

THE TREASURY, THE COMMISSARIAT AND
THE SUPPLY OF THE COMBINED ARMY IN
GERMANY DURING THE SEVEN YEARS WAR
(1756 - 1763).

by

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ABSTRACTThe Treasury, the Commissariat and the Supply of the Combined Army in
Germany during the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763).Hamish Macdonald Little

This study is concerned with the provision of non-combatative supplies and services by the Treasury and its commissaries to the Combined Army, which campaigned in Germany during the Seven Years War. It examines the limitations and complexities of the traditional system of British military administration and the magnitude and problems of the task which was undertaken. It traces the slow and somewhat erratic emergence in the course of the war of a 'commissariat' in a recognizable institutional form, and finds evidence of experience, expertise and integrity among those chosen to staff it. The work of British administrators in providing forage, bread, transport and hospital services is investigated in detail from the points of view of the formulation of general policies and detailed arrangements, the execution and supervision of the latter, the keeping of statistical records and the process of account. Evidence is found of some effective and efficient work, involving the introduction of new and forward-looking methods, as well as examples of the inadequacies and failures known to be characteristic of the administration of the period. It is argued that the latter derived partly from contemporary preconceptions and political realities and the inherent difficulties of supplying a large multi-national army campaigning in Germany, and not merely from blatant incompetence. It is thus concluded that in this sphere of investigation the record of British administrators was not devoid of success, nor their work of significant elements of vitality.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Add. MSS.	British Library, Department of Manuscripts, Additional Manuscripts.
AO	Audit Office Papers, Public Record Office.
PMG	Paymaster General's Papers, Public Record Office.
PRO	Chatham and Egremont Papers, Public Record Office.
PROB	Probate Records, Public Record Office.
SP	State Papers, Public Record Office.
T	Treasury Papers, Public Record Office.
WO	War Office Papers, Public Record Office.

CURRENCIES AND CALCULATIONS

The German silver currency was:-

8 pfennigs = 1 (marien) groschen

36 groschen = 1 (rix-) dollar or reichstaler

Dollars were usually expressed in gold ducats, whose value was subject to less fluctuation.

The Dutch currency was:-

2 pennings or penningens = 1 doit

8 doits = 1 stiver

20 stivers = 1 guilder

Calculations are made correct to the nearest whole number or to two decimal places if greater accuracy is required.

Calculations involving sterling do not use fractions smaller than a quarter of a penny.

CHAPTER I

ARMY SUPPLY AND THE WAR IN GERMANY

If Napoleon ever did observe that an army marches on its stomach, he merely stated a truism. Supplying soldiers with the common necessities of life, as opposed to supplying them with the means and instruments of war, is a matter of paramount importance, and authorities, both military and civil, must always have been aware that they ignored such considerations at their peril, that inadequate provision of food, clothing, shelter and other basic comforts bore a direct causal relationship to physical weakness, sagging morale and defeat in battle. And yet although such essentials are the 'sine qua non' of an efficient fighting force, they have not always been provided effectively. The problems of supplying an army which is operating over a wide area of difficult terrain in a barren or wasted land have frequently, and not surprisingly, proved insuperable, while it has perhaps been inevitable that faced with limited financial resources the assumption that a soldier may fight on an empty belly but that he cannot fight without arms and ammunition has usually been made. The supply of the British army in the eighteenth century was subject to these universal difficulties, but matters were further complicated by the political climate of that age, which on the basis of bitter past experience tended to view standing armies as primarily a threat to civil liberty. On this was founded the conviction that it should not be the function of the government to provide a soldier's daily needs: troops who were generously provided with the material comforts of life would represent a greater danger to freedom, and thus paradoxically, as in the case

of the preference for a militia as opposed to a regular army, a certain degree of military inefficiency was a not undesirable state of affairs.

The first result of this attitude of mind was that the army itself was obliged to seek many of its essential supplies from unofficial or semi-official sources. Thus at home quantities of food and drink might be furnished by private citizens, who, on their own initiative or in response to personal approaches and public advertisements by military officers, offered various provisions for sale by item or in bulk. Abroad, householders with whom the troops were billeted would provide their guests with a table, while a similar service was performed by innkeepers in England, where compulsory quartering in private houses was illegal.¹ Further supplies came from the sutlers, private merchants or shopkeepers, who followed the army with meat, dairy produce, grain, meal and pulses, and inevitably beer and spirits. It was the responsibility of commanding officers to see that their men were served by adequate numbers of sutlers, some of whom were accorded the status of official suppliers to regiments or to companies of infantry and to troops of cavalry,² although many others attended the army on a temporary, informal and frequently haphazard basis.³ Compared to these methods of supply the role of the civil government in the victualling of the army was often a subordinate one,

1 See below p.12.

2 Sir J.W. Fortescue, The Early History of Transport and Supply. (1928) p.13.

3 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.44, (1) July 1761.

for although complete rations of food and drink might be provided by the Treasury for troops serving in far-flung colonial spheres and garrisons, where supply on the spot presented considerable or even insuperable difficulties,¹ in Britain and Europe the Board's responsibilities usually amounted to no more than the provision of bread and biscuit when the army was in camp or on campaign.² Moreover, in executing all these commitments exclusively by means of contracts with private merchants rather than through the activities of state officials such as were to be found in Prussia for example, this country dissociated itself from continental absolutism and at the same time from the most direct and effective method of supplying an army.³

Food for horses was as vital a commodity as food for men, but forage was also obtained from a variety of mainly unofficial

1 J.E.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 1774 - 92. (1958) p.177. N. Baker, Government and Contractors: the British Treasury and War Supplies, 1775 - 1783. (1971) p.22.

2 Binney, op. cit. p.177. Such was the extent of the Treasury's commitments to its own troops and those of other nations in the Combined Army in Germany in the Seven Years War, although to this general rule there were some limited exceptions, such as the provision of a range of foodstuffs for troops undergoing conditions of particular hardship or those in hospital. See below pp.24 & 306.

3 R.A. Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia. (1953) pp.148 - 149. C. Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great. (1974) pp.134 - 135. M. Howard, War in European History. (1977) pp.68 - 69. In Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (1977) pp.21 & 33 - 34, M. Van Creveld argues that contracts with private merchants for army supply were still the norm under eighteenth century absolutist regimes, and that no state before the end of the century possessed a professional supply corps. Nevertheless, there was still a significant difference between the British method of supplying bread to its troops and the Prussian system of a field bakery administered by military officers, and drawing its raw material, in part at least, from reserves of grain amassed as a result of nobles and peasants paying their taxes in kind. Duffy, op. cit. pp.134 - 135.

sources. Whenever possible grass was consumed or taken from where it grew wild, although together with hay, oats and other suitable grain the army could purchase it from farmers and local inhabitants. In any of these cases the soldiers themselves might be responsible not only for amassing and transporting the provisions, but also for actually harvesting the crops from the fields.¹ Forage contracts with merchants could be concluded by commanding officers in cases of necessity when the army was serving abroad,² and it was usual for the Treasury to make such agreements when the troops were encamped in Britain,³ but this method of supply was regarded as an exceptional and expensive way of feeding horses. As far as possible the army was expected to make its own arrangements to live off the land with little or no assistance from the civil authorities.⁴

Arrangements for quartering the troops also strike the modern observer as somewhat irregular. In Britain and the colonies there were some garrisons and barracks, equipped with furniture and supplied with fuel and lighting, but the proportion of the army thus accommodated was always very small, for as General Wade remark-

1 See below p.151.

2 See below p.156.

3 Binney, op. cit. p.177.

4 Van Creveld, op. cit. pp.27 - 29 & 38, has called into question the commonly held belief that all eighteenth century armies were totally dependent on magazines for their forage supplies, and effectively demonstrated that when on campaign they lived to a large extent off the surrounding countryside. But if the British army was no different in this respect from continental forces, it still knew nothing of the Prussian system whereby forage could be requisitioned from the localities in preparation for a campaign and military horses compulsorily grazed on peasants' fields in peace-time. Duffy, op. cit. p.134.

ed:- "the people of this kingdom have been taught to associate the idea of Barracks and Slavery so closely together, that, like darkness and the devil, though there be no manner of connection between them, yet they cannot separate them, nor think of the one without thinking at the same time of the other".¹ Most troops were therefore quartered in civilian establishments, although in England a statute of 1679 prohibited the use of private houses for this purpose without the owner's consent, and thus recourse was usually had to inns and places of public entertainment.² In foreign countries with fewer scruples in connection with civil liberties the forced or voluntary billeting of British soldiers in private dwellings was more common.³ But the army also lived and slept for considerable periods in the open air, for which purpose the military authorities accepted a responsibility to supply tents and a range of camp necessities, including blankets, knapsacks, kettles, canteens and bowls.⁴ In official encampments in Britain the Treasury provided firewood and straw for

1 Quoted in C.M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: their Administration and Government. (1869) Vol.I, p.223.

2 H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century. (1977) p.38. The author incorrectly makes a proclamation of 1689 the authority on billeting, whereas this merely reaffirmed the statute of ten years previously, 31 Chas.II, c.1. I am indebted to Professor I.R. Christie for directing my attention to pp.49 & 287, n.22 in his book Empire or Independence, 1760 - 1776: a British-American Dialogue on the Coming of the American Revolution, (1976) written jointly with B.W. Labaree, where this information is to be found.

3 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.6, 5 May 1761, f.8, 18 May 1761.

4 R.E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne. (1966) pp.128 - 129. It may be assumed that blankets were supplied from various references to blanket wagons which accompanied the troops, for example Extract of a Letter of R. Oswald, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

bedding, materials for which the military commander was responsible when the army served abroad.¹

If the army thus had to rely to a considerable extent on private citizens for its food and shelter, it was no less dependent on their co-operation when it came to move itself from place to place. Apart from an artillery train for transporting bulky military equipment and stores, and a strictly limited number of wagons provided by the bread contractor for delivering his loaves,² the army had no permanently established and regular means of carrying its provisions, baggage and non-military stores. Consequently, in Britain it had to resort to the temporary hire of civilian wagons, carts and animals in the areas where it happened to be,³ while similar methods prevailed when campaigning abroad with the additional possibility of impressment in enemy territory. This failure to create an adequate system of transportation has been described as 'one of the most remarkable features of English military history',⁴ and in the eighteenth century derived at least in part from the principle that an army thus kept in chains was unlikely to be an effective oppressor of

1 Estimate of the Amount of the Different Proposals for Supplying the Several Camps, 1757, T/1/375 No.138, f.245. Straw came under the general heading of forage and a certain quantity was included in a complete ration. See below p.143.

2 Both could be used for a variety of other purposes, and thus ammunition wagons might be fitted with baskets so that they could carry bread, Rogers, op. cit. pp.86 - 87. See below pp.259 - 260.

3 R.C. Jarvis, Army Transport and the English Constitution with Special Reference to the Jacobite Risings. 'The Journal of Transport History', Vol.II, 1955 - 1956, pp.101 - 104.

4 Ibid. p.101.

civil liberty.

Two other aspects of the supply of goods and services to the British army provide further examples of the informality of the system of military administration, or at least of its workings. In theory the soldier received all necessary clothing and uniform from, and had it periodically replaced by the colonel of his regiment. In practice, however, the men might well have to provide extra items of dress for themselves at their own expense, because regimental finances were frequently so inefficiently or so fraudulently managed that there were insufficient funds to provide all the necessary items,¹ although this state of affairs derived more from faulty administration than from deliberate policy. Finally, if the soldier fell ill or was wounded he could be cared for by official medical services and personnel. But there were few examples of permanently established and generally available hospitals, for while garrisons and barracks might contain some informal accommodation, the Royal Hospital at Chelsea for invalid soldiers was the only significant example of such an institution. Thus in peace-time most unfit soldiers simply stayed with their regiments and presumably travelled in carts if unable to walk. On campaign both general hospitals and regimental infirmaries were usually set up in a town near the sphere of action,²

1 C Barnett, Britain and her Army, 1509 - 1970 (1974) pp.143 - 144.

2 T/52/55 f.374, 16 January 1764, referring to the appointment of an Inspector General of Regimental Infirmaries and Chief Director of Hospitals in Germany during the Seven Years War.

while so-called 'flying' or mobile hospitals dealt with the wounded on the spot.¹ 'Hospital' is, however, rather an inflated term to describe such establishments, for the former might be found scattered in private houses rented or requisitioned for the purpose,² while the latter were really ambulances rather than institutions designed to care for patients over a considerable period of time. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to lay too much stress on the informality of medical arrangements in the British army, for no contemporary state had a particularly impressive record in efficient and compassionate care of its sick and wounded soldiers.

A second result of anti-military prejudice in eighteenth century Britain is to be found in the administrative structure of departments and boards, officers and officials responsible for army supply. Duplication of function and overlapping jurisdictions were the order of the day, and derived partly from the determination to submit the army to a significant measure of civilian control, and at the same time to prevent the concentration of power in too few hands. Among the institutions of central government involved in such matters, the Treasury, staffed entirely by civilian administrators, clearly played an important role in connection with its provision of bread, bread wagons, forage and fuel at various times, and it deleg-

1 Minutes at a Meeting of Lord Granby, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Martin, 27 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f.49.

2 Standing Orders, 29 July 1760, Add. MSS. 28855 f.10. General hospitals could presumably be accommodated in some large public building if available.

ated the detailed formulation of its contracts for the troops at home to the two civilian Comptrollers of Army Accounts.¹ The Board of Ordnance, a department which enjoyed considerable independence, also had a vital part to play in supplying the drivers, horses, wagons and equipment of the artillery train, as well as in exercising responsibility for the construction and upkeep of barracks with their furniture, stores, fuel and lighting, and for the provision of tents and camp necessities.² Another department whose multifarious activities touched on the supply of the army was the War Office, where the Secretary at War had charge of the provision of medical supplies, personal camp equipment and uniform.³ The responsibility for transporting troops overseas fell to the Navy Board, for feeding them on board ship to the Commissioners of Victualling, and for caring for invalids abroad to the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded,⁴ although in transport matters the Ordnance was again a law unto itself, making its own arrangements to transfer its personnel and property overseas, even to the extent of hiring its own ships.⁵

1 E.E. Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. (1926) p.46.

2 Rogers, op. cit. p.37. Scouller, op. cit. p.195.

3 Curtis, op. cit. p.35. R.A. Bowler, The Influence of Logistical Problems on British Operations in North America, 1775 - 1782. (1971) pp.22 - 23. There was also, however, a sub-committee of the Board of General Officers, the Clothing Board, which laid down standards for dress and uniform and supervised the colonels' clothing contracts, without enjoying any real power to control the actual supply. Curtis, op. cit. pp.48 - 49. Scouller, op. cit. pp. 158 - 160.

4 D.A. Baugh, Ed., Naval Administration, 1715 - 1750. (1977) p.3. Scouller, op. cit. pp.212 & 237. The Navy Board's repeated efforts to rid itself of army transport business did not succeed until 1794.

5 Scouller, op. cit. p.209.

The principles of civilian involvement and multiple fission were equally evident in the provision and administration of supplies and services in the field, where a plethora of officers and officials was to be found, exercising functions which frequently lacked precise definition. In theory there was no matter beyond the purview of the army's Commander-in-Chief, on whom rested the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of his men, and he was usually assisted in his tasks by a number of staff officers. Among the latter were the Quartermaster-General, who supervised the activities of sutlers and foraging parties,¹ and dealt with matters of quartering which were not the responsibility of the Board of Ordnance,² as well as with the issue, care and maintenance of camp and field equipment,³ the Wagon-Master-General, an officer of the Board of Ordnance, who controlled all vehicles and animals on the march,⁴ and the Physician-General, Surgeon-General and Apothecary-General, civilians who were accorded military rank, and who exercised various functions including the provision of drugs,⁵ and presumably of other items of medical stores and equipment. Another officer who could be a civilian was the Commissary General, one of the oldest offices in the British army

1 Ibid. pp.64 & 264. These functions had been taken over from the Provost-Master-General at the end of the seventeenth century.

2 Rogers, op. cit. p.35. The dividing line was not clearly drawn and demarcation disputes were common.

3 Bowler, op. cit. p.35. The Quartermaster-General's department also exercised responsibilities for food and forage during the American War of Independence.

4 Scouller, op. cit. pp.63 - 64 & facing p.78.

5 Ibid. p.236. Such officers would not always be found in the field.

staff.¹ He was primarily an employee of the Treasury, administering the goods and services which the Board provided, but he was also involved in the hiring and requisitioning of transport and the issue of medicines and medical stores.²

Acting under the authority of these staff officers were many other subordinate officials and minor employees. There were controllers of trains, wagon masters, commissaries of draught horses and conductors, responsible for the administration of the train and its stores and the control of its hired civilian drivers.³ The expansion of hospital services in war-time involved the appointment of many extra personnel, some of whom were accorded military rank but who remained civilians, and including surgeons, surgeons' mates, physicians, apothecaries and matrons, assisted by purveyors of provisions and equipment, storekeepers, quartermasters, stewards and clerks, the whole establishment being managed by an Inspector and Director General.⁴ A number of Treasury commissaries, frequently but not always civilians, worked under the direction of the Commissary General.⁵ Fur-

1 Bowler, op. cit. p.41.

2 Rogers, op. cit. pp.83, 85 & 96.

3 Scouller, op. cit. p.174. As late as 1798 the horses drawing field guns at a Woolwich review were driven by ploughmen wearing smock frocks. Curtis, op. cit. pp.6 - 7.

4 Establishment of the British Hospitals Germany, 26 December 1761, Hotham MSS. DDHO 4/227.

5 The term 'commissary' must always be used with precision, for in its widest sense it means anyone holding a commission. Thus diplomats charged with certain missions could be called commissaries, and the army contained commissaries of musters and commissaries for the exchange of prisoners of war, whose tasks were not directly concerned with providing supplies. Scouller, op. cit. pp.60 & 65.

ther subordinate officers and officials were attached to the regiments, which were in most senses the real basis of the British army, and where the colonel's responsibility for the well-being of his men was exercised through such officers as the regimental quartermaster, who assigned quarters and billets and distributed supplies and stores including clothing, and the major appointed to supervise the activities of the sutlers.¹ Regiments also carried a surgeon and his mate on their establishments, and it is possible that some colonels accorded the loose appellation of 'commissary' to officers charged with various tasks connected with supply.² Finally, it should be noted that in England the intervention of local government officials was necessary before the army could obtain some of its basic needs, for the quartering of troops in inns and the hiring of horses, carts and wagons from private citizens were only permitted on the authority of the civil magistrates, while local constables supervised the execution of the arrangements under a scale of payments fixed by statute.³

Some further illustrations of the principles enunciated above are to be found in the complex system by which the supply of the army was financed. The Crown on the advice of the Treasury and other responsible ministers decided annually the numerical stren-

1 Ibid. pp.66 & 220.

2 Return of Forage Required for the Detachment of Artillery, 11 November 1758, Hotham MSS. DDHO 4/59, which contains a reference to a 'Commissary and Pay Master', although such an appointment may only have been made when parties of troops were detached from the main army.

3 Clode, op. cit. Vol.I, pp.218 & 230. Jarvis, op. cit. pp.111 - 112.

gths, rates of pay and contingent expenses of the various regiments. The soldiers' pay included an allowance for clothing and uniform, while the term 'contingency' covered many of their daily needs, including bread, bread wagons, forage, wood and hospital services, as well as a number of financial allowances made on these heads.¹ Estimates on these bases were drawn up and presented to Parliament by the Secretary at War and the Paymaster-General.² These procedures only covered the so-called ordinary expenditure of the army, and each year additional sums were spent on provisions and services which could not be detailed or costed in advance. They were known as extraordinaries, and again included many items of a non-military nature. In peace-time extraordinaries did not usually reach significant proportions, but it was otherwise in war-time when they might fall not very far short of ordinary expenditure.³ As Parliament had made no provision for such expenses they were financed by making advances from the Exchequer to the Paymaster-General on the army's subsistence account⁴ before payment became due, and by withholding pay for up to a year, the deficit thus arising being made good by a retrospective parliamentary vote for extraordinaries.⁵ Such financial contortions were held to be necessary in view of the impossibility of making an

1 See below p.24.

2 Clode, op. cit. Vol.II, p.259. The Board of Ordnance again demonstrated its independence by formulating its own estimates which were presented separately, although they were subject to Treasury scrutiny and revision. Scouller, op. cit. p.31. Binney, op. cit. p.160.

3 Clode, op. cit. Vol.I, p.131.

4 The pay of the troops was divided into subsistence and offreckonings. See below pp.22 - 23.

5 Binney, op. cit. p.153. H. Roseveare, The Treasury: the Evolution of a British Institution. (1969) p.93.

accurate estimate in advance of the cost of the provisions and services needed, but at the same time the government was encouraged to underestimate the level of ordinary contingencies in order to avoid political difficulties, knowing that there would be little effective criticism of expenses already incurred. The result was paradoxically to weaken parliamentary control of military expenditure, as the House of Commons was obliged to recognize the 'fait accompli' of the previous year's extraordinaries often running into millions.¹

The leading figure in the issue of money was the Paymaster-General who acted as the 'sole domestic banker of the army'.² He received mainly from the Exchequer the funds for ordinary expenditure, and issued them under the authority of sign manual warrants to the regimental agents, from whom the money passed in turn to the regimental paymasters, to the captains of companies and ultimately to the troops themselves.³ The Paymaster-General's issue of cash for extraordinary expenditure was authorized by Treasury warrants,⁴ and the funds forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief. The auditing of the accounts of these transactions was undertaken by the Comptrollers of Army Accounts who acted under the orders of the Treasury.⁵ The ordinary soldier was probably unaware of most of the intricacies of this system, but he needed no reminding of the smallness of the sums

1 Roseveare, op. cit. p.93.

2 L.S. Sutherland & J.E.D. Binney, Henry Fox as Paymaster General of the Forces, 'The English Historical Review', Vol.LXX, 1955, p.230.

3 Ibid. Clode, op. cit. Vol.II, p.299.

4 Sutherland & Binney, op. cit. p.230.

5 Curtis, op. cit. p.46.

which finally arrived in his pocket. Rates of pay had been fixed in the reign of William III and remained unchanged throughout the eighteenth century,¹ and from his miserable pittance the soldier was expected to pay for all his daily needs. The major proportion of pay was known as subsistence money,² and from it deductions were made for a part of the cost of the bread supplied by the Treasury,³ in cavalry and dragoon regiments for each ration of forage which had been provided by government contract,⁴ and for whatever camp necessities were purchased by the authorities.⁵ Further deductions occurred if regimental officers had made arrangements for the bulk supply of food-stuffs to their men,⁶ while as soon as the soldier entered hospital the whole of his subsistence money could be made over to the medical

1 J. Williamson, A Treatise of Military Finance (1782) p.7.

2 For a private foot soldier it was 6d out of 8d per day, for a corporal 8d out of 1/0d and for a sergeant 1/0d out of 1/6d. Scouller, op. cit. p.128.

3 For each 8d loaf provided 5d was deducted. State of what may be the Monthly Expenses of the British Troops in Germany, 2 November 1758, T/1/385 No.112.

4 Lord George Sackville to T.O. Hunter, 26 July 1759, T/1/395 f.43. Williamson, op. cit. p.53. The deduction was usually 6d per ration.

5 During war-time a deduction of 4d per week could be made in winter quarters towards the cost of providing tents and camp necessities for the coming campaign, Standing Orders, 17 November 1758, Baker MSS. Vol.VI, 66/189, but the normal method was apparently to withhold one day's subsistence money per week, and when it was accounted for every two months in arrears to claim that it had already been expended on such items. Scouller, op. cit. pp.128 - 129.

6 Such arrangements might be made for the supply of meat, Journal of Corporal Todd, f.91, 11 September 1761, while it was presumably usual for an officer to pay an innkeeper's bill for feeding his men and to recoup his expenditure from their pay. In theory the troops should have benefitted from bulk purchases and general arrangements, but the officers were no doubt largely engaged in such activities for their own profit.

authorities.¹ From what remained after these numerous stoppages, and frequently it cannot have been very much, the soldier paid personally for whatever other provisions and articles he purchased from local inhabitants or sutlers.² The difference between the whole of the soldier's pay and his subsistence money was known as the offreckonings, and these too were subject to a number of deductions. They included sums for the services of the Paymaster-General, of the regimental agent and paymaster, and of the various officials concerned with mustering the troops and passing accounts, as well as for the upkeep of Chelsea Hospital,³ before the net offreckonings were transferred to the regimental stock purse fund, to which was charged the cost of clothing supplied by the colonel, and from which a further deduction was made for the services of the surgeon.⁴

Thus in these ways there was practically no article or service which the soldier received for which he was not charged directly or indirectly, so that 'mirabile dictu' he supported himself like any private citizen. And yet a closer examination reveals that in significant respects this was a mere illusion, for the pay of the

1 This was a major source of income for the hospitals, and was probably improperly used to cover medical expenses as well as the cost of the patients' board and lodging. Declared Account of R. Cathcart, 20 June 1766, A0/1/1506/216.

2 Corporal Todd complained that the troops were often without money to buy these extra comforts. Journal of Corporal Todd, f.44,(1) July 1761, ff.91 - 92, 11 September 1761.

3 Scouller, op. cit. p.132. Williamson, op. cit. p.11.

4 The sum involved was 2d per month. Scouller, op. cit. p.132.

troops was quite inadequate to cover all their expenses. Consequently, a number of items, for example the bread and bread wagons supplied by the Treasury, were not and could not be paid for in full,¹ while in the same way the deduction of sixpence for each ration of forage provided by the government was a purely nominal sum unrelated to the real cost of the provisions. In addition, both commanding officers and the government might on occasions find it necessary to grant bounties and gratuities, usually in the form of free provisions, as morale-boosters, charging the same to extraordinaries,² while regimental funds had to be supplemented by such contingent allowances as wagon money, which was paid to officers and was supposed to help meet the cost of transporting their personal effects and camp necessities,³ and forage or grass money to officers and regimental officials for similar purposes at the rate of two hundred days per annum.⁴ But perhaps the most original, if not bizarre way of supplementing regimental funds was that which allowed establishments to carry a certain number of fictitious men, whose pay could be used to meet various necessary or urgent expenses.⁵ So, whatever the appearances, British soldiers were unable to

1 State of what may be the Monthly Expenses of the British Troops in Germany, 2 November 1758, T/1/385 No.112. Scouller, op. cit. p.221.

2 Hunter to S. Martin, Recd. 29 December 1759, T/64/96 f.289(b). Standing Orders, 16 October 1761, Add. MSS. 28855 f.65. The allowances made on these occasions for the Combined Army as requested by Prince Ferdinand were presumably not unknown to the British army.

3 Scouller, op. cit. p.147.

4 Ibid. See below p.147. The allowance was calculated on the basis of a certain number of rations which varied according to rank, and was translated into cash at the rate of sixpence per ration.

5 Scouller, op. cit. p.142.

maintain themselves adequately on their pay alone, while regimental funds also needed constant injections of capital to preserve a degree of solvency. But neither the long overdue increase in basic wages, nor the shouldering of a more complete responsibility for the army's needs in the form of adequate parliamentary supply for all provisions and services, was politically acceptable. Indeed, as late as 1828, the Duke of Wellington could argue that an increase in soldiers' pay would not be in the country's best interests as it would make the people feel that the army was burdensome, and consequently might lead to a reduction in its numbers.¹ The result was a system by which token deductions from pay continued to be made to preserve the fiction that the army supported itself, while at the same time its shaky finances were shored up by supplementary allowances. Political prejudices were thus accommodated at the expense of both military and administrative efficiency.

The fact that at various times and in various theatres of war during the eighteenth century Britain employed military forces from Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick to help fight her battles is in itself a further illustration of the distrust of a standing army in this country, and the supply of these mercenary contingents was organized on a similar basis to that of the British army. Under the heading of 'extraordinaries' the Treasury might provide specific items and services such as bread, forage, wood, straw and bread wagons, if need

¹ Clode, op. cit. Vol.I, p.107.

be by making contracts with private merchants, and the supervision of the execution of the necessary arrangements was entrusted to a commissary appointed by the Board.¹ But any of the above might be found by the troops themselves, their officers and the German commissaries and supply officials, who were responsible for providing all other necessities.² Thus once again the organization of supply involved a number of different officials, exercising arbitrarily determined responsibilities and liable to tread on each other's toes. The financial arrangements for the maintenance of hired German troops usually committed the British government to supply their pay and to reimburse their extraordinary expenses, while the rulers of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick received in addition an annual subsidy and an initial payment of levy money with which the soldiers were recruited and equipped ready for action.³ The precise definition of the extraordinary expenses to be reimbursed could provide a bone of contention, as Britain might maintain that a sum for the provisions and services concerned was already included in the soldiers' ordinary rates of

1 Warrant appointing Colonel Amherst, 22 February 1757, T/1/375 No. 23, f.51.

2 *Payement d'un Corps de Troupes Hessoises à 6,672 Hommes*, (1759) Add. MSS. 32887 f.168, with reference to the establishment of a commissariat and an 'Office des Vivres et des Provisions'.

3 Treaty between His Britannick Majesty and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassell, 18 June 1755, in C. Jenkinson, A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers, (1785) Vol.III, pp.48 - 53. Points to be Considered with my Lord Bute, 25 November 1761, Add. MSS. 32931 ff.272 - 275. Britain might also promise to compensate her allies for enemy damage to their territories in the course of war, leaving the exact sum to be paid open to negotiation. Hessian Treaty, Article Séparé, 1 April 1760, SP/108/273.

pay,¹ but usually claims for marching expenses, hospitals, losses and various 'douceurs' such as forage and baggage money to officers were accepted.² An additional source of financial complexity derived from the fact that when Britain provided bread and forage for her mercenaries by means of contract, a deduction might be made from the pay of the troops as a contribution towards the cost,³ so that what was given with one hand was partially taken away with the other. Levy money and ordinary pay were calculated on the basis of estimates drawn up by the German authorities, examined and approved by the Secretary at War,⁴ and together with subsidies were the subject of parliamentary grants of supply, but similar grants for extraordinary expenditure were usually made retrospectively after liability had been accepted and accounts examined and liquidated, a process initially undertaken by the British commissary, and completed by the Treasury or other officers to whom it delegated the task.⁵ Cash for all these services was issued to the Paymaster-General, and either remitted

1 T. Pownall & C.W. Cornwall to C. Jenkinson, 26 March 1764, T/52/56 f.337, Article XI. Idem. 4 January 1765, T/1/440 f.235.

2 In the Expenditure of the £500,000 Granted by Parliament, PRO/30/8/89 f.13.

3 PRO/30/8/76. Hessian Bread, (1759), Add. MSS. 32887 f.176.

4 J. West to Secretary at War, 16 January 1759, T/27/27 f.415. W. Ellis to Martin, 9 February 1763, T/1/424 f.160. H. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III. (1894) Vol.I, p.79.

5 Duke of Newcastle to Viscount Barrington, 14 November 1761, Add. MSS. 32931 f.25. At the end of the Seven Years War the Treasury appointed a special body to examine such accounts, known as the Commissioners for Examining German Demands.

abroad by government contractors,¹ or paid to the agents or bankers of the foreign states in London.²

Such then were the arrangements by which the non-military needs of the British army and its auxiliaries were met. It was a system which involved a peculiar admixture of official and unofficial sources of supply, which was directed and administered by numerous officials, owning different and frequently conflicting allegiances, and in which the attempt to promote military efficiency while at the same time providing obstacles to military oppression produced an irreconcilable clash of interests. The result was a structure of such labyrinthine complexity that even the parliamentary Commission of Accounts set up in 1780 was said to have 'really abandoned in despair the task of comprehending the methods of our military finance'.³ This study seeks to examine only one aspect of these affairs, the role of the Treasury and its commissaries, in one field of action, the Seven Years War in Germany.

Although this part of the conflict might seem to have been peripheral to the major struggles between Britain and France on the seas and in the colonies, and between Austria and Prussia in southern Germany and central Europe, it was nevertheless an area of

1 PMG/2 passim. T/29/33 ff.12 - 13, 1 February 1758. The Memorial of G. Amyand and N. Magens, 14 March 1758, Add. MSS. 32878 f.214.

2 M. de Feronce to Jenkinson, 7 January 1763, Bute MSS. No.21. T/29/35 f.99, 8 June 1763.

3 Sir J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army. (1910 - 1911) Vol. III, p.521.

considerable strategic importance. For France and Austria it provided an opportunity to threaten both Prussian and British territory, thus preventing both powers from concentrating their efforts elsewhere, if not offering the possibility of conquests to use as bargaining counters at the peace. Prussia's Rhenish provinces of Cleves, Mark, East Friesland, Lingen and Tecklenburg, small and isolated, were tempting prizes, while Hanover, whose frontier was almost indefensible,¹ was clearly Britain's Achilles' heel as well as the western gateway into Prussia itself. Against these threats the roles of Britain, Prussia and Hanover were largely defensive, due primarily to their numerical inferiority,² although there were moments when it seemed possible that they might carry the war into the Austrian Netherlands or even into France itself.³ The French had two possible routes for an attack on Hanover; their capture of the Prussian fortress of Wesel in 1757 offered the chance of advance along the river Lippe through the heart of Westphalia, while the seizure of the free imperial city of Frankfurt-am-Main on the first day of 1759 opened up the possibility of progress through Hesse-Cassel.⁴ Given their numerical superiority, a two-pronged attack from both directions would probably have the optimum effect. For their opponents, therefore, the possession of such

1 Sir R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War. (1966) p.8.

2 One of Israel Mauduit's arguments in his pamphlet, Considerations on the Present German War, 6th edition, (1761) pp.80 - 82, was that it was pointless for Britain to fight in Germany because it was impracticable to follow up the victory by invading France.

3 Savory, op. cit. pp.182 - 183.

4 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol.II, pp.487 - 488.

fortresses as Münster and Lipstadt was of crucial importance to prevent the juncture of the French forces, and also to safeguard the river Weser, so essential for supplies and as a line of defence.¹

The campaigns which were fought within this strategical framework involved an allied army which steadily grew in size, and for whose maintenance and supply Britain became increasingly responsible as the war progressed. Known as the Army of Observation in 1757, it contained contingents from Hanover and its two allies, Saxe-Gotha and Bückeberg, Wolfenbüttel, which was part of the possessions of the Duke of Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel and Prussia to a total strength of approximately 55,000 men.² Of this number only the 12,012 Hessians were both maintained and supplied with extraordinaries by this country, although in February 1757 the House of Commons voted £200,000 to help the Hanoverian authorities meet the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of their troops,³ while the extraordinary supp-

1 Ibid. pp.488 - 489.

2 A total of 42,672 for the troops of Hanover, Saxe-Gotha, Bückeberg and Wolfenbüttel may be an overestimate as it comes from 1758 when they were mustered by a British commissary, J. Durand to Earl of Holderness, 16 December 1758, SP/87/29 f.69, although at the end of 1757 Newcastle referred to more than 42,000 men in 'The King's Hanover Army', Newcastle to Mr. Page, 26 November 1757, Add. MSS. 32876 f.136. The Hessians numbered 12,012, Hessian Treaty, 18 June 1755, Add. MSS. 38333 f.122, and the Prussians early in 1757 had six battalions and some small detachments, perhaps as many as 5,000 men, although they withdrew in April when Wesel was evacuated, Savory, op. cit. p.20 & Appendix II, p.451.

