PRAGUE.

A General frames his designs according to the measure of his talents and the means within his reach. Inferior minds frequently see difficulties where great men see none. "If I were Alexander," said Parmenio, "I would do this:" "And I, were I Parmenio," said Alexander. Had Lloyd meditated on the spirit of this celebrated reply, he would have formed juster thoughts upon the measures of the King. I wish he had not stopped at mere assertion, but had shewn us how the Austrians, even by any one single position, could have prevented the King from forming a junction with Prince Maurice's\* column. To form his discussions, and to draw his criticisms fairly, he should have founded them on actual events; and when he blames the King for causing Prince Maurice to move through Pasberg, while his own main army went by Gishübel and Nollendorf, (the distance is by no means so great as he represents,) he might have chosen likewise to observe that the Prince had scarcely an enemy near him, except a very few light troops at Auffig and Paskopel. The actual distance between the columns may be ascertained by

\* Prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau. TRANSLATOR.

by any one who knows the distance from Marienberg to Dresden. They could easily afford assistance to each other as soon as they entered Bohemia; and I have already demonstrated that the Austrians could not have prevented the irruption, even if their whole army had been posted at Auffig. Besides he forms ideas too conclusive of the defiles leading to Bohemia. The Prussians in this war have penetrated by them more than once, and in the war of 1778, Lieutenant General Mollendorff moved through Pasberg to Commottau, and in the middle of the winter too, by the most difficult roads to Brix. What, after all, are defiles to a commander who has courage, understanding, activity, and gallant troops? When Lloyd speaks of difficulties opposed to the King's plan of penetrating into Bohemia, some of which ought to have been insurmountable, we think on the left eye of Zadig, mentioned by Voltaire. "Had it but been the right eye," said the doctor, "the cure were easily effected; but swellings in the left eye are not to be reduced by medicine." Meanwhile the eye got well, and the doctor gave a learned treatise to the world, to prove that Zadig should have lost his eye by all the rules of art.

The King, in the opening of this campaign, displayed the execution of one of the first principles in war, to anticipate his enemy. To strike the blow with greater efficacy, means were invented to lull the enemy into security, and to inspire them with a high opinion of their disposition. Seeming to attempt an entrance into Bohemia, by various



ways, by means of Prince Maurice, General Manteuffel, and Prince Henry, and afterwards by drawing back their corps; this seemed to indicate that an irruption into Bohemia was attended with insurmountable difficulties. It was easy to bring the Austrians to entertain a high opinion of themselves. They formed the presumption readily that the corps of Koningsegge at Reichenberg, of the Duke of Aremberg at Egra, and a few light troops in the mountains between Lowofitz and Auffig, were sufficient to prevent the King's irruption. These flattering thoughts brought on a slumber, from which the cannon of the King awaked them.

I will grant to Lloyd that Marshal Brown, after his junction with the Duke of Aremberg, would have been as strong as the King. I will also grant that some good positions might have been taken between Prague and the Eger; but how the King's junction with Marshal Schwerin could hereby have been prevented, I cannot discern. The Duke of Aremberg first joined Marshal Brown at Welwarn, the King having already passed the Eger, which happened on the 27th of April, and not on the 26th, as Lloyd says. On that same day Marshal Schwerin's army was already at Jung Buntzlau. Now had Marshal Brown occupied any where between Welwarn and Prague, so strong a post that the King could not have attacked him without great risk, then nothing could have hindered Marshal Schwerin with his army to have passed the Elbe, either at Mel-

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nick, or between Melnick and Raudnitz, to unite with the King, or he might have marched straight to Prague, which would have soon obliged the Austrians to abandon their position, or to suffer the corps of Koningsegg to be routed a second time; and as they had been so imprudent as to place their magazines so far in front that they were in the power of the Prussians, they were under the necessity of drawing back to Prague in order to secure subsistence.

As easily might it be demonstrated that the enemy, after taking up such a position, could as little have prevented Marshal Schwerin's junction with the Duke of Bevern. The King having formed his arrangements on the actual state of circumstances, regulated also by the measures of his enemy, and not on possibilities, found that he could very well allow his columns to proceed at a certain distance from each other, without the danger of being beaten in detail, or exposed to defeat. That he was exposed to no danger in crossing the Moldau in presence of the enemy, I have already shewn. That these measures had a prosperous issue is not to be ascribed to chance, but to the wisdom which concerted them.

## BATTLE OF PRAGUE.

There is perhaps nothing more difficult in history than to describe a battle, so as to be instructive to military men, and at the same time to be impartial. The public accounts soon after the event are most commonly an unintelligible jargon of unmeaning circumstances, in which both parties endeavour to conceal their faults and to justify their dispositions, to over-rate their own advantages, and proportionably to undervalue those of their opponent.

What Lloyd has thought proper to give as the description of this battle to introduce his criticisms, are exactly of this sort; it is therefore necessary that I should subjoin another.

As soon as Prince Charles assumed the command, he crossed the Moldau, and encamped with his left extending to the Ziskaberg hill near Prague, and with the right to the village of Kyge: Maleschutz was in the rear of the right wing. The army was drawn up in several lines in the usual manner, with the cavalry upon the wings, and the infantry in the center. The Prince's design was to draw in the corps of Count Koningsegge, which had been driven back by Marshal Schwerin, and to wait for Marshal Daun, who was in his march from Moravia to the main army with a considerable corps.

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The camp was upon a chain of heights which, from Hortlortzes to Prague, are rocky, high, and steep. There is another range in front of them, extending along the Moldau, which are lower and have a number of vineyards upon them; the roads between are so narrow and inconvenient that an army cannot advance in column. At the village of Kyge, the declivity begins to abate till it terminates in a plain at the manor of Sterboholi, where the ground becomes advantageous to cavalry. On the right flank, and to the rear, there were a number of fish ponds, connected by a rivulet, which runs through the village of Unter Potschernitz, Wissotchan, &c. and at Luben falls into the Moldau. All along the rivulet the ground is extremely difficult for an army to pass, not only from being steep and rugged, but from the marshy banks of the rivulet. Where the heights abate, near Kyge, there were some roads of communication across, but which had many obstacles. There are between Hostawitz and Kyge two considerable lakes; and in order to approach the latter village, you must move across a dam between them. There is likewise a considerable lake at Hlupetin.

From this description of the ground, it is obvious that in this first position the left wing was secure against every attack, so that a few battalions properly posted should have been perfectly sufficient there. The right wing, but particularly on the flank, had likewise advantageous ground; but the camp could be turned on that side, and then

then had every thing to fear from an enterprising enemy.

Prince Charles was too experienced a general not to perceive this well. As soon as the corps of Koningsegge had joined the army, and he had received intelligence of Marshal Schwerin's near approach, he changed his camp, so that his left and center remained on the Ziskaberg heights; but he drew back his right, and formed an angle, the point of which was posted on the heights between Kyge and Maleschutz. But he neglected altering another part of his original disposition, and did not remove his cavalry from the left wing, where they could be of no use from the nature of the ground. The right wing was then upon the heights behind Sterboholi, but still a considerable distance from thence. To cover the angle some battalions were moved in front, where they threw up an entrenchment and a strong battery. All the artillery was drawn out along the front of the line, and placed so advantageously, that the batteries could flank each other and completely command the ground in front. To add to all, they began to throw up redoubts, but on the day of the battle some of them were unfinished, and others were useless.

We must allow the Austrians the praise, that they excel in attention to this point, in forming works agreeable to the rules of art. Marshal Daun was truly an original in this respect. His field-works were made with such solidity, that, at the distance of twenty years, in 1779, I saw them still in the best condition

condition in his camp of 1759, at Plauen near Dresden.

When we think of the prodigious natural strength of that ground, and also remember that at that time the King had lost the battle of Cunnersdorff, and the corps of General Fink at Maxen, and certainly had not half Daun's numbers; what judgment are we to suppose the private soldier entertained of the heroism of his leader?

The Prussian tactics being founded on the system of attack, which constantly inspires the soldier with fresh courage, they are not partial to entrenchments. Their enemies, and several military authors, have been witty on the subject of their works; and in truth they were often of no farther use than as a breast-work to rest the arms upon; but it is not to be inferred that they had no knowledge of the art, because they rarely, if ever, were in the situation that they chose to practise it. Their courage was their wall; and as to the art itself, can there be any mystery in throwing up some thousand cubic feet of earth, and in giving it consistency and form? I am well convinced of the advantages of works in many cases; but marching with a lantern in broad day-light is perfectly ridiculous.

In this new position Prince Charles determined that he might encounter not only Marshal Schwerin, but the King, who was still on the other side of the Moldau, and that he might without apprehension expect them even after they should form a junction; and the apparent strength of his ground in many places seemed to justify his resolution. It was also

much intersected with hedges and ditches, and a body of troops in working their way through all these obstacles, of course would be exposed to the effects of their artillery; which, though often greater in imagination than reality, yet, when well served, may at a certain distance be exceedingly destructive.

Nevertheless these ditches were not a sufficient cover for his flank, and in reality the Austrian commander gained nothing farther by this new position than obliging his enemy to make a greater circuit to attack him; for when we rely on such obstacles as hedges and ditches in a field of battle, against an enemy advancing with intrepidity and skill, they may often prove of greater detriment than of advantage, by occasioning prodigious breaks and bendings in your line, much more injurious to the defender than to the assailant. But the method of attacking in flank or rear was unexpected; and truly the generals of modern times before the King, thought only of the parallel attack, not excepting those great commanders Eugene and Marlborough.

Schwerin's army having crossed the Elbe at Brandeis on the 4th, and encamped between Praffin and Mischitz, the King resolved to cross the Moldau with twenty battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, and to attack the enemy, notwithstanding the strength of their position. When the bridge was ready, the King, by the signal of three cannon shot, gave intimation to Marshal Schwerin that he was about to begin the passage  
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of the river, which was immediately effected, and he arrived with the corps in the evening in the camp at Czimitz. While the passage was going on, the hussars of Seidlitz arrived from Marshal Schwerin's army, which consequently was very near.

On the 6th the King moved at five in the morning towards Marshal Schwerin. Having formed a junction, he rode with the Marshal to the heights to reconnoitre, and perceiving that the enemy were not to be attacked in front, the Marshal was sent in full gallop to the left wing to see if the enemy's right could not be turned, and if they could not be attacked in flank. He immediately perceived that the enemy's right did not extend to Sterbohli; that their flank had little strength, being on ground of a gentle declivity, of no consequence to infantry moving to attack; and that to their right there was a very fine plain for cavalry. In the front of their right wing there seemed a fine green plain apparently consisting of meadows, and as there were several dams to receive the water, it seemed more than probable that these meadows, if not quite dry, at least were passable for infantry, while the cavalry moved farther to the left, and the artillery should pass across the dams. In examining the chart, it is easy to perceive that the Marshal formed a just opinion; and his not being able to distinguish the half empty dams from meadows, from their being filled with green slime and grass growing from the bottom,

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was merely one of those deceptions of sight to which all men are liable.

As soon as the King received the Marshal's report, the army immediately marched, by divisions to the right, with such precision and celerity, as no one can form a just idea of who has not seen the Prussian troops manœuvre, and been a spectator of their strength and facility of movement\*.

The Austrians were not apprised of these circumstances till the head of the line of march appeared at Unter Potchernitz. The hills perhaps concealed the march, or they had adopted the opinion, that the King either could not attack this day, or would not choose it, for they had sent their cavalry to forage. They now sent orders for them to return with the utmost haste, and to draw up in the plain behind Unter Michelup. At the same time Prince Charles ordered the cavalry of his left wing to march with the greatest speed to reinforce the right. Both orders were accomplished in

\* Twenty Prussian battalions occupying nearly four thousand yards, advance in line for twelve hundred paces and more without the least derangement of their order; then execute a conversion on their centre, and take up a line oblique to their former front in ten minutes. A column of twenty Prussian squadrons, each ninety yards in front, or thereabouts, display a front in fifty-four seconds. There are numberless other combinations as extraordinary, and which may appear fables to those who do not know the Prussian troops.—MIRABEAU *Monarchie Prussienne*, article *Affaires Militaires*, octavo edition, p. 187. TRANSLATOR.

in good time. Their cavalry drew up in three lines, and, in their front, General Haddick with his hussars formed an angle, the right side of which extended to the pond of Unter Micholup. Their infantry at the same time moved off by the right with great precipitation, yet they could not reach the heights of Sterboholi before the Prussian army, which continually approached. Our infantry moved to the right of Unter Potchernitz. The heavy artillery and a great part of the cavalry moved through the village. As soon as the left came on the ground of Sterboholi, the Marshal gave orders to form and attack. Part of the infantry moved across the dams, some along the narrow foot-bridges, and some, in the best manner they were able, across the meadows. This could not be effected in the most perfect order; the dams were narrow, and the troops were under the necessity of filing off in many places; but the half empty dams had nearly stopped the progress of the greater part. The soldiers sank above the knees in mud. Several battalions were obliged to leave their guns behind, at the moment they most wanted them, against an enemy whose front was covered with a numerous and well-served artillery.

But this undaunted infantry surmounted every obstacle, and had actually formed their line about one o'clock. It would have been well if they could have halted for a moment, as their fatigue had already been excessive; but so great was their ardour and impetuosity, that they waited not an instant to attack the enemy. They were received

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with cool intrepidity, and with a prodigious discharge of ordnance. The King had ordered that the soldiers should not fire, but use their bayonets: this command was punctually obeyed. Notwithstanding the most tremendous cannonade, the line advanced in good order. At four hundred paces from the enemy they came down to the charging position, with a view to carry all before them with impetuosity; but the enemy's musquetry became dreadfully destructive, and the intervals they caused in our battalions were not to be replaced. The grenadiers upon this came down from their heights, and followed the Prussians sword in hand. This they practised several times during the war, but they commonly had reason to repent it. It was generally when the enemy gave way, upon which occasion there may be reason to suppose the measure to be proper at first sight; but if we fairly consider the nature of our arms, we must soon be convinced that it can be right on no occasion whatever. The foot soldier, when he draws his sword, must either throw away his firelock, or must sling it. If he does the last, it causes great impediment; and if the first, he loses his defence. In either case he must draw back if the enemy should rally and oppose with bayonets, or cause their second line to move in front. The Austrians have learnt this custom from the Turks, whose janissaries generally attack with swords when they have given a volley. But they should recollect that the Turks are ignorant of the use of the bayonet, which is much to be preferred

preferred to swords for the foot soldier. The Imperial grenadiers consider it as a proof of courage to depend upon their swords; but upon this occasion, where these battalions gave way, and fled in considerable disorder behind Sterboholi to the dams at Dubetch, not any one of them was wounded by a sword in the pursuit; and, on the other hand, when men are firm with bayonets fixed on their firelocks, they will laugh at swords.

The cavalry of the left wing of Marshal Schwerin's army mean while had crossed the dam near Sterboholi, and formed in the plain, with their left to the fish-pond at Unter Micholup. This pond was about two hundred paces long, and the Austrians were drawn up behind it, and did not give their enemy the smallest opposition in the passage of the dam. Either they had lost their eye-sight, or were in a state of indecision what to do. In this state they were not suffered to remain long, for as soon as the Prussian cavalry had marched up, the Prince of Schoneich, who commanded them, attacked those of the enemy, threw their first line into confusion, but lost his flanks, being outnumbered by the enemy on both sides, and was obliged to draw back by their second line, which now advanced. But he again returned to the charge, attacked the enemy anew, and broke through their line in several places, though in others he was not so successful. Colonel Warnery in particular, with five squadrons of Putkammer's hussars, having got through, left the pond at Unter Micholup to his

right, and manœuvred with such skill that he came on General Haddick's flank, and not only dispersed several regiments of the enemy's cavalry, but obliged the rest to desist from their pursuit of part of our cavalry which had been again beaten back.

Engagements of cavalry differ from those of infantry in this respect, that after an exertion they require more time to breathe and form anew, which gives the enemy an opportunity to rally. So it happened upon this occasion; but Ziethen's and Werner's hussars having come from the left wing, they renewed the attack, which now proved decisive. The whole Austrian cavalry were dispersed, part of them were driven back behind their infantry, and part to Sabielitz and Unter Micholup. Some regiments of their cavalry endeavoured to rally, but the regiment of Stechow's dragoons having joined the hussars which Colonel Warnery had again assembled, they attacked, and once more routed the enemy, and took the standard of the regiment of the arch-duke Joseph.

The right wing of the Austrian infantry was then thrown into confusion, which was increased by some squadrons of Prussians who cut their way among them.

During these engagements of the cavalry, Marshal Schwerin was fully employed in endeavouring to restore order to the broken infantry. He commanded several battalions to advance from the second line into the first, and to drive back the enemy.

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This they immediately proceeded to execute, but his own regiment unfortunately followed the example of the corps which stood next them, and came to a halt. The Marshal immediately quitted his horse, took the colours in his hand, headed the troops, and having restored the way to victory, died, like a true hero, for his country\*. Several generals followed the example of the Marshal in dismounting from their horses, and leading their brigades on foot. This and their animating words inspired the soldiers with new strength. The enemy no longer could oppose them, but took to flight in great disorder.

From a movement which the Austrian army made opposite to the King towards their own right, to gain more ground and form an angle, in the fear of being attacked in flank and rear, they suffered several inconveniences. Great haste being made in unfavourable ground, their columns lengthened, which, when they came to form, occasioned several intervals, and a great space was left

\* Upon a former occasion, Marshal Schwerin represented to the King, that, instead of forty thousand men which had been promised, the lists only contained thirty thousand. "True," replied the King, "but you have forgotten to add your own name, which may well be estimated at ten thousand."—The Emperor Joseph the Second, in the year 1776, enquired for the spot where Schwerin fell; and having drawn up six battalions of grenadiers, fired three salvos of artillery and small arms, taking off his hat between each discharge.—Marshal Schwerin was killed at the age of seventy-three.

TRANSLATOR.

left between this angle and the remaining part of the army behind Sterboholi. The left side of the angle had not taken up a right *alignement*, which seems to have been the cause of this opening of above 400 paces.

The King immediately saw the consequence of this manœuvre, and did not hesitate a moment to avail himself of the advantage. General Manstein, with the grenadier battalions of Kanitz, Fink, and Wedel, were immediately ordered to advance, and the regiments of Hzenplitz and Manteuffell, and a body of cavalry, to support.

The gaining of this post was of the greatest advantage, as flanking batteries were opened along the enemy's right and left, which could not fail to prove decisive. The enemy withdrew their artillery from the redoubts, and giving way, the grenadiers pursued them closely. The King, in seizing the advantage of this opening, had great difficulty, from the nature of the ground, which was extremely rugged. The regiments performed wonders of bravery. The loss which several corps sustained was very great. The regiment of Winterfeldt alone, in the attack of a battery, lost one thousand men, having advanced under the severest fire in as good order as if they had been at a review. The grenadiers of Maurice and Manteuffell advancing to their support, called out, "Comrades, let us have our share of danger and of honour;" and they suffered very nearly as much, but gained the post. The enemy defended  
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their retreat, so that when one hill was gained, a line of troops appeared upon the next, through which the fugitives retired, while they continued to maintain their ground with obstinacy.

The Prussian army kept inclining to their left towards the Moldau as they advanced. The enemy's right wing was completely routed; they fled through Micholup and Sabietch in the greatest confusion; and the King having penetrated so far that his right was now at the hospital of invalids, and the left not far from Wischerad, the retreat of the enemy's right wing and center was cut off, and they had no other choice than to enter Prague, through which, after the battle, they endeavoured to pass, but were driven back into the town by Marshal Keith. Another body attempted to pass the Moldau behind Wischerad, but were prevented by the King's left wing. During the battle, Prince Maurice endeavoured to throw a bridge across the Moldau at Brunick, above Prague, to come upon the enemy in rear; but, from the want of a sufficient number of pontoons, was obliged to desist, and could only cannonade them as they fled. Could this design have been effected, their whole army must have been destroyed\*.

Thus ended the battle of Prague, in which both sides fought with extraordinary bravery. If those men who, in their admiration of the ancients, consider modern troops as little in comparison, would, with imaginations unseduced by all the elo-

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\* Two or three pontoons more were wanting, and there was an unexpected swell in the river.

ARCHENHOLTZ.



quence of ancient historians, compare the plain facts in every battle of this war with those of former times, they would acknowledge no inferiority on the side of their contemporaries. The Prussians did all that men could do. There were marshes which they struggled through; there were mountains which they climbed, regardless of the formidable position of their enemies, and of the destruction caused by their artillery. Some battalions did retire, but returned with fresh vigour to the attack. No battalion was twice beaten back. The fertile genius of the King had formed the Macedonians, which his father left him, into Spartans.

The reasons why Lloyd would have had the King refrain from attacking the enemy; "that it was improbable he could have beat them in so strong a camp, that they were in the neighbourhood of a fortress," &c. &c. are observations of too common place a nature to have any weight. Marshal Daun was approaching so fast, that his junction with the main army was to be apprehended. Had this happened, it is obvious that it would have been still less probable the King should have beat them; and as to the plan of marching towards Kollin or Kuttemberg, his Majesty would indeed have been no common general had he committed such a fault. That an army is not to be attacked because they are in the neighbourhood of a fortress, is a most extraordinary opinion. A fortress is supplied with necessary provisions for its own garrison for a certain given time. If you are so fortunate as to beat the army in its neighbourhood, it then becomes

comes the rendezvous of that army, not only of the fugitives, but of the wounded. The want of provisions alone must soon oblige the commandant to a capitulation, and let the army's strength within be what it may, they cannot use it if they are blocked up on every side; an elastic body, when compressed, cannot preserve, or soon regain, its natural figure, or elasticity. As to their attacking Marshal Keith, is it possible that Lloyd can be serious? Does he not know that they did attack him several times in vain? We really might have expected better observations from the pen of Lloyd, in his attempts to throw light upon the operations of the King; yet he will reason, as the French did on Newton, his great fellow-countryman. They tried, and tried again, their theories upon colours. His geometry produced the prism, giving to optics a new form of science, upon which they *reasoned*. Had not Lloyd abounded still in common-place ideas and remarks, he would have seen no such mighty wonder in the King's considering it as possible to shut up an army of fifty thousand men in Prague, in hopes of obliging them to surrender at last. The loss of the battle of Kollin hung on the turn of a straw. Had the King gained it, what would have become of Prince Charles? He had an example of history on his side, in the blockade and surrender of Vercingetorix, by Cæsar, at Alexia.

As to the letter said to have been written by Marshal Belleisle, I never can believe that so complete a French gasconade could proceed from the

pen of that brave General: "*Avec la moitié des troupes que le Prince Charles y a actuellement, je détruirois l'armée Prussienne.*" "With one half of the troops which Prince Charles had, I would destroy the Prussian army." Such impertinencies were not uncommon from the French for some little time after the commencement of the war. Before the battle of Rosbach, an Æsop figure of a French officer observed, shrugging up his shoulders, "*On fait bien de l'honneur a Monsieur le Marquis,*" meaning the King of Prussia, "*que de lui faire une espece de guerre;*" but as to Marshal Belleisle, when he was blocked up in Prague, and made his famous retreat from thence, if he had had the King opposed to him, he would have been sung in the streets of Paris, as the Count de Clermont was after the battle of Crevelt.

*Moitié casque, moitié rabat,  
Clermont vaut bien un autre.  
Il preche comme un soldat,  
Et se bat comme un apôtre.*

Half helmet, half cassock; lo! Clermont, most quaint,  
Has preached like a soldier, and fought like a saint.

Lloyd casts his reflections on the Austrian Generals, particularly Marshal Brown, with little ceremony, and as little knowledge of the circumstances. "The position of the right wing of the Austrian cavalry was surely very advantageous, as the Prussians could not attack them without  
"expoling

“exposing their flank to General Haddick’s  
 “hussars, which he had drawn up in an angle.  
 “Suppose the Austrian cavalry had taken the  
 “position which Lloyd proposes, and placed their  
 “right by the other dam, which was of very in-  
 “considerable depth, the Prussians could have  
 “attacked them not only with an equal front,  
 “but could have also made a circuit, and have  
 “come upon their flank and rear \*.”

The supposition of Marshal Brown’s having acted from private motives, is indecent and improbable; such accusations should be founded on the surest grounds, and not upon conjecture.

