







JOHN WATTS DE PEYSTER.

1898

Master of Arts, Columbia College of New York, 1872.—LL.D., Nebraska College, 1870.—Litt. D. (1892) and LL.D. (1896), Franklin and Marshall College, Pennsylvania.—Honorary Vice-President of the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Philadelphia.—Honorary Member Clarendon Historical Society, Edinburgh, Scotland; of the New Brunswick Historical Society, St John, Canada; of the Historical Societies of Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Northern Indiana and of Lancaster County, Penn.; of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, &c.; of the New York Burns Club, &c.—Corresponding Member of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, Canada, &c.—Honorary Member of the London Society of Science, Letters and Art, 1893, and recipient of the Gold Medal for 1894 for "Scientific and Literary Attainments," and of United Empire Loyal Association of Canada, 1895.—Hereditary Member of the Military Society of the War of 1812.—Life Member Royal Historical Society of Great Britain, London, Eng.—Member Maatschappij Nederlandsche Letterkunde, Leyden, Holland. First Honorary Member Third Army Corps (Army of the Potomac) Union.—Honorary Member Third Army Corps, Gettysburg Battlefield Reunion, and Member of the Honorary Committee.—Director of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, 1864 to 21st June, 1880.—Member American Historical Association, United States; of the Holland Society, New York.—Associate Member Military Institution of the United States, &c., &c.—Member, Life, Honorary and Corresponding Member of over forty State and Local Historical, Scientific and Literary Societies and Associations, &c., at home and abroad.—Recipient of Votes of Thanks from Legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania, and twice from the State of New Jersey.—Colonel N. Y. S. I., 1846—assigned for "meritorious conduct" to command of 22d Regimental District, M. F. S. N. Y., 1849.—Brigadier-General for "important service" (first appointment in New York State to that rank, hitherto elective), 1851, M. F. S. N. Y.—Military Agent State of New York, in Europe, 1851-53.—Authorized and endorsed by the United States, 1851-53.—Assisted in organization of present Police, New York, and first reported in favor of Paid Fire Department with Fire Escapes and Steam Engines, 1852-53, New York.—Adjutant-General State of New York, 1855.—Brevet Major-General State of New York for "meritorious services rendered to the National Guard and to the United States prior to and during the Rebellion," by "Special Act" or "Concurrent Resolution," New York State Legislature, April, 1866 (first and only General officer receiving such an honor (the highest), from State of New York, and the only officer *thus* eveted (Major-General) in the United States.)

CONTINUATION

OF THE

HISTORY

OF THE LATE

WAR IN GERMANY,

BETWEEN THE

KING OF PRUSSIA,

AND THE

EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.

ILLUSTRATED WITH A NUMBER OF

MAPS AND PLANS.

PART II.

CONTAINING

FIRST. An Analysis of the Grecian, Roman, and Modern Military Institutions, together with a new System; &c.

SECOND. Of the Rise and Progress of the Passions, and their Application relative to the Conduct of an Army; &c. the Philosophy of War.

THIRD. Of the Analogy between Military Operations and the different Species of Government; the Policy of War.

FOURTH. The Principles of War Demonstrated.

FIFTH. The Application of those Principles to the Military Constitution of the different Powers of Europe; with Maps of France, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Germany and Russia, with an Analysis of their different Frontiers, wherein we examine whether and how they may be attacked with Advantage.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL LLOYD,

WHO SERVED SEVERAL CAMPAIGNS IN THE AUSTRIAN SERVICE.

LONDON.

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, AND SOLD BY S. HOOPER, THE CORNER OF MAY's BUILDINGS, St. MARTIN's LANE.

M DCC LXXXI.

J. Watts de Peyster:

LL. D.

MASTER OF ARTS, Columbia College, of New York, 1872.
ROSE HILL, IN THE TOWNSHIP OF RED HOOK, NEAR TIVOLI P. O., DUCHESS Co., N. Y.

September, 1874.

JUDGE ADVOCATE, with the rank of MAJOR, 1845.
COLONEL N. Y. S. I. 1846; assigned for "*Meritorious Conduct*," 1849;
BRIGADIER-GENERAL for "*Important Service*" [first appointment—in N. Y. State—to that rank, hitherto elective] 1851, M. F. S. N. Y.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, S. N. Y. 1855.
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, S. N. Y., for "*Meritorious Services.*"
[first and only general officer receiving such an honor (the highest) from S. N. Y.,] and the only officer THUS brevetted (Major-General) in the United States.]
by "*Special Act*," or "*Concurrent Resolution*," *New York State Legislature*, April, 1866.

LAWS OF NEW YORK, Vol. 2.—89th Session, 1866, Page 2149.

Concurrent Resolution requesting the Governor to confer upon Brigadier-General J. WATTS DE PUYSTER [de Peyster] the brevet rank of Major [General] in the National Guard of New York.*

RESOLVED, (If the Senate concur,) That it being a grateful duty to acknowledge in a suitable manner the services of a distinguished citizen of this State, rendered to the National Guard and to the United States prior to and during the Rebellion, the Governor be and he is hereby authorized and requested to confer upon Brigadier-General J. WATTS DE PUYSTER [de Peyster] the *brevet rank of major-General* in the National Guard of New York, for meritorious services, which mark of honor shall be stated in the Commission conferred.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *in Assembly*, April 9th, 1866.
The foregoing Resolution was duly passed. *By order of the Assembly.*
J. B. CUSHMAN, Clerk.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *in Senate*, April 20th, 1866.
The foregoing Resolution was duly passed. *By order of the Senate,*
**So in original.* JAS. TERWILLIGER, *Clerk.*

MILITARY AGENT, S. N. Y., (in Europe,) 1851-'3.
HONORARY MEMBER, THIRD CLASS, of the MILITARY ORDER of the LOYAL LEGION of the U. S.
FIRST HONORARY MEMBER Third (Army of the Potomac) Corps Union.
MEMBER—10th June, 1872, DIRECTOR—of the GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION.
MEMBER OF THE NETHERLANDISH LITERARY ASSOCIATION
[*Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde*] at Leyden, Holland.
RECIPIENT, 1856, of *Three Silver Medals* from H. R. M. OSCAR, King of Sweden and Norway, &c., for a Military Biography of LEONARD TORSTENSON, Field Marshal, Generalissimo;
of a *Gold Medal* in 1862, from WASHINGTON HUNT, Governor S. N. Y., for "Efforts to Improve the Military System of New York," &c. &c.,
and Suggestions for a Paid Fire Department with Steam Fire Engines, &c. &c.;
of a *Gold Medal* in 1852, from the FIELD AND STAFF OFFICERS of his Command, 9th Brig., 3 Div., N. Y. S. Troops, "In testimony of their Esteem and Appreciation of his Efforts towards the Establishment of an efficient Militia," &c.; in 1870, of
a Magnificient BADGE, MEDAL and CLASPS voted at the Annual Meeting of the Third Corps (Army of the Potomac) Union, held at Boston, Mass., Thursday, May 5th, 1870, when
A Resolution was adopted to present a *Gold Medal* of the value of $500, to Gen. J. WATTS DE PEYSTER, of New York, as a testimonial of the appreciation by the Corps of his *eminent services* in placing upon record the true history of its achievements, and in defending its commanders and their men from written abuse and misrepresentation;"
and of several other Badges, Medals, &c., for services in connection with the military service of the State of New York.
HONORARY MEMBER of the NEW JERSEY and of the MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETIES, and of the PHRENOKOSMIAN SOCIETY of PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE, *Gettysburg*;
of the PHILOSOPHIAN SOCIETY, *Missionary Institute, Selin's Grove*,
and of the EUTERPEAN SOCIETY, *Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania*,
and of the GASMAN LITERARY SOCIETY, of *Nebraska College, Nebraska City.*
HONORARY MEMBER of the N. Y. BURNS CLUB.
(BURNS WAS A member of the *Dumfries Volunteers*, of which Col. ARENT SCHUYLER DE PEYSTER, 8th or King's Foot B. A., was Colonel, to whom the "National Bard of Scotland" addressed, just before his death, in 1796, his "POEM ON LIFE.")
and LIFE MEMBER of the ST. NICHOLAS SOCIETY of NEW YORK,
(of which city JOHANNES DE PEYSTER, *first of the name in the New World*, was *Schepen*, 1655, *Alderman*, 1666, *Burgomaster*, 1673, *Deputy Mayor*, 1677. *Mayorally offered and refused.*)
MEMBER
of the NEW YORK, of the RHODE ISLAND (Newport) and of the PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL SOCIETIES, of the MILITARY ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
and of the CENTURY CLUB, New York City.
LIFE MEMBER
of the HISTORICAL SOCIETY of MICHIGAN,
of the NEW YORK GALLERY OF FINE ARTS, and Director of the N. Y. INSTITUTION for the INSTRUCTION OF THE DEAF AND DUMB,
and of the NUMISMATIC and ARCHÆOLOGICAL SOCIETY of NEW YORK.
LIFE MEMBER or FELLOW of the AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; PATRON of the ASSOCIATION for the BENEFIT OF COLORED ORPHANS, and of the NEW YORK DISPENSARY; LIFE DIRECTOR of the AMERICAN TRACT, and LIFE MEMBER of the AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, N. Y.
CORRESPONDING MEMBER
of the STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETIES of MAINE, of VERMONT, of RHODE ISLAND, (Providence,) of CONNECTICUT, and of WISCONSIN; of the LONG ISLAND and of the BUFFALO HISTORICAL SOCIETIES; of the NEW ENGLAND HISTORIC-GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY; of the QUEBEC LITERARY & HISTORICAL SOCIETY;
of the NUMISMATIC AND ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY of PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania;
etc. etc. etc.

TO HIS

ROYAL HIGHNESS

GEORGE AUGUSTUS FREDERICK,

PRINCE OF WALES.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS,

THE exact attention which your Royal Father has given to, and the uncommon knowledge he has acquired, in every Department that can affect the intereſt and happineſs of his People, and the honour of his Country; equally attentive to the minuteſt, as well as to the moſt extenſive and important Objects in the Military Line; encourages me with the utmoſt humility and diffidence to lay this Treatiſe at your Royal Highneſs's Feet, from the pleaſing view that your Highneſs is animated by that great example: humbly hoping that it will be received

received as a mark of my zeal and gratitude to my Gracious Sovereign, and of the moſt profound reſpect for your Royal Highneſs; happy, ſhould it prove, in the leaſt amuſing, uſeful, or explanatory of the great events of ſo remarkable a period in the Military Hiſtory of Europe; and during which, the abilities, courage, and activity of the Monarch of a ſingle Country, reſiſted the efforts and baffled the views of many hoſtile Nations.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNES'S,

Moſt devoted Servant

Bruſſels,
20th. May 1781.

H. LLOYD.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author has been adviſed to publiſh this Part of his Work as mentioned in his Propoſals, for the Continuation of the Hiſtory of the late War in Germany, &c. In the mean while the Remainder of that Work is going on with all Expedition; the Author being now reviſiting the ſeveral Countries (the Subject of the Hiſtory) in order to locate the Scenes of Action with more Preciſion.

The Preface to the former Volume being ſo immediately connected with the Subject of the preſent Publication, that the Author flatters himſelf will apologize to the Purchaſers of that Work for its being prefixed to this.

IN order to elucidate in one View the particular Reflections and Deſcriptions contained in this Work, as well as in Military Hiſtory in general, a Map on a large Scale is now engraving, that will comprehend the countries between the Meridian of Paris and that of Peterſburg, and from the Latitude of the laſt mentioned Place, to that of Conſtantinople; on which will be traced the natural Lines of Operation, leading from the Frontiers of the reſpective Countries; as alſo the Lines on which the reſpective Armies did really act in the ſeveral Campaigns during the War we deſcribe, which will enable the Reader to ſee and judge of the Propriety of their Operations.

This Map will be given to Purchaſers of the Work; it is therefore requeſted, that Gentlemen will give their Names and Addreſs to each reſpective Bookſeller of whom they buy it, which will entitle them to the Map on producing this Note.

PREFACE.

THE various and numberleſs authors who have wrote on the art of war, may be divided into two claſſes, Didactical and Hiſtorical: the firſt are of great uſe, no doubt, but by no means comparable to the others; particularly ſuch as Xenophon, Polybius, Cæſar, and Arian, who had not only ſeen, but executed great things.

THIS enabled them to write on thoſe tranſactions with judgment and propriety; and their works will ever be regarded, by military men in particular, as a pure ſpring from whence the general principles of war may be deduced, much better than from any ſyſtematical author.

THE moderns, who have undertaken to write the hiſtory of different wars, or of ſome renowned Commanders, being chiefly men of learning only, and utterly unacquainted with the nature of military operations, have given us indeed agreeable but uſeleſs productions.

BOTH ſpecies of compoſitions are uſeful and neceſſary to thoſe who make war their profeſſion: they are, however, in my opinion, in many reſpects imperfect. The didactical

kind communicates its precepts purely and ſimply, without any application: ſo that they make but a weak and tranſitory impreſſion on the mind, which time ſoon effaces. From whence it is become a proverb, that the road to ſcience, by means of rules and precepts, is long and tedious; that by example, ſhort and agreeable.

A READER, no doubt, is much more attentive to real, than to imaginary tranſactions. He believes that it is poſſible, at leaſt, to imitate what others have executed. There is beſides, in every elevated mind, an emulation which encourages and animates us to tread the footſteps of thoſe great men, whoſe actions and characters are juſtly the object of our love and veneration. For which reaſon, hiſtory has been ever recommended as the beſt, eaſieſt, and moſt effectual method to inſtruct mankind.

THOSE hiſtorians, both ancient and modern, who have given us an account of different wars, though in many reſpects extremely valuable, are not as accurate as they might, and ought to be.

THEY do not deſcribe, with ſufficient preciſion and exactneſs, the countries wherein the wars were carried on, nor the particular ſpots upon which ſome great tranſaction happened; the number, ſpecies, and quality of the troops which compoſed the reſpective armies are generally omitted, as

as well as the plan of operations; and the operations themſelves, excepting thoſe which appeared extraordinary. They do not explain minutely, as they ought, why, how, and where every operation was tranſacted. They only, in general terms, give the hiſtory of a campaign, without explaining ſufficiently the motives by which the generals were actuated, how the various operations of it were conducted; and laſtly, what was the nature of the ground where they happened.

THE knowledge, however, of theſe points is ſo neceſſary, that it is impoſſible to form an exact opinion of the propriety or impropriety of any military tranſaction without it.

THE author of the following hiſtory has compoſed it upon a new plan, which he hopes will meet with the approbation of the learned. He propoſes to give a clear and exact account of the moſt eſſential tranſactions which have occurred during the courſe of this important war. Theſe will ſerve as a baſis and foundation upon which he will write a commentary, wherein the various principles of war will be occaſionally explained.

THAT the reader may be enabled to form a proper judgment of the conduct of the generals who commanded the reſpective armies, the author will, firſt, give ſome general

thoughts on the principles of war: ſecondly, he will explain the plan of operations of each campaign: thirdly, he will give a military deſcription of the ſeat of war: and, fourthly, a particular one of the ground where any extraordinary action happened, with the plan of it, together with an account of the conduct of the action itſelf, and endeavour to point out the manœuvres that contributed eſſentially to the gain or loſs of it.

By this means the reader will be able to form a proper and exact judgment, not only of ſuch tranſactions, but likewiſe of the reflections and opinions of the author. It is with reluctance he finds himſelf obliged to ſpeak of himſelf; it is however neceſſary, leſt he may be thought to advance things without a proper foundation.

He has had the good fortune to ſerve ſeveral campaigns under the orders of general Count Lacy, now inſpector general of the Auſtrian army, while quarter-maſter general of it, by which means he has been enabled to acquire an exact knowledge of the country, of which he has given a deſcription, and to be acquainted with the motives and motions of the reſpective armies. In the campaign of 1760 he was intruſted with the command of a very conſiderable detachment of infantry and cavalry, with orders never to loſe ſight of the Pruſſian army; which he punctually complied with, and was never unfortunate.

The

THE two laſt campaigns he had the happineſs to ſerve near the perſon of a prince, whoſe ſocial and military qualities have gained him the love and veneration of the preſent age, and will, no doubt, tranſmit a glorious and immortal name to poſterity.

THE author is perſuaded, that his ſtyle is full of foreign idioms and expreſſions; and therefore hopes the critics will not give themſelves the trouble to convince him of it, particularly, if they underſtand his meaning.

AS to his opinions he believes them reaſonable, but does not preſume to think himſelf infallible; and, conſequently, does not pretend to impoſe them upon others. He will think himſelf happy if his labours are attended with any advantage to his country.

REFLEC-

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR;

AND ON THE

COMPOSITION AND CHARACTERS

OF THE

DIFFERENT ARMIES IN EUROPE.

IT is univerſally agreed upon, that no art or ſcience is more difficult than that of war; yet, by an unaccountable contradiction of the human kind, thoſe who embrace this profeſſion take little or no pains to ſtudy it. They ſeem to think, that the knowledge of a few inſignificant and uſeleſs trifles conſtitute a great officer.

THIS opinion is ſo general, that little or nothing elſe is taught at preſent in any army whatever. The continual changes and variety of motions, evolutions, &c. which the ſoldiers are taught, prove evidently, they are founded on mere caprice.

THIS art, like all others, is founded on certain and fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable, the appli-

application of them only can be varied: but they are in themſelves conſtant.

THIS moſt difficult ſcience may, I think, be divided into two; one mechanical, and may be taught by precepts; the other has no name, nor can it be defined or taught. It conſiſts in a juſt application of the principles and precepts of war, in all the numberleſs circumſtances and ſituations which occur; no rule, no ſtudy, or application, however aſſiduous, no experience, however long, can teach this part; it is the effect of genius alone. As to the firſt, it may be reduced to mathematical principles; its object is to prepare the materials which form an army, for all the different operations which may occur: genius muſt apply them according to the ground, number, ſpecies, and quality of the troops, which admit of infinite combinations.

IN this art, as in poetry and eloquence, there are many who can trace the rules by which a poem or an oration ſhould be compoſed, and even compoſe, according to the exacteſt rules; but for want of that enthuſiaſtic and divine fire, their productions are languid and inſipid: ſo in our profeſſion, many are to be found who know every precept of it by heart; but, alas! when called upon to apply them, are immediately at a ſtand. They then recall their rules, and want to make every thing, the rivers, woods, ravins,

ravins, mountains, &c. &c. ſubſervient to them; whereas their precepts ſhould, on the contrary, be ſubject to theſe, who are the only rules, the only guide we ought to follow; whatever manœuvre is not formed on theſe, is abſurd and ridiculous. Theſe form the great book of war; and he who cannot read it, muſt for ever be content with the title of a brave ſoldier, and never aſpire to that of a great general.

THE firſt object of the mechanical part is to form the ſoldier, relative to the uſe to be made of him, and to provide him with thoſe inſtruments of his profeſſion which are of moſt general uſe, becauſe he cannot be loaded with many of different kinds; and that he be inſtructed relative to the actions he is to perform, and nothing more. This is ſo evident, and conformable to reaſon, that I will preſume to eſtabliſh, as the firſt laws or principles of the art of war, what is already admitted in every other; *firſt, that a ſoldier be cloathed and armed relative to the action he is to perform: ſecondly, that he be taught nothing but what is of uſe to him, in the different ſituations which can occur, before the enemy: thirdly, that he be taught every thing that is abſolutely neceſſary for him to know, in every caſe that may happen.*

MANY will exclaim againſt theſe propoſitions, particularly thoſe whoſe whole ſtudy has been applied to learn the num-

numberleſs and inſignificant trifles with which all the armies in Europe abound, and whoſe only ſcience is reduced to adjuſt a hat, a button, &c. and ſuch other important matters in which the merit of an officer intirely conſiſts, according to their opinion of military deſerts. They attribute the glorious victories of the king of Pruſſia to theſe and the like puerilities; and have therefore, with great care and diligence, even with a degree of madneſs, introduced the Pruſſian exerciſe into all the troops of Europe—nothing but Pruſſian will go down.

Short cloaths, little hats, tight breeches, high-heeled ſhoes, and an infinite number of uſeleſs motions in the exerciſe and evolutions have been introduced, without any other reaſon than their being Pruſſian; as if really theſe things could contribute to gain one battle, make a fine march or manœuvre, carry on the operations of a ſiege, chooſe a fine camp or poſition, &c.

It is impoſſible, one would think, that men can be ſo blind as not to perceive, that what makes the object of their ſtudy and veneration, has, in fact, no kind of connection with, or influence on the events of war; yet are they ſo infatuated with them, that they judge of every man as he appears to be expert in them, and eſteem the reſt of mankind ignorant, and worthy their contempt; but as, in my turn, I have no great regard for men who

are attached to ſuch trifles, I ſhall be very indifferent as to the opinion they may be pleaſed to form of me, and of my productions.

If the form of dreſs, now in uſe among the ſoldiers, be examined by our canon, it will be found, I think, very unfit for the purpoſe it is made for; can any thing be more troubleſome and uſeleſs than the hat? it anſwers no one end: the face is expoſed to the ſun, the neck and ſhoulders to the cold and rain, which in a very little time ſends numbers of the poor men to the hoſpitals.

The coat and waiſtcoat are equally uſeleſs, becauſe they leave the body totally expoſed to the inclemency of the weather, and being tight, hinder the men from moving with eaſe and facility.

To theſe inconveniencies, which ſend every campaign, particularly if carried on in the winter, at leaſt one fourth of the army into their grave, may be added, that if it rains for any conſiderable time, the ſoldier can with difficulty make uſe of his arms; and ſometimes, in preparing them, he loſes the happy and deciſive moment. I would therefore recommend it thoſe who have it in their power to invent ſome better form of dreſs, as well out of humanity, as for the ſervice of their country, which is connected with theſe things much more than is generally imagined.

As

As to the arms made uſe of, the gun is, no doubt, the beſt that has been invented for the infantry, being of more general uſe than any other. It were to be wiſhed, provided the muſket is to continue ſolely in uſe, and without lances, that it was lengthened two feet, including the bayonet, which, it is thought, may be done without any ſenſible inconvenience to the ſoldier.

If it was conſtructed ſo as to be loaded at the breech, and the center of gravity thrown further back near the lock, it would not be ſo top-heavy as at preſent, and would be much more advantageous in action.

M. Saxe invented one of this kind, which he gave to his regiment of Uhlans; but it had many inconveniencies, which may be eaſily remedied. This ſpecies of guns will be particularly uſeful to the cavalry.

The infantry ſhould have caſks and cuiraſſes, made of ſtrong leather, which would laſt for ever, and defend them effectually againſt the ſabre and bayonet, and even againſt balls, at a certain diſtance.

The French have offered a great premium to any one who will prepare leather, ſo as to reſiſt the effect of fire-arms.

than by any other method whatever. In coming out of a defile, you may inſtantly form the line without preſenting the flank to the enemy, which muſt happen if you do it as the Pruſſians, by a converſion on either flank, in order to give room to thoſe who follow to form upon the line without danger.

THE line may be formed, though ever ſo near the enemy, with eaſe, becauſe you face him, and can with eaſe and ſafety protect and cover the motions of the troops, while they are coming out of the defiles and forming: and the ſame thing may be equally executed when a column is to be formed, in order to advance or retire; which is a point of infinite conſequence, and ſhould be eſtabliſhed as an axiom, that no manœuvre whatever be executed, eſpecially when near the enemy, unleſs it be protected by ſome diviſion of the troops.

IT is in the human heart to fear the dangers we do not ſee, and for which we are not prepared, more than thoſe we do ſee, which is the caſe of all converſions; the ſoldier does not ſee the enemy, and by preſenting his flank, is deprived of all means of defence.

NO movement therefore ought to be made near the enemy by converſion, excepting only to form the line on either flank, ſhould they be attacked. As to the different evolutions

lutions now practiſed, I ſhall not here examine them; but will eſtabliſh as a rule, that muſt be generally obſerved, and by which alone it is poſſible to compare one evolution with another, and judge of their propriety.

THAT evolution is beſt, which with a given number of men may be executed in the leaſt ſpace, and conſequently in the leaſt time poſſible.

THERE is ſcarce any figure, geometrical or ungeometrical, which our modern tacticians have not introduced into the armies, without ever conſidering how far ſuch forms were uſeful in practice.

IT is very poſſible to point out all the caſes that may occur in war, as to the manner of fighting, which muſt finally be reduced to that in columns or in lines; conſequently that form or figure is beſt, which is beſt calculated for offence and defence, marching in all kind of ground, and may be ſooneſt changed into a line or column, as the caſe may require.

IT is a general opinion, founded on the practice of all the troops in Europe, that a column cannot march without taking up twice the ground it occupied while ſtanding, becauſe the laſt man cannot move till the firſt has advanced the length of the whole column. This is,

is, no doubt, true in practice, and Marshal Saxe thought it irremediable without the *tact*: nothing, however, is so easy to be remedied, nor deserves it more; because, as we have already said, marching is the most important point in all the military art.

A MAN posted in a line occupies nearly two feet, from one elbow to another, and not quite one foot from front to rear; that is, a man is not quite one foot thick, consequently, when the lines make a motion to the right or left, the distance between each man is above a foot, which is augmented by near two more, if they all begin the march with the same foot; so that all the difficulty consists in making the men march with the same foot, and keep time constantly, which is easily done, if the species of step you would have them march is marked by the drum, or any other instrument. This is often necessary after passing defiles, and when they march in irregular and unequal ground, which is apt to throw them in confusion.

THE article of marching is so essential, that it requires and deserves the greatest care and attention: it may be asserted, that the army which marches best must, if the rest is equal, in the end prevail. If what I here propose, and what is actually executed by the Portuguese army, with great precision, be once taught, so that several regiments

ments formed in one column can practiſe it, an army of forty battalions, for example, will make a given march in leſs than half the time, which they now require, as may be demonſtrated.

As to the different kind of firings made uſe of, they are for the moſt part dangerous or impracticable.

THE platoon firing is ſuch, as muſt neceſſarily produce a general confuſion, as well by the noiſe of thoſe who command them, as by the breaking of the line and kneeling, which are three of the greateſt inconveniencies that can poſſibly happen, and cannot be executed without imminent danger when near the enemy, and therefore muſt be totally excluded. Even the King of Pruſſia himſelf is of the ſame opinion; for he ſays, the platoon fire would, no doubt, be the beſt, *if it could be executed.* This is ſo dangerous and impracticable, that I will preſume to eſtabliſhthe follwing rules on quite contrary principles.

FIRST, The utmoſt ſilence muſt be obſerved; and therefore the commanding officer of the battalion ſhall alone command the different firings.

SECONDLY, That a battalion, or regiment, in advancing to the enemy, muſt never be broke, unleſs forced thereto by the nature of the ground.

THIRDLY, That the firſt rank muſt never kneel under pretence of giving the third an opportunity to fire with ſafety, becauſe it is very dangerous if near the enemy; and moreover, fatigues the ſoldier in ſuch a manner, that he is ſoon uſeleſs. To theſe many other things may be added, which are neceſſary for the ſoldier to know, as to retrench himſelf, make faſcines, gabions, conduct a ſappe, &c.

WHAT has been hitherto ſaid, regards the ſoldier as well as the officer: what follows regards the laſt only.

AS all kind of evolutions is founded on calculation, being a combination of ſpace and time, it is morally impoſſible for a man to compute theſe two objects, without ſome knowledge of geometry and arithmetic.

THE firſt thing to be conſidered, in order to reduce all evolutions to a geometrical preciſion is, that a man occupies from elbow to elbow, when he has a gun on his ſhoulder, near two feet; and that when he marches a regular pace, he will make in every minute one hundred and ten ſteps, and that he meaſures each ſtep about twenty inches; conſequently as the ſpace which a certain number of men occupy in order of battle is known, and the common velocity with which they move, it is eaſy to calculate

calculate the ground, and time required, to perform any evolution, with a given number of men.

A LITTLE experience, and a certain *coup d'œil*, aided by this theory, will enable a man to judge with great preciſion of the time and ſpace neceſſary to execute any evolution whatever: a thing of the utmoſt conſequence in a day of action; becauſe you will be able to make a thouſand motions in the preſence of the enemy, which are generally deciſive, if done with preciſion and exactneſs, which you dare not even attempt, unleſs you are certain of being able to execute them.

THE ignorance of generals in this ſublime and delicate part of war, is the reaſon why you ſee them quite ſuſpended in time of action, incapable of changing their plan, according as new circumſtances riſe (which always do riſe) becauſe as the enemy approach, they very juſtly fear to make any motion in his preſence, as they do not know, whether they have ground, or time enough to execute this or that manœuvre, though convinced of their uſefulneſs. Hence it ſeldom happens that an action is won in conſequence of the general's diſpoſitions; and that chance has generally much more influence on the events of battles than human prudence.

GENERALS form their diſpoſitions in the cabinet, and ſuppoſe many circumſtances which never happen, at leaſt

juſt as they ſuppoſe them; and during the action, few men have that ſublime talent to ſee the new circumſtances that occur, and take advantage of them.

THE knowledge of geometry is equally uſeful and neceſſary, in order to determine the impulſe that bodies, animate or inanimate, make on each other, as this is in proportion to the maſs and velocity: if your cavalry is of a leſſer ſize than that of the enemy, you may render it ſuperior, by giving it a greater degree of velocity. Upon this principle the Spaniſh cavalry, though very light, has generally beat the German, in their different wars with the houſe of Auſtria; and upon this principle our great and heavy horſe is certainly inferior to the hunter, particularly if you make theſe work more on their haunches than at preſent.

NOTHING contributes more to facilitate the evolutions of cavalry than this; they will be enabled in one inſtance to ſet out on a gallop, without being obliged to paſs ſucceſſively from ſtanding to trotting, and then to gallop. While this is performing, the light-horſe is on your flanks, or ſhocks yours with a ſuperior degree of velocity; and therefore gains what he loſes in the maſs, and beats you.

THE march of armies cannot be calculated with any degree of preciſion without the help of mathematics: becauſe

cauſe whatever is not reduced to ſpace and time, will in practice turn out very uncertain.

THE choice of camps depends on two principles; the one geometrical, and the other is the effect of genius: the firſt conſiſts in calculating the diſtances relative to the number and ſpecies of troops which compoſe the army.

THE other, in ſeeing all the different combinations that may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the choice of that preciſe combination which is moſt advantageous. This inacquirable and ſublime talent is much ſuperior to the other, and independent of it.

GREAT geniuſes have a ſort of intuitive knowledge, they ſee at once the cauſes, and its effect, with the different combinations which unite them: they do not proceed by common rules, ſucceſſively from one idea to another, by ſlow and languid ſteps: no, the *whole*, with all its circumſtances and various combinations, is like a picture, all together preſent to their mind; theſe want no geometry, but an age produces few of this kind of men: and in the common run of generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid groſs errors.

FORTIFICATION, another very extenſive branch of war, is purely geometrical in the execution. The conſtruction of every ſpecies of works ought to be reduced to geometrical

cal preciſion, and may therefore be learnt by any one; but the chooſing the ground advantageouſly is here, as in the choice of camps, the gift of genius alone, and ſubject to no rule. As the practice of fortification depends on one principle alone, we ſee a remarkable uniformity in the works of all engineers, which proves they knew only what they learnt, and indeed what alone could be taught them; but that they had not one grain of genius, which varies infinitely, and forms new combinations relative to the new circumſtances which muſt and do occur.

It is with the ground as with the features of men; there are not perhaps in the whole world two features perfectly alike, nor two pieces of ground of a given extent perfectly ſimilar; and conſequently, where the ſame ſpecies of works, or the ſame order of battle, would be equally proper for both. Genius alone can diſtinguiſh the moſt minute and imperceptible difference to the vulgar eyes, there is between different grounds, and occupy them accordingly. From hence appears how inconſiderate thoſe great engineers and Tacticians are, who attempt to ſubject every kind of ground, though infinitely different, to one general rule.

The perfection of our art would be, no doubt, to find a conſtruction, or an order of battle, equally proper for all kind of ground; but this being impoſſible, the only thing remain-

remaining for them to do, is to find ſuch a conſtruction, and ſuch a formation of the troops, as may, with the greateſt ſimplicity, and conſequently velocity, be adapted to thoſe numberleſs circumſtances which occur. This ought to be the conſtant object of their ſtudies, but can never be attained without geometry.

The artillery, now become the ſoul of military operation, is nothing without geometry. The dimenſions of pieces, as Mr. Muller very juſtly obſerves, ought to be regulated by the uſe you propoſe to make of them; and I will add, by the nature of the country where they are to be uſed. For want of attending to this natural reaſon, imitation and caprice have been the only rules followed in determining the dimenſions of pieces.

As the French, during the reign of Lewis the XIVth, gave birth to moſt of the cuſtoms and faſhions of Europe, ſo in this important article were they imitated by every body; 24 pounders of immenſe length and weight were made by princes who had neither places to attack or defend; whoſe countries, for want of roads, did not permit the uſe of ſuch heavy machines; they were even introduced into armies, though no ſiege was expected.

It ought to have been conſidered, that the French made war in a fine open country, where the roads are good, and where there is a great deal of water carriage.

That

THAT Lewis the XIVth and XVth were, from the proximity of their own fortreſſes, enabled to form their magazines near the ſcene of action: and laſtly, that in Flanders they could not make one ſtep, without beſieging ſome important place.

THE French artillery was formed relative to theſe circumſtances. But why we, and other princes, that are not ſituated in ſimilar circumſtances, ſhould imitate the French, I do not know. I am very glad to ſee Mr. Muller's opinion prevail, and hope that artillery, and every other machine relative to military operations, will hereafter be made in the moſt advantageous manner poſſible, for the uſe we can in our circumſtances make of them. This gentleman has propoſed many excellent things in his works, which makes it needleſs for me to ſay any thing on the ſubject.

I WISH, for the ſake of the public, he may give us the doctrine of ſieges in all its parts, including the theory and practice of mines, in order to complete his moſt uſeful works *.

THE next, and indeed moſt important object of any, to thoſe who aſpire to the command of armies, is geo-

* The Author did not know that Mr. Muller had already executed this.

graphy;

graphy; not only *that* which conſiſts in a general knowledge of a country, but a local one: a man muſt be thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country, and its productions; and particularly with thoſe objects which are immediately connected with military operations, as the ſpring, courſe, breadth, depth, velocity, windings, banks, fords, bridges of rivers, whether they are navigable or not; whether they run into your country from that of the enemy, or on the contrary: in the firſt place, you muſt have a fortreſs as high up as poſſible, in order to hinder the enemy from taking advantage of the navigation, which is a very great one, and facilitates much the operations of an army; inſomuch, that all great generals make it a point never to quit them if poſſible: and it is remarkable that the Auſtrians have generally been worſted by the Turks, whenever they have quitted the Danube.

If the river runs out of your country, you muſt have likewiſe a fortreſs, as low as may be, in which you muſt form your magazines, that you may at once enter your enemy's country.

If the river runs along your frontier, as the Rhine does with regard to France, you muſt endeavour to occupy two or three capital points upon it, with good and extenſive fortreſſes; ſo that you may not only cover your own country, but alſo make it impoſſible for an enemy to pe-

netrate without giving you an opportunity to enter his, and cut off his ſubſiſtences: though the river be not navigable, it may however be of great uſe in military operations, particularly if it runs parallel to the enemy's frontier, and croſſes the principal roads that lead into his country, becauſe then they furniſh good poſitions on their banks. If you make war on any river, you muſt be maſters of both ſides, if poſſible, otherwiſe they are of little uſe, excepting only to take poſitions behind them. When you have a ſtrong place on a navigable river, you may with a handful of men embarraſs a great army.

THE paſſing of rivers is juſtly conſidered as one of the moſt delicate and dangerous operations of war; and yet it generally ſucceeds for want of being perfectly acquainted with them; and for want of diligence and activity in thoſe who oppoſe it, otherwiſe it cannot ſucceed; for though an enemy cannot prevent your throwing a bridge under the protection of your artillery, if properly placed, he can, however, hinder you from occupying ſuch an extent of ground as is neceſſary to develop your army, and may, without expoſing himſelf to your artillery, attack any part of it that has paſſed.

THIS method ought to be embraced rather than attempt to prevent a paſſage. A remarkable inſtance of this happened in Italy, in the war for the ſucceſſion of Spain.

PRINCE

PRINCE Eugene wanted to paſs a certain river, which the vigilance of his antagoniſt, the duke of Vendome, had for a long time prevented: at length, however, the prince having ſtole a march, threw over a bridge, and even a great part of his army had paſſed and intrenched themſelves under the protection of the artillery on the other ſide, ſo that Vendome could not attack them without much loſs and danger: he therefore poſted his army as near as poſſible, ready to attack them, if they offered to quit their retrenchments, in order to form and extend their front, but it was found quite impracticable; for the Duke had placed his troops in ſuch a manner, that they formed a portion of a circle concave towards the enemy, ſo that the whole fire, both of artillery and ſmall arms, could be directed and concentred upon the retrenchments.

PRINCE Eugene having obſerved the duke's diſpoſitions, was too wiſe to riſk an action in theſe circumſtances, with a river behind him; he therefore ordered his troops to repaſs the river, and broke the bridge after them.

THIS example is the beſt leſſon that can be given on the defence of rivers; if the courſe of the river is convex to you, it will be extremely difficult to hinder an enemy from paſſing; becauſe, marching on the chord of the circle, he has much leſs ſpace to go than you: he labours,

however, under one difficulty, which is, that generally ſpeaking the banks of every river are higher on the ſide where its courſe is convex: if the banks are in the leaſt elevated, no bridge can be thrown over the river; and they are always high alternately, if the river has a winding courſe; high on the convex ſide, and low on the concave of the curve it forms.

In defending the banks of rivers, the army muſt be ſeparated into two or more great corps, as the nature of the river admits, and diſpoſed in ſuch a manner as to be able to diſcover where the enemy paſſes, and ſtrong enough to hinder him from occupying any poſts far from the banks; becauſe he will then have ground to form his whole army upon, and there is no advantage in fighting him. A due attention to what we have ſaid, and a perfect knowledge of the river, will make it impoſſible for an enemy to paſs it.

I am ſurprized that no uſe is made of ſmall rivers and rivulets to make inundations to cover camps, which may be executed on almoſt every ſpot with very little expence, and would render them no leſs ſtrong than fortreſſes. All capital poſitions ſhould, if poſſible, be covered by inundations, which are much more efficacious than all the retrenchments in the world. The ſluices muſt be made as low as poſſible, and, moreover, covered with ſome good work or other.