3 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany, Add. MSS. 38333 f.6. The full cost of these troops was in excess of £1 million per annum, Estimate of the Charge of 38,000 Men, Journal of the House of Commons, 13 April 1758, Vol. XXVIII, p.189.

lies and services of the small corps of Prussians were provided by the British commissary attached to the Hessians.¹ In 1758, however, by a resolution of the House of Commons of 20 April Britain assumed full responsibility for the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of 38,124 troops of Hanover, Saxe-Gotha, Bückeburg and Wolfenbüttel,² while the remaining 4,548 Hanoverians continued at the charge of the electoral authorities.³ With the arrival of 8,716 British soldiers to join the Combined Army, as it was now called, in July,⁴ and Britain's agreement in December to provide the extraordinaries of all the troops, except the 4,548 Hanoverians, by means of her own commissaries,⁵ the year ended with 63,400 men in arms without counting the Prussians, and this country directly supplying the extraordinaries of approximately 61,000 soldiers.⁶ In 1759 a number of augmentations

1 Add. MSS. 38333 f.6.

2 Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 209 - 210. The commitment was back-dated to 28 November 1757.

3 Mémoire of Baron Münchhausen, 12 December 1758, Add. MSS. 32886 f. 290. F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol. V, p. 1, 114. Westphalen's figure of 4,548 has been used in these calculations rather than Münchhausen's 4,546. This arrangement continued until the end of the war.

4 Martin to R. Boyd, 11 July 1758, T/27/27 f. 356.

5 Add. MSS. 32886 f. 289. Until 25 December 1758 only the Hessian, Prussian and British troops were supplied by British commissaries, the Hanoverian commissariat being responsible for the rest of the Combined Army.

6 42,672 Hanoverians and associates, 12,012 Hessians and 8,716 British. The Prussian contingent now consisted of only ten squadrons of dragoons and five of hussars, Savory, op. cit. Appendix II, p. 451. Four squadrons of Hanoverian dragoons contained 714 men, *ibid.* p. 450, and on this basis fifteen squadrons of Prussians would have totalled 2,678 men. Thus $63,400 + 2,678 - 4,548 = 61,530$.

extended this commitment, 6,992 Hessians ¹ and 700 Hanoverians ² being added to the Army's establishment, which together with 3,869 Prussians ³ brought its total strength to 74,961 men, 70,413 of whom looked to Britain for their extraordinaries. The process continued in 1760 with the formation of a British legion of 3,135 men, drawn mostly from French deserters, ⁴ the addition of 14,611 British troops, Newcastle's so-called 'glorious reinforcement', ⁵ 3,413 Brunswickers, ⁶ 3,392 Hessians ⁷ and 1,001 Hanoverians, ⁸ so giving a force of 100,513 soldiers with Britain supplying extraordinaries to 95,965 of them. Finally, a convention with Brunswick in 1761 increased that country's contingent by 361 men, ⁹ while by 1762 the effective state of the Prussians had risen to 4,374, ¹⁰ so that at the end of the war the strength of the Combined Army had reached at least 101,379, and Britain had become responsible for providing extraordinaries to no less

1 Hessian Treaty, Separate Article, 17 January 1759, Add. MSS. 38333 f.122.

2 Martin to Hunter, 19 January 1759, T/27/27 ff.419 - 420.

3 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.V, p.1,114.

4 Savory, op. cit. p.202.

5 Westphalen states that 23,327 British troops served in Germany in 1760, op. cit. Vol.V, p.1,116, although there seems to be no corroborating evidence for his statement that the original contingent of 8,716 had risen to 12,255 by 1759, *ibid.* p.1,114.

6 Brunswick Treaty, 14 January 1760, and Ulterior Convention, 5 March 1760, Add. MSS. 38333 f.123.

7 Hessian Treaty, 1 April 1760, *ibid.* f.122.

8 T/29/33 f.286, 13 February 1760.

9 Brunswick Convention, 10 August 1761, Add. MSS. 38333 f.123.

10 List of the Effective Men of the Allied Army, 1 October 1762, Add. MSS. 38334 f.186. No figures have been found for the complete establishment.

than 96,831 men. This was a large force by contemporary standards,¹ and its supply represented not only a far greater commitment than Britain had previously undertaken, but also a task of considerable complexity, deriving partly from the Army's multi-national character. As Colonel Richard Peirson, the Director of the British commissariat between 1760 and 1762, commented:- ".... I have seen sufficient to convince me that content can never reign long in an allied army, was it conducted by angels from heaven" ²

The campaigns fought by this army produced no decisive victory or momentous results, and in 1763 the 'status quo' was perfectly restored. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of activity, and if at the end of the war the political map had not altered, the military tide had ebbed and flowed over the territory with monotonous regularity.³ In 1757 the French advance through Westphalia swept all before it; the Army of Observation under the command of the Duke of Cumberland lost the battle of Hastenbeck on 25 July, and by mid-August the enemy had occupied Hanover and Brunswick and sent detachments into Emden and Cassel with little or no opposition. Cumberland retreated to Stade, where finding himself hemmed in, he accepted the Convention of Kloster Zeven, a capitulation rather than an armist-

1 Eighteenth century commanders rarely operated with armies in excess of 80,000 men, Howard, op. cit. p.99.

2 R. Peirson to Newcastle, 6 February 1761, Add. MSS. 32918 f.305.

3 The following account is based on Savory, op. cit. and Fortescue's A History of the British Army, together with Sir J.S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War (1907) and R.P. Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans (1899 - 1904).

ice,¹ on 8 September. Such was the inauspicious military situation inherited by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, one of Frederick the Great's ablest generals, when he assumed command of the Army in November, and few can have anticipated the rapid change of fortune which now occurred. By May 1758 the French had been driven back across the Rhine, a British expeditionary force had occupied Emden, and Cassel had been retaken by a detachment under the Hessian general, Prince Isenberg.

With the enemy's advance successfully repelled Ferdinand now took the offensive, and crossing the Rhine he defeated the French army under the Comte de Clermont at Crefeld on 23 June, a victory which opened up the possibility of an attack on the Netherlands. To prevent this the French sent a large army under the Prince de Soubise to create a diversion in Hesse-Cassel, and when Isenberg was defeated at Sanderhausen on 23 July, so posing a new threat to Hanover, Ferdinand was obliged to recross the Rhine. The rest of the year saw attempted French movements along the river Lippe and northwards from Cassel, and the largely successful efforts of the Combined Army and its detachments to contain this activity. The campaign of 1759 opened with a bold attempt by Ferdinand to dislodge the French from Frankfurt-am-Main, which they had taken on New Year's Day, while at the same time guarding Westphalia with a corps under General Spörcken. On 13 April, however, Ferdinand was defeated at the battle of

1 W.L. Dorn, Competition for Empire, 1740 - 1763. (1963) p.320.

Bergen, and compelled to withdraw his main army to Westphalia, leaving a detachment under Lieutenant-General Imhoff to protect Hesse-Cassel, although the latter was forced to abandon Cassel in June. The twin French armies under the Marquis de Contades and the Duc de Broglie now began to close in on Ferdinand's forces threatening his positions on the Weser. On 10 July Minden fell, and Lipstadt and Hameln were besieged as French troops began to cross the river and move into Hanover. Fortunately for the allies, the timely victory at Minden on 1 August relieved the pressure, and forced the French to retreat south in Hesse-Cassel, abandoning Cassel and Marburg. Meanwhile a detachment of the Combined Army under Imhoff laid siege to the French garrison in the city of Münster, and forced it to capitulate on 22 November. Ferdinand had thus completely turned back the French advance, and could again envisage the extension of the war outside Germany.

It was hoped that a decisive blow in Westphalia in 1760 would be the quickest way to peace, but as a result of the previous year's exertions the campaigning started late, and it was the French who first began to push northwards in Hesse-Cassel and eastwards in Westphalia in late June and early July. To counteract their movements Ferdinand found it increasingly necessary to divide his army into separate corps, of which the most important was under the command of the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, who won a significant victory at Warburg on 31 July. But the main army was unable to pre-

vent Cassel falling into enemy hands once again,¹ and to discourage further French advances into Westphalia or Hanover Ferdinand resolved on diversionary tactics in the form of an attack on Wesel, the important French base on the Rhine. A large detachment under the Hereditary Prince appeared before the fortress in late September, but the unsuccessful battle of Kloster Camp on 16 October sealed the fate of the expedition. The year closed with the French still poised to attack Hanover, and to relieve this pressure Ferdinand decided to engage in a winter campaign to drive them out of Hesse-Cassel with his army divided into three columns. By March 1761, however, the attempt had failed, and the Combined Army had taken up positions between the rivers Lippe, Diemel and Leine.

This situation encouraged the French to make an all-out effort to produce a decisive result, and with the size of both their armies considerably increased Soubise was to move along the Lippe, while Broglie was to cross the Diemel and threaten Hanover. By June these moves had begun, and Ferdinand detached the Hereditary Prince to a position west of Münster, while Sporcken was on the Diemel and the main army at Paderborn. The battle of Vellinghausen on 16 July was an allied victory, but it did not prevent Broglie advancing to the Weser, invading Brunswick and capturing Wolfenbüttel in October, while Soubise was able to take Emden again in September. But the last year of the war saw the threat to Hanover relieved by the allied victory at Wilhelmsthal in Hesse-Cassel on 24 June 1762, the

¹ After its capture by the French in June 1759 the Landgrave's capital had been abandoned in August.

French retreat from the latter in August, and Ferdinand's recapture of Cassel on 1 November, soon after which hostilities came to an end.

There were a number of features of these lengthy and complex campaigns which created problems for the supply of an army. Firstly, the war was sustained within the same relatively small area for six years, and the longer it lasted the more difficult did it become for the rival armies to find their livelihood, especially as it was a recognized part of military tactics to exhaust territories or to destroy provisions deliberately.¹ Indeed, such aims could even be put top of the list of military objectives, for as one expert wrote:- "The main and principal point in war, is to procure plenty of provisions, and to destroy the enemy by famine".² In these ways the cumulative effects of heavy demand, destruction and the inevitable disruption of ordered agrarian life were bound to create increasingly severe problems of sustenance as the war went on. Secondly, despite the fact that eighteenth century armies usually went into winter quarters before the end of the year, in 1759 - 1760 campaigning continued until January and February, while in 1760 - 1761 the extensive operations in Hesse-Cassel meant practically no respite at all. Such manoeuvres undertaken in the very worst weather could wreak havoc and destruction in an army's transport services, and had the additional drawback of making it impossible to lay in provisions in magazines

1 Prince Ferdinand to Holdernessee, 8 August 1759, SP/87/35 f.121.

2 T. Simes, A Treatise on the Military Science, which Comprehends the Grand Operations of War (1780) pp.6 - 7.

for the forthcoming campaigning season. Thirdly, supply problems were exacerbated by the fact that the Combined Army rarely acted as one unit. In 1760 - 1761 there were large-scale diversionary siege expeditions to Wesel and Cassel, while in the early months of 1761 Prince Ferdinand's forces were separated into no less than five different corps.¹ In this way it was difficult to concentrate resources and personnel, and much duplication of effort was necessary. Finally, despite the popular belief that mid-eighteenth century warfare was a leisurely affair, the campaigns in north-west Germany were characterized by much rapid movement. As Ferdinand himself wrote:- "... la nature de cette guerre, où il s'agit de faire face à plus d'un Endroit, avec des forces inegales, exige fort souvent des marches subites, quelquefois secretes, et souvent de longue Traite".² It is true that much of the manoeuvring for position resulted in no engagement, but it nevertheless threw a considerable strain on transport services which were kept constantly active, shifting stores and provisions to correspond with the positions occupied by the troops, or removing them to safety from the advances of the enemy.

In addition to problems deriving from the nature of the war further difficulties arose from the nature of the campaigning area. The latter extended for over two hundred miles from the Baltic Sea to the river Main, and for distances of between one hundred and

1 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany, Add. MSS. 38333 f.20.

2 Ibid. f.8.

fifty and one hundred and eighty miles from the Dutch frontier and the river Rhine in the west towards the river Elbe, the Harz mountains and the Thuringian forest in the east. The area is one of contrasting physical features, its southern half composed largely of upland plateau, mostly more than a thousand feet above sea level and partially enclosed by a range of higher massifs, while the northern half is dominated by the great plain, which stretches from the Netherlands to Poland. From the point of view of an army seeking food the terrain is not particularly hospitable, for the damp soils and raw climate of the higher parts of the plateau are unsuitable for arable farming, as are the heavy clay or poor sandy soil and moist climate of many parts of the plain. Nevertheless, rye for bread together with oats and other fodder crops for animals may be grown on the lower reaches of the upland area and on some parts of the plain, while wide tracts of land can support cattle and sheep and provide hay, meat and dairy produce.¹ In the eighteenth century, compared with the Netherlands and England, the agriculture of the area was underdeveloped. Much land remained unexploited, including the famous Lüneburg Heath on the west side of the Elbe, described in 1751 as a sandy desert,² while further south many areas of the uplands were still covered with forests and woods. In the early part of the century Hanover was economically

1 There is one small strip of highly fertile soil, the Loess belt, stretching from the Dutch frontier towards the rivers Ruhr and Lippe. The above account is based on chapters II and III in N.J.G. Pounds, The Economic Pattern of Modern Germany. (1963).

2 *Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 1751 - 1772*, by Henry Hulton, f.38. The author also described the area between Bremen and West Friesland as barren and disagreeable, *ibid.* f.5.

backward and sparsely populated,¹ while even at the end of the century two-fifths of its land was uncultivated.² Everywhere simple crop rotations necessitated the leaving of much unproductive fallow land each year,³ and there is little evidence that the new food and fodder crops, which were already proving their value in other parts of Europe, were to be found to any significant extent in the area before 1750.⁴ Moreover, as opposed to Germany east of the Elbe, which was a land of aristocratic estates intensively cultivated by serf labour, the north-west of the country was characterized by fragmented peasant holdings, with the lords more interested in extracting rents and fines from their tenants than in directly exploiting the land for commercial purposes.⁵

Yet it is easy to overemphasize the agrarian backward-

1 C.T. Atkinson, A History of Germany, 1715 - 1815. (1908) pp.47 - 48.

2 H. Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1648 - 1840. (1965) p.296.

3 B.H. Slicher Van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500 - 1850. (1963) pp.244 - 245. The author finds evidence of more frequent fallow in north Germany in the eighteenth century than in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

4 The potato had made little headway even in Prussia by mid-century despite the efforts of Frederick William I and Frederick II to promote it, and its use by the troops in the Bavarian Succession War of 1778 - 1779 was sufficiently novel to win for that conflict the peculiar title of 'Kartoffelkrieg', while red clover, sainfoin and lucerne were not in general use before the second half of the century. W.G. East, An Historical Geography of Europe. (1950) p.401. E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson, Eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol.IV, the Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. (1967) p.300. Slicher Van Bath, op. cit. pp.279 - 280.

5 H. Sée, Esquisse d'une Histoire du Régime Agraire en Europe aux XVIIIème et XIXème Siècles. (1921) p.79.

ness of the campaigning area and to paint an oversimplified picture of subsistence-level farming. The larger free imperial cities such as Hamburg and Frankfurt-am-Main, which were growing in size in the eighteenth century,¹ must have acted as stimuli to agricultural production in the surrounding countryside, while important capitals like Cassel, Hanover and Brunswick presumably exerted a similar influence. In addition, although there is evidence to suggest that many smaller towns in the area were stagnating or even declining,² modern research has clearly demonstrated the growing importance of various forms of rural industry,³ a development which may well have encouraged food production over a wide area. Nor was production for the market impossible under a system of landholding, in which the typical peasant, the 'Meier', could possess as much as sixty acres of land and employ inferior classes of peasant to work for him.⁴ Thus if north-west Germany was not a land overflowing with milk and honey, it was far from completely barren, although its resources were limited and might easily be exhausted by constant and heavy demands from rival armies,

1 Hamburg had a population of about 40,000 in 1650 and this had risen steadily to 100,000 by 1800, when it was surpassed in Germany only by Vienna and Berlin. Holborn, op. cit. p.30.

2 G. Benecke, Society and Politics in Germany, 1500 - 1750. (1974) pp.68, 93 & 107 - 108.

3 H. Kellenbenz, Rural Industries in the West from the End of the Middle Ages to the Eighteenth Century, in P. Earle, Ed., Essays in European Economic History, 1500 - 1800. (1974) pp.61 - 62. M. Barkhausen, Government Control and Free Enterprise in Western Germany and the Low Countries in the Eighteenth Century, in *ibid.* pp.218 - 224 & 259 - 262.

4 Two 'Hufen' of thirty 'arpents' each, an 'arpent' being roughly an acre. The holding could, however, be scattered. See, op. cit. pp. 73 - 75.

while production by means of relatively small scattered units necessitated a high level of efficiency in the amassing of provisions.

Such efficiency was not easy to attain in view of the various limitations and obstacles presented by the means of transport and communication. Contour variations provided basic problems for the unmechanized transport of bulky materials in the centre and the south of the campaigning area, while the regular and well-distributed rainfall, much of which falls as snow in the winter especially in the upland regions,¹ created far from ideal conditions for carriage on the crudely constructed and badly maintained roads of the eighteenth century. For although contemporary postal maps seem to show a reasonably developed road network, it has to be remembered that they mark rights of passage rather than prepared or constructed highways,² and few of the major routes were classified as 'chaussées', or metalled roads, even at the end of the century.³ The improvements already being made in England by the turnpike trusts, and in France by the 'Ecole des Ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées', founded as recently as 1747, but continuing a tradition deriving from Sully and Colbert, were seldom found in Germany.⁴ The roads of Hanover were said to be either so rocky or so boggy that wagons could only take two-thirds of the loads

1 Pounds, op. cit. p.32.

2 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol.IV, p.216.

3 W.H. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century: the Social Background of the Literary Revival. (1965) pp.161 - 163.

4 S.B. Clough & C.W. Cole, Economic History of Europe. (1952) pp. 443 - 444.

which they were able to carry in the Low Countries,¹ while it has been estimated that wood for fuel could not be carried economically for more than twelve miles in the area.² Water transport was of course preferable for the carriage of bulk supplies, and north-west Germany is amply provided with natural waterways. Today most of the rivers have been improved out of all recognition as channels of communication, but few offered unbroken or straightforward navigation in the mid-eighteenth century. Even the great river Rhine presented considerable hazards above Bonn, for it was only in 1834 that a proper passage was blasted through its famous gorge,³ and it was not always possible to sail between the river and its tributaries such as the Ruhr.⁴ The estuary of the Weser, which was a vital artery of supply for the Combined Army, was subject to extensive silting,⁵ and as goods proceeded upstream and into its tributaries they often had to be transferred to progressively smaller and shallower craft, while at the junction with the Fulda this exercise involved carrying the cargoes overland.⁶ Climatic conditions, either drought or flood, could bring transport on both the Weser and the Ems to a total standstill for as much as three-quarters of the year.⁷ Artificial water-

1 An Estimate of the Charges that will Attend the Furnishing an Army of 40,000 Men, 23 January 1758, Add. MSS. 32878 f.191.

2 East, op. cit. p.406.

3 K.A. Sinnhuber, Germany: its Geography and Growth. (1970) p.66.

4 East, op. cit. p.406.

5 T.H. Elkins, Germany. (1960) p.225.

6 Peirson to Martin, 2 & 21 June 1760, T/1/405 ff.62 & 67.

7 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 20 April 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 f.76. F. Halsey to Magens, 20 February 1762, Halsey MSS. 15039.

ways which might have eliminated many of these obstacles were conspicuous only by their absence, except for a solitary canal which extended for some twenty miles north of Münster, by-passing a section of the upper Ems.¹ The campaigning area could certainly not compete with the comprehensive system of readily navigable waterways to be found in the Dutch Republic and the Netherlands. To natural obstacles were added other artificial ones, notably customs barriers and tolls, which have been called 'the curse of the German economy'.² There were reputedly thirty-two toll-gates on the Weser between Elsfleth and Münden,³ and other rivers were presumably no less liberally endowed.

Finally, against these disadvantages should be set the fact that, despite the generally low economic development of the area, there must have been, as in any largely agrarian society of small farmers, moderate resources of wagons, carts, horses and oxen. Moreover, the importance of rural industry in many places implies the existence of considerable supplementary traffic in raw materials and finished products, and consequently the availability of additional means of transport on both land and water.⁴ Thus it may be concluded that while north-west Germany was by no means devoid of the means of internal communication so essential for the carriage of

1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

2 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol.IV, p.554.

3 East, op. cit. p.407. The author presumably means 'Münden' and not 'Minden' as he states that some of the toll-gates were in Hesse-Cassel.

4 Some villages actually specialized in haulage. Kellenbenz, op. cit. p.78.

an army's supplies and provisions, and while it offered more facilities and fewer obstacles than, for example, the wilds of North America, the transport system of the area was subject to significant limitations, which would clearly hinder the movement of vital commodities, especially if the war lasted any length of time.

Had the campaigning area enjoyed any degree of political unity its communications might have been more adequate,¹ but a cursory glance at the map is sufficient to show its fragmented nature, although no map can do full justice to the intricate overlapping of 'feudal jurisdictions, overlordships, inheritances, partitions and alienations'.² Despite the fact that there were fewer political authorities in the north-west than in other parts of Germany, there were nevertheless more than fifty, ranging from the approximately 8,500 square miles of Hanover³ to the tiny enclaves of free imperial cities such as Goslar,⁴ and the inhabitants of the various states hardly thought of themselves as Germans, regarding even their close neighbours in the same light as Frenchmen or Dutchmen.⁵ The area was one of great administrative complexity, which derived not only from the multiplicity of political units, but also from the

1 E.A.W. Zimmermann, A Political Survey of the Present State of Europe. (1787) p.108.

2 Benecke, op. cit. p.7.

3 Atkinson, op. cit. p.47.

4 Other free imperial cities such as Bremen, Frankfurt-am-Main and Hamburg had somewhat larger areas.

5 Benecke, op. cit. p.7.

fact that several of the larger states were composed of a number of separate territories scattered over a wide area,¹ and controlled by local governments or 'regencies' with an inevitable augmentation of bureaucratic personnel. Another reason for the proliferation of officials, who might perform useful functions or merely possess an honorary title, was the continuing effort of every prince, however petty, to turn himself into an absolute ruler, extending the influence of his government over provinces, towns and country districts. In places where this process had not enjoyed complete success the provincial estates, municipal councils and seigneurial administrators still vied with the representatives of central government, and the resultant conflict of interests did nothing to increase efficiency.² And even in Prussia, which was in the vanguard of the movement towards centralized absolutism, Frederick William I's 'predilection for collegiate organization'³ encouraged an increase in personnel at all levels of government and in all areas. It is not therefore surprising that contemporaries believed that it was necessary for the happiness of every German that he should have some title, office or character.⁴

1 This was especially noticeable in the case of Prussia, whose possessions were strung out across the whole of north Germany.

2 It was not until 1774 that the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was able to appoint ten permanent officials, or 'Landräte' to administer the various parts of his domains, F.L. Carsten, Princes and Parliaments in Germany from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century. (1959) p.186.

3 Dorwart, op. cit. p.190.

4 Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 1751 - 1772, by Henry Hulton, f.156. The demand arose less from the character of the people than from the nature of their political system.

The political and administrative structure of north-west Germany clearly created problems for the supply of an army campaigning there. Goods and services could only be provided on a piecemeal basis after negotiations and arrangements with many different authorities and officials, a process which automatically involved duplication of effort and waste of time. Moreover, co-operation and co-ordination between organizers and suppliers belonging to different states could not be counted on, for the latter would almost certainly regard each other with jealousy and suspicion, while similar clashes of interest might be anticipated between the agents of princely power and those of the localities, or even between rival members of the administrative boards or chambers within the same state. In all these ways the Combined Army's broth stood in danger of being spoiled by too many cooks.

CHAPTER II
THE COMMISSARIAT

'.... an Institution so various and yet so new in this Country' ¹

The success with which Great Britain supplied the troops for whom she was responsible in Germany during the Seven Years War may be measured firstly in the suitability and effectiveness of the administrative structure, which was called into existence to deal with the task in hand. Was the Treasury prepared to provide or allow staffing levels which were numerically adequate? In a service characterized by multifarious duties and responsibilities were the individual commissaries given functions which were sufficiently limited and specialized? Were they accorded an appropriate degree of power and independence to enable them to take the requisite actions with the necessary promptitude? And finally, were the conditions of service such as to encourage the employment of the most suitable and best qualified personnel?

At the outset of the war the Treasury's attitude to the numbers of staff it was prepared to employ seems to have been hardly generous, or even realistic. In 1757 and 1758 the supply of the 12,012 Hessian troops and the small corps of Prussians was entrusted to a single commissary, who in addition to carrying out his everyday duties was also expected to deal with various other complex

¹ A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany, Add. MSS. 38333 f.30.

matters,¹ and to act as commissary of musters to the Hessian troops.² And yet despite this heavy burden of work the Treasury disregarded a strong plea for the appointment of deputy commissaries.³ Even more surprising was the Board's original intention that the supply of the 8,716 British troops, who arrived in Germany in July 1758,⁴ should simply be added to the responsibilities of the one commissary,⁵ and when after indignant complaints at this attempt to pile Pelion on Ossa a second commissary was appointed to look after the British contingent, the Duke of Newcastle could still protest that the arrangement was uneconomical, and argue that if one man could be persuaded to do the job on his own the public would be saved much unnecessary expense.⁶

At the end of 1758 Britain accepted responsibility

1 Robert Boyd, who acted as commissary in 1758, was ordered by the Treasury to make up his predecessor's accounts from 1757, Boyd to Treasury, 30 March 1758, T/1/386 No.14, to obtain details of the quantities of forage captured from the enemy, Boyd to Treasury, 2 April 1758, *ibid.* No.16, and to formulate his considered opinions on the respective merits of the different methods of supplying the troops, Treasury to Boyd, 1 August 1758, T/27/27 f.371.

2 Jeffrey Amherst acted in this capacity in 1757, T/1/375 No.29, f.63, and it is assumed that his successor, Boyd, was similarly employed in 1758. Mustering troops involved a full-scale parade twice a year and the submission of detailed returns.

3 Boyd to Treasury, 9 April 1758, T/1/386 No.22. Pye & Cruickshanks to (Treasury), 2 June 1758, T/1/385 No.45. The contractors had to send their own employees to receive and store forage being delivered on their account.

4 See above p.31.

5 S. Martin to M. Hatton, 1 September 1758, T/27/27 ff.378 - 379.

6 Duke of Newcastle to Duke of Marlborough, 20 September 1758, *ibid.* f.384.

for the direct supply of extraordinaries to approximately 61,000 soldiers in the Combined Army,¹ thus making it impossible to avoid a considerable augmentation in personnel, and in appointing Thomas Orby Hunter Superintendent of Extraordinaries, the Treasury granted him full powers to employ as many deputies as he judged necessary to carry on the service efficiently.² At first, Hunter seems to have been unsure whether he would be allowed to make all the requisite appointments, and on 11 February he wrote to the Board:-

".... what I have to do, already in these parts, is beyond the power or Capacity of any one Man to go thro', with any Chance of doing justice to the Publick, the overlooking Direction and Controul of the whole is full Employment for one Man, the Execution & Detail must be in other hands this must be the Plan, or their Ldps good Intentions for the Publick in sending me hither will I fear be frustrated" ³

But his fears were unfounded, for the Treasury had only wished to make clear that it did not intend itself to nominate any commissaries,⁴ and before long even this policy was modified in two cases.⁵ By

1 See above p.31.

2 T.O. Hunter Patent, 6 January 1759, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/1.

3 T/64/96 f.28.

4 Martin to Hunter, 13 February 1759, *ibid.* f.19. Boyd and Hatton, the two commissaries who had been responsible for the Hessian and British troops respectively, had been recalled by the Board in order to allow Hunter to make a fresh start.

5 Hatton was reappointed, Martin to Hunter, 23 March 1759, *ibid.* f. 56, and Richard Oswald, who had been employed by Hunter on a temporary basis to take care of the army in Hesse-Cassel, was given a permanent responsibility, Martin to Hunter, 30 March 1759, *ibid.* f. 73, Hunter to Martin, 29 April 1759, *ibid.* f.102, and also a Treasury commission, as proved by the declaration of his account at the Exchequer at the end of the war, AO/1/519/223.

the end of the year the Superintendent had appointed seven other commissaries,¹ and had employed two more on what may have been a semi-official basis,² without the raising of any objections or the expression of any reservations in Whitehall. This brought the commissariat's permanent establishment of senior officers at the end of the year to thirteen, including two commissaries of musters,³ and gave a ratio of one commissary for 5,416 troops, a dramatic improvement on the previous figure of one for approximately 11,000 troops.⁴

At the beginning of December 1759 Hunter was granted leave of absence to come to England, and ordered to instruct Michael Hatton to act in his place.⁵ By the end of March 1760 it was known

1 Bilgen, Bishop, Faber, Fuhr, Ramberg, Roden and Trotter. Not all were accorded the title of commissary; Bilgen became inspector and controller of the foreign artillery train, Fuhr acted as an accountant, and Bishop, Faber and Ramberg as directors of various services. See Appendix I.

2 Massow and Meyen, for whom no details of salary have been found, *ibid.*

3 Bilgen, Bishop, Boyd, Durand, Faber, Fuhr, Hatton, Hunter, Massow, Meyen, Oswald, Ramberg and Roden. Trotter is not included as he served for only three weeks in June 1759, *ibid.* The commissaries of musters are included as their functions had previously been carried out by commissaries for the supply of extraordinaries.

4 By the end of 1759 Britain fully maintained 70,413 men in the Combined Army. In 1758 two commissaries had supplied extraordinaries to 12,012 Hessians, 8,716 British and approximately 2,678 Prussians, see above pp.30 - 32. A third commissary, who mustered the Hanoverians in 1758, is omitted as Britain did not at this time provide the electoral troops with extraordinaries

5 Martin to Hunter, 7 December 1759, T/64/96 f.270. Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.147 - 154. Although bound under 1760 these instructions were left by Hunter on his departure from Germany in December 1759.

that the Superintendent would not be returning to Germany,¹ but it was not until 6 May that the name of Richard Peirson was first mentioned as a successor, and he did not begin his work until 24 May.² Thus during this long interval, when Prince Ferdinand's orders for the formation of a large magazine of provisions at Cassel for the forthcoming campaign³ really required an augmentation of personnel, the commissariat was not only understaffed but deprived of the services of its permanent director. And yet, despite Hatton's complaints that he was desperately short of responsible assistants, and his warning that serious arrears of business were accumulating especially in connection with the settlement of accounts,⁴ the Treasury did practically nothing to help.⁵ The delay was partly due to the Board's attempt to dissuade Hunter from resigning, and partly to its inability to find a successor of sufficient standing to be entrusted with the powers he had exercised,⁶ but when matters dragged on for nearly six months a search for a temporary replacement should have been made

1 Newcastle to Prince Ferdinand, 25 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 ff. 2 - 3.

2 Newcastle to Marquis of Granby, 6 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.294. R. Peirson to Martin, 25 May 1760, T/1/405 f.57.

3 Extracts of the Correspondence between Hunter and Hatton, 1760, T/1/405 f.330.

4 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1760, T/64/96 ff.344 - 345.

5 The appointment of James Browne to settle the expenses of maintaining prisoners of war slightly eased the burden of work on Granby, the British Commander-in-Chief, who had been given financial responsibilities on Hunter's departure from Germany. See below p.77.

6 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany, Add. MSS. 38333 ff.9 - 10 & 13.

a priority. Nevertheless, if the Treasury had failed to deal with the immediate problem, it had still recognized the necessity of a further strengthening of the commissariat's establishment, for in May and June 1760 four new commissaries were appointed in London,¹ while the power of granting warrants for the payment of goods and services provided was now given to the British Commander-in-Chief, the Marquis of Granby, an arrangement which, albeit unintentionally, took some weight off Peirson's shoulders.² These and other changes brought the total strength of the commissariat's senior staff at the end of the year to eighteen,³ which for an army now containing 95,965 men supplied by Britain⁴ meant a ratio of one commissary for 5,331 troops.

Yet a closer examination of the situation reveals that this slight statistical improvement may well have been nullified by other unfavourable factors. For example, both Granby and Peirson had onerous military duties to perform, and were quite unable to give their undivided attention to commissariat affairs.⁵ Newcastle claimed

1 Blakeney, Cockburn, Frederick Halsey and Thomas Halsey. See Appendix I.

2 Add. MSS 38333 ff.9 - 10. Instructions to Peirson, 9 May 1760, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/3. The Treasury was not prepared to grant full financial powers to a man of Peirson's rank and standing. Granby had temporarily exercised these powers since Hunter's departure in December 1759. See below p.77.

3 Bilgen, Bishop, Blakeney, Boyd, Browne, Cockburn, Faber, Fuhr, F. Halsey, T. Halsey, Hatton, Massow, Meyen, Peirson, Redecker, Roden, Scheedler and Voss. Durand, Oswald and Ramberg had withdrawn from the service in the course of 1760. See Appendix I.

4 See above p.32.

5 Peirson commanded a battalion of Guards, Newcastle to Granby, 7 October 1760, Add. MSS. 32912 f.432.

that he had always feared that Peirson's dual responsibility would lead to a neglect of supply matters,¹ and yet in August 1760 the Treasury burdened him with further duties, when jointly with Boyd he was ordered to undertake the mustering of the Hanoverian troops,² while at the same time Granby announced that the pressure of campaigning had obliged him to ask Peirson to carry out his commissariat functions.³ It can hardly have come as a surprise, therefore, when in September Peirson informed Newcastle that his 'military and civil capacities do in some measure jarr',⁴ and by early 1761 he was putting matters more forcefully to the Treasury by pointing out 'pretty strongly' the impossibility of attending to both tasks,⁵ although nothing was done to ease the situation. Equally significant was the recognition from the very beginning on the part of at least one commissary that the establishment of May 1760 was inadequate for Ferdinand's plan to campaign with several corps and detachments acting separately from the main army, a view which was communicated to the Treasury,⁶ and later confirmed by experience. As Peirson wrote in the first days of 1761:- "Your Grace made provision for commissaries last

1 Ibid.

2 Newcastle to Peirson, 12 August 1760, Add. MSS. 32909 f.432. Peirson was specifically informed that he was to have no increase in salary for these additional duties, which had to be undertaken because of the resignation of James Durand.

3 Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760, *ibid.* f.300.