As to the strength of the two armies in the battle, both sides have over-rated the numbers of their opponent. Many consider it as a matter of great importance, to know if an army was strong or weak in a battle; and think to find the key to many an event from this intelligence, which otherwise would be inexplicable. It is generally matter of consolation to the vanquished, that they were opposed by superior numbers; yet it is not always matter of shame to have been beaten by a great general. Turenne and Monte Cuculi, if they had fought, must one of them have lost the battle; but whether the victor or the vanquished was the greatest

\* I ask General Warnerey’s pardon for having used his own words on this occasion. As he was present at this battle, and has a thorough knowledge of the tactics of the cavalry, he surely is the best authority.—See his *REMARKS sur plusieurs Auteurs Militaires*, page 95.

man,

man, would perhaps have appeared much more decidedly by their conduct after the engagement. On the most minute enumeration of the corps on either side \*, it appears that the Prussians had in all Bohemia about one hundred and ten thousand men, of whom sixty-four thousand were on the field of battle, where the Austrians had seventy-six thousand six hundred and twenty-one men. But very little stress is to be laid upon the circumstance of one army's being somewhat stronger than the other, unless the superiority be beyond all measure. Fifty thousand may well contend with sixty, seventy, or even eighty thousand. The King has shewn in this war, that with from twenty to thirty thousand men he could beat an army of from sixty to eighty thousand. His enemies indeed have never shewn any such examples. Numbers may be often an incumbrance; and generals of the first-rate have preferred commanding armies moderately numerous, knowing when to give and when to refuse a battle. Yet one advantage in superior numbers must remain unquestionable. Large corps can be detached to incommode an enemy in flank or rear, to cause diversion, or to form sieges. Had not

\* This in the original takes up many pages. The Prussian account states, that the Austrians lost 30 officers, and 4,000 men, (the killed are not stated,) sixty pieces of cannon, and 10 standards: that their own loss was 54 officers and 3,099 men killed; 397 officers, 8,208 men wounded; and 6 officers, 1,537 men missing. Colonel Templehoff leaves the state of killed and wounded as it stands in General Lloyd's account.

the

the Austrians been stronger than the Prince of Bevern at Breslau by more than twenty thousand men, they never durst have formed the siege of Schweidnitz.

## CONSIDERATIONS ON SUBSISTENCE.

The reasoning of Lloyd upon the battle of Prague, partakes of all the wildness of the spirit of adventure, and of all the wantonness of that of censure.

Lloyd is read with eagerness, perhaps because he has very boldly given to the world his thoughts upon the King's operations. Mankind feel a sort of satisfaction and comfort when they find a heart so stout as to attack superior talents of decided eminence, and then are very ready to bestow applause.

Lloyd returns to his darling project of driving the Austrians across the Danube, and besieging Olmutz. I must beg to add something to what I have observed in speaking of the first campaign, to demonstrate still more fully the nature of this chimera.

*Pour établir le corps d'une armée il faut commencer par le ventre.* "To maintain a military body, you must begin by providing for the belly." If this plain rule be once forgotten, there can be no military operations; and yet to how many difficulties does the observation of it lead? the greater in proportion as the army is more numerous. Small corps of from ten to fifteen and twenty thousand

thousand men can penetrate more easily into an enemy's country than large armies. Hence in the thirty years war, armies being far less numerous than at present, could move from one end of Germany to the other.

It must necessarily be the first care of a general, in the execution, as well as in the plan of a campaign, not only to obtain sufficient means of subsistence, but to dispose of it in magazines in such situations as may be most advantageous. The lines of operation will be one or more as the army forms different bodies.

In an offensive war, these lines, proceeding from different directions, will unite at some fixed point, to which the main design will tend. In a defensive war, these lines extend from post to post along the frontier, and to the rear. The King's line of operations in the present campaign, on the one side of Dresden, was directed upon Prague, through Budin and Welwarn; on the other side, from Zittau, through Gubel, Jung Buntzlau, Brandeis, and also upon Prague. On the side of Silesia, from Schwednitz and Glatz, through Landshut, Konigshoff, Gitchin, Buntzlau, and Brandeis, upon Prague.

To determine on the choice of such lines of operation among the great variety which occur, as may conduce to the main object by the shortest and most efficacious way, is certainly one of the principal qualities of a general. The success or failure of most operations turns entirely upon this, Is the choice a good one? Advantages obtained  
by

by victory, or otherwise, may then be turned to great account; or if you have the misfortune not to conquer, or are obliged by other unfavourable circumstances to change the original design, you can draw back with safety. On the contrary, if the choice be bad, battles may be won, yet no advantage be gained. Armies may be under the necessity of yielding up their conquests, and of evacuating whole provinces which they had gained. Numberless examples may be found in the course of this war, to illustrate these assertions.

The subsistence of the army then being a consideration of the very first importance, we must not only pay attention to the circumstances of the country proposed as the theatre of war, to the degree of its fertility, &c. &c. but likewise to the season of the year.

The chief articles of an army's subsistence are bread and forage. These are rarely to be had in a sufficient quantity from any country for a length of time. On this account, magazines must be placed along the line of operations in places either tenable in themselves, or so situated that they may be covered by few troops; and a sure communication with the grand magazines must be maintained, to supply the consumption readily, and without great difficulty. In this campaign, the King's main magazine was in Dresden. More in front they were in Leutmeritz and Melnick. On the other side they were in Zittau, Schwednitz, Jung Buntzlau, and Brandeis. Such magazines  
must



must receive continual supplies of flour and forage, whether they are procured from your own or from your enemy's country. Whether magazines of forage are requisite or not, must be decided by the season of the year.

The state of the army being known, the mass of bread and forage daily requisite may easily be calculated, and when the time which probably may be necessary for the execution of an operation is considered in the estimates, the quantity required may still be ascertained.

An army of one hundred thousand men will consume daily two hundred thousand pounds of bread. The common ration is two pounds a man. We know from experience that seventy-five pounds of flour will yield one hundred pounds of bread. Reckon daily for every hundred men one hundred and fifty pounds of flour, one hundred and fifty thousand pounds will be required for the daily consumption. An army furnished with the proper implements of war has always a moveable magazine in the *bread waggons* of each troop and company. They commonly can carry six days bread: the soldiers carry three. The army is thus furnished for nine days; a time sufficient for most enterprises, especially when, after the expenditure, you can receive supplies anew.

In a defensive war, your marches commonly extend along your chain of magazines, which are often in strong places, and you can move from one magazine to another without fear of want of bread,

bread, even although these places should be at the distance of eight or nine days from each other.

By means of the provision train a greater supply may, upon an extraordinary occasion, be carried with the army, by increasing the number of carriages. These are generally slightly loaded in the field, for many reasons; so that a waggon with four horses seldom carries more than eighteen measures of seventy-five pounds each. This yields eighteen hundred pounds of bread. Such a waggon then is sufficient to furnish bread for nine days for one hundred men, and one thousand waggons will be requisite to furnish bread for the whole army for the same period of nine days, beside those which must carry necessaries for the train.

When all these preparations are made with care, and the bread waggons, the flour waggons, and the field bakery, are properly appointed, an army is then furnished for eighteen days, and can undertake any operation which does not require longer time.

The field bakery is commonly constructed so as to supply bread every second or third day. In an iron oven of the usual sort, one hundred and fifty loaves, of six pounds each, can be baked at once; and when it is necessary, the ovens can bake five times in one day. Such an oven then can daily furnish seven hundred and fifty men with three days bread. To furnish one hundred thousand men with bread for three days, there must be one hundred and thirty-four such ovens. When the

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bakery

bakery happens to be set up in a town, the ovens therein can all be employed, and the bread necessary for the army be prepared in a shorter time.

Let us now consider this army as leaving their magazines, and penetrating into an enemy's country, to proceed upon a certain chosen line of operations. We suppose the spring to be the season; they cannot then expect to find subsistence in the country, especially if the enemy have been stationed there throughout the winter. They must be furnished from their own magazines, which, as we have observed, can be effected for eighteen days. But as there can be bread ready only for nine days, more must be begun to be baked some days before the quantity is expended.

Not more than six days march then can be made without a halt; for as four days are requisite to prepare a store of six days bread for the army, if this were not done, there would be no bread the tenth day. The bakery must therefore be set to work on the fifth, or at most on the sixth day, from the beginning of the march: so that an army must advance gradually from their main magazines, if they would not be obliged to return. Their business being to establish magazines upon their line of operations, the provision train has not only to supply the consumption, but a certain superabundance, to prepare for the worst, until it is possible to fill new magazines by deliveries from the enemy's country.

I shall

I shall suppose the bakery set to work the fifth day from the commencement of the march, sixty miles from the main magazine: the deficiency of flour is to be supplied as follows:

The half of the provision train unloads the fifth day, and goes back. By the time they have reached the magazine, the other half unloads, and goes likewise back. Reckon fifteen miles for each day's march, and one day between loading and unloading, which is the smallest computation; upon this calculation they return in nine days. On the fourteenth day the army has, or has had, bread for twenty-two days and a half; on the seventeenth for twenty-seven; on the twenty-third for thirty-one and a half; and on the twenty-sixth for thirty-six days, including what has been served out, and what is still in the bread-waggons. Thus it appears that thirteen days flour will always be in store, so that want is not immediately to be apprehended.

Now if you place your bakery farther from your main magazine, so that your provision train shall require twelve or more days to replace the consumption, in a short time this would be found to be impossible. Suppose the distance eighty miles, the train will require twelve days to go and to return. The bakery, in this case, will be set to work on the seventh day, and, by a parity of reasoning, the same measures being adopted with the train, on the tenth the army will have, or have had, bread for twenty-two days and a half; on the twenty-fourth for twenty-seven; on the thirtieth for thirty-one and a half; and on the thirty-sixth

for thirty-six days. The want of bread then follows; and if the army be obliged to draw back, numberless inconveniencies must ensue: The following may therefore be established as a principle; viz.

That your bakery, if it is to be supplied solely from your main magazine and not from any convoy out of the enemy's country, must be at that degree of proximity to your main magazine, that the provision train shall have it in their power to supply the consumption in nine days.

Nor must the army remove beyond a certain distance from the bakery; that is to say, the bread-waggons must be able to go and to return in six days; for as they can only load six days bread, it is obvious that if they require longer time to go between the bakery and the army, want must be the consequence. Besides, when the distance is great, a strong escort is always requisite. In that case the enemy may very possibly succeed in their attempts to cut off or disperse a convoy.

Hence it follows, that in the season where no means of subsistence are to be found in a country, namely, in the spring, the penetrating far into an enemy's territory must be attended with considerable difficulties. Nevertheless cases may be supposed when it may be of the greatest consequence to appear early in the field, and to drive back the enemy as far as possible; for example, when the campaign is to be opened with a siege. When an undertaking of this nature is intended, preparations must be made to assemble a number of carriages in the country of the winter-quarters, sufficient

sufficient to carry a fortnight's, or a month's flour for the army, besides the waggons of the provision train which will add to the quantity. No small number of waggons then will be requisite. If we suppose that each country waggon will carry twelve measures of flour, two thousand waggons will be requisite to carry only twelve days flour for an army such as I have stated. Thus much however may be done as a collateral aid, that as long as you remain in the enemy's country you may collect all the flour you can find there, and any corn that remains may be ground into flour. But you must not rely too much upon this: you are to trust only to your own magazines. The supplies which are obtained accidentally may serve as a counter-balance to unexpected events, such as the loss of a convoy, &c. &c.

But if the supply of *bread* require so much attention from a commander, the supply of *forage* is not less material or difficult, especially when the campaign is opened early in the spring. To prevent the cavalry and other saddle horses of the army from being worn down at the beginning of a campaign, each horse must daily have three feeds of oats, and the carriage and pack-horses the same quantity of barley or rye.

In the formation of designs, we ought to make an estimate, according to the rules of probability, of the quantity of forage which the circumstances of the country of which we are about to take possession may yield. This will require a local knowledge of the degree of its fertility. In a square Ger-

man mile\* I will suppose one half arable, the other half meadows, rivers, lakes, woods, villages, or ponds. Suppose the husbandman to leave fallow one-third of this arable land; another third to be sown with wheat, or rye; a sixth with oats; and the remaining sixth with other vegetables. Allow a German mile to be two thousand Rhineland rods in length; the square of that mile contains four millions, and the half two millions of square rods, or nearly 11,112 acres, reckoning the acre at one hundred and eighty square rods, whereof the sixth part, or 1,852 acres, are sown with oats. On each acre we may reckon six sacks, or at least five. Half the square of a German mile will then yield 9,260 sacks of oats.

An army requiring daily 100,000 rations, will, according to the present custom, have 48,000 horses. Suppose among them 16,000 draught and pack-horses, which require no oats, 32,000 will remain that do require them; their quantity will be 96,000 pecks, or 6,000 Berlin sacks† of oats. It follows then that a German square mile will be sufficient to support the cavalry, and other saddle horses of the army, for a day and a half, and two square miles for three days, with oats. The

\* About five English miles.

† The German word *scheffel* has been here translated sack, and, a little before, measure.  $56\frac{1}{2}$  Berlin scheffels are equal to a last of Amsterdam, which contains  $81\frac{2}{3}$  English bushels; so that a scheffel is  $1\frac{2}{3}\frac{1}{3}$ , or nearly one bushel two pecks English. The Rhineland foot is 12.372 English inches. The calculation of produce seems on purpose to be estimated at a very low rate.

TRANSLATOR.

carriage

carriage and pack-horses will find sufficient subsistence from the other species of grain.

This calculation can only hold good while the oats are still in the straw, whether on the ground, or in the stack. At any other season of the year than the autumn, immediately after harvest, some deduction must be made, and in the spring the calculation will not apply at all.

If a campaign be opened early in the spring, as in the months of April or May, and you intend to penetrate into the enemy's country, care must be taken that the necessary corn and forage be provided for the whole time of operation, and that it be transported to the army as long as you cannot forage in the fields and villages. Even when rye, barley, and oats, can be had in green forage, these must be considered but as grass; and if we should diminish the ration even one half, still a considerable mass of corn will be necessary, and the condition of the cavalry will be impaired; the transportation of this forage must occasion prodigious difficulties whenever you remove to the smallest distance from your magazines. A multitude of carriages will be requisite, which are not always to be had in the country of which you are in possession. An army then must encounter prodigious inconveniences in its advance, unless their forage and subsistence can be conveyed to them by water. This happens in Bohemia, on the side of Saxony, where the Elbe is navigable as far as Leutmeritz; but when you would penetrate into Bohemia, or Moravia, from the side of Silesia, there is no conveyance but land carriage.



To sum up the whole, I will suppose the army to advance so far that each convoy shall require fifteen days in going between the main magazine and the army. When they have *balted*, they ought to be furnished with at least fifteen days forage. If six days march are to be made, they must *proceed* from the magazines with eighteen days corn.

Not to swell the computation, I will abide by the supposition of the half ration only being brought from the magazine, and that we shall trust to the country for the other half.

An army with forty-eight thousand horses, according to this statement, daily requiring four thousand five hundred Berlin sacks of oats, must in eighteen days have eighty-one thousand sacks. Suppose a waggon, with four horses, to carry eighteen sacks, there must be four thousand five hundred waggons for the first transportation, which must be doubled if you carry the whole ration. Add the two thousand waggons, necessary for the bringing of flour, and there are six thousand five hundred waggons to be furnished.

Hence we may perceive how many difficulties are attendant upon operations in the spring \*, particularly in countries where there are no navigable rivers. The statement is very moderate, because the half ration is adopted, and hay and straw are

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\* There may be local and occasional exceptions from this rule, after a year of uncommon produce, and in countries of great fertility ; such as the Netherlands for example.

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not considered, it being supposed that the country may furnish them.

As long as it is necessary to provide corn for the cavalry, it will be impossible to remove to a greater distance than two or three days march from the magazines. No undertaking, in such cases, is likely to succeed at a greater distance with large bodies. The destruction of an enemy's magazines may be attempted with small corps, since a sufficient quantity of forage will probably be found in the towns and villages of the country, if they have not been entirely exhausted. Besides, such expeditions are commonly executed with rapidity, and concluded in a few days.

There is one case, however, in which a General can venture to penetrate into an enemy's country without these complex preparations; when the enemy have placed their magazines at so small a distance from their frontiers, that, by justly ordered dispositions, there appears a probability of taking possession of them before the enemy can rescue or destroy them. This was the case in the present campaign. In such an undertaking a General does not risk much. If he should fail, he can easily draw back; but if he prove successful, he subjects the enemy to the greatest difficulties. Their operations will prove retrograde; the aspect of the war will undergo a change very unfavourable to them; they may find themselves obliged to form plans entirely new, and may even be forced to the adoption of a system of defence.

When you have not the design of carrying the war into the enemy's country, but mean to be on

the defensive, no favourable opportunity must be neglected to carry off their magazines; or if that cannot be effected, to destroy them. In order to be fortunate in such attempts, you must completely know the art of coming by surprise upon your enemy, and of veiling your intentions in such obscurity, that although possessed of the greatest address, he may conclude that your designs are totally different from what they really are.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF PRAGUE.

Let us now apply the preceding principles to General Lloyd's project of driving the Austrians to the Danube. We plainly see that the King could not even think of this till the harvest season. He had no magazines for his further progress in Bohemia. The country was completely exhausted, and there was no forage as yet upon the ground. It then became his object to oblige that army to surrender, which he had defeated, and had driven into Prague. "The King," says Lloyd, "in the vain, but flattering hopes of obliging fifty thousand men to surrender prisoners of war, lost sight of Daun and the right wing, and neglected the opportunity of striking a decisive blow."

What would he have said, if the King had set out with his army in pursuit of Marshal Daun, and left an army of fifty thousand men in his rear, to cut him off from Saxony and his magazines? What sort of a decisive blow could the King have struck, if he had let those fifty thousand men escape

Is

Is it possible to comprehend what Lloyd could mean by a decisive blow? It seems that the most decisive blow which the King could possibly have struck, would have been to force these fifty thousand men to surrender. He had far greater reason to hope for success in this design than any which Lloyd could possibly devise; that of driving the Austrians across the Danube not excepted. But Lloyd, to give his reasonings an air of consequence, lays down such propositions as we can well say never entered into the mind of any other man. With him it is a mere nothing to vanquish two great armies, and take their whole artillery and baggage. Prince Charles must have retired to the Danube: he could not have presumed to remain near the King, without being exposed to complete destruction. No; he could not even be in security on this side of the Danube, but must have endeavoured to have passed that broad river with the greatest expedition to join the other troops. We must either suppose the Austrians to have been suddenly struck with blindness, or to have remained totally inactive while they heard of the King's taking Prague and Olmutz.

Truly Lloyd pays his friends the Austrians and their generals a very handsome compliment. I for my part, who certainly must, during this war, consider myself as their enemy, have yet too much confidence in them to suppose, even for a moment, that their conduct could have justified the smallest part of this extraordinary conception.

Yet

Yet all this, according to Lloyd, must certainly have come to pass, if the King, instead of besieging the town, had, the morning after the battle, detached twenty thousand men to Beneschau in pursuit of the enemy, and had moved with the remainder of the army to Bohmish Brodt against Daun. An admirable project! If we take up the map, we shall soon see that if Prince Charles had been at liberty the morning after the battle, he could have been at Beneschau before the twenty thousand Prussians. If the King had marched against Daun, he certainly would have drawn back; in which case Prince Charles could have easily found means to cut off this corps from the King's army, or to have shut them in between himself and that part of his beaten army which was at Beneschau. It is unaccountable that it never occurred to Lloyd in his project, to leave a corps in opposition to Prince Charles, at least to prevent his undertaking any thing against the King's magazines. This corps should have been at least forty thousand strong; and if we suppose the King's army after the battle was still ninety thousand strong, there would have remained fifty thousand. Had he detached twenty thousand men to Beneschau in pursuit of the fugitives of the right wing of the Austrians, thirty thousand would have been left for him to have advanced with against Marshal Daun.

But the Marshal had full thirty thousand men under his command, and when joined by seventeen or twenty thousand, who escaped from the battle, and when the King had likewise been joined by his  
twenty

twenty thousand, the two armies would have been nearly of equal strength. I cannot see why it should have been necessary for Daun to run like the Amalekites, supposing him to have been as swift of foot. I therefore must return to what I have said, that it was incomparably more agreeable to the principles of war, to keep Prince Charles shut up, than to leave him at liberty to form new operations.

That “ when Daun advanced, the King had no choice but to raise the siege, and to attack the Marshal with his whole force;” this thought is so very extravagant, that Lloyd’s boldness in inventing it is much to be admired. It is one of the first principles in war to frustrate the intentions of the enemy, and if possible to do the very contrary of what he wishes you to do. Daun had no other object than to relieve Prince Charles. Did the King raise the siege? This object was obtained without a blow, and the Austrian commander had little more to wish for. Would Prince Charles then have permitted the King to have attacked the Marshal with his whole force? Would he not have followed him, and have endeavoured to form a junction with the Marshal? Could not the latter have chosen positions by which he might have avoided an engagement with the King? Or suppose the King had beaten Marshal Daun; what would he have gained thereby? After the battle, there would have been as strong an army as his own in Bohemia, as the vanquished troops would have

have united with those of Prince Charles, then at liberty to act. Where then was *the decisive blow*? Things would have remained in the same situation as before, or rather would have had a more unfavourable aspect for the King. Very different would have been the event if he had beaten Daun at Kollin. Then would there have been no need to study a chimera; *there* would have been a *decisive blow*, of which history, in ancient or modern times, could hardly furnish an example.

The siege of Olmutz is a project by no means in concert with the situation of affairs at that time. It is extraordinary how often Lloyd contradicts himself. When we consider the motives which, in his opinion, are requisite to induce a commander to undertake a siege, we shall find that not one of them existed at this time. Had such been the intention, the King must have marched diagonally through Bohemia, and no where have found either bread or forage. Suppose these difficulties surmounted, yet two months must have elapsed until he could have appeared before the place. When we reflect that the King must have first made the necessary preparations for the siege; that he must have established magazines in Moravia for the maintenance of the besieging army; that this could only have been done from his stores in Upper Silesia; and that for the transportation of provisions, battering artillery, and other implements, a prodigious number of carriages must have been requisite; the time required is surely not too great. While the  
King

King was thus employed, the Austrians would have had the opportunity of recovering from their loss at Prague, and of receiving reinforcements. It is scarcely to be supposed that they would have remained inactive; or that, with an army which in a short time must have amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand men, they would not have made a single attempt to attack the King, and relieve the fortrefs.

The preservation of Saxony must have had some share of the King's attention. Had he gone into Moravia, he must have left an army behind of at least thirty thousand men for the protection of Saxony. Having ninety thousand, there would have remained sixty thousand. From them he must have detached, at least, fifteen thousand to the siege, which he would have covered with the remaining forty-five thousand. The Austrians could have acted against both armies with a superior force. For if they detached fifty thousand men against the army which covered Saxony, they had seventy thousand men to march against the King. Had they, but with moderate conduct, employed this superiority, they probably would have been as successful as in 1758, and the King must have had to raise the siege, and to draw back into Silesia. Even the conquest of the place would have been of no great advantage to his affairs, as the near approach of the French, and the army of the Empire, must have obliged him to return to Saxony. The enemy would have



have had an opportunity of re-conquering the place, and the King would have lost a garrison of several thousand men.

Had the Austrians adopted the measure of removing to Saxony with the greatest part of their army, and of driving back as far as possible the corps appointed for the protection of Saxony, and have laid siege to Dresden, the King would probably of himself have raised the siege, as the possession of Saxony was certainly of greater consequence to him than that of Olmutz. But had he had the misfortune to be attacked and beaten by the armies advancing to relieve the place, then would he have stood in need of all his great talents to have extricated his affairs from such impending ruin. Had he beaten the Austrians, the conquest of Olmutz would have been the sole fruit of the victory; and he must have returned to Saxony, and left that fortress to its destiny. Perhaps such an event would have obliged the Austrians to have adopted more prudent measures, to have approached nearer to their allies the French and the army of the Empire, and to have employed their strength more fully upon the side of Saxony. By these means alone could their objects have been accomplished.

## ON THEORY.

From the whole of the foregoing observations, it appears that Lloyd had either no right theory of war, or that he failed in the application. Theory has been said to be the right foot, and Experience the left. To move, we must have both. The observation is a truth, and whoever would acquit himself upon the theatre of war with approbation, must form a proper theory of the part he has to act. Yet there are many who have much aversion to all theory. Such men have no conception of the meaning of the word, which being of greater acceptance in the schools of science than in common life, they think applicable only to grammarians or pedants. Their opinions would be changed if they considered, that theory is nothing more than the collection of the principles by which they are to act, in order to be fortunate. Without it, all is accidental; all success ought to astonish; no misfortune ought to raise our wonder.

There may be yet another cause why theory is not to the taste of a certain set of men. The application of these principles requires much diligent and constant observation, an occupation by no means suited to their minds: so that we find but few, alas! but very few, who think at all upon the subject. It appears to them much easier, and more agreeable, to trust to chance, for what they ought to do upon particular occasions, and to learn by experience

ence alone; as if a man's experience could comprehend the vast variety of different conjunctures which occur in war.

It is indeed a strange supposition that we can come near perfection, in one of the most difficult of sciences, without endeavouring to acquire just principles, and to expect every thing from experience; or, more properly speaking, from the number of years that we have worn a uniform; the best of which are often but too much devoted to the passions.

Theory and experience must go hand in hand to form an officer of eminence. By theory, we learn the most essential principles in the formation of the different species of troops which compose the great bodies that constitute an army. We discover the elements by which the different parts are connected together, and are brought to act with the greatest energy and effect. It teaches us to reject those movements which are not applicable to the whole as well as to the part. It opens our eyes upon prejudices, errors, and ancient habits, tending to defeat the very purposes they were intended to promote. By theory, we learn discernment of possibilities, and discover the means most efficacious for their execution; we penetrate our enemy's intentions; we foresee, and we prevent, his measures; or we determine when it may be prudent to abandon our designs. Above all, a firm and undaunted conduct, a constant and undisturbed presence of mind, in a dangerous, a complicated,  
and

and an embarrassed situation, can only be the result of a sound and rational theory. On the contrary, the want of it creates uncertainty, irresolution, and a fatal anxiety of deportment, which, spreading like contagion through the troops, unnerves their faculties, and brings on the loss of many a golden opportunity of turning the balance of advantage, when, by some daring unexpected stroke, we might evade or rise superior to our enemy, at the moment he thought us in his power.

