




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


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REASON

BY
W. L. G. T.

(FIVE EIGHTY PENCE)

REASONS

REPORT OF THE

WARREN COMMISSION

(The Warren Commission Report)

REASONS

In SUPPORT of the

WAR in *GERMANY*,

In ANSWER to

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

Present *GERMAN WAR*.



L O N D O N :

Printed for G. WOODFALL, the Corner of *Craig's*-
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REASONS

FOR

WAR

AND

CONSTITUTION

OF

THE UNITED STATES



BY

JOHN W. FULTON

ADVERTISEMENT.

HAVING been lately in the country to spend the holidrys with my neighbours there, I found a total change had prevailed in the system of their politicks, during my absence. I left them a few months before passionate admirers and zealous friends of the king of Prussia, and of prince Ferdinand: but in the first visit which I received from the parson of our parish, who had been one of the most zealous among them, he asked me whether I had not read, and how I liked the Considerations on the present German war? I answered, that

I

I had read them, and did not like them. He replied by repeating the king of Prussia's words in the author's advertisement; and concluded with the quotation from Tully, contained in the last page of that pamphlet, applying it as the author does.

I answered, the king of Prussia was our enemy when he gave us the good advice for our conduct then, which the author recommends to us now to follow; and that the Athenian miscarriage in a naval expedition against Sicily, when the defeat of their hopeless and dispirited troops was a consequence of the destruction of their fleet which conveyed them thither, could not be applied to a war upon the German continent. He had read Thucydides, and did not much insist upon that instance.

However,

However, we widely differed in many other particulars; and as we could not then finish the controversy, we agreed to postpone it for the present, and thoroughly debate the subject at a club which meets every week in the neighbourhood. He assured me I should find every man there of his opinion.

To fit me for this combat, I read over with great attention the pamphlet, and made remarks in the margin as I went along. From these notes the following reasons are collected; and if they produce the same effect upon my readers in London, that they had upon the members of our club, I shall have no reason to repent of my labour. For I think it of importance to my country, that every man should be convinced of the falshood of a work calculated to prove, " that while pro-
" vidence

(viii)

“ *vidence has been pleased to put the*
“ *whole advantage of the war into*
“ *our hands,---we are giving it to*
“ *our enemies.*” p. 128.

N. B. The references in the following
work are to the first edition of the
CONSIDERATIONS.

REASONS

In SUPPORT of the

WAR in *GERMANY*.

THAT *France* is more populous than *Great-Britain* and all the territories belonging to it, is an undoubted proposition; altho' deducting the useless hands from the stock of each nation, the disproportion is not so formidable as is generally apprehended by us. In all our wars upon the continent of *Europe* with this power, we have had one advantage, which has more than evened that difference: Our armies have been chiefly composed of foreigners. We have fought *France* with *English* treasure, but not with *English* blood; and while her natives were dragged from the plough and the loom to exercise the musquet, and perish or be disabled in the field, ours were employed in the arts of

B

peace,

peace, and in supplying the drains of war by manufacture and export.

Whoever considers the pay and other expences of a *British* soldier, fighting for his country in *Germany* or *Flanders*, as the greatest loss felt at home from his absence, has formed a very erroneous estimate of the value of labour in agriculture, manufacture, and commerce. Every foreigner employed abroad in the room of an *Englishman*, where men are necessary to be employed, produces a saving to this country, which multiplied upon many heads, forms a balance in our favour, incredible to those who are not much acquainted with political arithmetick; and which, if turned against us in our various continental wars, would have long since depopulated and beggared this country.

Altho' therefore it is confessed that *France* exceeds us in numbers of men; it must be allowed, that the disproportion between us is not equal to the difference of the *British* and *French* natives, which compose the respective armies now acting in *Germany*. Twenty thousand *British* troops are the highest complement that has been employed by us in that service in any year; while one hundred thousand *French* must be owned a very moderate calculation on their side: and that a number more than equal to this has
since

since the war began, "innocent and harmless" as it is represented in p. 78, found their graves in *Germany*, is a fact not to be controverted.

In such proportion *Britain* has been more tender than *France* in risking the lives of its subjects, p. 73, 79. and tho' the killing of men may not be the end of war, p. 73. yet, unhappily for the human species, it always is one of the principal means by which controversies between princes are determined; whether, in the author's words, "*the great intent of war be, by victory to conquer an enemy's country,*" or to defend a friend's. p. 73, 74.

Near four parts in five of the allied army being natives of the country where the war is carried on, inured to the climate and habituated to its food, their loss by sickness has been inconsiderable, compared with that sustained by our enemies, throughout campaigns lengthened beyond the measure of military operations in former times. Long and painful marches to the place of action, and unprovided retreats from it in disastrous events thro' a less known and unfriendly country, are circumstances all operating to our advantage; from which the armies of *France* have suffered infinitely more in deaths and desertion, than from the sword of their enemy: cannon and bayonets have been

harmless implements, compared to other means of destruction, with which providence in this quarrel has fought on the side of the invaded.

But such losses are, it seems, of no avail to us, and cause no prejudice to *France*: for, important as the lives of our fellow-subjects are to *Britain*, our author sets those of *Frenchmen* at a low rate indeed; as near nothing as words can state them; p. 76.

“ In the present course of the war *France* can lose nothing by a defeat. Except only in the number of the killed and wounded, which in the common course of battles may be set at about the double of that of the conquerors, what other loss have our enemies to sustain?” Magazines, artillery and baggage are small items that have been here omitted in this account. Yet by such losses those very enemies have, in different periods of their history, been driven out of *Germany*; and the same fate, p. 24. attending almost invariably, in numberless instances, their unjust attempts upon other countries, prove to conviction, if perfidious ambition could be convinced, that *France*, stronger at land (within her own dominions) than *England* or any other power in *Europe*, p. 3. loses that superiority when she ventures far from home, beyond the influence of her infinite resources, p. 67. And thus

thus circumstanced, she in the year 1673 became inferior to the efforts of a few small provinces, half undone by her inhuman devastations, and opposed, deserted, and betrayed by unnatural and infatuated allies.

The issue of that invasion in the last century, and of the kingdom of *Bohemia* in the present, are instances, which opposed to the resistance made by *France* against the two grand alliances, reduce the author's proposition in p. 3. to what I have ventured to state it; and demonstrate that the inference he would draw from that struggle against the powers of *Europe*, p. 59. is in no measure applicable to the present contest, p. 74.

The successes which have already attended the allied army in *Germany*, and the losses sustained by the *French* in their invasion of it, however they are depreciated by the author's representation of them, will in the history of these times, whatever the final event may be, add one instance more of the insufficiency of the power of *France*, to overrun at will weak but distant states; while the scanty numbers of our allies have at the utmost extent been only increased by twenty thousand *British* troops.

The

The weaker those states are represented, and the less important to the invader, p. 23, 24. the stronger the proof will be, that the pride of power has its bounds, and innocence and weakness a security against it, beyond the reach of stretched and strained ambition.

The author complains, p. 79. *that the distinguishing art of this war has hitherto consisted in the raising trifling skirmishes into battles and victories; and that there are who knew that they could not make their court in any method so effectually, as by magnifying the victories of our German army, and aggravating the losses of the French.* The battle at Minden was then a trifling skirmish! and indeed so it appears to be by the author's account of it, p. 78, 129. *Nay, had our horse charged the French, and trampled down three or four thousand Saxon and French foot, the advantage would have been trifling: "for no substantial benefit would result to England from it." p. 79. why then would it doubtless have been a very good thing? p. 78. "The killing of men is not the "end of war." p. 73. "The only loss would "have been of men." p. 79. "But France "cannot be hurt by the mere loss of men, "which were it five times greater, it could*
 " I re-

“ presently supply by draughts from its mi-
 “ litia, or replace when it pleased with re-
 “ cruits in *Germany*.” Why then was not
 the *French* army presently recruited? and
 why did it remain during the rest of the
 campaign exposed to all the disadvantages of
 a war of defence only? p. 71.