If

If the country is mountainous, the roads muſt neceſſarily paſs through many defiles, formed by the ravins, torrents, rivers, &c. conſequently advantageous camps and poſitions are to be found on every ſpot.

The knowledge of all this, when improved by ſuperior talents, will enable a ſmall army to make a ſucceſsful war againſt one infinitely ſuperior, as appears evident from the example Duke Ferdinand has given us in his glorious campaigns in Heſſia.

Moſt particular care muſt be taken to occupy all the mountains without exceptions, before you approach them with the army; for though there are few great roads in ſuch a country proper for cavalry and artillery, you may however be certain, that if the country is well peopled, there is no mountain, however it may appear ſteep and craggy, nor any wood, though in appearance impracticable, but what, on diligent enquiry, will be found to have roads at leaſt for infantry; and therefore you muſt never encamp in ſuch a country without occupying all the mountains; which will not only ſecure your army, but will enable you to obſerve the enemy's motions, and prevent him from obſerving yours; a thing of ſo much conſequence, that I will eſtabliſh it as a rule never to let an enemy ſend a patrole near your army; on the contrary, you muſt always ſend yours on his flanks.

When

When the ground has been well reconnoitred, and the mountains occupied, you must always camp behind them, so that the enemy cannot see you, and that you may keep him in a state of incertitude, which is a great advantage in military operations: upon this same principle you must never camp near a wood, unless you occupy it entirely, otherwise the enemy covered by it, may make some decisive motions against you, which you cannot perceive till it is too late to prevent it. Had this maxim been observed at Malplaquet, Hastenbeck, and Torgau, things would have turned out otherwise in all probability.

Never approach a wood or a mountain, unless you occupy it entirely, is a rule that must be for ever observed, and cannot be transgressed without imminent danger.

Not only an exact knowledge must be had of all fortified towns, but even of all the villages; particularly those through which the high roads pass, because they form defiles; which being occupied, put an effectual stop to an enemy, and give you time to make any disposition that may be judged necessary.

The science of position, camps, marches, and even the project of campaign or plan of operations, must be regulated

lated by theſe points: it is on this knowledge only you can determine the number and ſpecies of troops that muſt compoſe the army; and conſequently the quantity and quality of your magazines, and where they muſt be made; and every plan that is not founded on theſe principles, muſt fail in the execution, if your antagoniſt has common ſenſe; ſo that the great and important parts of war, as well in the formation as in the execution, depend on the knowledge of the country; and wiſe generals will always chuſe to make them the foundation of their conduct, rather than truſt to the uncertain iſſue of battles. If you poſſeſs theſe points, you may reduce military operations to geometrical preciſion; and may for ever make war without ever being obliged to fight. Marſhal Saxe calls battles the reſource of ignorant generals; when they do not know what to do they give battle.

NEXT to this local geography of a country, the natural hiſtory and political conſtitution of it is an object that deſerves the utmoſt attention; the quantity and quality of its productions, ſoil, climate, food, and form of government; becauſe on theſe the phyſical and moral qualities of the inhabitants entirely depend. Thoſe who inhabit the plains and rich countries, are generally effeminate and bad ſoldiers, impatient under the leaſt fatigue, are ſoon ſick, require too much food, and are leſs active than thoſe

of

of the mountains, and in every reſpect inferior to them. What did not the poor Highlanders do? What did they not ſuffer? They will live where an Engliſhman, though animated with equal courage and love of glory, will periſh; merely from the difference of their ſituations before they become ſoldiers.

THE Croats in the Empreſs's ſervice, ſeldom or ever camp, and are expoſed to all the inclemency of the weather; yet, in proportion, much fewer of them die than among the reſt of the troops, which can be attributed only to the difference of the countries from whence they come.

THE inhabitants of great towns are ſtill worſe than thoſe of the plains, being long enervated with vice and its conſequences, they are unable to ſupport any fatigue; and moreover, too talkative ever to form a good and obedient ſoldier. The form of government produces no leſs variety in the characters of men than the phyſical qualities of the country.

THE ſubjects of a deſpotic prince being from their birth taught obedience and ſubordination (two eſſential qualities to form a good ſoldier, if not entirely alienated and weakened by oppreſſion and poverty) are preferable to thoſe

thoſe of republics, unleſs theſe are animated by the enthuſiaſtic fire of liberty; of which they are very ſuſceptible, if conducted by an able hand, and become invincible; but if deſtitute of this principle, they make but indifferent ſoldiers; becauſe their pretenſions to liberty claſhes continually with that blind ſubordination which conſtitutes the very foundation of a good army.

As the ſubject of a deſpote cannot poſſibly be animated with a paſſion for liberty, that can raiſe any degree of enthuſiaſm, their leaders muſt endeavour to ſubſtitute that of religion, which is ſuperior to the other. When theſe two principles are united, the ſoldier is invincible. If we conſider the force they have on the human heart, and how eaſily raiſed, we moſt be ſurprized to ſee the generals of our age neglect them entirely: this proves they want the moſt infallible and muſt ſublime art of conducting mankind.

THERE is another ſpecies of enthuſiaſm much weaker than the former, and may be rather called a ſtrong paſſion, whoſe object is the love of glory and riches; both theſe principles are ingrafted in the human heart, and if cultivated with care, will produce wonderful effects, eſpecially among the officers, who, by their ſituation, have the means of enjoying the fruits of them. Theſe prin-

ciples are to be found chiefly among the ſubjects of a mixed and monarchical government, where glory and riches are attended with a real ſuperiority and diſtinction.

FROM theſe moral and phyſical principles are formed national characters, whoſe influence is ſeen more or leſs in every army, as it is more or leſs ſubject to military diſcipline. If this is ſtrong, and founded only on the principle of fear, it deſtroys national characters, and does not ſubſtitute any thing that is equivalent to it. Diſcipline ſhould be founded on national characters, and both are improved by it: but as thoſe who have the formation and conduct of armies, ſeem wholly unacquainted with human nature in general, and with its various modifications, according to the difference of countries and government, they find themſelves incapable to form a code of military laws, founded on national characters; and are therefore forced to deſtroy theſe, and eſtabliſh it on the weak, uncertain, and ſlaviſh principle of fear, which has rendered our armies much inferior to thoſe of the antients, as appears evident from the hiſtory of mankind.

THE French are gay, light, and lively, governed rather by an immediate and tranſitory impulſe, than by any principle of reaſon or ſentiment: their ſenſations, from the nature of their climate, are very delicate; and therefore objects make a very ſtrong impreſſion, but momentary, becauſe

becauſe a new object, producing a new impreſſion, effaces the former: from whence follows, that they are impetuous and dangerous in their attacks; all the animal ſpirits ſeem united, and produce a ſort of furious convulſion, and gives them a more than ordinary degree of vigour for that inſtant, but it exhauſts the whole frame: the inſtant following they appear languid and weak, and changed into other men.

To this national character may be added, that their armies are recruited from the claſs of men that inhabit the towns, who of all others are the leaſt proper for ſoldiers, being vain, impatient, talkative, and effeminate; they advance as aſſured of victory, having a great opinion of themſelves and contempt of others; but if repulſed, their ſpirits are exhauſted, ſhame ſucceeds, and humbles them to ſuch a degree, that they are not eaſily prevailed upon to renew the attack; and as their vanity will never let them confeſs they are in the wrong, they throw the fault on their leaders, become mutinous, and deſert.

WHEREFORE it ſhould be a maxim, in making war againſt the French, to keep them continually in motion, eſpecially in bad weather, always attack them, never permit them to follow their own diſpoſitions, force them to obſerve yours; their impatience will ſoon reduce them to

commit ſome capital error. If their leader is wiſe and prudent, and refuſes to comply with their unreaſonable requeſts, they will treat him with contempt, grow turbulent, and deſert.

THE preſent miniſtry endeavours to introduce the German diſcipline among them, without conſidering the difference there is between their national characters; and I doubt whether it will produce the effects they expect from it; Nature muſt be improved, not annihilated.

THE Auſtrian army is compoſed chiefly out of the claſs of labourers, vaſſals of the great lords; they are obedient and patient, and bear without a murmur the greateſt hardſhips; and though their religion does not riſe to any degree of enthuſiaſm, probably for want of being excited by an able leader, yet it keeps them ſober and free from vice: objects muſt ſtrike hard to make any ſenſible impreſſion, which once received laſts long, becauſe not eaſily effaced. By education and temper little diſpoſed to reaſon about cauſes and events; and therefore very proper to form a good ſoldier, and ſuperior to any other who are not raiſed by ſome ſpecies of enthuſiaſm.

THE Ruſſians have all theſe qualifications, in common with the Auſtrians; and beſides, ſuch a fund of religion and reſpect, or rather veneration for their prince, which inſpires

inſpires them with a degree of enthuſiaſm, that muſt neceſſarily render them ſuperior to every other army that is not animated with ſimilar principles. Their courage alone has rendered them victorious, in ſpite of all thoſe difficulties in which the general ignorance of their officers involved them.

THE Pruſſian army, being compoſed chiefly of ſtrangers of different countries, manners, and religion, are united only by the ſtrong chain of military diſcipline; this and a moſt rigid attention to keep up all the forms and diſcipline eſtabliſhed, conſtitutes a vaſt and regular machine, which being animated by the vigorous and powerful genius of their leader, may be juſtly accounted one of the moſt reſpectable armies in Europe; but ſhould this ſpring, however, languiſh but for an inſtant only, the machine itſelf, being compoſed of ſuch heterogeneous matter, would probably fall to pieces, and leave nothing but the traces of its antient glory behind.

THEY have a facility in manœuvring beyond any other troops whatever; and their victories muſt be aſcribed to this chiefly; for all the genius of the leader can do nothing without it, and almoſt every thing with it.

THE Spaniards are brave and patient; and have beſides a point of honour, which being improved, would make them

them good ſoldiers. Their army at preſent would make but an indifferent figure, for two or three campaigns, as their generals have neither that knowledge, founded on ſtudy and application, or that produced by experience.

THE Engliſh are neither ſo lively as the French, nor ſo phlegmatic as the Germans; they reſemble more however the former, and are therefore ſomewhat lively and impatient.

IF the nature of the Engliſh conſtitution permitted ſome degree more of diſcipline, a more equal diſtribution of favours, and a total aboliſhment of buying and ſelling commiſſions, I think they would ſurpaſs, at leaſt equal, any troops in the world.

THE Turks, and every government founded on military force, muſt neceſſarily decay, unleſs the ſame fanaticiſm which gave it birth be kept up by continual wars.

MAHOMET underſtood this principle ſo well, that he has made a religious precept of it, commanding his followers never to make peace with their enemies.

AS the force of this army depends entirely on numbers and enthuſiaſm; if this laſt is ever extinguiſhed, which now ſeems to be much the caſe, the other will avail them no-

nothing; and that immenſe fabric being no longer animated with the only ſpirit which could ſupport it, muſt ſink under its own weight.

THE principles which are only curſorily mentioned in this preface, will be examined and demonſtrated in the following work.

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N. B. The Maps of France, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Germany, and Ruſſia, and the Plans, N° 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, to be placed at the End of the Book.

OF THE COMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT ARMIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

PART THE FIRST.

CHAPTER I.

WAR is a ſtate of action. An army is the inſtrument with which every ſpecies of military action is performed: like all other machines it is compoſed of various parts, and its perfection will depend, firſt, on that of its ſeveral parts; and ſecond, on the manner in which they are arranged; ſo that the whole may have the following properties, viz. ſtrength, agility, and univerſality; if theſe are properly combined, the machine is perfect. Care muſt be taken that not any one of theſe properties be increaſed by diminiſhing another, but that the whole may be in proportion.

By ſtrength in an army, I do not mean that force which ariſes from numbers, but that which proceeds from the mode in which troops are ranged and armed. This ſtrength muſt be adequate to every purpoſe of war; equally proper to reſiſt or attack an enemy, whether cavalry or infantry, in an open or in a cloſe country.

By agility I mean, the celerity with which an army marches and performs the various motions required in the conduct of a campaign. This property is the moſt eſſential, and cannot be acquired but by continual exerciſe, nor even then, unleſs the original conſtitution of the troops be calculated for a facility of motion.

The firſt problem in Tactics ſhould be this: how a given number of men ought to be ranged, ſo that they may move and act with the greateſt velocity; for on this chiefly depends the ſucceſs of all military operations.

An army ſuperior in activity can always anticipate the motions of a leſs rapid enemy, and bring more men into action than they can in any given point, though inferior in number. This advantage muſt generally prove deciſive, and inſure ſucceſs.

A battle is a changeable ſcene, in which every circumſtance is inſtantaneous and tranſitory, without activity, thoſe favourable opportunities, which always occur in days of action eſcape, and perhaps do not return in twenty campaigns.

By univerſality I mean, that the mode and form in which the troops are ranged, ſhould be equally proper to act in different kinds of ground, and againſt every kind of troops, to attack or defend; becauſe an army once formed into a line, and near the enemy, cannot without much difficulty change the order in which it is formed, or indeed make any motion, but forwards; therefore when any change is required, recourſe muſt be had to the ſecond line or reſerve, and generally without ſucceſs: it is therefore highly neceſſary that the firſt formation of the troops ſhould be ſo general as to be applicable to every particular caſe, and require no change during the action, unleſs in employing more or fewer men againſt any given point.

If

If ſuch are the properties (I mean ſtrength, agility, and univerſality) which render an army perfect, it is evident that the arms made uſe of, the manual exerciſe, and the different evolutions in which the ſoldier is to be inſtructed, ought to be analogous to theſe principles, and whatever is not conformable to them ſhould be exploded as vain and inſignificant at leaſt, if not, as very often happens, dangerous and impracticable.

I know that it is much more eaſy to conceive and point out the principles which ought to guide us in the conſtruction of a machine than to put them in practice; for whatever paſſes through the hands of man participates of his imperfections. We ſhould not however deſpair; if the perfection we aim at is not attainable, to approach it is a great merit, and will in ſome meaſure anſwer the end propoſed.

For want of certain and known principles in the conſtitution of an army, caprice and imitation ſeem to have been our only guides; whence innumerable changes and novelties are continually introduced into our modern armies. Error and folly ſucceed each other like modes and faſhion in dreſs; what is to-day an object of applauſe and admiration, is to-morrow exploded, and ſucceeded by ſome new chimera equally abſurd and tranſient.

A certain great prince, in the courſe of his reign, has undoubtedly performed ſome very extraordinary acts; and therefore our military gentlemen have implicitly adopted the dreſs, exerciſe, evolutions, &c. uſed in his armies; I believe without ſufficiently weighing the matter, or conſidering that the ſucceſs of his operations ought principally to be attributed to his ſituation, as a ſovereign of uncommon abilities at the head of his armies, and to the particular circumſtances of his enemies; advantages which are but rarely com-

bined ſo as to produce that unity and vigour on which ſucceſs in war almoſt intirely depends.

The continual attention paid to the diſcipline of his troops, gives them a facility in manœuvring ſuperior to that of his enemies, which certainly contributed to his victories; his head and heart did the reſt. Mode of dreſs, and a thouſand inſignificant objects with which he torments his army, had nothing to do in the matter. To obviate this phrenzy of imitation, and if poſſible to fix ſome certain principle for the compoſition and direction of an army, is the object of the following diſcourſe.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY.

THE different operations of war, and the variety of the ground in which they are performed, indicate a neceſſity of different ſpecies of arms as well as of troops; accordingly we find at all times armies compoſed of infantry and cavalry, and theſe armed with different kinds of weapons; ſome carried miſſile weapons, others hand-weapons: by miſſile weapons, I mean thoſe inſtruments with which a man throws darts, ſtones, balls, &c. at an enemy when at a certain diſtance. By hand-weapons (I cannot otherwiſe tranſlate what the French call ARME-BLANCHE) I mean thoſe weapons which a man holds in his hand while he ſtrikes the foe with the other end; ſuch as ſwords, pikes, bayonets, &c.

It is needleſs to obſerve that there is a conſtant and invariable connexion, or at leaſt there ought to be, between the ſpecies of arms made uſe of by the troops (infantry or cavalry) and the mode of

of ranging them; becauſe they muſt be formed in ſuch a manner as to be able to manage their arms with advantage: though this principle is ſelf-evident, and eſſentially neceſſary to be obſerved in the compoſition of an army, yet we ſhall find in the ſequel it has been almoſt totally neglected by the moderns.

The miſſile weapons of the antients were extremely weak, if compared with ours; the ſhield was ſufficiently ſtrong to parry, or at leaſt diminiſh their effects; however they were found neceſſary, and generally adopted. It is evident that men armed with miſſile weapons could not be formed into one maſs, or in a deep order of battle, becauſe in that caſe they could not poſſibly have made uſe of their arms with any advantage; they were therefore left to themſelves, that is, they choſe the time, place, and object; and advanced or retreated only upon a general ſignal.

The uſe of ſuch troops was very conſiderable; they could interrupt and harraſs the motions of more maſſive bodies, though for want of conſiſtency and ſtrength they could not break them. No ſpecies of ground could be abſolutely improper for thoſe light troops, and a cloſe country was particularly favourable to them; plains and cavalry were to be avoided; in every other circumſtance they could act with advantage; but cavalry and maſſive bodies could neither move nor act but in plains and open countries.

No army could therefore be complete unleſs it was compoſed of three ſpecies of troops, viz. infantry, cavalry, and light troops; and accordingly we find the antients and moderns have adopted them in the conſtitution of their armies.

Of the antients the Tartars, and all the Aſiatic people, thought that velocity was the peculiar advantage of the cavalry, and that this property might be exerted to advantage; it ſeems they fought pell-mell

pell-mell loosely, A LA DEBONDADE: at least the Roman very often; for we are told that the cavalry dismounted in action, and fought on foot, which they could not have d it been formed into great squadrons, and attacked in a li modern European way.

A CAVALRY thus constituted was of great and general ticularly in pursuing a broken enemy, who were necessari minated, which is now the case with the Tartars and Their extreme activity and velocity prevent all dispositio infantry for a retreat, unless they are favoured by a ver ground, where cannon may be placed. As they move s and in very small bodies, they penetrate every where; road is impervious to them, they in an instant surround the whom they generally cut to pieces.

WE have endeavoured to unite mass and solidity to th of the horse, but I think without success; activity, the property of the horse, is diminished, and almost totally by the mode in which our cavalry is formed; all bodies velocity in proportion to the augmentation of their mass the advantages derived from cavalry and light troops, use of both absolutely necessary, yet as their manner o was neither general nor decisive, the principal force of an thought to consist in a good body of infantry, and with r is properly formed: its operations are, or may be mor solid, and decisive, than those of the other bodies.

ALL troops, I believe, have been formed into s parallelograms; because these are the only figures or which a body of men united can move or act. The ci was used by Cæsar, and which is so much admired by could be proper only when it was surrounded, and co particular spot, which was the case when it was used by

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CHAPTER III.

OF THE PHALANX.

THE Greeks ranged their infantry in a maſs called a phalanx; it conſiſted of about 16,000 men; whether it was a ſquare or an oblong figure is not material. This maſs moved and acted in one body, when the nature of the ground permitted: neceſſity only made them divide it into ſmaller ſections. It is evident,

FIRST, That ſuch a maſs could be armed only with hand-weapons, becauſe none but the foremoſt ranks could poſſibly make uſe of any other, and even of theſe with little effect, the whole maſs being formed in a cloſe order with ſmall if any intervals.

SECOND, The leaſt inequality of the ground interrupted, or totally ſuſpended its motions, and conſequently by driving the phalanx into broken ground, and avoiding its ſhock and impulſe, any troops formed upon more active principles would ſoon throw it into confuſion, break and defeat it. The phalanx vanquiſhed the Perſians, becauſe they, confiding in their numbers, fought in plains; they were indeed likewiſe vanquiſhed by the Romans; but that was becauſe the legion was formed on more active principles than thoſe which modelled the Aſiatic armies.

HENCE it is that no maſſive bodies, ſuch as a phalanx, or the column propoſed by Folard, can act or defend themſelves againſt much ſmaller numbers armed with muſkets, and that the uſe of miſſile weapons is incompatible with every deep and maſſive order.

The advantages of maſſive bodies ariſe from their natural weight and ſtrength, and from the hand-weapons which they muſt neceſſarily uſe: the foremoſt ranks preſſed by thoſe behind are forced to advance; the ſlain and wounded are inſtantly ſucceeded, and though the number is diminiſhed, the front is equally cloſed and extended, and the action is proſecuted with the ſame vigour, ſo that if the ground permits them to act at all, they muſt act with ſucceſs when they can approach the enemy.

The uſe of hand-weapons brings the men ſo cloſe together, that no alternative is left but to die or conquer. Hence the victories of the antients were ſo complete and deciſive, that a battle or two concluded a war.

The length of the Peloponneſian and Punic wars aroſe from other cauſes, which we ſhall explain hereafter. The phalanx could not abandon its original inſtitution, nor deviate from the line on which it acted to purſue a broken enemy; this was left to the cavalry and light infantry, which generally did the buſineſs ſo effectually that few eſcaped.

The Grecian cavalry ſeems to have been good, but ſmall in number. The country in general was improper for cavalry, and beſides as it was divided into a great number of ſtates, the territories of the contending powers were too contracted to admit of a numerous cavalry. Their wars were confined to excurſions of a few days, and produced rather ſkirmiſhes than battles. The weaker kept within the walls of the capital; the ſtronger ravaged the ſmall dominions and retired; and thus ended the campaign.

In the courſe of the Peloponneſian war, ſo well deſcribed by Thucydides, which laſted above twenty years, no great battle was fought, which was the cauſe of its duration; and the face of the country

country was such, that an enemy could not be forced into action: to this we may add, that the armies on both sides were composed of confederates, which necessarily weakened or destroyed their own activity and vigour.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE LEGION.

THIS body of men formed a complete army; it was composed of heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry, armed with missile and hand-weapons; it was ranged like our troops in a rectangle, the more extended faces of which fronted the enemy. The legionary infantry was placed in the center, the cavalry on the wings, and the archers and slingers were distributed along the front of the line, and fought where they could, without interfering with the heavy infantry. They were very active in a day of battle, often mixed with the cavalry, and supported it, let no opportunity escape where they could annoy the enemy; very unlike the light troops in Germany, who generally disappear on a day of battle, and very often cannot be collected in two or three days after.

MONTECUCULI says, that it is absolutely necessary to intermix small detachments of forty or fifty foot with the horse, and that at the battle of Saint Gothard fought upon the Theisse, in Hungary, against the Turks, these detachments contributed much to his victory.

I AM so far persuaded of the utility of this method, that I am surprized it is not generally adopted, because a company of foot may be formed in such a manner as to oppose cavalry with success in a plain, as we shall shew hereafter.

THE legionary infantry were ranged nine or ten men deep. Authors vary on this point, which is not material. Each man had three feet ſquare to act in, that he might uſe his arms offenſive and defenſive with advantage. The ſubdiviſions of the legion correſponded exactly with our brigades. I do not know how their cavalry was formed, whether in great or ſmall diviſions, though I believe in the latter, nor in how many ranks. It ſeems they fought in ſmall parties of about thirty or forty men, and in four ranks, but on this point I am not certain.

THE infantry being formed nine or ten men deep, a Roman army of equal ſtrength with a modern one, occupied only a third part of the ground which is requiſite for the latter: it follows, that the motions of the whole line were more rapid in that proportion. The nature likewiſe of their arms did not require that the action ſhould be at all interrupted; conſequently a battle was begun, proſecuted, and concluded, in leſs time than ten of our battalions would take to paſs in review on Wimbledon-Common. The advantage of the phalanx was in its impulſe and ſhock only, that of the legion in its activity, ſufficient ſtrength and ſuperiority to the phalanx in velocity, the legion prevailed over the phalanx, and every other arrangement.

I AGREE with the illuſtrious and ſagacious Polybius, that the legion was the moſt perfect order then known, or perhaps that can be invented. It was ſtrong, and formed for activity, analogous to the arms it bore, and therefore was ſo far perfect; yet in the diſtribution of the whole, it had, I think, one capital defect common to the phalanx, and to our modern armies. Its cavalry was placed on the wings of the infantry; indeed it could not be otherwiſe in the Grecian order. This I preſume is a very great defect, and I think I ſhall prove it in the ſequel of this work. The cavalry thus diſpoſed was too weak, ſo that it could not act an independent part; and

property, ſtrength, in an eminent degree. The legion was likewiſe well armed, and was both ſtrong and active; but as we obſerved before, it was defective in the arrangement of the whole: the cavalry placed on the wings could not ſupport, nor be ſupported by the infantry.

We can by no means determine whether or not our troops are properly ranged, till we have carefully examined the nature and effects of fire-arms, which are now the only weapons made uſe of by the infantry. The ſword is a uſeleſs burthen to the ſoldier; and therefore it ought to be rejected.

Our fire arms are certainly ſuperior to the miſſile weapons of the antients; and if we conſider only their force, and the facility with which they are managed, it will appear ſurprizing that whole armies are not totally deſtroyed in a few hours: it is certain, however, that the muſket is by no means ſo dangerous and fatal as the ſword and pike. When the infantry was armed with theſe they came neceſſarily to cloſe fight; the greater part of the vanquiſhed, and many of the victors were of courſe ſlain or wounded, and the victory was more deciſive; for a regular retreat was impoſſible. But the uſe of miſſile weapons and fire-arms has introduced a new mode of waging war, leſs bloody and deciſive. A conſiderable diſtance generally intervenes between the two armies during a great part of the action, and ſometimes during the whole; for the two lines very rarely join, and engage with ſwords and bayonets. This reciprocal ſituation enables the whole, or any part of an army frequently to change its poſition, or quit the field entirely, as circumſtances may require, without difficulty or danger, and with little loſs.

A muskET, and every ſpecies of fire-arms, are the moſt delicate inſtruments of war, and moſt uncertain in their effects. Independent of the quantity and quality of the powder, the manner of loading

CHAPTER V.

OF THE MODERN INSTITUTION OF AN ARMY.

CUSTOM is a tyrant, who governs mankind with more deſpotic ſway than an Eaſtern monarch. To oppoſe *him* is treaſon and rebellion. An opinion, well or ill founded, is not to be irradicated by any direct argument; it can only be extirpated by time, and favourable circumſtances. The modern philoſophy, though for the moſt part founded on mathematical principles, has not in the courſe of more than a century been able to expel entirely the dreams and viſions of Plato and Ariſtotle. It is no leſs odious than difficult to convince a man he is in the wrong, and that his opinions are abſurd. Few have inclination to inveſtigate their grounds; and ſtill fewer have the capacity to inveſtigate them effectually. Hence they prefer travelling in the known path, to the trouble of enquiring after a new one. In matters of religion and politics, I ſhould not hazard any new opinion, becauſe true or falſe it might produce doubt and diſcord, which a good ſubject ought to avoid. Peace and harmony ſhould be the guide and principles of his actions; but in military affairs my errors can do no harm; they will be treated with contempt and vaniſh. I have therefore only to requeſt the reader to examine impartially what I ſhall ſay on this important ſubject, before he pronounces judgment on my labours.

WE have already ſhewn, that the mode in which a body of men, whether infantry or cavalry, is formed, ought to be analogous to the ſpecies of arms they carry, and that the whole machine ſhould be ſtrong, active, and univerſally adapted to every operation of war. The phalanx was properly armed, and poſſeſſed the firſt property,

property, ſtrength, in an eminent degree. The legion was likewiſe well armed, and was both ſtrong and active; but as we obſerved before, it was defective in the arrangement of the whole: the cavalry placed on the wings could not ſupport, nor be ſupported by the infantry.

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A muskET, and every ſpecies of fire-arms, are the moſt delicate inſtruments of war, and moſt uncertain in their effects. Independent of the quantity and quality of the powder, the manner of loading

loading the piece, the ſtate of the atmoſphere, the agitation of the ſoldier, &c. cauſe ſuch variations in the direction of the piece, as renders its effect very uncertain; inſomuch, that by calculation it appears, that not above one ſhot in four hundred takes place. The diſtance between the two armies, and the uncertainty of the effects of fire-arms, are the cauſes why our battles are never deciſive; few are ſlain, and the remainder have time to retire. Wars are not now as formerly terminated by battles, and complete victories. An army, though much inferior in number to the enemy, and even in point of goodneſs, when commanded by an able leader, will occupy ſome advantageous poſt, ſtop the progreſs of the mighty and victorious for years, till victor and vanquiſhed are almoſt equally exhauſted and ruined, and peace is become neceſſary to both parties, for want of means to proſecute the war. Hence, in our days, no kingdoms are overturned, no nation is enſlaved. The ſubject alone feels the weight and calamities of war. The monarch, ignorant of their miſeries, ſits down in peace, enjoys his pleaſures, regardleſs of the ultimate event, becauſe it ſeldom affects his throne. He makes war or peace to gratify his own caprice, or that of a favourite.

If the natural defects of fire-arms are ſuch, and ſo many, that a good markſman, left entirely to himſelf, cannot once in ten times hit an object placed at any conſiderable diſtance, what can be expected from an ordinary ſoldier in the ranks, preſſed before, behind, and on every ſide, his motions continually interrupted by thoſe of his comrades; agitated by the cries of the dying, and by the terror of death floating before his eyes, himſelf and the object he aims at, if any, in perpetual motion? Very little can be expected from this man, as we have already ſhewn. When to all this you add the motions of the horſe, it will appear evident that fire-arms, excepting a pair of piſtols, when the enemy is near, are totally incompatible with cavalry, as well as with all maſſive bodies; becauſe

cauſe neither can uſe them with advantage. It is difficult, and perhaps impoſſible to find out a method to range the infantry, ſo as to make uſe of fire-arms with any degree of ſucceſs. If it is formed of ſeveral ranks, three or more deep, and likewiſe with the ranks and files cloſe, as is now the mode, they cannot make uſe of their arms; and if formed in few ranks, with ranks and files open, they cannot fire at all; and being thus diſunited, they can neither move nor act for want of ſtrength. On the whole, therefore, it ſeems impoſſible to range a body of men armed with muſkets ſo that they may have the properties required, viz. ſtrength, activity, and univerſality. Theſe difficulties have obliged the moderns to try ſeveral methods to diminiſh them, by introducing different manners of firing. Some have thought it was beſt to fire by ranks, others by files, as platoons, diviſions, &c. Count St. Germain, in a valuable treatiſe publiſhed ſince his death, rejects both methods, and propoſes it ſhould be done by ſingle files, beginning at the right or left. The firing by ranks, if you begin with the laſt, then the ſecond, and firſt ſucceſſively, is undoubtedly the moſt ſimple mode of any, and the leaſt ſubject to difficulties and confuſion. The laſt rank having fired falls back three ſteps, the ſecond one, and the firſt remaining in their place. Then they cloſe the ranks, and begin with their third rank as before, advancing gradually ten or twenty paces, and then halt to fire as before. The platoon firing, eſpecially if done in ſmall diviſions, does not continue two minutes, it is all confuſion, to which the noiſe of the officers in giving command does not a little contribute. The method propoſed by St. Germain is ſubject to the ſame and greater difficulties. Whence it appears that a muſket, and indeed every other ſpecies of miſſile weapon, can be uſed with advantage only by men placed ſingly. The firing by ranks in the manner propoſed approaches the neareſt to it, and therefore ought to be preferred to all others. It might be continued for ſeveral hours regularly, and without any interruption or confuſion, which cannot be done in any other method. I do not

propoſe

propoſe this method as perfect; I believe it is impoſſible to find any that is not ſubject to numberleſs difficulties. This ſeems to me to have fewer than others.

In whatever manner the troops are ranged, and in whatever manner they fire, it is certain the effect is confined within a very narrow compaſs. When the ground between you and the enemy is very cloſe, ſo that they cannot approach you without much difficulty, or not at all, then indeed, the uſe of fire-arms is indiſpenſible, and very advantageous; the enemy muſt overcome the obſtacles which they throw in his way, and which hinder him from making any great uſe of his arms, while yours are more or leſs covered, are fired with eaſe, and generally with ſucceſs. But when the enemy can and will approach you, which he ought to do if he attacks, it is evident that the uſe of the muſket ceaſes, and the combat muſt be finiſhed by ſome other weapon, unleſs your troops are frightened, and run away before the enemy approaches.

From theſe premiſes I draw two concluſions: 1ſt. That the muſket is not adequate to all the purpoſes of war: 2d. That the uſe of fire-arms is particularly adapted to a defenſive war. In a plain and open country, where the enemy's cavalry or infantry can approach you, fire-arms ſoon become uſeleſs; and in a cloſe country you can find a thouſand ſtrong camps, which neither cavalry nor infantry can approach without much difficulty: then fire-arms are of infinite uſe, and the only arms which can be of any ſervice.

But, as in war, it is neceſſary to attack as well as defend; and it was found that the muſket was proper only for the latter, and that every inſtitution would be imperfect, unleſs a troop was armed with hand weapons as well as miſſile; we have attempted to unite the advantages of both by adding the bayonets, but without ſucceſs: for the whole is too ſhort and cumberſome as a hand weapon, and the bayonet ſerves only to render the uſe of the muſket more difficult, and its effects leſs certain.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DEFECTS OF MISSILE AND HAND WEAPONS.

LET us examine and compare the advantages and defects of miſſile and hand weapons: this will lead us to conclude, that both are abſolutely neceſſary to form the inſtitution of a complete body of men. Fire-arms are calculated for a defenſive war, and to keep the enemy at a diſtance, which prevents a total overthrow; but are of no uſe when he can approach you.

HAND-WEAPONS, on the contrary, can be of no uſe at a diſtance; but are abſolutely neceſſary when the armies approach each other. The former are proper for a cloſe country, the latter for an open one. The effects of the one are precarious and undeciſive; thoſe of the latter certain and complete. The muſket is the reſource of prudence and weakneſs; hand-weapons are the arms of valor and vigor.

AN able general, at the head of troops armed with fire-arms, though inferior in number to the enemy, may protract a war many years, and finally prevail over a leſs able leader; which cannot be effected if the armies carry hand-weapons: for they muſt neceſſarily ſoon come to an action, and that action muſt, from the nature of the arms, be deciſive: hence the art of war, among the ancients, was ſimple and deciſive; and hence it is complicated and ſcientific among the moderns.

THE art of war of the ancients was confined to what we call evolution, directed to the purpoſe of fighting only, which they conſidered as the ſole means of finiſhing a war. In ſhort, their whole attention was directed to diſcipline, to the exerciſe of the troops, and to the field of battle.

BUT we ſtudy camps, poſitions, and lines: our plans of operations are very extenſive, and often embrace a hundred leagues, which we cover by occupying a given poſition: thoſe of the ancients were contracted and confined within a narrow compaſs; ſeek the enemy, and fight him, was their favorite military maxim: they did not ſeem to think it poſſible to protract a war by ſkilful manœuvres: accordingly, their wars were of very ſhort duration, unleſs ſome exterior circumſtances, ariſing from the nature of the ground, that of the troops, and finally, from the different political ſyſtems of the contending parties, tended to protract them; which we have ſhown to be the caſe in the Peloponneſian war, and which, we ſhall hereafter ſee, was the cauſe that made the Punic wars ſo long.

THE principles of an active and defenſive war were little known to the ancients. Jugurtha and Sertorius ſeem to have been the only generals of antiquity who underſtood and practiſed them: but none of theſe wars can be compared, for vigor and activity, with the late war in Germany; in which more battles were fought in two campaigns, than in any century among the ancients.

THE reſult was very different from the uſual effect of ancient wars. A great part of the globe changed maſters during the ſixth century of the Roman republic; whereas the empire of Germany remained in its former ſtate, at the peace of Hubertſburg: this difference aroſe, we think, entirely from that of the ancient and modern

modern arms, and conſequently from the different mode of conducting a war.

We are often obliged to act a defenſive part to cover and protect an immenſe tract of country againſt a ſuperior enemy: prudence requires that we ſhould avoid a general action; and when we think it adviſeable to riſk one, aided as we are with fire-arms, a thouſand ſtrong camps may be found where we may engage an enemy with advantage.

A given poſition will enable a good general to harraſs and check the progreſs of an enemy during a whole campaign, whereas the ancients, armed with hand-weapons, came ſo near each other, that it was almoſt impoſſible to avoid a general action, which, from the nature of their arms, was deciſive.

Fabius, aided by a very cloſe and mountainous country, with difficulty protracted one campaign without coming to a battle, becauſe Hannibal's forces conſiſted chiefly in cavalry, which, in ſuch a country, could not act with advantage.

The reſult of what I have ſaid is, that an army armed with fire-arms only, is ſlow in its motions, and undeciſive in its actions; it is characterized with ſcience and art, and particularly adapted to a defenſive war.

Troops, armed with hand-weapons, are rapid in their motions, and deciſive in their actions; leſs ſcientific than the former, but ſingularly proper for an attack.

It ſeems, therefore, that to render an army perfect, and adequate to every purpoſe of war, it ſhould be provided with both kinds of weapons.

If one ſpecies of arms cannot be made ſo as to ſerve the purpoſe of a muſket and a hand-weapon, which I believe is the caſe, a body of men muſt be ſo formed as to manage both kinds of arms; or, finally, different bodies of men armed differently, muſt be ranged in ſuch a manner that they can aid and ſupport each other. We ſhall examine this theory hereafter. How far modern armies are endowed with the perfection we aim at, will appear in the courſe of our inveſtigation. I beg the reader's pardon for having dwelt ſo long on this ſubject, and for having uſed ſo many repetitions; but I conſider what I have been advancing as the foundation of all tactics, which alone can offer us ſome certain and fixed principles to form and conduct an army: I hope, therefore, and recommend to all military men, that what has been ſaid in this chapter may be examined and weighed with the attention it deſerves.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS.

The moderns have adopted the muſket as an univerſal weapon, and, of courſe, endeavoured to range the infantry relatively to its form and uſe; but without ſucceſs: for we have already proved, that a body of men, ranged three deep, cannot make uſe of fire-arms with advantage, which the experience of every battle, and the millions of ſhot fired without effect, prove to a demonſtration. Beſides, this mode of ranging the troops is attended with many inconveniencies, and is ſubject to ſome capital defects.