4 Peirson to Newcastle, 23 September 1760, Add. MSS. 32912 f.38.

5 Peirson to Martin, 21 February 1761, T/1/410 f.52.

6 F. Halsey to Martin, 19 May 1760, T/64/96 f.370.

year for two armies, but this year we have seldom been without four, so that it is difficult to know how to station them".¹

In May and June 1761, after Ferdinand had complained that he had no reason to be content with the commissariat,² and Hatton, who had made a special journey to England to explain the Commander-in-Chief's dissatisfaction in more detail, had stated categorically that staff shortages had hindered the work of supply,³ the Treasury took effective action, appointing no fewer than eleven new commissaries,⁴ and relieving Peirson of his military and mustering duties so that he could concentrate his attention on commissariat affairs.⁵ As a result of these changes the Combined Army at the end of 1761 had twenty-seven senior commissaries in attendance,⁶ or one official for every 3,568 men supplied by Britain.⁷ And yet the Treasury had only acted tardily, and its claim that the men on the spot

1 Peirson to Newcastle, 2 January 1761, Add. MSS. 32917 f.40.

2 Ferdinand to Earl of Holderness, 30 March 1761, Add. MSS. 38197 f.143.

3 T/29/34 f.51, 28 April 1761.

4 Arnold, Cuthbert, Dyer, Elliot, Fraser, Higgins, Hulton, Johnston, Levett, Mason and Pownall. See Appendix I.

5 Newcastle to Peirson, (1761) Add. MSS. 32916 f.414. Johnston was appointed to muster the Hanoverian troops. Although Peirson was relieved of these duties, he was now given the financial responsibilities previously exercised by Granby, Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/4.

6 To the previous establishment of eighteen commissaries are added the eleven names above and one extra German official, Ammon. Three commissaries, Redecker, Scheedler and Voss had withdrawn from the service by the end of 1761. See Appendix I.

7 The addition of 361 Brunswickers to the 95,965 troops supplied by Britain gave a total of 96,326. See above p.32.

had failed to inform it promptly of the problem¹ must be rejected in the light of the evidence of its own correspondence. In fact the Board had been held back by the belief that it did not know where or how to find prospective employees possessing the qualifications it demanded,² and it seems to have expected a high-ranking commissary to recommend suitable candidates,³ although as long as such officers were permanently stationed in Germany and in touch with few of their compatriots, this was a somewhat unrealistic hope. The result was that the commissariat had waited for the Treasury to make appointments, while the Treasury had waited for the commissariat to forward names, and nothing had been done until complaints from the Commander-in-Chief could no longer be ignored. Thus while there had been no unwillingness to allow improved staffing levels, there had been some inefficiency in translating intention into practice.

The work of the new commissariat, which was better equipped than any of its predecessors to perform its tasks, was unfortunately clouded from the beginning by accusations and revelations of irregularity and fraud,⁴ which eventually persuaded the Treasury to establish a commission of enquiry to make a full investigation of the charges.⁵ That the Board had even now not completely learned the

1 Draught Treasury Letter to Earl of Bute, (May 1761) Add. MSS. 32923 f.196.

2 Ibid. f.178.

3 Newcastle to Peirson, (1761) Add. MSS. 32916 f.413.

4 Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and Irregularities, 5 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 ff.426 - 430.

5 State of the Commissariat, Add. MSS. 38335 f.176.

lesson of past experience is seen in the fact that the three commissaries appointed to conduct the enquiry were expected to continue to carry out their normal duties,¹ with the result that the latter were almost certainly seriously neglected. The Commissioners' findings, coupled with other information, revealed a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, which early in 1762 led to the dismissal of one commissary,² while at approximately the same time Peirson and three others resigned or withdrew from the service,³ and the employment of German officials, who were held responsible for many of the abuses, was discontinued with the probable loss of four commissaries.⁴ But these nine vacancies in the commissariat's establishment

1 Martin to Peirson, 3 November 1761, Add. MSS. 32930 f.296. Only two commissaries, Cuthbert and Hulton, eventually undertook the work.

2 Frederick Halsey, T/29/34 f.235, 2 March 1762.

3 Elliot, Hatton and Thomas Halsey, see Appendix I. Peirson's salary was paid until the end of June, although his successor, George Howard, had taken up his duties a month earlier, Howard to Treasury, 28 May 1762, T/1/417 f.430. Although Thomas Halsey's commission was not revoked until the end of 1762, he had apparently not carried out his functions since the beginning of the year, Howard to Martin, 27 November 1762, *ibid.* f.173.

4 Ammon, Massow, Meyen and Roden. It is not possible to give precise dates for the ending of the employment of these commissaries, but on 27 January 1762 the Treasury had ordered that Massow be deprived of all effective power in matters of supply and be permitted to act only in an advisory capacity, A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury's Correspondence with the Commissariat in Germany, Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 ff.3 - 4, and it is probable that the others ceased to exercise any real influence at the same time, if in fact they had not already withdrawn from the service. See Appendix I.

were more than adequately filled by twenty-three new appointments,¹ bringing the total number of senior commissaries on 25 December 1762 to forty-one, which for 96,831 troops² represented one commissary for 2,362 men, and reflected a further significant improvement in staffing ratios.

While it is possible to speak with some degree of mathematical accuracy about the numerical levels of senior commissariat staff, such specific conclusions can obviously not be drawn about the myriads of subordinate and inferior employees, ranging from deputy and assistant commissaries and magazine inspectors, through book-keepers, secretaries and clerks, down to magazine keepers, craftsmen and general labourers, many of whom were employed on a temporary basis and amongst whom there was a high turnover rate. Yet despite this limitation, there can be little doubt that there was a marked increase in the numbers of minor personnel in the course of the war. Whereas in 1759 Hunter was assisted by no more than sixty magazine keepers and other subordinate officials attending the Army in various capacities,³ two years later Thomas Pownall referred to between four

1 The Treasury appointed Bromfield, Clark, Colsworthy, Cosne, Fawcett, Howard, Kyd, Leach, Legh, Mudie, Oswald, Webb and Weir. Although it cannot be proved that Kyd's appointment dated from this time, no reference to his acting before 1762 has been traced. Thomas Pownall, as director of the department of control, nominated Boyve, Collins, Crawford, Meyer, Ross, Stanton and Tozer, while Howard engaged Gunn and Turton, and presumably Smith, whose appointment does not appear in the Treasury's warrant books. See Appendix I.

2 See above pp.32 - 33.

3 An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany, 1759, T/1/397 f.67.

and five hundred employees involved in the running of the magazines,¹ while at the end of the war he described the control branch of the commissariat alone as such that in 'Variety & Extent of Business & Number of Persons employed was equal to the office of Excise'.² In much the same way Hunter listed a mere ten clerks on the commissariat's establishment,³ less than the number found in the office of the Commissioners of Enquiry alone in 1762.⁴ Nevertheless, the records do contain some complaints about staff shortages in the lower ranks,⁵ although there is no suggestion that this was the result of parsimonious policies on the part of the Treasury, which not only endowed the directors of the commissariat with the power to appoint as many subordinate employees as they judged necessary for the efficient functioning of the service, but urged them not to neglect this important

1 T/29/34 f.205, 17 December 1761. The increase may have been somewhat less dramatic than these figures suggest, for while Hunter's estimate was confined to magazine keepers and their administrative assistants, that of Pownall probably included ordinary labourers. Nevertheless, in 1762 there were fifty-four magazine keepers in one of the two districts into which Pownall had divided the field of operations, List of All the Magazines, Magazine Keepers & Control Officers, 15 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.32 - 33, and assuming that there was an equivalent number in the other, and that each keeper had two administrative assistants, the total staff would be in excess of three hundred without counting workmen.

2 Memorial of T. Pownall, 22 April 1766, T/1/451 f.247.

3 T/1/397 ff.66 - 67. The list does not, however, take account of clerical assistants employed by Oswald in Hesse-Cassel, Hunter's Answer to the Memorial of Münchhausen, 22 April 1759, T/1/395 f.31.

4 The Commissioners employed twelve clerks, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.188.

5 Hatton to Martin, 21 August 1758, T/1/384 No.51. Memorial of J.D. Schroder, 16 July 1763, SP/9/228, complaining that he had had to supervise several scattered magazines on his own.

responsibility.¹ Nor apparently did the directors of the commissariat, or those to whom they delegated the task of making appointments at the lowest levels,² fail to exercise their powers; indeed there is some suggestion that by the end of the war officials had been allowed such freedom of action that over-staffing had occurred.³ When staff shortages did exist they seem once again to have been the result of an inability to find personnel, whose qualifications and characters fitted them for employment in the commissariat,⁴ rather than of the imposition of any system of fixed and arbitrary quotas. Altogether, the Treasury's attitude to the appointment of minor officials was as generous as it could have been, and the commissariat found itself in the enviable position of being theoretically able to engage as many assistants as the efficiency of the service seemed to demand.

The substantial increases in the numbers of all kinds of commissariat employees as the war progressed derived partly from a recognition that the growth in the size of the Army supplied by

1 Newcastle to Hunter, 16 February 1759, Add. MSS. 32888 f.139. T/29/34 f.44, 23 April 1761.

2 Until the last year of the war, when the department of control took over responsibility for such matters, see below p.193, magazine keepers were usually appointed by commissaries of supply, and secretaries, clerks, book-keepers and workmen by commissaries, directors of services and magazine keepers, in all cases subject to the approval of the head of the commissariat and the Treasury.

3 Such seems to be the implication of Pownall's Circular Letter to Magazine Keepers, T/1/420 f.123, enclosed in his own letter to the Treasury of 16 July 1762, and stressing that in future all appointments by magazine keepers were to be approved by him as necessary for the service, and of his Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/413 f.364, ordering that their employment must automatically terminate with the exhaustion of their depots.

4 F. Halsey to N. Mogens, 16 April 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Peirson's Answer to Complaints relating to the Commissariat, 6 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32923 f.393.

Britain, and the more complex nature of its operations, necessitated extra hands, and partly from the deepening realization that the intricacy and difficulty of the task of supply itself should not be under-estimated, and that greater efficiency demanded more generous allocations of staff. But the translation of these principles into practice was not always achieved promptly and comprehensively, a fact which might lead one to deduce a certain degree of administrative short-sightedness or rigidity, perhaps deriving from notions of false economy. If such an element was present in the Treasury's attitude, it probably owed something to the fact that no eighteenth century ministry could afford to ignore the political implications of the creation of large numbers of government places, and the hue and cry inevitably raised by the anti-patronage brigade.¹ Indeed, this consideration may well explain why the Board was more liberal in its policies relating to the appointment of minor employees, for such nominations made in Germany came less easily to the notice of potential critics. Nevertheless, an equally important factor militating against the provision of adequate numbers of personnel was the inability to find suitable candidates, and although on some occasions standards may have been set somewhat too high,² and insufficient efforts made to seek out prospective employees, considerations of

1 I. Mauduit, Considerations on the Present German War, Additions for the Sixth Edition. (1761) pp. 36 - 37.

2 To head the commissariat the Treasury sought a man of 'authority, ability, and activity', but on one occasion lamented that the country could not perhaps provide a person who measured up exactly to these standards, Draught Treasury Letter to Bute, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32923 f. 198.

quality were quite rightly never completely subjected to those of quantity.

As the Treasury came to recognize the need for more commissaries, so it also began to show a greater appreciation of the importance of assigning its employees to specialized and clearly defined branches of the service. The major responsibilities of the commissariat were the planning and organization of supply, the control and supervision of its execution and the process of settlement and account, and there were obvious difficulties in one person exercising all three functions. For example, the supervisory branch was a peripatetic occupation, demanding a minute attention to all the details of deliveries and services in many different places, and thus could hardly be combined with the thorough examination of extensive and complicated accounts, which bound a commissary permanently to his desk. Quite apart from these practical considerations, the hallmark of any mature administrative structure is a certain degree of specialized expertise, and there was room for the development of this quality within the commissariat. In 1757 and 1758 these considerations seem to have been far from the Treasury's thoughts, for its commissaries were expected to act as jacks of all trades, and frequently found their situation difficult, if not impossible,¹ but

¹ Hatton complained that the settlement of forage accounts alone was more than enough work for one person. Hatton to J. West, 7 October 1758, T/1/384 No.61.

Hunter's establishment of 1759 incorporated a measure of specialization, for it included two full-time inspectors of magazines and transport services, each assisted by an under-commissary, and one full-time accountant, assisted by three clerks.¹ Nevertheless, the fact that these important responsibilities were entrusted to relatively minor officials,² suggests that they were regarded as of lesser significance than other aspects of the commissariat's work, while it is also clear that the number of inspectors was insufficient to undertake the supervision of all branches of the service.³ Moreover, when Hunter wrote in June 1759:- "It is impossible for me to describe to their Lordships the immense extent of business, that I labour under for every thing is thrown upon me; and for the regular Conducting of the same it would require 4 or 5 distinct Offices",⁴ he had already realized that the concentration of overall responsibility for supply, control⁵ and account in the hands of the Superintendent meant too much work for one man, and that this situation could only be relieved by the creation of semi-autonomous departments.

The reconstruction of the commissariat in May 1760 did

1 T/1/397 ff.66 - 67.

2 Ghest and Ross, the two inspectors, were granted salaries of only 10/0d per day, while Fuhr, the accountant, had £1 per day, *ibid.* This compared unfavourably with the £3 per day allowed to Hatton and Oswald, the two commissaries of supply. See Appendix I.

3 There is no evidence, for example, that they were able to supervise the administration of the foreign hospitals, whose director, Bishop, reported monthly to Hunter. Add. MSS. 38335 f.176.

4 Hunter to Martin, 9 June 1759, T/64/96 f.177.

5 This was the normal word used by contemporaries to describe the supervision of the execution of supply arrangements.

nothing to put this suggestion into practice,¹ but in appointing two commissaries general to organize supply, two commissaries of control and one commissary of accounts, all with salaries of at least £3 per day,² the Treasury showed a growing recognition of the need for specialization, and of the importance of the supervisory and accounting branches. This may indeed have been the first occasion on which the Board directly nominated officials to particular responsibilities other than supply,³ but unfortunately this significant development was not carried effectively into practice, for such was the urgency of the Army's needs that both the commissaries of control were assigned by Peirson and Granby to other branches of the service and never acted in their intended capacities.⁴ The Treasury was not un-

1 Although the British Commander-in-Chief was now given the task of granting money warrants, see below pp.77 - 78, Peirson was charged with the great bulk of the commissariat's work in all its diversity.

2 The commissaries general were Hatton and Edward Blakeney, the commissaries of control Sir James Cockburn and Thomas Halsey, and the commissary of accounts Frederick Halsey. See Appendix I.

3 The usual practice was for the Treasury to appoint commissaries general, and to leave them to find deputies and assistants, who could be assigned to the non-supply branches of the service. Such had been the basic pattern of appointment under Hunter in 1759.

4 Cockburn at first replaced Oswald, who had refused the Treasury's commission, as commissary of supply to the army in Westphalia, Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/1/405 f.61. He then undertook the examination of the accounts of the foreign hospitals and of the artillery and provision trains, Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760, Add. MSS.32909 f.300, and throughout the winter of 1760 - 1761 again acted as a commissary of supply, this time with General Kielmansegg's corps, List of Contracts made by Sir J. Cockburn, November 1760 - March 1761, Halsey MSS. 15064(A). Thomas Halsey was transferred to accounts immediately on his arrival in Germany, Peirson to Martin, 21 June 1760, T/1/405 f.67, while Frederick Halsey acted as a commissary of accounts until September 1760, when he was ordered to function as a commissary of supply, F. Halsey to Martin, 25 September 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030. Thus although no one acted as a commissary of control, there were at times three commissaries of account.

aware of the frustration of its intentions,¹ and yet it appointed no additional staff, probably hoping that both the officials concerned could be restored to their intended sphere of action before too much time had elapsed. But if such was the attitude in Whitehall it suggests that the existence of specialist commissaries of control was still regarded as a luxury rather than as a necessity, an impression confirmed by the fact that the anticipated temporary redeployment lasted for a whole year without any action being taken to find replacements.

Early in 1761, after Prince Ferdinand's severe strictures on the commissariat, the Treasury realized that matters had been allowed to get out of hand, and admitted that as the Combined Army had recently been divided into four or five separate corps:-

"The several Commissaries assign'd to different departments all essentially necessary for carrying on the Service & prevention of frauds, could no longer be confin'd to those departments; Commissaries of Controll & of Accompts, became all Commissaries of Contracts, and then began that confusion, those neglects those disappointments, those frauds that necessity of employing improper persons in the subordinate Stations, that want of inspection, that

1 Surviving letters prove that all the above changes, with the exception of Cockburn's activities with Kielmansegg's corps, were communicated to the Board, and it is hardly possible that the latter could have remained ignorant of the doings of one of its nominees for as long as five months.

irregularity of payment, which is so well described in P. Ferdinand's paper." ¹

The new establishment of May of that year thus sought to retrieve the situation by increasing the numbers of commissaries of control and account to three of the former and two of the latter, ² and by issuing strict instructions that commissaries of control were only to be given other responsibilities in cases of unavoidable necessity, of which immediate notice was to be sent to the Treasury. ³ Moreover, in appointing a number of deputy commissaries at the same time, the Board hoped to provide a pool of lesser officials, who could be assigned to the different branches of the service as the need arose, without disturbing the commissaries of control and account from their proper business. These moves, together with Peirson's nomination of a third magazine inspector, ⁴ mark a further development in the importance attached to the non-supply aspects of the commissariat's work, although by staffing the commission of enquiry at the end of 1761 with a commissary of control and a commissary of accounts, who were thus unable to give their full attention to their normal duties,

1 Draught Treasury Letter to Bute, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32923 f.196, Although this letter seems to suggest that there were fewer commissaries of account than there should have been, the Board had nominated only one such official, Frederick Halsey, and his functions had been assumed by his brother. It could also have been added that commissaries of supply had been obliged to act as commissaries of accounts, a task for which they rarely had sufficient time, Cockburn to Granby, 7 February 1761, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book I.

2 The three commissaries of control were Cuthbert, Levett and Pownall, see Appendix I. Thomas Halsey continued to act as commissary of accounts, and was joined by Hulton. Peirson & Hatton to Ferdinand, 13 April 1761, F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol.V, p.289.

3 T/29/34 f.73, 13 May 1761.

4 Peirson to (Treasury), 16 June 1761, T/1/410 f.72.

the Treasury showed that it was still not completely true to its declared principles.¹

The final stage in the evolution of specialization within the commissariat occurred in April 1762, when Thomas Pownall was named director of a separate department of control. Although he remained subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and other superior officials appointed by the Treasury, he was granted a considerable measure of autonomy, with powers to direct all commissaries of control and account and other subordinate staff operating in the spheres of his responsibility,² and consequently to influence the forms and procedures of these branches of the service. The beneficial effects of these changes were soon apparent, for with as many as nine commissaries of control³ and numerous minor officials⁴ at

1 The Board claimed that it had thought of sending officials from England to conduct the enquiry, but had rejected this idea because such persons would have lacked experience, Draught Treasury Letter to Bute, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32923 f.181. This does not explain, however, why no attempt was made to find replacements to carry out the normal duties of Cuthbert and Hulton. Moreover, it is symptomatic of the greater importance attached to the supply branch, that the original intention to appoint a commissary of supply to serve on the commission of enquiry was abandoned, when Cockburn, the official concerned, had to undertake the temporary direction of the commissariat on Peirson's resignation. T/29/34 f.251, 25 March 1762.

2 T/52/53 f.349, 7 April 1762.

3 Seven of these, Boyve, Collins, Leach, Levett, Meyer, Stanton and Aaron Tobzer, with salaries of at least £1 per day, counted as officials of the first rank, see Appendix I. Frederick Vaudriancy had 15/0d per day, Pownall & Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 17 March 1764, T/52/56 f.274. No details have been found on the salary of John Tobzer, Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 f.107.

4 For one of the two districts into which Pownall had originally divided the campaigning area in July 1762 he listed over forty control officers attached to individual magazines, List of all the Magazines, 15 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.32 - 33.

his disposal, Pownall initiated a fully comprehensive system of supervision, covering every aspect of army supply. Moreover, he was able to assign individual commissaries to limited and clearly defined responsibilities, so that some for example concerned themselves with transport services, others with the bakery, while five separate districts, each administered by a deputy commissary, were created to deal with the provision of forage and its issue to the troops from magazines.¹ In a similar way the accounts branch was divided into three departments, staffed by a total of four commissaries, one keeping a detailed record of all accounts settled and dealing with regimental demands and charges, two others examining the vouchers presented in justification of claims, and the fourth verifying and liquidating accounts on the basis of the vouchers allowed.² These arrangements not only extended the range of supervisory activities and introduced a more thorough and accurate examination of accounts, so that these departments were no longer the poor relations of the service, but they also enabled commissaries and other officials to familiarize themselves with limited areas of responsibility, and thus in theory at least to increase their competence and to execute their tasks more efficiently. Such were the important benefits conferred by Pownall's work in the last year of the war.

The appointment of commissaries of control and acc-

1 Add. MSS. 38335 ff.106 - 109.

2 Webb acted as accountant general, Dyer and Bromfield as commissaries of check and Legh as commissary of accounts, *ibid.* ff.110 - 111. Pownall's original plan had assigned five commissaries to the accounts branch, State of the Office of Control, (27 June) 1762, T/1/417 f.351.

counts with a status equal to that of commissaries of supply, the considerable increases in their numbers, and above all their organization in a separate and semi-autonomous department, containing subordinate offices each charged with a recognizable area of responsibility, were reflections of the growing realization that army supply could not be properly administered by officials who were burdened with a range of varied and frequently incompatible duties. Although the Treasury only groped slowly and hesitantly towards the goal of greater specialization, and somewhat tamely allowed its early moves in this direction to be rendered nugatory, it ultimately introduced significant changes, for which, however, it owed a considerable debt to the understanding and determination of Pownall. These developments make it possible to speak for the first time in a meaningful sense of the 'commissariat' as an institutional structure, for previously British troops had been served by a mere collection of individual commissaries.

Nothing would have been more fatal to the efficiency of the supply of the Combined Army than an attempt to direct and control affairs in all their complex detail from London. Adequate and responsible delegation of authority is another hallmark of successful administration, never more so than when communications between superiors and subordinates are normally ten days or two weeks in transit.¹ The commissariat in Germany needed considerable independence in

¹ Inclement weather could cause even longer delays, for on 6 March 1759 five mails, despatched from London at weekly intervals, arrived in Germany simultaneously, and Hunter received a reply to a letter written on 31 January. Hunter to (Martin), 25 February 1759, T/64/96 f.37. Hunter to Newcastle, 2 & 7 March 1759, *ibid.* ff.49 & 57.

respect of two particular powers, which were exercised by the Treasury when it undertook the supply of the British army at home. The first was that of formulating and concluding contractual agreements for provisions and services, in which connection promptness of action was of vital importance, and the second was that of issuing and disposing of cash, for effective control of the purse-strings offered a potent means of influencing the process of supply in the best interests of the Army. At the outset of the war the Board accepted the principle that its commissaries could not submit the terms of every proposed contract for approval without jeopardizing efficiency, and that as it had few means at its disposal to judge the reliability of the entrepreneurs to be employed and the fairness of the prices to be allowed, little purpose would be served by insisting on such a rule of action. Thus in 1757 Amherst was given the power to conclude supply arrangements independently, although the Treasury expected to be kept informed of the steps which he had taken.¹ A year later, however, this theory broke down in practice, when the Board expressed its disenchantment with the contracting policy adopted, and ordered that no further agreements be concluded without its specific approval except on a temporary basis in an emergency.² This change in policy was probably an over-reaction to the Treasury's recognition of its own negligence, which had caused it to mislay Amherst's letter in-

1 Warrant appointing Colonel Amherst, 22 February 1757, T/1/375 No. 23, ff.51 - 52.

2 West to Boyd, 11 March 1758, T/27/27 f.322. Martin to Hatton, 1 September 1758, *ibid.* f.378. The Treasury had been shocked to learn that the Hanoverian Chancery of War had supplied large quantities of forage to the Hessian troops without any advance agreement on price, T/29/33 ff.21 - 22 & 25 - 26, 1 & 8 March 1758.

forming it of his arrangements for over a year,¹ and before long delays in communication and the exigency of the service had made it clear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the business of supply on such a footing.²

The appointment of Hunter ended this confusion, for although the new Superintendent was instructed to seek the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, and if there was time to consult the Treasury, his power to conclude contractual agreements on his own initiative was fully recognized.³ In the course of 1759 he consulted Whitehall on more than one occasion, but the Board's usual reaction was to confess its ignorance of the details of such matters, and either submit entirely to his judgment, or approve his arrangements with certain riders or recommendations.⁴ Nor did the Treasury see any reason to question the introduction of fundamental changes in the methods of supply, and when for example Hunter took the provision of bread to the foreign troops out of the hands of the private contractor and put it under a system of public management, the Board simply deferred to his opinion that the new arrangements would be more efficient.⁵

1 See below p.162.

2 Boyd to Treasury, 29 April 1758, T/1/386 No.29. The Board was obliged to accept a contract between Marlborough, the British Commander-in-Chief, and Abraham Prado despite the exorbitance of its terms, and lamented that it was unable to annul it, Treasury to Duke of Marlborough, 30 October 1758, T/27/27 f.394.

3 Hunter's Instructions, 8 January 1759, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/2.

4 Martin to Hunter, 2 February 1759, T/64/96 f.9. T/29/33 ff.170 - 171, 11 April 1759.

5 West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, T/64/96 f.222. There had been justified complaints about the performance of the bread contractor. See below pp.229 - 230.

On the other hand, there were a number of occasions when the Superintendent felt himself unauthorized to accept financial liability for certain charges,¹ and the process of referring these knotty problems to London tended to produce delays and dissatisfactions. But although it might sometimes seem in Germany that the applications for directions were unnecessary, and that the Board showed a reluctance to make up its mind on some issues, the business of supplying a multi-national army inevitably required the resolution of certain complex matters at the highest level of central government.²

In appointing Peirson to replace Hunter in May 1760, the Treasury ordered that it be kept regularly informed of all steps taken for the supply of the Army,³ and although it also seems to have implied that no contracts were to be finalized without its approval,⁴ the commissariat was allowed a free hand in making the necessary arrangements for a period of some eighteen months, during which the Board's interventions were confined to drawing attention to what it considered were minor blemishes in the terms of agreements.⁵ Once

1 Among the examples were the provision of bread and forage to troops not maintained by Britain, the payment of aides-de-camp out of extraordinaries, Hunter to Newcastle, 2 March 1759, T/64/96 ff.48 - 49, and the granting of an allowance of meat money, Martin to Hunter, 18 May 1759, *ibid.* f.111.

2 On some issues, however, there does seem to have been unnecessary procrastination, see below pp.226 - 227.

3 Instructions to Peirson, 9 May 1760, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/3.

4 Considerations relating to Prince Ferdinand's Army, 6 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32999 f.399.

5 As for example when a contractor was allowed to deliver forage directly to the troops instead of into a magazine, T/29/34 f.75, 19 May 1761.

again the officials in Germany were even permitted to initiate a fundamental change in the framework of supply, when at the end of 1760 the foreign artillery and provision trains were transferred from public management to private contract, a change which somewhat mystified the Treasury at first, but which was none the less accepted. Indeed, in this affair the commissariat may have been accorded too much rather than too little freedom of action.¹ At the beginning of 1762, however, as a result of the lurid revelations of fraud emanating from Germany, the Board was led to take two actions which compromised the commissariat's independence. The first was the dramatic cancellation of an immense contract for six million rations of forage on the grounds that the prices agreed were exorbitant.² This intervention, which caused considerable disruption and confusion in supply arrangements, seems to have been based on an imperfect understanding of the real costs involved, and the Treasury's belief that large sums of money could be saved by engaging the subcontractors to deliver on its own account proved to be illusory.³ The incident demonstrates that in the matter of prices the usual decision to defer to the judgment of the commissaries in Germany was the only effective basis on which the supply of the Army could be organized. Secondly, the establishment of the commission of enquiry resulted in a stop of payments due to contractors suspected of fraud, and the assumption that those involved were not

1 See below pp.268 - 269.

2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.83. Newcastle to Sir J. Yorke, 19 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 ff.436 - 437.

3 See below pp.178 - 181.

to be further employed in the business of supply. This development brought protests from Ferdinand and Cockburn, who feared the effects of the withdrawal of so many important and experienced suppliers,¹ and was probably not unrelated with the difficulties and shortages which occurred later in the year.² Nevertheless, even if a case could be made out for continuing the employment of the suspected contractors with more stringent safeguards against fraud, the Treasury's inflexibility on this issue may well have reflected the views of a number of influential commissaries.³

An even more thorny problem relating to the commissariat's independence concerned its control over the issue of money in payment for goods provided and services rendered, for which British financial traditions insisted on a lengthy and somewhat leisurely process, not at all geared to the urgency of war. The various stages were the liquidation of accounts by means of a thorough examination of the figures and calculations of which they were composed, and a check of the vouchers presented in justification of the charges, the issue of a certificate or debenture for the sum found justly due, the granting of a warrant which authorized payment and finally, the latter's encashment. The role of the Treasury's commissaries was confined to liquidating accounts and issuing certificates, for the power of

1 Granby to (Commissioners of Enquiry), 21 July 1762, T/1/417 f.85.
Martin to Howard, 31 May 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/7.

2 Ferdinand to Howard, 16 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/9/7.

3 Pownall, with his responsibilities for the elimination of fraud as director of the department of control, must have approved of the decision, and while Howard reported Cockburn's views to the Treasury, he apparently made no effort to support them.

granting warrants was before the Seven Years War only delegated to the army's Commander-in-Chief,¹ while the funds from which cash payments were made were entrusted to the Paymaster-General or to his deputy who attended the troops. When the army served in Europe it was also the Commander-in-Chief who was empowered to draw bills of exchange, usually on the Paymaster-General or on government bankers in the United Provinces, for exceptional and urgent payments which could not be met from the normal remittances of money. To these general rules there was one exception: a commissary attending foreign troops in British pay on the Continent was permitted in the absence of a British military commander and deputy paymaster to draw bills of exchange, although the fact that he could only do so for an authorized amount in payment for provisions and services which had been specifically approved by the Treasury,² meant that he had little freedom of action in such matters. This system was inevitably regarded as strange and inefficient by those accustomed to the more direct and centralized methods prevalent under absolute monarchy. It meant firstly, that the officials who supplied the army exercised no real control over the issue of money, and so were unable to regulate payments in the manner which they considered to be in the best interests of the service, and secondly, that cash could not be made available except by official authorization at the culmination of a laborious process of account. Such measures were designed to safeguard the British taxpayers' money, but did little to facilitate

1 Martin to Hatton, 29 April 1760, T/64/96 f.339.

2 (Amherst) to Treasury, 10 April 1757, T/1/375 No.31, f.66.

the supply of the army. In the course of the Seven Years War in Germany, however, these traditional forms underwent significant modification, involving an important increase in the powers of the commissariat.

In 1759 Hunter was authorized to issue his warrants on the deputy paymaster for the payment of the extraordinary supplies and services of the Combined Army, the first commissary to be entrusted with this responsibility.¹ The change was a reflection both of the increased importance of the commissariat's role in looking after the needs of such a large number of troops, and equally of the great trust conferred on Hunter personally, but it was also a sound move on administrative grounds, for it relieved the Commander-in-Chief of burdensome duties for which he had little time and perhaps little inclination, and confided them to an official who was fully conversant with all the details of supply. Nevertheless, the new arrangement went so much against the grain of established practice that one member of the ministry was reported to have withheld his consent,² perhaps afraid that with the fingers of an ordinary commissary on the purse-strings a nightmare of uncontrolled expenditure was about to begin. On Hunter's departure from Germany in December 1759 the Treasury decided temporarily to restore the granting of warrants to the British Commander-in-Chief,³ and when Peirson was

1 Martin to Hatton, 29 April 1760, T/64/96 f.339.

2 Peirson and Hatton to Ferdinand, 13 April 1761, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.V, p.288.

3 T/29/33 f.261, 18 December 1759. Considerable confusion arose in the early months of 1760, because in his absence Hunter had authorized Hatton to grant warrants for certain essential services and the deputy paymaster refused to accept them. Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/405 ff.170 - 171.

appointed in May 1760 this reversion to traditional arrangements was confirmed.¹ The change was largely the result of the failure to find a successor of sufficient standing to be entrusted with plenary financial powers, but it was a retrograde step and, despite the Board's belief that the service would not suffer as a result,² proved in the course of the next year to be quite unsatisfactory. Granby's preoccupation with military affairs did not allow him to devote adequate attention to commissariat business,³ so that the granting of warrants and the payment of accounts were subject to much delay.⁴ Thus early in 1761 Prince Ferdinand complained that difficulties were arising not because of lack of money but as a result of faulty methods of payment,⁵ and in June the Treasury issued a new commission to Peirson, authorizing him to make draughts on the deputy paymaster,⁶ a power which was continued to his successor, Howard, in 1762.⁷ The bold administrative change of 1759 was thus reintroduced, and although the Treasury must be criticized for its failure to adhere to its original

1 A Short Narrative, 1761, T/1/410 f.328. Peirson was allowed to grant warrants in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief.

2 Newcastle to Granby, 29 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.138.

3 Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760, Add. MSS. 32909 f.300.

4 There was, however, a more particular difficulty in that Hunter's accountant, Fuhr, being a German national, could not hold a Treasury commission, and Granby therefore doubted whether he was authorized to grant warrants on his certificates. Peirson to Newcastle, 9 August 1760, *ibid.* f.362.

5 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 20 April 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 f.77.

6 Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/4.

7 Martin to Howard, 2 July 1762, *ibid.* D/HV/B/4/10.

plan, the war ended with the head of the commissariat in a position to exercise effective control and co-ordination over the process of paying accounts.

Although the granting of warrants was a far from negligible power, it was limited by the amount of cash which the deputy paymaster had at his disposal, which in turn depended on the size and regularity of the Treasury's monthly remittances. Consequently, the right to draw bills of exchange outside these limits was a matter of some importance, and this responsibility was usually entrusted to the same official who granted warrants.¹ Thus between December 1759 and June 1761 it was exercised by the British Commander-in-Chief with the same deleterious results as have been described above. The Board's attitude was not completely rigid, however, for when early in 1760, after the rejection of his warrants by the deputy paymaster, Hatton ventured to draw some bills without specific permission from London, the Treasury not only accepted them but permitted him to draw others in cases of urgent necessity.² It has been suggested that by imposing monthly quotas on the amount of money which could be drawn by means of bills of exchange, and by refusing to grant wide discretionary powers to draw on government funds through continental money centres, the Treasury unwisely restricted the financial authority of its representatives in Germany.³ Such criticisms may apply to the period of

1 Hunter, Granby, Peirson and Howard. See the accounts of bills drawn under the heading of 'Extraordinarys' in PMG/2/3 - 6.

2 A State of the Commissariat of the Army in Germany, Add. MSS. 38333 f.10.

3 R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle and the Financial Management of the Seven Years War in Germany. 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research', Vol.49, 1971, pp.28 - 30.

Hunter's administration, but in 1760 the Board specifically permitted its officials to draw bills without limit,¹ and Newcastle stated that if the credit of Pye and Cruickshanks of Amsterdam, who until that time had been the sole negotiators of bills, was insufficient, then recourse should be had to Cliffords of the same city.² Somewhat later Peirson seems to have been subject to little restriction in this sphere, and by early 1762 such considerable sums were involved that the discount on bills had been forced up to between six and eight per cent,³ another illustration of the danger involved in allowing the commissariat too much freedom of action. In fact, in the last part of the war the only restrictions which the Treasury seems to have imposed were an insistence that it must be notified of draughts made and of the particular services to which they were applied,⁴ and in August 1762 to prohibit the drawing of bills payable before 1 December 1762 in order to provide more breathing-space at a time of year when the cash available to meet such commitments tended to be rather low.⁵ Altogether therefore, there is little evidence after 1759 that the commissariat's access to financial reserves was arbitrarily or artificially limited in respect of the amounts of money involved.