The *French* militia consists of about fifty
 thousand men, employed in garrisoning their
 interior fortifications, and in assisting to de-
 fend their coasts. How the loss at *Minden*,
 p. 79. could have been presently supplied
 from such a stock, scarcely sufficient for the
 other important services to which they were
 destined, may be very evident to the writer
 of the pamphlet, as well as the facility of
 filling up such a void at pleasure with re-
 cruits in *Germany*; but it is apparent that
 neither seemed practicable to the *French* mi-
 nistry. And the specimen which our author
 has given of his knowledge in the *French*
 revenue, of which he confesses “ he knows
 “ nothing,” p. 68. and his very imperfect
 and unfair stating a certain gentleman’s ar-
 gument, in the last session of parliament,
 joined to his real or affected ignorance of the
 produce of our sinking fund, and the unac-
 countable inaccuracies in his calculations
 thro’ p. 69 and 70, render his opinions upon
 the

the ways and means of both nations somewhat problematical.

But "infinite resources," p. 67. "inexhaustible numbers of men," p. 79. "Millions to spare," p. 123. are bold assertions; which, had assertion the force of facts, would defeat every inference that can be drawn from bankruptcy and beggary at home, and defeat and dishonour abroad.

The author takes no notice of the loss sustained by the *French* previous to the battle of *Crevelt*. These were all the consequences of affairs so trifling, p. 78. as not to be worthy of mention in his impartial *Considerations*. He estimates the defeat at *Minden* "under three or four thousand men which the *French* lost there," p. 79. yet in 1758 they precipitately retreated from *Hanover* to *Crevelt*, and in 1759 from *Minden* to *Giessen*.—an immense tract of country—leaving behind them spoils and trophies equal to the fruits of a complete victory, and suffering all the miseries and disgrace which attend Derout and flight. Could these effects have been produced from slight causes, *Britain* has little to fear from a power thus dispirited and distress'd by inconsiderable checks; and many pages have been wrote in vain to prove the superiority of *France* over every state in *Europe*.—Were her armies, so constituted,
equal

equal in numbers to the *Persian* or *Mexican* myriads, they would fly like them; and *France* with her *infinite resources in men and money*, would scarcely be a match for a Landgrave of *Hesse*, or our good ally the Prince of *Buckeburg*—for with him the author allows that we have a continental connection, *p.* 100.

But our Author, intent to prove the impossibility of resisting *France* in *Germany*, suppresses or extenuates every event that would invalidate his Argument. The loss of a battle is confined to the numbers killed or wounded in the action, *p.* 79, lessened far below the truth, *p.* 78, 129. every other article is omitted; consequential losses never enter into his account of a defeat; and lest the memory and sagacity of his readers should supply those defects—the *destruction of men is of no importance*, and *France has millions of money yet to spare*.

But in despite of our Author's assertions, the battles at *Crevelt* and *Minden* were great and important actions; the last decisive of a campaign which lasted five months after the victory was gained. The affair of *Warburg* was one of those many operations during this campaign, which have defeated the utmost efforts of an enemy exerting every
C
nerve,

nerve, and draining every vein of exhausted power to put an end to, not to protract, as the author absurdly imagines, a war in a country where by his own confession, *p.* 129, "*France can gain nothing nor Britain lose.*" That all this, *p.* 79, has been done without the effusion or hazard of much blood on our side; and that the effect of victories has been obtained clear from the common price at which they are often dearly purchased in pitch'd battles, is the highest encomium upon the abilities and humanity of two Princes, who deserve from every subject of these kingdoms a better treatment than this author is pleased to afford them. *p.* 82. 129.

But if any doubt could be entertained of the advantages gained by us in *Germany*, the balance remaining due to us upon the exchange of prisoners, and the shifting and degrading of generals, no less than four commanders in chief of the *French* army being removed in four years, are facts which carry conviction with them.

But it seems our success in *Germany*, if we have been successful there, "may easily be accounted for," *p.* 68. This account seems to be contained in the following propositions, a little farther explained than the author has done, in order to elucidate his meaning.

meaning. P. 72. "The *French* have every year brought a superiority of numbers into the field; as great a superiority as they ought in good policy to send to that service, whatever be the number of their forces at home." It is then, in the author's opinion, good policy in the *French* to suffer themselves to be beaten in *Germany*; for the superiority they sent was not in every year sufficient to prevent a defeat. P. 83. "And if they know their own interest, they never will send an over-powerful army thither to drive us out of it (*Germany*) and put us upon bethinking ourselves of ours." Again, p. 129. "It is not now the business of *France* to exert its whole force, as it did in former wars, with three or four armies in *Germany*. It is not the interest of *France* to beat us out from thence, that would open our eyes."

The two last paragraphs in some degree qualify the first. They do not assert, that to be beaten in *Germany* is the interest of *France*, but merely not to beat her enemy there. Happily for us the apprehensions of the latter event were so strong upon her, as to lessen the proportion necessary for self-defence. Her good policy in this instance seems at first glance a little to have failed in the execution of her plan: but, in the au-

thor's system, if we consider the impossibility of proportioning the numbers of one army to another, so exactly as neither to be beaten nor beat ; or to calculate the effects of a victory over a discomfited enemy, so as to know with precision and certainty, as in a game at tennis, how far the force of a blow may operate ; *France*, abounding with men and with money, chose rather to expose herself to the lesser evil, than to the hazard of incurring a greater, by driving her enemy out of *Germany*. Nay had any more of the allied army perished than have already fallen, every additional loss on our side would be prejudicial to her, and would hasten an event, which must defeat a scheme planned for our destruction : we should, perhaps, e'er now have been driven out of *Germany* without a possibility of returning thither, from the difficulty of recruiting an army, which, even successful as we have been, cannot be supplied with men, p. 67, 82.

Had *Clermont* succeeded at *Crevelt*, *Contades* at *Minden*, or *Broglio* at *Warburg*, they no doubt had orders to stop a pursuit ; and the *French* army, like a pack of well-trained hounds, would at the word of command have stood stock still, and suffered their trembling and flying prey to escape, with possibly a slight pinch, to serve for the sport of succeeding days. But even this expedient

pedient might have failed them: We might have fled without a pursuit, as the *French* did from *Minden*. And were our flight to be as rapid as theirs, we should have evacuated *Germany*, and utterly destroyed the project of an insidious enemy, who, like a sharper at play, means to take us in by voluntary losses. It must however be allowed, this *Gallic* cogger of the dice of war has ventured farther than the skilful knights of a less honourable profession are wont to do; and an ignorant by-stander would without hesitation pronounce the gamester, who lost for four years successively, rather a dupe than a knave. But such gamesters there are, who beaten at one table, court fortune at another; change their seats to improve their luck, and impatient of setting down upon the remains of a shattered estate, risque the whole with the odds still against them.

The policy of *France* is however deeper laid, and our author's happy penetration, altho' lost on an ignorant ministry, "and an obstinate nation," p. 81, has for the instruction and benefit of posterity discovered the latent causes of events, which would otherwise have been recorded in the memoirs of politicians and the annals of historians under false, tho' specious appearances.