First,

FIRST, A line of three ranks wants ſtrength: it cannot withſtand the ſhock either of horſe or foot, if the former act with vigor, and if the latter are formed on more ſolid principles, and are properly armed. This extreme weakneſs is the cauſe that two or three battalions cannot advance half a mile on a plain, on a day of review, without floating: one part or other always projects; and you are forced to ſtop continually to rectify the line, and make it proceed regularly.

SECOND, This very thin order neceſſarily obliges you to extend the front, whoſe motions become more difficult in proportion; and activity, the moſt eſſential quality an army can poſſeſs, is entirely loſt.

A LINE, conſiſting of thirty battalions and fifty ſquadrons, occupies five or ſix miles from one end to the other. It is eaſy to conceive, that however open the country may be, ſo extenſive a line muſt move with great ſlowneſs and difficulty; and if the ground is cloſe, and interſected with hedges, ravins, &c. it can neither move nor act at all; and the whole is continually ſtopped, ſometimes for many hours, before you can advance a ſingle mile: and when at length you come near the enemy, your attacks are weak and partial, confined to ſome particular points, which are often not the moſt favorable: whereas a general effort ſhould be made againſt the enemy's whole front, while at the ſame time particular ones are carried on againſt thoſe parts which offer the greateſt advantages.

THE ſlowneſs of your march gives the enemy time to prepare themſelves for your reception, to change their poſition, or to retire ſo prudently, that theſe mighty preparations finiſh in a few inconſiderable ſkirmiſhes.

IT

It matters not how numerous an army is, unleſs, by ſuperior activity and diſpoſition, you can and do bring more men into action againſt the different points you attack, than the enemy can oppoſe to you.

It was to this advantage only that the king of Pruſſia owed many of his victories in the laſt war; for his army, except at the battle of Prague, was always inferior to thoſe of his enemies: add to this, that ſuch an extenſive line muſt neceſſarily have many weak parts from unfavorable ground, of which an able general will avail himſelf, and attack you there with advantage.

Finally, your diſpoſition being once made, it muſt be proſecuted, and the line muſt advance on its original track; for its extreme length and natural flowneſs do not permit any alteration to be made near the enemy, however neceſſary it might be; and if a brigade or a regiment is thrown into confuſion, the whole line muſt ſtop; and if ſome remedy is not inſtantly applied, drawn from the ſecond line, the battle is loſt: for the enemy penetrates through the interval, attacks your army, thus cut in two, on both flanks, and beats you; which happened exactly in this manner at the battle of Prague, as we ſhall relate hereafter. Much more might be ſaid to prove, that the modern method of ranging the infantry three deep, renders it totally defective in two eſſential properties—ſtrength and activity.

This method of ranging the infantry three deep is likewiſe ſo far from rendering it univerſally proper for all operations of war, that it can march in that order only in a plain, at the riſk of being cut to pieces by a reſolute cavalry, or by infantry formed on more ſolid and active principles; and it can fight only, when covered by a ſtrong country, by intrenchments, &c. where an enemy can approach it with difficulty: ſo that, upon the whole, it ſeems defective

tive in three points, viz. ſtrength, activity, and univerſality; in which we think the perfection of an army, and indeed of every machine, doth principally conſiſt. This we give as our opinion only, without the leaſt pretenſions to infallibility: let the more able examine and decide.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE CAVALRY.

THOUGH I have not ſerved in the cavalry, yet, as I have ſeveral times commanded conſiderable detachments of horſe, I hope it will not be thought impertinent, if I preſume to give my opinion upon this ſubject.

CAVALRY are generally, like the Infantry, ranged three deep, and armed with muſkets, piſtols, and ſwords. The difficulty with which the infantry manage the muſket, proves that the cavalry cannot uſe it at all, particularly the two laſt ranks.

THE Huſſars, and ſuch troops as generally act ſingly, may be permitted to continue the uſe of muſkets; but thoſe who are formed and ranged to act in a maſs, and ſword in hand, ought not to carry them, becauſe they are expenſive, troubleſome, and totally uſeleſs.

IT will be objected, that if the cavalry do not carry a muſket, a few Huſſars, or other troops who do, will be able to harraſs, and perhaps

perhaps beat double the number of the beſt cavalry, who can neither remain quiet on the ſpot, nor purſue in a line; the only method they have in acting againſt a ſcattered and light enemy. The muſket, therefore, is neceſſary in the cavalry.

THIS argument appears plauſible; but in fact has, in my humble opinion, little weight: for whether they carry muſkets, or not, they will loſe their labour if ever they pretend to ſkirmiſh with the light horſe; their men and horſes will be harraſſed; and they will be finally beat back to their line, from which they ought never to depart.

CAVALRY neither can, nor ought to fight but with ſword in hand; when the ground, or the troops they contend with, do not permit this to be done, they muſt be kept back, or elſe mixed with ſtrong detachments of infantry, formed in ſuch a manner as to be able to reſiſt the charge of the enemy's cavalry; of courſe the muſket muſt be laid aſide.

THE ranging of the cavalry three deep is intended, no doubt, to enable them to reſiſt the ſhock of an enemy; but as we have ſaid before, they ought not at any time to wait for the ſhock, becauſe even a light and weak cavalry, on full gallop, will break through any line of horſe, however maſſive, if it waits the ſhock.

THE ranks being cloſed, the firſt overthrown, neceſſarily falls on the ſecond, this on the third, and ſo on; and the whole runs away: but if the ranks were kept at ſome diſtance from one another, when the firſt was broken, the ſecond might advance and attack the enemy, already checked and in diſorder, and eaſily put them to flight. But being formed, ranks and files cloſed, there is no remedy at all for a diſaſter, except from the ſecond line or reſerve, as in the infantry:

infantry: and even this reſource will fail of ſucceſs, if the enemy purſues his advantages with vigour. For the firſt line will probably throw the ſecond alſo into confuſion, becauſe there are not ſufficient openings in the ſecond for the firſt to paſs through, which there ought to be: then indeed the ſecond line, on ſeeing the firſt in confuſion, ought to advance ſword in hand, and might thus probably gain an eaſy victory. The broken line in the mean time recollects itſelf, and forms again behind the ſecond, which is now become the firſt.

THE ſword is too ſhort, and particularly, as the ſoldier is taught to ſit with long ſtirrups; he kills the horſe by a dead weight, always bearing without intermiſſion on the ſame parts: this may be graceful for aught I know, but it is very oppreſſive to the horſe, and hinders the man from reaching the enemy. Piſtols are neceſſary in caſe the man loſes his ſword, that he may not remain totally defenceleſs.

PEOPLE talk very much of the ſhock of the cavalry. If they mean that two horſes puſh each other, and ſtrike with their breaſts, which the French, who abound in unmeaning words, call COUP DE POITRAIL, it is an abſurdity; for the head and neck being projected in a right line before the horſe's breaſt, it is impoſſible to ſtrike with it; ſomething, however, conſiderable is, and may be done, when a ſquadron either waits for, or encounters another.

THE horſes being puſhed on vigorouſly, and finding themſelves checked by the head of thoſe in front, endeavour to paſs between them; and in ſuch caſe, it is certain that the cavalry, which moves with the greateſt velocity, whatever may be the oppoſite maſs, will undoubtedly penetrate and overthrow it. Hence it is that velocity is every thing in the cavalry; if you are deficient in this, your

cavalry is not worth keeping. I ſaw once an example of this kind during the laſt war near Gourlitz in Luſitatia.

ZIETHEN's regiment of huſſars fell in with the Auſtrian carabineers, and was repulſed; but on ſeeing the king's army arrive they rallied, attacked the carabineers (who imprudently waited quietly on the ſpot) broke them, drove ſome hundreds into a moraſs, where they were killed or made priſoners in ſight of the Auſtrian vanguard, conſiſting of eight or ten thouſand men, who could not relieve them; for the action laſted only a few minutes.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE.

BY order of battle, I mean the diſtribution of the different ſpecies of troops of which an army is compoſed, not including thoſe which paſs under the denomination of light troops, as they never enter the line.

IN general, the whole is ranged in two or more lines; becauſe, firſt, the being formed only in three ranks, it would take up ſo much ground, that it would be impoſſible to range or manage a numerous army. Secondly, to ſupply the defects and weakneſs of the firſt line, by ſupporting it, and replacing the whole or any part of it, which may be broken and thrown into diſorder, by the ſecond.

THE cavalry and infantry form ſeparate bodies; the former are generaliy placed on the flanks of the latter.

THE

THE perfection of an order of battle conſiſts, as we apprehend, firſt, in placing each body of men, where they can act with moſt advantage. Secondly, in bodies of different ſpecies, being ſo placed as to be able to ſupport each other that the victory may be complete; otherwiſe it often happens, that while your cavalry are victorious, the infantry are beat, and the battle loſt, or vice verſa. Thirdly, in your armies being ſo ranged as to be univerſally adapted to different ſpecies of ground, ſo as to require no material alteration in marching up to the enemy, or during the action.

FIRST, It is evident, that if the cavalry are placed on the flanks of the infantry, they can neither ſupport, nor be ſupported by it, which diſpoſition I therefore conceive is a moſt capital defect.

SECOND, Both in marching, camping, and fighting, it may and generally does happen, that the infantry and cavalry are placed on improper ground, where, however, they muſt ſo remain; becauſe it is in general impoſſible to change the original diſpoſition; therefore, upon the whole, it ſeems deficient in all the points, which conſtitute a ſolid and active order of battle.

MOREOVER, as both lines are formed in a cloſe order, if the firſt is broke and vigorouſly purſued, it overthrows the ſecond for want of ſufficient openings. This cannot advance with celerity, and in a firm order to ſtop the enemy; ſo that both generally go off together, and the battle is loſt. Whereas, if at leaſt the ſecond line had intervals to let the firſt paſs through them, and at the ſame time advanced in good order, while the enemy is in ſome degree of confuſion, they would not only check them, but probably would gain an eaſy victory.

THE reaſon given for placing the cavalry on the wings is, to protect the flanks of the infantry, which I think is the moſt abſurd

ſurd reaſon that can be alledged, becauſe this may in a moment fortify its flanks againſt infantry or cavalry, by forming a ſquare or a column, which the cavalry cannot do; its flanks are naturally ſo weak, that they offer no kind of defence.

M. ST. GERMAIN, in a work publiſhed ſince his death, for this very reaſon adviſes, that the cavalry ſhould camp behind the infantry, becauſe, ſays he, if it is attacked in the night, it is totally defeated before it can be put in a ſtate of defence.

NUMBERS, beyond a certain point, can add nothing to the force of an army, unleſs they can be made to act together; they increaſe its inactivity, and render it altogether unmanageable. By thus ſeparating the cavalry from the infantry, it very ſeldom happens that they can be brought to act in a proper place, and in a proper moment: they really, in a day of action, form two different armies, and act ſeparately, and very indirectly contribute, if at all, to the ſupport and ſucceſs of each other.

IF either is beat, the other muſt fall back and retire: whereas if they were formed on other principles, the whole muſt be vanquiſhed, or none, becauſe they would form only one army, though compoſed of different ſpecies of troops, and mutually ſupport each other.

BEFORE I conclude this diſcourſe, I muſt, firſt, beg leave to recapitulate, briefly, what we have ſaid, that the reader may ſee it at one view, and be enabled to examine and form a clear judgment of it. Secondly, to give a deſcription of a battle, which will corroborate and illuſtrate the opinions and arguments that I have endeavoured to eſtabliſh.

FIRST, The general uſe of fire-arms, and of every kind of miſſile weapons, is not adapted to all the various operations of war, but is ſinguarly

ſingularly proper for a defenſive war, and conſequently for a cloſe country, where the troops being covered and protected by the obſtacles which ſuch a country offers, the enemy can with difficulty approach you.

SECONDLY, That the uſe of miſſile weapons has rendered the art of war much more ſcientific than it was among the ancients, when it was confined chiefly to the arrangement of the troops, the exerciſe, and evolutions: what we call manœuvres, on an extenſive line, ſeem to have been little known to them; and fighting was the only method adopted by them for finiſhing a war, which the nature of their arms ſoon brought to a concluſion.

THIRDLY, That our battles neither are nor can be deciſive, and may be conſidered rather as great ſkirmiſhes than general actions, very few being ſlain in compariſon with what happened when hand-weapons alone were uſed.

FOURTHLY, Though our infantry were formed three deep, with a view to the muſket they carry; yet can they make but a very imperfect uſe of it, and the cavalry cannot uſe it at all.

FIFTHLY, That by forming both infantry and cavalry in three ranks, they are too weak to march with firmneſs and conſiſtence, to attack or defend themſelves againſt troops formed on more ſolid and active principles.

SIXTHLY, This method of forming the troops neceſſarily lengthens the line, ſo that it cannot march with any velocity in a plain, much leſs in a cloſe country.

SEVENTHLY, That a line of five or ſix miles, does of courſe meet with improper ground for the kind of troops which may happen

pen to be placed there; yet no alteration can be made in the line, however neceſſary it may be.

EIGHTHLY, That the whole front muſt advance together, which renders it totally inactive, and gives the enemy time to take their meaſures for fighting or retreating at their pleaſure, which reduces the battle to an inconſiderable ſkirmiſh.

NINTHLY, That the general cannot poſſibly ſee and conduct all the operations of ſuch an extenſive line, ſo that, by the neglect, ignorance, or malice of the officers under his command, the action is always very imperfectly carried on, and fails of ſucceſs in more than one point; which may render that of the other attacks uſeleſs. It wants, in ſhort, unity of action and activity in the execution.

TENTHLY, To prevent the line from being protracted without end, we are obliged to form ſeveral; ſo that if we conſider the few men who act together in the firſt, and that none at all act in the others, unleſs ſucceſſively, and when it is commonly too late; we ſhall find, that not a ſixth part of the army is engaged at one time, and of that ſixth part not one, perhaps, at the moſt eligible point of attack or defence.

ALL theſe defects, and many more which could be enumerated, proceed originally from our making the muſket the general inſtrument; and from our adapting both the formation of the troops, and order of battle to that inſtrument, as we have clearly proved in the preceding chapters.

OF A BATTLE.

I CAN no way better expoſe the defects of our military arrangements, than by relating in a few words, how this great machine, an army, is brought into action, how a battle is fought and concluded,

cluded, and what are, in general, its conſequences, which I have ſeen in the courſe of ſeveral campaigns.

AFTER many marches and counter-marches, which often take up the moſt favourable part of a campaign, a battle is at length reſolved on: all thoſe who are informed of this reſolution, and too many always are, put themſelves in motion to ſolicit ſome command, or to carry the news of the expected victory; in obtaining which favour and intrigue generally prevail, to the prejudice of the truly brave and deſerving officer.

SEVERAL days are employed in examining the poſition of the enemy, which might be done in five minutes; for a general who cannot, in one inſtant of time, ſee and determine the manner of attacking any camp, is unworthy to command an army: during ſuch delay, the enemy prepare themſelves to receive you, fortify themſelves, change their poſition, or retire; ſo that you have freſh and great difficulties to encounter, or perhaps you loſe your labour, and muſt follow the enemy to ſeek another opportunity, which may not offer in a whole campaign; eſpecially if under an able general, who wiſhes to avoid an action.

THE mode of attacking is at length fixed, which, ten to one, muſt be altered, becauſe the enemy, while you loſe your time in preparing yourſelf, have materially altered their poſition. If you are not apprized of this in time, and you march up to them, your original diſpoſition is loſt, and you are unable to form another that may be proper to anſwer the preſent circumſtances, which may require that your cavalry or infantry ſhould change the ground, and replace each other. Nothing of this can be executed before the enemy, without offering your flanks, and conſequently expoſing yourſelf to a total defeat. When any alteration in the order of battle is required, it ſhould be done a day or two before you quit your

your camp, otherwiſe ſuch confuſion will enſue as cannot be remedied.

THE battle of Lignitz, in 1760, was loſt, and the brave Laudhon ſacrificed to malice or ignorance, becauſe the quarter-maſter general of M. Daun's army would, the evening before the battle, change entirely the original order of battle withou any apparent reaſon. The conſequence was, that the main army arrived upon the ground about ten hours too late, when we found Laudhon had been well beat, and the king ready to receive us; but as our original plan was fruſtrated, we could not form another, though we had ſufficient time, and though with Laudhon's army we were above twenty thouſand men ſtronger than the enemy, whom we permitted to continue his march to the Oder unmoleſted: the reader will pardon this digreſſion.

THE different brigades of artillery generally precede the columns, to favour their developement; that is, to prevent the enemy from oppoſing the forming of the line, and becauſe the general and the ſoldier think nothing can be done without it, though in truth it produces more noiſe than any real advantage. This prodigious train of cannon, and its concomitants, continually ſtop and retard the march of the troops by ſome accident or other, ſo that ſeldom or ever they arrive together, and in time, on the ground where the line is to be formed.

THIS is a very critical moment, if the enemy knew how to avail himſelf of it: for if he is perfectly acquainted with the ground between his camp, and that which you have left, he will know all the roads by which you march, and conſequently by advancing to meet you, in order of battle, he can attack the heads of your columns, and defeat them all ſingly, without giving them an opportunity of ever forming the line, in the ſame manner as one attacks a rear-

a rear-guard: but happily for you, he confides in the ſtrength of his poſt, and ſuffers you to do what you pleaſe.

His army is like a ſet of china-ware on a chimney-piece, it muſt not be touched or moved, for fear of breaking it: after three or four hours cannonading and ſkirmiſhing your army is formed, and advances towards the enemy preceded by the artillery, which retards the march very much, and occaſions the loſs of many men, which could be avoided by marching rapidly to the enemy.

Supposing the army conſiſts of ſixty thouſand men, the firſt line will occupy five or ſix miles; in this extent of ground a thouſand obſtacles both by art and nature occur, which neceſſarily retard your progreſs, becauſe the whole line muſt advance together; for if ſome parts precede at any, though ſmall diſtances, the others, a vigilant enemy, by marching rapidly through the intervals, cuts your army aſunder, takes you in flank and gains the battle; which ſo happened exactly at the battle of Prague.

To avoid ſuch an inconvenience, by keeping your army together, and advancing in a line parallel to that of the enemy, you are ſometimes ſeveral hours in getting over a mile of ground, which ought to be executed in a few minutes. If by the firmneſs of your troops, and the inactivity of your enemy, you come up with him, and ſucceed in one or two points of attack only, the battle is won, though perhaps only two or three battalions have been diſplaced; and if you fail in what you ſuppoſe the principal attack, you retire almoſt unpurſued, and you have loſt the battle.

In the former caſe, the enemy has no reſource in his firſt line, which can make no movement but forwards or backwards; ſo that if you can maintain yourſelf on the ground you have gained, the

enemy retires ſucceſſively, and goes off. This is a critical moment alſo, if the enemy knew what to do.

If inſtead of endeavouring to regain the points loſt, he advanced part of his ſecond line to prevent your going farther, and oblige you to bring the greateſt part of your forces to maintain the ground gained, which is generally done; and if with the reſt of his army he made ſome conſiderable effort on the reſt of your line, in all probability he would ſucceed, and force you by this means to relinquiſh the advantages you had gained to prevent this part of your army from being cut off, which would certainly happen, if any other part of your line was driven back and defeated: ſometimes, indeed, ſuch a movement is made, but generally with a view only to favour a retreat, and ſeldom or ever to gain a victory.

As your attacks are ſucceſſive, ſo muſt your advantages be, and you gain one part after another, or rather the enemy abandons them, you can make no general effort in attacking or purſuing the enemy, who has time to retire at his leiſure.

Your army who have, perhaps, been twenty-four hours under arms, are ſo fatigued with that ſituation and with the combat, that they are unable to move, and much leſs to proſecute the advantages they have gained with any vigour.

The light troops are ſent after the enemy, but with ſmall ſucceſs, for they are generally attentive only to plunder; and moreover, a few battalions thrown into a wood or village put an end to the purſuit; and the enemy, who probably have loſt only a few cannon and priſoners, occupy a neighbouring hill, and your victory is reduced to nothing more than barely the field of battle.

Such

SUCH have been the victories I have ſeen, and ſuch the conſequences, which I can attribute only to the natural ſlowneſs and inactivity of our armies, which proceed, as we have ſhewn, from the uſe of fire-arms, and from the conſequent mode of ranging the troops.

SOMETIMES, indeed, a commander of very ſuperior abilities may, from ſuch an imperfect victory as I have deſcribed, draw great and ſignal advantages, as it happened after the battle of Liſſa, where the Auſtrians, in the courſe of a month, loſt ſucceſſively the greater part of their army, without any apparent neceſſity for the loſs.

BUT when the commanders are nearly equal in abilities, a whole war may paſs in ſkirmiſhes, without their ever coming to a general and concluſive action, which happened on the Rhine when Montecuculi and Turenne were oppoſed to each other.

INDEED our battles, as we have ſeen, are commonly nothing more than great ſkirmiſhes; and therefore, as I have ſaid before, wars are not now, as formerly, concluded by battles, but for want of means to protract them.

CHAPTER X.

A NEW SYSTEM.

HAVING ſhewn, in the preceding chapters, that the uſe of fire-arms excluſively; the arrangement of our infantry and cavalry in three ranks in conſequence of uſing thoſe arms; and finally, the order of battle, are imperfect, and render an army inadequate to almoſt every operation of war; it remains, that we

ſhould examine, whether and how a given number of men, horſe or foot, may be armed and formed, and the order of battle ſo contrived, that it may be free from thoſe defects to which our modern inſtitutions are ſubject; and that it poſſeſs ſtrength, activity, and univerſality, in which we make the perfection of an army to conſiſt.

WHILE we make uſe of fire-arms alone, as is now the caſe in the infantry (for the bayonet and ſword are of no uſe to the ſoldier) it is evident, that no ſyſtem can be formed which will in any degree diminiſh the imperfections of our armies: if you range the men in two ranks, for example, that they may uſe the muſket with more advantage, the line will be ſo extenſive and weak, that it cannot be managed at all, or ſcarce be put in motion; much leſs will it be able to reſiſt the ſhock of the enemy: and if, on the contrary, you range the troops in four or five ranks, all the arms they can carry will become totally uſeleſs.

IT follows, therefore, that a certain number of men ſhould be armed with pikes: this alone can enable us to form a number of men in ſuch a manner, that they ſhall have ſtrength to reſiſt the ſhock of an enemy, horſe or foot, and to act in every kind of ground with equal advantage; it muſt combine and unite the ſolidity of hand-weapons with the advantage of fire-arms. If this can be accompliſhed, we approach very near the perfection we aim at; and undoubtedly render an army, formed on theſe principles, ſuperior to any other now exiſting.

THE uſe of hand-weapons neceſſarily requires defenſive weapons, ſufficiently ſtrong to parry or diminiſh their effects; they are ſo connected, that they ought never to be ſeparated, particularly in the cavalry, where the action paſſes ſword in hand.

ARMOUR

ARMOUR of any kind in the infantry, oppoſed to infantry, armed as it is at preſent, is leſs neceſſary, though always uſeful: it gives confidence to the men, and likewiſe diminiſhes, and ſometimes deſtroys entirely the effects of a muſket-ball when fired from a certain diſtance, or with a conſiderable angle, above or below the horizon and direct line. And as infantry may be, and very often is oppoſed to cavalry, and cloſes with infantry, I think it ought to be provided with ſuch an armour as we ſhall propoſe hereafter.

IT is well known, that a third or fourth part of an army, in the courſe of a few months, by death or ſickneſs, goes off; of which diminution many cauſes may be aſſigned, as bad and ſcanty food, and neglect of the ſick in the hoſpitals. The principal cauſe however is, I think, the dreſs, which does not cover the ſoldier againſt the inclemency of the weather, and ſeems calculated only for parade and ſhew, in a ſunſhiny day, before the ladies, like the dreſs of other petit-maitres. Whereas it is evident, that both the dreſs, arms, and exerciſe, ſhould be made with a view only to health, and to the purpoſes of war: and it being impoſſible for the ſoldier to carry every thing which may, once in an age, be uſeful to him, we muſt fix upon ſuch equipments only, as he will find always neceſſary and uſeful.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE DRESS OF THE SOLDIER.

HE muſt have three ſhirts of ſtrong cloth, without thoſe gewgaws ruffles; two pair of drawers; two pair of breeches made of ticking, and long enough to come almoſt to his ancles, ſuch as the Huſſars, Croats, and Hungarian infantry wear; two pair

pair of ſtrong thread ſtockings; and four pair of ſocks, to keep his feet clean, and prevent them from galling and bliſtering, which is always the caſe when the wool is next the ſkin.

He muſt have two waiſtcoats of the ſame ſtuff with the breeches, and two under-waiſtcoats, unleſs the upper ones are lined, which I would prefer.

He muſt, for the winter, have the ſame number of woollen ſtockings, a pair of breeches, waiſtcoat, and coat of ſtrong and thick woollen cloth. The coat muſt have a lapelle to come to the waiſt-band of his breeches, and to button from top to bottom. The flaps of the coat and waiſtcoat muſt not be ſo open and gallant as the preſent mode.

He muſt alſo have a good great coat, with ſleeves, to come below the calf of the leg, with a ſmall cape or collar to button about his neck, and a hood to come over his head, under his hat.

All the winter apparel may remain with the depot of the regiment until September, excepting the great coat: that will keep him warm enough, though the reſt of his cloaths are only of linen or cotton.

He muſt have a black leather ſtock, quilted within, to keep him warm, and at the ſame time to keep the ſtock in a proper ſhape.

He muſt, finally, have half boots, which are handſome, and much better than ſhoes; they prevent the wet in a great meaſure, and the duſt, ſand, and gravel, which always get into the ſhoes, and gall and cripple the man.

I would

I WOULD have a button fixed on the waiſtband of the breeches, and a loop to the waiſtcoat, to keep the former up, without tying it too hard, which heats the loins, and hinders the free motion of the limbs. As part of the dreſs always remains at the regiment's depot, the ſoldier may carry the reſt, and what he really wants, with eaſe. I have omitted ſpeaking of the hat, that very uſeleſs, if not ridiculous piece of dreſs, becauſe I intend ſubſtituting in its place another, which will both cover and protect the head, neck, and ſhoulders.

CHAPTER XII.

OF DEFENSIVE ARMS OR ARMOUR.

THE firſt part naturally to be covered is the head. For this purpoſe, I would have a hat made of ſtrong leather prepared in the ſame manner as that of which jack-boots are made, ſuch as the couriers abroad uſe: it muſt be quilted within to make it ſit eaſy. The brim muſt be three inches broad to cover the face and carry off the rain: to this brim I would have fixed five or ſix ſmall chains, made of ſtrong wire, to hook to the breaſt-plate or cuiraſs, which he muſt alſo have. Such a hat will effectually protect the upper part of his body againſt the ſabre, in whatever manner it is uſed, either by ſtriking as the Europeans, or puſhing horizontally, as the Turks and Aſiatics do.

I WOULD recommend that a plate of braſs be put on the hat, ſignifying the number or name of the regiment, battalion, and company, all which muſt be numbered. It is incredible how much this trifling circumſtance would contribute to enforce diſcipline and valor.

THE

HAVING thus cloathed and armed our ſoldiers, we muſt now proceed to range them, and in ſuch a manner, that they may make uſe of their arms to advantage. I would have the infantry formed in four ranks, and the three foremoſt armed as I have directed with a muſket and ſhort lance only; the fourth and laſt rank with the long pike, ſword, and a pair of piſtols.

THE ſhorteſt men to be placed foremoſt, and the others ſucceſſively, according to their ſize; ſo that the fourth rank be the talleſt. This diſpoſition will greatly facilitate the uſe of their arms; whereas the method uſed has a contrary effect; it is abſurd, and calculated for ſhew only.

THE three foremoſt ranks, protected by the pikes when they approach the enemy, will, if they fire by ranks and with temper, do it effectually, and when at a diſtance, before they have fixed on the lance to their muſket, can manage it with great eaſe, and conſequently with effect.

IT is needleſs to obſerve, that a body of men ranged in four ranks march more ſteadily than in fewer, and faſter. It is true the line will be ſhorter by a fourth part; but this circumſtance is ſo far from being a defect, that on the contrary, it renders the line ſtronger and more active, which we reckon the greateſt of all advantages. But it may be ſaid, if your line is ſhorter, the enemy will attack one if not both your flanks. This objection will fall to the ground by the general arrangement of the whole, as will appear hereafter.

FOR the preſent let it ſuffice to prove, that a body of men formed three deep cannot reſiſt the ſhock of one that is four deep, and armed with lances, muſkets, and pikes, and the quantity of fire is nearly equal; for that part of the enemy's line, which extends beyond your flanks, is of no uſe while at a diſtance, as the men in a line cannot be brought to fire on the right and left, ſo their fire is loſt;

loſt; and when you approach the enemy, you muſt march rapidly up to him, which will ſoon put an end to the diſpute. But this OUT-FLANKING of you cannot happen, by the mode in which we propoſe to range our battalions.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS.

I WOULD have a battalion conſiſt of five companies, one of which is to be called light infantry; the other four heavy infantry, all armed alike, excepting that the lance, which is to ſerve inſtead of the bayonet, may be made a foot longer for the light than for the heavy infantry, becauſe they generally act ſingly, and therefore can manage it with eaſe.

EACH company of the heavy infantry is to conſiſt of one hundred and twenty-eight men, rank and file, not including officers and under officers; the company of light infantry being much oftener called upon duty, ſhould be much ſtronger, they might even amount to two hundred, for they would decreaſe probably much faſter than the others.

EACH company of heavy infantry will form a front of thirty-two men, the battalion conſiſting of four companies, one hundred and twenty-eight files, to whom I allow one hundred yards or ſomething more of ground; becauſe I would not have the files cloſe and preſſed, as that ſituation hinders them from uſing their arms.

Four companies of heavy infantry will make -	512
One of light infantry we will ſuppoſe - -	200
	712

A REGIMENT of two battalions will make eight companies of heavy infantry, and two of light, which in the whole amount to about one thouſand four hundred. It will be aſked, why ſo many light infantry? My anſwer is this:

LET the regiment be formed as in the annexed plate, with an interval of one hundred yards beween each battalion, who muſt have on their flanks, one three or four pounder, and one ſeven or eight inch howitzer.

THE two companies of light infantry will be placed oppoſite the opening between the two battalions, and on the flanks. As theſe may extend thmſelves at leiſure fifty yards to the right and left or more, and even the interval between the two battalions may be made to extend one hundred and fifty yards without inconvenience or danger, it is evident that the whole ground occupied by our regiment, though formed in four ranks, greatly out-flanks the ſame number of men in three only.

THE fire of our two light companies will alone produce a greater effect than that of the enemy, for this obvious reaſon, that our light infantry acts where and how they pleaſe, aims at their leiſure, croſſes their fire along the enemy's whole front, goes upon their flanks, &c. in ſhort, it acts with all the advantage of real and expert chaſſeurs. If to this you add the ſolid fire of the heavy infantry, it will appear undoubtedly true, that upon the whole, we ſhall in this be ſuperior to the enemy, as we ſhall be in the extent, ſtrength, and activity of the line. Vide Pl. I. fig. 4. & 5.

I ASK, what will the enemy do? Will he advance within that portion of circle, and come to the ſhock? What chance has he with his ſhort muſket and bayonet againſt my muſket and lance, and a row of pikes, which project ſix feet beyond the firſt rank, and

and prevents him from approaching it, and much more from breaking it? If he waits your approaching him, he is overthrown in a moment: when you can come up to him you muſt conquer.

SUPPOSING the country is much incloſed, it is evident that here likewiſe you have the advantage; for he cannot poſſibly drive you from behind a hedge, ditch, or an entrenchment; and if you attack him, having come ſo near, to be within reach of your pikes, he muſt fly: and finally, if you cannot approach him with your line, the two companies of light troops may get on his flanks, and force him to abandon his poſt, however ſtrong: therefore, in whatever ſpecies of ground you act, you muſt neceſſarily prevail over the enemy.

So much for infantry oppoſed to infantry. Let us now examine, whether formed and armed on our principles, it may not likewiſe be oppoſed with equal ſucceſs to cavalry, in a plain and open country. If this can be done, then we may declare, that our inſtitution is perfect.

LET each company be divided into four parts, and form a column of eight men in front, and ſixteen deep; and let the companies, thus thrown into columns, be ranged as in the plate, with the light infantry and cannon. Vide Plate I.

I SUPPOSE this battalion is attacked in a plain by ten ſquadrons. My light infantry and cannon keep off the cavalry, probably effectually; particularly, if the firſt and ſecond ranks advance one after the other, and fire like the light infantry, which they may do without any riſk, at the diſtance of twenty or thirty yards; becauſe if they are preſſed they reſume their poſt, and the light infantry fills up the intervals between the companies.

I WILL

I WILL let the cavalry advance full gallop, undiſmayed by the fire of the columns; and I oppoſe to them eight ranks, the three firſt armed with the muſket and lance; the fourth and fifth with long pikes, while the ſixth, ſeventh, and eighth can fire at the enemy, who is ſo much higher, without any inconvenience to themſelves, or danger to the preceding ranks, as is evident.

Now I would aſk Seidlitz, were he alive; I aſk Wagnitz in the Heſſian ſervice; I aſk Sir William Erſkine in ours, Whether they think they can, at the head of two thouſand Elliots, break this column? They can. Well, I will join the four companies, and form a complete ſquare; can they break this? No; they will not ſay they can: for, excluſively of the muſket, lances, and pikes, I will venture to ſay, that no body of horſe, with any degree of velocity, is able to break through a body of infantry of ſixteen ranks, becauſe the quantity of action produced by a horſeman on full gallop (for one only ſhocks at a time) is not equal to the reſiſtance of ſixteen men placed behind each other, ſo near as to ſupport in a maſs the ſhock of the horſeman.

I CONCLUDE therefore that, armed as I propoſe, a battalion of infantry will beat in the open field twice the number, or indeed any number of horſemen formed and armed as they are at preſent.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE CAVALRY.

THE more I conſider the cavalry, the leſs I am able to ſay or write any thing which can ſatisfy myſelf, much leſs thoſe who are better informed than I am in this branch of military knowledge.

WHETHER it is ranged in three or in thirty ranks, it is always certain that the firſt rank alone can act, be they armed with fire-arms, or with ſwords, or with both. And if the firſt rank is broken, and thrown into confuſion, the whole muſt give way.

SECONDLY, That if a body of horſe remains on the ſpot, any troop, cavalry or infantry, armed with a muſket, will beat it, and force it to retire, or to advance ſword in hand, which avails nothing againſt infantry covered, or againſt light cavalry which ſkirmiſhes, becauſe it cannot approach the former, nor reach the latter, without breaking the line: then it is inferior to them; becauſe their ſuperior velocity enables them to baffle every purſuit of heavy cavalry. If theſe charge, the foremoſt rank alone can uſe their weapons; the others are of no uſe, but to ſupply the place of the ſlain or wounded in the firſt; ſo that a third part only of your cavalry can act at the ſame time, and two-thirds remain idle ſpectators. Activity is the moſt eſſential property of the horſe: in the preſent mode of forming it there is none.

IT is an axiom, that you ought to bring as many men into action at once as poſſible; but though the ground is quite favourable, you can bring only a third part. How is this to be remedied? I don't know. In whatever mode the cavalry is ranged, it is impoſſible to diminiſh

diminiſh the defects above-mentioned; and if to theſe you add thoſe which ariſe from the difficulty of the ground which the enemy may chuſe, ſo as to render your cavalry uſeleſs for a whole campaign, one would be tempted to abandon it almoſt entirely, excepting ſuch a number as is required to patrole, keep guard before the camp, &c. becauſe the expences of it are immenſe, and its utility inſignificant.

If the infantry, ſuch as we propoſe, is ſuperior to the cavalry even in open ground, it ſeems evident that a much ſmaller number of cavalry, than what is commonly uſed in our armies, would be ſufficient, and we ſhall eſtabliſh the proportion between the one and the other accordingly. But whether the cavalry be few or many, how are they to be ranged and diſtributed?

We have ſhewn that the preſent mode is bad. Muſt they then, like the Turkiſh and Aſiatic cavalry, ſcatter and diſperſe themſelves over the whole country, ſkirmiſh with the enemy's line at a diſtance, ſurround it, draw it into improper ground, wait till it is in motion and broken, and then attack it ſword in hand?

I cannot reſolve this queſtion; but certain it is, that in ſuch a caſe, ten ſquadrons acting in this manner produce more real action than fifty formed and acting like ours.

Nor do I ſee how a line of horſe can extricate itſelf from troops who act like the Spahis, whether it remains on the ſpot, or advances: this light cavalry will not reſiſt the ſhock of our line: granted. It will not wait for the ſhock, but diſperſe itſelf, harraſs you, and wait for a more favourable opportunity.

But it will be objected, when the light cavalry retires, ours may attack the enemy's infantry, and defeat it: No; if it is formed as

we

we propoſe: but if the enemy's infantry is broken, a few of our ſquadrons will drive them off the field. Very well; but light cavalry will do that much more effectually; ſo that which-ever way I conſider this ſubject, I am at a loſs what to determine.

I LAY it down, however, as a maxim, that the cavalry ſhould be ranged, and diſtributed ſo, that it may act more or leſs in every kind of ground. Secondly, That whenever any part advances to attack, each individual horſeman ſhould really act, and not the foremoſt rank only, as now is the caſe.

I AM conſcious I walk on a ſlippery path; however, I think the order of battle I ſhall propoſe will, in a great meaſure, procure us the advantages we aim at.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE FORMATION OF A SQUADRON.

I WOULD have a ſquadron conſiſt of 160 men rank and file, not including officers and under-officers; becauſe, if it is leſs numerous, it will ſoon be reduced to nothing, either the horſe or man, or both, being ill, you will have no force to take the field.

A REGIMENT ſhall conſiſt of four ſuch ſquadrons, and of one of light cavalry, which may amount to 200 men, as theſe are obliged to greater duties than the others; ſo that the whole regiment will amount to ſomething more than 800 men. Each ſquadron, armed as we have already propoſed, ſhall be formed into four ranks, which make forty files; and theſe ſhall be divided by eight: ſo that

piquets of both armies, and diſappearing when theſe come to a battle.

But according to our plan, they will perform all the duties commonly done by light troops; and likewiſe in a day of action, they ſhall be employed in ſuch a manner, as will enable them to render more real ſervice than the heavy infantry, as will appear from the inſpection of our order of battle. The ſame reaſoning will equally hold good for the great number of light cavalry; and it is therefore unneceſſary to repeat it.