1 Draught Treasury Letter to Hatton, 29 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.157. Newcastle to Granby, 2 May 1760, *ibid.* f.211, & 12 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32906 f.12.

2 Newcastle to Granby, 2 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 ff.211 - 212.

3 P. Taylor to J. Powell, 27 April 1762, WO/79/25. Taylor to Cockburn, 21 May 1762, *ibid.*

4 Newcastle to Peirson, 24 February 1761, Add. MSS. 32919 f.244.

5 Martin to Howard, 27 August 1762, T/1/417 ff.112 - 113.

The developments described above had no effect on the actual issue of hard cash to the government's creditors, and although throughout the war the ultimate responsibility for such matters lay with the Paymaster-General and his deputy, the commissariat's authority in this area underwent a significant increase as a result of the modification of traditional financial forms. In 1759 a second deputy paymaster, entrusted with considerable funds, was attached to the troops operating in Hesse-Cassel at the beginning of the year and in Saxony at its end, and the latter was authorized to issue money on the warrants of the commissary of supply accompanying the detachment.¹ This decentralization of payments was obviously a sensible arrangement, for it prevented creditors having to travel long distances to seek what might be very small sums of money, but the powers thereby given to a subordinate commissary were unusual, and in justifying his action Hunter also described it as 'Inconsistent with the English method System & Oeconomy'.² The Treasury, however, approved of the steps he had taken without comment and permitted similar arrangements the following year.³ At approximately the same time in another concession to easier and speedier payments, the Board permitted commissaries of supply to order advances of cash on account to those holding large contracts, who could hardly be expected to wait for

1 Hunter to Oswald, 30 March 1759, T/1/395 f.381. Hunter to Martin, December 1759, T/64/96 f.289(a).

2 Hunter to Newcastle, 6 December 1759, Add. MSS. 32899 f.331.

3 Martin to Hunter, 14 December 1759, Add. MSS. 32900 f.74. Treasury to Granby, 2 May 1760, T/1/405 ff.352 - 353. Extracts from the Treasury's Orders and Instructions to Blakeney, 10 June 1760, Hot-ham MSS. DDHO/4/214.

several months, while their deliveries were being completed, before receiving any money.¹ Again this was a sensible arrangement which gave additional authority to the commissaries, and enabled them to assist those contractors whose services seemed to be the most essential, or whose problems of liquidity seemed to be the most acute.

These arrangements did not, however, satisfy Prince Ferdinand, who in complaining of unnecessary and damaging delays in the payment of many accounts at the beginning of 1761, recommended the introduction of the Prussian system, whereby all commissaries were entrusted with the disposition of cash and were accompanied by cashiers with funds which could be expended without lengthy formalities.² At first the Treasury shrank from this prospect, believing that it would lead to the expenditure of large sums of money without reasonable check and control:- ".... if the alteration desired should take place; Money must be advanced to a Number of inferior Persons, who cannot be known to be equal to so great a Trust. This might open a way to fraud, & at the same time render a discovery of It, extremely difficult".³ Nevertheless, after some discussion the Board abruptly changed its mind,⁴ and decided that with full authority for ordering the

1 Draught Treasury Letter to Hatton, 29 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.158. Treasury to Granby, 2 May 1760, T/1/405 f.352.

2 Add. MSS. 38333 f.21. T/29/34 ff.52 & 58, 28 & 30 April 1761.

3 Add. MSS. 38333 f.25. The Paymaster-General was also reluctant to make his deputy liable for the sums entrusted to such cashiers, T/29/34 f.138, 14 July 1761.

4 T/29/34 ff.75 & 86, 19 & 28 May 1761. Draught Treasury Letter to Bute, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32923 f.199.

issue of money now to be restored to the head of the commissariat, the latter could be made responsible for defining the precise terms on which the money was to be received and expended, and for supervising its administration by the commissaries and cashiers concerned.¹ This system continued to operate in the last part of the war, when the Paymaster-General was asked to appoint a proper number of deputies to act as cashiers with small military chests subject to the direction of British commissaries responsible for the supply of detachments of the Combined Army,² and it became the means of making immediate payment on the spot without complicated paper work for the multitudinous deliveries of small quantities of provisions by country people. Despite its initial misgivings, the Treasury had thus given the officials charged with the organization of supply control over the issue of cash, and thereby provided them for the first time with an essential means of encouraging deliveries.

The Board's record in providing its commissaries with adequate powers and in allowing them a sufficient degree of freedom of action is clearly a mixed one. In 1758 and 1762 there were misguided interventions in supply arrangements which caused much confusion, although for most of the war the commissariat did not suffer from irritating interference in the running of its daily affairs, and was free both to formulate and execute its policies. In the sphere of finance the war ended with the Superintendent in possession of new and exten-

1 Treasury to Bute, 27 May 1761, T/1/410 f.337.

2 T/29/34 f.318, 7 July 1762.

sive powers over the supply and issue of money, and commissaries of supply exercising novel responsibilities in connection with cash payments. The Treasury had, however, failed to adhere consistently to the first, and had shown little initiative in introducing the second, and both factors had been contributory causes of a serious back-log in the settlement of accounts. Nevertheless, the overall picture which emerges from the period is of a commissariat with increased authority and independence, further reflections of its emergence as an institution.

In turning finally to a discussion of whether the conditions of employment encouraged suitable applicants for posts in the commissariat, the major consideration is salary levels. A commissary worked under considerable pressures, for military success often depended on speed in finding large quantities of provisions, in amassing and distributing them, in moving them to positions of safety when the enemy made unexpected advances, and in dealing with the interminable reams of paper-work. Moreover, such tasks had to be performed amidst the confusion and chaos of war, involving at the worst a real threat to life and limb and at the best a very low standard of material comfort. As Frederick Halsey wrote:- "... ye. village that is ye. headquarters is worse than the most ragged village in Northamptonshire (The Hereditary Prince) has a little hole for his bed, & he dines in ye. Stable wth. Horses & Cows; We Commissaries pig together in a Smiths forge".¹ To all this had to added separation

¹ F. Halsey to T.H. Noyes, 10 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.

from family, friends and personal affairs, with little prospect of regular leave or holidays.¹ It was therefore essential to offer commissaries financial rewards which were commensurate with a difficult, frustrating and frequently dangerous job, performed under harsh conditions, and possessing some of the characteristics of a sentence of transportation as well as those of government service.

There can be little doubt that the officials in the upper ranks of the commissariat were granted a generous remuneration, which compared very favourably with what could be gained in other walks of life. The three superintendents or directors who served in the course of the war enjoyed salaries of between £5 and £10 per day, Peirson being allowed £5 in 1760 and £8 in 1761, while both Hunter and Howard were paid £10 throughout their administrations.² All were given lump sums of money on appointment of either £500 or £800 to provide themselves with equipment and cover travelling expenses.³ In addition both Peirson and Howard continued to enjoy their military pay

1 Some commissaries were, however, accompanied by their wives in Germany, C. Mason to Pownall, 17 November 1761, T/1/413 f.91, and there were also moments for relaxation, for Hulton described how he was able to enjoy tea, coffee and cards twice a week at certain times, and even indulge in hunting. Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 1751 - 1772, by Henry Hulton, ff.172 - 173 & 176.

2 See Appendix I. The payment of only £5 to Peirson on his first appointment reflected the fact that he was a person of less standing than Hunter and was not entrusted with the granting of warrants. When he was given the latter power in 1761, his salary was still not raised to the level of that of his predecessor, but in reverting to the former payment on the appointment of Howard the Treasury was seen to have showed a certain lack of generosity to Peirson.

3 £500 in the case of Peirson, T/52/50 f.492, 14 May 1760, and £800 in those of Hunter and Howard, F. Halsey to Magens, 29 April 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Martin to Howard, 2 July 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/10.

and perquisites such as allowances for forage and transport, and Hunter, although a civilian, also possessed the latter as he was accorded the honours of war usually paid to a major-general.¹ Finally, the superintendent's secretarial and clerical assistance was provided at the Treasury's expense as part of the contingent expenses of his office.² A superficial comparison shows that Hunter and Howard had salaries which were only slightly less than that of the Lord Chief Justice,³ on approximately the same level as that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,⁴ and superior to those of every British soldier serving in Germany with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief,⁵ and to those of high-ranking officials such as the Commissioners of the Council of Trade and Plantations and the Commissioners of the Treasury.⁶ By exchanging the office of junior Lord of the Admiralty for that of Superintendent of Extraordinaries Hunter received a theoretical salary increase of no less than 265%.⁷ In practice, of course, the head of the commissariat

1 T.O. Hunter, Patent, 6 January 1759, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/1.

2 Newcastle to Hunter, 16 February 1759, Add. MSS. 32888 f.139.

3 £4,000 per annum. The Court and City Kalendar or Gentleman's Register for the Year 1762, p.120.

4 £3,400 per annum, made up of £200 patent salaries, £1,600 additional salary and £1,600 salary of a Treasury Lord. J.C. Sainty, Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Vol.I, Treasury Officials, 1660 - 1870. (1972) pp.17 & 27.

5 £10 per day. Establishment of General and Staff Officers, 28 February 1759, T/1/391 f.77.

6 £2,500 per annum until 1761, whereafter £2,000 per annum for the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, and £1,600 for the Commissioners of the Treasury. Sainty, op. cit. Vol.III, Officials of the Boards of Trade, 1660 - 1870. (1974) p.28. Ibid. Vol.I, p.17.

7 A junior Lord of the Admiralty received £1,000 per annum. The Court and City Kalendar, 1762, pp.209 - 210.

was in a less favourable situation than some of the officers cited, for he enjoyed no fees or unofficial profits, and it is possible that one reason for the high level of his remuneration was an attempt to compensate for this disadvantage. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to argue that the commissariat's directors were in any sense underpaid, and although Peirson might well feel a personal grievance, the salary awarded to the other two superintendents represented a more than adequate wage for the job.¹

A small proportion of commissaries with major responsibilities received salaries of £5 per day,² a figure well in excess of the £3 per day previously allowed to senior commissaries,³ and as Newcastle pointed out the equivalent of the pay of an envoy extraordinary.⁴ For Pownall this represented an increase of 40% on what he had received as Governor of Massachusetts Bay,⁵ and for Hatton it was an even more significant improvement on the mere £200 he earned as Brit-

1 Although Hunter frequently complained about overwork, no statement has been found to justify the claim that he regarded himself as insufficiently remunerated. Browning, op. cit. p.31.

2 There were four altogether; Cockburn, Fawcett, Hatton and Pownall. See Appendix I.

3 While there are possibly examples of commissaries paid more than this before the Seven Years War, it is significant that Abraham Hume, the Commissary to the Forces Abroad during the Austrian Succession War, had this allowance, and continued to draw it as Commissary General to the Troops at Home and Abroad in 1757. Calánder of Treasury Books and Papers, 1742 - 1745, Preserved in the Public Record Office. (1903) p.421. T/52/48 f.128, 3 June 1757. 21

4 Newcastle to Granby, 25 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.78.

5 £1,300 per annum. J.A. Schutz, Thomas Pownall (1951) p.140. It should be pointed out, however, that in transferring to Germany in 1761 at £3 per day Pownall accepted a cut in salary.

ish consul in Flanders from 1749 onwards,¹ and the £2 per day he gained as Secretary to the Commissioners for Negotiations relating to the Barrier Treaties in 1752.² Ordinary commissaries drew £3 per day, which put them on a par with the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, junior Lords of the Admiralty and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.³ Among the officials for whom this represented a significant increase in salary were William Fraser, who had earned approximately £500 per annum as Assistant Under-Secretary to the Secretary of State,⁴ and Hulton, whose employment as Comptroller of the Customs in Antigua brought him only £350 per annum,⁵ and who at the end of the war accepted the post of Plantation Clerk with the Commissioners of Customs at £500 per annum.⁶ Lower down the scale, assistant and deputy commissaries received £1 or £2 per day, a more modest remuneration, but one which probably represented more than they would have earned in a normal secretarial capacity with the government or a private employer.⁷

1 T/53/46 f.49, 12 January 1757.

2 T/53/44 f.374, 6 December 1752. T/53/46 f.402, 10 January 1759. He continued to draw both salaries while acting as a commissary in Germany.

3 The Court and City Kalendar . . . , 1762, pp.127, 130, 177 & 209 - 210. The Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance had a salary of £1,100 per annum and all the rest £1,000 per annum.

4 Although Fraser was paid by fees at this time, £500 was the salary allowed to the holder of the office in 1770 when a fixed remuneration was introduced. Sainty, op. cit. Vol.II, Officials of the Secretaries of State, 1660 - 1782. (1973) pp.26 - 27.

5 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.187. Memorial of Hulton, December 1765, Add. MSS. 32972 f.261.

6 Ibid. Hulton to Newcastle, 31 January 1766, Add. MSS. 32973 f.325.

7 A number of assistant commissaries accepted employment as clerks with the Commissioners for Examining German Demands at the end of the war, and were paid a maximum of 12/6d per day. The officials concerned were Boyve, Higgins, Leach, Stanton and Aaron Tozer, see Appendix I.

In addition to their ordinary salaries commissaries of all ranks might enjoy supplementary benefits. Those who held military commissions were often granted equipage money or other allowances on taking up their commissariat appointments,¹ while Pownall, who received the honorary title of 'Colonel', enjoyed the various perquisites to which such an officer was entitled.² Other commissaries were given 'ex gratia' payments on the successful completion of especially onerous tasks,³ while compensation was also paid to those for whom appointment to the service in Germany had involved financial loss.⁴ With specific Treasury approval some officials continued to draw the salaries of other government posts from which they had been seconded to the commissariat,⁵ although in such cases they were presumably expected to pay for the deputy who replaced them. Finally, it must be remembered that a commissary's personal expenses might be lessened by the provision of free quarters,⁶ and that he did not have

1 Boyd to Martin, 28 February 1759, T/1/395 f.429. T/29/33 f.47, 10 May 1758. T/29/35 f.67, 12 April 1763. Despite Frederick Halsey's belief that he should have received such allowances, F. Halsey to Magens, 29 April 1760 & 5 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029, there is no evidence that it was granted to all commissaries as he claimed.

2 C.A.W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall (1908) p.167.

3 The two Commissioners of Enquiry for example were granted £200 each, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.174 - 175, although both complained that the reward was inadequate.

4 Weir was granted a pension of £200 per annum because of the loss and damage he suffered in having to leave North America for Germany. T/52/57 ff.346 - 347, 5 February 1766.

5 See above p.88 n.2.

6 Various commissaries talked of having quarters assigned to them or taken away from them by the military authorities, for example Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.130, and it is assumed that they had the same rights as magazine officers, who were allowed 'quartier franc'. General Report on Depots, 26 October 1762, T/1/417 f.317.

to foot the bill for such items as travelling expenses incurred in the execution of his duties, stationery, postal charges, salaries and expenses of clerks and the hire of office accommodation,¹ this expenditure being reimbursed under the heading of contingencies. In connection with the latter the Treasury's attitude was ungrudging, for when in 1762 Howard expressed some concern at the size of the sums being charged, the Board replied that '.... it is fitt to give all reasonable encouragement to Gentlemen, imployed in affairs of so much consequence to the Publick',² although the Superintendent still felt it necessary to add that '.... the demand of such large Contingencies makes the appointment of these Gentlemen equal, if not greater than many of the first Offices in Government'.³

And yet there were some less favourable aspects of the commissaries' financial situation. Large as their salaries were, they did not last for more than the duration of the war, and the Treasury stoutly resisted any claim to the right to half pay on the cessation of hostilities.⁴ Employment in the commissariat was thus a temporary affair, and did not offer any long-term financial security. There were also disadvantages in the methods by which salaries were

1 F. Halsey to Mogens, 5 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Contingent Account of J. Levett, 24 August 1762, T/1/417 f.167.

2 Martin to Howard, 8 July 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/12.

3 Howard to (Treasury), 4 September 1762, T/1/417 f.152.

4 Memorial of A. Ross, 17 September 1765, T/1/444 f.85. T/29/37 f.134, 17 September 1765. Some commissaries appointed by the Board of Ordnance or the War Office were entitled to half pay, for example Mason, who had acted as commissary of stores at Guadeloupe, Martin to Mason, 25 May 1761, T/27/28 f.163.

paid. The wages of officials with Treasury commissions were issued in London,¹ a practice which in itself was somewhat inconvenient, necessitating the employment of an agent and banker, whose services in remitting the money to Germany had to be paid for. Boyd complained that a 'friend', who received and forwarded his £500 equipage money, only allowed him £453/14/6,² a deduction of over nine per cent. Another disadvantage of payment in London was the loss of one shilling in the pound for the Place Tax,³ and the payment of Treasury fees on the issue of salary warrants, all of which Frederick Halsey was told brought the total deductions from pay to twelve per cent or more.⁴ Commissaries without Treasury commissions were paid in Germany by warrant of a superior officer on the deputy paymaster, but this too had the disadvantage of being subject to a deduction of 2/6d in the pound and one day's pay per annum, as ordered by the Paymaster-General.⁵ In the case of one commissary, Fuhr, the Treasury intervened to cancel the latter deductions and substitute that of one shilling in the pound,⁶ but this may have been a special favour on account of his revelations in connection with fraud, and others were probably not so fortunate. Another

1 Cosne was given the choice of receiving his salary in Germany or in London, but his case was exceptional. T/29/34 f.259, 1 April 1762.

2 Boyd to Treasury, 28 February 1759, T/1/395 f.429.

3 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, T/1/417 f.124.

4 F. Halsey to Magens, 5 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.

5 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, T/1/417 f.124.

6 Ibid. As a German Fuhr could not be given a royal commission, and so the allowance of his salary with the lesser deduction was unusual.

drawback of payment in Germany was that if the salary was fixed in dollars the depreciation of the currency could cause considerable losses. Casimir Bilgen, the director of the foreign artillery train, was allowed 200 dollars per month in 1759, when it was reported that less than three dollars were exchanged for a ducat, but a year later, with the ducat worth more than four dollars, the real value of the salary had sadly declined.¹ Delays in the payment of salaries were by no means an infrequent occurrence. Commissaries with Treasury commissions were supposed to be paid quarterly,² but the reality was often far removed from the theory. Hatton only received his wages for the first four months of 1760 at the end of April 1761,³ although this was nothing compared to the situation of Fuhr, who claimed at the end of the war that he had received only one year's salary out of four,⁴ and Joseph Trotter, evidently a man of some patience, who petitioned for his salary six years after it was due.⁵ But the hardship caused by such delays should not be exaggerated, for if commissaries did not always bother to press the Treasury to pay their arrears, it was presumably because they were able to meet their expenses from the public money in their hands, for which they were not called to account for many years.⁶

1 Peirson to Martin, 21 June 1760, T/1/405 f.67.

2 F. Halsey to Magens, 10 August 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.

3 T/52/52 ff.210 - 211, 28 April 1761.

4 Draught Treasury Letter to Cockburn, 15 February 1763, T/1/427 f. 330.

5 Memorial of J. Trotter, 10 July 1765, T/1/444 f.241. He had, however, only served for three weeks in 1759.

6 Memorial of J. Leach, (March 1765), T/1/447 f.204.

The salary levels of the lesser commissariat officials, who were mostly Germans, must obviously be discussed in more general terms. Until the last year of the war magazine officers and other supply assistants were paid in the range of 15/16 - 25/26 dollars per month,¹ which in 1759 represented a remuneration of approximately £29 - £50 per annum.² By 1760 - 1761, however, with the fall in the value of silver money, there had been a serious erosion of real wages, and Frederick Halsey was of the opinion that 25 dollars per month was insufficient to live on in the vicinity of the Army,³ where prices tended to be artificially high. By 1762 magazine keepers at least seem to have benefitted from wage increases resulting from Pownall's reorganization of the control branch of the service, for forty-nine such officials were paid between 24 and 50 dollars per month,⁴ although Halsey could still write:- '.... where can we find a Man of Capacity & honesty, & capable to undertake Such an Employ, quit his own business, & at the End of a War, hire himself for 30 .. Rds. pr, Month, & liable every day to be turnd. adrift to the wild

1 An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany, 1759, T/1/397 f.67. A List of Proviant Verwalters and Proviant Schriebers, 18 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15105. F. Halsey to General Elliot, 20 December 1760, ibid. 15030. F. Halsey to Hatton, 2 February 1761, ibid.

2 Hunter quoted a salary range of 15 - 25 dollars per month, and said that the higher figure was worth about £4. T/1/397 f.67.

3 F. Halsey to Magens, 16 April 1760, Halsey MSS.15029.

4 At different times in 1759 the ducat was worth 3, $3\frac{1}{2}$ and $3\frac{1}{4}$ dollars, an average of $3\frac{1}{6}$ dollars, while in 1762 it was worth $4\frac{1}{2}$ dollars, Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218. This represents a decrease in the value of the dollar of 32.14%. A rise in the minimum salary from 15 to 25 dollars is an increase of 66.67%, and in the maximum from 25 to 50 dollars one of 100%. List of all the Magazines, Magazine Keepers and Control Officers, 15 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.32 - 33.

world without any means of Subsisting?'¹ The salaries of clerical assistants were on the whole little better. Many of those employed in Hunter's office received only 3/0d per day,² while in 1760 the normal salary for a secretary was reported to be no more than 25 dollars per month.³ These earnings compare unfavourably with the 5/0d per day allowed to assistant magazine clerks in Britain,⁴ and the minimum salary of the same figure granted to clerks employed by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands in London at the end of the war.⁵ Inferior officers did of course benefit from various small perquisites such as bread and food allowances and free quarters,⁶ but against this has to be set the fact that their wages were often seriously in arrears, a situation which was far more embarrassing for them than for the commissaries, and reduced some of them to offer their pay certificates for sale at as much as 20% discount.⁷

No doubt the salaries and allowances fixed by superior officers in the commissariat represented the customary rates for

1 F. Halsey to Magens, 21 February 1762, Halsey MSS. 15038.

2 Approximately £55 per annum. T/1/397 f.66.

3 F. Halsey to Magens, 16 April 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.

4 Approximately £92 per annum. T/29/32 f.386, 5 May 1756.

5 T/29/35 f.185, 10 October 1763.

6 List of all the Magazines, Magazine Keepers and Control Officers ..., 15 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.32 - 33. General Report on Depots, 26 October 1762, *ibid.* f.317. Peirson to Martin, 21 June 1760, T/1/405 f.67.

7 A. Tozer to Pownall, 21 January 1763, T/1/427 f.506.

the job in Germany,¹ but the fact that their recipients, while occupying positions of great trust and responsibility, had no inherent obligation or loyalty to Great Britain would have made above-average wages a sensible investment. Frederick Halsey traced a direct connection between low wages on the one hand and fraud and speculation on the other, and argued that some of the posts should have been filled by people sent from England,² a point also taken up by Pownall on more than one occasion.³ But the Treasury never acted on this advice, which would have involved the payment of higher salaries, and despite being warned of the bad effects of the situation, it never encouraged its commissaries to introduce reforms.⁴

In conclusion, it appears that senior commissaries in Germany during the Seven Years War received favourable if not generous financial rewards, and in its treatment of them the Treasury showed no trace of a narrow, parsimonious outlook, which would have fatally compromised the commissariat's efficiency by failing to attract suitable employees into the service. There is less evidence of a comparable situation in connection with minor officials, amongst whom average and in a sense inadequate salaries were the order of the day, a state of

1 Minor German officials could be paid as little as £16 per annum. W.H. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century: the Social Background of the Literary Revival. (1965) p.265.

2 F. Halsey to Magens, 21 February 1762, Halsey MSS. 15038.

3 T/29/34 ff.204 - 205, 17 December 1761. Pownall to Martin, 9 February 1762, T/1/418 f.310.

4 A Short Sketch of the Evils Arising under the Commissariat in Germany, 8 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 ff.235 - 236. The Board's insistence throughout the war that minor officials must be found in Germany also made administrative sense, in that those appointed knew the country and its language.

affairs accurately described as 'the worst Oeconomy that England can practice'.¹ This pattern no doubt reflects the bias inherent in eighteenth century society itself, from which it was difficult to escape even for reasons of administrative efficiency.

1 F. Halsey to Mogens, 21 February 1762, Halsey MSS. 15038.

CHAPTER III
THE COMMISSARIES

"C'est dommage qu'il est Commissaire. Car ce maudit nom me cause toujours mal au coeur." ¹

No administrative machine, however carefully designed and constructed, can function effectively without the motive force of adequate staff. Eighteenth century commissaries, constantly reviled in their own day by long-suffering soldiers on the one hand and by critics of government expenditure on the other, have not on the whole had a more favourable press from historians. Those who served in Germany during the Seven Years War are described by one authority as 'rascally and ignorant', ² and by another as a 'shady crew'. ³ This chapter attempts to demonstrate that amongst fifty-nine superior commissariat officers ⁴ there is more evidence of experience, ability and integrity than of the amateurism, incompetence and dishonesty, which have frequently been uncritically accepted as the hallmarks of commissaries in this period.

An investigation of the professional background of commissariat officials reveals that a significant number had enjoyed the best possible experience of service in other wars or in other

1 Letter to C.H.P.E. von Westphalen, 3 June 1761, F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg, (1859 - 1872) Vol.V, p.359.

2 R. Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: a Story of the British Army, 1702 - 1770. (1958) p.324.

3 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Eds., The History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1754 - 1790. (1964) Vol.II, p.656.

4 See Appendix I.

fields. Thomas Orby Hunter and Michael Hatton had both been closely connected with army supply in Flanders during the Austrian Succession War, the former as deputy paymaster of the forces,¹ and the latter as a commissary of supply.² Thomas Pownall, as Governor of Massachusetts Bay, had been directly and actively involved in military administration including commissariat affairs in America in 1758 and 1759³ before his arrival in Germany in 1761, as had Daniel Weir, who had served as commissary general at the conquests of Louisberg and Quebec,⁴ before taking up his post with the Combined Army in 1762. Joseph Leach,⁵ Charles Mason⁶ and Alexander Ross⁷ had all been under-deputy commissaries in England, while Leach had acted in the same capacity on the Belle Isle expedition,⁸ and Mason had held the post of deputy commissary of stores and provisions at Guadeloupe.⁹ In addition, Ross served as a minor commissariat officer in Germany for over

1 Namier & Brooke, op. cit. ibid. Although the deputy paymaster was not directly involved in army supply, he came into daily contact with its problems.

2 Accounts of M. Hatton, 1745 - 1748, Orlebar MSS. OR/1868.

3 J.A. Schutz, Thomas Pownall (1951) pp.133 - 139 & 164 - 165.

4 T/52/57 ff.346 - 347, 5 February 1766.

5 T/52/48 f.73, 2 February 1757.

6 A. Hume to Viscount Barrington, 14 October 1758, WO/1/976 ff.613 - 614.

7 T/52/48 f.73, 2 February 1757. As Alexander Ross, the commissary in Germany, was also an official of the Board of Taxes on leave of absence, his identification with the commissary in England in 1757 cannot be certain. See below p.106.

8 G. Howard to S. Martin, 9 June 1762, T/1/417 f.44.

9 Hume to Barrington, 14 October 1758, WO/1/976 ff.613 - 614. Martin to C. Mason, 25 May 1761, T/27/28 f.163.

three years before being promoted to a post of responsibility,¹ and Thomas Bishop,² Jerome Boyve,³ John Crawford,⁴ and Cornet Gunn⁵ all underwent similar apprenticeships, while the title of 'OverStalmeister' given to Ramberg, the director of the great provision train,⁶ suggests, without positively proving, that he was promoted from the ranks of the service. Among the German commissaries Meyen and Roden had been attached to the Hanoverian commissariat before entering British employment,⁷ while few could rival the experience of President von Massow of the Prussian Chamber of War of Minden, who not only held an important permanent post directly concerned with all aspects of military finance and supply, but had had responsibility for the provisioning of armies in the field during the Austrian Succession War.⁸

All the military officers who acted as commissaries

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- 1 R. Peirson to Martin, 16 September 1761, T/1/410 f.151. He had been employed as an inspector of magazines.
 - 2 J. Parker to C. Hotham, 6 November 1758, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/8.
 - 3 Memorial of J. Boyve, 30 September 1765, T/1/444 f.222. He had acted as Pownall's chief secretary.
 - 4 An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany, 1759, T/1/397 f.66. He acted as a book-keeper.
 - 5 Peirson to Martin, 5 May 1761, T/1/410 f.64.
 - 6 Instructions for M. Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.150.
 - 7 T.O. Hunter to R. Oswald, 20 April 1759, T/1/394 f.102. Hunter to Martin, Recd. 29 December 1759, T/64/96 f.289. Both men were Prussian officials, Meyen being Director of the Chamber (of War) of Cleves, although Roden's title was said to be honorary, Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33048 f.149.
 - 8 Hatton to Martin, 30 January 1761, T/1/410 ff.142 - 143.

were, as serving soldiers, no strangers to the business of army supply, although a number of them had more than a passing acquaintance with commissariat affairs. Colonel Robert Boyd had spent twenty-six years (1730 - 1756) in Minorca, where he had acted as storekeeper for the Board of Ordnance and commissary to the troops in the island.¹ In 1757 he was appointed deputy Commissary General in England² before being transferred to Germany the following year. In 1756 Colonel Jeffrey Amherst had been given the task of transporting 8,000 Hessian troops to England and providing for them on the march,³ a major supply operation, and Colonel James Durand had acted in a similar capacity for a contingent of Dutch troops in the same year.⁴ Lieutenant-General George Howard, in addition to commanding a regiment, had been responsible for organizing the foraging of the Combined Army in 1761,⁵ while a somewhat more specialized experience was that of Colonel Ruvigny de Cosne, who as a more junior officer had been a commissary for the exchange of French prisoners of war in 1747,⁶ a task which no doubt involved the examination and settlement of the accounts of provisions supplied. Lieutenant-Colonels James Browne and William Fawcett, who had both been secretaries to the Marquis of Granby,⁷ must have been

1 Memorial of R. Boyd to the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, (1764), Add. MSS. 38202 f.131. Earl of Holderness to J. Amherst, 3 January 1758, SP/87/27 f.192.

2 T/29/32 f.462, 12 May 1757.

3 Amherst's Instructions, (1756), SP/87/27 ff.1 - 2.

4 Holderness to Treasury, 23 July 1756, SP/44/134 f.374.

5 Standing Orders, 8 September 1761, Add. MSS. 28855 f.60.

6 T/52/44 f.44, 11 April 1747.

7 Duke of Newcastle to Prince Ferdinand, 25 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f.3. The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126.

constantly involved with general military administration, especially in view of the British Commander-in-Chief's profound dislike of such matters,¹ while Fawcett had the additional experience of having acted as Deputy Adjutant-General.² Casimir Bilgen, although not a military officer, had assisted the operations and movements of the British troops in 1758 in his capacity of 'engineer'³ before being appointed inspector and controller of the foreign artillery train. Finally, five other commissaries, Colonels James Johnston, Richard Peirson and Richmond Webb, Ensign Thomas Turton and Cornet Gunn,⁴ had apparently only general military experience to offer, although this in itself inevitably meant a direct acquaintance with the methods and problems of supply. In a number of the cases cited above the combination of active military service and some specialized administrative or financial post in the army formed a perfectly adequate background and training for the tasks undertaken in Germany, while Boyd's experience was as comprehensive as could have been realistically demanded for any prospective commissary. On the other hand, although Peirson cannot have been ignorant of commissariat affairs, there was nothing in his previous career to justify his going straight to the top as Director of Commissaries, while Howard's elevation to the same position was based on a somewhat limited connection with matters of supply.

1 T. Thoroton to Marquess of Granby, 30 May 1760, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Twelfth Report, Appendix, Part V, Rutland MSS. Vol.II, (1889) p.214.

2 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126.

3 Hunter to (Martin), 11 February 1759, T/64/96 f.26.

4 Turton had acted as an aide-de-camp to Granby, Howard to Martin, 24 September 1762, T/1/417 ff.464 - 462 (sic), while Webb retired from the army in 1758, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XX, p.1,014.

One other form of direct experience of commissariat affairs arose from involvement in contracts for the supply of the army. Richard Oswald, a West India merchant,¹ had acted as a contractor for bread, bread wagons and forage to the Hessian troops in England in 1756,² and for the supply of bread and bread wagons to the British troops in the Combined Army from 1758 onwards.³ He was a commissary to that Army in 1759 and 1760, but in the latter year refused to act as commissary general to the troops in Westphalia,⁴ a post of responsibility for which his contracting activities would have provided a solid basis of experience. Of lesser standing than Oswald was his principal agent, Peter Paumier, who was appointed a deputy commissary at the beginning of 1763 for the sale of the various trains which Oswald had supplied,⁵ and with whose affairs he was obviously well acquainted. Similarly, the appointment of Andrew Clark as deputy commissary to manage the provision train in 1762 was simply a continuation of the role which he had already played as agent to Sir Lawrence Dundas, who had been the contractor for the train.⁶ Finally, Philip Faber, the director of the foreign bakery, had at least been held in readiness to act as a bread contractor to the Army,⁷ and Councillor Voss was reported to

1 The Universal Director by Mr. Mortimer, (1763), Part III, p.54.

2 T/29/32 f.385, 28 April 1756. Martin to Oswald, 17 March 1757, T/27/27 f.279.

3 Draught Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 14 February 1759, T/1/395 ff.387 - 394.

4 Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/1/405 f.61.

5 Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, AO/1/520/225.

6 Howard to (Treasury), 10 August 1762, T/1/417 f.490.

7 Hunter to (Oswald), 1 May 1759, T/1/396 f.28. The fact that Faber was sent to the Army to forestall the threatened emergency of the existing bread contractor quitting his agreement strongly suggests that he already had experience of the work involved, although he may have gained it in the service of the commissariat of one of the German states.

have been an entrepreneur before becoming a commissary.¹

The thirty-two commissaries mentioned above all had some measure of direct experience of army supply, and a number of others came from backgrounds which had some relevance to the tasks which they were called upon to perform in Germany. Seven had held administrative posts in central or local government in Britain or Germany. Both David Cuthbert and Charles Arnold were excise officers, the former having lost the post which he had held in Scotland,² and the latter having been granted leave of absence from the Excise Office on his appointment to the commissariat.³ Henry Hulton had served for five years (1756 - 1761) as Comptroller of the Customs in Antigua,⁴ and Charles Bromfield had acted as a revenue officer in Jamaica.⁵ William Fraser was a clerk in the Secretary of State's office from 1751 - 1759, and Assistant Under-Secretary from 1759 - 1761.⁶ Edward Blakeney had been appointed British consul at Nice in 1759, although

1 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33048 f.150. There is no specific indication that Voss had been engaged in army supply, although this seems to be the implication of the statement that he had been an entrepreneur before becoming a commissary.