Had

Had his pamphlet never been published, the fruitless attempts of *France* upon *Germany* during four successive years would have been ascribed, as they universally have been until the day of his publication, to a want of means adequate to the enterprise. It would be remembered that during this period she had lost her best resources of wealth; that her trade was captured and her manufacturers were ruined; the exigencies of government were so pressing, that altho the miseries of her people disabled them from paying their ordinary taxes, yet new ones were imposed, and edicts from the throne were answered by her parliaments in the language, tho' not the tone of rebellion. Her plate was melted down with a loss to the owners of the whole workmanship; the bills of her colonies were protested; the public creditors defrauded of their payments; officers civil and military, of their stipends; purchases under public faith cancelled; the pensions upon which many of her nobility and gentry subsist were stopt; and the royal stables left without provender from the mere want of money to purchase it. Ministers were successively disgraced on the failure of their schemes to raise money by imposts that were found impracticable, and by loans at an excessive interest which could not be filled. Baffled and subdued by land and by
 sea

sea in every part of the world, she would be drawn planning weak and chimerical schemes for the invasion of *Britain*, while she sat pale and trembling for her own safety at home, with a few ragged undisciplined troops for the defence of her coasts. Such possibly would have been the false and disgraceful picture drawn of *France* by some future painter to decorate the palaces of our princes, and perpetuate events which now do honour to the *British* name in the eyes of a mistaken and uninformed world.

But how will the prospect be altered, when enlightned and inspired by the author's discoveries, some *French Phidias* shall in breathing marble carve the Gallic *Jupiter*, a thunderbolt in his hand, and *Britannia* lying prostrate before him ! the sex will be of infinite importance to the statuary : for *Lewis XV.* must not be represented like his predecessor in the *Place des Victoires* trampling under foot the nations of the universe. This milder *Jupiter* must be drawn like the God of the poet, consuming the unhappy *Semele*. And *Ovid's* description is so expressive of the author's plan, that I cannot help imagining he had in his view the beautiful lines which follow, in many pages of his matchless performance. In no other part does he stand indebted to any man who ever spoke, wrote, or thought before him.

Æthera

*Æthera conscendit, nutuque sequentia traxit
Nubila, quæis nimbos immistaque fulgura ven-
tis*

*Addit, & tonitrus, & inevitabile fulmen.
Qua tamen usque potest, vires sibi demere ten-
tat.*

*Nunc quo centimanum dejecerat igne Typhæa,
Nunc armatur eo: Nimum feritatis in illo.
Est aliud levius fulmen, cui dextra Cyclopium
Sæviticæ flammæque minus, minus addidit iræ:
Tela secunda vocant superi. capit illa—*

METAM. Lib. 3, 300.

The clouds in the second line, which the thunderer drew after him, are admirably characteristic of the deep and mysterious policy which has envolept the *French* monarch's designs, impenetrable to mortal ken until pierced and dissipated by the author. The last line indeed contains two words not absolutely favourable to his plan—the *Tela secunda*, may in the most classical sense be interpreted, as if the arms of *France*, employed as they have been in *Germany*, have been rather fortunate to us. The event of the fable is also against our author; for *Semele* perished instantaneously in the flame, altho' *Jupiter* chose his slightest bolt: had she lingered and died of a consumption, the story would have been more applicable to the purpose of the pamphlet. But it is evi-
dent

cent from hence, that the thunder of the sky cannot be so proportioned and modified even by *Jupiter*, as to destroy by slow and stated degrees.—No wonder then that the thunder of war should be as little tractable to the will of a commander; who cannot say to the rage of battles—*so far thou shalt go and no farther.*

But to be serious, if it be possible to be serious in answering the weakest and most extravagant proposition that ever entered into the head of man, as the basis of a system upon which a great nation has rested her only hope of salvation; does the author really think that *France* intends to lengthen out the war in *Germany* by the means she has employed, and for the ends he proposes? p. 72. Indeed if she does, her invasion of *Germany* and her prosecution of the war there, is one of those “effects of desperation rather than of council,” with which he has charged her in p. 126.

He tells us p. 81. “the *French* cannot propose to conquer *England*, by sending armies into *Germany*; their only hope is to exhaust and weary us out by a land war, which we must carry on with them upon such very disadvantageous terms; and to

D

“divert

“ divert us from their islands by employing
 “ our attention in *Germany*.”

The conquest of *Hanover* is therefore not the object of *France*. And however *Britain* may rate that electorate, even as “ her “ greatest stake,” p. 36. yet the entire and quiet possession of it, would, far from advancing the affairs of *France*, put a period to *her only hope of exhausting and wearing us out*.

Has she not meant in every action in which her troops have been engaged with the Allies during this war, to drive them out of *Germany*, or oblige them to lay down their arms? and in more than one of these actions, had fortune declared on her side, would not either of these events have been the necessary consequence of her success? Have her ministers been scrupulous during this war, in their orders to her generals, of any one of those means which have rendered her infamous to the present and all future ages, by her devastations of the United Provinces, and her more than *Pagan* barbarities in the *Palatinate*? Are any traces of the author's policy to be found in *Bellisle's* letters to *Contades*? and when she had failed in one year by the valour of our troops and the conduct of our generals, did she not attempt in every succeeding year to overpower them

them with numbers? Has not her obstinate perseverance in establishing winter-quarters in *Hesse* and *Gottingen* at the end of this campaign, been with a view of starting in the beginning of the next nearer to the end of her labours, her losses, her expence, and her disgrace.

It is not true, that *France* is at less expence than we are in *Germany*: The *French* army came from a greater distance, than near four parts in five of the allied army did. Her magazines and hospitals cost her more; for her contractors purchase upon credit, and their reimbursements are slow and precarious: Their extortions are therefore greater.

The rate at which her troops are paid, is lower than that of the few *British* forces which form a part of the allied army; but the *French* troops have other allowances which at least even that difference. And the state is an immense loser, which exercises a sparing œconomy in these articles: Men must eat, and be clothed and covered; and if scantily provided, sick men cost more and do less service than the healthy. The *French* are more numerous than the allies in *Germany*, therefore, as above explained, more expensive. *France* subsidizes more powers

than we do, and in all probable conjecture at a much higher price.

But to put an end to suppositions—if *France* meant to lengthen out the war in *Germany*, why was the treaty of *Closter-seven* concluded? Why did not *Richlieu* retire, rather than oblige the allies to lay down their arms? And if it be said, for every thing extravagant may be said, that a breach of the treaty was foreseen, why were not the *French* better prepared for that event? and why afterwards obliged to retire, unsuspecting and surpris'd, with a greater loss, altho' no one considerable blow was struck, than what signalized any victory gained by the armies of *Europe* in the Grand Alliance!

When these facts are reconciled to the author's system, I shall ask whether there be an instance in the history of the world, of a power suffering loss heaped upon losses, and disgrace upon dishonour for four years together, merely with a view to exhaust the adverse power by expence? And if this proposition be not sufficiently strong, let another circumstance be added—such policy has been ascribed to a bankrupt people, acting at a much greater expence of money and of men, against a nation in full credit.

That

That *France* has often, p. 9, fomented quarrels between her neighbours, and insidiously joined, and perfidiously deserted one side, in order to weaken both, is certain. But then she remained an unloving spectator, and did not stake her whole upon the issue of the conflict. This policy has been reserved for the author of the considerations.

But if the only view of *France* has been to exhaust *Britain* by a war in *Germany*, while we are so blindly obstinate as to mean its defence by an armed force, why has she not attained that end without any expence to herself of blood or of treasure? The author has pointed out the means in p. 77, 89, and they are so obvious, that had the designs of *France* been confined to his plan, they could not have escaped her ministers.

Why have not the *French* troops been kept at home? P. 77. "Will the *French* revenue be at all lessened, or the state brought so much nearer to bankruptcy, for their having no army to pay out of their own country?" "But *England's* expence must go on. Our enemies will not tell us, that they do not intend to go into *Germany*; they certainly will go, if we attempt to lessen our expence, and withdraw a great part of our troops. Where then is the end of our labour?" And again

again p. 89. " Why then should *France* sue for peace, when at worst they have only to stand still, and keep their money at home, and their troops upon their frontiers, holding the appearance of marching into *Germany*? and our ruin is completed: for we must be at still the same expence; and after having got six and thirty millions in debt, must go on to eight and forty."