Well may we ask, how any one can form a well connected plan of operations, if he is unacquainted with the theory of war? This, and this only, can raise him to the height from whence his eye can survey the wide field, can trace the paths on which he ought to tread, and point to the position of approach, by which, with the greatest certainty and expedition, he may attain the object of his hopes. How shall he cast a look into futurity, to anticipate what shall be probable, to foresee the chain of different events which may occur in the course of a war, and to separate their consequences? How, if these profound considerations are not guided by well-founded theory?

Should the principles, upon which the theory of any science is constructed, be erroneous, innumerable faults must be the certain consequence; but they will be most severely felt in war. If the metaphysical philosopher proceeds upon false grounds, the mischief is not great; his readers indeed may be tired: but a general, acting on improper principles, may be the cause of many a gallant soldier lying  
 G 2 dead.

dead upon the field, and of forcing his sovereign to a disgraceful peace.

And yet we seem still very far from possessing a good theory of the art of war, notwithstanding that the French have overflowed, and still do overflow all Europe with their military systems. These are only various forms of the same Greek and Roman dish, mixed up with the dreams of a Folard.

We might obtain the theory we require, by meditating on the actions of the King, of Prince Henry, of Duke Ferdinand, and the Duke of Brunswick. Were it necessary to look farther back for instruction, we shall find it in the conduct of the great Gustavus Adolphus, and if we add a Condé, a Turenne, a Marlborough, an Eugene, a Saxe, we should not stand in need of gleaning military science from the histories of ancient Greece and Rome.

A soldier who indulges the ambition of being more than a mere instrument, and would create a system for himself which should enable him to fill any station in which he may happen to be placed, need only draw his sources from the military history of these commanders, marking their conduct upon those occasions when their talents were called forth. He then perhaps may catch a spark of their æthereal fire, and comprehend their principles and theory; not by reading merely, but by meditation: and yet how few can think? We must, besides, be filled with passion for our occupation. For the officer who is not attached to his profession as he would be to his mistress, can never rise to eminence.

## BATTLE OF KOLLIN.

The King, having effected a junction with the Prince of Bevern on the 14th of June, took up his camp with the right to Malhotitz, and the left to Kaurzin, at which last he fixed his head-quarters. The army remained in this position on the 15th and 16th, to give time for the arrival of Prince Maurice, who was coming with six battalions and ten squadrons from Prague, and likewise in expectation of the bread waggons, which had gone to load at Nimburg. The prodigious number of the enemy's light troops, which covered the country in front of their army, prevented the possibility of obtaining any certain intelligence of Marshal Daun's position, in spite of every effort in reconnoitring. The King had sent out Colonel Warnery for this purpose, along the Zaffawa, but he did not return till a few hours before the battle.

The bread having at length arrived on the 17th, was served out to the army in the forenoon, and the King, that very afternoon, resolved to move to the heights of Suchdol. But Daun had moved from his camp at Gintitz on the 17th, and on the evening had arrived upon the heights at Kriechenau, where he took up a camp, with his right behind Chotzemitz, and his left to Swoyschitz.

The direct road from Kaurtzin to Suchdol passes through the district where the enemy were posted. The King being informed of their having blocked up his way, was obliged to change his plan. He

moved his army by divisions to the left, and drew farther back to Nimburg. Planian then lay immediately in front of the infantry of his left flank, and his right extended towards Kaurtzim.

This movement made the enemy apprehend that the King would turn their right flank, and perhaps oblige them to change their position; and it appears that this really was the King's design. Daun moved his camp the same night, and brought his right nearer to Kretzezor. The corps of Nadaſti was moved from the left wing towards the rear, and took poſt upon the heights to the right of Krezezor. They arrived there at break of day, and their poſition was ſuch, that their huſſars and ſome other cavalry were in three diviſions on their right. One thouſand of the regiment called Germanic cavalry, and three Saxon regiments of light cavalry, Prince Albert's, Bruhl's, and Prince Charles's, were drawn up on their left. A deep ravine ſeparated this corps from the main army. Infantry and croats occupied the copſe wood and the village of Kretzezor, near to which batteries were erected.

General Nadaſti had given orders to General Noſtitz, who commanded the Saxon cavalry, to extend them, as well as the thouſand German cavalry, as much as poſſible, to occupy the whole ſpace between the wood and the right of Daun's army. But the diſtance was too great for this to be effected by them, and beſides the ground was not to be defended by cavalry from an attack of infantry. Lieutenant Colonel B—— represented  
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this to General Nostitz, who found that the remark was just, and hastened to General Nadaſti, to represent the necessity of occupying the post with infantry. General Nostitz could not find General Nadaſti, but Lieutenant Colonel B—— seeing him approach, rode up, and communicated his remarks and apprehensions as to the nature of the post. General Nadaſti likewise found that they were well grounded, and hastened toward Marshal Daun, to request the infantry necessary for the reinforcement of this post. Orders were given for a corps of infantry to be immediately taken from the reserve for that purpose. About eleven o'clock that infantry occupied the ground, and formed an angle, when the Saxon cavalry took post nearer to Daun's right wing. The thousand Germanic cavalry remained on the left of the copse, and there was a considerable interval between them and the Saxon cavalry.

On the 18th, at break of day, there remained no trace of the enemy's camp, except some troops of cavalry which appeared on the heights between Kriechenau and Brezefan. The King, still abiding by his determination of taking up a camp at Suchdol, ordered the tents to be struck at six o'clock, and the army to move from the left. This was done in the following order: General Ziethen had the advance guard, with fifty-five squadrons of dragoons and hussars. General Hulsen followed with the grenadier battalion of Nimſſchetſki, Waldau, and Fink, and the two regiments of infantry of Munchow and Schultz. They di-



rected their march in two columns by the \* Imperial road, and to the left of it. The army followed by divisions in three columns. The first was composed of the infantry of the first line, and moved on the Imperial road which leads from Prague to Kollin. The second column marched on the left of the first, and consisted of the infantry of the second line. The third column was composed of the remaining cavalry of the army.

When the heads of the columns had passed through Planian, they discovered the enemy's army between Kretzevor and Brezesan. Their first line was half way down the side of the hill, and their second line upon the summit. Their whole front was covered by villages and defilés, some of which were impassable. Their artillery drew out several very advantageous batteries along their front, to rake the approaches with a crossing fire. Daun having employed the whole of the preceding night in taking up this position, it may be inferred that he was desirous of a battle.

The King now perceived that he was about to accomplish what he most desired but least expected, the bringing the enemy to an engagement. The situation of his affairs required it. The longer they avoided meeting him, the more had he to apprehend that Prince Charles might make a successful effort to extricate his army blocked up in Prague, and penetrate, at every hazard, at least with a part if not with the whole; for when

\* Kaiser-weg.

the King had withdrawn the corps with which he joined the Prince of Bevern, the army before Prague was considerably weakened.

The King's views in this march were merely to gain the heights of Suchdol; but now that a battle was in his power, he halted the heads of the columns at Novimiest, and ordered the advance-guard under General Ziethen to move on to Slatisluntz. This gave the columns a better opportunity to close up, as they had been much lengthened in passing through the defilés at Planian. Here they waited for the grenadier battalions of Kahlden, Mollendorf, and Wangenheim, which had remained at Kaurtzim. These were to form upon the left, and to support the attack. Meanwhile the King reconnoitred the enemy's position, and gave out to the generals the order of attack. General Ziethen was commanded to move with the advance guard to Kollin, to attack General Nadaſti and his cavalry the moment they appeared; to endeavour to drive them back, but chiefly to cover the left flank, if a general engagement should ensue. The army to follow, and continue their march in three columns; and as soon as the heads of those columns should come near the enemy's right, which would happen when they reached Kretzezor, General Hulsen with the three battalions of grenadiers, and the regiments of Munchow and Schultz, was to attack the enemy's advance post at Kretzezor, supported by five squadrons of cavalry, drawn up in their rear in three divisions; and should the enemy be driven back from this

post by General Hulsen, the columns were then to incline to the left, and to drive them also from the copse at Radowefnitz. While this General advanced, the army was still to continue their march in three columns, whose line of direction should be such, that they might be ready to support General Hulsen if he found too great an opposition. But should he gain his point, the battalions of the left wing were to form up, to move rapidly against the enemy's right, and endeavour to throw them into disorder; but *the whole line was on no account to attack the enemy at once; the right wing was continually to keep back; and positively not to begin a fire of musquetry, till they should receive farther orders to advance upon the enemy.*

The whole cavalry was ordered to form behind the left wing, not only to support General Ziethen, but also the infantry; and if the latter should gain the superiority, to seize hold of the critical point of time to cut their way among the enemy, and complete the victory. On the right wing, ten squadrons of cuirassiers were to be ready against any unexpected event; although, from the nature of the ground, extremely difficult for cavalry, it was not supposed that they were to obtain great advantage over the enemy.

This disposition was so clear, that I cannot conceive how it was so ill attended to in the execution. The King knew the ground most perfectly. The Duke of Bevern had performed several movements upon it during six weeks, and it was natural to imagine that every circumstance of it would be familiar

familiar to his generals and staff-officers. The King had a right to expect that his disposition, which was so perfectly adapted to the nature of the ground, would be put in execution agreeably to his intentions and commands. But the contrary was proved by the event, and the King had the misfortune of not being rightly understood.

According to the orders, the army was not to advance during General Hulsen's attack. The left wing only was to support him. Hence it followed that as soon as he formed his battalions, and moved against the posts of Kretzezor, the heads of the columns were to incline towards Kutlierz, and when General Hulsen had routed the posts at Kretzezor, and extended further towards the copse, he would necessarily move between Kretzezor and Kutlierz; so that when this General should make himself master of the copse, the left wing and his corps would have come to be in line, and the oblique position would have been preserved, which the King had in view. By this mode the enemy's right flank would have been gained, and if the attack had then commenced, the battalions would have come gradually into action, and the whole army would not have been engaged till the enemy were nearly routed. By the possession of the copse General Hulsen would have covered the left flank against Nadaſti's cavalry, and if the attack against the enemy's main army should not have succeeded, his position would have

have been extremely well calculated to have covered the broken battalions, while others from the right wing should advance, take up their ground, and attack the enemy anew. Or if the battalions had forced their way, General Hulsen would likewise have advanced, and would have attacked the enemy in the rear, which his position would have enabled him to do by much out-flanking them.

Perhaps it might have been well in this attack, if the brigades of the left wing had moved forward, one after the other, so that the army might have been formed in echellons. The attack by echellons has great advantage. The army is thereby in parts, whereof each forms a separate whole, independent in itself, yet in the closest connection with each other. Each echelon affords protection to the flank of that which precedes it; the first requires cavalry upon its flank, unless it has some advantage of ground from a river, marsh, lake, or any other obstacle to cover it. The cavalry can be placed behind them, and are not only ready at the proper time to cut their way among the enemy, when the infantry shall have caused them to waver, but to beat back their cavalry, if, on the failure of any single echelon's attack they attempt to penetrate. By this mode the whole army cannot be beaten, for it always remains in the power of the commanding general to withdraw in the greatest order the echellons which follow, as soon as he is certain that that echelon which formed the main attack cannot make the impression he desired.

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The nature of this mode of attack plainly shews that it can be employed to greatest advantage, when the enemy, in his position, has a post, upon the maintaining or the losing of which the victory, or the defeat of the army, depends. Such a post is either on a flank, or in the center, and you can proceed by echellon either from your flank or center, as shall be requisite. But it is obvious that the echellon which makes the attack must be well supported.

Had the army taken up this oblique position, nothing would have been lost, even if General Hulsen had been beaten back. The enemy would not have dared to have followed him, or to have quitted the advantage of the ground.

The King, by drawing almost the whole of his cavalry to his left, and placing it behind his infantry, gave a clear intimation of his intentions. He knew that the cavalry were to be employed with effect only upon the ground between Kollin and Kretzevor. The generals of the Prince of Bevern's army must have been well acquainted with this circumstance, and they should have made it known to the other generals, who had not had the same opportunity of being well informed of the ground. As soon as Nadaſti's cavalry should have been beaten by General Ziethen, the cavalry of the left wing, according to the nature of circumstances, should have drawn off to the left, and if General Hulsen's attack had succeeded, and the army had been fully engaged with the enemy, then leaving the copse upon the right, they might have  
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come round upon the enemy in rear. Had the cavalry done this, the King's disposition would have been rightly executed, and the battle, notwithstanding every unfavourable circumstance, would most probably have been won.

It is not sufficient to learn the disposition made by the commanding general. It is not sufficient in many cases to abide by the mere letter of obedience. We must take the whole design into our view, and regulate our manœuvres in such a way as shall be most conducive to the accomplishment of the General's intentions. For this end we must chiefly be attentive to the circumstances of events, which, during a battle, may be so various, so unforeseen, and so important, as to require the discretion of subordinate commanders at their peril, since the commanding General cannot be every where.

After the King had given out his orders, and the battalions had got through the defilés of Planian, and had closed up, the army pursued their march at one o'clock in the afternoon, in three columns as before. General Nadaſti perceiving this, advanced with the greatest part of his cavalry to Kutliertz, and posted them in two lines, with great intervals, so as to make a re-entering angle on the flank of the main army. This seems to be a very favourite position with the Austrians. General Haddick did the same at Prague. Nadaſti probably thought, that by this method he would more effectually cover the right flank of the army, and that, if the Prussians attacked Marshal Daun, he could

could come upon them on their left flank and in their rear. And this would certainly have happened, if the Prussians had had the complaisance to have permitted him to remain there. The supposition was certainly extraordinary, and Nadasti soon found that he had reckoned without his host. Upon General Ziethen's advancing to attack him, he prudently drew back, and took post on the right of the copse behind Kutliertz.

About two o'clock the heads of the columns came opposite the enemy's right wing. General Ziethen formed up his cavalry to cover General Hulfen's left flank, and the latter formed up his battalions. The three battalions of grenadiers came into the first, and the regiments of Munchow and Schultz into the second line. Behind, in a third line, were five squadrons of dragoons. The army followed at a little distance, still in three columns. The advance guard moved rapidly upon the enemy. Their battery at Kretzevor kept up a heavy fire, which from the distance could do no execution, nor did the Prussian artillery return an answer to it. General Hulfen advanced with his seven battalions against the heights with the quickness and vivacity usual in Prussians. He gained the heights, and attacked the enemy with such impetuosity, that they were obliged to abandon the village of Kretzevor and their battery there, and to withdraw in the greatest disorder. The infantry in the village and the croats drew back, partly towards the copse, and partly behind  
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the reserve. Hulsen having gained this post, had now to incline and attack the copse. His battalions having already suffered much in the attack, he employed a few moments in setting them again in good order. At this moment he discovered a whole line of the enemy's infantry extending between the village and the copse. That he might not be outflanked by them, he was obliged to extend his line. For this purpose he brought forward the battalions of the second line into the first, and formed of the seven battalions but one line. The enemy's infantry, opposite to him, mean while stood fast with the most phlegmatic composure, and allowed all this to pass without advancing to give him the least interruption. Hulsen now perceived that the army was still far behind him, and that none of those battalions had come to his right which ought to have supported him. Instead of advancing, therefore, he sought to maintain the post which he had taken till the army should come up. In the mean time he amused the enemy with a cannonade, which was not without an answer from their artillery.

During General Hulsen's attack, General Ziethen came down upon Nadaſti's cavalry, threw them into disorder after a short opposition, and drove a part of them behind Kollin, and part behind Radowesnitz, so that they did not again appear during the battle. In the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, the Prussians necessarily passed the copse behind Kretzezor, which, as before observed, was occupied by croats and

and infantry, and covered by a battery, to which their right flank was exposed. The enemy began a heavy fire upon the cavalry, which brought them to a stand, and obliged them to desist from the pursuit, and retire to Kutliertz. The dragoons of Norman, which were to have supported the attack of Hulsen, drew off to the left, attacked the enemy in the copse, and took from them seven colours: they then fell in with the Saxon carabineers, and routed them completely.

While the attack with the advance-guard under Generals Ziethen and Hulsen was proceeding with so much success, and promised an event so agreeable to the expectations of the King, the army which ought to have supported it, did not observe their orders with that exactness and precision that might have been expected from the disposition which the King had made. In the observance of minutiae, the general design was neglected. There were a number of villages in the front of the Austrian army, and the fields were covered with standing corn, which, from the fertility of the country, was of a great height. In this corn the Croats lay concealed, and, according to their custom, fired singly on the columns as they passed, and though at a considerable distance they now and then wounded a few of our soldiers.

This offended a certain great commander\*, and

\* This was General Manstein, as we learn from the King's posthumous works; in which it is added, that he shewed in the battle of Prague a similar ill-timed impetuosity.

TRANSLATOR.

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occasioned him to give orders to the second battalion of Bornstaedt to form a front, and drive the Croats from the standing corn. This probably would have been of no great consequence, had the battalions which followed been apprised of what was intended, and had continued, as they certainly would have done, their line of march. But this was unfortunately omitted, and nothing further was thought of, than the driving out of the Croats. The King having ordered that all should incline to the left, it was concluded that, when the battalion in front formed up, the following one should do the same. Accordingly that part of the army which followed the battalion of Bornstaedt, formed a front, and having already taken an oblique position, each battalion became successively engaged, in order to support the advanced battalion, which met with a much stronger resistance than could be expected, especially as they attempted to drive the Croats from the village of Chothemitz, where the enemy supported them with their infantry and artillery. There now commenced several ill-devised attacks upon the enemy's front, where the battalions found nothing but steep heights and the most difficult ground. In these various attacks, such extraordinary proofs of undaunted and intrepid valour were exhibited, as have seldom been equalled, and never exceeded, in any battle in ancient or modern times. The Prussians were beaten back, but not intimidated. Scarcely had the battalions formed anew, when they advanced again upon the enemy, and their continued efforts lasted till sunset.

set. It appeared as if every individual, from the general to the private soldier, had resolved to conquer, or to die. No single battalion had quitted the line, though many had suffered prodigious loss.

During these events upon the right wing of the Prussian army, the other columns continued their march to support the attack of General Hulsén. A considerable interval consequently occurred. At length they heard the noise of the attack of the right wing. They thence imagined that it was time for them to form up. The words *FRONT-FORM, FORWARDS, MARCH*, were given, without adverting in the least to the possibility of moving in line through the defilés, and over mountains almost perpendicular. The ground was so much intersected, that scarcely a single platoon could preserve a front, and yet all persevered in moving on to the attack. Several battalions actually did surmount the declivity, and when they had attained the summit, found that they had no support. Even four regiments of cavalry placed themselves in the interval, which had attempted likewise to ascend the declivity. Of these, one regiment charged upon a great battery in their front, but without effect.

General Hulsén now seeing some battalions advance, set his troops again in motion, advanced upon the copse, and drove from thence the Croats and the infantry. The enemy defended themselves with the greatest resolution, brought on fresh

troops, and drove back the left of Hulsen's corps. Here the fire from the small arms and artillery lasted nearly two hours without interruption. Hulsen defended his post upon the heights, and the enemy likewise defended their ground, with the greatest obstinacy. General Hulsen having received a reinforcement of two battalions, once more advanced, and having actually broken the enemy's left wing, was on the point of taking another battery. But at the moment when a single step only was necessary for gaining the battle, a circumstance arose, which, from its great peculiarity, deserves to be particularly detailed.

I began with relating what had passed on the side of the Austrians; that Nadaſti had occupied the extensive ground between Kretzecor and the copse with cavalry alone, but that he had been induced by well-grounded representations to require infantry from Marshal Daun, which had arrived just before the Prussian attack commenced, and that the Saxon cavalry had drawn nearer to Daun's army. They remained in this position while Hulsen continued his attack, and even after he had thrown the left flank into disorder. While their fresh troops were advancing, General Noſtitz, who commanded the Saxon cavalry, caused the regiments of Prince Albert and Bruhl to move to their right, and get nearer to their infantry that they might be ready to support them against the Prussians, and afterwards to act according to events. He forgot to send the same orders to Prince Charles's

Charles's regiment. The two regiments accordingly moved from their right, which as soon as the commander of Prince Charles's regiment of dragoons observed, he rode up to General Nostitz, and asked if the order was meant to comprehend his regiment? He was answered, *Yes*. The commander replied, that he would instantly obey the order, but begged leave to represent, that it was a very disagreeable circumstance to be obliged to leave ground with which he was so perfectly acquainted, and where, on that account, he hoped to have an opportunity of attacking the enemy to great advantage. General Nostitz bethought himself a moment, and replied, That his regiment might continue posted, and that he would likewise give orders for the other two regiments immediately to return thither. When this commander was returning to his regiment, he met an officer quite out of breath, who asked for General Nostitz. The Lieutenant Colonel asked, what he wanted with the General? In reply, the officer shewed him a note, written with pencil, in these words: "The retreat is to Suchdol." The Lieutenant Colonel begged the officer, upon no account, to shew the note to any person but General Nostitz, and sending a trusty under-officer to conduct him to the General, rode back to his regiment. Here he found all in a bustle. They had seen a quantity of artillery drawing back, and the Austrian army preparing on every side to retreat.

Daun had by this time found much cause for serious reflection, from the Prussian mode of attack, from the nature of his position, and from the consequences to be apprehended if he lost the battle, which the situation of affairs at that time seemed to render highly probable. He found himself entangled in very difficult ground. The Prussians, by the attack upon his right wing, threatened to turn his flank, and, by attacking him in rear, to oblige him to draw back towards Kriechenau and Schwoysitz. He saw that the greatest part of the Prussian cavalry remained between Kollin and Kretzecor, where they would have it in their power to cut off the retreat of his army, and to throw it into the utmost confusion, if once the infantry should succeed in turning his flank. In proportion as his camp of Kriechenau was good while a front was presented to an enemy, in the same degree was the ground difficult should the army be beaten in that position. They would have been driven back by a victorious enemy among defilés, marshes, and ponds, and would have run the danger either of being cut to pieces, or of being all taken. Their baggage and artillery must have been lost, and their flight must have ended in the most complete overthrow. Of two evils then, he thought it most advisable to chuse the least, and circulated to his Generals an intimation preparatory for a retreat, which would have been executed very soon, had not a mere trifle given the whole affair another turn, and determined the advantage on the side of

of the Austrian commander, in a manner far different from his expectations.

A General of the first rank in the Austrian army, gave orders to a Brigadier under his command, to draw back, probably after he had read the note written in pencil from Marshal Daun. The Brigadier thought there was yet time enough, and declaring, once for all, that he would not obey the command till he saw that it was absolutely necessary, stood fast in his post, and continued to maintain it. Not far from thence the commander of the Saxon regiment of cavalry so often mentioned, observed that the fire of the Prussian infantry, which formed the attack on the left wing of the Austrians, began to grow weaker, and soon after entirely ceased. This was not to be wondered at. The battalions had been exposed to a constant fire from half past two o'clock \*, and had nearly exhausted their ammunition. They were tired out, and advanced with a slow step and with fixed bayonets. Some regiments however still kept up a brisk fire, particularly those of Bevern and Hulsen. They were followed and supported by the regiment of Prince Henry, which had been brought from the second line to supply the intervals in the first.

At this time the Austrian regiment of Salm quitted their line in great disorder, notwithstanding every exertion of their officers; but yet it seemed

\* The troops were under arms before day, and the battle was not ended till nine at night.

TRANSLATOR.



written in the book of destiny, for the misfortune of the Prussians, that, in spite of incredible exertions of bravery, they were to lose the battle, and that all the wisely ordered-dispositions of the King were to be fruitless. Hence the Lieutenant Colonel of the Saxon regiment of Charles, instead of remaining in front of his regiment to wait for orders, conceived that he was not to be a mere machine, but that on matters of so great importance he might be permitted to represent his opinions, and *with the greatest respect* to make objections. That the officers to whom these observations were imparted, should conceive it possible for any one under their command to think, and even to think better than themselves, was highly improbable and contrary to every rule of military etiquette. Improbable however as it was, it unfortunately came to pass. The Lieutenant Colonel, seeing that the regiment of Salm gave way, advanced to them, spirited up the soldiers, and pledged his honour that he would support them to the last moment. He succeeded in rallying the men: they formed as well as they could, and made a new attempt to advance into the line. While they were thus employed, several squadrons of Prussians appeared coming down in full speed to charge this battalion. The Lieutenant Colonel of Prince Charles's regiment instantly gave orders to advance and attack them, and as the ground was very narrow for cavalry, he ordered them to move by squadrons. These commands were executed. They

They moved from their left, passed through the intervals of the regiment of Salm, fell upon the Prussian cavalry with the greatest fury, routed them, and pursued them to a considerable distance. They were followed by the two other regiments of Saxon cavalry, and the one thousand Germanic horse, which charged and routed the Prussian cavalry who were stationed on the spot. Having placed themselves in order again after this successful shock, they perceived that an opportunity now offered of falling upon the rear of the Prussian infantry, while they might be attacked by other regiments of Austrian cavalry in front. The Prussian battalions having, as has been already observed, each made separate attacks, great intervals had ensued, between which the Saxon cavalry broke through. When the commander of the regiment of Bevern saw the enemy's cavalry behind him, he gave the word "BATTALION TO THE RIGHT ABOUT, FIRE BY PLATOONS FROM THE RIGHT;" as it stands in the book of regulations. The regiment behaved as if they had been at a review, and gave several regular fires by platoons. The regiments of Prince Henry and Hulsén, which stood next, did exactly the same; but all this did not prevent the enemy's cavalry, which attacked them in front and rear, from at length obtaining the superiority, and either cutting down or taking prisoners the whole of these three regiments. But they had the glory of selling their lives, or liberty, at a dear rate.