2 T/29/32 ff.158 & 196, 17 October 1753 & 15 May 1754. Petition of D. Cuthbert, 4 June 1755, Add. MSS. 34736 f.197.

3 T/29/34 f.71, 7 May 1761. Martin to Commissioners of the Excise, 20 May 1761, T/27/28 f.163.

4 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.187.

5 Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from January 1754 to December 1758, (1933) pp.232 & 444.

6 J.C. Sainty, Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Vol.II, Officials of the Secretaries of State, 1660 - 1782. (1973) p.78.

he apparently never took up this post,¹ and most of his career had been spent as secretary to his relative, Lord Blakeney, the Governor of Minorca.² Among the German officials who served in the commissariat Redecker probably exercised some administrative responsibility as he described himself as 'Bailiff',³ although his designation as Prussian Councillor of War was said to have been merely titular,⁴ while Ammon had held an important diplomatic post as the Prussian resident at Cologne.⁵

General administrative and diplomatic experience also enhanced the qualifications of some of the commissaries who had had a more direct contact with army supply. Pownall had spent eleven years as a clerk at the Board of Trade,⁶ where his brother, John, was to become an important 'subminister' of the period,⁷ and in 1753 had entered the American service as secretary to the Governor of New York, becoming Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey in 1755 and Governor of South

1 Irvine to J. Wallace, 30 May 1759, SP/87/31 f.146. Irvine to (Holderness), 13 March 1760, *ibid.* ff.247 - 248. On his way to Nice Blakeney was unfortunate enough to be captured by French troops at Cologne, and was imprisoned for nearly a year amongst felons in a common gaol.

2 Newcastle to Peirson, 3 June 1760, Add. MSS. 32906 f.454. Edward Blakeney's grandfather was a first cousin of Lord Blakeney, Burke's Irish Family Records, (1976) pp.123 - 124. R. Browning in The Duke of Newcastle and the Financial Management of the Seven Years War in Germany, 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research', Vol. 49, 1971, p.27 n.36, states incorrectly that Edward Blakeney was the son of Lord Blakeney.

3 Memorial of F. Redecker, Read 31 March 1763, T/1/427 f.237.

4 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. ff.149 - 150.

5 *Ibid.*

6 Namier & Brooke, Eds. *op. cit.* Vol.III, p.316.

7 F.B. Wickwire, British Subministers and Colonial America, 1763 - 1783. (1966) p.71.

Carolina in 1760.¹ He did not, however, take up the last appointment, transferring to Germany as a commissary of control.² Hunter, who is described as a man of business rather than a politician, had been a commissary to treat with France in 1748, and at the time of his appointment to the commissariat in December 1758 had spent the previous two years as a Lord of the Admiralty.³ In 1752 Hatton had been nominated secretary to the commissaries who negotiated with Austria and the United Provinces on the problem of the barrier treaties,⁴ and throughout the 1750s had acted as consul at Ostend, Nieuport and Bruges, a post which was largely concerned with the protection of British merchants in those ports.⁵ In addition to his military service Cosne had pursued a diplomatic career of some distinction, having been secretary to the embassy in France from 1751 to 1755, and then holding the same post in Spain from 1757 to 1760, both appointments including a brief period when he was in charge of the mission.⁶ Finally, Ross was an officer of the Board of Taxes who was given leave of absence to serve in Germany,⁷ and Bilgen, who is variously described as an 'engineer' or director of dykes in the Prussian province of Cleves,⁸ was also

1 Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.III, p.316.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. Vol.II, p.656.

4 T/52/46 f.31, 6 March 1752.

5 T/52/45 f.92, 19 December 1749.

6 D.B. Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives, 1689 - 1789. Camden Miscellany, Third Series, Vol.XLVI, (1932) pp.21 & 135.

7 Peirson to Martin, 11 April 1761, T/1/410 f.57. T/29/34 f.44, 23 April 1761.

8 Hunter to (Martin), 11 February 1759, T/64/96 f.26. Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33048 f.150.

referred to as an 'amtmann' or district administrator.¹

The relevance of these different forms of administrative and diplomatic experience as a training-ground for commissariat employees varied from case to case. A familiarity with book-keeping and accounts through employment in the customs, excise or revenue departments was clearly of particular use to commissaries of account and control such as Cuthbert, Hulton and Ross, and not irrelevant to commissaries of supply such as Arnold and Bromfield. A knowledge of mercantile practice and problems, gained through work in the customs and excise services or through the exercise of consular responsibilities, obviously helped commissaries in their dealings with contractors. Moreover, both Cuthbert and Hulton must have enjoyed more than a passing acquaintance with fraud and speculation, which was an effective preparation for their work as Commissioners of Enquiry.² Cosne's diplomatic experience was pertinent to his task of negotiating the settlement of accounts with the authorities of Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel,³ while the executive responsibilities exercised by Pownall in America must have helped him to establish the department of control, delimiting the functions of the various officers and providing them with full and lucid instructions.⁴ On the other hand, the general administrative experience gained by Fraser in the Secretary of State's office and by Blakeney as the amanuensis of the Governor of Minorca was of less sig-

1 C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Ferdinand, 6 July 1762, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.VI, p.221. Such titles tended to be used rather loosely.

2 See below pp205 - 208.

3 See Appendix I.

4 See below pp192 - 194 & 201 - 203.

nificance for their work in the commissariat, although both employments probably brought other advantages, namely an acquaintance with German affairs in the case of the former, and with military matters in the case of the latter.¹ Thus although an administrative background did not offer a completely appropriate training for a commissary, it seems in a number of cases to have furnished experience which was not irrelevant to both the general and particular aspects of commissariat business.

At least three commissaries came from mercantile backgrounds, which did not involve direct experience of army supply. Sir James Cockburn lost his hereditary estates in Scotland as a result of legal judgments, and entered business in London with Henry Douglas, a wealthy West India merchant, whose daughter he married.² Douglas and Cockburn also acted as London correspondents of the Receivers General of Scotland,³ and Cockburn himself was associated with a number of prominent City merchants, including Sir George and Sir James Colebrooke, Nicholas Linwood and John Sargent, as well as with John Calcraft, the regimental agent and protégé of Henry Fox.⁴ It was on behalf of himself and these five gentlemen that he had originally

1 For further details on Fraser's knowledge of German see below p.112, n.8.

2 T.H.C. Hood, The House of Cockburn of That Ilk. (1888) pp.102 - 103. Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.II, p.229.

3 J.E.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 1774 - 92. (1958) p.63.

4 Case for Counsel's Opinion, (1764), Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/139 f.1.

gone to Germany in January 1760, seeking a contract to supply the Combined Army, but disappointed in this hope he joined the commissariat a few months later.¹ Sir James was thus a man of some standing and connection in the business world, and his knowledge and experience of its techniques and practices must have been considerable. A similar conclusion applies to the Halsey brothers, Thomas and Frederick. They were the sons of Charles Halsey, who was engaged in the Hamburg trade and had resided in Germany until inheriting the estates of his elder brother at Great Gaddesden in Hertfordshire in 1739.² Thomas Halsey was brought up as a merchant at Hamburg,³ although it is probable that Frederick, while not severing his German connections, was mainly concerned with the English estates after the death of his father in 1748. The Halseys also had commercial and financial connections by marriage, for Nicholas Magens, a German merchant and prominent London financier, was their uncle.⁴ The two commissaries thus came from a solid mercantile background, and their close contacts with Germany were especially relevant for service in that country, with whose officials and business men they must have had many dealings. It may be assumed that John Levett came from a commercial background from the fact that he was

1 Ibid. He perhaps hoped to put business in the way of his associates from inside the commissariat.

2 Indenture, 14 November 1747, Halsey MSS. 14844. Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol. II, p. 568.

3 Newcastle to Granby, 29 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f. 139. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f. 7.

4 Newcastle to Ferdinand, 25 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f. 3. Charles Halsey and Nicholas Magens married daughters of Frederick Dorrien. Will of N. Magens, 1764, PROB/11/901 f. 319. Will of Elizabeth Magens, 1779, PROB/11/1057 f. 384. W. Berry, County Genealogies: Pedigrees of Hertfordshire Families. (1842) p. 89.

warmly recommended by many people in the City,¹ although no precise information on his activities and connections has come to light.² Finally, in the cases of two commissaries already mentioned in another context there is a possibility of mercantile or financial origins: Turton had reputedly 'been brought up to business' before entering the army,³ while Crawford may well have been related to the British banking family of that name established at Rotterdam.⁴

How appropriate was this sort of experience for the work of a commissary? All six officers were appointed as commissaries of account or control,⁵ for which branches of the service a working knowledge of book-keeping and accounts was the essential qualification, while in addition a commissary of control needed to be familiar with such matters of general business practice as the rights and obligations of parties under contract. It seems unlikely that these officials could have been ignorant of such basic concerns.⁶ Cockburn and Frederick Halsey also worked as commissaries of supply, a position which re-

1 Barrington to (Newcastle), 18 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32924 f.155.

2 A number of merchants named Levett appear in London business directories; e.g. Francis Levett, 'Assurance Director and Turkey Merchant', The Universal Director by Mr. Mortimer, (1763) Part III, p.44, and Thomas Levett of Warwick Street, Golden Square, A Complete Guide to all Persons who have any Trade or Connection with the City of London (1758) p.136.

3 Howard to Martin, 24 September 1762, T/1/417 ff.464 - 462 (sic).

4 James Crawford or Craufurd of Rotterdam was the correspondent of the deputy paymaster of the forces for the purchase of German currency. See their correspondence in Add. MSS. 54485.

5 See Appendix I.

6 Crawford, whose origins are uncertain, had in any case served a commissariat apprenticeship as a book-keeper, see above p.100, n.4.

quired a more specialized knowledge of the purchase and transportation of bulk food-stuffs and provisions. It is impossible to say whether Cockburn had any such experience prior to his arrival in Germany in January 1760, but his search for contracts must have led him to inform himself on the details of supply before his appointment to the commissariat,¹ and that these were matters not completely outside Halsey's orbit is proved by the fact that Hunter had used the family firm for the purchase of large quantities of forage in 1759.² Clearly neither commissary could claim Oswald's intimate experience of army supply, but like all their colleagues with a mercantile background they did not come to their tasks as total strangers.

One other aspect of the British commissaries' experience is worth investigating as of significance for their work: their knowledge of the country where they served and of its language. Westphalen claimed that none of them knew the territory and that practically all of them had a poor command of German.³ Neither of these criticisms, however, could apply to the Halsey brothers,⁴ nor to Fawcett, who had travelled widely in Germany, translated complex Prussian military treatises, and was reputedly granted an immediate promotion by

1 The proposals of Cockburn and Linwood for the supply of the Hanoverian artillery and provision trains must have been based on a detailed investigation of these aspects of the service. Memorials of Cockburn and Linwood, 18 March 1760, T/1/405 ff.384 & 386.

2 Hunter to (Oswald), 1 May 1759, T/1/396 f.29. Hunter to Martin, 22 November 1759, T/64/96 f.273.

3 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.I, pp.119 - 120.

4 F. Halsey to Mrs. Halsey, 30 June 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Mogens to Newcastle, 27 April 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 f.233. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.7.

George II for his fluent account of the battle of Warburg in the King's native tongue.¹ Hulton had paid at least one extensive visit to Germany, keeping a journal which clearly demonstrates his interest in, and knowledge of the country,² while the area can hardly have been unknown to Amherst, who had previously campaigned there³ and, as already noted, had accompanied the Hessian troops from their homeland to England in 1756.⁴ Such activities had presumably brought to both commissaries at least a passing acquaintance with the German language,⁵ and there is evidence to suggest, although not to prove, that Bishop,⁶ Cosne,⁷ Fraser,⁸ Thomas Higgins and Frederick Stanton⁹ were not ignorant of it either. On the other hand, three high-ranking commissaries, Pownall, Hatton and Blakeney, seem to have had no such

1 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126. The British Library Catalogue of Printed Books contains his translations of Regulations for the Prussian Infantry, 1754, and Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry, 1757.

2 Observations in the Course of Sundry Tours and Voyages, 1751 - 1772, by Henry Hulton.

3 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.I, p.357.

4 See above p.101.

5 Hulton would hardly have made unfavourable comments on other commissaries' ignorance of German had he been open to tarring with the same brush. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.25.

6 R. Adair to Barrington, 12 October 1758, WO/1/976 f.48. Bishop is reported as being able to speak 'the modern Languages'.

7 His selection for the special mission to settle the demands of Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel in 1762, see Appendix I, points to some knowledge of German.

8 In 1773 he became the official translator of German in the Secretary of State's office, Sainty, op. cit. p.79. It is possible, although not probable, that he was ignorant of the language in 1761.

9 Both men owed their appointments as clerks to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands to their understanding of French and German, T/29/35 f.313, 23 February 1764, but they may have obtained this knowledge after entering the service of the commissariat.

knowledge.¹

On the basis of information, admittedly limited and incomplete, about the backgrounds and experience of forty-six of the fifty-nine superior commissariat officers, or over three-quarters of the total,² some tentative conclusions as correctives to commonly held assumptions seem warranted. Firstly, while the service always contained a majority of civilians, the place occupied by military officers, of whom there were twelve altogether,³ was never insignificant, and even though they were a distinct numerical minority some of them held critically important posts. In 1757 and 1758 Amherst and Boyd executed all British supply responsibilities to the Hessians on their own, while Peirson and Howard, two of the three directors of the commissariat during the last four years of the war, were in charge of the British supply operation to the Combined Army at its most extensive. It is therefore wrong to interpret the problems which arose in terms of a completely civilian commissariat, which by definition could not understand or was unsympathetic to military necessities.⁴ Such a rigid dich-

1 Pownall did not contradict J.J. Uckerman's statement that he could not understand German, Add. MSS. 38339 f.231, (1766). Hatton on his own admission could not write German, Hatton to Granby, 3 February 1761, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book I. Frederick Halsey commented on Blakeney's ignorance, although it should be remembered that Halsey was jealous of his superior, F. Halsey to Peirson, 5 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030.

2 Some further uncertain information on the backgrounds of other commissaries is found in Appendix II.

3 Amherst, Boyd, Browne, Cosne, Durand, Fawcett, Gunn, Howard, Johnston, Peirson, Turton and Webb. Bilgen could possibly be added to this list as he had military experience, see above p102.

4 R. Hargreaves, The Commissariat in the Seven Years War. 'Review of the Royal Army Service Corps', Vol.2, No.4, 1961, p.62.

otomy was not reflected in staffing arrangements. Nor, secondly, is there any 'prima facie' evidence that commissaries tended to come from the worst elements of the commercial world, or were men of experience in business who had fallen on ill-luck.¹ On the contrary the total number of commissaries from a mercantile or financial background amounted to only eleven,² and of these Cockburn, the Halseys and Oswald were all men of standing, whom it would be difficult to describe in the above terms.³ In fact, commissaries amongst whose significant qualifications was administrative experience in central or local government composed a larger numerical group of seventeen,⁴ thus suggesting that such a background was more highly esteemed than one rooted in the private business world, and that mid-eighteenth century administration was less devoid of a bureaucratic ethos than is sometimes imagined.⁵

A third commonly-held belief about the commissariat

1 S.G.P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809 - 1814. (1957) pp.71 - 72.

2 Clark, Cockburn, Crawford, Faber, Frederick and Thomas Halsey, Levett, Oswald, Paumier, Turton and Voss. Two other commissaries, John Colsworthy and Johann Fuhr, possibly came from mercantile or financial backgrounds, see Appendix II.

3 Cockburn's later business career was less distinguished, see below P.120.

4 Ammon, Arnold, Bilgen, Blakeney, Bromfield, Cosne, Cuthbert, Fraser, Hatton, Hulton, Hunter, Massow, Meyen, Pownall, Redecker, Roden and Ross. Blakeney's connections with this group were admittedly somewhat tenuous, although Bishop may have belonged to it through employment in the customs service. See Appendix II.

5 The secondment of able British officials to commissariat service obviously created staffing problems in the departments and services which they left, and the fact that the government was prepared to pay this price suggests that such people were preferred to those from the world of private affairs.

is that it was staffed by officials who had little or no experience of the service, or training relevant to the tasks which they were called upon to perform. Such a view receives contemporary corroboration from Havilland Le Mesurier who wrote in 1796:- "... notwithstanding Commissariat Expenses have been commented upon in and out of Parliament from the Duke of Marlborough's time to this day, no one has attempted to bring a System forward which would obviate the inconvenience of sending Men abroad to exercise functions which are perfectly new to them." ¹ It is difficult to apply this criticism to the commissariat in Germany during the Seven Years War without substantial reservations. Thirty-two of the fifty-nine commissaries were not unfamiliar with their work as a result of previous experience in the commissariat or allied services, involvement in army supply contracts or active service as military officers or technicians. Moreover, a number of these commissaries brought additional experience from the wider business and administrative world, which probably endowed them with a less rigid and stereotyped conception of problems than that of officials, who spending a lifetime in the same service, could easily lack adaptability and diversity of outlook. The remaining commissaries whose backgrounds have been traced had general mercantile or administrative experience alone, which if it bore no direct relationship to commissariat affairs, was rarely irrelevant to the work. Le Mesurier rightly lamented the lack of a permanent system for training commissaries, a limitation which no doubt had untoward effects on the quality

1 H. Le Mesurier, A System for the British Commissariat, (1796) printed in R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation: the Reform of the British Army, 1795 - 1809. (1963) p.267.

of staff in the lower ranks of the service, but the evidence quoted above shows that to fill the vitally important senior positions the authorities could draw on a reservoir of personnel, who in some cases had minimal, and in others more than adequate qualifications for their work, and whose collective personality bore no resemblance to that of a blundering novice. To this general conclusion may be added a post-script. Although there were some and perhaps many British commissaries who had no acquaintance with Germany and its language, there are certain clear and significant exceptions to Westphalen's theory that as a body they were ignorant of such matters. Moreover, when to such officials as the Halseys and Fawcett are added the group of native Germans employed in the service,¹ it becomes impossible to describe the commissariat as entirely composed of bewildered strangers, severely handicapped in trying to exercise their functions in 'terra incognita'. Where commissaries with geographical and linguistic knowledge as well as professional experience could be found they were chosen,² but as long as armies needed to be supplied in any country or area of the world familiarity with the relevant locality could not be made a 'sine qua non' for appointment.

From this discussion of the qualifications and experience of the commissaries it is necessary to turn, secondly, to

1 Ammon, Bilgen, Faber, Fuhr, Massow, Meyen, Meyer, Ramberg, Redecker, Roden, Scheedler and Voss. Boyve, who was Swiss, was presumably no stranger to Germany and its language. See Appendix I.

2 The Treasury sometimes approached men with a German background only to find that they declined the offer of commissariat employment. This seems to have happened in the case of Nicholas Magens, Newcastle's Memoranda for the King, 19 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32903 f.373.

a consideration of their abilities, using evidence from their past and future careers as well as from their period of service in Germany. A number of the army officers who held commissariat appointments went on to occupy military posts of great responsibility. Amherst rose to be Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of the British army,¹ and although neither a great general nor a brilliant administrator displayed qualities which were hardly mediocre. Boyd became Governor of Gibraltar in 1790, having been second in command during the famous siege, and was promoted to the rank of General in 1793.² Howard held the Governorships of Minorca and Jersey and ended his career as a Field Marshal and Privy Councillor.³ Fawcett, after having been responsible for raising mercenaries in various German states during the American War of Independence,⁴ became a very influential officer on headquarters staff and his elevation to the Privy Council in 1799 was described as a rare honour for a man in his position.⁵

Other commissaries made important contributions to the world of politics and administration. Hunter sat in Parliament for twenty-seven years and in 1763 became a Lord of the Treasury, an appointment which reflected his talents as well as his readiness to change his political allegiance from Bute to Grenville.⁶ Howard was a member

1 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.I, p.359.

2 Ibid. Vol.II, p.1,008.

3 Ibid. Vol.X, pp.17 - 18. Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.II, p.645.

4 Horn, op. cit. pp.43, 47, 57 - 58 & 67.

5 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,126.

6 M.P. Winchelsea, 1741 - 1759 & 1760 - 1769. Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.II, pp.656 - 657.

of the House of Commons for even longer and is said to have spoken sensibly there on matters of military administration,¹ while although Pownall's parliamentary career is described as disappointing, he was always an informed contributor to American debates.² Oswald played an important political and diplomatic role at the end of the American War, when he was chosen by Shelburne, who is said to have had a high opinion of his 'moderation, prudence, and judgment', to ascertain the nature of the American terms of peace at Paris in 1782,³ while Fawcett was selected for another delicate diplomatic mission, that of trying to reconcile Great Britain and Prussia in 1765.⁴ Significant promotions were received by Fraser, who rose to be Writer of the Gazette and Clerk of the Signet in the Secretary of State's office,⁵ Cuthbert, who was appointed a Commissioner of Excise in Scotland in 1768 but died in the same year,⁶ and Hulton, who became Plantation Clerk in the Customs department,⁷ before transferring to America as a Commissioner of Customs.⁸ Perhaps less importance should be attached to Boyve's appointment as Councillor of State for the Regency of the

1 M.P. Lostwithiel, 1761 - 1766, Stamford, 1768 - 1796, *ibid.* Vol.II, pp.645 - 646.

2 M.P. Tregony, 1767 - 1774, Minehead, 1774 - 1780, *ibid.* Vol.III, pp. 316 - 318. Neither Cockburn nor Thomas Halsey seems to have made much impact on the House of Commons.

3 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XIV, p.1,223.

4 Horn, *op. cit.* p.53.

5 Sainty, *op. cit.* p.79.

6 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.177. Appendix I.

7 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.191.

8 Gentleman's Magazine, 1790, Vol.LX, p.185.

Principality of Neuchatel and Vallangin as this was probably an hereditary office.¹

Nor was the commissariat devoid of men of intellectual and literary attainments. By the end of his life Pownall's output of books, pamphlets and articles had reached significant proportions, and in addition to his most celebrated work, 'The Administration of the Colonies', included writings on subjects as diverse as politics, economics, geography, archaeology, philosophy and physics.² By definition therefore a dilettante he was also a man of considerable intellectual capacity. So too was Oswald, whom no less an authority than Thomas Carlyle called 'a man of great knowledge',³ and who wrote one treatise on politico-military affairs.⁴ On the other hand, Boyve's contribution to the history of his native provinces,⁵ and Fawcett's translation of French and German military manuals⁶ were probably somewhat less intellectually demanding. Finally, although Robert Kyd, who entered the service of the East India Company after leaving Ger-

1 Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, T/1/451 f.292. Both his great uncle and father had held official positions in the Principality, J. Boyve, Recherches sur l'Indigénat Helvétique de la Principauté de Neuchatel et Vallangin. (1778) pp.iv - v.

2 British Library Catalogue of Printed Books. It has been claimed that Pownall was Junius, F. Griffin, Junius Discovered. (1854).

3 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XIV, p.1,223.

4 Memorandum on the Folly of Invading Virginia, the Strategic Importance of Portsmouth, and the Need for Civilian Control of the Military. (1781).

5 Boyve, op. cit.

6 See above p.112, n.1. He also translated Maurice de Saxe's Réveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War in 1757.

many, does not seem to have left any published works, he became in later life an acknowledged expert on botany and horticulture and the founder of the botanical gardens of Calcutta.¹

In some respects the later careers of two commissaries shed unfavourable light on their general abilities. Firstly, Cockburn's involvement in East India affairs and the shady dealings of Lauchlin Macleane and John Macpherson with the Nawab of Arcot, in which Henry Dundas felt that he had been the dupe of others, and which resulted in his bankruptcy and some unworthy attempts to extricate himself from his plight,² suggest a lack of prudence and judgment, although even the ablest men are not immune from errors made in the pursuit of easy money. Secondly, although Peirson was eventually raised to the rank of Lieutenant-General and created a Knight of the Bath in 1780,³ he was never accorded the military governorship to which he aspired,⁴ and while his failure may have derived partly from political factors, there remains some suspicion that lack of any outstanding talent made it easier to pass him over on a number of occasions.

The past and future careers of the commissaries are

1 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XI, p.348. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 20 March 1764, Add. MSS. 38202 f.176. Although five commissaries, Boyve, Howard, Pownall, Blakeney and Frederick Halsey, attended university and the first three received degrees, reliable conclusions about their abilities cannot be drawn from this information.

2 Namier & Brooke, Eds. op. cit. Vol.II, p.230.

3 Peirson to Earl of Lincoln, 13 November 1780, Newcastle MSS. NeC 2436

4 Peirson to Lincoln, 27 July 1765, *ibid.* NeC 3447. Peirson to Duke of Newcastle, 28 February 1778, *ibid.* NeC 2777.

not without relevance to the argument of this section, but the acid test of their abilities lies in the effectiveness of their administrative performance in Germany, which fortunately in a number of cases is sufficiently well-documented to permit detailed examination. Of the three directors of the commissariat Hunter was the most able. His measures for keeping the Army provided were generally effective, not least because he was sufficiently adaptable to be able to break with traditional methods of supply when they proved to be unsatisfactory.¹ He also kept a constantly watchful eye on expenditure, pointing out errors in the Treasury's instructions which had they been carried into effect would have wasted money,² and persuading the military command to eliminate unnecessary expenses.³ No doubt his success in the latter sphere explains some of the criticism of his administration emanating from German sources, a consideration which played some part in persuading him to resign.⁴ Nevertheless, Hunter was a superintendent of initiative, who was not afraid to shoulder responsibility and who possessed the necessary organizing ability to put his plans effectively into practice.⁵

1 Faced with unreliable bread supplies from the contractor he took the foreign bakery into public ownership. See below pp.229 - 230.

2 Hunter to (Martin), 30 May 1759 & 7 November 1759, T/64/96 ff.144 - 145 & 263 - 264.

3 Hunter to Treasury, 31 January 1759, *ibid.* ff.12(a) - 12(b). Hunter to Martin, 11 March 1759, Add. MSS. 32889 f.2.

4 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.4.

5 Hunter enjoyed some advantages in exercising his responsibilities at a time when the Combined Army had not reached its maximum numerical strength and when shortages of provisions and difficulties of transport had not yet become acute, although even in 1759 his task was far from easy and straightforward.

Amongst those officials who acted as commissaries general or at a commensurate level of responsibility Pownall stands out as one of the ablest administrators to serve in Germany. While his task was easier than that of the head of the commissariat in that he did not have to balance the frequently conflicting claims of supply and control, he none the less showed evidence of considerable talent in his clear recognition of the many loop-holes which made fraudulent practices possible,¹ in his comprehensive and detailed proposals for remedying the situation and in his success, despite much opposition, in putting reforms into effect.² Critical statements from German sources, one to the effect that he was ignorant, incapable of filling the post he had been given and possessed of 'le Cerveau detraqué',³ reflect the antagonism felt towards his determined efforts to eradicate laxity and fraud, and cannot be accepted in the light of positive evidence about his work and achievement. In Hatton the Army had an able commissary general of supply, constantly resourceful in his search for provisions,⁴ and one who was complimented by the Duke of Marlborough for his quickness and understanding,⁵ a judgment confirmed by others who knew him.⁶ As temporary director of the commissariat during the

1 Pownall to Peirson, 20 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 ff.286 - 292.

2 Pownall's work is dealt with in greater detail below pp.192 - 204.

3 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 May 1762, Add. MSS.32938 f.214.

4 T/29/34 f.66, 6 May 1761.

5 Duke of Marlborough to Holderness, 15 August 1758, SP/87/32 f.61. Marlborough to Newcastle, 22 August 1758, Add. MSS. 32883 f.31. The British Commander-in-Chief's opinion must have been sincerely held as he can have had no interest in saddling himself with an incompetent commissary.

6 Baron Münchhausen to Newcastle, 1 November 1758, Add. MSS. 32885 f.162. Peirson to Newcastle, 10 November 1761, Add. MSS. 32930 f.381.

interregnum of early 1760 he was less successful, admitting that he was incapable of managing affairs of such consequence,¹ and some of the reasons for this may well have been connected with a tendency to lack order in his work,² and a certain inability to distinguish the trivial from the important.³

From the ranks of the ordinary commissaries Frederick Halsey was not only alert and resourceful in matters of supply,⁴ in which connection the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick thought sufficiently highly of his work to make him an honorary aide-de-camp,⁵ but a perspicacious critic of the many slack practices which were allowed to flourish before the appointment of Pownall.⁶ The abilities of Cuthbert and Hulton are clearly enough reflected in their work as the Commissioners of Enquiry, which they pursued with great thoroughness and attention to detail, although their enthusiasm often led them to make recommendations which could not in fairness be upheld.⁷ Similar talents for detective work were displayed by Fuhr, who made many of the init-

1 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1760, T/1/405 f.179.

2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.6.

3 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 May 1762, Add. MSS. 32938 f.215.

4 See below pp.167 & 290.

5 F. Halsey to W. Hamilton, 1 July 1762, Halsey MSS. 15029.

6 He was one of the first to draw attention to the evils arising from the practice of purchasing forage receipts, F. Halsey to Howard, 23 January 1761, Halsey MSS.15030, although he was eventually dismissed for irregularity himself. See below pp.133 - 135.

7 See below pp.204 - 208. Both Peirson and Pownall commented on Hulton's talents and ability, Peirson to Martin, 30 November 1761, Add. MSS. 32931 f.337. Pownall to J. West, 18 November 1761, T/1/413 f. 359.

ial revelations of fraud to the Treasury and displayed considerable ingenuity in obtaining proofs of his allegations.¹ Levett's investigation of the state of the Army's regular means of transport was thorough and competent, and included perceptive recommendations for the elimination of the worst abuses in one branch of the service,² while other commissaries who impressed their superiors or colleagues as able men were Thomas Halsey³ and Mason.⁴

Not surprisingly there were also commissaries whose talents are more the subject of uncertainty and doubt. As head of the commissariat Peirson was not nearly so successful as his predecessor, and for various reasons allowed the direction of important aspects of the supply operation to slip more and more out of his grasp.⁵ Moreover, he continued to rely on contractors who were strongly suspected of fraud,⁶ and failed to introduce essential measures of control which were strongly urged on him.⁷ He certainly had major problems with

1 Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and Irregularities, 5 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 ff.426 - 430. Memoranda resulting from Fuhr's Examination etc. before the Treasury, 27 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32930 ff.96 - 103.

2 Plan for the Control of the Hanoverian Artillery Train, 25 May 1762, T/1/420 ff.128 - 132.

3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.7. Hunter to (Oswald), 3 May 1759, T/1/396 f.30/31.

4 Hume to Barrington, 14 October 1758, W0/1/976 ff.613 - 614. T. Pownall to Martin, 23 October 1762, T/1/420 f.253.

5 During his administration Massow and other Prussian officials came to play an increasingly dominant role in commissariat affairs. Intelligence relating to the Commissariat, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32922 f.420.

6 Materials for a Letter to Prince Ferdinand, 19 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 f.442.

7 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.27.

which to cope, including increasing shortages of provisions, difficulties of transportation, rising prices, inadequate and tardy remittances of cash and until 1761 his own onerous military duties, and there is no reason to suppose that he was totally unsuited to his high office, but at the same time he seems to have lacked those powers of discernment and of effective direction and co-ordination which were essential attributes for a man in his position. Hulton concluded that he was a man led into a business outside his sphere,¹ and the comment may well be justified. There is again no evidence of incompetence in the case of Howard, the commissariat's third director, although one of the major features of his short administration was bitter criticism by Prince Ferdinand that he had not secured the necessary quantities of provisions in the right places at the right times.² Like Peirson, Howard had difficulties which were not of his making,³ but he showed unwillingness to accept full responsibility for some aspects of commissariat affairs,⁴ and thus although his supply arrangements seem on the whole to have been adequate, he did not always appreciate the need to pay meticulous attention to the details of their practical execution.⁵ Nevertheless, the anonymous German commentator, who tended to be hypercritical of British commissaries, made a favourable judgment on his ab-

1 Ibid. f.6.

2 Ferdinand to Howard, 16 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/9/7.

3 Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, T/1/417 f.435.

4 On the particular issue of granting warrants for services incurred before the beginning of his administration Howard eventually admitted that he had interpreted his instructions somewhat too narrowly. Howard to (Treasury), 21 July 1762, T/1/417 f.24.

5 Ferdinand to Howard, 15 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/9/6.

ilities.¹ The same writer was far from complimentary about Blakeney, whom he described as very incapable,² while one of the commissary's own colleagues dismissed his activities as wrong-headed derangements.³ The sparseness of his surviving correspondence makes it difficult to test the veracity of these statements, but it is probable that his failings were more those of character than of ability.⁴

It has not been the purpose of this section to prove that every commissary who served in Germany was a man of unqualified ability, but rather to contest the view that a commissary was by definition an official of negligible or even non-existent talents. The service was able to attract men of a high general level of intelligence, and some who had already, or were in the future, to exercise important military, political and administrative responsibilities with success and even distinction. Where it is possible to trace the details of their work during the Seven Years War and to find judicious estimates of their performance from contemporaries, little evidence of incompetence emerges. Inadequacies and failings certainly existed, and it was especially unfortunate that they were present in two of the three directors of the commissariat. But the idea that Newcastle filled the service with 'old men of proven mediocrity' is impossible to sustain.⁵ The welfare of the Combined Army and the interests of the

1 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 May 1762, Add. MSS. 32938 f.214.

2 Ibid.

3 F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030.

4 See below pp.128 - 129.

5 R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle and the Financial Management of the Seven Years War in Germany. 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research', Vol.49, 1971, p.27.

British Treasury and taxpayer frequently lay in competent if not capable hands.

Experienced and able men may still lack those qualities of character which are equally essential for effective administrative performance, and it is therefore necessary to investigate the extent to which the commissaries showed diligence, devotion and integrity in carrying out their functions. Hard work and pertinacity were never lacking if the comments on excessively long hours are to be believed. Hatton wrote in 1760:- "... I have had a pen in my hand from day Light till now 12 o'Clock: I have hardly an Eye left: and yet a hundred papers are Copying for my Signing so that I cant go to bed",¹ and his sentiments were echoed by Hunter,² Howard³ and Frederick Halsey.⁴ Personal protestations of hard work should always be treated with a degree of scepticism even when constantly reiterated, and more objective are the comments of superiors and colleagues which were frequently based on first-hand experience. A strong consensus of opinion existed on the subject of Hatton's untiring efforts,⁵ in which even the anonymous German commentator concurred,⁶ and

1 Hatton to (F. Halsey), 18 September 1760, Halsey MSS. 15121.

2 Hunter to Newcastle, 31 January 1759, Add. MSS. 32887 f.414.

3 Howard to (Treasury), 18 June 1762, T/1/417 f.393.

4 F. Halsey to G. Halsey, 26 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. F. Halsey to N. Magens, 13 March 1761, *ibid.*

5 Marlborough to Newcastle, 22 August 1758, Add. MSS. 32883 f.31. Münchausen to Newcastle, 1 November 1758, Add. MSS. 32885 f.162. Granby to Newcastle, 25 January 1759, Add. MSS. 32887 f.331. Ferdinand to Newcastle, 14 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32906 f.60. Peirson to Treasury, 7 June 1760, T/1/405 f.63.