Why then has not *France* completed our ruin by these means? *keeping her money at home, and her troops upon her frontiers!* Were her views only to exhaust us by lengthening out a war in *Germany*, why not attain that desirable end by means infinitely more eligible? Were the comparative means and expence of both nations still more in favour of *France* than they are stated in p. 69, 70, had *France* millions to spare, while *England* was incurring an additional debt of eight and forty millions, yet sure it would be worthy the attention of even that inexhaustible power, to save her treasure from being squandered in *Germany*, and let "*England's* expence go on."

The contrary measure of wanton and uncalled for extravagance, had *France* no other purpose to serve than what our author supposes as the animating spring of all her actions, would prove her *desperation* in one period

period of the present war p. 126, heightened into phrenzy in this; or as the pamphlet terms it in us, p. 81. "a mistaken zeal of the nation, and an eagerness to fight an *(Englishman)* any where." There are certainly no symptoms of such enthusiastic valour and hatred in the *French* nation, and her ministry has not even this poor excuse for their conduct, which he admits to ours.

However clear in its motives and end the *French* errand into *Germany* appears to our author, a discovery of the inducements which lead us thither has cost him much logical pains and disquisition, even from p. 116 to 126. where, by the help of many accurate distinctions, he arrives at the knowledge of what "every one must have remembered," p. 126. and what no one ever disputed, "that the army of observation was "an army of defence, not of diversion." And as he does not like the word *diversion*, we will allow, that the treaty of the sixteenth of *January* 1756, was a treaty meant for defence only.

But there are it seems other less expensive means with which we may serve our allies. And "the pointing out what appears to our "author the most effectual method of securing *Hanover* from the present and future attacks of our enemies, makes one
" prin-

“ principal end of his considerations.” p. 44. His method is no doubt plain, easy, and infallible in its effect : for it is no more than this—“ let them (the *Hanoverians*) alone” p. 25. “ they have nothing to do but submit.” *ibid.* An excellent and sure expedient to prevent an attack.

But then they will be entitled to an indemnification from us, and the author intends them an ample one indeed—nothing less than the “ *French islands*” p. 45, 46: “ not useless conquests on the *Mississippi*, “ but by seizing the *French islands*, and “ holding their whole *West-India* trade in “ deposite for *Hanover*.” 130. *Guadaloupe* and *Mariegalante* must then go to their old masters. And should *Martinico* with her five millions *Sterling per Ann.* and the *French* part of *Hispaniola* be conquered by us, they must also be restored for *Hanover*. Nay in p. 52. the indemnity is to be extended to our friends still farther, by conquests to be gained on the *French* coasts, and in the *East* as well as the *West-Indies*.

Possibly a question might arise at the conclusion of a peace, were a cession of any of our considerable conquests upon this account to be an article of the treaty, whether it would not have been better to have defended the dominions of our allies against the *French*
or

or at least to have obliged their armies to earn them at the expence of much blood and treasure, than to invite them by a faithless desertion of our friends to a quiet and unopposed possession of territories, after to be purchased back by us at so high a rate. Should we now leave the continent, *French* politeness would assuredly yield to such a courteous invitation of the *French* army into *Hanover*, "and would, without much *intreaty*, suffer it to stay there more than a twelvemonth round," p. 129, in sure expectation of an indemnity of at least fifty times the value of the electorate *. Those who have made their court by running the nation into a greater expence for the *German* war, than it had the least idea of," p. 45, would certainly not "make their excuse to the people," *ibid.* by such a conclusion of it. And the ministers, who should dare to set their hands to such a stipulation, would justly expiate that treason with their heads.

The alternative which therefore the pamphlet proposes, as the only expedient left in any change of our measures, is the strongest justification of them,

* In p. 129, and in many others, *Hanover* would be of no value at all to *France*. Indeed in p. 122, he computes it about half the worth of *Martinico*; valued at five millions *per annum*, p. 56 and 82.

But possibly no indemnification would be necessary. P. 13. " We should leave the *French* to themselves, to harass *Germany* as much as they please, and make themselves as odious as we can desire," as the only chance we have of forming and accelerating an union in *Germany* against them. This should be done, p. 16. " until the *Germans* shall see their own interest." " Leave the *French* to themselves, they will doubtless do as much mischief as they can; but in time they may make themselves generally hated, and the *Germans* wise enough to agree."

P. 30. " But, in general, the *French* are a fair enemy, and neither they nor we have exercised any unnecessary cruelties to each others subjects. Nor could the country therefore have any sufferings to fear beyond the allowed usage of war, upon an *English* account. Nor would a *French* army stay there in all probability more than one campaign, if we would but keep out of it, and take from the *French* court all hope of drawing over an *English* army to meet them there."

P. 24. " The *French*, 'tis true, would possess themselves of the revenues of the country; and all the taxes, which the people now pay to their sovereign, would be paid to *France*." *Ibid.* " A *French* army in the country would themselves probably find a

use

use for all the money they could raise there.

Many pages are employed to justify the intended *radical* destruction of the most fruitful provinces by one commander, p. 25. (See *Bellisle's* letters, p. 70.) and to extenuate and excuse the excesses and extortions practised in that electorate by another. P. 28. Great pains are also taken to quiet compassionate minds, and reconcile the alarmed *Hanoverian* to a return of the same guests, by instances of their inoffensive march thro' *Germany* during the course of the last war, P. 30, And by their humanity during this, in permitting, while they were masters of *Hanover*, *the sun to shine and the rivers to flow*, for the use of its inhabitants. P. 27. Happy for many of them they did, who despoiled of their ALL had perhaps no drink but the running stream, and no roof but the canopy of heaven.

Until the author can reconcile the features of two pictures drawn to represent the same object, but opposite and unlike as christian charity is, p. 26, to unprovoked and savage barbarism ; as the tenderness of a rightful and natural sovereign, p. 24, 33, collecting light taxes for government and defence, to the depredations of an invader, who renders himself *universally odious by*

doing as much mischief as he can, and wantonly harrassing an unresisting people ; until our ministers can determine from our author's assertions whether *France* be the angry lion seeking whom she may devour, or the lamb of innocence and peace breathing love and benevolence on mankind ; until some certainly can be obtained of cheaper terms than our author insists on for restitution at a peace ; until better reasons are given to convince us that *France* suffers nothing and would suffer nothing for ten years to come, by marching and maintaining an army much more numerous than ours, at a greater distance from home than near four parts in five of the allied, in a country that cannot subsist them, and with immense annual losses that must be annually repaired ; the nation will obstinately and unanimously, our author and possibly a few misled by him excepted, persevere in approving and supporting measures, which exhaust the last resources of a power already cut off from that main supply, which even in our author's opinion enables *France* to march an army into *Germany*. p. 58.

What remains to be done to perfect this great work, already almost compleated, cannot fail of succets ; and *Martinico* with her millions must be ours, while *France* is so employed and so wasted in *Germany*, as not

to be able to fit out a few frigates, *p.* 57: some of which must have escaped, thro' unavoidable accidents at sea; the vigilance of even a *British* Squadron, to supply an island which produces no one necessary for subsistence or defence.

It will be no objection to these measures that while we pursue the great object of this war; while every one part of our system supports another, all co-operating to the completion of the whole, we preserve inviolate the faith of the public, prophanely sported with, and sophistically quibbled away by an ill-reasoning author; *p.* 44 and 46, to *p.* 54; That we protect allies, attacked merely because they are our friends, staking their whole upon their confidence in us; to whom defeat would be destruction, and whose destruction would involve the protestant religion, the liberties of *Europe*, the trade, wealth, and freedom of these countries.

But in our author's opinion the assistance we give *Hanover* aggravates her evils; and a struggle for her defence is the completion of her miseries.