My army ſhall conſiſt of ſixty battalions and forty ſquadrons. The former will amount in all to about 42,000, and the latter to above 6500; conſequently, the whole army will be 48,500 men, which number we think equal to every operation of a campaign. What it may want in numbers, is amply compenſated by ſtrength and activity; in which properties we place the greateſt advantages an army can poſſeſs.

As we ſhall employ the light cavalry, and the infantry of the ſame ſpecies only to patrole and reconnoitre the enemy, and always together, very few men will be ſufficient for that duty. A hundred foot and forty horſe will do it more effectually than ten times the number; becauſe a few may approach the enemy unnoticed, which cannot be done by a corps conſiſting of thouſands.

A few may know always where you are, maſk your great corps, and perform any manœuvre they pleaſe without your knowledge; whereas, if a thouſand men are placed properly before your front in the moſt hidden and covered places, they muſt inevitably be obſerved. They muſt carefully avoid being ſeen on the high roads,

roads, but muſt place themſelves ſo as to be able to obſerve whatever paſſes there.

GREAT corps, like an army, are more anxious to prevent the enemy from obſerving them, than to obſerve him; they are afraid of being attacked, which their whole attention is directed to prevent: but the ſmall detachments which I propoſe cannot be attacked; for when they ſee a ſuperior force approach, they diſperſe and retire to the right or left, or to any quarter. The enemy cannot purſue them.

I ESTABLISH it as a maxim, that light troops are not to fight when placed before the front of the army, but to ſee what the enemy does, and give notice in time. If this doctrine is followed, very few of them will be neceſſary, and even theſe muſt be made uſeful in a day of action.

THE author of this work, at the head of two hundred chaſſeurs and a hundred dragoons, did, during the whole campaign of 1760, keep ſo near the king of Pruſſia's army, that he never loſt ſight of it for an hour, though the Auſtrian army, and the corps he belonged to were generally two or three marches off: and though he was always in ſight of the enemy, and ſcarce a day paſſed without ſome ſkirmiſh; yet, in the courſe of the campaign, he did not loſe twenty men; and one only was taken priſoner, who got drunk, and ſtaid behind.

THE author does not give this military anecdote to ſhew his particular merit, far from it; he conſiders it as a matter of courſe, which any man of common ſenſe, with activity and vigilance, can equally perform: in fact, there is nothing more ſimple. Detach thirty or forty chaſſeurs, who place themſelves in ſmall parties along the road to the right and left, covered with hedges, woods, walls, &c.

&c. then ſend twenty horſemen, who advance by two, or three, ſo that the foremoſt goes far enough to view the enemy by day, and hear his coming by night. Theſe turn a little out of the road, and liſten; if they hear any thing approach, they retire without noiſe to the infantry, and wait behind: a ſhot or two from theſe will ſoon ſtop the patrole: and, if it is not ſtrong, let them paſs, and make them priſoners.

MOREOVER, you can always know the different roads by which the enemy can march from his camp; and likewiſe gueſs, with certainty, what will be the direction of his march. You muſt have ſome intelligent perſon placed, ſo as to obſerve inſtantly when he commences his march, and whither it tends: all which may be eaſily done, if you have few men only, and if they are employed as we propoſe.

BUT if you are at the head of thouſands, you move and act with the ſame difficulty as the enemy; you cannot change the poſitions of a corps, as you do thoſe of a company of chaſſeurs, and a hundred light horſe, nor place yourſelf covered, and in the proper ſituation for reconnoitring: you muſt have a camp, and that camp is inſtantly diſcovered, which makes it difficult to watch the enemy with ſucceſs.

THIS camp is the center from which all detachments muſt be ſent, and to which they muſt return; the enemy, apprized of all this, ſtops them ſhort, occupies ſome commanding hill, makes a ſhew of attacking you, amuſes you a whole day; in the mean while his army has performed its march unknown to you.

I HAVE ſeen a thouſand examples of this. In the morning a report comes from a corps of 10 or 12,000: the enemy is gone, detachments are ſent after him; in eight or ten hours, perhaps,

haps, you have ſome intelligence, and perhaps not; but always too late: whereas, if ſmall parties were employed in the manner we propoſe, the enemy could not move unperceived; and I can with truth aver, that I have ſeen ſuch ſmall parties accompany the enemy during a whole campaign, and often within twenty yards of his columns, and never out of his ſight.

I BEG the reader's pardon for having dwelt ſo long on this article; but it ſerves to prove, that fifteen hundred men will perform this kind of ſervice much better, than ſo many thouſands which are now employed. I am ſo convinced of this, that I would undertake to do it, though the enemy's army amounted to a hundred thouſand men.

FOLARD, and many other judicious writers, obſerve, that in proportion as the infantry is bad, and the military art declines, the number of horſe increaſes in our modern armies; becauſe, ſay they, an able general at the head of a good infantry can do any thing, and wants but a ſmall cavalry. It is certain that when the infantry is good, much may be done with it; and if it is bad, you muſt increaſe your cavalry, to keep the enemy at a diſtance, as you muſt have a great quantity of heavy artillery for the ſame purpoſe.

IN a numerous, and particularly in a heavy cavalry, I find three capital inconveniencies, viz. The prodigious expence; the difficulty to provide ſubſiſtence; and, laſtly, that it is not of general uſe. For in a cloſe country, ſuch as is a great part of Europe, ten campaigns may paſs without an opportunity for your cavalry to come to a general action, if the enemy is able, and chuſes to decline it: whereas it is our opinion, that no ſpecies of troops or arms ſhould be employed, but in proportion to the general advantages which they procure.

FOR

For theſe reaſons, I do not by any means approve of the modern faſhion of employing ſo many horſe. Generally a fourth or fifth at leaſt of the army muſt be compoſed of cavalry; I think an eighth will be ſufficient, provided the infantry is good, and formed on the principles we have propoſed, and that the cavalry be ranged, and placed where it can act; and where it is always ſupported by artillery and the infantry, which we have endeavoured to combine in our order of battle.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE.

LET any given number of infantry be divided into twenty battalions, and let each of theſe, formed into three ranks, occupy one hundred fathoms: theſe will have a front of — — — — 2000

Let three thouſand horſe be formed likewiſe in three ranks: theſe will amount to a thouſand files, each at half a fathom, which will amount to — — 500

For the ſmall intervals generally left between the battalions and ſquadrons, I allow — — — 300

The whole extent of ſuch a line will amount to — 2800

Let the ſame number of foot be ranged in four ranks, each battalion will occupy only ſeventy-five fathoms: the twenty will occupy — — — 1500

I leave an interval equal to the front, which will be conſequently — — — 1500

3000

Out of which deduct ſeventy-five, becauſe there are only nineteen intervals — — — 75

2925

My

My line of twenty battalions, conſiſting of the ſame number of men, will ſurpaſs the other by one hundred and twenty-five fathoms.

THE Plate N° II. repreſents the two orders of battle; the one, fig. I. according to the uſual mode, the other, fig. II. according to our principles. Let us analyſe them.

IN the firſt place, ours outflanks the other by one hundred and twenty-five fathoms, which enables us to attack the enemy's flank, while it is likewiſe attacked in front.

SECONDLY, Our intervals are filled by three or four thouſand light infantry, who fire at their eaſe, chuſe their time and object; and if they are directed to fire obliquely along the enemy's line, and fix the officers in particular, it is probable that the fire of theſe alone will produce a more real effect than that of the enemy's whole line. If to this you add the fire of the battalions by ranks, as we propoſe, they will undoubtedly have a very great ſuperiority over the enemy.

THIRDLY, When the two lines approach each other, and come to hand-weapons, it is not preſumed that our modern battalions, armed with their bayonets, and three deep, can reſiſt a moment the impulſe of four ranks armed with pikes and lances, and likewiſe protected by their defenſive armour, ſo that in the uſe of miſſile and hand-weapons, ours have moſt certainly the advantage.

I CANNOT imagine any mode by which a modern line can be put on an equality with that which we propoſe. If it abides by its fire alone, it is unequal; if it comes to a ſhock and the uſe of hand-weapons, it is ſtill much more ſo. Will it break its

line and ſend detachments after our light infantry? This is in fact adopting our plan, and confeſſing it cannot be beat but by one ſimilar.

In our caſe this will not avail, becauſe ſhould they ſend ſuch a detachment, our two companies to the right and left of our battalions will form a column, which will take ſuch detachments on both flanks, while the company of light infantry, placed as in fig. 2. attacks them in front, and when they are thrown into confuſion, which muſt ſoon happen, a ſquadron or two placed oppoſite the interval, as marked in the plan, will advance ſword in hand and attack them pell-mell, that is, ride through them, which muſt in a few ſeconds exterminate them.

I saw at Siliſtria, in Turkey, two ſquadrons attack a column or maſs of above ſix thouſand Turks, in this manner, whom they defeated and diſperſed in leſs than three minutes; and had they not covered themſelves under the banks of the Danube, whither the cavalry could not purſue them, they would have been all cut to pieces. Colonel Carleton was preſent at this event.

It may be objected, that it is not eaſy for the two companies to form the columns propoſed; to which I anſwer, that ſuch an operation does not require twenty ſeconds: and moreover, ſuppoſing it was not done at all, my company of light infantry, ſupported by a ſquadron of horſe, armed with the muſket and lance, will be more than a match for the enemy's detachment, which, in fact, admits not of the leaſt difficulty till a flank is formed; for the operation is made under the fire of the two remaining companies, and one of light infantry.

I conclude, therefore, that a modern ine is in every reſpect inferior to that which we propoſe. I may be prejudiced in favor of

of my principles; I therefore earneſtly intreat experienced gentlemen of my profeſſion, to examine this ſubject with attention, and if they differ in opinion, I ſhall be extremely obliged to them if they will communicate their ſentiments. Truth is my object.

So much for infantry oppoſed to infantry. Let us now examine that part of the line which is oppoſed to the enemy's cavalry. Many people will ſuppoſe that our four ranks, though armed with lances and pikes, are not ſufficiently ſtrong to reſiſt the ſhock of a line of horſe in three ranks; I am of a different opinion, and fully convinced that they are; becauſe one horſe alone can come to the ſhock at once; and if killed, wounded, or ſtopped, the other two behind cannot advance, ſo that the united force of our four men is in fact oppoſed to that of one horſe only, and if theſe forces are mechanically computed, it will be found that the latter is by much inferior to the former; and if to this you add the effects produced by the fire firſt, and then by the lances and pikes, no doubt can remain; for the horſe has nothing but his weight and velocity. However, be this as it may, I will admit that my infantry is in fact too weak; I will, therefore, form a column of each company, whoſe front is eight men, and flank ſixteen. I hope no one will think this too weak to reſiſt a line of horſe, or rather, as we have ſhewn, one rank, which alone can act.

ACCORDING to our propoſed plan, ſeven battalions, and as many ſquadrons, are oppoſed to twenty ſquadrons; theſe battalions have ſeven howitzers, and as many field pieces. The light infantry is placed before the intervals, and my ſeven ſquadrons behind them. The firſt and the artillery keep up a conſtant fire againſt the cavalry. Now I aſk, will it ſupport this fire, and for how long? I believe not long, it muſt either advance or retire when you approach it; I ſuppoſe the former, which can be done only between my inter-

vals. My light infantry and my cavalry poſt themſelves as marked in the plan. Only part of the enemy's cavalry can paſs at once, and theſe will receive the fire of two columns in their flanks, and when they have paſſed will be fired at by the light infantry in their backs; in that inſtant my ſeven ſquadrons will attack them in flank and rear, and I think totally diſperſe them.

INDEED, I am ſo perſuaded of the ſuperiority of my infantry ranged and armed in the manner propoſed, that I do not think any cavalry, however reſolute, can approach, much leſs break it; inſomuch, that I would venture to attack it in an open country. If the enemy's cavalry retires, you muſt ſend yours after them, who purſue them, not in a line, but like our huſſars.

THE ſecond plate ſhews our order of battle advancing to the enemy, and whoever conſiders it with attention, will perceive, that though there are intervals between our battalions, the enemy cannot avail himſelf of them, for he dares not penetrate between them without ruin, as he will be oppoſed by our light infantry and cavalry. Moreover, he muſt break his own line, and leave an interval, which cannot be guarded but by the ſecond line, which is generally too far off. In the mean time the diſpoſition of our line enables it to advance without any interruption, as no inconvenience can ariſe from one part's being more advanced than another, for that part is protected by the cavalry and light infantry. Even, if many of our companies or battalions were broken, the enemy cannot purſue them without breaking his line, and expoſing ſuch detachments as he may order to advance, to be attacked in front and flank. And laſtly, the march of the whole is infinitely more rapid than if the line was cloſe as uſual. I therefore conclude, that our order of battle is much ſuperior to any other, and probably is that which has the feweſt defects of any which can be invented, and in which

which are combined the many advantages of miſſile and hand-weapons.

THE next plate ſhews our order of battle, when our troops approach within thirty or forty yards of the enemy, which they can get over in as many ſeconds.

THE meaning of this diſpoſition is obvious. The two columns on each flank of the battalions, when they have broken the enemy's line, fire on the flanks, while the other two companies continue to fire before them on thoſe who run away, and purſue them without intermiſſion, while the cavalry purſue thoſe who fly, with vigour. The light infantry advances very little before the intervals, and leaves the purſuit to the cavalry.

IF our line advances in this manner with rapidity, the enemy's firſt line will be cut to pieces, and the ſecond ſhare the ſame fate, if it does not retire in time. The ſame ſuperiority of force and activity will always prevail, and the victory muſt from the mode of attacking be complete and deciſive.

BY my order of battle, all the infantry is placed in one line, and all the cavalry in the ſecond: different in this as in many other things from the modern, as appears from the inſpection of the plan in plate N° II. My reaſons for this arrangement are;

FIRST, That I think it ſufficiently ſtrong to overturn a modern line formed and armed on weaker principles.

SECONDLY, Becauſe all my infantry acts at once, and my cavalry is brought into action only when the enemy's line, infantry, or cavalry is thrown into diſorder, when mine can act with advantage.

THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, That every ſpecies of troops, infantry, cavalry, light infantry, and artillery, ſupport and aſſiſt each other: ſo that the total quantity of action produced by my line is greatly ſuperior to that of the enemy, and conſequently muſt conquer. As according to the conſtitution of our army, it conſiſts of ſixty battalions, and forty ſquadrons, if the firſt are formed in one line, it will be extremely long and difficult to manage; we therefore propoſe, that forty battalions only ſhould be united in one corps; theſe will occupy a ſpace ſomething more than forty battalions and forty ſquadrons of the enemy.

THE remaining twenty battalions I would have formed into ſeparate corps, as marked in the plan, plate III. fig. 1. to attack the enemy in flank, while the forty attack him in front. The advantages of ſuch a diſpoſition are too obvious to require an explanation.

IF notwithſtanding what we have ſaid, our order of battle is thought too weak, being in one line only; then we propoſe that the twenty battalions ſhould be divided; viz. Seven ſhould be placed behind the right wing, ſeven behind the left, and ſix behind the center, as it is marked in the plan, N° III. fig. 2. with the cavalry in the ſecond line. This diſpoſition will ſatisfy thoſe who are accuſtomed to two lines and a reſerve: but I prefer the other diſpoſition for many reaſons, which will occur to every perſon who will examine the two plans with attention. I ſhall only obſerve, that the firſt diſpoſition is moſt proper for attacking, and the ſecond for defending. The firſt has however two great advantages. Firſt, That all your infantry act at the ſame time, and not ſucceſſively as in the ſecond. Secondly, That you neceſſarily attack the enemy on both flanks, as appears by the plans themſelves.

IT ſeems needleſs to obſerve, that if the enemy oppoſes cavalry, as probably he may, to the corps, A. B. This muſt be thrown into

into columns, as we directed, and as is marked on the firſt plan, N° I. but if oppoſed to infantry, no alteration to this reference is required.

We have already ſhewn, that the modern mode of ranging an army, and the uſe of miſſive weapons, renders it totally inactive, and proper only for a defenſive war, and to fight at a diſtance, to receive an enemy rather than attack him. To increaſe this inactivity, the general, as well as the ſoldier, ſeem to place all their confidence in the artillery, rather than in the valour of the ſoldier; accordingly the cannon is become the ſoul of our military eſtabliſhments.

At the battle of Prague there were above five hundred pieces of heavy cannon, which at a moderate computation, with the train, coſt more than forty thouſand foot would have done; and yet they did not produce any effect proportionate to ſuch an immenſe expence. I have three capital objections to this abuſe of artillery—the expence of it, the number of horſes required to attend it, and the great delays it always occaſions in the motion of the army.

In ſieges there cannot be too much, nor in the field too little artillery. In this laſt caſe, the uſe of heavy cannon is very much contracted, it can be carried but in few roads, cannot advance with the line, and muſt be employed only to protect the heads of the columns while they come out from a defile, and form the line, to form a battery againſt ſome point of attack, or to defend an intrenchment.

If the enemy is at all acquainted with his buſineſs, he may order his men to lie flat on the ground till your troops advance, and then attack them, or wait till they come up, in which caſes the artillery has little or no effect; and by a quick motion he comes up to your

your intrenchment, and attacks it ſword in hand, which will render your cannon uſeleſs. When a battery is directed againſt a defile, you may almoſt always avoid it, by turning to the right or left.

A GOOD van-guard with the field pieces will protect the heads of your columns better than all the batteries you can raiſe; beſides, if the defiles you paſs through are within reach of the enemy, he may either oppoſe artillery to artillery, or, which is much better, advance rapidly and attack them. The inſtant he approaches, the cannon ceaſes to be of any uſe.

UPON the whole, therefore, I conclude, that when you propoſe waiting for the enemy in ſome fortified poſt, as in a fortreſs, you muſt have abundance of heavy artillery: but as we place the greateſt perfection of an army in its velocity, and our ſyſtem is, we think, particularly calculated for that, and the uſe of hand-weapons, which renders miſſive weapons of every kind leſs uſeful, we reject of courſe that prodigious quantity of artillery, and we think thirty or forty twelve pounders more than ſufficient for an army of fifty thouſand men.

IN ten campaigns, you may not find an occaſion where theſe are neceſſary, and where common field pieces would not do the buſineſs equally well. As we have ſaid already our troops have much confidence in a numerous artillery; merely to indulge them in this opinion, though erroneous, I conceive that each battalion ſhould have a field piece, and a ſeven inch howitzer, until they are accuſtomed to the uſe of hand-weapons, and to face the enemy, then they will perceive, that artillery in general is ſo far from being uſeful, that it retards their marches, and expoſes them, during theſe delays, to much greater loſſes and danger, than if they left their artillery behind them, and thus diſincumbered advance rapidly to the enemy.

GENERAL

GENERAL REFLECTION.

WHAT we have ſaid regards an army in the field. It remains we ſhould examine how ſuch an army is to be prepared for action during peace, and how ſupported while in the field.

ONE of the greateſt difficulties which occur, is in ſupporting the army in the field, I mean in furniſhing recruits and cloathing. In a campaign or two, recruits are wanted, and the troops are almoſt naked.

THE firſt are raiſed in the country, very often at a great diſtance from theſe at of war; ſo that many periſh before they arrive; others are totally unfit for ſervice, and the few remaining placed in regiments, are quite raw, and before theſe can be rendered uſeful, many go to the hoſpital; hence one may ſafely affirm, that not one fourth part ever arrives to a ſtate of maturity and become real and uſeful ſoldiers. What a waſte and deſtruction of men! Forty years peace and a good government will not atone for the calamities and loſſes of a ſix years war.

DURING the late war in Turkey, the Ruſſians raiſed above three hundred thouſand recruits, and yet the principal army under M. Romanzow, at the concluſion of it, did not amount to above thirty-ſix thouſand; and that in Crimea, under Prince Dolgorouki, to about twelve thouſand, and all were in want of many neceſſary articles, which is always the caſe, particularly if contractors are any way concerned.

WHAT prevention of theſe evils can be found, it will be naturally aſked? The beſt I can think of is as follows:

LET the regiments have what we call perpetual quarters; that is, they muſt always during the peace, remain in one fixed place: and theſe places muſt form a chain on that frontier, which moſt probably may hereafter be the ſeat of war. For each regiment muſt be built a ſmall town in ſeparate caſerns, to prevent fire from communicating to the whole. A certain quantity of land muſt be aſſigned to them. If the frontier is ſubject to ſudden attacks from ſmall parties of the enemy, I would have a good intrenchment drawn about the caſerns or barracks, with a good ditch well paliſaded, where the peaſants may remain in ſafety with their cattle, &c.

THE recruits muſt be delivered to the regiments who are to take care to have them exerciſed. All the materials which ſerve to cloath the troops, muſt likewiſe be delivered into this depot, and there worked and made up by the ſoldiers and their wives, which would produce a vaſt ſaving to the ſovereign, and the ſoldier would be better cloathed.

IN time of war, a battalion remains here to train the recruits, and provide the cloathing for the whole regiment.

ALL the ſick and invalids, wounded, &c. officers and ſoldiers, muſt be ſent to this depot, where they can always be of ſervice, though unfit for military duty in the field. If a ſufficient quantity of land is aſſigned, it will maintain them comfortably with their pay; and the ſtate is not burthened with half pay, or to turn numberleſs poor creatures adrift, which is now the caſe.

IN this ſyſtem, the ſoldier may and ought to be permitted to marry, that his children may ſupply the immenſe loſſes occaſioned by the war. The women may help to cultivate the lands, and ſupport the community, whereas they are now the peſt of the army.

The

The army will receive the recruits formed and healthy, and will be always complete and fit for action; whereas now half the campaign passes in exercising them, before you dare approach the enemy: and in case of a considerable defeat, a battalion may be sent to the depot, and replaced by that which was there.

EACH male child, when he arrives at ten years of age, must have a portion of land allotted him, and he becomes a soldier. In short, by this method, the whole army becomes military colonies; and each soldier having, by this means, a certain, honourable and good retreat in his old age, serves cheerfully and well, becomes a member of the state, and has something to lose. No greater misfortune can happen to him than to be turned out of his regiment, which, in fact, is dispossessing him of his inheritance. Moreover, a man accustomed to live in a certain community, is more upon his guard than when he is continually strolling from one quarter to another; insomuch, that a regiment seldom passes through a village in its march, without leaving traces of insolence and disorder behind it.

WHAT I have said of the infantry holds equally good for the cavalry; each regiment of which should be composed of six squadrons; one remains at the depot, and performs exactly the same duties as the battalions; so I need not dwell any longer on the subject.

OF CONTRACTORS.

THERE is nothing performed by contractors, which may not be much better executed by intelligent officers. I object to contractors for the following reasons:

FIRST, They make immenſe fortunes at the expence of the ſtate, which ought to be ſaved.

SECONDLY, They deſtroy the army, horſe and foot, and even the hoſpitals, by furniſhing the worſt of every thing.

THIRDLY, It is always in the power of the contractors to check, and intirely ſtop the progreſs of an army.

AND, finally, Men ſo extremely covetous, may be eaſily induced to take money from the enemy, for revealing the ſecret, which they can gueſs at from the diſpoſition of the depots, or for not furniſhing the proviſions in time.

IN an army, there are always men of honour and activity to be found, who would do all the contractors do much better, ſave millions, and ſerve the troops effectually. Theſe muſt be employed, and theſe only.

PART

PART THE SECOND.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE GENERAL.

IN the preceding part, we have conſidered an army as a machine, with which the different operations of war, are to be performed; and endeavoured to point out the method which appears to us moſt adapted for the conſtruction of it, ſo that it may have the properties required to render it perfect. An army, however, differs eſſentially from a pure machine: this is formed in ſuch a manner, that when applied, it muſt neceſſarily produce a given effect, in proportion to its ſtrength. It can have but one principle of motion, whereas in an army, each individual part has, within itſelf, the ſpring and ſource of action, which it may exert or not at pleaſure. It follows, therefore, that however advantageouſly the parts, that is, the men are ranged, the whole will remain motionleſs, if the leader, who has the direction of their forces, cannot offer ſuch motives as will induce them to act, and in the manner he preſcribes. He cannot create action in individuals, he cannot force them to act, he can only perſuade and direct. His orders are ineffectual, the inſtant an army, or a great part of it, chuſes to diſobey. Coercion can have no room againſt ſuperior forces. Authority, in which alone the ſtrength of the general conſiſts, vaniſhes the

the inſtant it is not acknowledged; he muſt not therefore rely upon it intirely. In the common courſe of things, as our armies are conſtituted, it does very well; but upon many, and indeed upon all extraordinary occaſions, he will find it deficient, unleſs he poſſeſſes the art of perſuading, which can be done only, by offering ſuch motives to the troops as naturally tend to raiſe their courage when depreſſed, and check it when violent or inſolent, ſo that he becomes intirely maſter of their inclinations, and diſpoſes of their forces with unlimited authority. This is what I call the philoſophy of war, which, in my opinion, is the moſt difficult and ſublime part of this or of any other profeſſion. It ſuppoſes a perfect knowledge of the paſſions, becauſe it is from that ſource, a general muſt draw his arguments to perſuade or diſſuade, as circumſtances may require.

No author has treated this ſubject ſo far, as it regards the conduct of an army, though it appears evident from hiſtory, that all the great captains of antiquity practiſed it; of which we ſhall give ſome examples in the ſequel. If, as the matter is new, we ſhall diſcuſs it imperfectly, we hope the reader will excuſe it, overlook our errors, and avail himſelf of the few truths we ſhall propoſe to his conſideration.

An army, like the ſea, is ſometimes calm and ſlothful, at others, furious and outrageous, wholly ungovernable; both extremes are to be equally avoided. It muſt have ſuch a degree of motion as is required to perform whatever is preſcribed, and no more, that it may be confined and directed to a certain end.

Extreme rapidity is incapable of direction, and often overwhelms thoſe who attempt to moderate it. When the whole, or a great part of an army is diſaffected, ſullen, or breaks out into open diſobedience, it is obvious that compulſion is impracticable: this

this reaches only individuals; you must have recourse to persuasion, which supposes uncommon abilities and personal authority in the leader: if deficient in these points, he will find, that his orders will be ineffectual.

ARMIES are corrupted equally by good and bad success, and by idleness; from whatever causes the corruption and discontent proceed, a general must know how to calm the fury, as well as raise the spirits of his men: he must above all take care, that no cause of complaint can be imputed to him, nor even the least neglect, for both destroy his credit with the men; and it will be extremely difficult to pacify them, if they are personally prejudiced against him: it is no less dangerous to impute the evil complained of to them, unless they have, by some shameful act of cowardice or disobedience, brought it on themselves.

IN that case, even the general must have great personal authority over them, and reprimand them with much delicacy and circumspection; for a harsh expression will exasperate them, and aggravate rather than cure the evil. It is difficult to know what to say to an enraged multitude, animated perhaps against their leader, who, notwithstanding his probity and abilities, may be suspected and hated, and fall a victim to their wild and ungovernable fury.

CICERO, in describing the character of a perfect orator, supposes him a complete master of every science. If such extensive abilities are required to controul and guide the passions of an unarmed and peaceable assembly, subject to no fears, nor intimidated by the presence of any immediate danger, surely much greater wisdom, fortitude, and abilities are necessary to allay the fury of an armed multitude, to inspire the depressed and unfortunate with fresh courage, bring him unreluctantly, and even with confidence, to face and engage the victorious enemy, affront the greatest danger with alacrity,

alacrity, court the toils and perils of war with the ſame aſſiduity others do their pleaſure.

To induce men to act a dangerous part, is much more difficult than to perſuade them to adopt an opinion, which, for the moſt part, does not engage in any hazardous enterprize.

In the ſenate, the orator is prepared, and his auditors more or leſs diſpoſed to hear him, his mind free and undiſturbed; whereas a general is ſurrounded with difficulties and dangers. The ſoldier is a rude, ignorant, untractable being; and when many are united, an expreſſion miſunderſtood puts them in a flame; argument, and a long chain of reaſoning, have no influence over them. No fault, words, or actions eſcape their notice and cenſure; whence, if once diſaffected, misfortunes, which proceed from the cowardice of the ſoldier, neglect or ignorance of the officers, even thoſe cauſed by accident, a torrent, breaking of a bridge, &c. are all imputed to the general. His reputation and his authority over the ſoldiers depend entirely on ſucceſs, which, notwithſtanding the moſt extenſive abilities, wiſdom, and heroiſm, does not always anſwer our expectations; becauſe the concurrence of a great number of perſons is required; and if one or two only of the principal officers, from malice or ignorance, fail in executing the part aſſigned to them, the whole project miſcarries. What penetration in the choice of his principal officers, what dignity and popularity to conciliate their eſteem and affection, as well as thoſe of the army in general!

It is not enough that they know, and can perform what is preſcribed to them, they muſt be deſirous and anxious to ſecond your intentions at the riſk of their lives; they muſt be determined to ſucceed or periſh in the attempt.

To infuſe ſuch ſentiments into all ranks of men under your command, from the general to the ſoldier, demands uncommon qualities,

qualities, ſome of which we ſhall endeavour to trace, and give an imperfect idea of what we think the leader of an army ſhould be.

I TAKE it for granted he is perfectly maſter of the mode in which men ought to be armed, and ranged to the greateſt advantage; and that he knows how to direct and execute every operation of war without exception. The object we have here in view, is to ſhew, how he muſt acquire that degree of perſonal authority, as will enable him to gain the reſpect, confidence, and affection of thoſe under his command; and render him ſo entirely maſter of their inclinations, that his will is the only rule of their actions.

HIS conduct muſt be irreproachable, and free from all kind of vice, and even of any remarkable weakneſs either of body or mind. If he is given to women, gaming, or debauchery, his example will be followed, and a general diſſipation will enſue, which will ſpread, infect, and corrupt the whole army. Theſe vices are not only pernicious and ſhameful in themſelves, but very often lead men into crimes in order to procure the means to purſue them. They weaken the mind and corrupt the heart, render him unable to perform the duties of his employment, lay him open to the wicked deſigns of bad men, expoſe him in a fond or jovial hour to betray the ſecret of his projects, by which they miſcarry; and above all deſtroy his credit, reputation, and influence on the troops, whoſe good opinion, however, is the only ſolid foundation of ſucceſs and glory. Theſe are not only vices, but fatal in their conſequences, when a commander is infected by them: avarice and rapaciouſneſs are crimes of the deepeſt die, at leaſt are the ſource of them. They cannot be ſatisfied but at the expence of ſomebody, and probably of ſuch as are leaſt able to ſupport the fraud; and when gratified at the expence of the poor ſoldiers little pittance, or conniving at the abuſes and frauds of the contractors, to partake of the plunder, there is no puniſhment adequate to it. The perſon

guilty of it ought to be baniſhed from the ſight of men. It would ſeem incredible, if daily examples did not prove it, that a general ſhould be ſo abſurd as to prefer ſuch unlawful gain, which he cannot want but for his vices, to the ſatisfaction and advantage of being reſpected and beloved by his army, whoſe affections he moſt certainly forfeits, if once ſuſpected on this head.

PRIDE is an affectation of ſuperiority over others, which always offends, and makes men enemies: they will obey no farther than they muſt, to avoid cenſure or puniſhment; and ſo far from exerting themſelves to obtain the victory, will ſecretly rejoice at your defeat, and perhaps contribute to it, when they can do it without danger. It is inconceivable, that any man in his ſenſes ſhould act in a manner which, upon the leaſt reflection, he muſt know will give offence to thoſe very people, on whoſe good-will ſucceſs depends: however elevated his rank and ſtation may be, he can offend no man with impunity, particularly in an army, where the affection of all is more or leſs neceſſary. Pride ariſes from immoderate ſelf-conceit, and an opinion of our ſuperior abilities. Be it ſo, you are what you imagine yourſelf to be. Avail yourſelf, however, of what talents your inferiors poſſeſs, encourage them, they will improve by your inſtructions and example, and gratefully acknowledge the ſuperiority of a modeſt and humane commander. Oſtentation and pride are no proof of merit; actions alone ſhew it. No man is ſufficiently impartial to judge of himſelf; he muſt abide by the ſentence of the army, which, I believe, is always juſt; it is madneſs to pretend to force men to reſpect and love you, if your conduct is weak, irregular, and inſolent. Benevolence and affection create ſimilar ſentiments; pride is ſullen and diſdainful; vanity is open, and loquacious to intemperance; both proceed from the ſame origin; a high opinion of one's ſelf, and contempt of others, both are equally pernicious, hateful, and equally to be avoided in every ſtation

ſtation of life, and moſt ſo in a perſon placed at the head of others.

ENVY and jealouſy are inherent to low minds, and to men of moderate abilities, who aſpire to great commands, incapable of doing any thing that is praiſe-worthy, which can intitle them to the eſteem of mankind, they are continually plotting againſt men of merit. When princes, and perſons inveſted with great power, are infected with theſe paſſions, they degenerate into open cruelty. In perſons of lower rank, calumny and intrigue are the weapons they uſe to deſtroy thoſe they hate, for no other reaſon than becauſe they have merit, and deſerve their eſteem and friendſhip. Theſe paſſions are more common than one would imagine, inſomuch, that few are exempt from them. There is ſomething abſurd in this paſſion, that a general officer ſhould be jealous, and conſequently endeavour to cruſh and deſtroy thoſe men who are moſt capable of promoting his deſigns, appears to me the exceſs of folly: yet ſo it is, few men have magnanimity enough to ſuffer, much leſs acknowledge, equal or ſuperior merit in others. This vice makes a man unhappy in himſelf, obnoxious to others, and for the moſt part leads him to injuſtice, which finally becomes fatal to him. It throws him intirely into the hands of artful, baſe, and low people, who can be of no ſervice to him, and alienates the affections of all good and ſenſible men, and in time thoſe of the whole army, in which chiefly we lay the foundation of ſucceſs.

A SULLEN, ſulky, and moroſe temper is totally unfit for any command, it will ſoon produce an univerſal hatred, as levity, affectation of wiſdom expreſſed by the nods of the head, or other ſuch grimaces, expoſe him to contempt and deriſion. Above all things, a general muſt avoid warm, harſh, and intemperate expreſſions, or any word or motion which ſavour of inſolence or contempt, which generally give greater offence than the moſt ſevere treatment.

Such is human nature, particularly in men of ſentiment and education, nothing hurts more than the idea of being deſpiſed: it is an inſult never to be forgiven, and waits only for an opportunity to revenge itſelf. A warm temper blinds a man of his judgment, and expoſes him to ſay and do a thouſand raſh and inconſiderate things, which will involve him in dangers and inextricable difficulties.

Thus far we have only ſhewn what a general ſhould not be, if he pretends to deſerve that name; it is not ſufficient he ſhould be free from the vices and crimes above-mentioned; every man ſhould be ſo for his own ſake; he ſhould be poſſeſſed of eminent and uſeful virtues, great qualities, by which alone he can acquire true dignity, that perſonal authority and ſupreme aſcendancy over the minds of men, which the ſcepter cannot give.

Honours and riches may be conferred on any man, though undeſerving of them; but reputation and glory can proceed only from ourſelves. High birth, and other accidental circumſtances, if properly applied, contribute much to acquire and eſtabliſh perſonal conſequence, becauſe they place a man in a ſituation where he can give ſcope to his genius; whereas another, though poſſeſſed of the moſt extenſive abilities, if deprived of theſe advantages, is continually checked and kept under by the ſuperior influence, jealouſy, and malice of the great, who think they have a right to every thing, without being at the trouble to acquire the knowledge and ſcience neceſſary to fulfil the duties of the employments they aſpire to. Hence it is that obſcure merit, particularly in monarchies, ſeldom or ever raiſes a man to any very eminent poſt, unleſs the extreme diſtreſſes of the ſtate call him to the helm, which he is permitted to guide only while the ſtorm and danger laſt; when theſe ſubſide, tranquillity and vigour reſtored to the ſtate, he muſt give

give way to ſome intriguing courtier, retire and ſink into oblivion, of which we have too many examples, antient and modern.

When a general has acquired perſonal authority, is eſteemed and beloved by his army; when they have confidence in his wiſdom and abilities, experienced his valour, and ſeen his conduct crowned with ſucceſs, there is no enterprize, however difficult, above his reach; whereas, deſtitute of theſe advantages, though otherwiſe a man of merit, he can undertake nothing of conſequence without trembling for the event.

But how is this perſonal authority, this aſcendency over the ſoldiers to be acquired? I anſwer, firſt, by being free from vice: ſecondly, by ſhewing, by his words and actions, he is as much ſuperior in merit as in rank, and in every reſpect worthy their confidence and affection; brave without oſtentation, as a thing of courſe; unmoved by the preſence of the moſt imminent danger; calm, ſerene, a chearful and open countenance at all times, chiefly in a day of battle—This inſpires the ſoldiers with courage and confidence, and inſures a victory.

In any very great danger, the ſoldier looks up to his officer, and if he perceives the leaſt ſign of timidity, anxiety, or doubt, he concludes all is loſt, and generally conſults his ſafety by flight. The general muſt ſhare the toils and dangers of war with his men as circumſtances may require, and they ought to ſhare the advantages of the victory with him: but, alas! they have nothing to expect; above all things, he muſt be juſt in the diſtribution of thoſe favours which paſs through his hands; if merit alone is attended to, he conciliates the affections of all good men, and even the bad will endeavour to deſerve his protection; a general emulation will enſue: whereas, if he ſuffers himſelf to be influenced by any authority whatever, or ſeduced by the intrigue of courtiers, his

his followers, and ſycophants, a general diſcontent will follow; he is deſerted, abandoned, and hated by every one; the ordinary duties of the army are performed with reluctancy; murmurs and mutiny are not ſeldom the conſequences of the injuſtice of a general.

FAVORITISM is always, ſooner or later, fatal to every man who gives himſelf up to any individual, becauſe, independent of the weak or wicked counſels, a favorite may give his ſuperior, it makes him odious, and deprives him of the ſupport of good men. If he conſults the opinion of his army, he will ſeldom be deceived in the choice of his friends and adviſers; they never love or eſteem any man that is not in ſome degree deſerving of it: but a general, like a ſovereign, is ſurrounded by a claſs of men, whoſe intereſt and influence depend on keeping him in the dark, and preventing the leaſt ray of light from penetrating into his receſſes; he employs this or that man, not from any perſonal knowledge he has of his abilities, but from the recommendation of ſome artful and ignorant favorite. If, in ſpite of fate, and the malevolence of theſe people, an officer's endeavours are crowned with ſucceſs, all is in an uproar; his victories are depreciated, his conduct criticized and calumniated, until he falls a victim to their jealouſy.