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This attack decided the victory. For although the remains of the battalions which had been beaten had formed anew, and were again advancing to the attack, and although the King placed himself at the head of the cavalry to endeavour to repel the enemy, yet all was in vain; the field of battle was yielded up at sun-set. Most of the battalions under General Hulsen still continued to defend their post; and the cavalry of General Ziethen, and the left wing, did not begin to withdraw till nine at night. Some regiments did not think of moving till the orders reached them, and could scarcely imagine that the battle was lost.

I have taken the greatest pains to give a faithful narrative of this battle, and believe that I have succeeded. I likewise entertain the hopes, that every reader will be enabled by it to form a just and perfect judgment of the observations which Lloyd has thought proper to make upon this subject. I shall not dwell long upon the first, in which the circumstance of the Prussian army not being more numerous, is considered as a reproach. Had he consulted history, he would have found that the most decisive battles have been won by armies considerably, and often astonishingly, inferior in numbers to their opponents. For proofs of this, I need not resort to ancient history: even at school we learn that Alexander with a small, but well disciplined, number of Greeks, surmounted the most numerous hosts of Persians; that twenty thousand Romans under Lucullus routed

routed Tigranes and his two hundred thousand Armenians; that Hannibal was always weaker than the Romans, and yet overcame them in four pitched battles. But I would rather abide by examples from modern history. Montecuculi at St. Gothard, and Eugene at Belgrade, beat the Turks with armies which bore no proportion as to numbers. Charles the twelfth attacked the Russians at Narva with nine thousand, and routed an army of eighty thousand men. In the battles of Soor, Rosbach, Lissa, Zornsdorf, Lignitz, Torgau, and Freiberg, the Prussians were always considerably weaker in numbers than their enemy, and yet in all of them were victorious. At Torgau, in 1759, General Wunfch in broad day, with four thousand men, attacked and routed the Austrian and Imperial troops, amounting to fourteen thousand. Why has not Lloyd made the same observation on the battles of Lissa and Rosbach? But these battles were won; therefore the King was in the right. At Kollin he lost the day; and therefore he was in the wrong.—A style of criticism, admirable indeed for its solidity!

Had Lloyd obtained a more accurate description of the battle, and known the ground better, he would have found that not the smallest part of the disposition ought to have been changed. It was a master-piece, and could only be made by such a general as the King. Had Folard lived then, he might have had an opportunity of learning, and not have found it necessary to quote Mantinea and Leuctron

**Leuctron** as patterns for the oblique order of battle. The King's disposition was the oblique line. With him it is a principle, that the wing which forms the attack shall have the greatest strength, and that the different species of troops shall be so suited to the nature of the ground, that they can support and aid each other, to render the victory decisive if fortune be favourable; and, in case of being adverse, to prevent the enemy from pursuing their advantage. If the disposition made for this battle be coolly examined, it will be found that this principle was here minutely observed. I have already remarked, that we are to judge of a commander's merits by his conduct previous to the commencement of a battle, and not from events\*; because in the execution, a thousand unforeseen circumstances may occur. It is to be supposed that he has generals under him, who are capable, and who can comprehend the view and scope of his designs; that they are to make some use of their understanding and their eyes, and shew the difference between the thinking man and the machine; between the headlong bravery of the private soldier, and the calm courage of a superior officer, attending to extensive views and general consequences. It is evident that ill-timed bravery may have very pernicious consequences in the event of a battle. It was not necessary to chuse the wrong time and place for a display of

\* ————— careat successibus opto  
 Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.

OVID.  
 bravery.

bravery. The Prussians would have stormed Hell, if the King had ordered them. The stopping to drive the Croats from the standing corn, was injudicious in the extreme, perfectly contrary to the disposition which the King had made, and the first step to the confusion which ensued. Had the army quietly pursued their march, and followed General Hulsen, the left wing would have come to its proper ground behind him, and his attack would have proceeded with the same good fortune with which it had begun. While the whole army was advancing in an oblique line, the enemy would have constantly seen fresh battalions coming up, and as their right was already shaken, it would have been impossible for them to have avoided the disorder which had already begun to take place.

How can Lloyd say, that the King attacked in a place where he could not employ the different species of troops? This is a proof that he either did not know the ground, or had not taken the trouble to examine it with a military eye. What he says of the attack on the center, is one of those projects which I class among Folard's darling dreams of his columns, when he would retreat across a river in presence of a superior enemy. The whole front of Daun's army was so covered, that it would have been madness to have attacked him there. In no other place, but where the King did make the attack, was it possible to *employ the different species of troops*. How could this escape  
Lloyd's

Lloyd's attention? Did not Général Ziethen route Nadaſti's cavalry? and that ſo completely, that they durſt not again make their appearance; except the Saxon light cavalry, which had not been before engaged. The infantry had routed the enemy in ſeveral places, and the artillery, as well heavy as light, had conſtantly advanced and remained with the battalions.

Befides, did not the Auſtrian cavalry likewise find room to act? It follows that the different ſpecies of troops *could* be employed, becauſe they *were actually employed*. I ſhall not take the trouble of enlarging farther on the third and fourth of General Lloyd's faults. The deſcription which I have given of this battle plainly ſhews, that if the King's diſpoſition had been properly executed, Lloyd and his faults needed not now to have been the ſubject of diſcuſſion.

When he ſays, that the King ought not to have executed his movements in the day-time, he ſhould have recollected, that on the 18th of June the nights are not much above four hours long. Had the King moved at ſun-ſet, he could not before break of day have got through the defilés of Planian; for even during the day it required from ſix in the morning till twelve at noon for the columns to paſs them, and take up their proper order on the ground of Planian.

The loſs of this battle then is ſolely to be aſcribed to the orders given to the ſecond battalion of Bornſtaedt, to drive the Croats from the ſtanding  
corn,

corn, and to the misunderstanding which ensued. Had the army continued to move in uninterrupted connection and succession, and followed up the impression made by General Hulsen, it is highly probable that a perfect victory would have been the fruit of the King's excellent dispositions.

The most important events frequently take their rise from the merest trifles, as was the case in this battle. Had it not been for Lieutenant Colonel B——, of the Saxon regiment of cavalry, happening to observe that the ground between Kretzecor and the wood could not be maintained by cavalry, and that General Nadaſti perceived the justice of the remark, and that infantry were ordered to take up that ground; *that* cavalry would in all probability have been routed by General Ziechen; and General Hulsen, when he had taken possession of the village of Kretzecor, might have taken their army in flank and rear. His few battalions supported by the cavalry would have been sufficient to have completed the enemy's confusion.

It is much to the honour of General Nadaſti, that he paid attention to what was suggested to him. It is a rare instance upon such occasions. Too many are inflexibly obstinate, and not only take offence at any suggestion, but frequently endeavour to frustrate the good effects which might result from the ideas of others, merely because they were not their own. Nadaſti thought like a patriot, and was too great a man to be selfish.

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He adopted instantly what appeared most likely to conduce to the success of the day, and proved that he was more anxious to fulfil the duty to his sovereign and country, than to conceal his own faults or oversights.

The third circumstance which deserves to be taken into consideration is, that General Nostitz, when he ordered the Saxon regiments to move from their right towards the copse, forgot to give the same orders to the regiment of Prince Charles; and it is still more remarkable, that he was induced, by the representation of Lieutenant Colonel B —, to return with the other two. Had not this cavalry been at hand at that critical moment, to prevent the Prussians from cutting their way through the regiments of Salm, the Austrian line would infallibly have been again broken, and their overthrow most probably have been the consequence.

We may now conclude that Marshal Daun's disposition was not what paved the way to victory; however wise General Lloyd may represent it. The position which he had taken with his army was certainly strong, but highly dangerous to himself, against such an enemy as the King of Prussia; whose view in fighting a battle, was not merely to entitle himself to sing a *Te Deum*, but to give his enemy a complete overthrow.

When a camp or position is taken up, it is not sufficient that your front and flanks be strong, you must have the means of good retreat, and the army  
not

not be exposed to the danger of a total defeat. I have already observed, that Daun did not pay attention to this principle: nor does his conduct, after the battle of Prague, appear in any degree consistent with sound principles. He had an army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men while he was at Bömischbrodt, and when joined by that part of Prince Charles's army which fled after their defeat at Beneschau, he was at least forty thousand strong. The only force opposed to him was that under the Duke of Bevern, consisting of at most twenty thousand men. In what manner did Daun manœuvre against this little army, to which he was so greatly superior? He continued constantly to draw back, and suffered his magazines at Kollin, Kuttendorf, Suchdol, and Neuhaus, to be carried off before his face. This he ought to have prevented by every means in his power, and rather have given battle to the Duke of Bevern than have suffered it. He remained from the 7th of May till the 12th of June in a state of complete inactivity, and perhaps would never have advanced at all, if he had not received the most positive commands of the Empress Queen to proceed at all hazards to the relief of Prague. He was perfectly acquainted with the situation of that capital, and the total insufficiency of its magazines to support, for any length of time, an army like that which was now shut up within its walls. By his continuing so long without advancing, he exposed Prince Charles to the greatest danger of being

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obliged

obliged to surrender from want of provisions. In the pressure of such weighty circumstances, some risk ought to have been incurred; nor was it necessary to wait till he was by twenty or thirty thousand men stronger than his opponent. Why did he not march directly to Prague, as soon as he had formed a junction with Prince Charles's right wing, which had been defeated in the battle? As the King's army was intersected by the Moldau, he could not possibly have had more than two-thirds of it opposed to him. His approach would have inspired Prince Charles's troops with courage, and they could have afforded mutual support to each other during an attack. But he allowed a space of five weeks to elapse without undertaking any thing, and conducted himself as if Prince Charles had not existed. Such conduct certainly deserves no imitation. Had the King of Prussia been in Daun's situation, he would have found forty thousand men sufficient to have attacked an enemy with a force of one hundred thousand.

After the battle of Kollin, the same might have been said of Daun which was said to Hannibal; "Thou knowest how to conquer, but how to use thy victory that thou knowest not." It appears as if he had been too good a Christian to let the sun go down upon his wrath. On that day, which was nearly the longest in the year, he allowed the Prussian cavalry, which had beaten the corps of Nadaſti, to remain till ten o'clock at night upon the field of battle, and then to draw off without the smallest

smallest molestation. He did not even send a single hussar to follow the beaten infantry. He kept his army under arms the whole night; and next morning drew them back into their old camp at Kriechenau, as if he had been afraid that the King would return. When he arrived there at ten o'clock in the morning, he saw the whole Prussian baggage, between Kaurzim and Planian, in such a state of disorder and confusion, that the carriages could not get clear of each other: and notwithstanding they were only escorted by the single grenadier battalion of Manteuffel, he suffered them to proceed without interruption. An instance of forbearance and magnanimity almost without example.

The Prussian army in this battle consisted of thirty-two battalions of infantry, and one hundred and eighteen squadrons; and as the greater part of them had been in the battle of Prague, their strength could not at the utmost be estimated at more than thirty-two thousand men. The army under Marshal Daun consisted of forty-two battalions, thirty-eight companies of grenadiers, and one hundred and three squadrons. Add to these General Nadaſti's corps of ten thousand men, and some thousand Croats. Taking the whole together, and calculating the strength of the battalions according to the rules of probability, it will appear that the army must have amounted to sixty thousand men. It must however be observed, that the Austrians have a battalion to each regiment, which always remains behind for the purpose of raising

and training recruits; and as the loss which several of the regiments had suffered at Prague was supplied from these battalions, it may be fairly supposed that Daun's army was complete\*.

OPERATIONS AFTER THE BATTLE OF KOLLIN TILL  
THE TAKING OF ZITTAU.

The loss of the battle of Kollin brought the King's affairs into a very hazardous situation, and inspired his enemies with the greatest hopes. The French under Marshal D'Estrees had already made themselves masters of his dominions in Westphalia, had driven back the weak army under the Duke of Cumberland, and were approaching fast to the hereditary dominions of Prussia. The Prince of Soubise appeared in the Empire, with another army, in order to join such troops as the circles of the Empire might collect, and to act with vigour against Saxony. On the other side the Russians penetrated into Prussia with such a force, as the small army under

\* The King of Prussia, in his famous letter after this battle to Earl Marshal of Scotland, elder brother of Marshal Keith, says, "Twenty-three battalions were not sufficient to beat sixty thousand men out of an entrenched camp." Now we have seen that the Austrians had been but a few hours upon the spot, and that time had been fully employed in taking up the ground before they were attacked. Either the letter is not genuine, or doubtless it must have been the *natural* strength of the ground to which his Majesty alluded.

TRANSLATOR.

Marshal

Marſhal Lehwald was in no degree competent to reſiſt.

In Pomerania the Swedes had commenced hoſtilities, and the King had an army of one hundred and ten thouſand men oppoſed to him, which daily expected ſtill farther reinforcements from Hungary and Auſtria. His means of oppoſition to all their extenſive projects conſiſted in an army of ſeventy thouſand men. His deſtruction ſeemed inevitable, and no one ſaw the poſſibility of his reſiſting the force of ſo extraordinary a confederacy. Even the caution of the Imperial Diet was laid aſide: they thought they might now with impunity throw off the mask, and declare the King under the ban of the Empire.

But the King was not to be diſmayed. His extraordinary talents unfolded themſelves with peculiar energy, and his mind embracing the whole extent of military ſcience, diſcovered reſources ſo complete in themſelves, ſo applicable to his own ſituation, and ſo unexpected to his enemies, that he ſeemed at once to have bereft them of their faculties, and to have deprived them of all their powers of action. He kept their armies at ſuch a diſtance from each other, that he could attack ſingly thoſe whoſe progreſs threatened the moſt prejudicial conſequences; whiſt, in other quarters, the remainder of his force prevented the enemy, by a ſkilful ſyſtem of defence, from undertaking any thing of importance.

The junction of the Austrian army, of the army of the Empire, and of that of France, could happen no where but in Saxony. It was, therefore, a most important object of the campaign to hinder the Austrians from effecting it. After the battle of Kollin it was uncertain, whether in order to approach their allies they might not direct their views against Saxony, or whether they might not seek to penetrate into Silesia, and endeavour to reconquer that country, the possession of which was so much their object. It was a conquest however that was not easily to be effected. The fortresses were furnished even to superfluity with every thing necessary for defence. The garrisons, it is true, were not strong, but means could easily be found to reinforce them, by detachments from the army, when they should be threatened with a siege. The Austrians could not, till the harvest time, think of making an attempt on that quarter with much prospect of success, as their numerous army required great stores, and they had no means of conveying them thither but on carriages.

Their operations promised to be far more successful if directed on the side of Saxony. Should the King lose a battle there, he was in danger of being completely cut off from Silesia. The preservation of Saxony was of the greatest importance at that time, and had Lloyd adverted to this, he probably would not have said "that the conduct of the King, on the present occasion, did not appear

“ appear in the most advantageous light.” But the possession of Saxony depends upon that of Dresden; there being no other place of consequence in the country, and this town, at least from the side of Bohemia, is the key to Saxony. Every thing shewed the propriety of defending it to the utmost, by taking such positions as should frustrate every attempt of the enemy; and it appears to have been the highest degree of address, to have diverted the attention of the Austrians from this important object, by throwing other advantages in their way, which might be recovered without difficulty.

I will not attempt to penetrate farther into the motives of the King's operations after the battle of Kollin. No precipitation appeared in his conduct after that event. The retreat from Prague was made in the greatest order. On the 19th of June, the battering cannon were withdrawn from the batteries, and removed to the other side of the Moldau; from whence it was escorted to Leutmeritz, and transported by water to Dresden. On the 20th, the army marched off in three columns, with drums beating and colours flying, and moved to Brandeis. Prince Henry covered the retreat with the rear guard so perfectly, that the enemy could not reap the smallest advantage, notwithstanding the multitude of their light troops. Marshal Keith did not move on the other side till four in the afternoon of the 20th, when he drew back to Leutmeritz.



His rear guard was attacked by the light troops, but he continued his march with the loss of about four hundred men. The army beaten at Kollin was to be reinforced before any new attempt could be thought of. The King therefore moved to Lissa on the 21st, where he could easily be joined by the Prince of Bevern's corps; but Daun remaining perfectly at rest, and intelligence arriving that Prince Charles had moved on the 23d from Prague to Brandeis, it seemed probable that Daun would move towards him with his army, and that they would direct their operations along the Elbe to Saxony. The King having left part of the army which he had brought from Prague with that which had fought at Kollin, moved on the 24th with fourteen battalions and seven regiments of cuirassiers to Leutmeritz, and formed his camp upon the heights of Dirnowa.

Meanwhile the army of the Prince of Bevern remained till the 27th in the district of Nimburg, on which day they marched, and took up their camp at Lustmitz. On the 28th they went by Jung Buntzlau across the Iser, and encamped at Tcheditz. On the 1st of July, the Prince of Prussia\* arrived there and took the command. The great Austrian army continuing to advance, he went to Neuschloß on the 4th, and on the 7th to Böhmisch Leipa, where the army remained till the 17th.

\* Next brother to the late and father to the present King of Prussia.

TRANSLATOR.

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Both these positions of the King at Leutmeritz, and of the Prince at Leipa, seemed well calculated for the end proposed, of preventing the Austrians from penetrating into Saxony on the left side of the Elbe. They would not venture to leave a part of their army behind to watch the motions of the King and the Prince, and move with the remainder into Silesia, as the King could easily have come upon their rear, and have drawn them back or cut them off: if they had attempted to march into Lusatia, a variety of difficulties would have attended this undertaking. The Prince, by his position at Leipa, was master of the road by Gabel, of the Kaiser road, and of the road by Kamnitz, Krewitz, and Romberg, which are the best roads to Lusatia. The road by Greifenberg was the only one which remained open to the enemy, and it was by far the most difficult of any. It is true, they opened one road more to themselves by the taking of Gabel, an event which could not enter into their contemplation when the plan of operations was formed.

Highly as Lloyd praises this disposition of the Austrians, yet it does not by any means appear to have been the right one. It was said at that time, "America must be conquered in Germany." With as much justice might it have been said, "Silesia must be conquered in Saxony." The main object of their plan, according to Lloyd, was to cut off the King from Silesia; but this hope was perfectly visionary; for as long as the French  
troops

troops and those of the Empire did not extend their operations to Saxony, the King could easily preserve his communication with that province, or could soon have recovered it. The Austrians at that time were not very fond of acting upon plain ground, and they could not have blocked up the King's entrance into Silesia without risking a battle upon a plain. A general, who with a much stronger army than that of his antagonist, shall employ eternal caution, and remain constantly entrenched in his camp, can never venture upon bold and extensive designs. From the conduct of Prince Charles after the taking of Zittau, we may conclude, with much more probability, that the interrupting of the communication between the Prussian army and Silesia did not enter into his contemplation at the time he meditated an irruption into Lusatia. At least it would be very strange to suppose that a general should lay down a design, and employ means totally inconsistent with its execution. The Austrians did not till the end of August make a single movement that could point towards that object, for the small number of light troops, which plundered the country as far as Gorlitz and Lauban, could contribute nothing to this design, while the King was in the neighbourhood with his main army.

The only method by which they could have effected this design was by gaining a battle, and though the King offered them an opportunity they did not accept it. If a general is inclined to risk  
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an engagement, he should not place himself in such a position as to afford no apparent possibility of penetrating in any part: such, however, was the situation of the Austrians at Zittau, when the King marched from Bernstaedt to attack them. If the Austrians had really intended to penetrate into Silesia, the road through Lusatia was certainly not the shortest, and in respect to the maintenance of an army it was by far the most difficult. The Prussians had been masters of that part of Bohemia which lies between Saxony, the Iser, and the Elbe, from the beginning of the spring; in consequence of which that district of country was completely exhausted. The Austrians, having no magazines in the neighbourhood, must have brought their provisions from the heart of Bohemia, which would have occasioned a great loss of time, and have retarded all their operations; and even if they had at length succeeded in penetrating into Silesia by the way of Lauban, the Prussian army could have marched in a parallel direction, or have harrassed their rear so as to prevent their undertaking any thing of importance. If they had been attacked and beaten upon any part of this march, their complete destruction would in all probability have been the consequence: they would then have had no other retreat than through the mountainous tract, or through Upper Lusatia and Bohemia; in either of these cases, they would have had to contend with prodigious difficulties, for they had not a single magazine in the country, and their army must inevitably

evitably have been ruined before they could have reached Bohemia. A glance upon the map is sufficient to convince any one, that the nearest road from Jung Buntzlau to the center of Silesia is through Trautenau and Landshut.

If the Austrians, when they reached Munchengrätz, had left the Prince of Prussia in the mountainous country, and had drawn their whole army towards Silesia, they might possibly by advancing to Lignitz have cut him off from Breslau as well as from Schweidnitz. They would have no reason to fear that the Prince, or the King in conjunction with the Prince, would follow them diagonally through Bohemia, to shut them up in the mountains which separate it from Silesia, because they would have found no subsistence for their army upon the march, and were too far from the Elbe to receive any from other places. Besides the King must have made a great circuit through Saxony and Upper Lusatia, and thereby have afforded time to his enemies to have taken up any position they might judge most proper for the covering of a siege. This they might have undertaken in August, or by the beginning of September, and might have employed the remaining time either in establishing themselves in the country, or as the King was now fully engaged with the French, and the army of the Empire, in driving the small Prussian army out of Silesia. By this plan of operations, they would have rendered it impossible for the Prussians to have reinforced the garrison of Schweidnitz.

Schweidnitz with five battalions and a regiment of hussars, in consequence of which they would in a short time have got possession of that fortress.

The march towards Lusatia was directly contrary to their true interest, and if the King had not been harrassed by so many enemies, they would have had no other advantage to have boasted of at the end of the campaign, than the bombardment of Zittau.

The King had already obtained his object in part, by having kept them blocked up in a corner of Lusatia, till the French army and that of the Empire had approached sufficiently near to give him an opportunity, by rapid manœuvres and the happy issue of a battle, to get rid of them for the rest of the campaign, and to hasten to the assistance of the army in Silesia. The King's plan was so well devised, and all steps for the execution of it were so justly taken, that if the French army and that of the Empire had shewn more resolution and activity, so as to have afforded him an opportunity of beating them in September or October, Schweidnitz would not have been lost, and the Austrians, notwithstanding all their superiority, would have been unable to effect any thing in Silesia. But Providence seems to have determined that their success should answer no other purpose than to encrease the greatness of the King.

Lloyd praises the activity of the Austrians in driving the King out of Bohemia; but wherein it consisted, I am at a loss to discover. Instead  
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of following either the King or Marshal Keith, Prince Charles did not leave Prague till the 24th, and then proceeded no farther than to Unterpotchernitz.

On the other side, Daun had again returned to his old camp at Kriechenau, where his army remained inactive. In the morning the hymn of St. Ambrose was sung as a thanksgiving to the Almighty, and the evening concluded with three discharges of great guns and musquetry. The army was at length set in motion, and joined Prince Charles at Sworez on the 26th of June. This great army employed their time till the 30th in advancing to the Elbe, which it passed on the 1st of July upon five bridges at Czelakowitz, and afterwards encamped at Lissa. It appears as if the Austrians, by their unexpected good fortune, had been thrown into a species of stupor, from which they did not recover for several days. By their supineness and delay they gave the vanquished army an opportunity to collect new force, in consequence of which they remained another month in Bohemia, and subsisted during the whole of that time at the expence of the country.

It appears that Daun had put in practice, the old maxim of building a golden bridge for his beaten enemy. In some cases, this may perhaps be an useful maxim; but the King of Prussia knew too well the value of gold to employ it to such a purpose after any of his victories. He rather employed it in rewarding the bravery of his officers  
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and foldiers, and of the regiments which had captured any part of the enemy's artillery.

Much, however, may be said in justification of Marshal Daun. After a victory, even the victorious army is not always in a situation to undertake any new enterprize. One day at least must elapse before the regiments can receive a fresh supply of ammunition, to say nothing of provision, without which they cannot advance at all. This appears to have been the reason which obliged Prince Charles and Marshal Daun to wait several days before they could think of new operations. On the other hand it must be confessed, that if Daun had formed a well digested plan, and well connected as to its consequences, he would have been prepared for every event. Before he determined to give battle, he should have asked himself these questions: What am I to do farther if I gain the battle; or what am I to do if I lose it? In either case the army should have been provided with several days provisions, either to advance with vivacity, or to draw back with security; but this having been neglected, the necessary consequence was, that he was obliged to remain a considerable time in a state of inactivity.