He founds this doctrine upon the following principle. *P.* 25. " A small state invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than
than

itself, is doubtless under a great misfortune; all resistance is useless, and it has nothing to do but to submit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune; and that is, by having another great state, almost equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it. If the country submit, it has but one army to maintain; and may in the beginning yield upon terms which are tolerable: But if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is sure to be oppressed by them both.— An army is a many-headed monster, that must be fed; and the defending army ought to have as many mouths as the attacking; and each will get but all they can from the poor inhabitants.”

As this paragraph contains all the substance and marrow of others in *p.* 26, 27, 30, 55, 87, calculated to apply these doctrines to the present state of *Hanover*, I have transcribed the whole. Yet the miseries he describes in a country thus invaded and defended, are somewhat softened in the case of our allies, by having the revenues of *England* and *France* poured into them. *P.* 15. and in *p.* 100, *Hanover* would become a morsel more delicious to the King of *Prussia*, for our having spent there so many millions in defence of it. The instances given in *p.* 30 and 31, also prove to those who think like the author, if there be any such,

such, that a contested invasion ought not to be considered in "so very terrible a light."

But I confess that a small state invaded by a superior army is under a *very great misfortune* indeed; not to be compensated with the money spent by the contending powers, nor with the benefit of letting out its troops to one of them. The author therefore p. 31. forms a very false and invidious estimate of the losses of *Hesse*, and of the motives that actuated its landgrave, by the sum received from us for the hire of his troops. The lives of soldiers are thrown into this estimate as nothing. Were they *French* soldiers, such an omission would need no excuse in the author's political arithmetick.

Were his principle founded, the Prince of *Orange* in 1672, deserved the fate of the *De Wits*, for the madness of his resistance; And *Gustavus Adolphus*, in his attempt for freeing *Germany*, should have met in his relief of *Stralsund*, with that death which concluded his heroick atchivements at *Lutzen*. It is true, fortune prospered their endeavours; but the fortuitous event of things is no excuse for the rashness of enterprizes, formed and executed against every probability of success and infinite odds on the side of the vanquished.

Yet

Yet many of the *Grecian* heroes had no better excuse for their resistance of a power infinitely superior to the states which they defended and succoured. Those who failed and perished, share an equal glory with those who succeeded; and *Leonidas* at *Thermopylæ*, and *Miltiades* at *Marathon*, are recorded with the same praise by ignorant and uninformed analysts. Had our great deliverer been pushed back and suffocated in the last canal of *Holland*, his well-timed end would have saved his memory from the reproach of multiplied transgressions against our author's precepts: He landed a *Dutch* army here, which had not as many mouths, p. 25. as King *James's* forces on *Salisbury-Plain*, but contributed with them to feed upon poor *England*.

If actions like these deserve applause; if lawful Princes degenerating into tyrants may and ought to be opposed; if it be the duty of every honest Man to join in the design, altho' he perish in the execution; shall passive obedience and non-resistance to a foreign invader be preached up, as a measure of prudence, to injured, unoffending, and independent states! And shall a power, bound by every tie, political and moral, to their assistance, be branded with hard reflections for declaring itself in their cause?

If

If such doctrines be admitted, where is the security for smaller states? and must not all sink necessarily into the gulph of universal monarchy?

The historian's animadversion upon those states *p. 4*, which did not unite against *Rome*, is just and incontrovertable: His reflection is meant upon them. But our Author turns the censure of the annalist, upon those who fought singly against *Rome*. There should have been such a congress as he describes in *p. 107*, before a single buckler was raised against the *Roman* eagle. But no such august assembly attended the leaders of any of those states when invaded by armies infinitely superior to theirs; they should then have submitted without resistance, knowing that "all resistance was useless, and that they had nothing to do but submit." They should have waited until the *Romans* had rendered themselves *universally odious*, and then the world would have united against them. But altho' *Rome* "grew to a degree of strength, much greater than that of any other power," yet the states of the world did not mutually assist each other when they were attacked by her. *P. 4*. "This universal maxim of politicks" did not operate during many ages. Some nations who ventured to depart from it, asserted their freedom against those tyrants of mankind; and

the states which basely submitted, became provinces and slaves to *Rome*. Had the united provinces acted in 1672 upon the author's principle, the house of *Austria* would indeed not have assisted them after, nor an *English* parliament have compelled the treacherous and poultry pensioner of *France* to re-assume the roll and policy of an *English* King. But these were events improbable at the first outset, and by consequence do not justify it. And altho' a state despairing of itself will ever be deserted by its neighbours and friends, yet better it is that it should be so forlorn, lest it should otherwise "have more than one army to maintain."

Had *France* poured in forces to support the last rebellion in *Scotland*, superior to the strength of the loyal Clanns in that part of the united kingdom; or had *Constance* landed his troops in *Ireland*, *England* should not have sent a man to their assistance. And the nearer and dearer these parts of ourself are to us, than a foreign territory, the stronger this principle should act, even in proportion as our tenderness for them should be greater.

This excellent argument, in its application to *Hanover* receives infinite strength, and becomes absolutely conclusive from the author's analytical discussion, beginning in p.

100, of *that great question* upon continental connections, which in his words “ has been so long agitated,” and “ has now been determined:” “ all parties happily agree, that it (*Britain*) must have its continental connections.” But “ this is the first time these terms have been heard of in political debate; and this great question—never was a question before,” p. 101.

Ibid. “ The terms understood in their most general sense seem to be too general to be ever agitated at all ; because it is impossible for any man to say, that there may not arise some certain occasions and circumstances of affairs” (he might have said, it is impossible to say that such have not arisen) “ which may unavoidably force us to have some connection with the continent.” Many such have arisen, in which the terms of that great question have been agitated incomparably oftener and more strenuously since the act of settlement than before. No one question has been so much agitated ; nor was it determined then, nor more happily settled now, but in consequence of long and repeated debates, in which others had the merit of that discovery, which our author would assume to himself, that *England* should intrench herself within herself, and have no concern with the continent in *Europe*. Here our author is an errant plagiarist.

But in *p.* 103, he launches forth into a discovery which no man has a right to dispute with him. "An equal connection with all the nations of *Europe* is to all the operating effects of it in *war* and *peace*, the very same thing as the having no connection with any of them." Or, in other words, to have treaties of commerce in time of peace, for such treaties surely are connections, with all the nations of *Europe*, in which we should be considered as the most favoured; or to have none at all, is the very same thing. And a neutrality in *war*, *i. e.* an equal connection of friendship with all the nations of *Europe* all in war, is the very same thing as a connection of enmity," *p.* 103. *i. e.* a declared war against them all. This smoke-ball of a pompous phrase, *p.* 105. as lately happened at *Woolwich*, bursts and recoils upon the artist who contrived it. And the author's argument in this instance, as in numberless others throughout his book, perfectly corresponds with his own criterion of truth and error in *p.* 115. *out of his own mouth shall he be judged.*

This great Question of continental connections being now settled and determined by our author, so much more happily than it ever was before; I shall proceed to consider the state of *Britain*, not "chained and moored

moored by some connection to the continent," p. 104. But as the author would have her, and *Neptune* was of his mind in *Callimachus*, "so deeply rooted in the sea, as to neglect all her connections with the continent."

Thus fixed upon our firm and proper basis, "we shall have it in our own power to put an end to the war, whether the French choose it or not: no matter whether they will treat with us; from that time they cannot have a ship at sea, nor a possibility of coming at us."

Possibly they may have a few ships to supply *Martinico*, and to intercept our *East* and *West-India* trade. They may possibly have it more in their power to fit out privateers, by assisting adventurers with some of the spare millions now spent in *Germany*: an evil increasing ever since our privateers have had nothing to take worth their expence, and which our navy can alone never effectually prevent.