MANY things muſt be connived at and diſſembled, others are remedied by private reprimand, if few are concerned, and publickly if many. None but great and capital crimes muſt be puniſhed rigorouſly; and in that caſe I would have it done publickly in the Roman manner, in the preſence of the whole army, or at leaſt, in that of the corps to which the delinquents belong, and not by an obſcure court-martial, where a brave man is often ſacrificed to the envy and jealouſy of ſome great perſon, and many a villain eſcapes. Rewards ſhould go rather beyond, and puniſhments below the mark. No man is infallible, and errors muſt be forgiven.

EVERY

EVERY man under your command muſt partake of your kindneſs and generoſity, when he is in want and needs it, particularly the poor ſoldier, and poorer ſubalterns, who often have nothing but their pay to ſubſiſt upon, to whom the loſs of a horſe is a capital misfortune; the general ſhould have a particular liſt of theſe, and ſhould omit no opportunity to relieve them; he muſt pay the moſt ſcrupulous attention to the management of hoſpitals, where ſome general officer of humanity ſhould preſide; muſt not ſhut himſelf up like a ſultan, and appear only in ſtate and pomp to diſplay his greatneſs: on the contrary, he muſt not fail to appear before the line every day, if poſſible, with one or two adjutants only; ſtop at each regiment, enquire into, and ſee the ſtate of it (I do not mean that they are well curled); but whether they have their allowance of bread, proviſions, &c. and that theſe are of the beſt kind which can be procured; and if he finds there is the leaſt prevarication on this head, puniſh the authors, contractors, and colonels with the utmoſt rigour, and force them to refund their criminal gain, hang or diſmiſs them for ever. It is a certain truth, benevolence creates affection. The poor ſoldier is beyond all men grateful, and repays a thouſand fold the kindneſs ſhewn him by his ſuperiors. It is the duty and intereſt of the general to be juſt, humane, and kind to thoſe he commands, and particularly to thoſe of the lower claſs.

I HOPE the reader will excuſe the length of this diſcourſe, which gives ſome, though very inadequate idea of the qualities which a general ſhould poſſeſs; theſe applied properly will enable him to perform great things, and on many occaſions, ſupply the want of military ſkill, and repair errors to which all men are ſubject:—whereas the moſt extenſive knowledge of the art of war will miſcarry in its projects, if the army does not heartily concur in the execution.

IN

In the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to point out ſome of the moral qualities which a chief ſhould poſſeſs: we proceed now to ſhew what men are, and from what ſources he muſt draw ſuch arguments and motives, as may induce them to exert their faculties to the utmoſt of their power; it is not enough they know how to perform this or that operation; they muſt be willing and deſirous to do it; ſucceſs will be the conſequence.

OF THE PASSIONS.

IT is needleſs to diſcuſs minutely and metaphyſically the number and variety of the paſſions. Suffice it to trace their ſource and origin, and indicate thoſe motives which appear beſt adapted to raiſe and excite, ſoothe and calm them, as circumſtances may require; ſo that an able commander, by applying them properly, be always maſter of the actions of the troops committed to his care.

From ſenſibility ariſe agreeable or diſagreeable feelings, and from theſe pleaſure and pain; ſuch as are indifferent to us produce only a tranſitory, or no impreſſion at all, and conſequently leave man, or other animal, in the ſame ſtate he was before: whereas agreeable or diſagreeable feelings neceſſarily put him in motion, or at leaſt inſpire him with a deſire to act. Fear of, and an averſion to pain, and the deſire of pleaſure, are the ſpring and cauſe of all actions both in men and other ſpecies of animals. They have two origins, interior and exterior. The firſt is inherent to all animals without exception, becauſe it proceeds from ſenſibility. The ſecond is peculiar to man, and proceeds from his poſition in ſociety with his fellow creatures; were he alone in a deſart, he might perhaps differ from other animals, perhaps in ſagacity, and perhaps not.

Pain

PAIN and pleaſure, ariſing from interior and mechanical cauſes, and the gratifications of theſe wants, I call ſenſual or animal; and thoſe which proceed from the POSITION of a man in ſociety, I call ſocial. The firſt are few and limited, and may without much difficulty be gratified, which reduces animals of all kinds to a ſtate of ſloth and indolence, until their wants are renewed, and pain forces them to action.

IN proportion as ſociety is imperfect and uncivilized, man will be found to reſemble the moſt common animal; a ſavage and a ſlave differ very little from animals, being moved to act by their ſenſual wants alone: however, as man is always placed in ſome kind of ſociety, natural or civil, where his animal wants are ſatisfied, there is in him a principle of action, not to be found in other animals, which characterizes and diſtinguiſhes him from all others; this principle of ſocial action is, I think, general, and to be found in every man, more or leſs: it is the deſire of pre-eminence and ſuperiority; though the means, by which it is obtained, may and do vary according to the different ſituations in which men are placed, yet is pre-eminence the ultimate object of ſocial action, and operates upon him when his animal wants are gratified; whether it is coveted as a means to ſatisfy ſenſual pleaſures, as Helvetius ſuppoſes, or, as I think, more probable, to ſecure our independence, which cannot be done otherwiſe, than by a real ſuperiority, or both, is not material; it is certain we affect and deſire to hold a ſuperiority over men much more than over women, though the former cannot contribute to gratify ſenſual pleaſure.

GLORY, acquired by great actions, ſtudy, mathematics, eloquence, &c. do not tend to gratify the ſenſes, yet are more anxiouſly ſought after, than thoſe objects which do; this proves, that intellectual pleaſures and pains affect the human heart more than thoſe which proceed from the ſenſes alone. The deſire of pre-

eminence increaſes, as man riſes in ſociety: in whatever poſition a man is placed, if above want, he aims at ſome advancement in that claſs, of which he is a member; when arrived at the top, he wiſhes to enter into a ſuperior claſs, and ſo on to the end of his career.

When a man is placed low in ſociety, and intirely taken up in procuring food and raiment, he is precluded from the hopes of obtaining ſocial advantages, and approaches to the condition of animals: alſo a rich and powerful man at the head of ſociety, enabled to gratify his wants without labour; his deſires, activity, and principles of action are ſtifled in their birth; his attention is directed to vary his pleaſure of ſenſe, or ſome trivial amuſements, as gaming, hunting, drinking, &c. In the midſt of plenty and ſuperfluities, he is unhappy, and is ſurprized at it; whereas he ſhould conſider that pleaſure derives from ſome degree of pain, which creates in us ſome want or deſire, and therefore the immediate gratifications of them, whether they proceed from animal or ſocial origin, neceſſarily deſtroys the pleaſures of enjoyment, and conſequently that activity by which they muſt be obtained; for this can be exerted only during the interval, which intervenes between the time we wiſh for ſuch a thing, and the enjoyment of it: hence it is, that the greateſt degree of ſocial activity is always in the intermediate claſſes, between the extremes of poverty and of riches.

By ſocial activity, I mean that which tends to advance our rank in ſociety: by animal activity, that which tends to gratify thoſe wants on which our preſervation, or that of the ſpecies depends: it is vain to preach ambition, glory, honours, &c. to a man oppreſſed with miſery; heroiſm, valour, courage, are incompatible with extreme poverty, conſequently theſe and other ſuch affections of the mind can be found only in men placed above want, on whom alone

alone the desire of pre-eminence operates; the mode of acquiring it, and the object vary, according to the different positions of men; in order to increase their activity, you must propose means and objects, analogous to their different situations: the ambition of a merchant is different in its objects from that of the soldier, clergyman, philosopher, &c. whence the several classes, in which society is divided, have their peculiar characteristics.

CHAPTER II.

OF ANIMAL FEAR.

ANIMAL fear arises from the apprehension of some danger, which man and other animals feel inimical to their preservation, and therefore avoid it with the utmost care and caution: the natural effect of fear is flight, unless restrained by superior fear. No animal can be induced to encounter danger without compulsion; when the danger is great, and the hopes of escaping it entirely lost, then despair inspires courage, which produces the utmost exertion of our forces, and generally is crowned with success.

ANIMAL wants always produce action in some degree or other. Extreme fear and pain, arising from want, produce extreme exertion; it is dangerous to contend with man or other animal animated by such powerful motives.

WHEN the soldier really is, or thinks himself, placed in a dangerous situation, without a possibility of escaping, every thing may be expected from him; placed between death and victory, he becomes a hero; but if you expose him for a long time to great danger, and there remains a possibility of avoiding it by flight, he will

fly; becauſe the idea of preſent danger will prevail over the fear of a more remote puniſhment, which he may hope to elude. Moreover a conſiderable body of troops are not ſuſceptible of the fear of puniſhment, becauſe they cannot be all puniſhed, and individuals ſuppoſe each in particular is, that they are not to be ſacrificed: hence it appears, that fear is not a powerful nor effectual principle of exertion, unleſs extreme and deſperate; whereas the deſire of gratifying our wants is; I am therefore ſurprized to ſee generals act upon the contrary ſyſtem; they ſuppoſe fear the only principle of action in the ſoldier, as if he were an animal of a different ſpecies; for, ſurely, they will not acknowledge it as the motive of their own actions.

In our armies, the ſoldier is in fact reduced to the condition of an animal, and like them moved to action by bodily fear and animal wants, being totally excluded from the advantages of ſociety: I aſk, is it neceſſary it ſhould be ſo? No, every man is by nature ſuſceptible of paſſion, his poſition in ſociety may increaſe or diminiſh the ardour with which he purſues a given object; but all men, when free from danger, and their animal wants gratified, are perpetually in ſearch of ſomething, from whence they expect to derive pleaſure; no claſs of men is exempt from the general influence of ambition, conſequently all by ſome motive or other, analogous to their ſituation, may be excited to perform great actions, if the claſs to whom a man belongs is ſuſceptible of it, and in proportion as it is elevated above others.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER III.

OF HONOUR AND SHAME.

HONOUR proceeds from a deſire to gain the public eſteem; ſhame from the fear of loſing it. The particular qualities eſteemed honourable are peculiar to each claſs; valour and contempt of danger in a ſoldier; wiſdom in a ſtateſman; piety and learning in eccleſiaſtics, &c. becauſe theſe in each claſs are moſt uſeful to the community at large.

WHEN the principle of honour and a ſenſe of ſhame are firmly eſtabliſhed in the human heart, they operate more forcibly than the fear of death, and are the ſource of all great and heroic actions: the more elevated the claſs to which a man belongs, and his poſition in it, the greater will be his exertions to gain the eſteem of the public. A man buried in obſcurity is little affected by honour or ſhame; the deſire of pleaſing ceaſes, and he degenerates into a ſavage, and approaches to the ſtate of animals: hence it is that gentlemen are in general more anxious and delicate in what they ſuppoſe concerns their honour, than members of other claſſes; inſtead of depreſſing that claſs of men called ſoldiers, as we do at preſent, every method poſſible ſhould be uſed to raiſe and exalt it: as the difference of claſſes produces more or leſs activity in the purſuit of thoſe objects which are peculiar to them, ſo does that of government, which ſtamps on the whole nation a certain character different from that of others; ſome tend to promote honour and virtue, others to depreſs them.

IN deſpotic governments, there is but one claſs of men, viz. that of the ſoldier, the reſt are an aggregate of individuals, whoſe con-

condition is nearly on a level with that of animals, and like them is totally occupied in procuring the neceſſaries of life.

THE ambition of the ſoldier, confined to his claſs in time of peace, having no motive or opportunity of exerting itſelf, ſinks into ſloth and indolence; hence that lethargy and inaction which prevail in this kind of government, where a man cannot, by any exertions, obtain the public eſteem; where it is dangerous to attempt it, fear will be the only ruling principle which tends to inaction; honour and ſenſe of ſhame are utterly unknown.

IN monarchies the ſubjects are divided into ſeveral claſſes, more or leſs diſtinguiſhed; all may, however, partake of the public eſteem in ſome degree. A man is excited to exert himſelf by the emoluments peculiar to his claſs and ſituations, and by thoſe which he may reap from ſociety in general, and conſequently many and powerful motives concur to promote honour, virtue, and activity, when the ſovereign is a man of genius; but if weak and indolent, the activity of the ſubject will be directed to parade, and extravagancy, art, and intrigue will ſupplant virtue; the talent of pleaſing will be deemed the moſt important; that which is agreeable prevails over what is uſeful.

GREAT exertions are ſeldom found in monarchies, becauſe they are not always the moſt ſure means to obtain the eſteem of the prince; that of the public, which is the moſt powerful incentive to great actions, is unknown: the prince is every thing, the reſt are nothing; the eſteem of the former is the only object of attention, and may often be obtained by very inconſiderable exertions, and by means inconſiſtent with honour and virtue.

THE claſs of ſoldiers being conſidered as the moſt honourable, thoſe of the higher rank in it are reſtrained from committing any unworthy

unworthy actions by the ſenſe of ſhame; but as the great emoluments and rewards are peculiar to the nobility, they expect them from their connections, the favour of the prince and his miniſters or favourites, rather than from any exertions of their own; hence it is, that the certainty of obtaining them in the nobility, and the equal certainty of not obtaining them in the other claſſes, diminiſhes, or rather extinguiſhes the principles of heroiſm in all.

In republics, where all are equal, pre-eminence can be acquired only by perſonal and ſuperior merit; public eſteem is the reward of great and uſeful actions: hence it is that republics, antient and modern, have produced more great men than all the monarchies put together.

In theſe, favour procures every thing; in thoſe, nothing. In republics the utility of the whole is conſidered as worthy of rewards. In monarchies the pleaſure of the prince and of his favourites is the path which leads to pre-eminence. From the different modes of obtaining pre-eminence ariſes the prodigious difference we obſerve in the characters, manners, and exertions of men, as they are influenced by the different ſpecies of governments.

We have ſeen that motives ariſing from bodily fear, and the neceſſity of gratifying our animal wants, unleſs extreme, do not produce any great effects, and that they are not either conſtant or general; and therefore cannot be always applied with advantage. Thoſe which ariſe from the poſition of a man in ſociety, are indeed numberleſs and permanent, but not applicable to all; pre-eminence, and the means by which it is obtained, are within the reach of few perſons and claſſes only; thoſe of inferior rank are excluded entirely; ſo that like animals, it is by fear and want they can be compelled to act; we muſt therefore ſeek for a more general motive which operates on every claſs of men, and on every individual.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IV.

OF RICHES.

WHEN a people is corrupted by luxury, vice, and folly, the influence of riches is ſuperior to that of every other paſſion, becauſe they are an univerſal medium, by which they may all be gratified. Whoever poſſeſſes great riches, is the maſter of others in proportion as he can and will ſatisfy their wants, according to the expreſſion of Virgil, "Nam Deus, mihi ſemper erit, qui," &c. The rich and powerful are treated and adored like a divinity by his worthleſs votaries: as the influence of riches increaſes, that of honour and virtue declines; inſomuch, that not the leaſt traces of them are to be found. However, as we cannot form men to our wiſhes, and muſt take them as they are, it is neceſſary to apply that motive which is analogous to their ideas of good and evil, that we may ſecure their ſubmiſſion, and induce them to exert themſelves in over-coming difficulties and dangers to which the ſoldier is particularly expoſed. As in our ſyſtem he is excluded from the advantages of ſociety, viz. honours, rank, &c. we muſt apply that only medium left us, which can excite him to perform great actions, pecuniary rewards; they muſt however be tranſitory, and the recompence of victory and ſome extraordinary act of valour; they muſt not be exceſſive, and ſuch as put the ſoldier above want. Lands ſhould never be granted to a ſoldier, but when he retires from the ſervice; when by ſucceſſive victories an army is become rich, loaded with ſpoils, baggage, &c. it is ſoon corrupted and ungovernable. I approve of the example of Alexander; Burn them all, diſmiſs the old ſoldier, and ſend him home rich. The toils and dangers of a ſoldier are great, his rewards and enjoy-

enjoyments muſt alſo be great and intenſe, but of ſhort duration; his hopes muſt for ever be kept alive, and his wants ſometimes gratified, even to exceſs.

THE Greek and Roman ſoldier, was animated to encounter dangers, by the hopes of plunder, and the proſpect of obtaining all the honours of the ſtate, to which military virtue moſt certainly led him; the Mahometans by plunder and enthuſiaſm; the Tartars and free-booters, in the American ſeas, by plunder alone; all have performed ſuch actions of valour and heroiſm, as appear incredible to us.

WHEN we compare the motives which inſpired the different nations, with thoſe applied by us, we cannot be ſurprized at the prodigious difference we find in the effects: the cane may make a tolerable ſlave, but can never form a hero; beſides theſe motives of exertion, drawn from fear of bodily pain, from the advantages of ſociety, as honours and pecuniary rewards, there are others leſs general, but more powerful in their effects, viz. Liberty and Religion.

CHAPTER V.

OF LIBERTY.

THE love of liberty and independence is inherent to all animals without exception; their exiſtence depends upon it; they muſt all enjoy it in ſome degree; they muſt ſeek their food, and be able to preſerve themſelves by reſiſtance or flight. Man has ſubdued a great part of the animal ſpecies to his dominion; the greateſt, or rather all the human ſpecies, is alſo brought

to ſubmit to the yoke of the few whom nature had made equals: habituated to his ſituation, man ſubmits with patience, becauſe he knows not the advantage of liberty. In the animal creation thoſe individuals, who are not ſubdued by man, enjoy abſolute liberty; but the human ſpecies, conſtituted in natural or civil ſociety, cannot enjoy that degree of liberty, nor yet be reduced to abſolute ſlavery; he muſt like other animals have ſome degree of liberty to preſerve his life, but he can never attain to abſolute independence; born and bred in ſociety, he is neceſſarily connected with many perſons by the reciprocal wants and ſuccours, which each in particular ſtands in need of: no man, however low or exalted his ſtation may be, can live abſolutely independent; their wants, both natural and ſocial, chain them together, and this is the cauſe and origin of ſociety, of which man alone is ſuſceptible; other animals aggregate, but are independent of each other: man aſſociates becauſe his wants cannot be gratified by his own induſtry alone: our wants and our dependence increaſe together, and produce a voluntary ſubmiſſion to the will of him or them, who are enabled to gratify them; he obeys unreluctantly, becauſe it is a medium by which alone he obtains what he wiſhes for; but when he expects no advantage from his compliance, every command is conſidered as an oppreſſion, in proportion as it tends to deprive him of liberty, property, honour, &c. he will hate the authors, and embrace the firſt opportunity of ſhaking off the yoke, and reſume his natural liberty. There is in the nature of man a certain degree of ſufferance only, beyond which power cannot be exerted with impunity; it produces deſpair, which, if ſupported by any, the moſt trifling means, and conducted with wiſdom, is invincible: tremble, ye mighty monarchs, and beware, the effects of deſpair are terrible.

A PEOPLE reduced to the neceſſity of taking up arms againſt their ſovereign, is obliged to exert itſelf by the fear of a revengeful

vengeful maſter, death and ſlavery, and by the hopes of independency, and all the advantages which attend it; ſuch powerful motives generally render their efforts ſucceſsful.

THE firſt cauſe and object of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or ſuppoſed; the ſecond is to provide for future ſecurity, which can never be effectually done than by deſtroying the ſovereign authority: it is during this conteſt that the greateſt efforts are made, becauſe there is no alternative; freedom or ſlavery is the reſult of it. In proportion as the revolters ſucceed in their attempts, and their danger diminiſhes, their exertions will alſo decline, and if left to themſelves, will probably go no farther; but if you perſevere in attacking them, and treat them with cruelty and contempt, they will not be ſatisfied with any conditions you may grant them, but, moved by revenge, which is a very active principle, purſue their oppreſſors to deſtruction.

HAD Tarquin, had the Spaniards given the revolters time, and diſſembled their reſentments, a more favourable opportunity of regaining their loſt power would have offered, and perhaps the Roman and Dutch republics would never have exiſted. It was the ſenſe of danger, with which they were threatened, which rendered them invincible, and finally crowned their endeavours with ſucceſs.

FROM all we have ſaid, it follows, that the ſovereign in conducting ſuch a war ſhould, by a moderate conduct, diminiſh the idea of danger, and leave room to a ſolid and hearty reconciliation; and that the leaders of a revolt, on the contrary, ſhould ſhew, that no confidence or reliance can be had in the promiſes of an irritated maſter, which are only ſnares to divide, and then puniſh and enſlave thoſe whom he cannot conquer. Men truly animated with the enthuſiaſtic fire of liberty, if properly conducted, are always

ſuperior to thoſe who fight for the power and emoluments of a maſter; the difficulties are all in the beginning of the conteſt. When on one ſide is an army diſciplined, and abundantly provided with every thing which may render its operation ſucceſsful and victorious; on the other, nothing but courage and deſpair, which ariſe from a ſenſe of injuries.

CHAPTER VI.

OF RELIGION.

ALL religions are not equally calculated to produce a ſpirit of enthuſiaſm, ſome lead to an active, others to a ſpeculative life; the Mahometan is among the firſt, and the Chriſtian among the latter. No religion, I know of, offers more powerful motives to action than the Mahometan, none leſs than the Chriſtian. The former promiſes rewards analogous to the nature and inclination of men in general, and particularly adapted to the manners and mode of living of the oriental nations.

VICTORY is rewarded with the ſpoils of the enemy; death in the combat expiates all crimes, and, moreover, leads to pleaſures, which in this world, are conſidered the greateſt man can enjoy, and in the next, are believed to be infinite in intenſity, variety, and duration, embelliſhed with every beauty which a heated imagination can beſtow on them. Inſpired with ſuch powerful motives, it is no wonder the Arabs performed ſuch wonderful atchievements.

THE rewards propoſed by the Chriſtian religion are vague, indetermined, and incomprehenſible, no way analogous to the wants and ſituation of a human being: the general tenor of it is peace and ſubmiſſion,

ſubmiſſion, and therefore extremely well adapted to promote the deſigns of tyranny and deſpotiſm in whomſoever power is lodged.

THE Chriſtians take not arms, like the Mahometans, to propagate their dogma which prohibits it.

THE ambition of the clergy has, however, covered the earth with blood and ſlaughter; violated rights, oppreſſion real or ſuppoſed, were the pretext, but generally ambition was the true cauſe. Whenever religion is made a motive of war, the effects are more vigorous and deciſive, than when it proceeds from other cauſes.

ETERNAL pains and pleaſures are motives which act more forcibly than any other derived from human and tranſitory origin. Theſe wars are generally cruel, and every means to deſtroy the enemy are eſteemed lawful; hence treachery, aſſaſſinations, breach of faith, &c. are common in ſuch wars. They fight for the honour of the Divinity; to murder his enemies is a grateful ſacrifice: againſt men animated by religious enthuſiaſm, much caution is required, particularly againſt the attempts of individuals; avoid the firſt impulſe, victors or vanquiſhed, truſt them not.

IGNORANCE, the only foundation of clerical power and influence, is greatly diminiſhed in Europe, and a ſpirit of toleration prevails. If the people are ſuffered to enjoy their opinions in peace, they will no longer be made the tools of the ambitious and intriguing clergy, to diſturb and ſubvert the ſtate. The clerical order, in moſt religions, is very dangerous, and muſt be watched with a vigilant eye; unleſs he is totally ſubordinate to the civil power, he will diſturb and uſurp it if he can; he muſt be ſtrictly confined to the exerciſe of his paſtoral functions, and never ſuffered to interfere in public affairs.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VII.

OF WOMEN,

AND THEIR

INFLUENCE ON THE HUMAN HEART.

THE origin and foundation of that attachment, which the two ſexes feel for each other, is without doubt in our animal wants, and if confined to this alone, would upon gratification, as in other animals, be immediately diſſolved; but our ſocial wants cement that union by habit, and in proportion as they can, will aid and ſupport each other. It is obſervable, that this reciprocal attachment and friendſhip are much ſtronger in the lower and middling claſſes of ſociety, than in the more elevated. The firſt by their ſituation are, in a great meaſure, precluded from the pleaſures and amuſements derived from general ſociety, being chiefly employed in procuring the neceſſaries of life; confined within a domeſtic circle, it is there alone they muſt find content and happineſs. They ſtand in need of each other continually for the ſupport and pleaſure of life; habit confirms the union, friendſhip, calm and peaceable friendſhip, ſucceeds that tumultuous and tranſitory paſſion called love.

PEOPLE of high rank, are much leſs attached to each other, becauſe they ſtand leſs in need of each other; ſo that when their ſenſual wants are gratified, they do not feel that mutual dependence, which is the only chain by which man and woman, as well as ſociety in general, are tied and linked together; hence it follows, that they recur to foreign aid (if I may ſo call it) for pleaſure; the domeſtic

domeſtic chain is broke, a general diſſipation and reciprocal coolneſs enſue, and nothing but the appearance of an union between man and wife ſubſiſts. The great have ſuch a facility in obtaining the objects of their wiſhes, that they anticipate pleaſure, and by that means debilitate, and finally deſtroy the powers of enjoyment, which reduces them to a ſtate of apathy and inſenſibility; hence that ennui and melancholy is the cauſe and origin of ſuicide.

THERE are two periods in a man's life, in which the influence of women is great and almoſt irreſiſtible; youth and old age: in the former our ſenſual wants, and the paſſion ariſing from them, make the gratification of them a phyſical neceſſity, which, like other paſſions, increaſe in proportion to the obſtacles we meet with, ſo that it may produce rage, fury, and madneſs.

THE paſſion of love, that is, the deſire of enjoying a particular woman, ariſes from the difficulty of obtaining her; would ſhe inſtantly comply and gratify our wiſhes, our attachment would ceaſe, unleſs by her art in managing our other paſſions, ſhe can ſubſtitute ſocial wants, which never die, to thoſe extinguiſhed by a too eaſy gratification.

MEN advanced in years are thruſt out of general ſociety, which obliges them to live within the compaſs of a narrow circle of acquaintance, much at home, man is in continual want of ſupport to prop him up like an old tree. In theſe circumſtances, his wife, or ſome other favourite, has a powerful influence over him, and directs all his meaſures. The reſult of all this is, that if women lived more retired, their influence would increaſe in proportion, as they keep men at a diſtance, as we ſee in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, &c. Our manners in Europe are incompatible with the power which women might

might enjoy in the ſtate; could they be made the recompenſe of honourable actions, we ſhould ſee great exertions to deſerve their eſteem and favour.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MUSIC.

THE power of muſic, over the heart, is very great and might therefore be made uſe of to raiſe or calm the paſſions. It were to be wiſhed ſome able muſician and philoſopher would make experiments, by executing different pieces, to a promiſcuous audience of men and women of different ages, ſoldiers in particular; the reſult would ſhew what ſpecies of harmony was moſt adapted to raiſe courage in the troops. I would recommend this to Mr. Harris of Saliſbury, whoſe abilities and penetration are known and eſteemed by all: a treatiſe, the philoſophy of muſic, would be a new and important work worthy his pen.

PART

PART THE THIRD.

OF THE

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENTS

AND

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

AS our armies are armed and diſciplined in the ſame manner, it is natural to conclude, that the final ſucceſs of a war depends intirely on the goodneſs of the troops, and the abilities of the commanders. Though this may be true in general, there are, I think, other cauſes which muſt concur with thoſe above-mentioned; for, in the hiſtory of various wars, I find that ſome very extenſive and apparently powerful empires have been eaſily ſubddued; whereas other inconſiderable ſtates have made an incredible, and often ſucceſsful reſiſtance.

WHEN I conſider the wars carried on by the Perſians in Greece, with thoſe of Alexander the Great in Aſia, between the Romans and Carthaginians, thoſe of the Tartars in China and other parts of Aſia, thoſe of the Mahometans in Aſia and Europe, I perceive a prodigious difference in the duration and final ſucceſs of them;

from whence I infer, that the difference of government contributed as much towards it, as the goodneſs of the troops, or the genius of the commanders.

We muſt inveſtigate the reaſon, why in ſuch circumſtances, and againſt ſuch an enemy, a victory or two have been followed by the conqueſt of an empire, whereas twenty obtained againſt a much weaker in appearance, have produced no deciſive advantage. For want of examining this ſubject, we conſider all enemies as perfectly alike, we have but one mode of acting, though ſurely there is an eſſential difference, both in theory and practice, between deſpotic, monarchic, and republican governments, which operates continually on every branch of adminiſtration, civil and military; it will therefore be highly neceſſary to ſhew, that this difference ought to be conſidered as a principal circumſtance in forming a plan of war, becauſe on weighing it maturely, we ſhall find it to be the main ſpring of military operations, and that, as this is ſtrong or weak, active and rapid, ſlow or languid, ſo will finally be the reſults of them.

CHAPTER II.

OF DESPOTIC GOVERNMENTS.

It is by no means eaſy to define the meaning of words, and without exact definitions, our reaſonings will be vague and unconcluſive. Monteſquieu defines this ſpecies of government, "a government by caprice," as if the edict of a monarch, a plebiſite, or an act of parliament might not equally be the effect of caprice, as an order of the ſultan. This definition, like many others of the ſame author, ſignifies nothing.

The

THE ſovereign power, whether placed in one or more perſons, is by its nature arbitrary and abſolute; the mode in which it is exerciſed varies, which gives a peculiar character to each government. This difference in the mode of adminiſtering the ſovereign power ariſes, firſt, from the different manner by which it was acquired, and muſt be analogous to it, varied more or leſs, according to the phyſical and political mode of exiſtence of the ſubjects.

DOMINION is acquired ſometimes by diſpoſſeſſing the ſovereign only; the conqueror aſſumes his place, the people ſubmit, and the conqueſt is complete. This always happens in deſpotic governments, where the whole power of the ſtate, or rather, I may ſay, the ſtate itſelf, is centered in the perſon of the ſovereign: when he is deſtroyed, the war is finiſhed; for there is in the power of no other man, or body of men, a right, or a ſufficient power to collect new forces capable of making the leaſt reſiſtance. Submiſſion is the common lot of all. In ſuch circumſtances there can be but two claſſes of men, the one ſlaves, and the other armed, compoſed of the conquerors, comparatively leſs numerous.

THE country can be no otherwiſe kept in ſubjection, than by diſtributing the troops in the different provinces, whoſe firſt object is to deſtroy whatever may give ſuſpicion of a revolt, the next is to raiſe tributes. The manner of putting theſe inſtructions in practice, muſt neceſſarily be arbitrary, and depend totally upon the will of the Pacha, in whom, like the Roman proconſuls, in conquered provinces, all power, civil and military, is veſted. The people poſſeſſing nothing by any ſpecies of right, there is no room for laws, or any tribunals to interpret them; the will of the governor is the law, from whoſe deciſion there is no appeal, for this ſuppoſes rights, laws, tribunals, &c.

THE different provinces, are not in Aſia, as in European governments, united to the throne by the ties of general laws and mutual obligation, which form a common center, to which all tends, and a general ſyſtem of union and intercourſe between the different parts enſues, which makes what is called a NATION. It is not a ſociety political or civil, but a ſimple aggregation of individuals, like a flock of ſheep, whoſe exiſtence depends on the will of the Pacha or governor. Hence it is, that the deſpot does not himſelf, and by general laws, govern his dominions, nor do the different provinces form one political empire, but ſo many tributary provinces, whoſe chiefs, under different characters, govern them with an abſolute ſway, on condition of keeping them in ſubjection, and paying yearly a certain tribute.

THE ſituation of the Pacha being precarious, he has no intereſt in the welfare of the ſubject, his adminiſtration tends only to enrich himſelf, that he may ſecure an intereſt at court, which often produces a contrary effect; he is ſacrificed to appeaſe thoſe whom he has plundered; his treaſures are his real crime.

FROM conqueſts aroſe every where a kind of fœdal ſyſtem: hence the nabobs in India, the timariots in Turkey, and barons, counts, &c. in Europe, among whom the conquered lands were diſtributed on different conditions; at firſt at the pleaſure of the prince only, as now in Turkey, but in other parts, as in Germany, and the reſt of Europe, they became hereditary; we make acquiſitions, but no conqueſts.

IN making, as well as in ſecuring conqueſts, it is evident that the whole force of the ſtate is placed in the military, which, indeed, is the only claſs of men, united by ſome general rules, whoſe object can be no other than military diſcipline and ſubordination.

IN

In time of war the ſoldiery is kept in order by the fear of the enemy, and the hopes of plunder, induced to obey, and execute the commands of his ſuperiors unreluctantly; but when the conqueſt is made, and the country totally ſubdued, no longer awed by the preſence of an enemy, nor kept together by any ſenſe of danger, he feels himſelf the maſter, both of the enſlaved people, and of his ſovereign, grows ſlothful, inſolent, and formidable to both. An attempt to inforce order and diſcipline is followed by a mutiny; the commander's head muſt be taken off to appeaſe it. That once formidable and victorious army is now degenerated into a tumultuous rabble. The ſultan is indeed perfectly ſecure againſt the ſubjects, but expoſed to much greater danger, which continually threatens him from his own troops.

The governors of the diſtant provinces, cannot by force, be kept in due ſubordination, and from fear of puniſhment, which they know they deſerve, are often tempted to revolt. In this caſe, the ſultan is obliged to diſſemble, and recur to aſſaſſination, or oppoſe a ſucceſſor; he dares not march in perſon at the head of his guards to quell a revolt, being equally afraid of an armed force, wherever aſſembled, and by whomſoever it is commanded.

To preſerve the tranquillity of the ſtate, and keep danger far from the ſeraglio, is in this government a maxim of ſtate; for this purpoſe, the troops are diſperſed in ſmall bodies over the empire; ſo that there is no where any conſiderable force, excepting in the capital, who, feeling themſelves the maſters, are dangerous to the prince and his miniſters, and intirely corrupted by ſloth and indolence.

An army cannot acquire ſtrength, diſcipline, and ſubordination, unleſs the troops are kept together in time of peace, continually exerciſed

exerciſed in the garriſons and in the field, and often engaged in actual war; all which is incompatible with the principles of a deſpotic government. All armies degenerate by a long peace, and chiefly thoſe of a deſpot. Diſperſed, as they are, over an immenſe country, it is with great difficulty they are collected together and brought into the field, which is always very late, and never until the corn is grown, to feed their numerous cavalry. For the ſame reaſon they cannot continue long in any given ſpot, and the campaign laſts only a few months; they muſt retire for want of proviſions.

THE greateſt part of the Turkiſh army, like our ancient militia, ſerve only for a certain time, when this is elapſed, they go home, and abandon the poſts confided to them, whether they are relieved by other troops or not, which happened at Georgowa and Ibrailow, on the Danube, a few days after they had repulſed the Ruſſians with very conſiderable loſs. Unaccuſtomed to the diſcipline and ſubordination of a regular army, they do not act on a conſtant and regular plan; they march, camp, and fight in a looſe and diſorderly manner, inſomuch, that if attacked briſkly, they can never form, ſo as to make any tolerable reſiſtance.

CHANCE, the caprice of a Pacha, or of a few men who advance to ſkirmiſh, very often bring on a general engagement, or rather a multiplicity of partial actions, without any unity of object or deſign. In their attacks, from ignorance and the irregularity with which they are made, totally unconnected with each other, they are the more violent and impetuous, and extremely dangerous, if not oppoſed with vigour and firmneſs. The defeat of this or that body does not, as with us, prevent the others from advancing and breaking your line if they can; and if they ſucceed in one or two points, the great number of horſe, who act ſingly, gives

gives them a prodigious activity. They over-run and ſpread themſelves over the whole country; no ground is impervious to them; ſo that an army, once broke, can ſcarcely avoid a general deſtruction, unleſs favoured in its retreat by ſome particular circumſtances, and an uncommon firmneſs and conduct of the general. For theſe reaſons ſuch troops are formidable and dangerous in their aſſaults; but weak, when attacked, and eaſily thrown into confuſion, broke, and totally diſſipated if purſued with vigour, but with great order and caution; for ſometimes ſtrong parties will ſtop ſhort, and if they perceive you are in diſorder, will attack you with impetuoſity, and often with ſucceſs.

THE Aſiatic troops generally carry into the field all they poſſeſs, which greatly embarraſſes them, and in caſe of a defeat, makes their loſs irretrievable; for not being able to make any kind of diſpoſition for a retreat, camp, artillery, equipage, &c. is abandoned to the victors, and all without exception ſeek their ſafety in flight; a great part goes home and returns no more. At preſent, that enthuſiaſm, which rendered them for the moſt part victorious, is totally extinguiſhed; plunder is now the only motive which ſpurs them to action; if ſucceſsful, they are extremely formidable; if otherwiſe, they deſpond, and can with difficulty, and generally not at all, be brought a ſecond time to face the enemy. A defeat, for the moſt part, is followed by the diſgrace and baniſhment or death of the Vizir, to appeaſe the troops who cannot be puniſhed, and muſt not be ſuppoſed guilty. A new general, a new army, much worſe than the former, is collected with difficulty, and brought into the field very late in the ſeaſon. This, intimidated by the defeat of the former, ſcarce can be induced to approach the enemy, and far from attacking or oppoſing him with vigour, retires, or rather flies as he advances, abandoning one poſt after another, and finally the whole province; ſo that you have nothing

nothing to do but march to the capital, which you will certainly find deſerted.

THE Sultan, corrupted by ignorance, flattery, and a falſe opinion of his greatneſs and power, is terrified at your approach, intimidated by the clamours of the rabble and a mutinous army, has no other reſource for his perſonal ſafety, but in a precipitate flight. The inſtant the deſpot diſappears, reſiſtance is at an end; as the whole force of the ſtate is placed in the army. This being defeated, if purſued with vigour, the conqueſt of the empire is rapid and complete, which nothing can retard but want of proviſions; theſe being ſecured, proceed with confidence and be aſſured of ſucceſs.

IN general, deſpotic empires are very extenſive, from whence ariſe two bad conſequences: firſt, their frontiers muſt be weak, in proportion to its extent. Secondly, That their armies come late into the field, and being loaded with equipages, and moreover accompanied by a crowd of followers under different denominations, ſubject to no order or diſcipline. The country is ſoon exhauſted, ſo that they cannot keep the field above three months; if you can check their operations in the beginning, they retire and leave you at liberty to proſecute your plan without any oppoſition.