In the retreat of the Prince of Prussia from Leipa, several untoward circumstances concurred to occasion the loss of the baggage, and of a great part of the ammunition waggons belonging to the artillery, as well as of the pontoons. The Austrians do not appear to have understood the full extent  
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of their advantages, when they permitted the Prince of Prussia to advance to the relief of Zittau. His being able to draw from it the stores and provisions, as well as the greater part of the garrison, in the presence of the Austrian army, is a circumstance as honourable to the Prince, as the unnecessary burning of the town is disgraceful to Prince Charles.

In whatever point of view the destruction of that flourishing town be considered, it would be very difficult to find any grounds upon which it could be justified: it was no fortress: it was surrounded by a simple wall, which had no bastions or out-works, but the bravery of its garrison. Except the magazine, it contained nothing which could be of any use to the Austrians, and the loss which the Prussian army would sustain by the burning of the town was very inconsiderable in comparison of the misery which it brought upon the unfortunate inhabitants. Besides, the Prussians had abundant supplies from Dresden and Bautzen. Might not the Austrians with all their force, which was so infinitely superior to that of the Prince, have manœuvred in such a manner as to cut him off from the town? There is not a doubt that this was practicable; so that they might not only have taken the whole garrison, but the magazines would have fallen into their hands complete and unspoiled.

I cannot here do better than quote the words of General Warnery, upon the retreat of the Prince  
of

of Prussia, as they stand in his "*Commentaires sur les commentaires de Montecuculi*, page 50. part 2d."

"The camp at Bohmisch Leipa was the best in all Bohemia; it was like a fortress in the front and flank, and could never be turned in such a way as not to leave us two roads by which we could draw back without danger: in short, there could not be a better position for so small an army as ours, which was unavoidably obliged to remain on the defensive, and was ill provided with artillery. Had the troops, in the little miserable town of Gabel (where they were obliged to surrender in a moment) only received orders to draw back to Zittau on the enemy's approach, or had they done it without orders, our retreat would have been fully as secure as before, and would not have cost us ten men. It is certain that from this camp Gabel could not be defended; and that in our situation, at that time, it would have been highly dangerous to have made our retreat by the road which passed through that place, for the line of march would have lain through passes so very narrow and steep, that a few light troops, properly managed, could have destroyed an army. Had Gabel been evacuated at the proper time, the position of the enemy at Nimes would have occasioned no difficulty. We were still masters of the Kaiser road from Leipa to Romberg, and could at any time have reached

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" Zittau

“ Zittau before the enemy’s army: for, besides  
“ that they must have moved their whole maga-  
“ zines with them, they must also have been  
“ obliged in their march to have passed the de-  
“ filés; or if they left the mountains on their  
“ right, even then the ground was high and une-  
“ qual, and overgrown with woods, so that they  
“ could not have reached Hennewald before us.  
“ The Prince of Prussia had determined to move  
“ by the Kaifer road; but a certain officer, who  
“ had contrived to assume consideration to him-  
“ self, assured his highness, with a very confident  
“ air, that the enemy had cut us off from this  
“ road by posting forty cannon on either side of it,  
“ an assertion which had no foundation. He had  
“ suffered himself to be persuaded of this by a  
“ peasant, who most probably had been employed  
“ by the enemy. Upon this false intelligence,  
“ however, it was determined to retire by a great  
“ circuit through Kamnitz. To render the mis-  
“ fortune more complete, this same officer sent  
“ another under him to reconnoitre the Kaifer  
“ road, but he went no farther than to the castle  
“ of Birkstein, where he saw a large herd of cattle  
“ at a distance, and conceived them to be troops  
“ and artillery. The former had been a few  
“ days before with a General in Kamnitz, and  
“ asserted on his arrival, that on that side of the  
“ town the roads were excellent; but this likewise  
“ proved to be false, for that which we afterwards  
“ took was only used by peasants when they went

“ to fetch wood. But this was not the last of the  
“ said officer’s reports, for, being upon the ad-  
“ vance guard, he reported that the enemy had  
“ brought heavy cannon between Neudorf and  
“ Kreibitz, which was the cause of the pontoons  
“ and baggage waggons being burnt. As I knew  
“ his character, I did not give entire credit to his  
“ reports, but kept the waggons of the five squa-  
“ drons of hussars which I commanded, and  
“ brought them all fortunately through, notwith-  
“ standing that I had constantly the rear guard,  
“ from Leipä to Zittau. It will hardly be be-  
“ lieved, that this numerous artillery proved to be  
“ nothing more than felled trees lying upon a  
“ field, which had been lately cleared for the  
“ plough. Had we taken the Kaiser road, we  
“ should have got to Zittau before the enemy,  
“ and notwithstanding the great loss of time, we  
“ arrived soon enough to draw off the garrison.  
“ If upon this occasion *we* made one fault, the  
“ enemy committed ten. Our misfortune was,  
“ that the Prince of Prussia, in order to proceed  
“ with greater security and caution, called a coun-  
“ cil of generals. Had he acted upon his own  
“ judgment, all would have gone well, for he  
“ understood the matter ten times better than any  
“ of those with whom he consulted.”

After having surmounted every difficulty, the Prince arrived on the 21st of July in the place of Hennersdorf, and proceeded on the 22d, at nine in the morning, towards Zittau. He arrived there

at two in the afternoon, and caused the army to march up to Herwigsdorf. General Winterfeldt had arrived with the advance guard at eleven in the forenoon. The great Austrian army was beyond the Neisse behind Zittau, with their left to Krottaw, and extended through Ullersdorf and Fridensdorf to Turkau and Reichenau, the right wing extending to the wood of Reichenau. In this position they were secure against every untoward circumstance. The Prince's intention was to take possession of the heights of Eckartsberg, by which means he would have frustrated the enemy's design against Zittau; but upon General Winterfeldt appearing on the plain of Herwigsdorf, the Austrians immediately took possession of those heights. The Prince then found himself under the necessity of taking up his camp at Herwigsdorf in such a manner, that the right wing extended to Lower Herwigsdorf, and the left to the heights of Upper Herwigsdorf, with which it formed an angle. Both villages were in the rear. Meanwhile General Winterfeldt advanced between the town and Upper Herwigsdorf, to cover the retreat of General Schmettau out of the town, which was effected without disaster, so that seven battalions, and a number of waggons laden with bread and flour, and other baggage, arrived at the army. On account of the nearness of the enemy, no tents were pitched, but the army lay upon their arms that night. On the 23d it began to rain heavily, and at nine the tents were pitched. Upon this the  
enemy

enemy began to bombard the town, and by twelve o'clock one half of it was completely in flames. In order to save as much as possible of the great stores of flour and bread, in the afternoon, all the pack-horses and as many waggons as could be sent from the army moved towards the town, but unfortunately they arrived too late, as the greater part of the bread was by this time burnt. The town being nearly reduced to ashes, and it being impossible to remain in the streets in consequence of the great heat, the Commandant Colonel Dierke found it necessary to withdraw with his garrison towards the army. But he was not completely out of the town, when General Rebentisch brought him orders to defend it to the last man, upon which he faced about and re-entered the place. But by this time the enemy had entered the town on the opposite side, and the Prussians who had returned were completely surrounded. The greater part of the garrison, however, forced their way through, and none were taken but Colonel Dierke, Major General Kleist, a number of the first battalion of the Margrave Henry, and a considerable part of the battalion of Seers, which lost five colours. Some field pieces were also left in the town.

The Prince\* now thought proper to draw back, and sent his baggage to Lobau on the 24th. The army

\* This was a Prince of most amiable manners, who had often shewn considerable talents. He quitted the army upon this occasion, fell into a state of languor, as we learn from the

army followed on the 25th, at two o'clock in the morning, and arrived there at noon. On the 26th at noon, General Winterfeldt took possession of the heights of Hochkirchen, to cover the march of the army to Bautzen, which encamped there on the 27th, and waited the arrival of the King. The two regiments of Maurice and Bevern, which had suffered so much at Kollin, were detached from hence under General Manteuffell, to act against the Swedes in Pomerania.

On the 28th the King arrived with sixteen battalions of infantry and twenty-eight squadrons. Marshal Keith followed him with another corps, which took post at Roth-Naufritz, in order to keep up the communication with Dresden. Prince Maurice of Dessau remained at Cotta, on the other side of the Elbe, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons.

King, and in little more than twelve months he died. It is not improbable, that he had suffered the cross events which happened in this retreat to prey upon his mind. Yet they were nothing more than might have been expected. Harte, the historian of Gustavus Adolphus, asserts, That there are more instances of commanders dying of broken hearts than of any other description of men; *inamoratos* not excepted. This observation is made upon the death of a commander, whitened with forty campaigns—Spinola, who received a letter, from his master the King of Spain, which struck him to the heart. His chagrin was such, that he was soon confined to bed: he would never give the letter from his hand; continued constantly to cry out, “*m’hanno levato l’honore—m’hanno levato l’honore* ;” and in a few days expired.

TRANSLATOR.

On

On the 30th the King marched with a strong corps to Weissenberg, and resigned the command of the army at Bautzen to the Prince of Bevern. The Prince marched on the eighth to Nehern, and left General Rebentisch with ten battalions at Bautzen, in order to protect the bakery which was there established. Marshal Keith moved from his post at Roth-Naufritz, and advanced on the 14th to the heights of Hochkirchen. On the 15th the King went with his corps to Bernstadt, and the Duke of Bevern moved from his camp at Nehern to Herwigsdorf, near Lobau. The Marshal moved with his corps from Hochkirchen towards the Duke, and the army took up their camp in the rear of the long village of Herwigsdorf, which was occupied by five battalions of grenadiers.

By this position, the King once more opened his communication with Silesia, as Prince Charles durst not move from Zittau, for fear of being cut off from Bohemia. Perceiving that the King was advanced to Bernstadt and Herwigsdorf, he took up his position along the road from Lobau to Zittau, thinking that the King would advance through Hennerdorf; but the Marshal marched on the 16th from Herwigsdorf to Bernstadt, and on his arrival the King went forwards with all the hussars and free battalions, ten squadrons of dragoons, and ten battalions of infantry, to Hirschfeldt, to which place the army continued their march. By this movement he came upon the enemy's rear, who, upon intelligence of the Prus-



sian advance guards appearing in the woods behind Hirschfeldt, immediately took up the following position: Their right extended to the Neisse, and came upon the heights of Ratgendorf; their left came upon the high ground of Siersdorf; their center inclined inwards; so that their whole army formed a semi-circle along the heights. In their front, they had the hollow way of Witgendorf, which completely covered them. The ground on their right was so high and steep, that they had no attack to fear on that quarter; and they were completely protected by the mountain on their left flank, so that whatever body advanced on that side could from thence be completely enfiladed. In the hollow way was the village of Witgendorf, which was occupied by the croats and four hundred infantry. The enemy had a prodigious quantity of artillery in their front, and had thrown a great number of croats into the woods. Upon the right side of the Neisse stood the corps de reserve, and General Nadaſti's corps, with their left to the river, and their right to the wood at Reichenau. The ground before them was likewise full of natural difficulties. From Reichenau to Hirschfeldt the ground is marshy, intersected with lakes, and a small stream called the Kupferwasser. On their right they had thick impenetrable woods upon high hills, separated by deep defilés.

In this position were the enemy when the King arrived in sight of them at Tittelsdorf. Being resolved to attack them wherever it might be possible,

ble, he proceeded to reconnoitre them while the army advanced in three divisions. The right wing was in the Witgendorf wood, directly opposite to the enemy's left; from thence the front extended to the height of Tittelsdorf, and from thence to the little town of Hirschfeldt on the Neisse, which was occupied by a battalion. The hollow ground of Witgendorf separated the armies, which were only a cannon shot asunder. A heavy cannonade commenced, and lasted till sun-set. The King saw the impossibility of attacking the enemy, and the army lay that night upon their arms. In the morning they pitched their tents, and the head-quarters were fixed at Tittelsdorf. The only choice now was, by attempting to turn the enemy, to make them leave their advantageous position. With this view, the King caused some bridges to be laid across the Neisse, below Hirschfeldt, and detached General Winterfeldt with ten battalions of infantry, twenty squadrons of dragoons, and fifteen squadrons of hussars, across the river, to drive the corps of Nadaſti from their post. Winterfeldt immediately encamped upon the heights of Rona. A heavy cannonade ensued, but the object could not be accomplished, as the Austrians continually reinforced General Nadaſti. In this situation things remained till the 20th. Meanwhile the King detached General Grumbkow, with five battalions and ten squadrons of hussars, to Gorlitz, to cut off or drive out the Austrian garrison. But they had withdrawn from the town early on the 19th, and it  
was

was now occupied by the Prussians. The King seeing that it was in vain to attempt to bring Prince Charles to a battle, drew back to Bernstadt on the 20th, and remained there till the 24th. A corps took up the former camp at that place, which had been quitted on the 16th, and the greater part of the army moved to Schona under the command of the Duke of Bevern. General Winterfeldt drew off from his camp at Rona along the Neisse, and moved to Buhra.

#### OPERATIONS PREVIOUS TO THE BATTLE OF ROSBACH.

The King having given up to the Duke of Bevern the command of the army which he meant to leave for the protection of Silesia, marched on the 25th of August with sixteen battalions and twenty-three squadrons from the camp at Bernstadt, and on the 12th of September formed a junction with the corps of Prince Maurice at Dresden, who had continued there in order to cover that capital, and to serve as a check upon Colonel Laudon\*.

The King's army now consisted of the following battalions and squadrons:

\* Afterwards General Laudon.

INFANTRY.

INFANTRY.

Grenadiers,

- 1 battalion of Wedel,
- 1 ————— Fink,
- 1 ————— Kremfow,
- 1 ————— Kamin,
- 1 ————— Lubath,
- 1 ————— Billerbeck.

Musqueteers,

- 2 battalions of Guards,
- 1 ————— Retzow,
- 2 ————— Margrave Charles,
- 2 ————— Winterfeldt,
- 2 ————— Itzenplitz,
- 2 ————— Forcade,
- 2 ————— Meyrincke,
- 2 ————— Anhalt,
- 2 ————— Alt Braunschweig,
- 2 ————— Goltz,
- 1 ————— Hulfen,
- 2 ————— Kleist,
- 
- 28 battalions.
- 

CAVALRY.

## CAVALRY.

## Cuirassiers,

3	squadrons of Garde du Corps,
5	———— Gens d'armes,
5	———— Rochow,
5	———— Driefen,
5	———— Leib. regiment.

## Dragoons,

5	———— Meynicke,
5	———— Katte.

## Hussars,

10	———— Czeculi.
—	
43	squadrons.
—	

The strength of this army may be estimated nearly as follows: As most of the corps had been in the battles of Prague and Kollin, and had likewise suffered much by desertion and sickness, each battalion, one with another, may be reckoned at six hundred men, and each squadron at one hundred and twenty. This will amount to

Infantry,	16,800
Cavalry,	5,160
Artillery, about	400
	<hr/>
	22,360

in

in all twenty-two thousand three hundred and sixty men: with this force the King was preparing to advance against the combined armies. In this view, he formed an advance-guard of six battalions, fifteen squadrons, and the free battalion\* of Meyer, with which he marched forwards, while Marshal Keith followed with the remainder of the army.

The enemy had no troops in Saxony at that time but about four thousand light cavalry and infantry under Colonel Laudon, which now fell back to the combined army on their approach.

The King with the advance-guard shaped his march through Topschadel, Dobeln, Grimma, Rotha, and Pegau; the army followed in different columns by the same route. The greater part of the infantry were cantoned upon the march; a few battalions only, and the greater part of the cavalry, were encamped. No enemy appeared till they came to Pegau, where there were two hundred Austrian hussars of Laudon's corps, of whom one officer and ninety-eight privates were made prisoners. On the 11th of September the King crossed the Saala at Naumburg, where a few Austrian hussars were taken. The enemy being now at hand, the army encamped in order. Although the King advanced as far as Erfurth on the 13th, yet he saw nothing of the enemy, who had drawn back, and had taken up a strong position behind Eise-nach.

\* Free battalions were irregular troops, which enlisted on the terms of being disbanded at the end of the war.

TRANSLATOR.

The

The King did not think it necessary to go farther in pursuit of them, and to remove to a greater distance from Saxony and the Elbe, as the Austrians could have formed various enterprises in his rear, and might perhaps have detached a strong corps to the Marche. Some detachments from the army of Marshal Richelieu were committing various depredations in the districts of Halberstadt and Magdeburg. Notwithstanding the weakness of the King's army, he detached two corps to cover his territories and magazines in Saxony. On the 14th he sent Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick with five battalions of infantry, and two regiments of cavalry, into the district of Magdeburg; and Prince Maurice, with eight battalions of musqueteers, three of grenadiers, and two regiments of cavalry, moved through Naumburg, into the country between the Elbe and Mulda, in order to watch the motions of the Austrians in Saxony. The King continued at Erfurth with the remaining twelve battalions, the free battalions of Meyer, the Garde du Corps, the dragons of Meinicke and Czetteritz, and the hussars of Czeculi. The infantry were cantoned in different villages, and the cavalry encamped behind Erfurth. The King's headquarters were in Dittelsadt. It appeared as if the campaign were about to be closed in this quarter without any event of importance, and in truth nothing remarkable did take place till the battle, except a master-stroke of Général Seidlitz, which cannot be passed over in silence. On the  
15th

15th the King took the dragoons and hussars, and advanced with them to Gotha. Two squadrons of Austrian, and one of French hussars, had entered that place on the 13th, but they retired upon the King's approach, and he found the town unoccupied. Here he left General Seidlitz with five squadrons of Meynick's dragoons, and the hussars of Czeculi, which were posted in and about the town. Five squadrons of the dragoons of Czetteritz remained between Gotha and Erfurth, and the King returned to his position behind Erfurth.

In the mean time, the Generals of the combined army receiving intelligence that the King had detached these two corps, and that he was posted with a few battalions behind Erfurth, conceived that this was a favourable opportunity for an enterprize, and that they could not do better than begin by the capture of General Seidlitz.

Accordingly, two regiments of Austrian, and one of French hussars, all the grenadier companies of their army, all their croats and other light troops, with two Austrian regiments of cavalry, were ordered upon the expedition. The Princes of Hilburghausen and Soubise, and a multitude of other Generals, chose to be present at this undertaking.

General Seidlitz was too vigilant to allow them to surprise him, but being too weak to resist numbers so very superior, especially as he had neither infantry nor artillery, could not think of defending the town till the King came to his assistance. He therefore retired, and taking post at a small distance



rance behind the town, at the village of Sebeleben, sent orders to the dragoons of Czetteritz to join him immediately. The enemy advanced and took possession of the town and castle.

Now that the whole ducal family was established in the place, it was necessary to pay court in due form, and to omit no degree of politeness upon an occasion of so much joy and festivity. The whole court was assembled, and the French had every opportunity of shewing their wit and gallantry, in compliment to the fair ladies, congratulating them on their deliverance from the unpolished Prussians, with their pipes and tobacco.

In the mean time, the dragoons of Czetteritz having joined General Seidlitz, he thought himself sufficiently strong to attack the enemy. He sent on the hussars, who drove in the advance posts, and followed rapidly with the rest of his cavalry in a rank entire\*. The general officers were on the point of sitting down to table, when they were informed

\* The King's account of General Seidlitz's disposition is highly instructive; *Oeuvres posthumes*, tom. 3. page 205. as follows: " M. Seidlitz, having taken post at some distance  
" from Gotha, sent the dragoons of Czetteritz to a défilé,  
" which was about half a mile behind him, with orders to  
" draw up in a single rank, with a view to impose upon the  
" enemy by the extent of their front; still keeping them suf-  
" ficiently near at hand to protect his retreat if he were  
" obliged to yield to superior numbers. This excellent  
" stratagem deceived the Prince of Hildburghausen. He  
" had no just conception of the small number of the Prus-  
" sian army; thought they were advancing, and that this  
" great

formed of the appearance of the enemy, and the truth of the report was soon confirmed by a smart fire. The French have a lively imagination, and immediately conceived this to be the whole Prussian army, and the King at their head. They never could suppose that the Prussian hussars would venture to attack the town, unless they were supported by a large body of infantry. Soubise was too experienced a general to imagine they could be guilty of such an act of imprudence. He paid his compliments to the court in the greatest haste, and regretted that the uncivil behaviour of the Prussians obliged him to leave such agreeable company.

Unluckily Soubise had not thought of any disposition in case of a surprise, and therefore gave the word *sauve qui peut!* at the same time galloping with his suite out of the town. The other generals were animated by his example, and leaving the town in the greatest confusion, took the road to Eisenach. The Prussian hussars attacked the castle with great bravery, and drove out four companies of grenadiers who were posted in it.

In this manner did General Seidlitz, with fifteen hundred cavalry and without a single foot soldier, clear the town of a corps of about eight thousand

“ great line of cavalry was on the point of coming on.” M. Seidlitz perceived the impression he had made; and, in consequence, formed the enterprise as related by the Author. The King proceeds to bestow the praises upon General Seidlitz which he so well deserved.

TRANSLATOR.

L

men,

men, making six officers and fifty-one men prisoners of war. Beside these, the hussars took a number of secretaries, commissaries, comedians, lacqueys, hair-dressers, cooks, &c. whom General Seidlitz, in his politeness, -immediately sent back, without farther ceremony.

This transaction may serve to shew what may be done with cavalry, when they are commanded by a man of intelligence and determination. General Seidlitz from this time began to discover his great talents, and to convince the world that he was worthy of the confidence which the King reposed in him. Although he was one of the youngest Major Generals in the army, he commanded the whole cavalry at the battle of Rosbach. He kept possession of Gotha till the 22d, and on that day returned to the King, who remained in his quarters at Erfurth, in order to see what the combined armies were now to attempt. They continued however in a state of inactivity, with the single exception of their retaking Gotha.

At length, to give his army better quarters, the King returned on the 28th to the district of Butstadt, where he cantoned the army. Here he remained till the 10th of October, without being in the least disturbed by the enemy: there was every appearance that the combined army had no inclination to undertake any thing farther this campaign, and the King resolved to draw nearer to the Elbe, to be ready, in case of need, to march

to the assistance of the army in Silesia. With this intention he moved on the 11th, and passed through Naumburg towards Saxony.

In the mean time the Austrian main army had penetrated into Silesia, and had forced the Duke of Bevern back to Breslau. In Lusatia they had left General Marschal with six regiments of infantry and as many of cavalry at Lauban, and had stationed a corps of light troops under Generals Haddick and Morocz between Stolpin and Dresden. The road to the Marche of Brandenburg was completely open, and as there was not a single Prussian hussar on the right side of the Elbe in Saxony, or in Upper and Lower Lusatia, their inactivity is perfectly unaccountable. Notwithstanding the King was at a considerable distance, he was constantly present in their thoughts, nor did they venture upon a single enterprise of consequence. The only thing that resembled a military operation, was General Haddick's expedition to Berlin. He arrived there on the 16th of October, occasioned some consternation, advanced through the Siberian gate to the suburbs, levied a considerable contribution, and on the 17th marched back on his return.

This undertaking is a proof that a judicious boldness of enterprise in war, is generally attended with the best consequences.

Although the Austrians triumphed not a little in this advantage, yet in the event it cost them dear: for in all human probability to this very expedition of General Haddick are the glorious

events to be attributed, with which this campaign was concluded on the part of the King of Prussia. It would have been a matter of no small difficulty to have enticed the combined army from their fastnesses behind Eifenach, if they had not been encouraged by this success. If the King had moved towards Silesia without having had an opportunity of defeating them, they could easily have found means to make themselves masters of Leipzig, and of the whole of that part of Saxony which lies upon the left bank of the Elbe: so that the King, after driving the Austrians out of Silesia, would have been reduced to the necessity of returning to Saxony in the middle of the winter, and of exposing his troops to considerable difficulties and fatigue.

#### BATTLE OF ROSBACH.

The description which Lloyd gives of the battle of Rosbach, with the exception of a few trifling circumstances, is perfectly accurate. Having drawn in the corps under Duke Ferdinand, and that under Prince Maurice, the King resolved to attack the united armies, notwithstanding their prodigious superiority of numbers, and fixed upon the 4th day of November for that purpose. Early in the morning he perceived that they had changed their position in the night. They had resolved to attack the left flank of the Prussian army. The  
King

King was at table \* with his general officers, when the movement of the enemy was reported to him. He

\* In the life of Frederick, with anecdotes, published at Straßbourg in 1778, it is asserted, That the King dined in the curate's house at Rosbach; that one of his Aides de camp was sent to the top of the steeple, and every ten minutes communicated his remarks to his Majesty in a note written with pencil.

The Editor believes that he can state more accurately the fact upon which the above anecdote most probably was founded. In a private letter now before him, from Lord Dover, then General Yorke, who for so many years, and so honourably, filled the station of British Ambassador at the Hague, is the following passage. It is dated November 22, 1757, seventeen days after the event.