6 Add. MSS. 32938 f.215.

Cockburn's activity was also the subject of a number of favourable comments.¹ Massow's diligence was recommended by both Prince Ferdinand and Hatton,² whose strong desire to see him brought into the commissariat perhaps coloured their judgment, but Hulton, who suspected the honesty of his dealings, still recognized his marked capacity for hard work.³ Among commissaries whose application received more limited commendation were Gunn, Thomas Halsey, Higgins and Mason,⁴ while the fact that Cuthbert, Fuhr, Frederick Halsey, Hulton, Hunter and Pownall gave themselves unstintingly to their tasks appears in similar comments or in the actual record of their work.⁵ Positive complaints were made about some commissaries and Blakeney in particular was accused of lethargy.⁶ Whatever the truth of the matter, he behaved as if his health was precarious and his refusal to travel created a number of awkward problems,⁷ but the parts of his correspondence which sur-

1 Ibid. f.214. Howard to (Treasury), 18 June 1762, T/1/417 f.393. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.6 - 7.

2 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 22 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.32. Hatton to Martin, 30 January 1761, T/1/410 f.143.

3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.11.

4 Peirson to Martin, 5 May 1761, T/1/410 f.65 (Gunn). Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.7 (T. Halsey). Pownall to T. Higgins, 17 May 1763, Halsey MSS. 15293(A) (Higgins). Pownall to Martin, 23 October 1762, T/1/420 f.253 (Mason).

5 Peirson to Martin, 22 August 1761, T/1/410 f.82 (Hulton). Ferdinand to Münchausen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.III, p.338, Lord George Sackville to Newcastle, 8 April 1759, Add. MSS. 32889 f.412 (Hunter). See above pp.123 - 124.

6 F. Halsey to T. Halsey, 17 April 1761, Halsey MSS. 15029. Blakeney is referred to as 'B'.

7 F. Halsey to Hatton, 9 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030. Blakeney's usual excuse was that he could not make winter journeys.

vive ¹ seem to indicate that if not physically active he was not generally indolent. Amherst was not always as ready a correspondent in matters of army supply as he might have been, but on the one occasion that the Treasury accused him of failing to send details of contract negotiations, ² there were some red faces in Whitehall when it was eventually found that he had given ample notice but that his letter had been mislaid. ³ A number of other examples of lack of effort could be cited, but there seems to be no evidence that any commissary ever became a serious liability to the service as a result of inveterate laziness.

The fact that some commissaries stayed at their posts for the whole or most of the period during which Britain supplied the Combined Army suggests the existence of some degree of professional loyalty and devotion to the service. Bilgen, Bishop, Boyd, Crawford, Fuhr and Ross served throughout the four years, and Browne, Cockburn, Faber and Hatton for over three of them. ⁴ In view of the harshness of the life and work in Germany the surprisingly small number of seventeen commissaries left the service before the end of the war, ⁵ and of these some did not make the decision themselves. ⁶ Among the others

1 There are a number of his letters in T/1/405, 410 & 420.

2 Treasury to Amherst, 3 January 1758, T/27/27 f.313.

3 T/29/33 f.11, 1 February 1758.

4 See Appendix I.

5 Amherst, Ammon, Durand, Elliot, F. Halsey, T. Halsey, Hatton, Hunter, Massow, Meyen, Peirson, Ramberg, Redecker, Roden, Scheedler, Trotter and Voss. See Appendix I.

6 Amherst was promoted and sent to North America, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.I, pp.357 - 358, Frederick Halsey dismissed, see below p.133, and Scheedler made redundant when the provision train was put under contract, see below p.265. The services of Massow and some of the other German officials were also dispensed with, see above p.58.

Redecker resigned because he felt he could no longer be of any use to the commissariat,¹ while in the cases of Durand and Elliot bad health seems to have been the governing factor.² But although Hatton, Hunter and Peirson all cited the latter reason in their requests to be relieved of their posts, it is probable that disillusion with the service was equally or more influential in bringing about their decisions,³ as it was presumably with Thomas Halsey after his brother's dismissal and death. Yet there is no evidence of any wide-spread tendency among the commissaries to abandon a difficult task at the first opportunity, and although the Treasury sometimes had to put pressure on its employees to dissuade them from resignation,⁴ there was still a marked sense of responsibility, voiced by Frederick Halsey when he wrote:- '.... I have too much spirit to quit in time of difficulty'.⁵ Indeed, Halsey's devotion and public spirit were even more clearly demonstrated when, after what he considered an unjust dismissal, he stayed at his post to initiate his successor:- ".... notwithstanding what my private feelings may be at so abrupt a dismissal; I am determined to contribute all the little assistance I am able for the publick Service, tho' not as a publick Officer, yet as a Subject of Great Britain."⁶

1 Exposé of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/313 f.285.

2 Holdernessee to Peirson & Boyd, 15 August 1760, SP/87/30 f.155. T/29/34 f.247, 24 March 1762.

3 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1761, T/1/410 f.144. Hunter to Newcastle, 10 October 1759, Add. MSS. 32896 ff.420 - 421. Peirson to Newcastle, 21 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.272.

4 T/29/34 f.182, 14 October 1761.

5 F. Halsey to Peirson, 25 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

6 F. Halsey to W. Hamilton, 18 March 1762, *ibid.* 15049.

Less helpful, however, was the attitude of some commissaries at the end of the war, when no doubt anxious to get home and determined to avoid complicated financial embroilments, they refused to undertake the sales of government magazines and property, so leading Pownall to complain of a lack of co-operation in this vital matter.¹ But perhaps the chief criticism of the commissaries' attitude lies in their propensity, if not their eagerness, to engage in acrimonious disputes with their colleagues, which occasionally verged on personal vendettas and inevitably reduced the efficiency of the service. Few commissaries can have been involved in more quarrels than Pownall, who clashed with Massow over the control of minor officials,² with Howard over the best means of supervising the trains,³ with Cuthbert and Hulton over their alleged unwillingness to co-operate with him,⁴ and with Fraser whose sealed boxes he opened in order to extract certain papers.⁵ He was certainly a rather touchy man, who frequently over-reacted to what he considered to be encroachments on his sphere of influence. Fuhr for his part showed a definite lack of cordiality in his relations with Peirson,⁶ and a degree of malevolence towards the Commissioners of Enquiry.⁷ Such animosities were therefore partly

1 Pownall to Martin, 31 December 1762 & 11 January 1763, T/1/419 f. 166 & T/1/427 f.232.

2 Pownall to Massow, 28 October 1761, T/1/412 ff.246 - 247.

3 Pownall to Howard, 3 October 1762, T/1/417 f.288.

4 Pownall to Treasury, 6 July 1762, *ibid.* f.64.

5 Pownall to W. Fraser, 16 July 1762, Add. MSS. 38199 f.99. Fraser to Jenkinson, 27 July 1762, *ibid.* f.95.

6 J.P. Fuhr to Peirson, 6 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.90.

7 Peirson to Martin, 11 September 1761, *ibid.* f.97. Draught Treasury Letter to Cockburn, 15 February 1763, T/1/427 f.332. Fuhr was jealous of Hulton, to whom Peirson had given the post to which he aspired.

the result of failings of character, of irrational suspicions, jealousy and pride, although the work of both Pownall and Fuhr, who acted as bulwarks against fraud, was bound to create a certain amount of tension in their relations with other commissaries.

Finally, some commissaries showed their devotion to the service in their attitude to financial affairs. Pownall claimed in 1763 that he had borrowed 5,000 ducats, or nearly £2,500, to support his office, and that everyone else in the department of control who could find credit had done the same.¹ By the time Bilgen's accounts came to be settled in 1764 the Crown owed him the immense sum of £11,344/19/4,² and Faber's widow eventually received £5,373/3/4¹/₄,³ although not before her husband, whom she claimed had been obliged to borrow money at 6%, had had his goods seized and had died under arrest.⁴ Bishop's accounts show that he was owed £3,460/3/5¹/₂ at the end of the war, a sum which was finally paid to him or more probably his descendants a quarter of a century later.⁵ The government was in debt for smaller sums to a number of other commissaries,⁶ and altogether it received considerable assistance from those who were prepared to put their financial resources and their credit at its disposal. Not that the commissaries were ever indifferent to financial con-

1 Pownall to Martin, 25 January 1763, T/1/427 f.499.

2 T/52/56 f.38, 25 July 1764.

3 Ibid. f.450, 14 June 1765.

4 Memorial of Mrs. A.D. Faber, 5 March 1764, T/1/432 No.6, f.14/280.

5 Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218.

6 Declared Account of Sir J. Cockburn, 10 February 1791, AO/1/1508/224 (£793/0/1), Declared Account of M. Hatton, 20 December 1766, AO/1/519/222 (£824/15/1¹/₂), Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, AO/1/520/225 (£684/13/0).

siderations, they would have been more than human had they been so, but their public image as money-grubbers needs some modification. Higgins expressed a very different attitude when he wrote to Cockburn:- ".... I beg the favor of you to let me know whether it is in your power to grant me my dismissal; I don't speak this, Sir, from any inclination or desire that I have to decline the Service, as long as I can be useful or serviceable, but merely from a Shame of taking the Government's Money any longer for doing nothing".¹

What then of the commonest charge against eighteenth century commissaries; that they were by definition dishonest? It was said that the very word 'commissary' conveyed the idea of making irregular money,² and that their practice of occupying a church recalled the text, 'My house shall be called the house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of thieves'.³ Despite sweeping accusations of corruption⁴ very few officials fell under real suspicion, and only one British commissary was dismissed. Frederick Halsey had on more than one occasion disobeyed the strict letter of his instructions in order to prevent the army suffering.⁵ His granting of a certificate for a considerable sum of money to the contractor, N.F. Leopold, stating that he had examined and approved the vouchers of a delivery, whereas he

1 25 April 1763, T/1/427 f.387.

2 Peirson to Newcastle, 28 August 1760, Add. MSS. 32910 f.382.

3 G. Davies, Wellington and His Army. (1954) pp.77 - 78.

4 Intelligence relating to the Commissariat, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32922 f.420.

5 F. Halsey to Colonel de Lachevallerie, 3 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030. Halsey granted a certificate for hospital expenses before any money had actually been paid.

had seen no vouchers at all,¹ may have been an attempt to encourage the speedy production of provisions by making a cash advance, as Halsey claimed after Leopold had fallen under suspicion of large-scale fraud and fled to Amsterdam,² and the whole matter had been investigated by the Commissioners of Enquiry.³ This explanation is not completely plausible, however, as since early 1760 the Treasury had permitted advances of cash on account to large contractors,⁴ so that there was in theory no reason for Halsey to engage in his irregular manoeuvre. Further suspicion is aroused by the close financial connection between the commissary and the contractor. In March 1761 Leopold transferred 66,025 guilders, or £6,228/15/6,⁵ from his own to Halsey's account with Cliffords of Amsterdam, and although this sum was supposed to have been repaid in its entirety,⁶ there is at least a possibility that the transaction concealed a 'douceur' for services rendered. Another relevant piece of information is contained in a letter Halsey wrote to Nicholas Magens in June 1761, concerning a friend of the latter who wished to invest £2,000 in the English funds.⁷ The anonymous individual had asked Cliffords to remit the money to Magens and Halsey to recommend it to his care.⁸ This fact takes on

1 Newcastle to Sir J. Yorke, 2 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f.145.

2 Memoranda resulting from Fuhr's Examination etc. before the Treasury, 27 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32930 f.97.

3 F. Halsey to Hamilton, 18 March 1762, Halsey MSS. 15049.

4 See above pp.81 - 82.

5 The £ sterling was worth 10 guilders 12 stivers at this time, PMG/ 2/5 f.256(b).

6 F. Halsey to Messrs. G. Clifford & Sons, 25 March 1761, Halsey MSS. 15029.

7 10 June 1761, Halsey MSS. 15029.

8 Ibid.

more significance in the light of a letter of Fuhr to the Treasury,¹ stating that he had been told that in June 1761 Leopold had settled his accounts with Cliffords and other banking houses, and by means of correspondents had endeavoured to fix his ill-gotten gains in the funds. If therefore, Halsey was a party to this stratagem the probability of his involvement in fraud is heightened, although the surviving evidence will only permit his conviction on a charge of irregularity.

Another possible case of dishonesty concerned deputy commissary Smith, who was instructed by Cockburn in October 1762 to make a contract for 30,000 quintals of meal.² These orders were countermanded two weeks later in view of the approaching peace,³ although Smith still concluded an agreement for half the required quantity at a high price.⁴ The Commissioners for Examining German Demands found these circumstances suspicious and accused the commissary of trying to make a collusive bargain.⁵ In Smith's defence, however, it may be pointed out that while the price was far from cheap, it was not the most expensive agreed at this time,⁶ and that as Cockburn's letter, which had two hundred miles to travel,⁷ had only been written the day

1 Fuhr to Martin, 1 December 1761, SP/9/227. Fuhr had followed Leopold to Amsterdam.

2 Cockburn to G. Smith, 29 October 1762, T/1/420 f.260.

3 Cockburn to Smith, 2 December 1762, T/1/431 No.21, f.61/405.

4 Contract between Smith and Amtmann Miltz, 12 November 1762, T/1/420 f.276.

5 Pownall, C.W. Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 24 October 1764, T/1/431 No.21, f.60/404.

6 Fraser to Cockburn, 28 December 1762, T/1/420 f.264.

7 Post Road which Cockburn's Letter was to go, T/1/420 f.258.

before the contract was signed, it could not have been in Smith's possession at the moment of the agreement. There remains the possibility that the contract was made after the receipt of the letter and antedated, although this accusation was never made against Smith, who consequently cannot be conclusively convicted of fraud.

Allegations of dishonesty were made against Pownall on two occasions, both involving the contractor J.J. Uckerman. On the first he was accused of allowing bad forage belonging to Uckerman to pass up the river Weser after it had been rejected by John Ghest, the magazine inspector at Bremen, with the insinuation that he was involved in collusion with the contractor.¹ When the Treasury chose to believe Pownall's explanation that the Army's desperate need obliged the acceptance of inferior provisions with an appropriate reduction in price,² the case was taken up by John Wilkes in 'The North Briton' as a means of embarrassing the ministry.³ Ghest's accusations were not corroborated by the investigations of either the Commissioners of Enquiry or the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, and both Hatton and Peirson found his conduct highly arbitrary.⁴ There can be little doubt that his prime motivation was a desire for revenge after Pownall's termination of his employment in May 1762,⁵ and although his zeal for the service and his determination to eradicate fraud may

1 Memorial of J. Ghest, (1762), T/1/411 f.81.

2 Pownall to Jenkinson, 14 October 1764, T/1/439 f.280. T/29/35 ff. 23 - 24, 24 December 1762.

3 The North Briton, No.40, 5 March 1763.

4 Hatton to Pownall, 15 October 1761, T/1/411 f.127. Peirson to Pownall, 24 October 1761, *ibid.* f.126.

5 *Ibid.* ff.81 - 82.

be recognized, it would be unjustified to condemn the director of the department of control on the basis of this evidence alone.

After the end of the war, when Pownall acted as one of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, Uckerman claimed that at his prompting he had written to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, stating the need for money to be advanced before the Hessian accounts could be settled,¹ and in return he had been authorized to dispose of up to £4,000 in bribes.² Uckerman added that Boyve, Pownall's former secretary and a clerk to the Commissioners, had been privy to the affair.³ Early in 1766 Boyve was accused of taking bribes to settle some accounts,⁴ and suddenly fled the country, removing a large number of papers from his office.⁵ In a letter to the Treasury he denied Uckerman's charges against Pownall and himself,⁶ a story which he changed on his return to London in July, when he said that Pownall had told him and another clerk, Tozer, that they were all to have a share of the money provided by the Landgrave.⁷ This new version of affairs was denied by Tozer and Pownall,⁸ but Peter Taylor, the former deputy pay-

1 T/29/37 ff.342 - 343, 13 February 1766.

2 Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel to J.J. Uckerman, 24 February 1765, Add. MSS. 38204 f.93.

3 T/29/37 ff.342 - 343, 13 February 1766.

4 J.C. Jeanneret to West, 31 January 1766, T/1/446 f.314.

5 T. Bradshaw, C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to (Treasury), 24 February 1766, T/1/451 f.364.

6 Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, *ibid.* f.292.

7 Examination of Boyve, 12 July 1766, T/1/455 f.33.

8 Examination of Tozer, 12 July 1766, *ibid.* f.40. Pownall to Grey Cooper, 27 July 1766, T/1/451 ff.222 - 223.

master of the forces in Germany, said that Uckerman had told him that it had been at Pownall's instigation that he had applied to the Landgrave for money to expedite the settling of accounts.¹ It is again hard to convict Pownall on the basis of this evidence. His name was not mentioned in the Landgrave's letter, and even Alt, the Hessian minister in London, who recollected having heard the accusations, was unable to identify him as the author of the plan.² Tozer denied the charges, Taylor's evidence was mere hearsay, and Boyve's contradictory versions hardly made him a credible witness. The Treasury nevertheless saw fit to deprive Pownall of the £3,000 paid to the other two Commissioners for Examining German Demands as a reward for their services,³ justifying this penalty on the grounds that he should have brought the matter to the Board's attention when rumours of it had first begun to circulate ten months before Boyve's flight.⁴

Boyve's own role in the affair was probably less innocent, although there is no positive proof of his precise involvement. His position as clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands at a salary of only 12/6d per day compared very unfavourably with the extensive responsibilities and the £2 per day which he had enjoyed in Germany. When therefore Pownall told him that merit alone in a for-

1 Add. MSS. 38339 ff.232 - 233, (1766).

2 Ibid. f.233.

3 T. Whately to Jenkinson, 11 July 1766, Add. MSS. 38205 f.60.

4 Pownall might well have felt that he had been unfairly treated in view of the fact that Charles Wolfran Cornwall, another of the Commissioners, was conversant with the whole affair from an early date, but was neither criticized nor penalized for his failure to inform the Treasury. Add. MSS. 38339 ff.229 - 230. Paper transmitted by Mr. Cornwall to Uckerman, 16 May 1765, *ibid.* f.125.

eigner was seldom a recommendation in Britain,¹ he may well have decided to look to his own interests, and his close and partially informal connection with the settlement of Uckerman's accounts² suggests that it was through him, and perhaps at his prompting, that the contractor tried to offer the Hessian bribe money. His precipitate and suspicious disappearance with his papers was never satisfactorily explained,³ and his belated attempt to incriminate Pownall by changing his story was probably designed to draw attention from himself.

Finally, there is sufficient evidence to form a judgment on the allegations of fraud made against another German commissary. Fuhr showed that on more than one occasion President von Massow had ordered magazine keepers to issue general forage receipts to contractors in exchange for the detailed receipts, which had originally been given by the troops to local people but which the contractors had bought up at a substantial discount.⁴ In this way the latter were paid the contract price for forage which they had not delivered and made a considerable and totally unjustified profit. In his defence Massow claimed that he had only ordered subordinate officials to accept receipts for forage which the troops had taken from contractors' depots

1 Memorial of Boyve, 30 September 1765, T/1/444 f.223.

2 Pownall had ordered Boyve to provide Uckerman with factual information to help him answer the Commissioners' objections to his accounts. Pownall to Grey Cooper, 27 July 1766, T/1/451 ff.224 - 225.

3 His claim that he had to leave the country to take up his appointment as a Prussian councillor of state was a convenient but not very plausible excuse. Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, T/1/451 f.292.

4 A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury's Correspondence with the Commissariat in Germany, Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 ff.1 - 3. Fuhr to Martin, 22 August 1761, Add. MSS.32927 f.163.

in the vicinity of the magazine,¹ but his statement was disproved by his directions to the magazine keeper at Holzminden to obey all the orders of the contractor, Baron Hoym, as if they came immediately from headquarters, and by a letter from his secretary to the magazine keeper at Paderborn, ordering him to accept all the receipts presented by another contractor, Councillor Rose.² Both men were thereby aided in any fraud they chose to perpetrate, and it seems unlikely that Massow would have assisted his fellow-countrymen in this way without some share of the spoils.

Unverifiable charges of corruption were made against four other commissaries.³ There was some suspicion that Fuhr did not only make revelations of fraud but actually shared in some of the profits,⁴ Legh was said to have demanded 'douceurs' for the settlement of accounts in Germany and London,⁵ while the accusations against Hatton⁶ and Ramberg⁷ exist only as general complaints. Perhaps there were other examples which did not come to light; corruption is difficult

1 Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.4.

2 Ibid. ff.2 - 5.

3 The charges against Redecker concerned his activities as a contractor rather than as a commissary, Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and Irregularities, 5 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 ff. 427 - 428.

4 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to (Treasury), 5 July 1764, T/1/431 No.15, ff.113 - 114/33 - 34.

5 Evidence of S. Ascher, 30 April 1765, T/1/455 ff.172 - 173.

6 A Short Narrative of the Evils Arising under the Commissariat in Germany, 8 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 ff.237 - 238.

7 As director of the provision train he was implicitly criticized in Hunter's statement that he suspected the affairs of the train to be subject to frauds and bad practices, Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.150 - 151.

and often impossible to detect and prove in the face of determined efforts to conceal it. Yet it seems improbable that such activities could have completely eluded the careful scrutiny of Pownall, the energetic and sometimes fanatical enquiries of Fuhr and the meticulous and lengthy investigations of the Commissioners of Enquiry and the Commissioners for Examining German Demands. Nor is there any question of the Treasury having turned a blind eye to the peccadilloes of its employees, so giving the impression that they were more honest than they actually were, for the summary dismissal of Halsey and the heavy financial penalty imposed on Pownall, both active and successful commissaries who had much to commend them, show that the Board reacted strongly to the slightest suspicion of irregularity. Thus on the basis of an admittedly small number of examples, in which the evidence is not always definitive, it is possible to conclude that while the commissaries were clearly not all as innocent as lambs they bear little resemblance to a pack of ravenous wolves.

CHAPTER IV

FORAGE

'.... the petrol of ages other than our own' ¹

Few contemporaries, civilian or military, underestimated the crucial importance of forage to the forces in Germany. The Treasury went so far as to call it 'an article of the most essential Consequence to the very being of an Army',² while commanding officers lived in a state of perpetual nervous tension as the initiation of tactical movements was delayed by the tardy formation of magazines and depots, or as dwindling stocks forced them to abandon vital positions.³ Adequate supplies of animal food-stuffs were the prerequisite of mobility and therefore of military success, if not indeed of military survival. In summer it was sometimes possible for the animals of the Combined Army to find free grazing on the road sides, commons and meadows in their immediate vicinity, but such supplies were limited and might be quickly exhausted, so that even at this season, as throughout the winter, it was necessary to supply large quantities of hay. Horses, however, cannot live on grass alone, and thus oats or other suitable grain had to be furnished all the year round, while the term 'forage' also included straw which was used for bedding purposes. It is difficult to make an accurate computation of the total amounts of provisions involved in meeting these needs. In the first place reliable stat-

1 A.C. Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War. (1971) p.137.

2 S. Martin to M. Hatton, 29 April 1760, T/64/96 f.339.

3 Prince Ferdinand's concern about forage supplies for the expedition to Hesse-Cassel early in 1761 is constantly reflected in his correspondence, and his abandonment of the siege of Cassel in March 1761 was at least partly due to shortages of the essential commodity. Ferdinand to Duke of Newcastle, 20 April 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 f.76. Marquis of Granby to Newcastle, 31 March 1761, Add. MSS. 32921 f.200.

istics of the numbers of horses in the Army do not exist, and in any case they would have been impossible to formulate because of the large numbers of animals engaged in multitudinous temporary services. In 1762, however, one commentator claimed that the Army contained as many horses as men,¹ and although this was probably an exaggeration, Peirson spoke of the existence of 60,000 effective horses in 1761,² while two estimates from an unknown source give figures of over 55,000 during the last year of the war, not including the animals used to pull local wagons pressed into service by the regiments.³ Such numbers, however vague, clearly represent a massive increase on the 16,411 horses maintained in the last year of the War of the Austrian Succession.⁴ Secondly, the daily quantities of forage consumed by individual horses were not constant, for not only was there a variation in the size of the standard ration between armies of different nationalities⁵ and between animals engaged in different services,⁶ but it was sometimes necessary to order the delivery of reduced rations on account of short-

1 Letter from Hildesheim, 7 May 1762, Add. MSS. 32938 f.214. The effective state of the Army on 1 October 1762 was 77,139, Add. MSS. 38334 f.186.

2 R. Peirson to Newcastle, 12 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32924 f.25.

3 An Estimate of the Number of Horses Employed by the Army during the Last War in Germany, 1762, Dundas of Beechwood MSS. It should also be noted that there were significant numbers of draught oxen; 800 having been purchased in 1760 merely to pull the siege artillery, Ferdinand to Commissariat, 28 August 1760, Add. MSS. 32911 f.49.

4 A Calculation of the Number of Horses for which Forage was Probably Provided during the Campaign 1748, PRO/30/8/89 f.11.

5 T.O. Hunter to Newcastle, 9 May 1759, Add. MSS. 32891 f.58.

6 In the British army the forage ration of the horse guards was larger than that of the dragoons, T/29/33 ff.63 - 64, 10 July 1758.

ages, as also on occasions to increase allowances when services were particularly onerous.¹ Nevertheless, on the basis of the standard German ration of 10 lbs. of hay, 8 lbs. of oats and 5 lbs. of straw 60,000 animals consumed 268 tons of hay, 214 tons of oats and 134 tons of straw each day, figures which require very little multiplication before beginning to assume somewhat overwhelming proportions.

The above factors together with the constant fluctuations in the price of forage, which depended not only on its availability but on the distance over which it had to be transported,² make it equally difficult to calculate the total cost of these provisions. It was estimated in 1759 that the purchase of forage to supply the entire needs of the Army would cost £112,000 per month,³ and a calculation of 1761 yielded a figure of over £124,000 per month.⁴ As some provisions were obtained free these totals are not incompatible with those for the annual expenditure on forage of £615,453/17/5, £677,134/10/3 and £749,963/14/10 in 1759, 1760 and 1761 respectively, quoted by

1 Standing Orders, 25 October 1760, Add. MSS. 28855 f.24. Hunter to Lord George Sackville, 26 April 1759, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/31.

2 See below pp.166 - 168.

3 Computation of the Expense of the Extraordinary Services of the Combined Army in Germany for the Campaign 1759, T/1/395 f.7.

4 Peirson to Newcastle, 12 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32924 f.25. Peirson calculated on the basis of 60,000 effective horses and a daily ration costing 15 stivers, giving an approximate total of £4,100 per day. This figure was an underestimate for it was based on a valuation of the £ : 11 guilders, whereas at this time it was only worth 10 guilders 8 stivers, PMG/2/5 f.257.

Westphalen,¹ which show that forage was a consistently significant item in the military budget. Free forage came from the bounty of nature, the capture of enemy supplies, and the system of forced contributions whereby enemy states, such as the Bishoprics of Hildesheim, Münster, Osnabrück and Paderborn and the Duchy of Westphalia, were expected to supply their occupying forces without remuneration usually during the period of winter quarters. The initiative in establishing the latter arrangement apparently came from Prince Ferdinand,² whose close attention to British financial interests in this matter hardly corresponds with the popular contemporary view of Germany as an insatiable and wasteful consumer of British resources.

The payment of forage obtained in other ways was governed by a complex and confused tangle of responsibilities. The ultimate financial liability for the provisions consumed by both the British army and the German forces in the pay of this country belonged to the Treasury, which attempted to recoup some of its expenditure by deductions from pay. British cavalymen and dragoons were expected to contribute to the cost of their horses' food by a nominal deduction of 6d from their subsistence money for every ration supplied by the govern-

1 F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol.V, pp.1,114 - 1,123. The cost for 1761 is given as £374,981/17/5 until 24 June and this figure has therefore been doubled. Westphalen's accounts for 1760 and 1761 contain additional sums for forage which cannot be distinguished from other items, so that the totals given here are an underestimate.

2 Ibid. Vol.I, pp.113 - 114. Hunter to Treasury, 13 August 1759, T/64/96 ff.216 - 219. Hunter claimed that the system of contributions was a new one, but as the practice of armies subsisting at the expense of enemy territory is as old as war itself, he must have been referring to the detailed arrangements and quotas which the Commander-in-Chief had introduced.

ment.¹ During the war the Treasury adopted a hard-line approach to this matter, refusing to abate its claim to reimbursement even when it was pointed out that during the campaign of 1758 it had not in fact provided any forage.² Similar deductions were made from the pay of the Hessian troops,³ and also presumably from that of the Hanoverian and Brunswick forces.⁴ From the opposite point of view, however, the Treasury granted allowances of forage money to British officers and other regimental officials, such as surgeons and sutlers, to assist them in the period when they were not supplied by the government and usually calculated as two hundred days per annum.⁵ Among the German troops in British pay a far more complicated system known as 'vacant rations' was operated. In fact this general term had a number of different meanings. In the first place it was a payment to regiments for the difference between the number of horses to which the officers were entitled on the establishment and the number of horses which they actually kept, so that by a somewhat twisted logic, not uncommon in military admin-

1 Sackville to Hunter, 26 July 1759, T/1/395 f.43. J. Williamson, A Treatise of Military Finance (1782) p.53.

2 Granby to Newcastle, 25 September 1759, Add. MSS. 32896 f.82. Viscount Barrington to Newcastle, 4 October 1759, *ibid.* f.268.

3 T/29/35 f.246, 26 December 1763.

4 No specific reference to this has been found, but a deduction of 6d per ration was made from the pay of the Hanoverian troops in British service in 1743, Forage Allowed to the Troops of Hanover, T/1/375 No.155, f.286.

5 Rations Allowed to the Officers of the British Troops, 6 October 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/59. T/29/34 f.284, 18 May 1762. Letter from the General Serving in Germany, 24 September 1762, Bute MSS. No. 456(a). The allowance was granted in terms of a number of rations and then translated into cash at the rate of 6d per ration, Return of the General Staff in Germany 1758 - 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/64.

istration, money was claimed for the forage which the non-existent animals did not consume.¹ In this case the allowance was also known as a 'rachat' and for the Hessians was again calculated at 6d per ration.² Before the end of 1759 the concession was only granted to commissioned officers, but after pressure from Prince Ferdinand the Treasury ordered Hunter to allow it to the non-commissioned officers of cavalry and dragoon regiments, who were entitled to two rations of forage per day but only had one horse.³ Secondly, vacant rations represented the forage which was not drawn for the non-effective horses of the private soldiers of mounted regiments, an allowance also accorded by the Treasury at the end of 1759.⁴ Thirdly, when parties and detachments of troops who were entitled to draw government forage were too distant from the sources of supply to do so, and were thus obliged to purchase their own provisions, these rations were also considered vacant and reimbursed at the rate of 6 dollars per month.⁵

The system of vacant rations was a peculiar one not

1 Extract of a Letter from Brunswick, 12 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f.323.

2 T/29/33 f.22, 1 March 1758.

3 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.151. Extract of a Letter from J. West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, Add. MSS. 32898 f.153. Extract of a Letter from Hunter to West, 9 October 1759, *ibid*, f.154.

4 *Ibid*. Extract of a Letter from Martin to Hunter, 25 October 1759, Add. MSS. 32898 ff.154 - 155. Although it was claimed at the end of the war that the allowance for vacant rations did not apply to non-effective horses, Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts Appear to be, 10 January 1763, T/1/427 ff.359 - 360, this view did not accord with established Treasury policy.

5 Peirson to F. Halsey, 23 June 1760, Halsey MSS. 15115.

found in either the Prussian or the British army,¹ and the money paid was supposed to be used to help keep the regiments numerically complete,² although the complexity of the accounts and the resultant delays in payment meant that the cash for this matter of vital importance was seldom promptly available.³ Nor did the system necessarily encourage the maximum military efficiency, for there were financial advantages in remaining below the regimental establishment. As one correspondent remarked:- '.... on peut malheureusement dire de quelques Regimens, que plus ils sont incomplets, plus ils gagnent'.⁴ It was presumably because of these factors, coupled with the increasing revelations of fraud in connection with officers' receipts for vacant rations, that towards the end of the war the Treasury suggested the total abolition of the allowance, and its replacement with a fixed sum to be agreed with the commanding officers of regiments.⁵ But the Commander-in-Chief opposed the change, concerned at the discontent which it would create in his army, and arguing that the Treasury gained financial advantages from the existing arrangements as vacant rations were calculated at less than their real value.⁶ As usual the

1 Extract of a Letter from Hildesheim, 3 April 1762, Add. MSS. 32936 f.382. Extract of a Letter from Brunswick, 12 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f.323.

2 Mr. Best's Answers to the Objections of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 9 May 1764, T/1/432 No.97, f.223/273.

3 A considerable proportion of the accounts were not settled until the end of the war and then on an arbitrary basis. See below p.209, n.1.

4 Add. MSS. 32936 f.382.

5 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. MSS. 32935 ff.135 - 136.

6 Reply of Ferdinand to Howard's Memorial, 3 June 1762, T/1/417 ff. 61 - 62.

Board felt obliged to bow to military advice, although by 1762 it was really far too late to change an established practice.

The whole system of forage deductions and allowances illustrates some of the typical complexities of military finance in this period. Designed to ensure that the troops had sufficient money to provide for themselves and to reimburse the government for what it supplied, it gave with one hand and took away with the other. One is inevitably left wondering whether it might not have been simpler not to give in the first place and equally to abandon the claim to reimbursement. This would have led to much simplification and to no more inaccuracy, for the sums actually allowed such as 6d per ration and 6 dollars per month were purely nominal, and bore no relation to the cost of the forage involved, to transport charges or to fluctuations in the rate of exchange.¹ Under these conditions it was impossible to say whether the financial interests of either the troops or the Treasury were being upheld or damaged, and this was clearly an unsatisfactory situation. A complicated accounting exercise with a facade of accuracy thus bore no relation to financial reality, and stands as a significant criticism of the administrative methods of the period. On behalf of the Treasury, however, it may be argued that it was not unaware of the drawbacks of a system which it had inherited, and its proposal to abandon payments for vacant rations in the interests of greater rationalization, albeit belated, does not support the theory that eighteenth century administration was characterized by blind ad-

¹ The cost of a ration of forage varied considerably in the course of the war. See below pp.176 - 180.

herence to tradition. Nor was civilian reluctance to rock the military boat in the midst of war entirely misplaced as a guiding principle.