Impossible as it is to come at us, p. 120. "yet where so important a concern is at stake, it becomes no man to say, that an invasion is impossible." p. 121. "thirty or forty thousand men encamped or cantoned upon our south coast, makes us absolutely secure."

secure. Yet where so important a concern is at stake, it also behoves us to take some care of the north. Descents, without a view to conquest, may produce mischiefs of a very serious nature. P. 131. " Yet no one as a friend of his country, would be fond of giving (all) his reasons for" this assertion. Even poor *Pegg* would grievously complain at being entirely neglected. We have heard of meditated invasions from *Sweden*. And the *Swedes* will have no connection with us, but a *connection of enmity*. p. 103.

In a partition of our troops whether encamped or cantoned, the east and west coasts would plead some right to protection, and would produce unvarying precedents for their claim. All these different calls would swell the establishment for guards and garrisons in *Great-Britain* to fifty-thousand men, at a very low calculation—all militia, if the author pleases; when in actual service they are paid as those who have been called regular troops; their families are supported by the public; and in the great articles of manufacture and husbandry, the public is still a greater loser by their avocation from industry and labour.

A diversion upon the continent of the forces of *France*, has ever been thought one of our best securities against an invasion, and her

her troops being sent into *Germany* now, is a sure indication, p. 121, of her having no such design. *ibid.* " Had she such a design not a battalion would be sent thither. All would be brought down upon her coast." " Altho' she always has two or three hundred thousand men in her pay."

But to return to our military establishment, in the author's hypothesis. While our troops in *Great-Britain* would be greatly more numerous than they now are, the numbers necessary to be employed in every other part of the world should also in prudence be greater. For tho' an invasion of *Britain* or *Ireland* may not be very practicable, yet had *France* no continental expences to maintain, she might better afford to try experiments, not so impracticable as the author makes them, p. 122; of supplying with arms and ammunition those, who if so well supported as he supposes *Cape Breton* and *Quebec* were, *ibid.* while she was losing battles in *Germany*, would at least have rendered our success in *America* precarious: wisely humane as our treatment of the vanquished has been, yet no man would with that gratitude for mercy and benefits received should be the principal security for their allegiance to the crown of *Great-Britain*.

As our armies must be greater in this hypothesis, so must our fleets—and for the very same reasons. How considerable the deduction would prove, by these increased expences, from the saving our author wishes of all we expend in *Germany*, and how the balance would stand, is beyond his and my reach to calculate. But, two things are certain in his system; *France* would be at no expence beyond her common establishment in profound peace, and would be sure of a restitution of many losses in compensation for *Hanover*.

Such would the comparative situation be of both countries, even in the author's very imperfect comprehension of his subject, and of the consequences attending the scheme he proposes. In such a state, and it would be rendered much more desperate by other circumstances not yet explained, would it be "no matter whether the *French* would treat with us?" *P.* 57. "Might we then give them the offer of peace or war as long as they pleased, and calmly look on in security?" Would they be "willing to submit to any terms?" *p.* 130. Or rather, *ibid.* while they are themselves suffering nothing, and running their enemy every year" (tho' not quite) "ten millions nearer their ruin;" far from "suing for peace, will they not
keep

keep the war in (*that*) state for ten years to come?"

But *France* is better able to support a war in *Germany* than we are.

In treating this question it is not fair to draw inferences against any one measure of the war, merely from a view of the sum total of our expence compared with that of *France*. Let every operation in which we are engaged be tried singly, and stand or fall by its own merits. If we make conquests in all parts of the world, we must defray the expences of troops, of transports, and of fleets. *p.* 70. If we carry on trade during war, exceeding whatever has been known in peace, we must pay for its protection. *Ibid.* If the value of any purchases we have made, in their present and future consequences, be not equal to the price paid for them, we have in these articles made an unthrifty bargain. But they are conclusive upon no other operations of the war; and *France* would I believe be charitable enough to take them off our hands.

Our author presents us with one side of our account only: He states the costs, but sinks the profits. *Guadaloupe*, *Senegal*, and our acquisitions in the *East-Indies*, do not appear, in his considerations, to have enriched this kingdom with a single shilling.

The revenue of *Martinico* would be truly immense, "four or five millions sterling," p. 82. A million more or less is a trifling object. But had it been ours, I much doubt whether it would not greatly fall; far below the author's most moderate calculation: For then it would not serve to render the *German* war more destructive, by retarding the acquisition of so valuable a prize.

The weight of millions borrowed by us receives no alleviation, p. 69, from the lowness of our interest compared with what *France* pays; altho' the annuity be the only charge felt by the debtor: This circumstance was beside the author's purpose, and would tend to lessen the immense advantage she has over us in the superiority of her means, and the smallness of her expence.

Every gain with an enemy's loss is generally conceived as a double benefit, and upon this principle every ship taken by *Hawke* and *Boscawen* has been reckoned as two to the *British* navy. But how great was our error? every loss is a saving to *France*, and every miser knows that every saving is a gain. She has saved the expence of a fleet, amounting with us to five millions six hundred thousand pounds. P. 70. and with a difference of that whole sum, from this single article, she is better able than we are to carry on a
war

war in *Germany*, expending there *some spare millions*, which grow from losses, and fructify in defeats.

P. 69. " Her standing revenue of twelve millions" proceeding in a great proportion from commerce, remains and would remain for ten years longer, *p. 129*, undiminished, in the decline of trade and manufacture; nay strange to think, it probably goes on augmenting.—for of these twelve millions, seven were subject to any deficiencies in the other five; yet there are now no deficiencies, and no decrease of either. For, *p. 69*. these seven millions with two borrowed make the *French* fund for carrying on the war. That this fund is a clear and neat receipt is apparent, for the author places it in contrast, *p. 70*, with fifteen millions of ours, disposable money; twelve of these were borrowed, and a million and a half he supposes taken out of the sinking fund, which with the land and malt-tax he computes at four millions. P. 69. The produce of these two taxes he therefore states at no more than two millions and a half, allowing two hundred and fifty thousand pounds for deficiencies—a full and ample allowance upon that head. What has become of another million included in these sums, *p. 69*, and omitted in *p. 70*, where they are reduced from sixteen to fifteen mil-

lions, is not easy to say, nor worth enquiring after.

A nation thus miraculously circumstanced, above the reach of all sublunary causes, may say with the devil in *Milton*, *Evil be thou my good*: and this should be the motto of the *French* banners, particularly in their march into *Germany*, where suffering and damned herself, *France* means that others should suffer; altho' it be not in her power to make their miseries equal to her own.

But before I conclude these remarks upon the moneyed abilities of *France*, we must not pass by unnoticed the justness and consistency of our author's inference in *p.* 123. "Our enemies certainly have some millions to spare, else they *need not* spend them in *Germany*." How admirably well introduced is this assertion by what precedes it in *p.* 122? "It (*France*) does not send its army to invade the *German* dominions *from choice*, but *necessity*; because they cannot get to *England*, and have no other ground to meet us on." They therefore need not do what was necessary to be done; and expence upon a necessary work is a proof of superfluity.

But *p.* 57. "what is this *Germany* to *Britain*? Of what value is *Hanover* to us? are questions which often recur throughout the pamphlet.

pamphlet. Were I to answer,—as much, and of as great value as they are to *France*. The author would reply—they are of no value to either. And in the sense of present and immediate profit, his assertion is true. But it is equally true in numberless other instances of wars engaged in, wisely for the purposes of both parties, with an immense expence to each. The war in *Canada* may possibly be included in the number; and the taking of *Montreal*, for which the author is so thankful, if rated by what it will produce to *Britain*, or what it produced to *France*, would be a trifling acquisition to us, and a loss as inconsiderable to her.

But many things unimportant in themselves, become of infinite import in their consequences; and that the object of the present war in *Germany* is of this nature, seems to me plain to a demonstration. I shall state as fairly and as shortly as I can, my farther thoughts upon this subject.