“ This battle is one of the greatest lessons for a man of the  
 “ profession I ever read of, and I must please myself with  
 “ telling you an anecdote, which characterises the genius of  
 “ the Prince, and his superiority of knowledge and courage,  
 “ joined with the greatest prudence. My Author is the Bailiff  
 “ of the castle of Rosbach, where his Prussian Majesty had  
 “ his quarters on the 3d, 4th, and 5th instant. On the 4th  
 “ (says the Bailiff, who writes to one of his friends at the  
 “ Hague), his Majesty marched towards the enemy, but came  
 “ back again in the evening, saying, that they were too well  
 “ posted, and he must try something else. On the 5th, at ten  
 “ o'clock in the forenoon, he called for the Bailiff, and asked  
 “ him, whether he could not show him a place at the top of  
 “ his house from whence he could have a view of the distant  
 “ country? The Bailiff told him, No; unless his Majesty would  
 “ go up to the roof, from whence he would take off some  
 “ tiles. The King followed him, and through the roof ex-  
 “ amined the motions of the enemy for nearly an hour, then  
 “ came down to his officers, and ordered dinner to be served  
 “ at noon. He dined quietly, and with a good appetite. At  
 “ a little

He immediately gave orders for the army to hold themselves in readiness to march. Not long after this he received intelligence, that the heads of the enemy's columns were already opposite to his left flank. Upon this he instantly gave orders to General Seidlitz to move with the whole cavalry to the left behind the heights, in order to cut them off from Merseburg. The cavalry were saddled, and in motion in a moment. The infantry also received orders to move by divisions, and to follow the cavalry behind the heights. In the mean time the King mounted his horse, and reconnoitred the enemy. The cavalry moved so rapidly, that the infantry, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, could not keep up with them.

General Seidlitz having arrived with the cavalry behind the Janus-hill, perceived that the heads of the enemy's columns were composed of cavalry; that they were now between Reichertswerben and Lundstadt, and that he already outflanked them. Without a moment's hesitation, he formed in two lines, and came down upon the enemy without waiting for the infantry. As soon as the enemy saw the Prussian cavalry, they endeavoured to form,

“ a little after one, he ordered the Bailiff to shew him the way  
 “ up again; and after examining the enemy for half an hour,  
 “ he came down again, told the Generals to have the tents  
 “ struck immediately, and to have the army in order of battle,  
 “ as he was determined to fight. At a little after two,” continues my Author, “ his Majesty got on horseback, and a  
 “ little after three we could see no more of the French.”

TRANSLATOR.

but

but had not time, as General Seidlitz was already upon them both in flank and rear. None but the two Austrian regiments of Bretlach and Trautmanndorf could place themselves in any degree of order; but they, as well as the rest of the cavalry, were soon routed and driven through Reichertswerben and Busendorf, back to their columns of infantry. After this successful onset, the infantry arrived and formed. Not more than six battalions had got up, with Prince Henry at their head, who immediately supported General Seidlitz, as he was forming again to attack the enemy. The infantry advanced straight upon the enemy's columns, inclining constantly to their left, to come more upon their flank and in their rear. The complete overthrow of the combined army was the consequence of these manœuvres\*.

When

\* It is somewhat extraordinary that all the accounts vary with respect to the numbers of the combined armies in this battle. Some make them amount to ninety thousand; Lloyd relates that they were *above* fifty thousand; and Tempelhoff has not objected to that statement. The Prussians lost but three hundred men. Of the combined armies there were eight hundred killed and six thousand made prisoners, including eleven generals and three hundred officers. Seventy-two pieces of cannon, and many other trophies were also gained by the Prussians.

The dislike which the Germans bear to the French, is apparent from many passages of Tempelhoff's history, and may be farther illustrated by a well-known anecdote. In this battle of Rosbach, a Prussian hussar pursuing a French dragoon, perceived that he himself was followed by an Austrian horseman,



When we compare the conduct of the Generals of the combined army upon this occasion, with the whole of their deportment during the former part of this campaign, it is difficult to find any grounds upon which it can be explained or defended. Experience had convinced them, that the King, instead of avoiding them, wished for nothing more than an engagement. They were acquainted with the rapidity of his movements, and indeed only two days before had had the clearest proofs of it. Unless they threw dust in their own eyes, they must have perceived that in the art of performing able manœuvres, their own troops were mere novices, and yet they suddenly came to the resolution of attacking the King upon ground where he could bring the whole art of his tactics into practice, without any fear of losing the advantage of his dispositions through any misconception of orders; where he could employ troops of every description, and where each would contribute to the support of the other; where all his movements could be made with vivacity and order; in short, upon ground where skill was every thing, and numbers nothing.

The reinforcements which they had received from Richelieu's army may probably have contri-

with an uplifted sabre ready to cleave his head. "German comrade," said the Prussian, "let me take this Frenchman."—"Take him," said the Austrian, and galloped off. *History of the War*, written in German by Captain ARCHENHOLZ, an old officer in the Prussian service, and who also has written the *Picture of Italy* and the *Picture of England*. The latter is translated into English.


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buted to their extraordinary conduct, and possibly an idea that the King would have acted agreeably to the precepts which they had been accustomed to read in Puysegur, Quincy, and Folard; but in this they found their mistake. His choice of a camp perhaps strengthened them in their ideas. It was indeed very advantageous. His right was covered by the villages of Bedra, and the left by Rosbach; and the marshy banks of the Leibe, a little rivulet, prevented the possibility of a successful attack being made upon his front. As most people judge of others according to the principles which would direct their own conduct, they probably believed that the King would avail himself of the advantageous situation of his camp, and would wait to see in what manner they might chuse to attack him. It never occurred to them, that he could see through their intentions with a single glance, and could find means with the greatest ease to render them fruitless; that it never was his system to wait for the attack, but that he always chose to act that part himself, and to anticipate his enemy. The history of the former war might have convinced them of this in the clearest manner, and if they had remembered the battle of Soor, no doubt would have remained with them upon the subject. But their blindness was so great, that their design was not merely to beat the King, but to cut off his whole army.


From the King's conduct upon this occasion, it may be established as a principle, that an army  
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should never wait to be attacked; especially when the ground admits of moving freely to either flank, so as to come upon the enemy with impetuosity. It also follows, that when an enemy wishes to turn your flank in the day of battle, you can always prevent it, and even point the effect of it against himself. In the attempt, the line of his march must make an angle with the prolongation of your front.



The enemy A B wishes to gain the point E, to turn the flank of the army C D. It is plain that whichever of the two gains the point E the first, will outflank the other. A B moving by divisions, as the most proper method, will have a strong corps of cavalry at their head to gain the flank of C D with all possible speed. If C D be vigilant, they can very easily frustrate his intentions; they have only to do as the King did, to bring

bring their cavalry to the wing which the enemy wishes to attack, and set them in motion. With the least intelligence of the enemy's design, it is easy to contrive that their distance from the point E shall be less than his, and that consequently their army can be there before his. They have then gained his flank. He is beaten, if C. D. know their advantage, and move boldly to the attack. This will be evident if we consider what A B can oppose to them.



The cavalry of C D having gained the point E, the army A B has nothing left but to make an angle at B F. This they must do in a hurry, and most probably not in the best order, while C D's cavalry, already formed and advancing, inclines still to the flank as they move, comes down upon the

the cavalry of A B, takes them in flank, and even gets round their rear before they can form up a front.

Another inconvenience arises in the sudden formation of an angle. The distances between the divisions, as well as that between the first and second line, are lost. They are entangled together, and the second line is carried off with the first in their enemy's onset.

While the cavalry of C D is making their attack, the infantry will get up to E, and should they be but a few battalions, they must move on without waiting the arrival of more. This is not the time for deliberation, and it is evident even a few battalions may continue to advance without fear of being supported by the army. The battalions which follow, will soon come up near to the point E, and support the attack; but it is not necessary that they should go so far as the point E, for the attack is then necessarily continued in echelons, each arriving at its point while that behind is two hundred paces distant, and if they incline in moving but a little to the left, the enemy find themselves taken full in flank and rear before they can make preparations of defence.

Their angle at B likewise gives opportunity to the artillery of C D to employ their fire with the greatest effect, which may even enfilade their line, and complete the disorder. A very small army may in this manner throw a large body into total confusion.

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The cavalry may, upon such an occasion, contribute greatly to the success of the above movements; and it is but justice to say, that the Prussian cavalry, upon this occasion, led the way to victory in so complete a manner, that the infantry found their part extremely easy.

From this battle we may also draw another conclusion. That a General who leads an army well accustomed to all sorts of manœuvres, must always endeavour to attack his enemy upon the march, let them be ever so superior. This will give him an opportunity of forming designs, of the possibility of which his opponent has no idea. He thereby will so completely gain the ascendancy over his enemy, that he may commit faults with impunity, even in his presence, without his having the heart to punish the temerity. Nothing gains a General so much the confidence of his troops, as often leading them on to the attack. Many skirmishes take place on such occasions, which must end in favour of the attacking side, especially when your enemy pursues the opposite system, and is apprehensive of being attacked upon the march: whoever studies the events of the seven years war, will perceive that the King always sought to attack his enemy upon the march. Daun knew this, and therefore chose to occupy the most difficult ground by the greatest circuits, rather than give the King the opportunity of attacking him upon the march. This accounts for the decided superiority of the Prussian light troops, especially of the hussars, over those

those of the enemy; and hence arose the backwardness of the enemy to venture upon ground where the means of retreat were difficult in case of attack.

There is no battle to be found in history where the event was so extraordinary as in this. Both friend and foe laughed at the Generals of the united armies. But Soubise was particularly the object of ridicule. It was said, that he had written to the King of France, that he would soon send him the King of Prussia as prisoner. But as he did not keep his word, and one Job's messenger arriving after another, the wit of the choice spirits of Paris could not be restrained, but broke out into several severe epigrams. Among the rest was this,

*Frederic combattant d'estoc et de taille  
Quelqu'un au fort de la bataille,  
Vient lui dire, nous avons pris.—  
Qui donc ?—le General Soubise.  
Ah morbleu dit le Roi tant pis !  
Qu'on le relache sans remise.*

Frederick fighting with might and with main,  
Some one came up through the midst of the slain,  
Calling aloud to him, Sire, may it please—  
We have taken—What? whom?—we have taken Soubise.  
By the Lord, says the King, it is so much the worse,  
Send him back to his troops, I'll lend him a horse.

His friend Voltaire expresses his grief for his misfortune, and adds, that he soon afterwards won

two

two battles, of which they scarcely took the smallest notice in Paris. He might have added, that they were not worth mentioning\*.

OPERATIONS IN SILESIA.

Before we proceed to the examination of Lloyd's thoughts upon the operations of the Duke of Bevern, it is necessary to consider the actual state of the Prussian army after the battle of Kollin †, and as nearly as possible to ascertain its real strength.

\* The battles alluded to, are probably the affairs at Sangerhausen and at Lutternberg in 1758. General Lloyd, in his preliminary discourse, says, "The French, when they are beaten, have too much vanity to acknowledge that they are in fault, they throw the blame *entirely* on their commander, they grow mutinous, and desert." Whether a complete overthrow almost without resistance ought to have been effected by the circumstance of so small a body turning the flank of an army so very superior in numbers, had not the panic operated, may perhaps be a question. Had there been half an hour more of day-light, probably every man of their army would have been cut to pieces, or taken prisoners. Detachments of cavalry were immediately sent out in every direction, as we learn from the King's works. None of them consisted of above forty men, and for several days they continued to bring in prisoners and baggage.

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† There is a long detail in the original upon this subject, which the Translator supposes the English reader will excuse him for leaving out, as he gives the result.

It



It will plainly appear then, that the Duke of Bevern had not more than thirty-six thousand men, including eleven thousand cavalry, under his command in Silesia, to oppose the great Austrian army, which consisted of at least ninety or an hundred thousand men.

Against numbers so very superior, it would have been in vain to have thought of keeping up the communication with the Elbe, especially as there were no magazines in that quarter, and the country was almost exhausted. Dresden was the nearest magazine for flour, and the cutting off a single convoy must have brought on a total want of provisions. It was the Duke's object to endeavour to take up a position where he could be supplied with the necessary stores and provisions, without being obliged to send out large detachments to protect his convoys. For this purpose he was either to draw nearer to the Elbe, or to move farther into Silesia, and place the great magazines at Breslau and Schweidnitz in his rear. The first of these plans was not consistent with the King's views in leaving him behind, namely, to prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing of consequence in Silesia; so that he had no choice, but to make that country the theatre of operations.

When we come to analyse the reflections which Lloyd has hazarded on the Duke's position at Bernstadt, it will appear that they are by no means just. He first says, that the camp was *too far*

*far back.* Now this must be relative to something else, otherwise the expression has no meaning. If it relates to the Austrian army, I do not understand how the Duke could have taken a nearer camp. The Austrians were at Zittau, and had a strong corps under Nadaſti on that side of the Neisse. To be nearer to them, he must have taken his position either at Ofſtritz, or where the King was formerly posted. This would have been removing from Bautzen, where he had established his bakery, and his convoys would then have experienced much greater difficulty. It would also have been easy for the Austrians to have sent a strong corps to Bautzen through Lobau, which would have obliged him to draw nearer to the former, and consequently have removed him farther from Silesia. If the expression *too far back* refers to Silesia, we are still at a loss to understand how the Duke could take post nearer to that country, and at the same time preserve a communication with the Elbe. Yet, according to Lloyd, his camp was to be chosen in such a manner, that he might defend the communication with that river as well as with Silesia. Had it been possible to have effected both these objects by any position, it is evident that the position at Gorlitz was the only one which could be calculated for these purposes. Besides, the Duke would have reached Lauban sooner than the Austrians, and have moved parallel with them if they had marched with the whole, or with the greater part, of their

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army

army towards the Elbe: but had he determined to remain as long as possible in his camp at Bernstadt; he never could have got before the Austrians from the moment they came to the determination to move through Lauban to Silesia; for as soon as they effected, what was always in their power, a reinforcement of the corps of Nadaſti, so as to render it greatly superior to that of Winterfeldt, and when they afterwards took post at Seidenberg, they could have gained at any time as soon, if not sooner than the Duke, the possession of Lauban; since he would have been compelled to cross the Neisse, in order to form a junction with the corps of Winterfeldt. Had he gone thither, he must have risked a battle, which he had good reasons for wishing to avoid. The detachments to Lauban and Bautzen, which, according to Lloyd, the King ought to have made to keep up the communication with the Elbe, could hardly have effected the purpose; for as they must have chiefly consisted of cavalry, it would have been easy for the Austrians to have driven them away, by sending a few battalions of infantry against them.

Besides, a weak army cannot send out detachments, in presence of a superior enemy, without exposing them to be cut off, or to be attacked and beaten in detail. The position which the army of the Duke had been obliged to take, was sufficiently exposed to danger. General Winterfeldt, on the opposite side of the Neisse, with fifteen battalions  
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and forty-five squadrons, between Radmeritz and Buhra, was opposed to General Nadaſti. At Bautzen, Prince Francis of Brunſwick was ſtationed with ten battalions and ſome ſquadrons, to protect the bakery and the communication with Dreſden. In the center, the Duke of Bevern was poſted with the remainder at Schonau and Bernſtadt.

With a ſmall army it ſhould be a maxim to act conſtantly in a body, by which means alone a great undertaking can be formed. The idea of covering every thing muſt be abandoned, and the chief attention muſt be directed to the grand object of the campaign. If detachments are made, it muſt be only upon a very favourable occaſion, and with a view to ſome great ſtroke. Their eyes muſt be attentively fixed on the enemy's army, and no opportunity muſt be loſt of taking advantage of any falſe ſtep that may be made. For example, if they ſhould detach a number of corps from their army for the purpoſe of making a diverſion, or of ſurpriſing a magazine or fortrefs, this may ſometimes give a favourable opportunity of attacking them. A ſmall army may ſometimes find opportunity of falling upon one or other of ſuch detached corps, before it can be ſupported from the main army, or can have time to draw back; as Prince Henry did at Hoyerswerda in 1759 with General Vela, and the ſame year with General Gemminghen at Dommitſch. Two ſuch fortunate ſtrokes may give the ſuperiority to the

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weaker

weaker army, and oblige the stronger to proceed with greater caution.

It appears that the Duke of Bevern meant to have brought his different corps together as soon as circumstances would permit. The King had given him instructions that, as soon as the forage in his neighbourhood was consumed, he should move to Gorlitz, and make it the position of a strong camp; but he could not remain there any time without waiting for the arrival of a quantity of flour from Dresden, for which the King had given the necessary orders. Had the intended quantity arrived, the army would have had a provision of between ten and twelve days bread.

On the 31st of August the Duke left his camp at Bernstadt and Alt Schonau. General Winterfeldt also broke up his camp at Radmeritz. The former drew off towards Landscrone, and the latter beyond the Neisse to Moys, where bridges were thrown across the river to keep up the communication between the two armies. Lloyd says, that the Duke detached General Winterfeldt across the Neisse to Moys, but he is mistaken as to the fact, for Winterfeldt was detached by the King on the 17th of August, and continued constantly on the other side of the river. The corps at Bautzen could not join the army before the 7th, as the convoy from Dresden did not arrive sooner than the 3d of September. The Prince of Brunswick set out with the convoy on the 5th, and had brought it without loss to Gorlitz, but it did not  
consist

consist of more than half the quantity of flour, which was expected, consequently after the arrival of this convoy, the army could upon no account remain longer at Gorlitz than was necessary to bake the bread, but were obliged to move towards some magazine, from whence they could receive a new supply. The 7th, 8th, and 9th days of September were employed in baking, and on the 10th the army moved towards Buntzlau.

There is no doubt that the Duke of Bevern could have got before the Austrians to Breslau or Schweidnitz, and even have taken up the camp of Liebendahl as he reached Lignitz on the 19th, which was the day that Prince Charles came to Jauer. From hence he might have marched straight to Breslau, if he had not been induced to remain some days in Lignitz on account of the necessity of baking, as well as on account of the great magazines of forage which he wished to consume, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Even in this position he was not cut off from Breslau till the subsequent movements of the enemy.

Although the Duke knew from experience the inactivity of the Austrians, yet he ought not to have grounded his operations upon that supposition. From their great superiority of numbers they were always able to act with two large armies. If the Duke took up the camp of Liebendahl, he could not long have maintained it, but must have left it as soon as the enemy advanced with their

main army through Lauban to Buntzlau, and sent a strong corps to Marklissa to cover Bohemia. By this position he also ran the danger of being cut off from Glogau and the Marche, and in that case he could only have drawn his convoys from Breslau and Schweidnitz; but both these places were so distant, that, without a strong escort, his convoys would be in constant danger of being cut off, especially as General Janus was stationed with a considerable corps between Landshut and Freiberg. This must have obliged the Duke of Bevern to detach a considerable corps to watch his motions on the side of Schweidnitz. A similar corps would have been requisite on the side of Breslau, and his army would have been so much weakened that he could not have made any defence if the enemy were in the least enterprising, which the weakness of his army certainly encouraged them to be: he must consequently have fallen back either to Schweidnitz or Breslau, as might have appeared most advantageous at the time.

Schweidnitz was considered as a place of strength, and contained within its walls one of the most considerable magazines in Silesia. General Grumbkow had been detached to reinforce the weak garrison, and the Duke of Bevern had likewise sent Generals Fouquet, Brandeis, and Rebentish, to put this place, as well as Breslau and Glatz, in the best state of defence. Two battalions were sent to Glogau, and there were now in Schweidnitz eleven battalions and ten squadrons of hussars; but the latter

latter consisted of only four hundred and fifty each. The Duke had certainly every reason to suppose that the commandant would make a brave defence, and have held out at least six weeks.

Breslau was in a very different situation, for it could be considered as nothing less than a place of strength. It was surrounded by an old wall, with bastions in the old manner, and a covert way without palisades; few of the curtains were covered by ravelines, and the whole was surrounded by extensive suburbs. It was necessary that these should be burnt down, to the great calamity of the inhabitants, if the enemy should besiege the place in form, and the commandant were expected to make a vigorous defence. The garrison was very weak, consisting of only two of the worst battalions of infantry, which, even in a single rank, could scarcely extend over one-third of the circumference. It was thus exposed to the danger of surprise, or of being taken by storm; nor could it be expected to hold out long, when the enemy should appear before it, if it were left in this situation without reinforcement. The preservation of this place was of so great importance to the Prussian affairs at that time, that it was peculiarly the object of the Duke's attention. It contained one of the largest magazines in Silesia, sufficient for the supply of the Duke's army for seven weeks, besides a quantity of military stores. It served also by means of the Oder to keep open the communication with Upper Silesia and Glogau, and in some



measure, though imperfectly, with Saxony. It also commanded the whole of the country from Silesia between Poland and the right bank of the Oder, and enabled the Duke to recruit his infantry from the Marche of Brandenburg, and to supply his cavalry with horses, of which they were greatly in need, from Poland. He might easily from thence form a junction with the King, if after his expedition against the combined army he should return towards Silesia from Saxony. But even in the supposition of the enemy's taking Schweidnitz, they could not keep up their winter-quarters in Silesia. As long as the Duke remained in the country, the strong fortrefs of Glatz would have been in their rear, and it would have been impossible for them to find subsistence through the winter in the mountains. The King, after forming a junction with the Duke, could have obliged them without a battle to retire to Bohemia even in the middle of the winter.

All these reasons seemed to point out to the Duke of Bevern the propriety of moving to Breslau, rather than to Schweidnitz; and as he seemed doubtful on his arrival at Lignitz which to prefer, it may be reckoned among the fortunate events of this war, that the Austrians by their manœuvres obliged him to take the resolution which he did, without leaving him the alternative.

Granting that both armies in Silesia committed faults, yet those which may be imputed to the Duke are nothing in comparifon of those of the  
Generals

Generals who were opposed to him. From the commencement of a war, faults must of necessity be taken into the calculation, otherwise, when they unexpectedly happen, we shall be thrown into a state of perplexity and embarrassment, from which nothing can deliver us but similar faults on the part of the enemy.

Admitting that the King expected to have ended his operations against the combined armies by the end of October, and then to return to Silesia, the Duke's object was to parry the great superiority of the enemy by able manœuvres till that time. If we examine his conduct, we shall find that he completely attained his end, as far as depended upon himself; for nothing but the premature surrender of Schweidnitz could have destroyed his hopes of success: this was an event which it was impossible to foresee, and had the place but held out five weeks from the opening of the trenches, the Austrians in all probability would have been obliged to raise the siege by the King's arrival at Parchwitz on the 28th day of November. The march by which the Duke recovered the communication with Breslau, after the action at Barschdorf near Lignitz, is a proof that he was as superior to the Austrian commander in address, as he was inferior in point of numbers. He made it appear so probable that he was going to Glogau, that Prince Charles thought there was no necessity for hurrying his march to Breslau, by which means the Duke considerably got the start of him. When  
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we consider that his march was in point of distance double to that of his enemy, the boldness of the enterprise evinces in the clearest manner his perfect presence of mind, and his complete knowledge of the character of his opponent.

When Lloyd discovers so much prudence and activity in the conduct of Prince Charles upon this occasion, it can only be considered as a compliment, for the very contrary will be found on examination to be the real fact. Can his remaining from the 21st of July till the 8th of September in the neighbourhood of Zittau, without forming a single enterprise, be called activity? So long as the King remained there, Prince Charles was undoubtedly blocked up, and never could have advanced a step if he had not been extricated from his difficulty by the arrival of the combined armies. If his plan had really been, as Lloyd asserts, to cut off the King from Silesia, the means which he chose to adopt, were not likely to be conducive to the end proposed. At length, when the King actually marched away with a small corps, why did he allow General Winterfeldt to remain several days longer on the other side of the Neisse, and to retire without interruption to Górlitz? Why did he not at the same time detach a strong corps on the other side towards Bautzen, to carry that place, whilst with his main army he kept the Duke in awe in his camp at Bernstadt? And to crown all, when the Duke had drawn back to Górlitz, the Austrian General suffered the Prince  
of

of Brunfwick, with the whole convoy, to pafs his left flank, and to reach his place of deftination in perfect fecurity. This he ought on no account to have fuffered, and his great fuperiority in numbers afforded him abundant means to prevent it. Had he cut off or deftroyed that convoy, the Duke muft immediately have removed from Gorlitz, and either have retired to Silefia, or have moved towards the Marche. The corps which he at length fent to Bautzen, inftead of purfuing the convoy, loft their time in the attack of a caftle, which was defended by the free battalion of Chauffignon, and which was at length obliged to furrender at difcretion. This appears to have been a fnare which the Duke laid for Prince Charles, and into which he feems to have fallen with his eyes open.

Although Prince Charles deemed it impoffible to make any attempt while the King was with the army, yet it certainly was in his power to cut off the Duke from Silefia, when the King had marched away with a few battalions. Inftead of acting with his main army on the left bank of the Neiffe as foon as the Duke took up his pofition at Bern-ftadt, he ought immediately to have acted upon the right of that river. The corps of Nadaffi fhould at the fame time have directed their march through Seidenberg to Lauban, and have taken pofit between Lauban and Naumberg, as the main army fhould have done at Seidenberg. From thence the light troops might have ranged over the country between the Queifs and the Bober as  
far

far as Sagan, and have rendered the communication with Glogau extremely difficult. A third corps might have been placed upon the Eckartfberg heights, and have taken up a strong camp, so as to have completely covered Zittau. In this position Prince Charles might have remained till he could clearly discover the Duke's intentions. If he left his camp at Gorlitz to move towards Silesia, he might have moved with his main army in a parallel line, while the corps of Nadaſti should impede his passage across the Queiſ. If, on the other hand, the Duke should undertake any thing in his rear against Zittau, he could always have returned thither in time to relieve it. There would be no apprehension of the Duke moving into Bohemia, as he had no magazines in the neighbourhood, and the country through which he would be obliged to march would be completely exhausted. It is probable that the Duke would have been obliged to draw back to Glogau as soon as possible, especially as his provisions were nearly consumed, and upon this march the corps of Nadaſti with the least activity might constantly have hung upon his rear; or, perhaps by a skilful manœuvre, the Duke might have been reduced to the necessity of retreating to the Marche of Brandenburg.