The simplest method of purchasing animal food-stuffs was for the soldiers themselves to forage what was needed from the houses, barns and fields of the producers, for which purpose regiments usually possessed such non-combative equipment as scythes, sickles and cords.¹ In theory this was a cheap and effective procedure, for it avoided transport costs and the army was not deprived of valuable resources by the refusal of the indigenous population to make them available. In practice, however, the process of foraging was time-consuming and militarily inefficient, and it was also cordially hated by local people, to whom it seemed little better than armed robbery, frequently involving forced entry of their property,² physical assault on their persons,³ and the loss of the essential sustenance of themselves and their animals.⁴ Military authorities regarded some degree of foraging as inevitable,⁵ but there was always a feeling that its existence reflected an inadequacy in or a break-down of more regular supply arrangements.⁶ The latter consisted of delivering forage to the troops, either directly to their positions in the field or into depots and stores known as magazines in their immediate vicinity. These so-called

1 Military Order Book, 4 May 1758, Peterborough Museum Society.

2 Standing Orders, 13 September 1760, Add. MSS. 28855 f.14.

3 D. Reden to C. Hotham, 8 August 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/313 f.100.

4 Military Order Book, 10 October 1762, Peterborough Museum Society.

5 Ferdinand to Granby, 24 April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 ff.116 - 117.

6 Peirson to Newcastle, 29 July 1760, T/1/405 f.72.

'country deliveries' were made by local peasants and farmers, sometimes on their own accounts or as part of more general agreements made by governments, local authorities and officials. Private contractors and agents could also be employed, and this method had the advantage of extending the area from which forage was drawn, in some cases beyond the frontiers of Germany, although transport costs were thereby augmented and had to be added to the profits which private merchants expected.

Certain aspects of foraging raised further contentious financial issues on which the Treasury formulated no clear policy until 1760, and then only as a result of Prince Ferdinand's urgent request for a statement. The Commander-in-Chief was concerned that the increasing resentment against foraging would make local people withhold their provisions, and consequently jeopardize the supply arrangements for the coming campaign. His letter to Granby made it clear that a number of issues required greater precision. For example, when a country was foraged to prevent supplies falling into the hands of the enemy were the inhabitants to be paid for what was seized, and could the subjects of enemy and neutral states claim payment for provisions taken by the troops? ¹ On the whole the Board's views on these matters seem to have been moderate and just. Allied and neutral territories, foraged to deprive the enemy of their provisions, were not to expect an indemnification for what was tantamount to a loss to the

¹ Ferdinand to Granby, 24 April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 ff.116 & 118 - 119.

enemy,¹ although even subjects of hostile states were to be reimbursed for ordinary foraging as long as their contribution commitments had been fulfilled.² The Treasury also took up the question of green forage cut from the fields, pointing out that it was almost impossible to ascertain its value, as a result of which it had not been the usual practice of armies to pay for such supplies. No specific decision on this matter has come to light, but there is evidence that the troops continued to give receipts for such forage³ and that the right to reimbursement was recognized at the end of the war.⁴ In these ways the Board enjoyed some success in balancing the claims of German producers, supported by the military's desire to encourage effective supply, with the upholding of British financial interests. But at the same time the delay in formulating its precise liabilities shows a certain readiness to procrastinate in the face of complicated administrative decisions, and to take refuge in the belief that everything could be comprehensively settled at leisure when the war was over. Such an attitude had a detrimental effect on the efficiency of supply and was a contributory factor in the delays which developed in the settlement of accounts.

Although the Treasury accepted an extensive financial liability for the forage of its troops and the intervention of its commissaries was always necessary to authorize the prices to be paid,

1 Prince Ferdinand's Paper of 24 April, Observations upon it, *ibid.* f.124.

2 T/29/33 f.323, 21 May 1760.

3 Peirson to Martin, 7 July 1760, T/1/405 f.70.

4 T. Pownall to Martin, 16 July 1762, T/1/420 f.107. The issue is complicated by the fact that the term 'green foraging' could also apply to provisions taken from the bounty of nature.

its control of the practical arrangements for supply was significantly limited firstly by the powers of the military authorities, and secondly by those of German governments and officials. Military influence is seen at its clearest in the organization and direction of foraging, which remained the responsibility of individual commanding officers throughout the war,¹ although towards the end of 1761 Prince Ferdinand appointed Lieutenant-General Howard to direct and co-ordinate these activities so as to avoid the many conflicts and confusions which had arisen.² It would have been more appropriate for a Treasury commissary to have exercised this function, for military commanders, having no responsibility for the formation of magazines, did not always see the forage problem from a sufficiently long-term point of view.³ Nor was the Treasury's influence over the supply of contribution forage much more pronounced, for the direction of these matters was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, assisted by a body called the Winter Quarters Supply Commission.⁴ From its inception the membership of the latter included both German and British military officers and German officials, although there is some uncertainty as to whether a rep-

1 See the numerous rules and regulations which form part of the Standing Orders, Add. MSS. 28855.

2 Ibid. f.60, 8 September 1761.

3 Foraging could exhaust a country's supplies and make deliveries to magazines impossible, Letter of J.P. Heppe, 22 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/8/11. When Howard was appointed to the direction of the commissariat in 1762, the post of co-ordinator of foraging was apparently transferred to German hands, although Sir James Cockburn felt that logically it should have been given to the commissariat, Cockburn to Howard, 6 September 1762, *ibid.* D/HV/B/8/1.

4 Westphalen, *op. cit.* Vol.I, pp.111 - 113.

representative of the commissariat was associated with them before 1760.¹ In the latter part of the war a number of Treasury employees served on the Commission,² but it seems likely that the dominant influence was exercised by the ubiquitous President von Massow,³ and despite the fact that British commissaries usually participated in decisions,⁴ they probably played second fiddle to a man whose knowledge of the country and whose contacts with local officials were far superior to their own. Such a situation was hardly satisfactory in that the commissariat's formation of magazines depended partly on forage purchased from enemy states once they had fulfilled their contribution quotas, for which purpose some control over the arrangements made during the winter was essential. That this was far from the case appears in Hatton's comment that, although a member of the Commission, he had never been in possession of any of its papers.⁵

The control of the Treasury and commissariat over deliveries made on a voluntary basis by the local authorities, officials, peasants and merchants of allied and neutral states was in theory more complete. The requisitions or requests for supply from these

1 According to Ferdinand's letter to the Earl of Halifax of 23 December 1762, SP/87/47 f.211, Hunter had been a member of the Commission, although another source suggests that Hatton was the first British commissary to serve in January 1760, Letter of the Commission, 5 January 1762, SP/81/117.

2 Peirson, Howard and Cockburn, SP/87/47 f.211.

3 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.I, p.113. Letter of the Commission, 5 January 1762, SP/81/117.

4 Peirson and Hatton signed the orders of the Commission, Instructions to Mr. Rose for Levying the Contribution Money, 26 January 1760, SP/9/233.

5 Hatton to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 6 December 1765, SP/9/231.

sources could come from military commanders, but they needed the authorization and confirmation of the commissariat before being accepted as a legitimate charge on Great Britain.¹ In the case of the British troops in the Combined Army this was something of a new development, for their commanding officers traditionally possessed plenary powers to make forage agreements abroad,² a situation which not infrequently led to friction between the military and civilian authorities. One such example occurred in 1758, when on arrival in Germany the British Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Marlborough, signed what the Treasury considered to be an exorbitant forage contract.³ Marlborough was informed that had the bargain been made subject to the Board's approval it would not have been confirmed,⁴ and he was advised to try to persuade the contractor to abandon his agreement and to make a new and hopefully more reasonable one,⁵ a somewhat humiliating posture for any government to have to adopt. But after the assumption of direct responsibility for the supply of the Combined Army in December 1758 such a situation could not arise, for the forage of the British contingent was provided by the commissariat in the same way as that of the foreign troops, a development which constituted a sensible centralization

1 Pownall, C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 25 February 1765, T/52/109 ff.32 - 33.

2 Short Narrative of Treasury Proceedings for Supplying Troops in Germany, 23 October 1758, T/1/386 No.73, f.3.

3 Treasury to Duke of Marlborough, 30 October 1758, T/27/27 f.394.

4 Ibid. This seems to suggest that the Treasury would have preferred to compel the military authorities to make contracts subject to its approval, but was unable to do so as the provision of forage abroad was traditionally a matter for the commanding officer, with which the Board did not interfere. T/1/386 No.73, f.3.

5 T/27/27 f.394.

of authority in the Treasury's hands.¹

The commissaries could issue their own orders and make their own contracts and agreements for forage supply, subject to the Treasury's approval, without waiting for specific military orders, although their practical freedom of action was restricted in a variety of ways. For example, Prince Ferdinand and his closest advisers made no attempt to conceal their dislike of the employment of private merchants and entrepreneurs, arguing that they thought only of their own profits,² and that the need to reveal troop dispositions to them for delivery purposes was an unnecessary security risk.³ Such an attitude, emanating from the Commander-in-Chief, must have raised doubts in the minds of the Treasury's employees as to the wisdom of this method of supply, and the uncertainty may well have been reinforced by the prejudices exhibited by governments and local authorities towards contractors who did not enjoy their favour.⁴ Thus Hunter complained that:-

"The Supply of Forage & Provisions to the army here is now become a more irksome & disagreeable Task than ever, for those in power in these Countrys show but too plainly that none but such as are countenanced by themselves shall have the means of doing it"⁵ There was

1 The powers of the British Commander-in-Chief were not abrogated, but fell largely into abeyance with the appointment of Hunter as Superintendent and Director of Extraordinaries.

2 Ferdinand to Baron Münchhausen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol. III, p.338.

3 Ferdinand to Granby, (1760), Add. MSS. 28553 f.121.

4 In the case of Moses Levy, a Hanoverian contractor sent to supply the army in Hesse-Cassel in 1759, these prejudices went as far as imprisonment and the extortion of a large fine to secure his release, Hunter to (R. Oswald), 4 November 1759, T/1/395 f.379.

5 Hunter to (Martin), 13 September 1759, T/64/96 f.226.

thus some pressure on the commissariat to supply the Army with forage delivered directly by local producers, not in itself a bad principle, as such provisions were in theory cheaper than those of contractors, although the fact that the commissaries lacked any political or military authority tended to allow the control and organization of local deliveries to fall entirely into the hands of German authorities and officials. When in 1760 - 1761 Ferdinand demanded over one million rations, a so-called 'aid delivery', from various allied states, the commissariat failed to take the initiative in making the necessary administrative arrangements and an 'ad hoc' body, known as the Commission for Providing the Army, came into existence.¹ Peirson stated that in reality the Commission did not exist; that it was merely a high-sounding title invented to encourage the carrying out of orders.² This would not have mattered had such orders come from Treasury commissaries, but although Hatton's signature was sometimes included in the Commission's directives,³ the dominant influence again belonged to Massow, who issued instructions under his name alone and used the unofficial title to arrogate unwarranted powers to himself.⁴ To organize that part of the delivery which was to come from Minden and Ravensberg he employed another Prussian official, Redecker,⁵ who by mak-

1 Protocol of the Commission for Providing the Army, 23 December 1760, SP/9/228. A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury's Correspondence with the Commissariat in Germany, Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.3.

2 Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.3.

3 Providing Commission to Münchausen, 3 January 1761, SP/9/228.

4 Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.3.

5 Massow to Councillor Redecker, 23 December 1760, SP/9/230.

ing agreements with entrepreneurs to supply the forage totally changed the nature of the operation.¹ When these affairs were investigated in 1762, it proved to be virtually impossible to decide Redecker's exact status and the authority by which he acted.² Such were the ramifications and complexity of the affair that the commissariat had lost control of arrangements, and it is not inconceivable that it was unaware of Redecker's activities.

Towards the end of the war efforts were made to prevent matters slipping out of the hands of the Treasury's representatives in these ways. On the basis of information provided by Fuhr in 1761 the Board instigated an investigation of Massow's involvement in supply arrangements, and this culminated in an order to Peirson on 27 January 1762 that, while the President of the Chamber of War of Minden was to continue to advise and assist the commissariat, he was on no account to issue directions or to take any authority upon himself.³ A more positive move followed shortly afterwards, when the number of British commissaries was dramatically increased⁴ in an attempt to render the services of German officials less necessary. These changes were introduced very late in the day, but at least the problem had been recognized and some steps taken to ensure that he who paid the piper called more of the tunes.

1 Exposé of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/313 ff.285 - 286. If the delivery was to have been executed by private merchants, the commissariat should have made the necessary contracts without recourse to the assistance of German officials.

2 Letter of the Commissioners of Enquiry, 11 November 1762, SP/9/230.

3 Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 ff.3 - 4.

4 See above pp.58 - 59.

This examination of the administrative framework, within which the supply of forage to the Combined Army was organized, reveals a state of divided responsibilities with no one authority in a position to undertake the task of overall co-ordination. Such a situation did not facilitate the commissariat's duty to fill the magazines as efficiently and as cheaply as possible, although it was to some extent inevitable. The system of contributions, established by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of military conquest and involving no financial liability on the part of the Treasury, would not have been an appropriate charge for the commissariat to administer, while although the Board paid for provisions foraged by the troops in non-enemy states, the process of foraging could only operate on a foundation of military authority and discipline, which commissaries could not provide. In the same way German officials were bound to play an important part in forage supply, as they alone possessed political authority and influence over local inhabitants. Nevertheless, the commissariat does not always seem to have grasped the opportunities which presented themselves to assert its authority over various aspects of supply, and it must be criticized for its readiness to hand over the wheel to those like Massow, who did not have the safeguarding of British interests at heart. Nor was the Treasury above criticism, for its underestimate of the numbers of employees needed to staff the service in Germany adequately was at least partially responsible for the commissaries' somewhat passive acceptance of a back-seat role.

From a discussion of the system by which the provis-

ion of forage was controlled and administered, we turn to an investigation of the policies pursued by the Treasury and its commissaries in carrying out their particular responsibilities. Firstly, did the measures adopted provide effective supply for the troops in the form of prompt arrangements for adequate provisions, and secondly, were the interests of Great Britain upheld in the form of agreements whose terms were precise and exact and at prices which were reasonable or advantageous? In 1757 and 1758, when provision was confined to the Hessian troops in British pay, to the small corps of Prussians which served with the Combined Army and to the British troops, who only arrived in Germany in July 1758, the record of the British authorities was far from successful. To Amherst and Boyd, the two commissaries in charge, the most sensible arrangement seemed to be for the Hanoverian Chancery of War, through its commissariat services, to provide forage for the contingents maintained by Britain from the same sources and by the same means as they furnished their own more numerous troops, so avoiding a wasteful duplication of effort in making contracts and forming magazines.¹ In theory there was much to be said for this point of view and forage thus supplied should have been considerably cheaper than that of a private merchant, but unfortunately the Hanoverian authorities refused to make any contractual agreement on prices, arguing that provisions were purchased at many different rates and involved widely varying costs,² so that what was supplied on the British account would have to be left to a retrospective settlement. Thus the Treasury was committed

1 T/29/33 ff.22 & 25 - 26, 1 & 8 March 1758. On his way to Germany Amherst, through Sir Joseph Yorke, had made an initial contract with the British firm of Pye and Cruickshanks at Amsterdam for 1,200,000 rations. (J. Amherst) to Treasury, 10 April 1757, T/1/375 No.31, f.66.

2 T/29/33 ff.21 - 22, 1 March 1758.

to pay for forage at whatever prices the suppliers chose to buy it, and Amherst's belief that a specific and detailed contract was unnecessary as the Hanoverians were equally the King's officers shows a certain degree of naivety.¹ Moreover, by early 1758 when the Treasury came to investigate these affairs in detail, it had become clear that any settlement might prove to be even more detrimental to British interests, as many of the receipts of those who had sold forage to the Hanoverian commissariat and of those who had paid for its transport were irretrievably lost in places occupied by the French.² There was thus little chance of verifying the accounts let alone justifying them. Although the Board had every reason to be concerned at this unsatisfactory state of affairs, its own part in events was not above criticism. The exact nature of Amherst's agreement had not been discovered until nearly a year after it had been made for the simple but somewhat astonishing reason that his letter of March 1757 was mislaid in Whitehall, and only came to light after a frantic search in February 1758.³

Determined to make amends for this lapse, the Board decided to take matters more into its own hands by concluding a contract with Pye and Cruickshanks of Amsterdam for the purchase of up to £100,000 worth of forage in the Dutch Republic.⁴ It seems that this

1 Ibid. f.21. The Treasury certainly did not share this opinion, regarding the King's Hanoverian officers with the greatest suspicion.

2 Ibid. f.22.

3 T/29/33 ff.11 & 14, 1 & 8 February 1758. It is possible that Devonshire's Board was aware of the letter but Newcastle's, which took office in June 1757, apparently remained ignorant of the affair.

4 Treasury to Pye & Cruickshanks, 21 March 1758, T/1/385 No.32.

agreement involved more than simple supply considerations, being partly a response to Prince Ferdinand's opinion that such purchases would make it more difficult for the French to find provisions,¹ but this could hardly excuse a basic lack of precision in its formulation, which later made it impossible to decide whether the forage had been bought for the forces in British pay or as a friendly advance to the Hanoverians.²

Moreover, in another alarming example of administrative laxity, no record of the transaction found its way into the Treasury's papers.³ In addition to these moves Boyd, who had now succeeded Amherst, was given strict instructions to make no further agreements with the Hanoverian Chancery without seeking approval from London, except on a temporary basis in an emergency.⁴ Unfortunately, according to the commissary, this order came too late to prevent him reopening negotiations to renew the arrangements on the same vague terms.⁵ Boyd was also instructed to obtain proposals for alternative methods of supply,⁶ although his search for such proved largely elusive because of the high prices demanded by private contractors and their reluctance to undertake the transport of the provisions.⁷ In August therefore the Treasury sugg-

1 Ferdinand to Boyd, 11 March 1758, Add. MSS. 32878 f.199.

2 Remarks on Baron Münchausen's Memorial, 3 August 1759, T/1/395 ff.341 - 342.

3 Ibid.

4 J. West to Boyd, 11 March 1758, T/27/27 f.322.

5 West to Boyd, 14 April 1758, *ibid.* f.327. Boyd to Treasury, 29 April 1758, T/1/386 No.29.

6 West to Boyd, 14 April 1758, T/27/27 f.328.

7 Boyd to Treasury, 5 May 1758, T/1/386 No.30. Baron Steinberg to Boyd, 4 May 1758, *ibid.* No.31.

ested to Boyd that forage for the Hessians and Prussians, as well as for the newly-arrived British troops, might best be supplied by the Hanoverian commissariat,¹ not so much a contradiction of its former views, as the expression of a somewhat forlorn hope that the German authorities would change their minds and be prepared to contract on the basis of fixed prices. Their refusal to do so² can have surprised no one but the Board, although their inability to supply forage to the British troops on even a temporary basis was more unexpected,³ and caused an immediate crisis, which drove the Duke of Marlborough into his contract with Abraham Prado at the astronomical price of 2/9½d per ration.⁴

Thus in these first two years forage supply was not organized with the maximum efficiency. Although the Hessians and Prussians were apparently never short of provisions, this was far from the case with the British troops, while in a number of ways the agreements concluded lacked the precision necessary for the safeguarding of British interests. The Treasury had for long remained ignorant of the nature of the policy pursued by its employees, and its attempts to find a more effective way to supply the Army in the first half of 1758 had been characterized by an inappropriately vacillating attitude. The commissaries for their part, labouring under a heavy burden of work,⁵

1 Treasury to Boyd, 1 August 1758, T/27/27 f.371.

2 Martin to Boyd, 30 August 1758, *ibid.* f.377.

3 Boyd to Treasury, 9 September 1758, T/1/386 No.57.

4 Computation of Forage by Mr. Hume, T/1/405 f.490.

5 Both men acted as commissary of musters to the Hessians as well as having onerous military duties to perform.

had shown an unfortunate tendency to abandon their responsibilities to the Hanoverian authorities.

Given the far greater obligations and the increasing difficulties of forage supply in the last four years of the war, the record of the Treasury and its commissaries shows much improvement. Although there were frequent complaints about shortages of magazine provisions, the evidence does little to suggest that such failures were primarily the result of inadequate or tardy arrangements on the part of British officials. Throughout his period in office Hunter was closely attentive to the organization of supply from a variety of sources, including the purchase of magazines belonging to the Hanoverian commissariat,¹ agreements with German authorities for deliveries by their subjects² and contracts with both German and British merchants.³ If the Army did not always have sufficient forage,⁴ it was often the result of practical difficulties of delivery,⁵ and although the Superintendent's arrangements did not always reach the level of optimum provision, it was partly because he justifiably refused to make purchases faster than supplies could be brought into the magazines.⁶

1 Hunter to (Martin), 31 January 1759, T/64/96 f.12(a).

2 Hunter to Oswald, 1 April 1759, T/1/395 f.373.

3 Hunter to Oswald, 5 March 1759, T/1/396 f.131. Contract between Hunter and J.J. Uckerman, 20 September 1759, T/64/96 ff.232 - 236. Hunter to Martin, 4 March 1759, *ibid.* ff.51 - 52. Hunter to Oswald, 3 May 1759, T/1/396 ff.30/31.

4 Ferdinand to Münchausen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, *op. cit.* Vol.III, p.338.

5 Local people would not always obey Hunter's requisitions for forage, C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Ferdinand, 24 June 1759, *ibid.* pp.298 - 299.

6 Hunter to Martin, 11 February 1759 & 4 March 1759, T/64/96 ff.28 - 29 & 51 - 52. Extensive purchases in a short space of time would also have caused an artificial rise in prices.

Further rumblings of dissatisfaction with the commissariat's performance were heard early in 1760, when Ferdinand complained that in three months scarcely eight days forage had been amassed at Cassel, so ruining his tactical plans.¹ He attributed the failure partly to the commissariat's lack of knowledge of the country,² although in this connection it may be pointed out that British officials had certainly not made the mistake of trying to draw supplies from too restricted an area, having commissioned Thomas Halsey to make purchases for Cassel along the Weser,³ a plan frustrated as much by transport problems as by anything else.⁴

More serious complaints and recriminations occurred a year later, when it was reported that:- '.... the troops, (The British especially) and the Horses, are dwindled down almost to nothing, for want of Bread, & Forage, and a Total neglect of Magazines in the proper Places'.⁵ A detailed examination of the state of affairs in one part of the country at this time from the papers of Frederick Halsey, who was acting as a commissary in the Münster area, reveals that there were certainly some failures of supply. At Lipstadt in April the troops had to forage for themselves over considerable distances more

1 Ferdinand to W. Pitt, 20 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f.450. Ferdinand to Newcastle, 22 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 ff.31 - 32.

2 Ferdinand to Pitt, 20 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f.450.

3 Hatton to Martin, 15 April 1760, T/1/405 f.185.

4 In his letter to Pitt Ferdinand also attributed the transport difficulties to the commissaries' lack of knowledge of the country, but this was a somewhat oversimplified view.

5 Newcastle to Peirson, 13 January 1761, Add. MSS. 32917 f.275.

than 17,000 rations of oats and hay and nearly 7,000 rations of straw in a mere four or five days because they were unprovided with magazines.¹ But this was hardly surprising, for the whole area had been almost foraged to exhaustion and the commissariat was desperately bringing in oats, hay and straw from the Dutch Republic, the lower reaches of the Ems and the county of Bentheim.² Halsey gave his full attention to the organization of supply, making numerous contracts large and small, according high prices for forage carried over long distances so as not to deprive himself of any possible source of supply,³ and forming depots at critical points on the Dutch supply lines in order to effect a continuous replenishment of the major magazines.⁴ Nor could he be accused of giving too much attention to less pressing aspects of his duties, such as the settlement of old accounts, for he specifically ordered his deputies to concentrate on the more immediate matters of supply.⁵ The object of all this effort was to keep the troops provided with their daily needs on a hand-to-mouth basis, and yet at the same time Ferdinand expected the forming of magazines for the coming campaign. Considering all the difficulties and obstacles it was something of an achievement that by mid-June Halsey had amassed

1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 10 April 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031. F. Halsey to Hatton, 14 April 1761, *ibid.* Some of the provisions had to be carried distances of four or five leagues.

2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030. F. Halsey to Massow, 13 May 1761, *ibid.* 15031. F. Halsey to Ferdinand, 11 April 1761, *ibid.*

3 F. Halsey to Peirson, 2 May 1761, *ibid.* F. Halsey's Book of Contracts, April - June 1761, Halsey MSS. 15303.

4 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, *ibid.* 15030.

5 F. Halsey to Mr. Berth, 8 May 1761, *ibid.* 15031.

five magazines and a depot to supply a garrison of 10,000 for two months at Münster.¹ The military authorities might feel dissatisfied, but it is doubtful whether more could have been done to effect a regular supply of forage in an exhausted country.

Much the same story can be told in connection with the forage shortages in Hesse-Cassel, which were a contributory factor to the raising of the siege of Cassel in March 1761. Here the country had been reduced to something not far short of a desert by the combined effects of continuous campaigning and French exactions,² so that most provisions had to be brought long distances up the Weser. Before the winter campaign had begun, Hatton had travelled as far as Bremen in an attempt to lay the foundations of a regular supply of forage by water from as far afield as the Dutch Republic and Hamburg,³ and yet in the end the best laid plans had gone astray and all the obstacles to provision over such distances in mid-winter had proved too much. Thus in formulating its policies for supply the commissariat had not shown any tendency to lethargy and negligence, and although some of its plans presented major problems of execution, it had had no alternative but to attempt to put them into operation.

In turning to an examination of the defence of Brit-

1 F. Halsey to N. Mogens, 12 June 1761, *ibid.* 15029.

2 T.G. Smollett, Continuation of the Complete History of England. (1762 - 1765) Vol.V, pp.113 - 114. J. Clavering to Earl of Holderness, 9 September & 13 December 1760, Clavering Letter Books.

3 Peirson to Newcastle, 6 November 1760, Add. MSS. 32914 f.130. Peirson to F. Halsey, 30 October 1760, Halsey MSS. 15134.

ish interests in the years 1759 - 1762, it is clear firstly, that the commissaries were largely successful in formulating contractual agreements in precise terms with the inclusion of adequate safeguards. At the beginning of the period care was already being taken to define weights and measures accurately, a matter of some importance in a country where several different systems were in operation,¹ and to ensure that when payments were made in German currency, the fluctuating dollar was quoted in ducats.² Most contracts at this time were also careful to lay down the exact arrangements for payment, stipulating that it would be made at regular intervals or as certain proportions of the total delivery were effected, so as to encourage the contractor to carry out his obligations methodically and completely.³ In addition, attention was usually given to fixing the time limits within which deliveries were to be completed, although by 1760 there seems to have been some slackness in this respect, probably as a result of the increasing shortages of provisions and of difficulties in transporting them.⁴ In 1761 Pownall drew attention to this matter, pointing out that every agreement must contain a time clause if the commissariat was not to find itself short of forage at critical moments, and burden-

1 Contract between Hunter and Uckerman, 20 September 1759, T/64/96 f. 233. Contract between the Commissariat and G. Aussemorth, 8 October 1760, Halsey MSS. 15055.

2 Contracts separated by only short intervals of time showed significant variations in exchange rates. Thus an agreement with G. Mottman & Co. of 14 October 1760, Halsey MSS. 15056, quoted the ducat @ $3\frac{1}{2}$ dollars, while one with Samuel & Zuntz of 29 November 1760, *ibid.* 15066, valued it @ $3\frac{2}{3}$ dollars.

3 Contract between Hunter and Uckerman, 20 September 1759, T/64/96 f. 234. The proportion to be delivered before payment could be demanded was usually at least one half, but there were wide variations. Contracts between the Commissariat and N.F. Leopold, 19 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15062 & 15063.

4 Contract between the Commissariat and Mottman & Co., 14 October 1760, Halsey MSS. 15057, stating that deliveries were to be made as soon as possible.

ed with unwanted deliveries when the need had long since passed.¹ This recommendation was scrupulously observed in a number of contracts made by Cockburn in the last year of the war,² suggesting that any former tendency to a lack of precision had been corrected.

The commissariat's agreements also contained more specific safeguards of British interests. It was always the custom to include inspection clauses, so that it was possible to verify that provisions were up to standard and that the exact terms of the contract had been fulfilled,³ while failures in these respects were subject to penalties throughout the period.⁴ As dishonest practices increased, further conditions based on bitter experience were written into contracts, such as that the deliverer must make his account books available for inspection,⁵ while the penalties imposed for non-fulfillment and fraud became both more precise and more harsh. Thus whereas in mid-1760 the contractor Uckerman had been threatened simply with whatever punishment the Commander-in-Chief should see fit to impose should he fail to carry out his obligations on time,⁶ by the last part of the war it was more usual to insist on a forfeiture of one third of all

1 Pownall to Peirson, 20 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.286.

2 State of the Contracts made by Sir J. Cockburn, 17 June 1762, T/1/417 ff.413 - 414. Contracts of Sir J. Cockburn, October - November 1762, *ibid.* ff.242 - 261.

3 Contract between Hunter and M. Levy, 6 March 1759, T/64/96 f.69.

4 Contract between Hatton and Uckerman, 3 June 1760, T/1/405 f.404.

5 Contract between the Commissariat and G. Aussemorth, 8 October 1760, Halsey MSS. 15055.

6 Contract between Hatton and Uckerman, 3 June 1760, T/1/405 f.404.

deliveries if time limits were not adhered to.¹ From 1761 onwards traffic in bought receipts² was subject to the draconian but necessary penalty of total confiscation of all provisions already delivered and also of those amassed in depots awaiting delivery.³

The generally satisfactory nature of contract formulation in the last four years of the war does not mean that there were no mistakes and lapses. Hunter's great contract with Uckerman, which turned over the employees of the commissariat to the service of a private contractor in order to expedite his deliveries, ran the risk of compromising British interests.⁴ Hatton was guilty on one occasion of making a contract which contained a basic contradiction in its terms, allowing the contractor on the one hand to bring to account vouchers for deliveries to the troops from his depots, while on the other forbidding all commerce in receipts on pain of confiscation.⁵ Frederick Halsey unwisely included a clause in an agreement with Leopold, permitting unsupervised deliveries direct to the troops instead of into a magazine, where quantity and quality could be verified by a commissariat official.⁶ Such examples of lack of judgment or careless-

1 Contracts of Sir J. Cockburn, October - November 1762, T/1/417 ff. 246 & 260. Contracts throughout the period had contained the provision that if deliveries were not made on time, the commissariat had the right to make alternative purchases at the contractor's expense.

2 See below pp.198 - 199.

3 T/1/417 ff.242 - 261.

4 Contract between Hunter and Uckerman, 20 September 1759, T/64/96 f. 235. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.125.

5 Remarks on Hatton's Contract with Redecker of 19 February 1762, SP/9/230.

6 T/29/34 f.75, 19 May 1761.

ness should not be passed over, yet they are not typical of Hunter, Hatton and Halsey, nor of the commissariat in general, whose approach to the draughting of forage contracts was on the whole very careful and alive to the need to protect British interests within a framework of specific conditions backed by mercantile law.

Agreements between the commissariat and local farmers tended to be considerably vaguer than those concluded with contractors. Instructions issued by Blakeney to various bailiwicks for forage deliveries at the end of the war made no regulation as to time, quantity, species and price,¹ while Frederick Halsey's letter to the Regency of Waldeck in 1761 spoke somewhat casually of several thousand rations and payment at a reasonable price.² Such examples, however, do not necessarily prove negligence on the commissariat's part for, as many local people had little desire to yield up their valuable provisions to the troops and had to be persuaded or cajoled to part with them, specific agreements were out of the question, while it would hardly have been possible in any case to make a contract with every individual who delivered a few pounds of forage. Nevertheless, when local officials were prepared to undertake full responsibility for the organization of deliveries by their subjects, advancing money to make purchases and acting in much the same way as private contractors at much the same prices,³ more precise conditions were not only poss-

1 Letter of Requisition, 6 September 1762, T/1/420 f.39.

2 28 March 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

3 The prices allowed by Cockburn to Amtsrath Borries, a deputy of the Chamber of War of Minden, were on the same level as those granted to private contractors, T/1/417 ff.242 - 245.

ible but necessary. A number of agreements were made in such terms,¹ although there was at least one significant failure, when in 1761 Hatton authorized Councillor Redecker to buy up an unlimited quantity of forage and stated that everything he did would be retrospectively confirmed by the commissariat.² Handing a German official 'carte blanche' in this way clearly ran considerable risks, which are difficult to justify even on grounds of the Army's desperate need.

An examination of the economy with which forage was provided between 1759 and 1762 suggests that the Treasury and its commissaries enjoyed some measure of success, while at the same time failing to grasp certain opportunities. Deliveries by local farmers were the cheapest method of supply and according to Frederick Halsey could cost 20% less than entrepreneurs' forage.³ British officials therefore had a bounden duty to do everything possible to tap such sources, and Ferdinand's opposition to the employment of private contractors for security reasons was an additional incentive in this direction. But while the commissariat always relied on local deliveries to a significant extent, it tended to regard them as the cause of much trouble and frustration. As Peirson wrote:- "... the hanoverians don't produce their forage with that alacrity that a friendly army ought to expect from a country it comes to defend. They seem to keep it up in order to augment our want of it, & so raise the price at

1 See the contracts made by Cockburn with a number of bailiffs in late 1760 and early 1761. Contracts of Sir J. Cockburn, Halsey MSS. 15064(A)

2 Hatton to Redecker, 29 March 1761, SP/9/230. See below p.207.

3 F. Halsey to Howard, 23 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

their will. There is undoubtedly forage enough in that country, but it comes out like drops of blood."¹ In this situation the commissaries often tended to favour agreements with merchants, which although more expensive relieved them of much difficulty and trouble. This attitude was understandable but British officials failed to take certain steps, which were well within their power, to encourage local deliveries. For example, it was left to Prince Ferdinand to point out early in 1760 that people might produce their forage more readily if tariffs of payment were fixed and published in advance.² Nor did the failure to take prompt steps to prevent delays in the settlement and payment of accounts do anything to overcome any reluctance to make forage available.³

If then for various reasons great reliance was placed on entrepreneurs, were the latter employed with the maximum economy? Commissaries of supply had the power to make contracts in different places at what seemed to them to be the most appropriate prices,⁴ but little or no evidence has apparently survived as to how exactly they went about this task. Sometimes they seem to have acted in a way which was detrimental to British financial interests, as for example in employing contractors at least partly for reasons of favouritism and connection or because of past services. Thus Blakeney was said to have relied on provisions sent from Amsterdam by his friend, Arthur Conron, despite the acute transport problems involved, rather than on those

1 Peirson to Newcastle, 2 January 1761, Add. MSS. 32917 ff.40 - 41.

2 Granby to Newcastle, 23 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 ff.45 - 46.

3 Peirson to Martin, 12 May 1761, T/1/410 f.9.

4 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.15.

which could have been supplied more cheaply from the depots of German contractors nearer at hand,¹ while the granting of a vast forage contract to Uckerman in December 1761, shortly after he had been accused of fraud and malpractice in the execution of his previous agreements, certainly exposed British finances to the possibility of further depredations.² At the same time, however, there were contractors who attempted to gain unfair advantages on the basis of their military and political connections, but who were made to moderate their terms by the commissariat. Such was Councillor Knipping, who was recommended for a delivery of 200,000 rations of oats by Prince Ferdinand, and proposed to supply them at 12 stivers per ration when others were ready to undertake the business at 8 stivers.³

The contract price of forage was always considerably higher than its prime cost, because legitimate expenses, charges and profits had to be paid not only to the main contractor but also to the subdeliverers whom he employed. Redecker's accounts suggest that there could be a difference of as much as 30% between the prices charged by the subdeliverers and those paid by the commissariat to the contractor.⁴ This inevitably raises the question of whether it would

1 Hatton to (F. Halsey), 17 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15141.

2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.82 - 83. Memoranda Resulting from Fuhr's Examination, 27 October 1761, Add. MSS.32930 f.102.