FROM ignorance, or rather from deſign, they have no ſtrong places; ſo that nothing can retard your operations but their army, or want of ſubſiſtence, and that being defeated, and this ſubſiſtence provided, you meet with no other obſtacles but ſuch as ariſe from the nature of the country. As theſe armies are very numerous, particularly their cavalry, it is dangerous to act againſt them by detachments, unleſs they are intimidated by a previous defeat, then indeed it may be done with leſs danger, but never with

with ſucceſs, and you are prevented from acting vigorouſly in any part if you pretend to act in many at the ſame time.

ROMANZOW followed another plan, and loſt many detachments, and if the Turks had known any thing of war, his whole army would have been deſtroyed ſeparately. By this prepoſterous mode of making war, it was protracted till the Ruſſian empire was intirely exhauſted, inſomuch, that the whole force, which could be collected againſt the Turks in 1774, did not exceed 50,000 men, though above 300,000 recruits had been raiſed during the courſe of the war. When the peace was concluded, there was ſubſiſtence only for ſix weeks. Poland was totally ruined.

IN the winter previous to the laſt campaign, the author of this work, then a general officer in the Ruſſian ſervice, had the honour to preſent a plan for the enſuing campaign, to the empreſs, ſhewing the neceſſity of paſſing the Danube, as the only means of obtaining an honourable peace, which a battle or two at moſt would procure.

THE plan was adopted, and had the moſt complete ſucceſs. Two vigorous actions, the one conducted by lieutenant-general Kamenſkoi, and his ſubſequent operations, and the other by the author of this hiſtory, forced the Vizir to conclude a peace within a month from the opening of the campaign; had not ſome political reaſons, and the interior diſturbances raiſed by Pugacheff interfered, the Ruſſian army might in a few weeks have been in poſſeſſion of Conſtantinople.

THE concluſion of what we have ſaid is, that a defenſive war cannot be made with ſucceſs againſt this ſpecies of troops, and conſequently you muſt always attack them with all your forces, guided

by prudence and caution, and ſupplied with proviſions, ſucceſs and conqueſt will be your reward. In deſpotic governments reſiſtance diminiſhes as you approach the capital, where it vaniſhes intirely.

CHAPTER III.

OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS.

THOUGH in this ſpecies of government, as well as in thoſe called deſpotic, the whole power of the ſtate, legiſlative and executive, are united in one and the ſame perſon; yet they differ totally in the mode of exerciſing the ſovereign authority. This difference ariſes from many cauſes.

FIRST, From the different ſtate of the conquered people; if theſe are civilized, enjoy fixed and hereditary property, and of courſe are governed by known and permanent laws, the civil government will be in a great meaſure preſerved, as in China, India, and England, in the conqueſt of which countries the ſovereign was diſplaced rather than the nations conquered; for in all of them property was fixed in ſomebody, and the civil government more or leſs preſerved. If the ſubjects of a conquered country were ſlaves, they continue in that ſtate becauſe the victors are more intent on ſecuring their conqueſts, than in forming a code of laws.

SECONDLY, From the different condition of the conquerors, if theſe were ſlaves and mercenaries, the new government will be military and arbitrary; the chief will be conſidered as ſole and univerſal proprietor of the country and the people ſubdued; but if the victors were a free people, a certain degree of freedom will prevail in the government of the conquered country.

THE

THE northern people, who ſubdued the ſouthern parts of Europe, were an aggregate of free tribes, or ſmall nations, each conducted by its particular chief, ſubject in the field to one elective general. When the conqueſt was made, the lands were divided among theſe chiefs, and ſub-divided by them among their followers; the vanquiſhed were made ſlaves. The victors preſerved their ancient rights and liberties, exerciſed every ſpecies of juriſdiction within their reſpective domains.

THE king had ſcarce any authority over the lords, nor could any public meaſure be adopted without the conſent of parliament. The king, like them, lived on the revenues of his private patrimony; for it ſeems there was not then, as now, a conſtant and public revenue; wherever the property is fixed and hereditary, civil liberty muſt ſubſiſt, and be an inſurmountable barrier to deſpotiſm, and, vice verſa, a military government will neceſſarily enſue, when property is fluctuating, uncertain, and dependent on the will of any one perſon. This is the true and only characteriſtic by which theſe different ſpecies of governments are diſtinguiſhed. In the firſt caſe, the ſovereign authority is adminiſtered by known and general laws. In the other there can be none; and every operation of government is particularly iſolated, and adapted to a given circumſtance, without antecedent, or conſequent, in the ſame manner as in the conduct of an army in the field.

THE clergy, by their great poſſeſſions, and their influence over the people, became very powerful and formidable, when their religion was embraced by the conquerors. As they alone poſſeſſed the little learning then known, they were placed every where at the head of affairs.

THE Roman law was introduced into all courts of juſtice, and it may be truly ſaid, that the popes were the univerſal legiſlators

of the chriſtian world. Having acquired fiefs, the heads of the clergy of courſe had ſeats in the national aſſemblies, like the temporal lords, and exerciſed the ſame juriſdictions within their domains.

As all the landed property was in the lords and their followers, it is evident that the government was an ariſtocracy, like that of Poland, where the king is nothing, and the people in general are ſlaves; ſo far from encroaching on the rights of others, the king could not preſerve his own, but by oppoſing parties to parties, and fomenting the quarrels then very frequent among the great, becauſe the executive power was too weak to controul them.

It is eaſy to perceive, that the military art was then at a very low ebb: in this anarchy Europe remained for ſome centuries; at length induſtry produced a new order of men; the people became free, acquired riches, privileges, and power; towns were incorporated, and ſhared in the legiſlative power; a ſyſtem of rights was eſtabliſhed; the influence of the crown increaſed with that of the people, while that of the lords was diminiſhed and reduced within proper bounds; violence and diſorder vaniſhed, a certain degree of vigour in the adminiſtration of affairs prevailed, which of courſe produced peace and tranquillity in the ſtate.

Such a diſtribution of the ſovereign power in king, lords, and commons, ſeems the moſt perfect of any which human wiſdom can invent, provided they are kept ſeparate and independent of each other; whereas nothing could be more abſurd and inconſiſtent with the happineſs of mankind, than the fœdal ſyſtem, which ſuppoſes the ſlavery of the greateſt part, and where the violence and oppreſſion of the few could not be checked, puniſhed, or controlled.

The happy ſyſtem of government above-mentioned continued for ſome centuries throughout all Europe; a juſt diſtribution of power

power ſecured political and civil liberty to all in ſome degree. At length, however, the king, in whom the executive power was lodged, by time and perſeverance, deſtroyed in moſt ſtates the fœdal and hereditary juriſdictions; by keeping ſtanding armies, introducing pomp, parade, and expence, he reduced the nobility to want and a total dependence on the crown; what would never have been executed by force, was imperceptibly and peaceably done by luxury alone; neither nobles nor burghers participated any longer of the legiſlative power, they retained their civil rights and ſome perſonal privileges, ad honorem only; ſo that the whole power of the ſtate, legiſlative and executive, was made hereditary in one family, and of courſe political liberty vaniſhed.

THUS a free government, the moſt perfect of any that ever ſubſiſted, was deſtroyed, and that of one man ſubſtituted in its room, which muſt generally happen, "becauſe the executive power acts "conſtantly and ſyſtematically againſt the legiſlative, and being "in poſſeſſion of the forces and revenues of the ſtate, will, by force "or ſeduction, reduce it to dependence and ſervitude, which is "proved by the hiſtory of all republics."

THOUGH the monarch poſſeſſes all the powers of the ſtate, like the ſultan, yet he cannot exerciſe them in the ſame manner; for in monarchies the ſubjects enjoy the ſame civil rights, privileges, and immunities, which they poſſeſſed while the government was free, excepting thoſe by which they partook of the ſovereign power: hence it is, that the different mode of acquiring the ſovereign power, and the different ſituation of the people in Europe and Aſia, neceſſarily oblige the monarch to exerciſe his powers by general laws; whereas the deſpot muſt act occaſionally as circumſtances require, that is, in a military manner.

WHILE

WHILE the fœdal ſyſtem prevailed, and even for ſome time after, the third ſtate, or the burghers, participated of the legiſlative power. The militia was connected with the ſtate, but raiſed and armed only at certain times when thought neceſſary. The revenue of the crown was not ſufficient to maintain an army conſtantly, nor did the nature of that kind of government admit it. The crown or executive power, which in every government is inimical to liberty, pretended to find that the militia was ineffectual to defend the ſtate; every method was uſed to aboliſh it, and ſubſtitute a ſtanding army in its room, which ſhould depend intirely on the will of the king.

THIS ſcheme ſucceeded, and from that moment political liberty vaniſhed, and civil liberty became often precarious. The army as ſuch, is no longer a claſs in the ſtate, but a mere inſtrument of power in the hands of the crown, and the more dangerous when compoſed of men without birth or fortune, becauſe they depend more intirely on the will of their leader. It is now formed of two ſpecies of men, the higheſt and loweſt in the ſtate.

THE nobility deprived of that conſequence, which they enjoyed by the fœdal ſyſtem, very naturally reſumed the profeſſion of their forefathers and took to arms; they retained many of their ancient privileges, and by attaching themſelves to the ſovereign, acquired new honours, employments, and riches; he alone was therefore conſidered as the fountain of all advantages which could be acquired in the ſtate.

THE manners of a court naturally produce great expences, which render thoſe connected with it totally ſubſervient to the will of the prince.

THE

THE nobility and gentry form the firſt claſs in this ſpecies of government, and are immediately connected with the monarch.

THE claſs of the law derives its importance from the laws, and is therefore attached to their due execution in oppoſition to government, who always conſiders them as an obſtacle to arbitrary adminiſtration: whenever this claſs of men are reduced to few, eaſily intimidated or corrupted, a civil tyranny (the moſt barbarous of all tyrannies) will enſue, as in Rome during the government of the Cæſars.

THE other claſſes of the ſtate look up to this as the only protector of their rights and liberties; individuals may be ſeduced, but this whole body cannot be ſo for any conſiderable time; it is againſt its intereſt, becauſe it would be deſtroying the ſource of their exiſtence and importance.

THOUGH in monarchies the armies are mere mercenaries, yet will they concur to enforce arbitrary power only to a certain length, becauſe the greateſt part of the officers, choſen from the nobility and gentry, enjoys privileges which give them conſequence independent of the prince, and unite them in ſome degree to the ſtate; theſe are perpetual and hereditary, whereas the advantages they derive from the prince are temporary and perſonal, and when put in oppoſition to each other, they firſt prevail, particularly if any attack is made, which affects the body of the nobility and gentry.

THESE circumſtances, we conceive, prevent a monarchy armed with a numerous band of mercenaries from degenerating into a military and deſpotic government, which always happens in thoſe ſtates, where the ſoldier is unconnected with the ſtate, and intirely dependent on the monarch.

IN

In the preceding chapter, we have ſhewn, that a mercenary army is equally fatal to the nation and to the ſovereign; it is therefore ſurprizing princes ſhould be ſo deſirous to eſtabliſh an arbitrary and military government.

When we conſider, that all power is centered in the monarch alone, one would conclude, that he ſhould act with more vigour than is uſually ſeen.

The adminiſtration of all civilized governments, where the people are divided into various claſſes, and enjoy certain privileges, will be found intirely republican, being divided into many ſeparate departments, and the mode of adminiſtering the provinces various, there cannot be that unity and energy as in deſpotic governments, the wheels of this complicated machine are neceſſarily clogged, and with difficulty can be brought to act together uniformly and vigorouſly. The different departments have not an equal ſhare of activity; intereſt, ignorance, and intrigue interfere, ſo that the whole moves more ſlowly than could naturally be expected from this kind of government; for which reaſon, military operations, whoſe eſſence is celerity and vigour, are not attended with the ſame ſucceſs as in deſpotic governments, unleſs the ſovereign is an able man, and leads his armies in perſon. In this caſe, they are nearly equal in vigour, and much more conſiſtent than in any other ſpecies of government.

The ſovereign and his officers are, however, chained to the empire; they have a home, where they expect the reward of their actions and enjoyment of life. Hence it is, that after a few months campaign, they continually look back, and with impatience wait the happy moment to retire; there is nothing ſo arduous but the troops will execute, provided it leads to a concluſion. The want

THE nobility and gentry form the firſt claſs in this ſpecies of government, and are immediately connected with the monarch.

THE claſs of the law derives its importance from the laws, and is therefore attached to their due execution in oppoſition to government, who always conſiders them as an obſtacle to arbitrary adminiſtration: whenever this claſs of men are reduced to few, eaſily intimidated or corrupted, a civil tyranny (the moſt barbarous of all tyrannies) will enſue, as in Rome during the government of the Cæſars.

THE other claſſes of the ſtate look up to this as the only protector of their rights and liberties; individuals may be ſeduced, but this whole body cannot be ſo for any conſiderable time; it is againſt its intereſt, becauſe it would be deſtroying the ſource of their exiſtence and importance.

THOUGH in monarchies the armies are mere mercenaries, yet will they concur to enforce arbitrary power only to a certain length, becauſe the greateſt part of the officers, choſen from the nobility and gentry, enjoys privileges which give them conſequence independent of the prince, and unite them in ſome degree to the ſtate; theſe are perpetual and hereditary, whereas the advantages they derive from the prince are temporary and perſonal, and when put in oppoſition to each other, they firſt prevail, particularly if any attack is made, which affects the body of the nobility and gentry.

THESE circumſtances, we conceive, prevent a monarchy armed with a numerous band of mercenaries from degenerating into a military and deſpotic government, which always happens in thoſe ſtates, where the ſoldier is unconnected with the ſtate, and intirely dependent on the monarch.

IN

differ. Their wars, when carried into diſtant countries, are without plan or vigour; parry only the firſt impetuoſity, their efforts will ſucceſſively diminiſh, and at length vaniſh intirely.

CHAPTER IV.

OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT.

FROM what we have ſaid of the military ſtate, it appears that republican governments are not in general analogous to it, particular circumſtances may however give them the activity required to operate with vigour abroad and at home; if preſſed they ſeldom want it.

IN democracy there can be no ſtanding army, nor mercenaries, ſuch power lodged in the hands of one man, which we think eſſential for the command of troops, is incompatible with the ſafety of the ſtate; the military force muſt be formed out of a militia of citizens, who from their ſituations cannot act far from their country, nor for any conſiderable time. An offenſive war is, therefore, contrary to the principle of exiſtence of a democracy; even a defenſive war, unleſs the dominions are extenſive, would ſoon exhauſt the ſtate, becauſe the taking great numbers from their daily labours would ſoon reduce them for want of ſubſiſtence.

THE wars of ſuch a people are generally of ſhort duration, and confined to an excurſion of a month or two, which may be repeated for many years, as in the Peloponneſian war, a great battle, which ſeldom occurs, puts an end to the conteſt, if the dominions are much contracted, which was the caſe in Greece and in Italy; during the

the firſt five hundred years of Rome, we read often of a war being finiſhed in a very few days.

FROM what we have ſaid, it appears, that a republican government is by no means calculated for long and diſtant wars; the main ſpring is too complicated to produce that vigour, unity, and perſeverance required to conduct military operations; accordingly we find that ſuch enterprizes have been generally fatal. But as every citizen conſiders himſelf as cloſely united to the ſtate, they concur heartily in its defence, and always exert themſelves in proportion as they are preſſed, aud diſpute the laſt inch of ground with more vigour than the preceding. The idea and advantage of liberty recur in their full force, and very often excite an ardour and enthuſiaſm not to be overcome, which is verified by a thouſand examples; a democracy, therefore, is of all others the beſt calculated for a defenſive and the leaſt for an offenſive war. Particular circumſtances, and for the moſt part local, determine and ſtamp a character on each republic, according to its mode of exiſtence.

CARTHAGE, ſituated on a barren ſhore, confined on the land ſide by various and powerful nations, was neceſſarily forced, like the Dutch in our own times, to turn their thoughts to induſtry, commerce, and navigation, which led them by degrees to explore, and then to conquer, or acquire ſettlements in Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, Minorca, &c. which often involved that republic in wars, which could not be carried on at ſuch a diſtance without ſtanding armies, the people almoſt wholly employed in arts and trade could not compoſe thoſe armies, which in time became a checkered multitude of mercenaries and allies, of various nations, which wanted unity, on which chiefly the force of armies depends: they were, however, ſufficient againſt the different people they contended with, particularly when their operations were confined to the

iſlands and the coaſt, becauſe their fleets could co-operate with ſucceſs, and had they carried their views no farther, they might probably have exiſted many ages longer; but long and diſtant wars, ſupported only by money and mercenaries, brought on neceſſarily their diſtreſs and final deſtruction.

THE power of a republican government being very complicated, loſes its force in proportion as it is extended, like the ſpring of a watch, and acquires vigour as it is compreſſed; moreover, diſtant and military commands require and aſſume greater powers than are compatible with the ſafety of the ſtate: hence thoſe eternal jealouſies and intrigues againſt their commanders, which always weaken his operations, and often render his victories uſeleſs, becauſe in fact they might become dangerous.

IT is eaſy to ſee, that confederate republics being more complicated, are ſtill leſs proper for war, either offenſive or defenſive; their total want of unity, or rather total ſeparation of views and intereſts, render their reſolutions ſlow, and their operations languid; inſomuch, that if any member of the confederacy is preſſed or ſubdued, he ſeeks his ſafety in ſubmiſſion, rather than expect the ſupport of his confederates.

SWITZERLAND, aided by the nature of the country, and by a good militia, formed in the arts of war at the expence of European princes, is an exception to this rule, and, I am perſuaded, would make ſucceſsful efforts againſt any invader.

SUCH being the mode of exiſtence of a confederate republic, I am ſurprized Rouſſeau ſhould think it poſſible to give it a force and energy equal to that of the moſt powerful ſtate. If many, or all, are placed in a country acceſſible at all, by occupying any poſt, you

you will cut off the communication between them, and prevent them from ever uniting their forces, and by preſſing one member alone ſoon break the confederacy, which is proved by the examples of the ſeveral Grecian confederacies.

THE reſiſtance and final ſucceſs of Lewis the Fourteenth aroſe from the nature of his enemies, the defection of a principal ally rendered ten ſucceſsful campaigns fruitleſs, in the war 1740. The languor and fear of the Dutch, the nature of a confederate army, oppoſed to a monarchical one, independent of the difference of ability in the commanders, gave that war the iſſue it had.

THE ſuperior talents of a chief may give force and unity to an army compoſed of troops of various nations, as Hannibal did; but nothing can for a conſiderable time, particularly if unſucceſsful, give it to a confederate army, when the numbers of the confederacy are nearly upon an equality.

THE views of the different parties ſeldom coincide in the various points, which occur in a long and extenſive war; when oppoſed to ſuch an army, temporize, uſe inſinuations and ſeductions; ſome one or other of the parties will grow tired and fall under the temptation, or attack vigorouſly the dominions of one of the members; this will create a powerful diverſion, and probably bring on his defection, which will ſoon break the confederacy.

IT is dangerous to oppoſe ſuch an army in front the firſt campaign; emulation and hopes of ſucceſs give them vigour; it were expedient to anticipate their union by occupying ſome capital poſt, and prevent them from joining at all, which is eaſily done, as the motions of ſuch troops are generally very ſlow, and recruits, ſtores, &c. brought from different places, and often from a great diſtance.

ROME:

ROME in its infancy, ſurrounded by many different people, was placed in that critical ſituation, where it was neceſſary to periſh or conquer. It happened, as it generally does with men thus ſituated, they conquered ſucceſſively all their adverſaries; they acquired by the ſword, and muſt preſerve their acquiſitions by the ſword.

THIS celebrated people, if placed at the mouth of the Tiber, thirty miles from the ſpot they occupied, would have become fiſhermen at firſt, and perhaps a ſmall commercial republic, and diſappeared; but placed where it was, their exiſtence depended on the ſword alone.

AFTER the expulſion of their kings it became a democracy, and every citizen was bred and trained a ſoldier; it was the only trade; the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief occupation was war, which continued without intermiſſion for near five hundred years, attacking or attacked; ſcarce a year paſſed without ſome military operation.

NECESSITY firſt made that republic purely military, their particular form of government rendered it ſo afterwards; the right was in the people, but the power really in the ſenate; the continual abuſe of it occaſioned thoſe diſputes and contentions which diſturbed the tranquillity of the ſtate, and more than once brought it on the brink of deſtruction.

THE ſenate, far from deſiſting from encroaching on the people, became daily more wanton in their oppreſſions; to ſecure their uſurpations the moſt proper method was, to engage the people in continual wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a diſtance.

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THIS was a temporary remedy, but in the end proved fatal to the republic; for the force of the people was great, and wanted only a head to direct it, which, ſooner or later, muſt be found. Marius and Cæſar, or any leader with ſuperior talents and ambition, muſt, aided by ſuch forces, eaſily overcome the ſenate, whoſe power was founded in opinion, art, and cunning only.

A PEOPLE thus conſtituted, trained in the practice of war during the ſpace of ſix hundred years, muſt acquire a degree of art and addreſs infinitely ſuperior to that of other nations, who made war only occaſionally. The neceſſity of a vigorous diſcipline and ſubordination muſt appear evident; from being always in the preſence of the enemy, it became a habit, and continual exerciſe made every operation of war familiar and eaſy. To their ſuperior knowledge were added ſuperior motives to exert their talents. Victory was a means which led to pecuniary advantages, to a pre-eminence and advancement in the ſtate.

THE virtue and proweſs of the ſoldier exalted the condition of the citizen, no human reward was refuſed to great military merit. With that knowledge the fruit of ages, and with every motive which can excite a man to a vigorous exertion of his forces; ſuch a people muſt neceſſarily become finally ſuperior to every other people placed in different circumſtances.

THIS difference alone rendered Rome a military republic ſuperior to Carthage, a commercial one. The firſt ſpecies of republics muſt probably fall by the hands of a citizen, the laſt by thoſe of a foreigner.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER V.

OF AN ARISTOCRACY.

THIS ſpecies of republics, whoſe authority is ſupported by opinion, rather than force, is obliged to adopt many of the maxims of deſpotiſm, particularly if confined within narrow limits. Jealous and ſuſpicious, private executions are employed oftener than public. They fear each other, the people if numerous, and likewiſe their neighbours.

THE command cannot with ſafety be committed to the care of an eminent citizen, nor even to a ſtranger of ſuperior abilities; he muſt be watched and environed with ſpies as well in peace as in war.

THE neceſſary powers to conduct an army with vigour, and enforce diſcipline and ſubordination, cannot be granted him, both himſelf and the troops muſt be kept low in the opinion of the public. Hence it is that ſuch troops do not deſerve the name of ſoldiers, being calculated only for ſhow and parade, are totally incapable of action. However, if the people have been governed with moderation and wiſdom, they may be induced to exert themſelves ſtrenuouſly in the cauſe of their maſters, and more than once have ſhewn uncommon vigour, when the republic has been threatened with great and imminent danger.

WARS in general, and particularly thoſe carried on at a diſtance, conqueſts, &c. are incompatible with an ariſtocratical republic. In this ſort of government the people muſt be careſſed, protected, and treated

treated with humanity and an equal diſtribution of juſtice, the nobles awed by fear, and the neighbouring powers kept friendly by policy: to theſe maxims the ancient and moſt illuſtrious republic of Venice owes its glory and duration.

MIXED and limited monarchies are in fact republics, muſt be governed on the ſame principles; as the executive power is here much more uniform, ſimple, and ſtrong, ſo the ſtate has more vigour abroad and leſs convulſions at home. Sooner or later the equilibrium is loſt, and the balance intirely on the ſide of the executive power, which, contrary to the opinion of Monteſquieu, ought for ever to be ſeparated from, and dependent on the legiſlative power, and in no caſe whatever be made a part of it; that is to ſay, the ſame perſon or perſons entruſted with the executive power muſt not be likewiſe a part of the legiſlative, otherwiſe it will finally become an abſolute monarchy.

ALL general aſſemblies centre finally in few, and perhaps in one perſon. The army is commonly mercenary, and totally dependent on the chief magiſtrate, yet the complicated principles of the government puts the executive power often in oppoſition to the legiſlative; ſo that the meaſures of the former, however wiſe and juſt, are thwarted, and the operations clogged with ſo many reſtrictions, that it wants the neceſſary vigour to proſecute a war with ſucceſs, particularly in the beginning. A common and preſſing danger, however, gives them unity and conſiſtency, ſo that, contrary to what happens in deſpotic and military governments, more vigour appears in the proſecution of a war than in its beginning. When by great ſucceſſes it draws towards a concluſion, new intrigues, factions, and diſputes ariſe, the principle of action ſubſides, every body grows tired, and peace at any rate, even a bad one, muſt be had.

CHAPTER VI.

OF CIVIL WARS.

WHILE the fœdal ſyſtem prevailed in Europe, it was almoſt a continual ſcene of civil wars, diſcord, and contention; the great lords were too powerful, and the crown too weak to preſerve the peace or reſtore it when diſturbed. Within theſe two centuries induſtry has raiſed a new order of ſubjects; the crown has continually increaſed in ſtrength.

THE fœdal ſyſtem and a national militia have diſappeared, and a regular army ſubſtituted in its room. The nobility, formerly the tyrant of the vaſſal, and a terror to the prince, is now become the moſt abject tool of unlimited prerogative, which can be checked and controled by no one. The whole force of the ſtate being centered in the prince alone; his authority, thus ſupported, knows no limits but his own diſcretion; it is therefore almoſt impoſſible there ſhould be any civil wars in Europe.

ON the leaſt appearance of an inſurrection, troops may be inſtantly diſpatched to diſperſe and diſſipate the few who have had the temerity to aſſemble. The nobility having no longer any influence over the people, and by exceſſive luxury reduced to a blind obedience to the court, neither can nor will diſturb or oppoſe its operations, and the people in general diſperſed, and without a chief, cannot be united or brought to act on any regular plan of oppoſition.

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SOME tranſitory efforts and diſcontent may ariſe in great cities, but on the appearance of a regular army muſt vaniſh. The rabble acts for a moment only, there is no poſſible means of keeping them together, or to direct them on a given plan: thoſe who poſſeſs any thing recur to the protection of the ſtate, and are happy, if permitted to enjoy what they have in peace.

VARIOUS circumſtances may occaſion a revolt, and render it dangerous, when the motives are permanent and of great importance to the whole community. Such as religion and liberty, men will unite in the defence of both, and exert themſelves in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened. It is not a partial or tranſitory evil, but a general one, and the greateſt of all calamities they fear, and, therefore, while the leaſt probability of a ſucceſsful reſiſtance appears, they will to the laſt moment defend themſelves, and the more ſo, as a war carried on upon theſe principles leaves no room for a reconciliation.

THERE is no medium between eternal happineſs and damnation, a total ſubmiſſion or a total independence; the one or the other of the parties muſt be intirely conquered. Notwithſtanding ſuch powerful motives, it would be very difficult they ſhould produce unanimity and come to a head, if in the beginning government acts with vigour: on one ſide there are ſtrength, authority, opinion, armies ready collected and prepared for action; on the other a total want of all theſe. It would therefore ſeem impoſſible that in ſuch circumſtances any rebellion ſhould be formed at all, much leſs become dangerous, unleſs neglected at firſt, particularly if the province is contiguous and within reach of government, but when they are placed at a very great diſtance, intercepted by the ſeas, or any very difficult mountains, the people numerous, and animated by the motives above-mentioned, they will have time to

confer together, unite, form ſome plan of government, and act upon ſome certain line. They are prepared in ſome meaſure to oppoſe in any attack to be made on them; the more extenſive the country, the more eaſily defended, becauſe thoſe who attack muſt act on one line only, whereas they who defend themſelves may oppoſe you on many.

THERE is ſcarce a point in the whole country, from whence ſupplies of ſome kind may not be drawn, whereas the aſſailant can draw it from one alone. Theſe advantages are ſo very conſiderable, that in the end, thoſe poſſeſſed of them muſt finally prevail, if they confine their views to a defenſive war; unleſs you contract your line of operation by a great and deciſive victory (which gives you a ſufficient tract of country to ſubſiſt upon, that you may proceed gradually to ſubdue the whole) no ſolid operations can be executed. They will be confined merely to fruitleſs excurſions, and at the end of every campaign you will find yourſelf leſs able to proſecute the war, which grows languid, is neglected, and finally abandoned for want of means to continue it, and the people are ſeparated from you for ever.

SUCH has been, and generally muſt be, the iſſue of wars proſecuted at a great diſtance, unleſs the firſt campaign gives you a deciſive ſuperiority; it follows of courſe, that the ſucceſs of ſuch enterprizes depends intirely on the vigour of your operations: if in the beginning they are not deciſive, they never will be ſo hereafter.

VICTORY, terror, and a general pardon may force the people to ſubmiſſion, re-eſtabliſh union and the public tranquillity. If the people in general have not from perſonal motives revolted, but have been excited by the ambition and authority of a few conſiderable men, means may be found to ſow diſſenſion among them; a pardon may then incline them to diſperſe.

FROM

FROM whatever motives the revolt proceeds, the authority of the ſovereign muſt be ſupported ſword in hand. There can be no negociation between the ſovereign and the ſubject; the firſt muſt never ſpeak in vain, nor the laſt reſiſt with impunity, otherwiſe government is at an end. With what caution then ſhould the ſovereign avoid every meaſure which may poſſibly bring his authority in queſtion, when the conteſt muſt finiſh in the ruin of his ſubjects or himſelf. It is a ground ſown with difficulties and precipices, deſtruction is unavoidable; all other wars leave ſome opening to a reconciliation and peace; this none, it is inexpiable.

PART

PART THE FOURTH.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE CAMP. *Plate 4.*

TO judge of a Camp, you muſt draw a line from one wing to another, extending it a mile beyond them which will mark the front of it, and ſhew you all its advantages and imperfections at one view, and the points which command: any one of thoſe being carried, forces the enemy to retire, and inſures the victory.

SECONDLY, You muſt draw three more lines, perpendicular to the camp line above, toward both wings and the center, which gives you the profile of the ground before the camp. The conſideration of theſe four lines will ſhew you what points you ought to attack, and how, and with what ſpecies of troops, as in fig. 4.

SOMETIMES an army is not encamped on a right line, but forms an irregular one, as in fig. 5. It is evident that the parts of it which project muſt be attacked, becauſe you can invelope them, whereas if you leave them behind you, and advance againſt the inward parts, the enemy invelopes you, and attacks one or both your flanks. This rule is equally true, whether the line be natu-

ral

ral or artificial, as thoſe of a fortreſs. The baſtion muſt be attacked before the curtain: the firſt being taken, the other parts cannot reſiſt. The ſame thing will happen in every ſpecies of irregular lines.

If on examining the four lines, which give the front and profile of the enemy's camp, you find it too ſtrong, and you cannot force him by any direct attack to abandon it, you muſt leave him there, and place yourſelf on the one or the other of his flanks, as in fig. 6. and extend your line, ſo that it may act on his line of communication, which will ſoon force him to change his poſition, and fall back. The leaſt delay or neglect on his part will enable you to attack him with advantage, and, if you act with vigour, to defeat him intirely, particularly if his other flank is poſted on a river, a moraſs, a precipice, &c. which is generally the caſe, to ſecure, as they ſay, the flanks. A very dangerous method, becauſe, if an enemy poſt himſelf on the other wing, you cannot avoid a total overthrow, if he attack you with vigour; wherefore, contrary to the general opinion, I adviſe that your flanks may be ſecured by the natural ſtrength and diſpoſition of them, which may be eaſily effected rather than by ſuch adventitious and dangerous methods.

If inſtead of acting on the enemy's flanks and line of operation, you advance in front againſt him, it is plain, that though you are much ſuperior to him, yet if the country is cloſe and favourable to him, you may not in a whole campaign have an opportunity to attack him with advantage; and thus no action can in ſuch circumſtances be either general or deciſive, which muſt ever be the main object of a general who acts on the offenſive, as that of him on the defenſive muſt be to avoid it. No ſolid and important operation can be executed while the enemy can keep the field; you muſt therefore by a deciſive victory, or by good manœuvres, force him to retire, and give you room to act uncontrolled.

CHAP.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE MARCH OF AN ARMY; AND OF THE FRONT OF THE MARCH.

THERE is quackery in every thing. A quarter-maſter general is very proud, if he can put in the Gazette that the army has marched in a great number of columns, as if that was the reſult of his wiſdom. The number of columns on which an army marches, depends intirely on the number of practicable roads.

In a populous and cultivated country there are many roads, becauſe there muſt neceſſarily be communications between the villages, towns, &c. whereas in a cloſe country, interſected by narrow paſſes, mountains, ravins, valleys, torrents, rivers, woods, &c. there are few practicable roads, and thoſe not very good, which of courſe oblige an army to march in few columns.

If in ſuch a country you pretend to march in many, the army cannot eaſily be formed in order of battle in front, or on the flanks. A vigilant enemy may oppoſe it in front, and prevent the forming, while at the ſame time he attacks the columns on the flanks, retards your march, and perhaps defeats your army intirely, which has frequently happened. Much caution is required in making war in a cloſe country. In an open country you march in ſeveral columns, ſee the enemy at a diſtance, and therefore have time to form your line, and prepare for his reception.

In marching, as well as in every other operation, it is an axiom, that you muſt perform them in the leaſt time poſſible.

The

THE purpoſe and direction of your march muſt determine the mode and manner of executing it.

SUPPOSING you are oppoſite the enemy, in a parallel line, as in fig. 7.

IT is evident, that the direction of your march muſt be either towards him, from him, on one or other of your flanks, or in an oblique direction, to place yourſelf on one or other of his flanks.

THE mode in which your army is encamped, will facilitate the execution of your march: I therefore recommend that repreſented in fig. 6. which is that in which I would have you fight, for the reaſons aſſigned in the preceding chapter. Your march muſt be always analogous to the mode in which you encamp and fight, and be regulated by them.

THE facility and celerity of the march depend on the mode of forming the columns.

FIRST, The line is divided into ſo many columns as there are roads; then by a demi-tour to the right or left, each column marches by the road aſſigned to it.

THE line being formed in three ranks, it follows, that the front of each column has only three men in front, which renders the march ſlow and difficult, in proportion to the length of the columns. A column of horſe will, according to this method, occupy in marching more than double the ground it does in order of battle, becauſe the length of a horſe is more than double his breadth or thickneſs; for which reaſons, an army ſhould never march in this manner, excepting in two caſes only; that is, when you propoſe placing yourſelf on the enemy's flank, as in fig. 7, or that both

enemies march in parallel directions; becauſe in whatever point of the march the enemy approaches you, your army is in order of battle in a moment, by making the front to the right or left, as the enemy ſtands. Your march in this, as in every other caſe, muſt be covered by your light troops, placed between you and the enemy, particularly towards that flank of the enemy where you intend going, and the rear of your march, that he may not attack either the head or rear of your columns, both which are very weak, having no more than three men each in front, and being as near as may be to each other. They are all eaſily enveloped, even by a ſmall body, and defeated. You can never form a line in the front or rear of your march, capable of making the leaſt reſiſtance.

SECONDLY, The ſecond method of forming a column is, by dividing the battalions into ſeveral parts, each conſiſting of eight or ten men in front, more or leſs, as the roads permit. Then each diviſion wheels to the right or left, as in fig. 8. and marches off to the roads aſſigned them, leaving an interval between each diviſion.

THIS method is generally made uſe of by the Pruſſian; though improper for all marches in whatever direction they are made. In a review they do very well, becauſe you can thereby diſcover the poſition and march of the ranks.

A COLUMN formed in this manner with intervals, occupies the ſame ground as in order of battle, ſo that nothing is got by it. After a march of a few miles, the diſtances are loſt; ſome will be found greater, others leſſer, than they ought to be; therefore it is impoſſible to reſtore the order of battle, if the enemy approaches either flank: and if you intend to form the front, perpendicular to your line of march, it is evident that operation requires equal time, whatever may be the front of your ſeveral diviſions, becauſe the

the diſtance from the van to the rear will be the ſame, whether their fronts be of three or thirty men, as the intervals between them are equal to the front they occupy, when ranged in order of battle, in three ranks. From whence it follows, that this method has no one advantage, and is attended with many difficulties, both in marching and in forming the line, and therefore muſt be entirely exploded.

THIRDLY, The third method of forming the column of march is the ſame as the ſecond, viz. by diviſions, wheeling to the right or left, with this difference, that the ſeveral diviſions cloſe and leave no interval between them, excepting very ſmall ones, to diſtinguiſh the battalions and regiments, as in fig. 9.

BY this method it is plain, that if the front of each diviſion is nine or twelve men, the length of your column will be only the third or the fourth part of what it will be if formed in the firſt or ſecond manner above-mentioned, though compoſed of an equal number of men, and conſequently requires only a third or fourth part of the time to be reſtored and formed in order of battle; therefore I prefer it to all others, excepting in the two caſes above-mentioned, viz. when you march on the enemy's flank, or when both armies march on parallel lines, and ſo near, that an attack on either ſide may be intended, or poſſible, becauſe in ſuch circumſtances it is neceſſary that an army ſhould in an inſtant be in order of battle.

VARIOUS methods may be adopted to form columns of march, that is, ſuppoſing a battalion is divided in five or more parts, it is plain that either of them may be made the van of it, fig. 10, 11, 12.

M. GUIBERT, whoſe writings do him and his country honour, if I remember well, propoſes the diviſions on the right and left ſhould

march by the diagonals, as marked in fig. 10. thoſe of the right before that of the center, and thoſe of the left behind it; becauſe he ſuppoſes this the ſhorteſt and moſt expeditious method of doing it, which is true only in part; that is, it is ſhorter than if the right or left diviſion was made the head of the column, as in this caſe the other diviſions muſt march double the ground.

THIS method is ſubject to one very great inconvenience, both in forming the column and in opening it. The diviſion which forms the head, marches before the front to take its place, covers it ſo intirely, that no part of it can act if the enemy advances, which is a capital fault, becauſe every motion made near the enemy muſt be ſupported by ſome corps in order of battle. Moreover, thoſe different motions, ſome forward and others backward, will eaſily produce confuſion.

THE beſt methods I know is, either to order the diviſion of the center to advance briſkly, and the other diviſions to the right and left, as in fig. 11. to march behind it alternately, or rather from the right or left, which is the beſt of all.

WHEN the columns come to the ground, where they are to perform the line, the head marches ſlowly, and the other diviſions march to the right and left alternately, or to the left in the ſecond caſe, as in fig. 12. to take up their ground, which is done with ſimplicity and quickneſs.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER III.