When the present contest began between us and *France*, we apprehended that she would renew the war, lately put an end to in *Germany*, in conjunction with the King of *Prussia*; and therefore concluded a treaty with *Russia* merely to prevent this consequence. The House of *Austria* intent on wresting *Silesia* from him, proposed to unite
with

with us and our ally to serve that her darling purpose. In this case *France* would undoubtedly have joined with *Prussia*, and a war in *Germany* would have been accelerated and rendered inevitable, which *Britain* laboured to avert. In such an alliance for such ends as *Austria* proposed, all appearances of success were by recent experience proved to be against us. The *Dutch* would not engage, and *Russia* was at too great a distance even in the author's opinion, *p.* 38, to be a very effectual ally. Thus circumstanced, we had nothing to expect from the *Austrian* project but a sure increase of expence beyond that of the former war, and a more than probable repetition of losses and defeats; at the end of which we should be obliged to sit down under a load of additional debt, with the doubled disgrace of having unsuccessfully broken thro' the most solemn treaty, first concluded at the instant prayer and for the immediate salvation of the house of *Austria*, and again renewed and confirmed for the same end and from the same motives.

In this situation the treaty of *Westminster* was signed in *January* 1756, merely with a view *p.* 94, 97, on our side to keep the *French* out of *Germany*; and on the *Prussian* side to be protected from a *Russian* invasion; without a single shilling to be paid
by

by us to the *Prussian* monarch. The spirit of this treaty was on our part the very same with that which dictated the *Russian*: Both were meant to keep the *French* out of *Germany*. For altho' the *Russ* would in case of a rupture act directly against *Prussia*, yet it is evident that if the apprehension of this event would have so far operated upon the *Prussian* monarch as to render him averse from a *French* invasion, as he certainly would have been, *p.* 94; *France* would as certainly not have attempted one in the system at that time subsisting, without encouragement and assistance from him. But the encouragement refused by *Prussia* was supplied by the *Empress-Queen*.

This unnatural conjunction of the two houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, seemed, as it well might, an impossible event. And without it, the peace of *Germany* would have been preserved by the treaty of *Westminster*; whereas a compliance from us with the *Austrian* scheme, would render war in *Germany* and a *French* invasion unavoidable. For, *p.* 8, no man can be so wild as to think that *France* would permit the *Empress-Queen*, even unassisted by us, to recover *Silesia*; and weaken if not destroy that power whom she contributed to raise at the expence of her best blood and treasure, as a rival to the house of *Austria* in *Germany*; had not her

her consent been obtained, and advantages offered to her, which, in a *new system* induced her to depart from that policy which had directed her operations in *Germany* for more than two centuries. The house of *Austria* could not have been mad enough to measure her single force against such mighty odds as *France* and *Prussia* united; and her revenues were not sufficient to render the contest more equal by strengthening her own arms with those of *Russia*, who without pecuniary supplies, however well disposed, neither would nor could march to her assistance.

She therefore offered such advantages to *France*, and gave an immediate pledge of her sincerity, which induced the court of *Versailles* to become her ally against the King of *Prussia*, and to enable *Russia* and *Sweden* to join in the same cause.

A war in *Germany*, and a *French* invasion inseparable from it, were therefore the necessary consequences of every project entertained by the house of *Austria*: of that in which she would have had us become her accomplice, and of that which when refused by us, she has since attempted in concert with her hereditary enemy and the irreconcilable foe to *Great-Britain*. She therefore brought the *French* into *Germany*; and the miseries
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of that unhappy country are falsely imputed to us, who by the treaty of *Westminster* devised the only possible means of preventing them; and by our glorious resistance in conjunction with our heroic ally, have down to this period stoppt the completion of a scheme more formidable to the Protestant religion, the liberties of *Europe*, and the safety, independance, and prosperity of this kingdom, than could have been executed by the house of *Austria*, when her power was most dreaded, or by *Lewis XIV.*, when he aspired at universal monarchy. In this scheme the two great powers of *Austria* and *Bourbon* have unfortunately engaged another, the greatest power of the North, to second their designs. The king of *Prussia* is so situated as to be a check upon the aggrandisement of *Russia*, where alone any new acquisition would be an addition of real strength to that vast empire, and the only power that can thwart her authoritative influence over other neighbours, whom possibly she does not now mean to subdue. Other causes have cooperated, of a more private nature, to indispose the *Russian* monarch towards him. Such causes will operate, because monarchs have human passions and frailties—and nations are governed by them.

The views and interests of *Austria* and *France* are not the same,——nay they are
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widely separate; so separate, as not to interfere in instances of the greatest importance to each. From this circumstance they embrace more objects, and the danger becomes more universal; while their vicinity is such as to admit a mutual assistance equally necessary to both.

It is of little avail to the King of *Prussia*, that *France* may have an interest in his preservation, if that interest be light in the balance when opposed to other advantages, which must be purchased by an acquiescence in his ruin; or by doing still more, and becoming the active instrument, as was intended at *Rosbach*, of his total defeat.

The hopes of advantage, for gratitude is out of the question, which the house of *Austria* may still conceive from the preservation of *Great-Britain*, yield in like manner to the attainment of another object more immediate, and in her conception, no matter whether thro' passion or reason, more important to her. *Silesia* produces incomparably a greater revenue than *Newport*, *Ostend*, and the country of *Luxemburgh*; nay possibly more than the whole *Austrian Netherlands* clear from the expences they create. *Silesia* is in our author's opinion, p. 65, "to the *Austrian* family so great an object in itself, and so very necessary

sary to the defence of the rest of their *Turkish* frontier, that they never really will give it up." Can so much be said for the importance of a large district upon the *Flemish* coast, with something more thrown into the bargain? *Austria* may think a breach with the *Ottoman Porte* more likely to happen than with *Versailles*, and if it should happen, more dangerous. *Vienna* is safe from *France*, and our author proves in several parts of his work, that the *French* never can have any design upon *Germany*. But not to go so far as *Turkey* for an argument, has not *Austria* seen, while her fears and attention were directed towards *France*, a power grown up in *Germany*, which having wrested one of her best provinces from her in the last war, has shewn itself an over-match for her single force in this? Can she tremble at the clouds that may gather at *Versailles*, when she has heard the thunder of *Berlin* rolling towards the gates of her capital? It is in human nature to be more alarmed at nearer dangers, than at greater threatening at a distance. Even cool and dispassionate politicians are too apt to provide for the present moment, and leave to-morrow to providence or accident. Some have succeeded and some have failed by this manner of acting; but great as the number has been of the unsuccessful, they have been followed, and to the end of time will be followed, by others unwarned by

their fate. But suppose, and I hope it should
 be supposed, that the true interest of the
 Empress Queen claims another conduct—it
 will be a poor comfort to us and to our po-
 sterity, that the annals of *Germany* should
 record a woman, saved by our help from the
 ruin that threatened her headlong passions,
 and falling after into a deeper abyss from an
 attempt to push her deliverer into it. Princes
 and ministers may err fatally to themselves
 and their country, but facts cannot lye; and
 the conduct of the Empress Queen speaks
 conviction against her. Has she not al-
 ready delivered up *Newport*, and *Ostend*,
 p. 39, to the *French*? a part of those de-
 posites purchased from them with our blood
 and treasure. And is she not now in still “a
 closer union with them?” *ibid.* If the effects
 of this union have not yet appeared, in other
 cessions not less dangerous to our neighbours
 and to us; is not the reason clear and appa-
 rent? Would not the *Dutch*, and possibly
 other powers of *Europe*, be roused from their
 lethargy? an experiment too hazardous for
 her and her new ally, until the odds be
 more on their side in the present con-
 test: Let *Holland* sleep on, until she is a-
 wakened by a stroke, which shewing her
 danger shews her the impossibility of resist-
 ing it. That