As soon as the Duke left Gorlitz, the Austrian army should have advanced from Seidenberg, between the Neisse and the Queiſ. The corps of Nadaſti should have remained constantly on the right side of the Queiſ upon the Duke's flank, while

while the corps that was left at Zittau should have gone down the left bank of the Neisse, and endeavoured to turn his right flank. The only circumstance to which it would have been necessary for Prince Charles to attend, was to prevent the Duke from attacking his main army, or either of the two corps.

But the Austrians had certainly no reason to avoid an engagement. If their whole army be estimated at eighty thousand men, allowing twenty thousand for Nadaſti's corps, and ten thousand for the other, there will remain for their main army fifty thousand men; a sufficient number, in my opinion, for almost any undertaking. But this estimate is made upon the very moderate calculation which they gave out of the strength of their army after the battle of Breslau. They reckoned there six thousand men exclusive of a garrison of three thousand men which had been left at Schweidnitz. In Upper Lusatia were the corps of Haddick and Marschal, which may be estimated together at twelve thousand. These, with a corps of six thousand which had been detached to Upper Silesia, make their army amount to eighty-one thousand men. Allowing them to have lost six thousand men at Schweidnitz; sixteen hundred in the action at Moys; and by sickness, desertion, and various skirmishes, eight thousand more; the amount will be ninety-one thousand men, including the Bavarians and Wirtembergers. Reckon these at ten thousand men, and there will

will remain eighty-one thousand in the district of Zittau.

It appears from this statement to have been the interest of Prince Charles, to bring his opponent to a battle as soon as possible. A victory would on all probability have been followed by the conquest of Silesia, and in case of a defeat he had a certain retreat to Bohemia. But by remaining in his present system of trifling with the Duke, he might have been certain that he would throw such difficulties in the way of his operations in Silesia, as would make it impossible for him to undertake any thing decisive at the approach of winter. He could not foresee that Schweidnitz would surrender in so short a time. Had it held out but six weeks, his whole campaign in Silesia would have been nothing more than a destructive over-running of the open country.

His attack of General Winterfeldt at Moys was perfectly right: but in what mode did he avail himself of the small advantages which he obtained there? Should not General Nadaſti immediately have moved to Lauban, to have harassed the Duke on the other side of the Queiſs, and have made his passage as difficult as possible? but he took no measures with any view, and the affair was nothing more than an obstinate conflict without an object, in which a number of brave men were sacrificed to no sort of purpose. It appeared as if both sides had merely wished to make an experiment upon the united effect of fire-arms and hand

hand to hand weapons. In fact, the Prussian and Austrian grenadiers employed both with so much determination, that the Author of "*Préjugés militaires* \*" says, that the only engagement with bayonets, which he ever saw in his life, was at the heights of Holzberg. The bravery with which the Prussians defended the hill, inspired the Austrians with so much awful respect, that they would undertake nothing farther against the camp, but retired the next morning. This attack made no material alteration in the position of the army, which remained undisturbed in their camp on the 9th, and when all their flour was baked they moved on the 10th, and passed the river in presence of the enemy without loss. On the contrary, the Croats who endeavoured to disturb the rear-guard were very roughly handled by the free battalion of Kalben. The Duke passed the Queifs with as little difficulty the following day, and crossed the Bober on the 12th at Buntzlau.

It was not General Nadaſti's attack which obliged the Duke of Bevern to leave his camp at Landfrone, but merely the want of provisions, as I have before observed. If Prince Charles had had any determined plan of operations, he must have foreseen that the Duke would be obliged to retire into Silesia, and as three rivers were necessarily to be passed, he should have placed every

\* A Treatise on Military Prejudices, said to be written by the Prince de Ligne, Lieutenant General in the Imperial service.

possible



possible difficulty and obstruction in the way of his march; but he did nothing more than follow him slowly at a distance, as if merely to take a view of the halting place.

The Prussian account of the battle of Breslau is certainly defective. In order to supply the deficiency, I will give another relation of it, which will throw more light upon the transaction.

#### BATTLE OF BRESLAU.

The Duke of Bevern having formed his camp on this side of the Lohe, his right extended to Kofel, and his left to the village of Klein-Mochber. The river Lohe, and the villages of Pilsnitz, Schmidefeldt, and Hoefgen, were in his front. From Klein-Mochber the troops extended to Nickelsdorf, one of the suburbs of Breslau. An abbatis on the right flank reached from Pilsnitz to the Oder. Behind it were all the yægers\* of the army, and six battalions of grenadiers. The first line, consisting of ten regiments, was posted between Kofel and Klein-Mochber. Three regiments were posted in the villages of Pilsnitz, Schmidefeldt, and Hoefgen. Two battalions of grenadiers, and five of musqueteers, were posted

\* Yæger signifies hunter, and the numerous troops of that denomination are all supposed to be marksmen, bred in the forest, who can live in the open air. Those of the Hessian troops answered this description well, during great inclemency of weather in America.

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on the left flank. Forty squadrons of cuirassiers were drawn up between Kosel and Klein-Mochber in a second line. The whole camp was entrenched. There were four redoubts between Schmidefeldt and Pilsnitz, and two between the latter and Hoefgen. Before the village of Schmidefeldt there was a connected line of entrenchment, and there was a redoubt between Hoefgen and Klein-Mochber. The Austrian army was posted on the opposite side of the Lohe, between Strachwitz and Great and Little Maffelwitz, with a reserve between Gold-Schmieden and Stabelwitz. The village of Neukirchen was in their front, and was surrounded with strong entrenchments.

Both armies remained in this position till the surrender of Schweidnitz\*, when General Nadafti arrived

\* The King of Prussia, in his posthumous works, vol. iii. p. 224, says, that Schweidnitz was taken in the following manner: "M. Nadafti opened his trenches on the 27th of October; his third parallel was finished on the 10th of November; the garrison had made several successful forties, and though part of the town had been destroyed by bombardment, the enemy had not yet gained a single outwork. Impatient at making so little progress, Nadafti resolved to risk a coup de main. On the night of the 11th he attacked by general assault the redoubts which surrounded the place, two of which were taken. This occasioned M. Seers, who was governor of the place, and M. Grumbkow, the second in command, to lose their presence of mind. They capitulated, and surrendered themselves and garrison prisoners of war." In the Life of Frederick, with Anecdotes, it is said, That the besiegers had thirty thousand men; that they lost two thousand five hundred, and that Colonel Riverfon, a  
N French

arrived with his corps, and took post on their right between Bethlern and Opperau. Several redoubts were then thrown up before the suburbs of Ohlau, to prevent the enemy, who were now very superior in numbers, from taking possession of them, and turning the left flank of our army. The corps of Ziethen advanced between Grabitzen and Gabitz, and opposed a front to General Nadaſti. It consisted of seven battalions, all the dragoons, and two regiments of hussars.

On the 22d of November, at break of day, the Austrians advanced in three columns of attack. One of these, under General Nadaſti, passed the river at Hartlieb. Our army having got under arms, it was perceived that this column directed their march towards our left, and General Ziethen marched with his corps to oppose them in that quarter, being reinforced with two more battalions and a regiment of cuirassiers. General Nadaſti's column had crossed the river under the protection of a number of batteries of heavy cannon.

General Ziethen began a cannonade as soon as he approached, and formed an attack upon the head of the column, with his hussars and dragoons, which was attended with success; they broke through the Croats and the Hungarian and Wir-

French engineer, conducted the siege. That the commandant had himself been the engineer of the fortifications (which were star redoubts). That the garrison were very unwilling to surrender, and that one half of them, finding the capitulation was signed, found means to make their escape, only three thousand having surrendered.—Schweidnitz was taken twice, and retaken twice, during the war.

TRANSLATOR.

temburg infantry, took above one hundred prisoners, and threw them into such disorder that they fled on all quarters to the river. In the mean time the enemy attacked the village of Kleinberg, which the free battalion of Angenelli defended for a considerable time with extraordinary bravery; they were at length obliged to yield it to the Austrian grenadiers, having first set fire to it. They did not retreat far, but drew up behind a ditch, where they maintained their ground till the Prince of Bevern, a brother of the Duke, advanced with a battalion to their support. A most obstinate contest ensued between the infantry, and General Zieten having ordered the two grenadier battalions of Schenkendorf and Rosenberg, and the hussars of Werner and Zieten, to advance, the four companies of Austrian grenadiers were almost totally cut to pieces. The enemy were consequently obliged to abandon the village, with the loss of thirteen pieces of cannon, of which, for want of horses, only four were carried off the field. General Nadaſti was by this reception completely deterred from any farther attempt, and General Zieten maintained his ground upon the field of battle.

Meanwhile Prince Charles had drawn out five batteries of fifty-six pieces of heavy cannon, to protect the operation of throwing bridges across the river, and to cover the passage of the other two columns. The Prussians had scarcely any artillery to oppose to them, and one of the columns effected their passage at Klein-Mochber.

As soon as a few battalions had crossed, General Pennawaire attacked them with two regiments of cavalry, which were received with a heavy fire of musquetry and grape-shot, and in advancing to the banks of the river, the ground was so soft, that the horses sank in the mud; in consequence of which these two regiments were obliged to retreat. Upon this, the regiments of the Prince of Prussia and Prince Ferdinand advanced, under the command of Lieutenant General Schultz. The enemy here defended their ground with the more determination, that if they had given way they must have perished in the Lohe, and they sustained the attack with great courage. Our battalions suffered much from their grape-shot and musquetry, and were thrown into some disorder. Prince Ferdinand of Prussia, upon this, seized hold of a colour, rallied the men, and led them on again to the attack; but they were once more beaten back.

The loss we sustained upon this occasion had the farther effect of causing the redoubt before Grabisch to be abandoned somewhat too soon. Colonel Lindstaedt, who commanded the regiment of Schultz, ordered both the battalions of that regiment to advance from the village, and attack the enemy filing across the bridge at Mochber, and also to support the two above-mentioned regiments. The Major, conceiving that this order included the garrison of the redoubt, they being a part of the regiment, and consisting of about one hundred men, withdrew them as well as the artillery. Unfortunately the check which the two regiments in  
front

front had just received, made so strong an impression upon the young men of the regiment of Schultz, who were almost all of them recruits just raised in the country about Breslau, that they fled back to the village; and it required the utmost exertions of the brave Colonel Lindstaedt to prevail upon them to make a stand; but the enemy immediately availed themselves of this misconduct, took possession of the redoubt, and established cannon and howitzers in it, with which they enfiladed our whole line. They also took possession of the village of Grabisch.

The enemy's third column crossed at Schmidefelt. The regiment of Manteuffel, posted there, defended themselves with extraordinary bravery, until all their ammunition was expended, nor did the regiment of Prince Henry retire from Hoefgen till they perceived that the Austrians had gained their left flank, by having penetrated at Grabisch and Klein-Mochber.

The Duke of Bevern had by no means yet resolved to quit the field. Ten regiments of infantry had been got into tolerable order about five in the evening, supported by some regiments of cuirassiers. They advanced and drove back the enemy from the villages of Schmidefelt, Hoefgen, and Klein-Mochber; but shortly after, hearing a heavy fire on their flanks, and the night now setting in, the greatest part of the infantry and cavalry suddenly drew back to the suburbs of Nickelsdorf; nor can any reason be assigned for their precipitate retreat, as the enemy had not ad-  
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vanced

vanced a single step to attack them. Here the Duke found them, to his great surprise, when he came back from the post of General Ziethen, with whom he was concerting an attack to be made upon the enemy at midnight.

On the right flank at Pilsnitz, the enemy did not gain an inch of ground the whole day. General Brandeis, with his division, gallantly defended the abbatis from Kosel to Pilsnitz, and also repelled the attack upon the latter village. I was posted in the first redoubt behind Pilsnitz with a howitzer, being at that time a bombardier. When it began to grow dark, Pilsnitz was abandoned. Some of the enemy's infantry then advanced and penetrated to the side next us. Our artillery in the redoubts, which hitherto had fired but little, upon this began to act. Our infantry advanced again into line with the redoubts, and fired with their musquetry upon the enemy. The carabineers also advanced, with a view to make a charge, but were stopped by a number of broad ditches. The engagement here lasted about half an hour, when our right wing gave way. Our troops abandoned the redoubts, and drew off their artillery; nor can I say whether any orders for that purpose were received or not. Thus much I know for certain, that the Austrians did not follow us, and verily believe that, in the darkness which prevailed, they were in doubt whether we had left our post or not. I also well remember, that the grenadiers on our right flank were full of spirits, from the various accounts which had arrived, confirming the intelligence

gence that General Ziethen had beaten back the enemy.

The chief causes of our losing this battle seem to me to have been the great extent of our entrenchments\* and the superiority of the enemy's artillery, for we had but very few with the army, except some light three pounders attached to the battalions. Hence it was impossible to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. Could we have had a battery of from ten to fifteen twelve pounders, with a few howitzers in our front, and another of the same sort at Klein Mochber, it is more than probable that the whole of the enemy's undertakings would have failed.

As to Lloyd's "*Key to the Camp*," the event certainly proved that Klein-Mochber was the key, since it was there that the door was opened, but if Nadaſti's corps had been fortunate and had come upon the left flank of Ziethen's corps, the key to the camp would probably have been found in that quarter. The position proposed by Lloyd, with the right to Breslau, and the left to Grabisch and Kleinberg, appears to me to be far from well imagined, for nothing would then have been easier than for the enemy to have attacked the army both in front and rear.

The strength of the Duke of Bevern's army in the battle of Breslau may be very easily ascertained,

\* A camp, says the King in his posthumous works, like a garment, should be fitted to the body which is to occupy it, and neither be too small nor too large. TRANSLATOR.



by deducting from the statement of what it was when it entered Silesia the different detachments which were made, and it will appear to have been as follows :

9 battalions of grenadiers,  
 30 ————— of musqueteers,  
 40 squadrons of cuirassiers,  
 30 ————— of dragoons.

After every deduction, for the detachment of different battalions, for loss by skirmishes, by desertion, and by sickness, it cannot be supposed to have suffered a diminution of less than three thousand men. It will then, upon the most probable calculation, be found to have amounted to twenty-five thousand men in the battle of Breslau.

The Austrian army, including the corps under General Nadaſti, amounted to at least eighty thousand men, as appears very plainly from the statement of their force in the battle of Lissa\*.

\* In the battle of Breslau the Austrians employed the whole of the heavy cannon which they had taken in Schweidnitz. The King blames the Duke of Bevern for leaving, when he retreated, eight thousand men and eighty pieces of cannon, in the town of Breslau, to fall a sacrifice. He says, that it would not have cost him so much, had he attacked their camp. From eighty pieces of cannon in the town of Breslau, it seems as if the want of artillery so very severely felt by the Prussians in this engagement might easily have been supplied. The King employed the Duke of Bevern again in 1762, when he was released from being prisoner.

TRANSLATOR.

## BATTLE OF LISSA\*.

The expedition against the united armies of the Empire and of France having been so happily concluded at Rosbach, the King had little more to fear on the side of Saxony. He resolved to move to Silesia, and stop the progress of the Austrians in that quarter. The corps which he took with him, consisted of eighteen battalions and twenty-eight squadrons, with which he proceeded from Leipzig on the 12th of November, and arrived at Parchwitz on the 28th. Here he remained till the 3d of December, and was then joined by the army from Breslau under the command of General Ziethen †, During the march, the troops had  
been

\* This is called by the Germans the battle of Leuthen, but there being the town of Lissa on the field as well as one called Leuthen, the Translator has retained the name by which the battle is known in England.

† Nothing, says the King, could exceed the dejection of these soldiers, in consequence of their recent defeat. It was necessary to exalt them in their own opinion, and to recal their former exploits to their memory. Every method was employed to raise their drooping spirits. The King spoke kindly to them; he caused refreshments to be issued to them *gratis*, and even the resource of wine was not neglected. Their countenances began to brighten, and those who had just gained the victory at Rosbach, persuaded their comrades to cheer up  
their

been constantly quartered in houses, and furnished with every comfort, a precaution which was absolutely requisite. The army carried little with them but their arms and ammunition, and there was not a single magazine on their whole line of march; but their wants were supplied by hospitality, which cheered the soldier, lightened his labours on the longest days of march, and inspired him with new courage and alacrity to move against his enemy.

The King, knowing that there was still a small corps of Austrians in Upper Lusatia under Generals Marschal and Haddick, by which he might be incommoded upon his march, sent Marshal Keith, with a small corps across the Erzgebirg heights through Marienberg and Pafsberg towards Bohemia, to draw the attention of the Austrians on that side. He executed the design with much success. He moved through Commottau and Laun to Leutmeritz, levied considerable contributions, and after destroying the magazine and bridge at that place, withdrew, upon the approach of Marschal's corps, through Pafsberg, back to Saxony, where he went into winter-quarters.

The King was met by a very displeasing succession of messengers upon his march. Scarcely had he learnt that Schweidnitz had surrendered

their courage. Repose completed the endeavour, and they became desirous of an early opportunity of washing out the stain.

TRANSLATOR.

after

after an inconsiderable defence, than he received intelligence of the defeat of the army at Breslau; then that Breslau itself had surrendered, and that the Duke of Bevern was taken prisoner; that the Silesian regiments which had been left to garrison the town were entirely dispersed; that twelve battalions had marched out of the town with only four hundred men in each battalion; and that the spirit of desertion had begun to prevail so strongly among the Silesian cavalry, that few of the regiments had a third part of their original establishment. Thus was the Duke of Bevern's army weakened beyond belief. For reckoning the loss of the nine battalions in the town of Breslau, and the loss sustained in the cavalry, at six thousand men, and estimating the killed, wounded, and prisoners, in that battle, at about four thousand, and deducting the amount from twenty-five thousand, the army under General Ziethen cannot be calculated, at the highest, at more than fifteen thousand men. But as the battalions of the King's corps cannot be taken, one with another, at more than six hundred men, and the squadrons at one hundred, the army will amount to thirteen thousand six hundred. Consequently the King's army after the junction could not exceed twenty-eight thousand six hundred; a very inconsiderable force when opposed to the United Army of the Austrians, which amounted to at least eighty thousand men. This great superiority seems to have made them so insolent, that they affected to call the Prussian army, *The Guard Parade of Potsdam*.

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It is but too often the effect of prosperity, so to intoxicate the minds of men, as to destroy their natural energy, and reduce them to the level of the meanest understandings. Misfortunes, on the contrary, seem to be a source of strength, which restores the mind to its proper tone, and to its former vigour and elasticity. The King summoned all his generals and staff-officers to headquarters, in order to communicate to them the misfortunes which had befallen him, in the loss of Schweidnitz, the defeat of the Duke of Bevern, and the capture of Breslau. He told them, that in this unfortunate conjuncture, he had so entire a reliance upon their courage, their firmness, their zeal, and their love for their country, that he was confident they would take the first opportunity of wresting from the enemy the advantages which fortune had thrown into their hands. He charged them to make known his sentiments to all the officers, and to the army in general, and by degrees to prepare the private soldiers for the measures which were afterwards to be adopted. To tell them, that they must attack the enemy wherever they found him; that it was not now a question of numbers; that he hoped his troops would attack with valour, and exert their utmost efforts to gain a victory, in spite of every obstacle of numbers or entrenchments. That the time was now come when they were called upon to act as Prussians and Patriots, and that he desired not a better earnest of their future conduct than the victory

tory with which they had been so lately crowned at Rosbach.

It was impossible to hear these words delivered by the King, without emotion. They inspired in every one a desire of being immediately led against the enemy, and of shewing by their actions that they deserved this confidence which he reposed in them. They raised the courage both of officers and of soldiers to the highest pitch. All apprehensions of danger vanished, and every one seemed to feel within himself a certain prognostication of victory.

When we consider the composition of the Prussian army, the expectations of the King will not appear extraordinary. They were now almost entirely native Prussians: nearly the whole of the foreigners had deserted, and the few which remained had imbibed the Prussian character, of which the most conspicuous features is their strong attachment to their King and Country. If ever there has been a people who resembled the Spartans or the Romans, it was the Prussians of that day. Under the conduct of the King, they never doubted they advanced to certain victory.

No sooner had the junction been effected between the corps of Ziethen and that under the command of the King, than it was resolved to march against the enemy. The battalions had the following order of battle assigned to them:

VAN-

## VAN-GUARD.

MajorGenerals. *Wedel, Lattorffe, \*\*\*\*\* Golz, Kalkreuth.*

{ 2 Meyerinck's musqueteers.	{ 2 Itzenplitz musqueteers.	{ 1 Bornfaedt musqueteers, 1 Affenberg musqueteers.	{ 1 Wedel grenadiers, 1 Heiden grenadiers.	{ 1 Mantenfell grenadiers, 1 Haake grenadiers.
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## FIRST LINE.

Lt. Generals. *Retzow, Prince Ferdinand of Prussia, Prince Maurice.*MajorGenerals. *Geist, Munchow, Kahlden, Prince Francis of Brunswick.*

{ 1 Diringhosen grenadiers, 1 Kierfel.	{ Le Noble, Angenelli, Kalben.	{ 2 Forcade, 2 Brunswick, 1 Burgdorf grenadiers, 1 Shenkendorf grenadiers.	{ 2 Geist, 2 Winterfeldt.	{ 1 Retzow, 2 Kannacker, 2 Pannewitz.	{ 2 Krenzow grenadiers, 2 Karl, 2 Guards.
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Free battalions.

Left flank.

## SECOND LINE.

Lt. General. *Forcade.*  
MajorGenerals. *Oldenburg, Bülow, Robr.*

{ 1 Ferdinand, 1 Rosenberg grenadiers, 1 Henry, 1 Kalkstein.	{ 1 Plotz grenadiers.	{ 1 Wittenberg, 1 Austrian grenadiers.	{ 1 Brunswick, 1 Munchow.	{ 1 Prussia, 1 Bülow.	{ 1 Unruh musqueteers, 1 Kleih.
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Right flank.

CAVALRY.

FIRST LINE.

Lieut. Generals.	<i>Driesen,</i>	<i>H. of Wirtemberg,</i>	<i>Ziethen.</i>		
Major Generals.	<i>Meyer,</i>	<i>Nor- man,</i>	<i>Ste- chow,</i>	<i>Baron Schoneich,</i>	<i>Schmet- tau,</i>
	<i>Lentulus.</i>				
	} 10 squad. Barchuth dragons.	} 5 Kyan, 5 Driesen.	} 5 Stechow.	} 5 Prince Schoneich.	} 5 Seidlitz, 5 Frederick.
					} 3 Garde du Corps 5 Gens d'armes.

SECOND LINE.

Major Generals.	<i>Bredow,</i>	<i>Krokow, sen.</i>	<i>Krokow, jun.</i>	<i>Czettritz.</i>
	} 5 Baron Schoneich, 5 Geller.	} 5 Krokow, jun. 5 Carabineers.	} 5 Wirtemberg, 5 Krokow, sen.	} 5 Norman, 5 Czettritz.

HUSSARS.

	} 10 squadrons.
10 Ziethen,	
10 Werner,	
3 Warnery,	
5 Czeculi,	
6 Seidlitz,	
10 Putkammer.	

\* The Translator has frequently taken the liberty of omitting names, but upon this occasion, or that of Rosbach, he would deem it unpardonable. It is much to be regretted, that in the Prussian



On the 4th of December the army moved at break of day from Parchwitz, and marched in the following order to Neumark. The van-guard consisted of the battalions above-mentioned, and eight hundred volunteers from the whole army at their head, all the foot yægers, free battalions, and hussars, except those of Werner, the dragoons of Czetteritz, Norman, and Krokow, with a battery of ten heavy twelve pounders. The army followed in four columns by the right flank. The first column consisted of the cavalry of the right wing of the first and second line. The second column was composed of the infantry of the right wing of the first and second line. Their rear-guard was formed of the three battalions of Austria, Płotz, and Ferdinand, which covered the baggage. The third column consisted of the infantry of the left wing of the first and second line. The fourth column was formed of the cavalry of the left wing of the first and second line. The hussars of Werner had the rear-guard. The heavy artillery were divided into two brigades, and moved behind the second and third columns.

In Neumark, and behind it, there was a corps of croats and hussars, of about four thousand men, stationed there for the protection of the bakery of the Austrian army. These were surprised by the hussars, supported by the volunteers and free bat-

Prussian service the different corps are not known by numbers: those which were at Rosbach and Lissa will in a few years no longer be known by the names they bore at that time, which were those of their Colonels.

talions,

talions, who cut down above two hundred of them, made six hundred prisoners, and dispersed the remainder. The whole bakery fell into our hands.

On the same evening the King received certain intelligence, that Prince Charles had moved from his camp at Breslau, had passed the Lohe and the Schweidnitz rivulet, and had encamped on the side of them.