OF THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

WHEN, like the Tartars, you enter an enemy's country, with an intention only to ravage and plunder it, you muſt, like them, be mounted on light cavalry, enter at one part, ſweep all before you, and retire with your booty by another as faſt as you can.

IF this cruel and inhuman method of making war was adopted, hundred thouſand horſemen, ſo equipped, would in a ſhort time lay all Europe waſte, and cover it with deſolation, in ſpite of your fine armies, artillery, heavy ſquadrons, &c. becauſe activity is every thing in war, in which our armies are totally deficient, being chained to ſome fortreſs where their depots are lodged, they cannot advance a hundred miles, and are continually turning about in a narrow circle, of which the magazines are the center.

THE Tartars neither have, nor want depots; by the rapidity of their motions they muſt and do find every thing on the ſpot. But when we penetrate, with our great and very heavy armies, into an enemy's country, it is with a view to conquer ſome provinces, fortreſſes, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to ſubſiſt upon, we have fixed and determined points to lodge our ſtores and proviſions, from whence they are tranſported to the army, which muſt proceed from thoſe given points to other fixed and determined points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offenſive war; or from

from a given point in your own, towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defenſive.

THE line which unites theſe points, on which every army muſt act, is called *The Line of Operation*; and, of all thoſe we have mentioned, is the moſt important. For on the good or bad choice of this line the final event of the war chiefly depends. If it is ill choſen all your ſucceſſes, however brilliant, will, in the end, be found uſeleſs.

LET us illuſtrate this doctrine by an example; we will ſuppoſe an army of forty thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe, beſides thoſe required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horſes, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is at Exeter, and propoſes to advance to London, and has its magazines all at Exeter. I have only thirty thouſand men: I encamp as near Exeter as I can, and by occupying advantageous poſts, I will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to Dorcheſter or Blandford; till then I oppoſe the enemy in front with ſmall parties only in his flanks, but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles from Exeter, from which place alone he draws his ſubſiſtence, inſtead of oppoſing him in front with all my forces, I place ten thouſand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his depots at Exeter. The laſt will be diſtributed in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, ſo that a ſingle waggon cannot paſs unobſerved, and conſequently will be taken or attacked by ſome one or other of theſe parties. A hundred men will deſtroy as many waggons by diſperſing the drivers, taking away or killing the horſes, breaking the carriages, &c. The enemy muſt, therefore, ſend a ſtrong body of troops, ten thouſand men for example, to eſcort a great convoy. I then make a motion

tion to the right with my whole army; ſo that my left comes acroſs his left, my center and right go many miles beyond it. In whatever manner the eſcort is diſtributed, as part in the front, part in the center, and part in the rear of the convoy; I ſay, that neither ten nor even twenty thouſand can preſerve it; becauſe theſe are chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the ſtation they occupy; whereas my troops can engage and attack, how, when, and where they pleaſe: they can attack and amuſe the eſcorts in a paſs or a wood, which of courſe obliges the whole to ſtop, while two or three thouſand men, diſperſed in ſmall parties, attack the chain of waggons from one end to the other. If they ſucceed in ſome places only, the whole will be ſoon diſperſed.

It would be adviſeable to attack that part, which proceeds at the head of the convoy, with the greateſt part of your forces, if it goes ten or twelve miles from the camp; becauſe you may then cut it off intirely, and the whole convoy and the remaining part of the eſcort, unleſs the enemy falls back immediately to aſſiſt them, which is no eaſy matter, as you have the center and left of your army on his flank and rear in his retreat; and moſt certainly he will arrive too late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our object.

If inſtead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as we ſuppoſe, he is a hundred, at Saliſbury, for example; I always ſuppoſe that all his proviſions, without exception, come from thence, or from any where elſe, a hundred miles off. I ſay, that ſuch an enemy as we ſuppoſe, cannot remain a fortnight in that camp, though the convoys meet with no other difficulty, but ſuch as ariſe from the length of the road, bad weather, accident, &c. &c.

It is impoſſible to collect and maintain a ſufficient number of horſes, carriages, &c. to ſupply an army of fifty or ſixty thouſand men, including thoſe who follow the camp, with proviſions, ſtores, forage, &c. and to ſupply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey to and from the camp: two hundred miles, we ſuppoſe, which cannot be performed in leſs than twenty days. I am ſo convinced myſelf of this, that if you place twenty thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe, on any ſpot, ſo that they ſubſiſt only upon what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they muſt in a week go and meet their convoy, diſperſe, or periſh.

Now, if to theſe natural and inſurmountable difficulties, you add thoſe which an able leader can create by acting on the principles we have eſtabliſhed above, it will appear evident, beyond contradiction, that no army, great or ſmall, can act in a line of operation of a hundred miles, provided you can keep the field; of courſe you muſt avoid a general action.

The more the country is incloſed and interſected by woods, mountains, rivers, paſſes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will meet with: the more croſs roads, the more advantageous for you; becauſe they enable you to act continually on his line of operation. In ſuch a country, you may in almoſt every ſpot lay ſnares for his parties, even for his whole army, with ſucceſs. Whoever weighs what we have ſaid, will be convinced that the ideas and fears of an invaſion were vain and abſurd.

This reaſoning, which from experience we are perſuaded is juſt, will ſhew why our efforts in America have not been crowned with ſucceſs; and why, though in every reſpect infinitely ſuperior to the Rebels, we have never been able to penetrate fifty miles into the country, nor keep any one given point, though but twenty or thirty

thirty miles within land. From all which we deduce the following concluſions.

FIRST, That in the choice of your line of operation, when the nature of the frontier you intend to attack, and the poſition of your depots, leave you any choice, you muſt chuſe the ſhorteſt and the leaſt difficult.

SECONDLY, That the direction be ſuch that the enemy cannot act on your flanks, and of courſe on your ſaid line, which muſt happen if the provinces on the right or left of your march are in his poſſeſſion. The longer you proceed on ſuch a ſeries, the more certain is your deſtruction; for in a little time you will have no line at all; you will be intirely ſurrounded, and you are loſt.

THIRDLY, That it leads you to ſome deciſive object, otherwiſe ten campaigns, however fortunate, will give you nothing worth having.

IF the difficulties are always in proportion to the length of your line of operation, it follows, that when other circumſtances are nearly equal to that army which acts on the ſhorteſt lines, muſt from that circumſtance alone prevail; even though much inferior, provided it is conducted with prudence and activity.

FROM theſe concluſions we deduce the principles of an offenſive war.

CHAPTER IV.

OF AN OFFENSIVE WAR.

WHEN you enter an enemy's country, it is with a view to raiſe contributions, deſtroy his magazines, &c. or make a diverſion to favour and facilitate the operations of an army which acts in another line; or finally to conquer ſome province.

THE mode of acting, in theſe three different caſes, will be different of courſe, and muſt be regulated by the different objects you have in view. In the two firſt caſes, prudence, and above all, celerity: in the laſt, prudence, activity, and ſolidity muſt be employed.

IN order to explain what I have to ſay on the ſubject we are diſcuſſing, I muſt propoſe the following queſtions.

FIRST, Is the province you propoſe to conquer fortified or not?

SECONDLY, Is it ſeparated from the other provinces of your enemy, by ſome conſiderable river which never freezes, or by ſome very high and difficult mountains, which have few roads and narrow, as is uſually the caſe?

THIRDLY, or finally, Has it no fortreſs, river, or mountains, but is like the provinces contiguous to it, open more or leſs?

ALL provinces whatever come under one or other of theſe denominations, and therefore your mode of carrying war into them, and the reſult of your operations, will be analagous to them.

IN

In the firſt caſe you muſt take the fortreſs, becauſe that alone can enable you to ſeparate your army, and take your quarters there during the winter.

If the place is conſiderable, and your enemy has a good army in the field, it will be a very difficult enterprize, and require much vigour and ſagacity to execute it with ſucceſs, particularly if the country is cloſe and favourable for a defenſive war; and your line of operation is long and interſected by rivers, mountains, paſſes, &c.

To facilitate your undertaking, I adviſe you to march up to the enemy, and force him to a battle; or by ſkillful manœuvres drive him ſo far beyond the fortreſs, that he cannot trouble you in the ſiege.

This ſuppoſes you are much ſuperior to the enemy, and that you can keep him at a diſtance with one part of your forces, while with the remainder you proſecute the ſiege, eſcort the convoy, &c.

If you are ſuperior to him only by a third part, and he is an able man, ten to one you will miſcarry, and be obliged to raiſe the ſiege with ſhame and loſs.

If the place is ſituated cloſe on the frontier, then by marching eight or ten miles into the country, you put it behind you, and carry on your ſiege, without any great obſtacle on his part, becauſe your line of operation is ſhort and eaſily guarded. He cannot force you to abandon your enterprize, but by a victory.

But if the place is ſituated thirty or forty miles within the country, by avoiding a general action, and acting with the greateſt part of his forces on your line, he will probably take your convoys,

and cut off your communication with your depots, and by that means oblige you to abandon the enterprize; and your retreat will be attended with great difficulties, becauſe your army will or may be attacked in front, flank, and rear.

From this I draw one concluſion; if your ſituation is ſuch, that in general you mean to attack your enemy on a given frontier, your fortreſſes can never be too near them, becauſe your line of operation will be the ſhorter.

But if ſuch places are intended to cover the country, they muſt be placed thirty or forty miles from the frontier, unleſs ſome particular circumſtances intervene, as a great river, a paſs, &c.

If you attack a place forty miles within the enemy's country, I would adviſe forming a camp in the Roman manner, about half way, with ſome redoubts before your entrenchments, to prevent the enemy from approaching them, and throwing ſhells and combuſtibles into your camp, and burn your ſtores, while you are employed in keeping the enemy at a diſtance and foraging the country. All your ſtores, proviſions, artillery, &c. are placed in this camp, and from thence brought to that you occupy about the place without danger or difficulty, which could not be done if they were brought forty miles off, becauſe a line of that length cannot be guarded.

In order to force your enemy to a battle, or to abandon the country, you muſt naturally employ all your forces united. Detachments, excurſions, &c. muſt of courſe be avoided, becauſe they weaken your army, are expoſed to be cut off, and ruin the country, which you muſt preſerve, if you mean to ſtay there.

Instead

INSTEAD of attempting to ruin his ſmall depots, ſcattered about the villages, which are the only your detachments can attack, preſerve your own, and ſecure all that lays behind you in ſome place as you advance. You can act only on one line, which muſt be determined by the poſition of the enemy, until you have drove him beyond the place you propoſe beſieging. From that moment you act in the defenſive, and your line is then determined from the camp you occupy to your depots: your whole attention muſt be directed to carry on the ſiege, protect your convoys, &c. It is then that the enemy changes his ſyſtem from a defenſive to an offenſive war: you are chained to your line, whereas he is perfectly at liberty, and will employ that liberty to act againſt you day and night, how, when, and where he pleaſes.

IT is probable the enemy may have ſeveral lines of operation drawn from his camp, wherever it is, to the different fortreſſes and depots which he may have behind him. In this caſe he will play with you a whole campaign, ſhifting from one line to another, without a poſſibility of bringing him to a battle, or of driving him out of the country. Your army will be ſoon exhauſted and wore out with marching and counter-marching, continually changing your line to follow him, till your proviſions fail, and oblige you to retire without attempting any thing with an army now half ruined. This is exactly the caſe in America.

IN ſuch circumſtances nothing remains for you to do, but to march againſt the place you intend beſieging, which of courſe will force the enemy to follow you; and if you can ſecure your line of operation, he muſt riſk a battle, or ſuffer you to take the place, which is the object you have in view.

IF

If the enemy has ſeveral lines behind him, you muſt endeavour to force him to act in one only, which muſt be done, if it can be done at all, by acting on one or other of his flanks, which will force him to leave his camp and take another. Suppoſing the enemy has three lines behind him, and that he is encamped on the middle; while he is on that line he laughs at you, and conſequently you muſt force him to take that on the right or left. If that on the right appears more advantageous to your views, of courſe you encamp athwart his left flank, and act in his rear, as is marked in Plate IV. fig. 6.

This will force him to quit his camp, and retire on his right flank: by repeating this operation, you will drive him where you pleaſe. The ſucceſs, however, depends on ſuperior velocity, which you cannot have, if the line you act upon is longer than his, and he is in any degree an able man; ſo that unleſs you are much ſuperior to the enemy in numbers, goodneſs, and your army ſo conſtituted, as to be alſo ſuperior in velocity, he will undoubtedly baffle all your attempts, and oblige you to return home.

If the country has no fortreſs, but is ſeparated from the other provinces by a great river or mountains, as we have ſuppoſed, is not very extenſive and open, and you are ſuperior in cavalry, you may, by ſkillful manœuvres, force him to paſs the river or mountains, and by placing your troops properly, keep poſſeſſion of it, otherwiſe not; of courſe, if the country has neither fortreſs nor rivers, &c. you may, like Barbarians, ravage and plunder the country, and like them abandon it in haſte, but you can never make war on a ſolid foundation.

These are, in my opinion, the principles of an offenſive war, deduced from reaſon and experience. Whenever generals have been

been regulated by them, for the moſt part they have been crowned with ſucceſs; and on the contrary, have generally been unfortunate, when they have deviated from them, which is confirmed by hiſtory. It remains with the general to know how to ſupply them as circumſtances require.

CHAPTER V.

OF A DEFENSIVE WAR.

IF the principles of an offenſive war are ſuch as we have indicated in the preceding chapter, it follows, that thoſe of a defenſive war are exactly the reverſe. If he who attacks you muſt immediately bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to beſiege ſome place of importance, form new depots, and advance further into the country, until he forces you to abandon the whole, or make peace on the terms he preſcribes, it is your part to avoid a general action; for while you have an army in the field, and know how to manage it with advantage, he may, though much ſuperior, be forced to abandon his project, and retire with a ruined army. Were you in a condition to venture an engagement with probable hopes of ſucceſs, you muſt not do it, becauſe if you are beat, the conſequence may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him to retire, which you may do without any riſk, if you adhere to what I ſhall ſay on the ſubject. The enemy has choſe his line of operation, which of courſe determines yours; you advance as far as you can to meet him: if you can anticipate his motions, paſs your frontier, deſtroy his ſmall depots, carry off the horſes and cattle, and the corn if threſhed; when he advances, you retire gradually from

one

one ſtrong camp to another, ſkirmiſh often, but never fight a battle. If there is a river in your country, or in his beyond the frontier, place yourſelf behind it, and encamp with three-fifths of your army in the center, and the two-fifths to your right and left, ſo that the whole of it conſiſts of 40,000 men, will occupy at leaſt fifteen miles, within which diſtance he muſt paſs: for if you place yourſelf acroſs his line of operation, he cannot deviate from it twenty miles to look for a paſſage. This diſpoſition being made, and patroles ſent from the extremity of your wings, he cannot throw a bridge, and paſs unobſerved. If the ground is at all favourable to you, the eight thouſand men we ſuppoſe on your right or left, will be ſtrong enough to prevent his paſſing, by attacking vigorouſly ſuch as have paſſed, or check him till you advance with your center. If he has paſſed, and is entrenched on your ſide, then encamp on ſome neighbouring hill, in three corps as uſual, in a circular form. Fortify your right and left, and place your heavy artillery on them. I ſay, he dare not leave his entrenchments and attack you, and muſt therefore repaſs the river, as it happened to Prince Eugene on the Adige, which we have already mentioned.

The only method the enemy has to paſs a river thus guarded, will be to ſend a ſtrong detachment thirty miles off to throw a bridge and fortify it. This is a very long operation, and will give you time to oppoſe it. When finally the enemy has paſſed, which I think impoſſible, if you act as we preſcribe, you retire of courſe to another ſtrong camp.

If the country has many paſſes in it, you may oppoſe his progreſs with ſucceſs on almoſt every ſpot, and force him to ſend a corps on your flanks and rear, which by acting on your line of operation, will force you to abandon a thouſand camps ſucceſſively, unleſs you attack and beat this corps, which you may eaſily do, if

the

the country is mountainous, for you may probably cut off his communication with the main army, and deſtroy it totally, which I have ſeen done. In ſhort, one way or other, you muſt get rid of this corps, becauſe no man, or body of men, can long withſtand an attack in front, and another in flank at the ſame time, or remain in any given poſt, if a powerful corps is placed ſo as to be able to act on its line of operation.

An enemy may be ſituated with regard to you, in three different manners; 1ſt, in front; 2dly, in front and flank; 3dly, in front and rear. In the firſt caſe, you may find numberleſs ſtrong camps, where you can ſtop him, though much ſuperior, and where you may riſk a battle, becauſe as our armies are conſtituted, a defeat is dangerous only to a certain degree, whereas in the ſecond and third caſes they muſt be fatal; if you remain on the ſpot until the enemy approaches and attacks you. No army conquers merely by reſiſting; you may repel an enemy, but victory is the reſult of action.

We have ſaid already that when an enemy advances againſt you in front and flank, you muſt beat that body which comes on your flank, preferable to the other in front, becauſe you can always oppoſe this with ſucceſs, but not the other: if you drive the army back a march or two, and leave the corps on your flank or behind you, ſo far from reaping any advantage from your ſucceſs, it may be fatal to you, becauſe the corps in your flank may occupy ſome paſs behind you, and cut off your army intirely, inſomuch, that the enemy ought to fall back and draw you after him, that his corps may act in the manner we hinted at.

If you are incloſed by two armies, you muſt march by the right or left, and ſlip away if you can, if not, you muſt fight. Ancient hiſtory furniſhes us with two events of this nature, from whence

we ſhall draw a general rule for the conduct of a general who may happen to find himſelf in ſuch an unhappy ſituation.

THE Gauls had invaded Italy, and having plundered it, were as uſual returning homewards loaded with ſpoils. A conſular army followed them, in hopes of ſome favourable opportunity to attack them and retake the plunder. Being arrived in Tuſcany, they were alarmed by the approach of another army coming accidentally to meet them. Thus on the point of being attacked in front and rear, they formed their army, ſo that it preſented a double front, and waited the event. They were attacked, and all cut to pieces.

THE other is in the hiſtory of the Jews; Jonathan and his brother, I think (no matter who) commanded the Jewiſh army, which was in the ſame ſituation as that of the Gauls. Jonathan divided his army in two parts, formed a line of chariots, waggons, &c. behind which he placed the weakeſt part under his brother to oppoſe one army; with the other, and beſt part, he advanced againſt the other army of the enemy, which he attacked with that vigour and fury, which ſuch a ſituation inſpires, and of courſe defeated the enemy totally; that part oppoſed to his brother, on ſeeing this event, gave over attacking the chariots, and ran away. There is not a finer manœuvre recorded in hiſtory: imitate this noble example.

WHEN two armies march againſt you, in the manner juſt mentioned, and come from a conſiderable diſtance; if your country is ſtrong, and has ſome good fortreſs in it, where your depots lay, occupy a ſtrong camp and be quiet; ſuch numerous armies in ſuch a ſituation cannot remain a fortnight; they muſt ſeparate for want of proviſions. In this manner the king of Pruſſia baffled the attempts of the Auſtrians and Ruſſians for four campaigns.

IF

If your country has no ſuch fortreſs to cover you, of courſe you muſt either beat one of the armies which marches againſt you, or by placing yourſelf on the outward flank of one of them; force them to unite, and act upon one line: avoid a battle, which you may then do as long as you pleaſe. They muſt ſeparate and retire, becauſe two ſuch armies cannot ſubſiſt on the ſtores provided for one only.

If finally two armies act in different lines, and attack diſtant provinces, you muſt of courſe oppoſe an army to each of them. If you cannot do it, abandon that which is far off, collect your forces, and attack that which is neareſt to you, and moſt dangerous. When your forces do not permit you to oppoſe your enemies at once in every point, you muſt act in part on the defenſive, and in the other offenſively. If you are too weak to act in many points at once, you muſt abandon ſome of them, that you may act with more vigour in others.

Having pointed out all the different ſituations in which an enemy, with one or more armies, can be with regard to yours, and ſhewn what you are to do in ſuch different circumſtances, we now return to our ſubject; and we will alſo ſhew, how you may check the progreſs of the moſt powerful adverſary.

When he has penetrated thirty or forty miles into your country, and you cannot or will not oppoſe him in front; when you cannot defend your own line, you muſt either retire as he advances, till he has drove you out of the country, or attack his. The method of doing this with ſucceſs, we ſay, is, to leave on your line, to oppoſe the enemy in front, a fifth of your army, chiefly cavalry; three-fifths on the flank of his march; the remaining fifth, all of light troops, horſe and foot, muſt be placed along his line of operation in ſmall bodies of one or two thouſand men, who occupy the moſt

advantageous ſpots, as woods, paſſes, &c. where they remain concealed. Parties muſt be ſent from one to the other of about a hundred men, ſo that there is not a ſingle point of the enemy's line which you cannot attack with ſucceſs in an inſtant. Half his army cannot protect his convoys on a line of thirty miles. If he ſends two or three ſtrong detachments to eſcort a capital convoy, perhaps of three thouſand waggons, becauſe you have taken or diſperſed his ſmall ones, ſuch a convoy will occupy near thirty miles: I ſuppoſe the eſcort to conſiſt of twenty thouſand men; theſe will be poſted in ſeveral corps, in front, rear, and along the flanks of the march; you are informed of his diſpoſition, you may reinforce that part which we ſuppoſe already placed on his line, whether you do or not. I ſay, that the ten or twelve thouſand light troops may unite in a ſhort time, and be ſuperior to the enemy's eſcort in any given point, and beat it; ſtop the front of the convoy, while your ſmall parties break the carriages, take away the horſes or kill them. If a hundred only of the carriages are deſtroyed, all thoſe which are behind muſt ſtop. The eſcort is chained to the convoy, even to particular points of it. If you cannot beat it, amuſe it by ſkirmiſhing; your parties in the mean time do the buſineſs.

By acting exactly in this manner, the Auſtrians took or deſtroyed a great convoy going from Neiſs to Olmutz, which obliged the king to raiſe the ſiege of that place next morning, and to abandon Bohemia in a few days.

If in the conduct of a defenſive war you adhere to the principles we have laid down, and the enemy's line of operation is only thirty or forty miles long, much more if it is a hundred, you will triumph in the end, and enjoy the fruits of your prudence and activity, which is every thing in war, particularly in a defenſive one, where they muſt ſupply the want of force.

From

FROM the nature of a defenſive war ariſes the utility and neceſſity of light troops, of which we ſhall treat in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

OF LIGHT TROOPS.

DURING the wars which we deſcribe, the Auſtrians had, I believe, near thirty thouſand of this kind of troops diſtributed in the different armies and corps. The only uſe I ever ſaw made of them was to obſerve the enemy placed, as they generally were, before the front of our armies, they could do no more, and even this they did very imperfectly, becauſe they were too numerous, encamped in ſuch conſiderable bodies, that they were totally deficient in activity, and preſerved nothing but the names of light troops. Obſerved by the enemy, he maſked them whenever he choſe to march by his flanks, or to retire, ſo effectually, that for the moſt part we had no intelligence of his motions, till it was too late to avail ourſelves of any favourable circumſtance which might offer, inſomuch, that I do not remember we ever attacked his rear guard with ſucceſs, though great bodies of light troops, and very often the main army, were near enough to do it with advantage.

WHEN the enemy advanced towards us, after ſkirmiſhing a little, theſe light troops diſperſed and retired where they pleaſed; and if a battle enſued, they diſappeared, and were loſt for ſeveral days. Many of theſe corps obſerved ſo ill, that very often they were ſurprized, made priſoners, or totally diſperſed. From whence I conclude, that a regiment of Huſſars, and a few hundred Croats, will obſerve

obſerve an enemy much better than ſo many thouſands, for this plain reaſon, they are or ought to be inviſible, and ſo poſted near the high roads, before the enemy's front, and on his flanks, that he cannot move without their knowledge. It is therefore abſurd to employ ten thouſand to do that which a thouſand can do much better.

THE number and uſe of light troops depend on the nature of the war chiefly. In an offenſive war, whoſe principles is to ſeek and fight the enemy, you muſt concenter your forces, and by no means diſperſe them, and loſe time in fruitleſs and laborious excurſions: your enemy is before you, advance in front: your army muſt have ſtrength and conſiſtency, of courſe it muſt have a heavy cavalry, infantry, and artillery, ſo that your real and phyſical force is ſuperior to that of the enemy.

IN ſuch circumſtances, you can want no more light troops than are neceſſary to explore the front and flank of your march: but if you are on the defenſive, you muſt avoid a battle, becauſe you are too weak, and muſt act on his flanks in the manner we have preſcribed, which can be done only with light troops, as is evident from the nature of this ſervice; you cannot therefore have too many of them. An army of forty thouſand men, half of which being light troops, if ably conducted, in a cloſe country, when the enemy's line is of any conſiderable length, will moſt certainly force him to abandon his projects and retire.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE FRONTIER LINE.

SUPPOSING this line to be like that marked in Plate V. *x. x. x.* &c. which as moſt lines of any conſiderable extent projects in many parts: I ſay, that however extenſive ſuch a line may be, the points on which it can be attacked are determined by the number and quality of the roads which lead to it, and by the poſition and diſtance of the reſpective capitals, and other ſtrong places within a hundred miles of it, beyond which no army can act with advantage; that is, no army conſtituted as ours are, can act, if its depots are diſtant above a hundred miles, unleſs there is water-carriage.

IF there are no ſuch places of arms at all, or on the one ſide of the frontier line only, it is evident, that no ſolid operation can be executed, and that they can tend only to ravage the country and retire, or to facilitate the operations of ſome other army, acting on another line, which was the caſe with the Ruſſians, during this whole war we are deſcribing. They could not, and the Auſtrians would not avail themſelves of the victories the former had gained at Palrig and Franckfurt on the Oder; ſo that the Ruſſians, unable to fix themſelves on or near that river, were always obliged to retire after a ſhort campaign, becauſe their line of operations was too long.

WE ſuppoſe the frontier before us to be three hundred miles in length; yet the enemy can act againſt it from three points only, where his depots are lodged, as in F. G. H. and even from theſe he

he can attack the two points C. E. on our frontier alone; when he has taken either of them, he muſt proceed next to B. or D. and from thence to the capital A. and not before. I have already ſhewn, in treating of a defenſive war, how you muſt counteract and check his progreſs, ſo ſhall conclude the ſubject.

We can no way better explain our principles, than by applying them to the different frontiers of Europe and America, accordingly, in the following part, we ſhall give a military analyſis of them, viz. of that of France, Auſtria, the Pruſſian dominions, Turkey, Ruſſia, Poland, England, and North America.

PART

PART THE FIFTH.

OF THE

FRONTIERS OF THE DIFFERENT SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE FRONTIER OF FRANCE.

IN deſcribing this and other frontiers, we do not pretend to point out the different poſitions and camps which may be taken on either ſide, becauſe it would require a more perfect knowledge of the countries than we are maſters of; and moreover, would be uſeleſs, becauſe theſe muſt be determined by the motions of the enemy, and many other occaſional circumſtances, by which a general muſt regulate his operations: what we ſhall ſay will, however, enable the ſovereigns, miniſters, and generals, to form their plans of war, offenſive and defenſive; theſe laſt muſt know how to conduct them.

WE have already ſaid, that the abſolute force of a frontier conſiſts in natural obſtacles, which an enemy would find in approaching and attacking it. Theſe ariſe from numberleſs cauſes, as

mountains, rivers, woods, defiles, the greater or leſſer fertility of the ſoil, the direction of it, &c. &c.

THE relative force of a frontier line depends on the diſtance of the capitals and fortreſſes, where the depots are lodged, of thoſe who attack or defend it, from whence their different lines of operations muſt proceed; as theſe are long or ſhort, the operations will be more or leſs difficult; inſomuch, that it may, I think, be eſtabliſhed as an axiom, that when the reſpective forces and abilities of the commanders are nearly equal, thoſe who act on the ſhorteſt line, muſt from that circumſtance alone prevail in the end, becauſe being nearer their depots, they can open the campaign ſooner, act with more vigour and activity, and for a longer time than thoſe whoſe line of operation is at a greater diſtance.

THE frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Baſil, in Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. I ſhall divide this long line into three parts, and conſider each of them ſeparately. The firſt part goes from Baſil to Landau, and covers Alſatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The ſecond part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Moſelle, covers Lorrain on the ſide of the electorate of Treves, the dutchies of Deux-Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan down the Meuſe to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; ſo that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

THE firſt part of this line is covered by the Rhine, on which are placed Huningheu, New Briſac, Straſburg, and Landau, all which are very ſtrong. Straſburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back part of Alſace runs a chain of mountains, which ſeparates it from Franche Comté and Lorrain; the diſtance between theſe mountains

mountains is from ten to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Straſburg, covered by the Rhine and the fortreſſes above-mentioned, could with eaſe prevent an enemy from paſſing that river, or at leaſt from beſieging any of them, and without taking them all, he could not poſſibly ſeparate his army and take his winter quarters in Alſace, while the French have any conſiderable force encamped or cantoned in the mountains above-mentioned. I am therefore ſurprized the Auſtrians ever made any attempt on that ſide, and much more ſo, that the French were ſo very much alarmed at it. For my part, I am confident, that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty thouſand men, ſo far from being terrified at the approach of an enemy, or oppoſing his paſſing the Rhine, would wiſh to ſee him ſhut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortreſſes; becauſe he would ſee the facility of preventing his repaſſing it at all, and of cutting him off intirely. Look at the map and judge.

THE ſecond part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes from Landau to Sedan, is very ſtrong both by nature and art, having ſeveral ſtrong places on it; and the country before it is no leſs difficult, being very mountainous, and conſequently full of narrow paſſes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of Germany; ſo that an enemy who advances on that ſide muſt have his depots on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maeſtricht and Namur on the Meuſe; in both caſes the army, which I ſuppoſe encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that ſide, while another of forty thouſand men, placed on the Meuſe near Sedan, will prevent any army from advancing into Lorrain or Champaign on that ſide, as is evident from the inſpection of the map.

WHETHER we conſider the ſtrength of this line, the direction of it, or finally, the obſtacles which the country before it offers, it will appear that no enemy can approach it, much leſs attack it with any proſpect of ſucceſs: a ſmall corps poſted at Luxemburg, might indeed advance from thence, and ravage a few villages in haſte, but no ſolid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on that ſide.

THE third and laſt part of the French frontier runs from Sedan down the Meuſe to Charlemont, and from thence to Dunkirk, and is 150 miles in length. It has been the ſcene of ſucceſſive wars for near two centuries, the moſt expenſive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind, of which the author propoſes giving the hiſtory on the ſame plan this work is wrote.

THIS line is ſtronger by art than nature, having a prodigious number of ſtrong fortreſſes and poſts upon it; moreover, it projects in many places, ſo that an enemy can enter it no where, without having ſome of them in front and on his flanks, his depots muſt be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thouſand men placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will ſo bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a ſtep without imminent danger; for that, which we ſuppoſe on the Sambre, by maſking Namur, penetrates into the country to Bruſſels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In the preſent ſtate of Auſtrian Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

IN the war for the ſucceſſion of Spain, at the beginning of this century, ten ſucceſsful campaigns brought the Allies no farther than Landrecy, not thirty miles from the Auſtrian frontiers, a very inconſiderable

conſiderable defeat at Denain obliged prince Eugene to raiſe the ſiege of that place, and in a ſhort time abandon his conqueſts, the fruits of many victories.

I KNOW moſt people ſuppoſe, that this was owing to the defection of the Engliſh: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and ſent parties to the Seyne: but will any officer ſuppoſe, that any army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could ſeparate and take winter quarters on the above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in poſſeſſion of Picardy, Normandy, and Champaign? No, it is impoſſible: the great fault of the French generals, when on the defenſive, was to oppoſe the enemy in front, whereas they ſhould have operated againſt their flanks.

THE final event of this long and bloody war ſhews the ſtrength of this frontier, and the prodigious reſources of the houſe of Bourbon. From the deſcription we have of the French frontier, towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears, that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, oppoſite to Alſace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impoſſible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorrain, &c.

THAT the ſecond part of the French frontier, from Landau to the Meuſe, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moſelle, between the Rhine and the Meuſe, the event of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the ſuperiority of the French, I mean the ſuperior advantages they poſſeſs in acting on that frontier, which are indeed ſo very great, that no forces can be collected and ſupported in Flanders by the houſe of Auſtria, the Engliſh, Dutch, and the German princes, which can preſerve that

that country againſt the efforts of the French; moſt certainly the Auſtrians alone cannot do it.

So much for the abſolute force of the French frontier: let us now examine its relative force. This, we have ſaid, depends on the length of the enemy's line of operation, direction of it, goodneſs and number of the roads, ſituation of his depots, &c.

Of all the powers in Germany, the houſe of Auſtria alone is in any degree able to contend with France; we ſhall therefore confine our obſervations to a war, which the firſt might undertake againſt the latter. Vienna is the point, from whence the Auſtrians muſt part, the diſtance between that place and the neareſt part of the French frontier, viz. Alſace on the Rhine, is above 300 miles, which alone gives the French a deciſive ſuperiority. In acting on the Rhine they have their depots on the ſpot; in a whole campaign their army need not march twenty miles, inſomuch, that the expences of maintaining it in the field would be very little more than in time of peace, becauſe it would require no train, equipage, &c. which retard the operations of an army, and are ſo very expenſive to the ſtate: whereas an army acting on a line of 300 miles, requires ſuch a prodigious train of equipages as would exhauſt the moſt powerful ſtate. The difficulty and expence of forming depots, as you advance, for ſuch a number of horſes as are neceſſary for a great army, would retard its motions, and finally put a ſtop to them altogether. Moreover, ſuch an army could not be brought to the ſcene of action till very late in the ſeaſon, and if by a deciſive victory it does not acquire a ſufficient tract of country in and near the enemy's frontier to take up its winter quarters, it muſt ſoon retire; while the enemy, abundantly ſupplied with proviſions and ſtores on the ſpot,

can

can purſue you in the retreat, and render your future attempts ſtill more difficult.

WHAT we have ſaid, regards the Auſtrian's line of operation only, as to its length and the obſtacles which ariſe from thence alone; we ſhall now conſider thoſe that proceed from the nature of the country, through that the different lines, on which it can march to act on the Rhine.

PARALLEL to this river, on the German ſide, at the diſtance of ten or fifteen miles, runs a chain of very high mountains, called the Black Foreſt, from Switzerland to Heidelberg on the Neckar, and from thence to the Main. Through the firſt of theſe mountains there goes from the Rhine to the Danube only one capital road; it paſſes over the Neckar, goes by Stutgard, the capital of the dutchy of Wirtemberg, along the Neckar to Ulm: it is one continual paſs or defile, between fifty and ſixty miles in length, and of courſe offers numberleſs poſitions, where a ſmall army can ſtop the moſt numerous.

THE country between the Rhine and the ſaid mountains belongs to the Elector Palatine, ſeveral leſſer princes, and free cities. The mountains themſelves comprehend the dutchy of Wirtemberg, ſome other principalities and free cities. On the eaſt ſide of theſe mountains lies Bavaria, which now likewiſe belongs to the Elector Palatine, and ſome free cities. This prince, by the acquiſition of Bavaria, is now ſo very powerful, that in conjunction with the duke of Wirtemberg, or even alone, he can hold the balance of Germany between the Auſtrians and the French, and hinder them from approaching each other.

THE

The ſecond road goes from Francfort on the Main to Wurtzburg, Nuremberg, and Ratiſbon on the Danube, and is no leſs difficult than the former. The Auſtrians can approach the Rhine only by the one or the other; if they advance by the firſt, the French may paſs the Rhine, and by occupying ſome poſts in the dutchy of Wirtemberg, ſtop their progreſs and force them back into Bavaria; and if they go on the other road, by occupying the heights on the left of the Rhine, between Mentz and Offenburg, prevent their paſſing that river, and force them down towards Coblentz and Cologne, or by paſſing the Rhine, and marching to Wurtzburg, prevent their approaching the Rhine at all; or finally, let them advance towards Coblentz and the Lower Rhine, and then paſs to the Main, and cut off all communication between the Low Countries and the Auſtrian dominions in Germany and Italy, which would prevent them from making any conſiderable efforts in Flanders.

We have already ſhewn, that France has great advantages in attacking Flanders, from the proximity of its depots, which are greatly increaſed, by the Auſtrian's line of operation, from Vienna to Bruſſels, which makes it impoſſible for them to preſerve that country. It was, no doubt, owing to this circumſtance chiefly, if not intirely, that the houſe of Auſtria could not preſerve *Alſace*, Franche Comté, and Lorrain, which finally will bring on the loſs of Flanders.

The French would find nearly the ſame difficulties in paſſing from the Rhine to the frontiers of Auſtria and Bohemia, and in all probability would loſe their army, as they have always done, whenever they went as far as the Danube. The French have however ſome very conſiderable advantages over the Auſtrians: they can invade and over-run Flanders, before it is poſſible for the Auſtrians to collect any forces there, capable of oppoſing their progreſs; and, moreover,

moreover, can form ſuch alliances in Germany, as would greatly embarraſs the Auſtrians; whereas theſe can form none that could in anydegree affect the ſafety of the French monarchy.

It would therefore ſeem adviſeable, and perhaps neceſſary, that the houſe of Auſtria ſhould exchange all its poſſeſſions from Luxemburg to Flanders for Bavaria, the preſent poſſeſſor of which might find it very eligible, as he might draw a line from Manheim to Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Namur, and eſtabliſh an eaſy communication between the whole: the Auſtrians no longer engaged in ſuch diſtant provinces, might turn their thoughts elſewhere with more advantage.

The French frontiers towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are too ſtrong to be invaded by thoſe powers: the idea of paſſing the Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deſerve a ſerious diſcuſſion. We ſhall conſider the coaſt of France on the Britiſh channel and the ocean on another occaſion.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERS.

THE frontiers of the houſe of Auſtria are of prodigious extent, having many ſeparate provinces, as thoſe in Flanders and Italy. Here I ſhall conſider only that frontier line, which begins in the Tirol, goes along the biſhopric of Brixen, Carinthia, Stiria, Auſtria, round Bohemia, Moravia, the new acquiſitions in Poland, Tranſilvania, and paſſing the Danube near Belgrade, goes up the Save, along Sclavonia and Croatia, which ſeparates thoſe provinces from Boſnia in Turkey.

For greater accuracy, we ſhall divide this immenſe line in ſeveral parts, relative to the different points, on which it may be attacked by the neighbouring powers.