That *France* is to have some prize superior to the losses and hazards to which she has exposed herself in *Germany*, is beyond a possibility of doubt. That prize is not to be found in *Hanover*, or *Hesse*, or *Brunswick*. It is not to be found in *Germany*.—Our author proves this to a demonstration, p. 17, 23, 24, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36. It is not to be found in the expenditure of millions, and the loss of thousands of her men, sacrificed to a chimerical and absurd project of exhausting, not of beating, a more wealthy and successful enemy. The promised land must therefore be situated somewhere else: she must pass through a sea of blood to possess it. *Hanover* is her road to the *Flemish* coast and to *Luxemburgh*; It is her road to *Holland*, where she will find nothing to oppose her. The *Dutch* are now neuter, a part of their barrier was demolished during the last war. Even the honest and wise among her people are silent thro' fear. They see the approaches of *French* power, and the breaches it has already made upon their security, as they do those partial inundations, which increasing every year, presage a total destruction. They expect their ruin from *Germany*, but they know not how to prevent it. Others there are who would enjoy the deluge, and draw a private advantage from public desolation. But the greater number hope,
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and are easy and resigned in this hope, that *France* will command, not destroy them; she will encompass them with her power, but save them for her interest; their numerous vessels, numberless seamen, and inexhaustible naval stores will be all at her disposal. And thus supplied, and thus possessed of the sea coast from *Holland* to *Bayonne*, an invasion of *Britain* which even now, our author thinks should not be slighted, will wear a more threatening aspect; or without threatening will be more formidable. Thus *Hanover* may be the road to *England*.

If it should be asked why the conquest of *Hanover*, so unimportant as it is represented, should be made a condition by the house of *Austria* for her cessions to *France*,—the answer is obvious; because the conquest of *Hanover* by *France*, and the destruction of the King of *Prussia* by *Austria* and *Russia*, would render the Empress Queen mistress of *Germany*. The author has pointed out, p. 33, 42, uses to which *Hanover* may be applied.—it may be given to *Wirtemberg*, or to *Saxony*.—no matter to whom,—to an old papist, or to a renegado from protestantism, if the protestant power be broken; and the *Palatinate* affords an instance exactly similar. The *Prussian* territories parcelled out, and *Hanover* trusted to safe hands, the house of *Austria* may then revert to her old system, when

when *Gustavus Adolphus* wrought the wonderful deliverance of protestant victims marked out for sacrifice by tyranny and enthusiasm.

Will *Russia*, no protestant, interpose in their favour? *Dantzick* and *Prussia* are to her of greater moment than the political salvation of all the followers of *Luther* and *Calvin*, throughout the whole extent of *Germany*. Neither papist nor protestant p. 19, she will remain an unconcerned spectator of the catastrophe, when her part is completed and her roll finished.

Will *France* interfere? and become again the defender of the protestant faith in *Germany*? p. 8. She seconded *Gustavus Adolphus*, but has deserted and devoted the King of *Prussia*. Her political conduct was suited to her interest in both instances: she was formerly only a great power by land, in the neighbourhood of a greater; she has since become a great maritime power, and has tasted the sweets of trade; her best resources depend upon a naval force. She and the house of *Austria* in their *new system* have no clashing interests; the objects of their ambition lie upon different elements: Imperial *Austria* can never hope and never has attempted to be powerful by sea; and *France* by her unsuccessful attempts to master

master *Germany* has been taught the madness of endeavouring to plan conquests there; while *England* inferior to her in many respects, has assumed the empire of the ocean.

There can be no absolute security for the duration of mortal systems. Passions, those hurricanes of the mind, may overturn the most solid and best constructed edifices. A *Lewis XIV.* or a *Charles V.* may arise in some future age, with the same frantic ambition that actuated those their predecessors. But human contrivance can form no better plan for duration than solidity of power; and the best security of a lasting amity among princes, arises from a diversity of uninterfering views, and such an equality of force as would render a breach between them perilous to the aggressor. Such an equality our author informs us, *p. 17*, would subsist between *France* with her present possessions, and the Empire, if thoroughly united under one directing head.

I am aware that *France* would in time grow more powerful by trade, than the house of *Austria* could by conquests. But were she mistress of the wealth of the universe, it would not be for her interest to conquer in *Germany*.

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This hypothesis in its utmost extent may appear wild and extravagant to many, and possibly is so. But does it appear such to the Empress Queen? for this is the only question which concerns *Britain*. *France* would certainly find her advantage in it, whose present conduct in any other supposition would be absurdly mad, ruining herself in *Germany* to strengthen her only rival upon land, and to weaken and undo the only ally she could trust to against her. If we must suppose either of the monarchs fitter for *Bedlam* than a throne, *Lewis* or *Theresa*, can we hesitate in our preference? A woman fired with injuries and lusting for revenge, who feels with indignation that while her ancestors were contending against *France* in a conflict by which neither was a gainer, a subordinate Prince, in the eyes of pride her subject and vassal, rose to a height which mated her power, and with a sacrilegious hand tore from her diadem one of its brightest and most precious jewels. I say a woman thus agitated, may when denied by her friends the means of vengeance, be transported by a double resentment to throw herself even into the arms of an old enemy, now more compliant with her call and co-operating with her passions: so probably was this union produced. By the treaty of *Versailles* each power renounced

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that old system which had for ages been the source of enmity between their houses.

The sincerity of their professions was proved by actions that could not be equivocal ; a mutual implicit confidence was demonstrated by their spurning away every other means of support, and the league was sanctified and confirmed by a sacrifice on each side worthy the importance of the occasion ; two monarchs, their friends and allies were severally devoted to destruction.

Does the history of those times which immediately preceded the treaty of *Westphalia* down to the signature of the treaty of *Versailles*, contain any stronger proofs of the system then pursued by the two contending powers, than what has passed since affords of a total change in that system ? If one set of measures invariably followed during one period proves the intention of the pursuit, an absolute reverse of these in another demonstrates the intention altered. *p.* 8, 9, 12. Yet the whole of our author's argument, and his strongest objections to our conduct, are derived from the old *French* and *Austrian* system ; from a system which no longer exists at the courts of *Vienna* or *Versailles*, and which by consequence cannot be a rule for our actions with respect to either of them.

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If facts such as we have seen, do not prove the purport of hidden conspiracies against faith and justice; if the written document must be produced, to render defensive measures necessary; then indeed *Great-Britain* had fewer motives for assembling an army in *Germany*, and can only plead in her excuse for such an expence of treasure and of men, the regard due to the faith of treaties, to the confidence of her allies, and to her own interest in obviating the necessity of an equivalent at the conclusion of the war; which, were our author to dictate the treaty, would strip her of all her most important acquisitions during the course of it. But if a confederacy against all that is valuable to men and to christians, be as clear as action can indicate design; and uniform cooperation, not resolveable into any other cause, can demonstrate concert and mutual obligations, then an allied army in *Germany* became necessary to defeat those designs, and alone can, if any thing can, sever the confederacy, by rendering its terms impracticable, and loose *Austria* from her compact with *France*. But whatever the event may be, *Britain* and her allies have done as became free, brave, and religious men: They have resisted the extirpation of freedom and religion, by the only means with which
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God and nature have armed them for their defence. *Altho' venial Swedes have sold their God for a bribe, altho' unhappy Saxons revenge upon Brandenburgers the miseries of an invasion rendered necessary by the weak perfidy of their own Prince; yet the protestant cause must be defended. Altho' protestant Palatines, Bohemians, and Hungarians come armed under the standards of their tyrants, the universal fate of an enslaved people; altho' driven and compelled Wirtembergers aim their weapons at the breasts of their brethren, to avoid the death that awaits them behind; p. 22. yet the vessel must be saved, even with the destruction of our captived friends tugging at a Pirate's bar.*

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