On the 5th of December the army moved before break of day. The grenadier battalion of Burgsdorf occupied the castle of Neumark, and those of Austria and Plotz remained with the heavy baggage and train of artillery. The order of march continued the same as the day before. The van-guard formed in front of Kemmersdorf, the cavalry before the infantry, which were posted upon the heights. In this position they remained with ten heavy twelve pounders in front till break of day, when the army came up. It was made known that the Austrians had advanced, that they were drawn up upon the plain, and that there probably would be a battle in the course of the day. This intelligence caused an universal joy, and the countenance of every soldier shewed an eagerness to meet the enemy. Every circumstance was favourable. The thickness of the weather prevented the enemy from perceiving our march, and the corps under the Saxon General Nostitz, which had taken post upon the heights between us and Borna, and which consisted of three regiments of Saxon dragoons and two of Austrian hussars, was completely

pletely surprised, and surrounded by our hussars and dragoons. Eleven officers and five hundred and forty men were taken, a considerable number were killed, and the remainder were driven back to the enemy's army. During this attack, the infantry of the van-guard had taken post before the villages of Polkendorf, Lampersdorf, and Katlau, to cover the attack. In the mean time the columns continued their march in the best order, and exhibited as fine a sight as can be well imagined. The heads of the columns kept in perfect line, and at their exact distance for forming. Every division kept its interval with as much precision as they could have done at a review, so that the formation of the line was the business of a moment.

The enemy's advance post at Borna being driven in, the King had an opportunity of reconnoitring the position of their army. Their right was posted behind the wood of Nipern, where the flank was covered by the village, and by several small lakes and ravines. Their front extended from thence behind Leuthen, Frobewitz, and Sagshutz; where, in order to protect the left flank, the corps of Nadasti formed an angle, which extended from Sagshutz to the ponds and marshes of Gohlau; and between the left and the corps of Nadasti there was a body of cavalry on the left of Leuthen. The King had so often manœuvred his troops upon this very ground in time of peace, that he knew exactly the strong and weak points of the position.

The ground upon their right was so much intersected both in front and flank, that it was not advisable to attack on that side, and his Majesty resolved to attack their left\*. He gave orders that during the attack made by the advance-guard, both the first and second lines should remain out of musquet-shot of the enemy, that as soon as the heads of the columns had passed the village of Borna, so that it should be between the second and third columns, the army should, from four columns, form two lines. This, by an inclination of the heads of the columns to the right, was effected with extraordinary quickness. The van-guard was ordered to make the first attack. By twelve o'clock the army, now marching in two lines, with the cavalry upon the wings, and the van-guard in front and to the left, had arrived

\* The ground near which this battle was fought, was at that time covered with wood, which, as well as the thickness of the weather, probably favoured the Prussian manœuvres. The King having led on his army in close columns, (the march being in front,) found the enemy stronger on their right flank than he expected. He immediately counter-marched his columns, (the expression in his posthumous works is, "*les colonnes qui étoient en ordre de déploiement furent renversées,*") and moved by a flank march, in open column, to gain their left. Marshal Daun said to Prince Charles of Loraine, "*Ces gens s'en vont; laissez les faire.*" He fell into the same error which the French had done at Rossbach, taking the manœuvre for a retreat. When the King formed his line, he ordered the attack to proceed by echellons of battalions, fifty paces behind each other, in order to refuse his left wing, and to prevent the possibility of the same mistake which happened at Kollin. TRANSLATOR,

upon the ascent between Lobetintz and Kartschutz. We were now near the enemy, and the King saw their whole position from the wind-mill at Lobetintz. I could easily distinguish them myself.

The van-guard now received orders to attack. As soon as they had the villages of Kartschutz and Striegwitz on their right, six battalions of their right wing formed an angle to cover the flank of the cavalry, and the remaining four battalions attacked the villages under cover of the fire of ten heavy twelve pounders. General Nadaſti had taken post upon their left, in order to take our army in flank; our van-guard had scarcely formed their line, when his cavalry made their appearance from behind the wood, and attacked our cavalry which were advancing. His attack threw them into some disorder, but our battalions which had formed an angle, gave their fire with such effect, that the enemy's cavalry drew back with the greatest precipitation. The fire of great guns and small arms then became very hot. This was about one o'clock. The six battalions attacked the Wirtemberg grenadiers, which were posted behind an abbatis, and drove them from it. General Wedel, with the regiments of Meyrincke and Itzenplitz, advanced against a great battery which the enemy had erected upon the heights before Sagschutz, and took it after a short opposition. This threw the whole corps of Nadaſti into confusion, and notwithstanding that several battalions of them rallied

lied behind the ditches, yet they were soon completely routed.

During the attack made by the van-guard, the army continued advancing and inclining to their right. The van-guard did the same. The enemy were constantly out-flanked, and the six foremost battalions of the van-guard forming an angle with the rest of the line, continually hung upon their rear. By these means every corps which was sent by the enemy to the support of their left wing, was broken to pieces the moment they attempted to form. They drew back in great disorder, and the King ordered the heavy cannon to be drawn still more to the left, while the troops were pressing forwards. The enemy attempted several times to form an angle at Gohla to cover the flank of their army, but were in this manner constantly prevented, while at the same time they were exposed to a heavy fire in the front. The cavalry of our right wing, which had hitherto been prevented from acting, by thickets, hedges, and ditches, at length found their opportunity at Gohla. The hussars of Ziethen fell upon the Bavarian and Wirtemberg infantry as they were retreating, killed a considerable number of them, and made above two thousand prisoners.

In the mean time the enemy's Generals were employed in forming an angle to the former front with that part of the army which had not yet been engaged. The point of the angle was at Leuthen, where they brought all the artillery they

could get together, and placed it upon the ascent behind the village. This village had not only from the beginning been strongly occupied, but was now filled by the reserve which had fallen back, and by the fugitives of the right wing, who threw themselves into the houses and the church-yard. All appeared determined there to maintain their post to the utmost, and the Prussian army was at least as much resolved to drive them out, at whatever rate they might attain the conquest. Both battalions of guards and the battalion of Retzow attacked the village, and now as dreadful and as destructive a contest of infantry took place as any which had ever happened. The enemy behaved with extraordinary determination. One battalion after another continued to form up, so that our left wing, which by the King's orders ought to have been constantly refused, was now engaged with the enemy. At length the guards conducted by Lieutenant General Mollendorf, who at that time was their eldest captain, broke in with irresistible bravery, and obliged the enemy to abandon the village after a defence of about half an hour. This conquest was certainly one step farther towards victory, but the enemy did not yet seem inclined to relinquish the field of battle. They continued to defend themselves for some time, drawing up their grenadiers and other infantry behind a number of ditches, which were of great assistance to them. But they at length fell into universal and inextricable confusion, and at one place in particular

cular near a wind-mill, where, without exaggerations, they were at least one hundred men in depth, our artillery availed themselves of the opportunity, and made prodigious slaughter; which soon obliged the whole to take to flight.

During the attack of the village, General Driesen, with the cavalry of our right, attacked in front the cavalry of the Austrian left wing, while Bareuth's dragoons drew off to the right and fell upon their left flank. Although they were exposed to a heavy fire of grape-shot, yet they routed the enemy, and drove them completely from the field, where they appeared no more. Our cavalry then cut in amongst the Austrian infantry, and made whole battalions prisoners. The right wing of their army had no better fate. After forming a front at Leuthen, they quitted that position, and moved to the left to change their front. The cavalry of our left wing, which had hitherto remained behind Lobetintz, no sooner saw this movement than they advanced, attacked the right of the enemy's cavalry, came upon their flank, put them totally to flight, and afterwards broke in among their infantry. Both these attacks of the cavalry obliged the enemy to leave Leuthen sooner than they otherwise would have done: they attempted however a third time to regain a position, but by this time our army had advanced so far that they were upon their flank, and their infantry being now totally unprotected, the Prussian cavalry came down upon them, killed a great many, and took a number of prisoners. Then no alternative was left. They fled across



the bridges at Liffa and Rathen, and the bridge of boats across the Schweidnitz rivulet, and gained them with difficulty, closely pursued by the Prussian cavalry. After the battle, our army took up their last position at the setting in of night between Guckerwitz and Liffa.

When the army had halted, the King rode up in front, and asked them, if there were any who were inclined to follow him to Liffa? The grenadier battalions of Manteuffel and Wedel, and the regiment of Bornstaedt, immediately stood to their arms and followed him. The houses in the town were filled with Austrians, and when the King, accompanied with several officers, rode up to the castle, he passed a number of their officers and soldiers who were wounded. An apartment had been quickly prepared for his reception, but as the grenadiers were advancing, they received a general fire from the houses. They broke into them without much deliberation, and put every one to death who had arms in their hands.

The General and Staff-officers now coming up, the King, with a countenance full of satisfaction, entered the apartment where the parole was to be given. They immediately approached and congratulated his Majesty upon the victory. "After such a conclusion of our labours, it is good to repose ourselves," replied the King. He thanked them in the most gracious manner for this additional proof of their fidelity and courage, which would hand down the glory of their names and of their nation to the latest times. He then gave orders

orders that a declaration should be made to the whole army, of the satisfaction with which he expressed the most perfect approbation of their admirable valour.

On the 6th the army moved in two columns by their right, and crossed the Schweidnitz rivulet. The enemy had fled across the Lohe, and were endeavouring to assemble their people in the neighbourhood of Breslau. General Buccow was posted with their rear-guard between Hoefgen and Klein-Mochber, but a few cannon-shot from our hussars obliged them to draw back. Prince Charles moved in the afternoon at three o'clock. He retired gradually by Borau to Schweidnitz, and from thence into Bohemia. On the 7th, three battalions of grenadiers, three of musqueteers, four of hussars, five of dragoons, and two free battalions, were detached in pursuit of the enemy, and by this small force was Prince Charles obliged to evacuate Silesia in the space of fourteen days. The expedition deserves to be minutely detailed, were this the proper place: it would prove extremely instructive both in the great and lesser scale of war. It is sufficient to say, that it was conducted by Ziethen.

This battle and its consequences cost the Austrians not far short of sixty thousand men. In action they lost, in killed and wounded, above six thousand five hundred; but I will only estimate them at three thousand, as many of the wounded fled to Breslau. There were twenty-one thousand  
five

five hundred taken prisoners, and at the surrender of Breslau \*, seventeen thousand one hundred and forty-six men laid down their arms. General Zieten made two thousand more prisoners. They had lost at Neumark the day before eight hundred. Above six thousand had deserted, and in the spring of 1758 the garrison of Schweidnitz, amounting to five thousand men, was obliged to surrender prisoners of war: and one thousand may be reckoned to have deserted from thence, or to have died; for when Prince Charles moved to Bohemia, the number in Schweidnitz was above six thousand. These losses together amount to fifty-six thousand four hundred and forty-six men. When we took Lig-

\* Breslau was invested on the 7th of December. General Sprecher commanded in the place. The King says, "That the garrison made a poor defence; they attempted a sortie in which they lost three hundred men. On the 16th, a bomb-shell set fire to a powder magazine," (which, according to Lloyd, destroyed eight hundred men.) "This," adds the King, "made a breach in one of the bastions. The cold became so violent, that the commandant became apprehensive that, in spite of his precautions, the ditch would be frozen, and that the place would be taken by assault. These considerations induced him to capitulate. He surrendered his whole garrison prisoners of war, and found that seventeen thousand men had yielded to fourteen thousand. But," continues the King, "it must be considered that part of this garrison was composed of fugitives from Lissa, and that, generally speaking, it is not so much the fortifications nor the number of soldiers which defend a town, but a great deal must depend upon the abilities and determined courage of a commandant."

TRANSLATOR.

nitz,

nitz \*, the Austrian officers acknowledged, that their army which retreated into Bohemia amounted to nine thousand regular infantry, and twenty-eight thousand cavalry, croats, and other light troops. When we recollect that, with the exception of a few troops in Saxony and Bohemia, the whole Austrian army was present in the battle, their numbers at Lissa will probably not be over-rated, when we estimate them upon that occasion to have amounted to ninety thousand men.

I have already observed, that the battles of the King of Prussia are completely original, but upon no occasion is the truth of this observation more striking than in the description of the battle of Lissa. In ancient history there is scarcely any instance, and in modern times not a single instance, of a battle which can in any degree be compared to it, whether we consider the disposition, the execution, or the consequences. It forms as it were an epoch in the military science, and exhibits not only the theory, but the practice of a system, the discovery of which must be ascribed to the King alone.

The King caused his army to move in such a manner, as to make an angle with the enemy's front. This brought on the true oblique line, which, in the judgment of all Generals who think upon their profession, and of all military Authors

† Lignitz capitulated on the 26th of December.

TRANSLATOR.

of

of the first rank, must prove the key to victory. But at the time when the King appeared upon the theatre of war, the idea of it was but dark and incomplete, and no General, at least in modern times, had thoroughly discerned its advantages, or had the courage to depart from the beaten track. Now it is the favourite position, and seems as if it were to take the place of every other, but whether any General can employ it with similar success, remains as yet a question. It is with this as with the sword of Scanderbeg: he sent it to Mahomet \*, but his arm went not with it, and it no longer seemed the same weapon when wielded by the

\* The Author speaks of Mahomet the second, who subdued the empires of Trebifonde and Constantinople, and who was surnamed the Great. This appellation seems to have been still better deserved by Scanderbeg, who defended his dominions against the whole Ottoman power in two several invasions. He gained great victories with extraordinary disproportion of numbers, and is not unworthy of being named with the Great Frederick. His real name was George Castriot. He received that of Scanderbeg from the Turks, being the same name by which Alexander the Great is known among them.

After wresting from the hands of the Turks his own hereditary dominions, which they had seized from his father, (he himself having been educated as an hostage,) and after making various conquests, he died, in full possession of the whole, in the year 1467, in the 63d year of his age. He was a Christian Prince, and was interred with great magnificence in the cathedral church of Lissa in Epirus: this coincidence of names is singular.

The account of Scanderbeg may be found in *Knolles's History of the Turks*, continued by Sir PAUL RYCAUT under the head of Amurath and Mahomet the second. TRANSLATOR.

Sultan's

Sultan's hand. At present every one is acquainted with the advantages of the oblique order of battle, but the genius of the King is wanting to give it the full effect. Whether from defect of genius, or of vigour in the execution, nothing but abortive misconception has ever since been produced by the attempt.

The nature of this order of battle makes it evident that the attack must be directed upon a flank. The main object is to make impression on a point; from thence to proceed to out-flank the enemy, and move upon their flank and rear. To attain this end, the wing which attacks must be made sufficiently strong to force superiority, but in order that the enemy may not have it in their power to reinforce the point attacked, it appears to be of the utmost importance to keep him in a state of uncertainty, with respect to your true design, till the moment of execution. This being once arrived, the attack must proceed with the greatest impetuosity. The enemy must not have time to recollect himself, but by a vigorous and unexpected attack must be overthrown before he is able to fire a shot.

Many other remarks might be made on this battle, *sed sapienti sat.*

## OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIANS.

“ The King of Prussia being informed of the  
“ Czarina’s accession to the treaty of Versailles,  
“ ordered General Lehwald, with about thirty  
“ thousand men, to march to the frontiers of  
“ Prussia, and oppose the march of the enemy.  
“ Accordingly this General having assembled his  
“ army in the month of June, advanced to Inster-  
“ burg, with a corps farther on towards Memel  
“ to observe their motions.

“ In the mean time the Russian army, consisting  
“ of thirty-one regiments of foot, fourteen of horse,  
“ five of hussars, and about sixteen thousand Tar-  
“ tars, Calmucks, and Cossacks, amounting in  
“ the whole to sixty-two thousand foot, nineteen  
“ thousand horse, and the above-mentioned  
“ Tartars, &c. broke up in May, and ad-  
“ vanced in four columns towards the frontiers  
“ of Prussia; three of which passed through Po-  
“ land, and the fourth through Samogitia, towards  
“ Memel. This last was commanded by Ge-  
“ neral Fermor, and destined to besiege that town.  
“ To facilitate which enterprize, Admiral Lewes,  
“ an Englishman of reputation in the Russian ser-  
“ vice, sailed with a considerable fleet to Revel,  
“ with about nine thousand men on board, in  
“ order to land and attack Memel on the sea side,  
“ while General Fermor did the same on the land  
“ side.

“ side. Accordingly they arrived before Memel  
“ at the end of June, and on the 5th of the follow-  
“ ing month they took that place by capitulation.

“ This conquest was of infinite consequence to  
“ the Russians, because they could make a con-  
“ venient place of arms of it, and by means of  
“ their fleet, provide it with provisions and stores  
“ sufficient to supply the whole army, who could  
“ not possibly be provided otherwise, and conse-  
“ quently prosecute the operations of the cam-  
“ paign.

“ This expedition being happily executed, the  
“ whole army under the command of M. Apraxin  
“ united in the month of August on the river Rufs,  
“ and from thence advanced towards the Pregel.  
“ Upon which General Lehwald quitted the camp  
“ at Insterburg, and retired towards Wehlau, where  
“ he continued till the 30th of August, and then  
“ advanced to attack the Russians who had passed  
“ the Pregel, and had encamped at Gros-Ja-  
“ gersdorf\*.”

• The passage between commas, is an extract from Lloyd,  
which seems necessary to connect the narrative.

TRANSLATOR.



## BATTLE OF JAGERSDORF.

Marshal Lehwald having crossed the Pregel, took up his camp behind a thick wood between Ranglack and Buschdorf. This wood had three outlets, which led to the enemy's camp. The first was a road by the side of the river, and was guarded by the hussars of Malachowski; the two others had roads which were so broad that troops could move on them with a whole division in front. These avenues were guarded by picquets, and the wood itself was thick and impassable.

Immediately after our troops had passed the Pregel, the Russian army encamped behind the wood of Norkitten in a very irregular line. The cavalry of their right wing was posted in front of Weinoten, and extended to Mischullen; the right wing of the infantry had their flank at Weinoten, and from thence extended through the wood to Schloßberg, with the left to the rivulet of Auxina, where the banks were steep and difficult of access. The cavalry of the left wing, and the swarm of their light horse, were drawn up between Sitterfeldt and the wood of Norkitten.

Soon after his arrival, Marshal Lehwald reconnoitred the enemy with a small escort; but could discover nothing of their large army, and only perceived a few Cossacks encamped. He dispatched Lieutenant General Schorlemmer, the Prince of Holstein, the Generals Platen and Ruesch, with

with two regiments of hussars, fifteen squadrons of dragoons, and two battalions of grenadiers, by the road through Almenhausen, in order to obtain more accurate intelligence. The battalions of grenadiers were posted in the wood; and the cavalry advanced into the plain, while the army remained under arms in camp, ready to move. Under these circumstances it was impossible to reconnoitre their position with sufficient exactness, and that was considered as the left flank of their army, which probably was nothing more than a camp of irregular troops. It was imagined that the left flank of their army extended to Sitterfeld, and upon this idea was the disposition formed for the attack upon the following day. During this reconnoitring, it was reported to the Marshal that a number of foragers appeared to the right; in consequence of which he moved with some troops from the camp, in order to drive them away, and to reinforce General Schorlemmer. By some misunderstanding, the army, contrary to his orders, got under arms, and followed him through the wood, in front of which they now formed. This was soon perceived by the Cossacks; the alarm was given in the enemy's camp, and their army got under arms, but as they did not move, the Marshal caused his troops to march back into their camp. General Schorlemmer, who still remained in front of the wood, was cannonaded for some time, but without suffering any loss. Some think that the Marshal would have done better, if he had attacked the enemy this day;

day ; while others may be of opinion that, with a force so inconsiderable in comparison with the enemy, precipitation is by no means advisable.

The Marshal thought that thus much at least had been discovered, that the left flank of the enemy was the weakest, and might be attacked with a prospect of success. In fact, the ground upon the right flank at Weinotten was very difficult, on account of several old ponds, between which there was no other passage than the narrow dykes by which they were divided. The attack was determined to be made the next day, the 30th of August ; in consequence of which, the army moved in three close columns at three o'clock in the morning. The first column marched by the left, and consisted of the right wing of infantry, five squadrons of dragoons, and the train of artillery. The second column moved by the right, and consisted of the left wing of infantry. These two columns moved close to each other through the ravines at Almenhausen, which village was upon their right. The hussars of Ruesch marched before both, to cover the heads of the columns. The third column moved through another ravine, and consisted of ten squadrons of hussars, and twenty-five squadrons of dragoons ; they marched by the right, except the hussars, who moved by the left. As soon as the army got clear of the wood, the columns separated ; the first column inclining to the right, and the second and third to the left. When all had formed, the army remained halted for a short time. The enemy

my were perfectly still, and not even one single vidette was to be seen, it being at that time the custom among the Russians to withdraw their outposts at retreat-beating, and not to send them out again till break of day. They now fired their reveillé gun, and began their usual morning music. The Marshal again set his army in motion, and advanced in line upon Jagersdorf.

The enemy in the mean time had made some change in their position, and had drawn their left flank nearer to Sitterfeld, where they had erected a strong battery. It was reported that they meant to move to Allenberg, on account of their being in want of provision: that with this view General Lieven had moved with a corps on the 29th, to Sitterfeld, and that their army were preparing to follow him on the 30th. Marshal Lehwald, whose intention was to attack the enemy's left flank, instead of doing so, came directly upon the center of their line, but as soon as he perceived it, made his army incline to the right, in order to gain their left flank. The cavalry of the right wing attacked the Cossacks and other cavalry in front of their left wing, and drove them back behind their infantry. The regiment of Holstein dragoons forced their way through them, took a battery of eight guns, and cut down all who opposed them. In this attack our cavalry had got too far from the infantry, and could not be properly supported by them. Besides the Marshal, for what

reason I do not know, had placed most of the cavalry upon the left flank, and as he at length observed, that he would have too few upon his right, he sent thither five squadrons, a force scarcely sufficient for the purpose. Notwithstanding the cavalry had already forced their way among the enemy, they could not maintain their advantage; for artillery being soon brought to bear upon them, they were obliged to retire. During this attack of the cavalry, the infantry advanced against the enemy, forced their way into the wood, and took several batteries; especially the infantry of the left wing, which took a large battery, and followed the enemy with charged bayonets to some distance in the wood. General Lapuchin was taken, and gave the badge of his military order to a serjeant of the regiment of Kanitz, as a token that he was his prisoner. As they advanced they met with other batteries, and at length they fell in with General Romanzow, who was marching across the wood, with a reserve, in order to support that part of the army which had been defeated. Upon the appearance of this force, our infantry were brought to a stand, and at length began gradually to retire. The thick fog, which unfortunately prevailed at this time, increased the disorder. The smoke of the cannon and musquetry did not ascend, and though the enemy set fire to the villages of Udeballen and Taupilke, it was so dark that the infantry could not distinguish friend from foe. Hence arose considerable disorder. In advancing, some battalions had inclined too much  
to

to the right, and others as far to the left, by which means great intervals were made. In addition to this accident, the right wing was in danger of being taken both in flank and rear, so that the Marshal found it expedient to draw back. The cavalry of the left wing were likewise fortunate in the beginning. When the hussars of Malachowski had reconnoitred the wood, the cavalry went through it and round it, attacked the Russian cavalry, and threw them back upon their infantry; but in the pursuit they fell in with the enemy's artillery, which galled them so severely that they were obliged to draw back. The retreat was made in perfect order, and was so well covered by the cavalry, that the enemy did not venture to pursue the beaten army.

Several circumstances appear to have contributed to the loss of the battle. The Marshal seems to have been rather precipitate, and not to have had an accurate idea of the enemy's position. As his object was to attack the enemy's left flank, he ought to have brought the greatest part of his cavalry upon his right, and not to have made the attack with them until the shock could be properly sustained with infantry. He likewise should have constantly refused his left wing; but they were too hot, and attacked the enemy too soon, whereby the same fault occurred which occasioned the loss of the battle of Kollin.

Upon the whole, the Russians themselves will allow that the Prussians advanced to the battle with  
extraor-

extraordinary bravery. At their first shock they carried all before them, but they had not sufficient numbers to cope with continual succession of fresh troops. The regiment of Kanitz charged before the line with fixed bayonets, and forced through the first line of the enemy into the second, where they likewise forced a part to give way; but, not being supported, they were obliged to retreat. In a word, the Prussian army was too weak, having scarcely twenty thousand against sixty thousand, on which account many allowances ought to be made,

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

# E R R A T A.

- Page lvii. line 27. *for* Royal Highness *read* Serene Highness.  
 26. — 4. *for* setting *read* fitting.  
 54. — 11. *for* Hzenplitz *read* Itzenplitz.  
       14. *for* right and left *read* line.  
 59. — 26. *for* was *read* were.  
 61. — 4. *for* Schweidnitz *read* Schweidnitz.  
 62. — 21. *for* Gubel *read* Gabel.  
 107. — 32. *for* Leuctron *read* Leuctra.  
 112. — 3. *for* the duty *read* his duty.  
       16. *for* regiments *read* regiment.  
 119. — 21. *for* it was *read* they were.  
 121. — 9. *for* drawn *read* driven.  
       10. *after* them off *insert* or.  
 147. — 10. *for* Stolpin *read* Stolpen.  
 161. — 28. *for* erached *read* reached.  
 166. — 3. *for* ran *read* would have run.  
       8. *for* be *read* would have been.  
 189. — 19. *for* features *read* feature.  
 192. — 2. *for* exaggerations *read* exaggeration.