The firſt part is that which goes from the county of Tirol to Paſſau on the Danube, and from thence to Egra in Bohemia. All this line, as far as the Danube, runs along and through the Alps, and is therefore impervious to any army, even light troops could not act againſt it with ſucceſs. The remaining part, from the Danube to Egra, is nearly as ſtrong, being covered by very high mountains almoſt inacceſſible. Over this line go three great roads, one from Inſpruck into Bavaria, towards Augſburg; another from Vienna up the Danube, to Paſſau and Straubing, &c. The third from Egra into the Upper Palatinate, towards Nuremberg in Franconia; from each of which there runs a few croſs roads that lead into the adjacent countries. It is, however, on theſe three only that an army can act; though an enemy cannot pretend to enter the firſt road, nor could any operation on that ſide be of uſe to him; yet the Auſtrians might aſſemble a very conſiderable force at Inſpruck, and behind the Inn, and from thence penetrate into Bavaria as far as the Danube.

The ſecond road, which goes along that river, is extremely difficult; a ſmall corps, poſted on the left of the Inn, near Paſſau, would ſtop an army, while the light troops would paſs that river higher up, and act on the enemy's flank and rear. All this country is moſt particularly adapted to light troops; moreover, the road runs cloſe to the Danube in many places, and as this river is there very narrow, and contracted by high mountains, a few troops on the oppoſite ſhore ſtops the march of an army as well as the navigation, ſo that while the Auſtrians have any force at all, and particularly light troops on the above-mentioned line, no enemy can, however

however numerous, attack it with ſucceſs, ; nor could he march down the left ſide of the Danube, leaving Egra and that part of Bohemia behind him, and on his flank: moreover the direction of this frontier line being concave towards the enemy, is extremely favourable to the Auſtrians, for independent of the prodigious ſtrength of the country, which alone enables them to oppoſe him in front with ſucceſs, he cannot advance againſt any given point of this circle without expoſing one or both his flanks, he would ſoon loſe his communication with his depots, muſt retire and change his line of operation.

FROM what we have ſaid, it appears that Egra is the only point of this line which can be attacked; this place neither is nor can be made ſtrong. It were adviſeable to build a capital fortreſs on that frontier ſo placed, that an army poſted near it might advance and take a central poſition between the ſource of the Maine and Ratiſbon on the Danube, ſo as to be on either river immediately, as circumſtances might require. Whatever enemy approaches this frontier, can have no other line of operation than one drawn from Nuremberg, Ratiſbon, or ſome other place on the Danube to Egra.

AN army covered by ſuch a fortreſs, as we propoſe, would undoubtedly render every attempt on that ſide fruitleſs, particularly if a body of fifteen or twenty thouſand men of light troops and Huſſars would enter Bavaria from the Inn.

AT the death of Charles the Sixth, the French and Bavarians entered Bohemia by Egra, which confirms our obſervation on this frontier; had there been ſuch a fortreſs as we propoſe, it is probable they could not have taken it, nor could they have left it behind them.

THE relative force of this line conſiſts in this: the Auſtrians can in a very little time collect ſuch forces as are able to defend it; whereas the Bavarians and French (for the firſt alone cannot contend with the Auſtrians) cannot be on that frontier in a year; theſe laſt can draw nothing from France at ſuch a great diſtance; the Bavarians cannot ſupply them with ſubſiſtence and ſtores for any conſiderable time, they muſt ſeparate and will be beat in detail: the French will loſe their army, and Bavaria will be ravaged and ruined.

THE hiſtory of the war of the ſucceſſion, and of that begun in 1741, carried on in this country, ſhews, that any future attempts againſt the houſe of Auſtria on this ſide will be equally unſucceſsful.

FROM Egra to the Elbe there is but one line of operation, viz. that which goes from Dreſden to Prague, from the Elbe to the Queiſs, which ſeparates Bohemia from Luſatia, no line can be drawn from the one to the other. From Friedland to the road, which goes from Olmuts in Moravia towards Neiſs, there are two lines of operations, one from Schweidnitz to Prague, the other from Neiſs to Olmuts: Glatz is a poſt rather than a fortreſs, from whence a line of operation might be drawn into Bohemia. However, if a conſiderable body of troops were placed in the county of Glatz, they would greatly facilitate the operations from Schweidnitz to Prague, and thoſe from Neiſs to Olmuts; and on the contrary, very much retard and check thoſe which the Auſtrians might carry on thoſe lines into Sileſia. This advantage ariſes from the ſituation of this province, which projects into Bohemia, and is the vertex of a triangle formed by lines drawn from Glatz to Neiſs and Schweidnitz, and another between theſe two laſt places.

IN

In the preceding part of this volume, which was printed in 1766, I gave a military deſcription of this frontier, pointed out the three lines of operation above-mentioned, and indicated the camps which the Auſtrians might occupy to fruſtrate the attempts of the Pruſſians: I there ſaid, by occupying the paſſes on the road, between Lowoſitz and Dreſden, no army coming from thence could enter Bohemia. Secondly, that by camping behind the Elbe, between Königſgratz and Königſhoff, the Pruſſians coming from Schweidnitz would be ſtopped there: and thirdly, that an enemy coming from Luſatia by Rumburg and Gabel into Bohemia, would alſo be ſtopped by an army poſted behind the Iſer.

The king of Pruſſia, in alliance with Saxony, reſolved to enter Bohemia, from Scweidnitz with one army, and from Dreſden with another. The firſt, very numerous, he commanded in perſon; the ſecond, compoſed of Pruſſians and Saxons, was no leſs ſo.

The Auſtrian forces were likewiſe divided into two armies, ſomething inferior to the Pruſſians; the emperor commanded that oppoſed to the king, and marſhal Laudon that deſtined to act againſt prince Henry. The reſult of all theſe diſpoſitions was, that the king entered Bohemia, and advanced to the Elbe, where he found the emperor encamped behind that river, exactly as we propoſed, in ſuch a manner, that the king could neither bring him to an action, nor by any manœuvre force him to quit his poſition. Prince Henry advanced towards the paſſes above-mentioned, but the diſpoſitions of marſhal Laudon were ſo juſt, that he could not attempt forcing them. Thus theſe two mighty armies, conducted by ſuch able generals, as the king of Pruſſia and prince Henry, were ſtopped ſhort in their careers unable to advance a ſtep.

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THE king naturally impatient, grew tired and aſhamed of his ſituation; the only probable means to extricate himſelf, and proceed in the execution of his plan, was to order prince Henry to leave Saxony, and enter Bohemia from Luſatia by the paſſes of Rumburg and Gabel, which would bring him on the emperor's flanks, and of courſe force him to abandon his ſtrong camp, retire, and ſo leave the king an opening to advance and purſue his plan. Accordingly prince Henry entered Bohemia by the paſſes above-mentioned: in the mean time marſhal Laudon, informed of the prince's motion, likewiſe quitted his camp, paſſed the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and advanced to the Iſer, behind which he encamped, with his right extended towards Turnau, by which means he ſtopped once more prince Henry, and effectually covered the Emperor's left flank.

THE king was again diſappointed, but did not deſpair; he formed another project, which he hoped would diſplace the emperor, the object of all his manœuvres: higher up the Iſer, in the mountains, is a place called Arnau, which the emperor had occupied, becauſe it covered his left; this the king propoſed attacking; accordingly he ordered his army to march on his right, while that of prince Henry marched on its left.

THE emperor reinforced this poſt, and the Pruſſians were repulſed. The ſeaſon was far advanced, and every attempt of the Pruſſians baffled, the king reſolved to put an end to the campaign; accordingly his army retired in ſeveral columns, that on his left, or rather on the right in his retreat, was iſolated. The emperor availed himſelf of this circumſtance, and ordered general Wurmſer to attack it, which he did with ſuch ſucceſs, that he defeated, killed, and made priſoners above 2000 men.

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It was natural to ſuppoſe, that prince Henry ſhould have retreated into Luſatia by the ſame roads he came; but to the aſtoniſhment of every officer, a little acquainted with his profeſſion, he choſe another route, long, difficult, and extremely dangerous; he marched by marſhal Laudon's left flank, advanced to the Elbe, paſſed that river at Leitmeritz, and from thence through the paſſes into Saxony, and executed his retreat with ſucceſs, becauſe nobody offered to moleſt him: why ſuch a general as Laudon, at the head of a numerous army, did not cut him off intirely at the paſſage of the Elbe, is a myſtery which cannot be explained, and the more ſo, as prince Charles of Lichtenſtein commanded a corps at Melnick, which could have oppoſed this paſſage in front, while marſhal Laudon with his whole army attacked his rear.

Thus ended this campaign and the war, as glorious to the emperor as it was ſhameful to the Pruſſians. Barren of events, it offers only one obſervation, which is this; in Bohemia, and I believe in moſt other countries, there are certain points, which being occupied, will baffle the attempts of much ſuperior forces. It is ſurprizing that in the ſeveral great wars carried on in Bohemia, theſe points ſhould have eſcaped the eyes of ſo many able generals.

The Auſtrians, by their acquiſitions in Poland, have formed a new frontier on that ſide; it runs from Teſchen in Sileſia, cloſe by Cracow on the Viſtula, and from thence almoſt in a right line to the Nieſter, within a few miles of Chotzim in Moldavia, on the ſame river; its length is about four hundred miles, its breadth various.

This country, like all Poland, is plain and open, has no fortreſs, nor any enemy, which for the preſent can render it neceſſary: however, as Poland may probably hereafter become the field of battle between

tween thoſe great powers, who divided a great part of it among them. The Auſtrians, like the Pruſſians, who are building a capital place on the Viſtula, ſhould likewiſe build one on their new frontiers.

THIS country is no otherwiſe uſeful to the Auſtrians, than by its productions; we muſt examine, however, whether it may not furniſh means to carry on any future war againſt the Pruſſians with more advantage than heretofore.

THE wars between theſe two powers have been chiefly carried on on the frontier which ſeparates Bohemia from Sileſia; and as things then ſtood, could not be proſecuted on any other lines than thoſe before-mentioned. That frontier is more advantageous to the Pruſſians than the Auſtrians, for the reaſons we aſſigned in the deſcription of that country, to which we refer: the back part of Sileſia towards Poland, from the Oder to the Warta, as far as Cuſtrin, is intirely open, having no one place of ſtrength on it, excepting Gros-Glogaw on the Oder and Cuſtrin: this line is near 300 miles in length. It is well known that the king of Pruſſia draws infinite advantages from Poland—horſes, cattle, recruits, corn, &c. without which he could not maintain his armies in Sileſia, nor form ſuch depots there as enable him to wage war in Bohemia.

THIS being premiſed, it ſeems clear, that if the Auſtrians built a place of arms on the line, between Teſchen and Cracow, a little further back, and opened a communication from thence to Hungary, through the paſſes of Tablunka, and ſome other roads through the mountains, which ſeparate that country from Poland, a powerful army might be aſſembled near the fortreſs, we ſuppoſe, to act on the back part of Sileſia along the Oder to Francfort, a very intereſting point to the Pruſſians.

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It is needleſs to point out all the advantages which the Auſtrians would reap from the operations of ſuch an army; I will therefore only ſay, that unleſs they find out a new line of operation, their attempts on Sileſia will be fruitleſs; and I ſee not how it is poſſible for them to eſtabliſh any other, but that which we propoſe.

The next part of the Auſtrian frontier runs from the Nieſter to the Danube, and ſeparates Tranſilvania and the Bannat of Temeſwaer, from Moldavia and Walachia: it is a chain of prodigious high mountains almoſt impenetrable, inſomuch, that there is but one paſs, through which wheel carriages can go; it leads to the Pruth. The Auſtrians have acquired here a tract of land, and have built a bridge over that river, a few miles behind Chotzim, and of courſe will open a good communication into Moldavia. They ſhould open two more roads through theſe mountains, the one from Hermanſtadt, the capital of Tranſilvania, cloſe by the river Alut, which runs into Walachia; and a third from the Bannat of Temeſwaer, through the paſs of Meadia into Walachia, cloſe to the Danube, oppoſite Widin.

This being done, nothing can hinder the Auſtrians from conquering Moldavia and Walachia in one campaign. The Turks have in thoſe countries only Giurgewa and Ibrailow on the Danube, Chotzim and Bender on the Nieſter, neither of which can reſiſt a fortnight's regular ſiege. As things now are, Auſtria holds the balance between the Turks and Ruſſians; for neither can paſs the Nieſter without her conſent.

The laſt part of the Auſtrian frontier runs from the Danube up the Save, and ſeparates Sclavonia from Boſnia. The country on both ſides of this river, particularly Boſnia, is extremely mountainous, inſomuch, that a regular army cannot move without great

difficulty. The direction of this line is very favourable to the Turks. It is, I think, impoſſible to advance beyond Belgrade towards Conſtantinople, while they are maſters of Boſnia: whereas they may paſs into Sclavonia, and by forcing a paſſage over the Drave, open a communication into Lower Hungary, the Bennat of Temeſwaer and Tranſilvania; with ſuch fruitful countries behind them, they might proceed into Upper Hungary and Auſtria, as formerly.

In the preſent ſtate of the two empires, nothing of this can happen; on the contrary, the Auſtrians are in every thing *infinitely* ſuperior to the Turks: the line of operations of the firſt goes from Vienna down the Danube to Peterwaradin, where, and at Temeſwaer, depots may be formed without trouble, and with very little expence, becauſe they would require ſcarce any horſes, carriages, &c. whereas the Turkiſh line muſt come from Conſtantinople, is 450 miles long, in many places very difficult; ſo that this diſtance may make an eſſential difference in the operations of the two armies.

In caſe ſuch a war ſhould happen, I would propoſe placing one army on the Save, with the left towards the Danube, and a ſtrong body of cavalry on the other ſide of that river; another, conſiſting of 30,000 men, chiefly light troops, two regiments of Huſſars, ſome howitzers and field-pieces, ſhould aſſemble in Croatia, and enter Boſnia on that ſide: this would oblige the Turks to abandon the Save, and fall back towards Servia, which will give the army, we ſuppoſe placed on the other ſide the Save, room to paſs it; and by thus acting in front and flank of the enemy, you will force him to abandon every province ſucceſſively, or fight you on your own terms.

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In a war with the Turks, I beg leave to recommend the uſe of the pikes, the order of battle propoſed in the preceding part of this work, with a numerous artillery and howitzers. The Turks always act in front with all their forces, and often with ſuch impetuoſity, that it is no eaſy matter to reſiſt their attacks; and if they ſucceed, it is no leſs difficult to avoid a total overthrow, which makes the order of battle we propoſe abſolutely neceſſary as well as the mode of acting on their flanks; more eſpecially at the time they are occupied in front: in this manner a column of near eight thouſand Turks, while engaged in attacking a redoubt, where there were ſeven hundred men, were totally diſperſed in five minutes time by three hundred horſe, who attacked them in flank in a looſe manner à la debandade.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE TURKISH FRONTIER.

We have already deſcribed that part of this line towards the Auſtrian dominions, it remains we now examine, that which confines on Poland and Ruſſia. If the Poles, like their anceſtors, the Tartars, made war with 100,000 horſemen, far from being a prey to their ambitious neighbours, they would make them tremble: all Poland, and the countries adjacent, from the Oder to the Dwina and Nieſter, on the frontier of Ruſſia, and even beyond the latter to the Wolga, are intirely open and defenceleſs, and abundantly provided with corn, horſes, cattle, &c. 100,000 horſe, divided into ſmaller bodies, would over-run this immenſe ſpace in a few months, and leave not a living creature behind them to cultivate the ground, which would become a deſart, and theſe mighty monarchs ſhut up with a few ſubjects in and about their fortreſſes. What would you

do with your immenſe armies of infantry, heavy ſquadrons, and your thouſand cannons againſt ſuch an enemy? Nothing: their ſuperior velocity gives them every thing, and leaves you nothing but the ground on which you encamp, which you muſt ſoon abandon, if you can, or periſh.

REMEMBER Peter the Great on the Pruth! By following this method, the Tartars under Genſis Chan and his ſucceſſors made greater conqueſts than any people in the world; but all this is a viſion, the Poles are nothing: a bad government deſtroys the reſources of the moſt powerful kingdoms; we ſhall therefore conſider the Turkiſh frontier ſo far as it relates to a war with Ruſſia.

THIS frontier runs from Chotzim on the Nieſter to the Black Sea, and from thence to Oczakow on the Nieper, along the Crimea towards the Don. It is true, that the Tartars, who inhabit the country from the Nieſter to the Don, along the Black Sea, are not ſubject to the Grand Seignior, but they are ſo far dependent on him, that they have always acted with him, and always will. On this frontier the Turks poſſeſs Chotzim, Bender, Oczakow, and Precop on the Iſthmus, which ſeparates the Crim from Little Tartary; in all which he can form his magazines with eaſe from Aſia and Europe.

THE Ruſſian frontier runs, on this ſide, from Kiow on the right of the Nieper as far as Kinſburn, oppoſite Oczakow, on the mouth of that river. On this frontier the Ruſſians have only one fortreſs, Pultawa, where Charles the Twelfth found the term of his victories and glory. This line is above five hundred miles in length.

THE Turkiſh and Ruſſian's principal line of operation muſt go from Chotzim to Kiow, which is two hundred and fifty miles: if either

either did not occupy Poland, and draw their ſubſiſtence from thence, it would be impoſſible for either to act on this line, and of courſe their wars would be confined to Little Tartary and the Crim, in which the Ruſſians have the advantage, as well from the poſition and direction of their frontier, which enables them to attack that country in different parts, as from the proximity of their reſources, the courſe of the rivers, &c. &c.

But as Poland has, and ever will be the property of thoſe who occupy it, both powers will act on the principal line from the Nieſter to Kiow. From the direction of the Turkiſh frontier, it is evident, that the Ruſſians cannot approach the Nieſter, if the Turks order thirty or forty thouſand Tartars to advance into Poland, between the Bog and the Nieper, and between this river and the Don, even the Tartars of Cuban might be made to act between the Don and the Wolga. If ſuch a diſpoſition was made and executed, the Ruſſians, far from advancing into Moldavia, would find it difficult to preſerve their own country, which is plain and open, and therefore cannot be defended by any armies whatever, conſtituted as ours are, againſt the incurſions of a hundred thouſand horſemen. We ſaw lately a miſerable vagabond, at the head of a few thouſand rabble, over-run a great part of the Ruſſian empire: our armies, I repeat it, are formed to act only on a very contracted line, and in a cloſe country they never can perform great things, or make extenſive conqueſts.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EUROPE.

THIS line begins at a ſmall river called Kymen in Finland, and is the limit between the Ruſſians and the Swedes; it runs along the gulph of Finland, and part of the Baltic as far as the mouth of the Dwina, on which is Riga, a very ſtrong place, and conſiderable for its trade: from hence it goes up the above ſaid river to its ſprings, and then to Smolenſko on thoſe of the Nieper, from whence finally it follows the courſe of that river to the Black Sea, oppoſite Oczakow; the Ruſſians have appropriated ſome provinces on the right of it. We ſhall divide this line into three parts. Firſt, that in Finland oppoſite the Swedes. Secondly, that from the mouth of the Dwina to Smolenſko. And thirdly, that from the laſt place to the Black Sea.

RUSSIAN FINLAND is quite a ſavage country, having nothing in it but foreſts, marſhes, lakes, rocks, and mountains, is extremely poor, and does not furniſh wherewith to feed the inhabitants, though few in number, and do not excced a hundred thouſand perſons. This country is ſo very ſtrong, that three or four regiments, which generally are quartered here, are ſufficient to defend it againſt four times that number; and the more ſo, as the Ruſſians can from Cronſtadt ſend any number they think proper over the gulph, and land them behind the Swediſh army, that would advance towards the Kymen: in whatever poſition the Swedes place themſelves, the Ruſſians may act againſt them in front and on either flank, and force them into the ſea, as in the laſt war in this country, or to abandon

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it and retire up the gulph of Bothnia towards Torneo, where they muſt periſh for want of ſubſiſtence.

The Ruſſian's line of operations goes from Peterſburg through Wyburg; the capital of Finland to David's Stadt, a new fortreſs, and thence to Frederickſham near the Kymen; all which places are well fortified: the Swediſh line goes from the ſame Kymen to Abo, and from thence over the gulph of Bothnia to Stockholm on the Baltic: the firſt line is about 150 miles in length, and the ſecond near 400. The firſt is a good road by which the army may be ſupplied, as alſo by water from Cronſtadt, Nerva, Revel, &c. whereas the Swedes muſt bring every thing from Stockholm and other places beyond the gulph of Bothnia.

Whoever conſiders theſe circumſtances, the great difference there is in the length of the reſpective lines of operations, and finally, the ſuperiority of the Ruſſian forces, will conclude that the Swedes, ſo far from being able to attack the former with advantage, cannot preſerve their poſſeſſions on this frontier a month, if they are attacked: it would therefore ſeem prudent to give them up rather than keep them on ſuch precarious conditions; ſuch a meaſure would greatly increaſe the power of the Swedes, who would have the Danes only to contend with, to whom in every reſpect they are much ſuperior. It was to the circumſtances above-mentioned only, we can attribute the loſs of the Swediſh provinces, on that ſide of the Baltic, by Charles the Twelfth: how could that prince ſuppoſe it was poſſible, with any forces Sweden could raiſe and maintain, to preſerve them at ſuch a diſtance, over a very difficult ſea, frozen for ſix months in the year, againſt the ſuperior forces of the Ruſſians, who were limitrophes, and able to act continually, almoſt during the whole year? The event of that, and I believe

believe of moſt wars, carried on on ſuch an extenſive line, confirms the doctrine we have eſtabliſhed; that is, they miſcarry and ruin thoſe who undertake them.

FROM Peterſburg to Riga, on the Dwina, there are Narva and Revel, which are ſtations for the Ruſſian ſquadrons; the coaſt is high, and by no means ſafe for great ſhips, which dare not ſhut themſelves in the upper part of the Gulph of Finland, where a weſterly wind would keep them longer than they would wiſh; ſo that the Ruſſians have nothing to fear on that ſide, and the leſs ſo as they have from Finland along the coaſt to Riga, at leaſt fifty thouſand men always in quarters.

THE country on the Ruſſian ſide of the Dwina, from Riga, is ſomething better than Finland, though like it, for the moſt part covered with lakes, foreſts, marſhes, &c. and of courſe is very thinly inhabited. On all this frontier an enemy can only advance towards Riga, and from thence to Peterſburg, or towards Pleſkow, which is the key into Novogorod and Moſcow; the loſs of Pleſkow, on the lake Peipus, brought on that of the Swediſh provinces. Had Charles the Twelfth been able to keep it, he might have prevented the Ruſſians from ſupporting themſelves on the Nieva in Ingria, and by acting on their line from Moſcow to Novogorod, have forced them to Tweer behind the Wolga. This Pleſkow is a very important poſt, if theyhad a powerful enemy to contend with on that frontier, but they have none: for the Pruſſians, however formidable, were they totally diſengaged on the ſide of Germany, can never advance to the Dwina: their main forces are behind the Oder, and muſt be ſupported from thence, and by land, becauſe the Pruſſian monarch has no fleet.

THE

THE Ruſſians can, firſt, ſend a fleet to ravage the coaſt from Memel to Stetin. Secondly, can advance in front into Pruſſia, and occupy it before the Pruſſians can ſend a ſufficient army to prevent it. Thirdly, they can ſend a conſiderable body of troops, particularly light troops, to act on the Pruſſian's line, from Koningſberg to the Viſtula, and even paſs this river and advance towards the Warta—ſuch troops want no magazines.

SMOLENSKOW is fortified, but not ſo as to be able to make any conſiderable reſiſtance; this is the moſt important point on all the Ruſſian frontiers, it is only two hundred miles from Moſcow, through which the communication between Peterſburg and the ſouthern provinces paſſes; by occupying Moſcow, the empire is overturned. It was through this paſs the Poles always entered Ruſſia, and for a long ſeries of years contended with ſucceſs with the Ruſſians, and even ſet up an impoſtor on the throne of that empire.

IF Charles the Twelfth, being maſter of Poland, inſtead of going to Puttawa, had taken Smolenſkow, and from thence advanced to Moſcow, a victory would have given him that important place, and for ſome time the empire. He could not however have preſerved it while connected with Sweden, for the ſame reaſons he could not preſerve his provinces on the Baltic; one unfortunate event, which muſt finally happen at ſuch an immenſe diſtance, would neceſſarily have ruined him.

IN ſpeaking of the Turkiſh frontiers, we have already deſcribed that which goes from Smolenſkow to Kiow, and from thence to the Black Sea. We ſhall conclude what we have to ſay on this ſubject, by obſerving, that however deſirous the Ruſſians may be to interfere in the affairs of Germany, they can only act an auxiliary part,

and that for a few months only in the year; they can never maintain any conqueſts beyond the Viſtula, ſo far they may proceed, becauſe their fleet might co-operate with ſucceſs, even this would become difficult, ſince the Pruſſians have made acquiſitions in Poland, which unites Pruſſia with the other provinces of the houſe of Brandenburg, and this communication is ſecured by a capital fortreſs now building on the viſtula, near Marien Werder: when we conſider the map, we ſee that the Turks and Pruſſians are the only powers that can approach the Ruſſian frontier, and that Auſtria muſt be attentive to their motions; it ſeems that an alliance between the two empires would be uſeful to both.

The reſt of the Ruſſian frontier, from the Don to the Wolga, along the provinces of Orenbourg, Siberia, and Irkutch, has for the moſt part ſeveral hordes of Tartars in the neighbourhood, who now and then make incurſions into the Ruſſian provinces to plunder, which having accompliſhed, they retire with the utmoſt expedition.

The Chineſe are on the limits of Irkutch, and ſeparated from it by a ſmall river, which runs through a Town called Kiachta, inhabited by the ſubjects of both empires. They could by means of the Tartars of Great Tartary be troubleſome to the Ruſſians, but are afraid of them, averſe to war in general, and do not wiſh to ſee the Tartars armed.

On the north of Siberia, towards the Frozen Sea, the inhabitants are ſavages, and live by hunting, pay a ſmall tribute in ſkins, which is all they have to pay.

The Perſian monarchy has for many years been torn by civil diſſenſions, which ſubſided during the reign of Gherim Khan, a very

very able and juſt prince, who died lately; and the civil wars, as uſual, are broken out afreſh, ſo that the Ruſſians have nothing to fear on that ſide: moreover, the mountains of Cauſacus, which run from the ſea of Aſoph to the Caſpian, preſent ſo many difficulties, that neither can make war beyond them.

HAVING deſcribed the frontiers of the principal European powers on the Continent, we muſt now return to conſider that of France on the Britiſh channel. This frontier extends from Dunkirk to Uſhant, and round that point, along the Bay of Biſcay, to Bayonne; on this line, however, there is but one harbour, where a great fleet can be built, equipped, and ride in ſafety, which is Breſt; ſhips of the line are alſo built at Rochfort, and equipped there, but few in number, and only few can be kept there with ſafety; they ſoon periſh, becauſe the water is ſweet, though the tide runs very high and violent up the Charante.

IN ſpeaking of the line of operation, on which an army acts, we have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it is of any conſiderable length, or interſected by mountains, paſſes, and rivers, and of courſe, if it goes over a conſiderable branch of the ſea, no ſolid enterprize can be executed on ſuch a line, though your forces are much ſuperior to thoſe who oppoſe you. A pirate may land twenty men on the coaſt of France, or any other, rob a hen-rooſt, burn a few houſes, and run away to their ſhip, in ſpite of France and its two hundred thouſand men, becauſe ſuch an expedition is executed in a few hours.

IN the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made ſeveral attempts on the coaſt of France, the reſult was burning ſome fiſhing-boats, and, by accident, I believe, ſome houſes, and were happy to come off. Their laſt exploits at St. Cas, was, we know,

very unfortunate. Whoſe fault was it? No doubt it was the fault of thoſe who planned theſe fine expeditions. Could we have burnt the enemy's docks, ſtores, &c. at Breſt and Rochfort, it would have been of great importance and worth trying; but every other object was by no means equal to the riſk or the expence, and never ought to be undertaken. No forces the Engliſh can bring on the coaſt will be ſufficient to take Breſt, or any other capital place: but for a moment I will ſuppoſe the French are aſleep; that the Engliſh fleet and fifty thouſand men are at Breſt. What then? Why, then they muſt in a ſhort time return home, if they can; for ſurely they cannot remain at Breſt, which in a ſhort time will be ſurrounded by a French army, who will beſiege you in it, you muſt therefore abandon it, or advance into the country: advance, in the name of God! you are at Rennes, the capital of Britany; What then, I aſk once more? Why, you will be ſurrounded, your communication with Breſt and your fleet cut off, and your army periſhes by the ſword or by famine.

WHAT I ſay of Breſt, which indeed is the only place on the coaſt where a fleet can for any conſiderable time ride with ſafety, is equally applicable to every other point on this coaſt, or any other coaſt whatever. If your army meets with any, though very inconſiderable reſiſtance; for while your enemy can keep the field, and act on your flanks, you cannot remain on any given ſpot; and if you advance, you only precipitate your ruin.

ON the coaſt of England there are three harbours, where a great fleet may ride with ſafety. The enemy muſt take one of them. Suppoſe it done, and that the Engliſh have not a ſhip left. Suppoſe further, that there is a French army of ſixty thouſand men encamped on Black-Heath, and off London bridge.

I ſay,

I ſay, there are two hundred thouſand men in England who have bore arms; I will put the half on horſeback, and the other half remains on foot; mix them as circumſtances may require, then I place fifty thouſand men in Surry and Suſſex, and as many in Eſſex, who act on the enemy's line, which on that ſuppoſition muſt go towards the Downs, there being no other place where his fleet can anchor; ſuch a diſpoſition being made, and only half the number of men we propoſe employed, I aſk any officer, any man of ſenſe, what will become of the enemy's army on Black-Heath, or in any other given point, ſixty or ſeventy miles from the coaſt? It muſt periſh; for undoubtedly no army can ſubſiſt on a line of ſuch length as is that, from France to Black-Heath, over a branch of the ſea, and penetrate into the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty thouſand men only to oppoſe their ſupplies. No army can ſubſiſt in a country, unleſs it draws all, or the greateſt part of its ſubſiſtence from the country itſelf, and of courſe poſſeſſes a great tract behind it, and on every ſide to the right and left; for if you can act on the enemy's line, he muſt retire; and though he ſhould be in poſſeſſion of ſuch a tract of country as we ſuppoſe, he cannot keep it, unleſs he is maſter of one or more ſtrong places, to enable him to ſeparate his troops and put them into winter quarters.

When the combined fleet appeared on our coaſt, the nation unaccuſtomed to ſee an enemy ſo near, ſeemed much alarmed, I then thought it my duty to examine the poſſible reſults of an invaſion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy muſt have acted, had he landed, and the different poſitions the Engliſh army muſt have occupied on ſuch lines to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the poſt he had taken on our coaſt. When I conſider this ſubject in a military light only, I wiſhed almoſt that the enemy had made ſuch

ſuch an attempt; becauſe once for all they would have ſeen the abſurdity and danger of it, and we ſhould for ever have been cured of our fears.

CHAPTER V.

OF AMERICA.

I TAKE it for granted, that every body has or may have a map of the ſeat of war in this country, and therefore have not given it here. Politics have not in the leaſt contributed to bring this important war to a happy concluſion, probably have retarded it. In general I have obſerved, that when they interfere with military operations, they have rather retarded than accelerated them: when an army is once in the field, and the plan of the campaign ſettled, let the general go on his own way, he is on the ſpot, and with the aſſiſtance of his officers alone, can determine what is to be done, and how it is to be done.

As I am totally unacquainted with the face of the country, it is impoſſible for me, even ſuppoſing I was a competent judge, to form any opinion of the different actions which have happened there, during this long war; moſt, if not all of them, have been ſucceſsful; it is therefore juſt to conclude, they were conducted with wiſdom and valour: why, the reſult of them did not anſwer the expectations of the public, will appear from what we ſhall ſay on the ſubject.

We muſt beg the reader will recollect what we have ſaid in Chap. III. pag. 133 to 137, on the line of operation, and Chap. IV. pag. 138 to 143, on the nature and principles of an offenſive war,

war, and compare the doctrine therein eſtabliſhed with the manner in which the American war was conducted: it will, we think, appear, that the want of ſucceſs did not ariſe from want of honour, valour, or of wiſdom, in planning or executing the various actions which happened; but from thoſe difficulties which aroſe from the nature of the country, and perhaps likewiſe from the defects in the general plan of war, that was adopted and purſued with ſo little ſucceſs.

The country is open, that is, it has no fortreſs excepting Boſton, New-York, and Charles-Town; it is very extenſive, and very thinly inhabited in proportion to its extent; ſo that there is no one province, I believe, which could maintain a fleet and an army for a month, which of courſe muſt be ſupported from England, that is, on a line of above three thouſand miles. Whoever conſiders this circumſtance only, and calculates the infinite difficulties in tranſporting and maintaining an army of forty thouſand men, at ſuch an immenſe diſtance, will find many reaſons, which have concurred to retard and fruſtrate the progreſs of our arms. Poſterity will admire the activity and vigour of our counſels, and be aſtoniſhed at the reſources of our country. The miniſtry could do no more than place and maintain a prodigious army on the ſpot where it was deſtined to act: no fault can juſtly be imputed to them; they are acquitted by every wiſe and moderate man, who conſiders their conduct as to this point with impartiality. Though the country has no fortreſs, it is however very ſtrong by nature, and has very few good roads; it is ſtill in its infancy.

Let us now examine, what ſeems to me, the real cauſes of our little ſucceſs in this long and unhappy war.

New-

NEW-YORK is the point from whence our army muſt advance into the country; from this point, with a radius of a hundred miles, for example; deſcribe a ſemi-circle, whoſe diameter is the ſea coaſt; as there is not, within that circumference, any one fortreſs whoſe poſſeſſion will render you maſter of a certain tract of country between it and the coaſt, it follows you cannot eſtabliſh a certain line of operation; the enemy is encamped on that portion of circle, and on whatever direction you proceed, he meets you, and if you preſs him, retires where he pleaſes, having an immenſe country behind him, which furniſhes him with proviſions from every point of the compaſs; whereas you are chained to New-York, you cannot follow the enemy too far, becauſe you have not a ſufficient number of horſes and carriages for that purpoſe; and moreover, the enemy may attack your line behind you and cut off your army, or force you to retire. While he has an army in the field, you cannot ſeparate yours, without the greateſt danger, twenty miles from New-York. If within the ſuppoſed circle, or any other circle, there was a capital fortreſs, your line of operation is of courſe determined between New-York and ſuch a fortreſs, in which caſe you march and act on that line, the enemy muſt follow you or anticipate you, he muſt fight you or let you take the place: whereas, as things now are, you are reduced to marching and counter-marching, advancing and retiring within a circle a whole campaign, even for twenty campaigns, without a poſſibility of bringing the enemy to a deciſive action, which the principles of an offenſive war require, or of fixing yourſelves on any one point. After much trouble and loſs you muſt neceſſarily return to New-York, and ſo on for twenty campaigns, unleſs you or the enemy, totally exhauſted, give up the quarrel for want of means to keep it up.

WHAT

WHAT I have ſaid of New-York, is equally applicable to any other point from Boſton to Georgia, and, indeed, to every other coaſt in the world. If your enemy can keep the field, if the country is open, extenſive, and deſtitute of fortreſſes, within reach of the ſhore and the harbour you occupy, you can never carry on a war with ſucceſs. The hiſtory of all wars, and of all expeditions, the ſix fruitleſs campaigns we have made in America, confirm the truth of our principles.

YET by the ſingular poſition of this country, the poſſeſſion of Canada, the ſuperiority of our fleet, and the activity of his majeſty's miniſters, I think, that notwithſtanding the difficulties which ariſe from the diſtance, the face of the country, and the nature of the war, it might with the forces, which have been ſent into that country, have been concluded in one campaign with glory and ſucceſs.

THE head, the heart, and ſupport of that rebellion, revolt, inſurrection (do not diſpute with me about names) are the four provinces included between Hudſon's River and Boſton: if we could or can ſubdue theſe four provinces, the war is at an end.

LET us therefore examine, whether with an army of thirty or forty thouſand men, ſupported by a powerful fleet, we could or can conquer theſe provinces? I ſay we could, and always can; if we can be maſters of Boſton; from that harbour draw a line to Albany, or ſome given point on Hudſon's River, not far from it, which is 150 miles, a corps of ſix or eight thouſand men advance from Canada towards Albany, leaving Hudſon's River always on the right; take poſſeſſion of Rhode-Iſland and of Newport on the Continent, with as many men; chiefly light troops, with very few field-pieces, and ſome howitzers, and as few carriages as poſſible; the more light horſe the better, becauſe they can forage at a great

diſtance, and act with vigour and celerity. The main army, twenty thouſand men, at Boſton. If this army advances to Hudſon's River; I ſay, that another of equal goodneſs and force cannot prevent it, if the enemy leaves that river, and goes to meet you towards Boſton, one or both of the above-mentioned corps from taking poſſeſſion of Albany, and of ſome other poſts upon it, and by moving about and avoiding a general action, he is ſurrounded and muſt periſh. If he beats your main army, or quits his line of operation, to purſue either of the above-mentioned corps, he cannot avoid his fate. It is evident, that the more he advances on the line, from Hudſon's River towards Boſton, the more certain is his ruin, for this reaſon; an army acting upon one line muſt relinquiſh it, if the enemy can oppoſe it in front, and at the ſame time on its flank and rear.

In ſhort, to conquer America, you muſt draw a line from Boſton to Albany, and act on that line in the manner we have propoſed: all operations on lines, drawn from the coaſt into the country, from Boſton to Charles-Town, will prove hereafter, as they have already done, unſucceſsful.

END OF THE SECOND PART.

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





A Company of Infantry of 128 men ranged four deep.

Fig: 1.



The same in a Column.

Fig: 4.

2 Batt.ns in the usual way.



Fig: 5.

2 Batt.ns according to our System.

Barth. sculp.

rder of Battle.

each formed three deep will occupy in front allowing

an about 1340 the whole Line 400

1340

1740 yards

g. 1.

2.



der of Battle.

rrals equal to the front out flank ten Squadrons

s viz. by a batt.n and a Squadron,

he Plate.

Bayly sculp.





The line of Cavalry is ommitted to avoid confusion.





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

Bayly sculp



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