3 Peirson to (F. Halsey), 15 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15135.

4 Redecker's Affidavit of the Prices Paid to Subdeliverers in 1761, SP/9/230. The prices paid were 11.02 stivers (21 March 1761), 9.84 stivers (12 April 1761), 11.02 stivers (25 April 1761) and 10.89 stivers (12 May 1761), an average of 10.69 stivers per complete ration. A letter of Hatton to W. Fraser, 23 July 1761, *ibid.*, shows that the commissariat paid Redecker an average of 13.88 stivers per ration, viz. 15 stivers, 14 stivers, 13½ stivers and 13 stivers. The increase in the two average figures is thus 29.84%.

not have been better to have made agreements with those who initially purchased the forage, so avoiding one set of costs and profits. The additional work and responsibility involved in such a policy would have necessitated a considerable augmentation in the numbers of commissaries, but even if the Treasury had come to accept this much earlier than it did, its officials could never have taken the place of a great contractor. The latter was by definition a man of standing in the commercial world, with a wide circle of contacts, possessing specialist knowledge and information and commanding confidence and financial credit, all factors which were of considerable service to him in carrying out his obligations.

The surest guarantee of reasonable prices was competition, and although there is no specific evidence that the commissariat invited formal proposals to deliver forage by means of public advertisements, it nevertheless tended to employ considerable numbers of contractors, who acted as a brake on each other.¹ In this way standard prices for deliveries in different areas, with suitable variations for additional transport costs,² became generally recognized and it was difficult for contractors to make agreements at prices above the norm, except in cases where the Army's need was desperate rather

1 The agreements made by Frederick Halsey, Halsey MSS. 15103, and by Cockburn, *ibid.* 15064(A) & T/1/417 ff.242 - 261, demonstrate the tendency to employ large numbers of contractors at prices, which although not standardized, fluctuated within well-defined limits.

2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 2 May 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

than urgent.¹ There was also, however, a small core of entrepreneurs, who were involved in forage deliveries on such a grand scale and whose services were so indispensable to the commissariat, that they apparently occupied a position in which they could have profiteered had they so wished. Of these no one was more important than Johann Jacob Uckerman, a Hessian,² who by the end of 1761 had obtained contracts worth over £800,000 on completion, and representing nearly three hundred days' supply of oats to every horse in the Combined Army, as well as additional quantities of hay and straw.³ Uckerman was extremely useful to the commissariat; with wide connections and numerous agents in Germany, other Baltic countries and England,⁴ he was able to draw forage from a large area, so effectively by-passing local shortages. Until the very end of 1761 he does not seem to have used his position and influence to profiteer at the expense of Britain, for the prices which he was allowed compare very favourably with those granted to other contractors. Thus his agreement with Hunter in September 1759 to deliver in Hesse-Cassel at 15 stivers and later 14½ stivers per ration⁵ was on the whole cheaper than Moses Levy's contract at the beg-

1 This was probably the reason for an agreement of 1761, allowing 23 groschen per ration, a price far above the norm, Peirson to Fuhr, 2 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.88. In such cases commissaries tended to ask the advice of their superiors before committing themselves, Extracts from Hatton's Letters, 4 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15211(B).

2 He eventually took British nationality, Journal of the House of Commons, 6 March 1764, Vol. XXIX, p.908.

3 See Appendix III.

4 Narrative of Uckerman, (1762), T/1/409 f.309.

5 Contract between Hunter and Uckerman, 20 September 1759, T/64/96 f. 233. The price was reduced when the agreement was prolonged beyond its initial two month period, Hunter to Martin, 22 November 1759, *ibid.* f.275.

inning of the year.¹ In 1760 his delivery of rations at 15 stivers until the end of November and then at 16 stivers² seems superficially expensive when compared to his contract of August of that year, which allowed him 13 - 14 stivers,³ and to Leopold's deliveries in November and December, which were made at 14 stivers,⁴ but it has to be remembered that this was a special assignment, undertaken at a very difficult time of year for a corps of troops which was unprovided with magazines.⁵ In the first part of 1761 the cost of a ration of oats in Uckerman's agreements varied between 8½ and 9 stivers, prices which correspond to those allowed to other deliverers at that time,⁶ and thus the burden of any charge against him must rest on his contract of 7 December 1761, in which he was granted 10 stivers per ration for the vast quantity of six million rations of oats, or 21,429 tons.⁷ Even this price, which is the equivalent of 16.67 stivers for a complete ration,⁸ did not seem superficially exorbitant, although it was not

1 Hunter to Oswald, 5 March 1759, T/1/396 f.131. Levy had been allowed a uniform 15 stivers.

2 Hatton to T. Halsey, 25 December 1760, T/1/444 f.342.

3 Contract between Hatton and Uckerman, 25 August 1760, T/1/405 f.446.

4 Certificates of F. Halsey to Leopold, 19 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15297.

5 Hatton to T. Halsey, 25 December 1760, T/1/444 f.342.

6 Contract between Peirson and Uckerman, 25 May 1761, T/1/410 f.254. Agreement between Hatton and Uckerman, 11 June 1761, *ibid.* f.252. At this time Redecker was allowed 7½ - 9 stivers for rations of oats, Accounts of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/313 ff.289 - 300.

7 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.82 - 83. Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 31 March 1764, T/1/431 No.3, f.5/151.

8 Oats usually represented three-fifths of the cost of a complete ration of forage in mid-1761, Pownall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 15 January 1765, T/52/56 f.488.

long before the emergence of certain inside information began to suggest that appearances might be deceptive. Uckerman proposed to fulfil a large part of the delivery by agreements with a number of English subcontractors, who were to ship provisions from England to Bremen,¹ and it was an application by Anyand and Tierney for permission to export grain, which fortuitously brought the whole affair to the Treasury's attention.² On making enquiries the Board was horrified to learn that the subcontractors were apparently delivering provisions at Bremen for a mere 6d, or not more than $5\frac{1}{2}$ stivers, per ration,³ and further investigations brought a proposal from a Mr. Wilson to deliver oats at Bremen at 16/0d per quarter, approximately 6.24d, or not more than 5.72 stivers per ration.⁴ In an atmosphere of panic⁵ the Treasury made its first positive intervention in affairs since 1758,⁶ annulling Uckerman's contract and making agreements with various English merchants to ship grain to Germany on the Board's account. In the course of the next few months a considerable quantity of forage was delivered at Bremen in this way at an average cost of 7,59d, or not more than 6.96 stivers per ration.⁷ Daniel Weir, the commissary char-

1 Narrative of Uckerman, (1762), T/1/409 f.309.

2 Newcastle to Sir J. Yorke, 19 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 f.436.

3 Ibid. ff.436 - 437. Calculating the £ at its maximum value at this time of 11 guilders, PMG/2/6 f.231.

4 Calculating one quarter as producing a maximum of 34 and a minimum of 28 rations, see Appendix IV, and taking the average cost. £ : 11 guilders.

5 Newcastle spoke of his brethren in the Treasury being frightened out of their wits, Add. MSS. 32934 f.436, but it is difficult to imagine the First Lord keeping his head when all around were losing their's.

6 The Board had previously declined to judge the prices allowed to contractors on the grounds that only the commissaries on the spot could do this accurately, Newcastle to Peirson, 16 September 1760, Add. MSS. 32911 ff.334 - 335.

7 See Appendix IV. £ : 11 guilders.

ged to receive it and send it up the Weser, claimed that the Treasury had saved at least £50,000 by taking matters into its own hands.¹

And yet a careful examination of the evidence suggests that the actual saving may well have been much less. Considerable expense was involved in getting provisions from their point of arrival in Germany to the Army, and thus goods for Bremen had to be unloaded at Brake or Vegesack, from whence they were taken in other boats to the port of Bremen itself to be stored prior to transport up the Weser.² This process involved not only the cost of freights, but that of other incalculable items such as demurrage, warehouse hire, renting of sacks, labourers' wages and expenses of land carriage, all of which may well have brought the average cost of a ration of oats from England to something not far short of the 10 stivers allowed to Uckerman.³ And even if the Treasury's oats were slightly cheaper, the contractor had every reason to expect a legitimate profit for all his trouble and responsibility.⁴ The commissariat's negotiation of prices in this affair may thus be vindicated and the Treasury, while it showed itself commendably aware of its supervisory obligations, caused a considerable amount of disruption for very little financial gain, and perpetrated something of a miscarriage of justice, at which Uckerman might feel justifiably

1 D. Weir to Howard, 16 September 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/5/18.

2 Peirson to Martin, 4 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 ff.219 - 220.

3 See Appendix IV.

4 The vast amount of work, frustration and anxiety, which were involved in collecting the provisions at Bremen and transporting them up the Weser, and which kept a commissary and several assistants fully occupied for some six months, are clearly apparent in Weir's correspondence in the Howard Vyse MSS.

aggrieved. Government contractors may well have made considerable profits, but it should not be forgotten that they also ran considerable risks.

The English merchants, who delivered forage on the Treasury's account in 1762, were mostly employed as agents on commission rather than as contractors at fixed prices, thus raising the general question of the use made of this method of supply during the war. Purchases on commission were particularly appropriate when provisions were to be bought in many different places, with great variation in price and cost of transport, so making it difficult to strike a fair bargain in advance, and they avoided the tendency of contractors to demand higher prices than were justified in order to safeguard themselves against inflationary trends in the market or delays in settling accounts, which if they failed to materialize brought unwarranted profits. At the same time, however, it was obviously to an agent's advantage to buy at the highest possible prices in order to augment his profits. The Treasury showed a certain 'penchant' for the employment of agents when large deliveries were involved. As early as 1758 James West, the Secretary of the Board, stressed the advantage of this method as a means of controlling the sums of money paid to merchants, arguing that if several agents were employed they could act as checks upon each other,¹ but it was only three and a half years later that such theories

¹ West to Newcastle, 27 October 1758, Add. MSS. 32885 f.97. These views might be considered a little naive, for agents could have no interest in controlling each other: on the contrary, an agreement between them to force up prices would seem theoretically more likely.

were put to the test. The commission of 2% allowed to the various merchants employed in 1762 was certainly not exorbitant,¹ and the Treasury took proper care to stress to its agents that they should spread their purchases over an appropriate period of time in order to avoid the inflationary effects of a sudden massive demand,² but in the end, as already noted, it seems unlikely that any real savings were made.

The commissariat's attitude to this method of supply was less consistent. Delaval and Halsey were employed by Hunter as agents on commission in 1759,³ but Peirson declared himself no friend of commission, arguing that it drove up market prices.⁴ Nevertheless, his deputy, Hatton, who had at first intended to make a contract with Conrad Mamberg for a large quantity of forage, agreed to employ him as an agent at the end of 1760,⁵ and followed this up in June 1761 with a similar accord for three million rations of oats.⁶ On both occasions the terms were very favourable to Mamberg, for he was allowed a commission of 3%, a figure which Hatton justified because of the trouble

1 2% was apparently the standard merchant's commission at this time, although Fuhr said that $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ was sufficient for large deliveries, Fuhr to D. Cuthbert, 25 April 1762, SP/9/227. In the 1770s the normal agent's commission was $2\frac{1}{2}\%$, N. Baker, Government and Contractors: the British Treasury and War Supplies, 1775 - 1783. (1971) p.89.

2 Martin to Amyand and Tierney, 2 April 1762, T/27/28 ff.276 - 277.

3 Hunter to (Oswald), 3 May 1759, T/1/396 f.30/31.

4 Peirson to Martin, 4 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f.219. Peirson claimed that if the quantities involved in Uckerman's contract of December 1761 had been purchased on commission, the issuing of the orders would have raised the price at least 50%.

5 Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/1/405 f.90. The great increase in the price of corn in the Dutch Republic made Mamberg's contract proposals so high that it was decided to arrange the matter on commission.

6 C. Mamberg to J. Boyve, 4 December 1761, SP/9/227.

involved,¹ but which some regarded as unnecessarily generous.² Indeed, there seems to be no reason, when other merchants were satisfied with 2% for equally onerous responsibilities, why Mamberg should have exacted so much more, although it may be said in mitigation that he agreed to abate 1% if his demands were promptly paid.³ Yet this was a condition for which there was no precedent, and Hatton's wisdom in accepting it was at least open to question. Needless to say prompt payment was not made and so the higher figure operated, while in addition Mamberg charged interest on the sums of money which he advanced in order to make his purchases.⁴ Nor did the implications of these superficially simple agreements end here, for on a large part of his delivery of 1761 Mamberg employed a subdeliverer, Münch, who not only charged his own commission of 2%, but took a further $\frac{1}{2}$ % towards insurance costs.⁵ Thus Hatton granted exceptionally favourable terms, and his failure to effect a close control of Mamberg's actions by a specific agreement in writing⁶ enabled the agent to exploit the situation to his own advantage. The commissariat's handling of the affair cannot escape criticism, and may have resulted from lack of experience in

1 Hatton to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 30 January 1764, *ibid.*

2 Fuhr to Martin, 23 December 1761, *ibid.* He said that any merchant of credit and reputation in Amsterdam would have delivered at 2%.

3 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 14 March 1765, T/52/56 f.444.

4 *Ibid.* The interest on all his deliveries as an agent amounted to the not insignificant sum of 73,282 guilders 4 stivers.

5 P. Münch's Accounts of Oats Provided for C. Mamberg, 1 & 24 July & 18 September 1761, SP/9/227. Fuhr to Pownall, 18 December 1761, *ibid.*

6 Hatton to John West, 30 January 1764, *ibid.*

making agreements of this sort.

A general assessment of the policies pursued by the British authorities in supplying forage to the Combined Army is somewhat difficult to formulate as their record is rather a mixed one. Shortages of provisions occurred throughout the war and on some occasions both Treasury and commissariat were partly to blame. Nor did all their arrangements fully uphold British interests, for the commissariat sometimes failed to exercise a sufficiently tight control over the activities of suppliers, while the Treasury's slowness in allowing more generous staffing ratios for the service in Germany made it difficult to pursue the most economical policies. Yet it must not be forgotten that failures of supply were frequently the result of problems of execution rather than of imperfect arrangements, and that a great deal of the commissariat's work was highly successful in safeguarding British interests. Above all, although there were some examples of overcharging which should not have occurred, there is no evidence of rampant profiteering and extortion in connection with the supply of this most vital commodity to an army which was far bigger than any previously maintained by Great Britain.

In turning, finally, to a more detailed examination of the execution of the policies described above two aspects of the work of the Treasury and its commissaries have to be discussed; the effectiveness with which forage was transferred from suppliers to consumers, and the accuracy with which accounts were kept and the promptitude with which they were settled. Nothing was more essential for the proper supply of the Army with the greatest measure of economy than

that the receipt, storage and issue of forage should be efficiently and honestly conducted. The initial responsibility in this connection belonged to a host of minor officials, known as 'Proviant Verwalters' and 'Proviant Schriebers',¹ who were usually attached to magazines, where one 'Verwalter' would have the overall charge as the keeper. In receiving forage from contractors, peasant deliverers, the German officials who organized supplies by their subjects and other magazines, commissariat officials were supposed to check its quality and to issue receipts for the quantities and species accepted. They then had to store and preserve the provisions until they were needed for consumption or for transfer to other magazines, when they would issue them to the troops and other personnel attached to the Army or to those responsible for the transport, taking receipts for the quantities involved.² As the war progressed and the nature of the campaigning became increasingly complex the numbers of magazines and subordinate officials increased, so that by the last year of the war Pownall estimated a total of between sixty and seventy magazines, employing some four or five hundred staff.³

It is evident that this army of minor officials, through whose hands passed vast quantities of forage, performed a crucial task. Inefficiency on their part could create a bottle-neck in the supply line between the deliverers and the troops, while a failure to

1 Literally 'directors' and 'clerks of supply'.

2 If deliveries were made direct to the troops instead of into a magazine an official was usually sent to supervise the proceedings.

3 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 f.106. T/29/34 f. 205, 17 December 1761.

act as the first bulwark against fraud and speculation could have serious consequences for both the Army and the British taxpayer. How fitted were they for this role and how adequately did they perform it? Nearly all of them were Germans,¹ and although Frederick Halsey issued a justified warning against national prejudice when he wrote:- '.... God forbid that I shod. think that there were not honest Men in Germany as well as England',² the fact remains that the backgrounds and connections of many magazine keepers were such as to make it difficult for them to uphold British interests impartially against those of the forage deliverers. Some of them had close links with the contractors, and might even have been appointed by the latter rather than by the commissariat.³ The relationships between magazine officers and German officials could also be very close. At Diepenau and Bielefeld there was even a complete fusion, for the local burgomasters themselves were in charge of the depot or magazine,⁴ while everywhere it must have been very difficult for a petty official to resist the influence of the local authority, to which he might well be subject as a German citizen or as an employee.⁵ Such factors were clearly ill-

1 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.15. There are occasional references to magazine keepers with English names, Pownall to West, 31 October 1761, T/1/410 f.324.

2 F. Halsey to Mogens, 21 February 1762, Halsey MSS. 15038.

3 Boyd to Pye & Cruickshanks, 17 May 1758, T/1/386 No.33. Pownall to West, 31 October 1761, T/1/410 f.324. Such examples usually occurred when the suppliers' depots were turned into commissariat magazines.

4 Report of Forage at Diepenau, 30 October 1761, T/1/413 f.378. Memorial of G.D. Elverfeld, 6 February 1766, T/1/445 f.16.

5 Many magazine officials in the service of the Hanoverian Chancery of War were taken into British employment after 1758. Hunter to Newcastle, 7 March 1759, Add. MSS. 32888 f.393. Memorial of J.D. Schroder, 16 July 1763, SP/9/228.

ustrated by the pressure brought to bear by President von Massow on magazine keeper Schmedding to accept forage receipts instead of actual deliveries on the account of Baron Hoym,¹ an action designed merely to further unjustifiably the interests of the contractor. But Massow's influence over magazine officials was not confined to such isolated examples, for he employed large numbers of deputies, who appropriated to themselves the titles of 'Kriegsrath', 'Kriegs Commissarius', 'Aide-Garde Magasin' and 'Sous Controlleur',² to whose influence and indeed interference those employed in the magazines were frequently subject. In such a situation it was difficult for the commissariat's employees to maintain their freedom of action and to ensure the efficient and honest fulfillment of forage agreements.

Even without these pressures the duties of magazine officials in receiving forage were by no means easy to perform. In the first place they might be ignorant of the precise terms of the agreement under which deliveries were being made, and thus to take simply one example they might accept forage offered outside the stipulated time limits.³ Secondly, the verification of the quantities delivered

1 Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.3. For further information on the trade in forage receipts see below pp.198 - 199.

2 Literally war bailiff, war commissary, assistant storekeeper and sub-inspector. Pownall to Massow, 4 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.278. Pownall's Comments on Massow's Letter, 31 October 1761, T/1/413 f.374. Most of these people were presumably employees of the Chamber of War of Minden.

3 As late as August 1762, after something of a revolution in forage administration, Pownall complained that magazine keepers remained ignorant of contract terms, Remarks on the General State of Deliveries, July & August 1762, T/1/417 f.88. Unjustified deliveries could be rejected in the accounting process, but it was clearly more efficient not to accept them in the first place.

could be a complex and arduous task, demanding a lengthy process of weighing and measuring. This was at least feasible when grain was delivered in sacks, but a labour of Hercules when hay and straw were received by the cart-load or even by the boat-load. Fuhr claimed that the magazine keepers rarely weighed the vast quantities delivered by Uckerman, but simply accepted his bills of loading,¹ while many officials seem to have contented themselves with a cursory count of sacks and trusses when accepting provisions.² Thirdly, quality control was equally problematical, for if performed thoroughly it meant opening every sack and probing to the middle of all loads of hay and straw. This was not always possible, as in the case of some large depots of hay and straw, collected by Uckerman at Verden, and accepted by the commissariat under the contract of December 1761. A magazine keeper was sent to take charge of them in February 1762, but because of the time of year he was unable to break down the stacks to make a full inspection. By June the forage had begun to show distinct signs of rotting and it was clear that some of it had been bad when taken over by the commissariat.³ From such examples there seems little reason to doubt that deliverers were able from time to time to unload short weight and inferior provisions.

Having received the forage, magazine officials were

1 Continuation of the Exposition of Frauds and Irregularities, 5 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32922 ff.429 - 430.

2 Pownall's condemnation of such methods in his Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers at the end of 1761, T/1/413 f.364, suggests that they were widespread at that time.

3 Pownall to Commissioners for Stating German Demands, 26 March 1764, T/1/431 No.2, f.3/155.

faced with the problems of storing and preserving it. The term 'magazine' perhaps conjures up a mental image of a concentrated group of purpose-built structures, effectively protected and guarded: the reality was very different. Magazines were frequently composed of a central store and a number of satellite depots, which could be spread over an area of several miles.¹ This was sometimes a deliberate and positive arrangement, designed to avoid useless transports when supplies passed the positions of the troops on their way to the magazine, although it could also derive from a lack of storage space in some places. Whatever the reason, the task of supervising a dispersed magazine was a difficult one and frequently obliged the keeper to delegate major responsibilities, which ideally he should have kept in his own hands. Moreover, although special buildings were sometimes erected for the storage of provisions,² it was more usual to take over existing barns and granaries,³ thus again dispersing commissariat property and making it difficult to supervise. But such arrangements were infinitely preferable to lodging forage in private houses in the absence of any better accommodation, where it was almost inevitably subject to damage and depredation,⁴ or storing hay and straw in the open air, sometimes without the elementary precaution of forming it into ricks and stacks, or protecting and guarding it against theft.⁵ The

1 According to its keeper the Magazine at Lemförde was spread over eight German miles, Memorial of J.D. Schroder, 16 July 1763, SP/9/228.

2 F. Halsey to E. Blakeney, 31 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

3 A. Tozer to Pownall, 21 March 1763, T/1/427 f.227.

4 Pro Memoria of Councillor Redecker, 22 November 1765, SP/9/230. Report of the Magazines by Cuthbert, 20 November 1761, T/1/410 f.238.

5 Ibid. f.239.

fact that the magazine keepers were frequently short of cash to pay for the necessary materials and labour may explain some of these inadequacies, and this situation could have the further pernicious effect of forcing them to borrow money from deliverers, who expected preferential treatment or unjustified favours in return.¹ Altogether, significant quantities of forage in store must have been pilfered, damaged or allowed to decay.

Finally, the issue of provisions brought the magazine keepers another set of problems, of which the most important concerned the right to draw forage. The troops were supposed to be supplied with rations according to their regimental entitlements and their effective numerical states, but it seems that officers rarely produced authorization for the quantities demanded and that magazine keepers were obliged to issue on good faith.² Even more intractable was the problem of the legions of auxiliary personnel, camp-followers and hangers-on, who all laid claim, usually unjustifiably, to government forage,³ so that Pownall commented:- 'The whole of the Issue is a kind of irregular Scramble for what every one can get'.⁴ This state of affairs could arise when keepers of large and busy magazines had to leave the

1 Ibid.

2 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. MSS. 32935 f.135. Again it was probably hoped that such matters would correct themselves in the accounting process, although the commissaries of account frequently found themselves as ignorant of entitlements and effective states as the magazine keepers.

3 A Short Sketch of the Evils Arising under the Commissariat in Germany, 8 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 f.235.

4 Pownall to Peirson, 20 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.290.

issue of forage to their subordinates,¹ although the officials in charge were not completely innocent, and a number of them cheated the commissariat by receiving forage from the deliverers by one weight or measure and issuing it by another,² so apparently balancing their accounts but in fact leaving themselves with a surplus which they could sell. The exact quantities of forage which were lost in these ways will never be ascertained, but there is a strong suspicion that it was not minimal.

Despite the situation described above, no attempt was made to subject the activities of magazine officials to a comprehensive system of control and supervision until the war was nearly over. No full-time commissary of control was assigned to the business of magazine administration before mid-1761,³ although Hunter had appointed two minor officials, Alexander Ross and John Ghest, to act as magazine inspectors,⁴ and the former at least seems to have continued to exercise his functions in succeeding years,⁵ while a German, Andrew Röhl, was appointed in the same capacity in 1761.⁶ But although it may be

1 Memorandum of J. Bessell, 12 December 1765, SP/9/231. Bessell was writing of a period when there were inspectors present at the issue of forage, but this had not always been the case.

2 T/1/410 f.239. The German 'Kimpten' could be either a measure or a weight, the former representing a greater quantity than the latter.

3 See above pp.65 - 67.

4 An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany, 1759, T/1/397 f.67.

5 Peirson to Martin, 16 September 1761, T/1/410 f.151. Cuthbert & Hulston to (Treasury), 30 November 1764, T/1/439 ff.303 - 304. In 1760 Ghest claimed that he was inactive for want of orders.

6 Peirson to (Treasury), 16 June 1761, T/1/410 f.72.

assumed that from time to time their efforts checked the growth of malpractice and led to the dismissal of negligent and dishonest officials,¹ their limited numbers and Fuhr's comment that '.... no Magazines have been regularly inspected ever since Mr Hunter's leaving the Army'² suggest that their work was piecemeal and haphazard. Yet even if it had been perfectly performed, little significant improvement would have resulted, for in Pownall's vivid phrase it was pointless to try to cure the smallpox by applying a plaster to each pustule.³ Any radical reform of forage administration required initially a far closer definition of the various responsibilities, duties and rights of the personnel involved, and of the methods and techniques which they were supposed to adopt. Only when the framework itself was tightened could any valid attempt to enforce the rules be made.

In late 1761 and early 1762 such a reform was gradually put into effect as a result of Pownall's establishment of the department of control. The changes and improvements thus introduced may be conveniently summarized under three headings. Firstly, the staff attached to the magazines, and involved in other aspects of forage deliveries and issues, were purged and totally subjected to the commissariat's control. Thus German officials, who had used high-

1 Peirson pointed out, however, that it was often difficult to find replacements, who were more suitable than those dismissed, Peirson's Answer to Complaints relating to the Commissariat, 6 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32923 f.393.

2 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33048 f.150.

3 Pownall to West, 18 November 1761, T/1/413 f.361.

sounding but invented titles, and had involved themselves in forage administration with no obligations to defend British interests, were brought under Pownall's direction or eliminated from the service.¹ At the same time it was laid down that all magazine keepers were to be appointed, or to have their appointments approved by the director of the department of control, and were to be assigned to specific magazines, with the exhaustion of which their commissions were automatically terminated,² while all subordinate magazine personnel were to be nominated and to have their salaries fixed by the department of control and not by their keepers.³ Secondly, the commissariat's employees were made fully aware of their responsibilities and duties, which were now more closely and precisely defined, for Pownall's instructions to the magazine keepers, running to twenty-six clauses, left little room for doubt.⁴ Officials were ordered to attend in person the delivery of all provisions and to weigh and measure the quantities exactly, rough estimates and counts being no longer regarded as sufficient. Issues were to be made by the same weights and measures, and in order to standardize practices and leave no loop-holes, Pownall fixed the Berlin pound and the Brunswick kimplen as the official weight and measure respectively, circulating patterns of each marked with

1 Pownall to Massow, 4 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.278. Pownall to Peirson, 20 September 1761, *ibid.* f.289. The purge inevitably involved a clash between Pownall and Massow, but the director of the department of control was sufficiently strong-willed and sure of himself to carry the day. The correspondence of the two men in October and November 1761 is found in T/1/413 ff.374 - 377.

2 Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/413 f.364.

3 Circular Letter to Magazine Keepers, (1762), T/1/420 f.123.

4 T/1/413 ff.364 - 368.

the commissariat's stamp.¹ In everything he did the director of the new control branch showed the most meticulous attention to detail, and a determination to eliminate the smallest temptation to slackness and dishonesty. Thirdly, a more comprehensive attempt was made to provide magazine keepers with essential information, which they needed to carry out their duties efficiently. Of prime importance in this connection were copies of the agreements under which deliveries were made, so that provisions offered outside the terms could be rejected,² and official lists of those entitled to draw government forage, consisting of a statement of effective numbers in the case of the troops and a written authority from the military command or the commissariat to draw a certain number of rations in the case of auxiliary personnel such as sutlers.³

Thus Pownall overhauled and reformed the whole structure of forage administration, reasserting the commissariat's control over subordinate officers, laying down a clear and exact definition of their duties, and providing them with necessary information and guidance for the effective execution of their responsibilities. Having achieved this, he then took steps to impose a far more detailed and direct supervision of the activities of subordinate officials by means of a full-time inspector for each of the five districts into which he divided the magazines, and subinspectors and assistants ass-

1 Ibid. Pownall to Martin, 9 February 1762, T/1/418 f.310.

2 T/1/413 f.367.

3 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. MSS. 32935 f.135. Memorial of Howard to Ferdinand and the Latter's Reply, 3 June 1762, T/1/417 ff.59 & 61.

igned to each individual magazine to superintend its day-to-day activities.¹ A series of regular reports were to proceed from the magazine keeper to the control agent each day, and from the latter to the district inspector each week, while Pownall received a monthly report from the inspectors on the basis of which he issued his own monthly survey of affairs for the Treasury.² The scheme clearly illustrates the constant care and attention which were being given to all aspects of forage administration as the war drew to a close.

While there can be little doubt that these changes had effects which were largely beneficial both for the supply of the Army and for the upholding of British interests, certain caveats must be entered. Firstly, control officers could sometimes take their duties so seriously that they impeded the flow of forage to the Army. Although Ghest was surely not typical in his refusal to accept a load of hay until a gang of workmen had picked all the clover out of it,³ and in his unjustified objections to the quality of much of the forage delivered by Uckerman and Mamberg,⁴ his actions illustrate the paradox that the more effective the system of control the slower the Army was supplied.⁵ Secondly, it must not be assumed that Pownall's regul-

1 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 ff.106 - 107. Pownall to West, 18 November 1761, T/1/413 ff.360 - 361.

2 A number of these are found in T/1/417.

3 S. Dyer to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 15 June 1764, T/1/432 No.80, f.36/188.

4 Narrative of facts Relative to Uckerman's Deliveries, quoting letters of Peirson and Dyer to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, 16 June 1764, T/1/439 ff.288 - 290.

5 Such a disadvantage had to be balanced against the fact that less forage was lost as a result of dishonest and slack practices.

ations were immediately and perfectly translated into practice. It was not until June 1762 that steps were taken to publish the effective numerical states of the troops on the fifth of each month in order to control the issue of forage,¹ and as already noted, as late as August 1762 Pownall was still complaining that copies of contracts were not being forwarded to the department of control to be communicated to magazine keepers before deliveries began.² Finally, the first effective system of supervising forage administration really came far too late, for no sooner was it fully operative than the war ended. Such practical limitations, however, do not detract from Pownall's reputation as one of the most assiduous, perspicacious and determined administrators to serve the Treasury in Germany.

In turning to an examination of the various accounts involving the quantities of forage received and issued and the payment of those who were entitled to reimbursement for what they supplied, we are confronted with what was perhaps the most complex aspect of commissariat affairs, and the one in which there were the most evident failings. Three kinds of account may be distinguished: firstly, those of country people, contractors and agents for deliveries made or forage taken from them by the troops; secondly, those of magazine keepers for provisions received and issued; and thirdly, those of the troops themselves for the government supplies which they received, and with

1 Ferdinand to various Commanding Officers, 3 June 1762, T/1/417 f.55.

2 Remarks on the General State of Deliveries, July & August 1762, *ibid.* f.88.

which they were debited in order to make deductions from their pay. But although such accounts may be detailed separately, they were in fact interdependent, each providing a means of check and verification of the others. Thus the settlement of contractors' accounts required not only an examination of the receipts and vouchers which they presented, but of the accounts of the magazines into which they had made their deliveries, while demands for reimbursement from allied and neutral states for provisions foraged by the troops needed to be verified against the accounts of the individual regiments.

Unfortunately, practically every kind of account was allowed to fall into serious arrears in the course of the war.¹ In Hunter's time magazine keepers were expected to send weekly returns of the provisions in their charge,² and these were collected by a German secretary, Ebeling,³ and possibly subjected to some form of scrutiny and approval. But Pownall claimed that such accounts had not been properly checked and certified before mid-1761,⁴ and both Hatton and Peirson admitted serious delays in their examination and settlement

¹ The researcher working in eighteenth century administrative history does not normally turn to the contemporary national press for information, but 'The Guardian' of 28 October 1964, p.19, reported that the commanding officer of the 3rd. Carabiniers was to make a token payment to Herr Blume, a farmer of Soest, for 490 rations of forage, taken without payment from his ancestors in 1761 by the regiment's predecessors. This is an unexpected illustration of the fact that the settlement of some forage accounts was not only delayed, but deferred almost until the Greek Calends.

² Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.147 - 148.

³ An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany, 1759, T/1/397 f.66.

⁴ Memorial representing the State in which the Accounts Appear to be, 10 January 1763, T/1/427 f.348.

in 1760 - 1761.¹ This meant that as well as it being impossible to verify the accounts of deliveries, and to tell at any given moment the exact quantities of forage in the commissariat's possession,² the magazine keepers' accounts were not subjected to any check, and consequently shortages in their stores as a result of carelessness or dishonesty were not detected or punished.³ Serious delays also occurred in settling the accounts for deliveries into magazines by local farmers. Sometimes this derived from the fact that people could not present their receipts for certification and payment because of the distances involved, but it is also clear that the commissaries were frequently too busy to deal with bulky collections of such documents presented by local authorities.⁴ A similar situation arose in connection with receipts given by the troops to country people when foraging took place. The failure to collect and pay the latter promptly was responsible for the growth of a widespread and pernicious practice, in which the creditors of the commissariat, desperate for cash, disposed of their vouchers to contractors at a discount, while the latter persuaded magazine keepers to exchange them for general receipts as if the forage had been taken from the magazine by the troops. The contractor was thus relieved of the need to fulfil his obligations and cheated the commissariat by being paid the higher magazine price for

1 Hatton to Martin, 10 April 1760, T/1/405 f.179. Peirson & Hatton to Ferdinand, 13 April 1761, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.V, pp.288 - 289. When Fuhr was given the unenviable task of dealing with the backlog in 1761, he found himself with thirty or forty large chests of papers, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.5.

2 T/1/427 ff.348 - 349.

3 Ibid. f.349.

4 F. Halsey to Mr. Berth, 8 May 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

forage. Contractors posted agents up and down the country to purchase receipts, the magazine keepers themselves sometimes acting in this capacity,¹ and German officials attached to the commissariat such as Massow and Redecker were also involved in these shady activities.² Even worse, however, was the fact that military officers and others with the Army wrote unjustified and fraudulent receipts specifically for sale and reputedly for the payment of tavern bills,³ while according to Pownall the forging of such documents became at one time 'almost a Public Fabrick',⁴ and they were offered on the open market rather like 'Stocks upon the Exchange in England'.⁵ To have prevented these abuses the receipts should have been collected in, posted to the accounts of the regiments which had given them and paid as soon as possible. Some attempt to do this was made when Hatton asked the various German governments to gather up and send the documents to the commissariat, but he apparently received scant co-operation⁶ and in any case there was little ready money available for payment.⁷ An attempt to overcome these obstacles by employing Uckerman to take up and pay receipts later emerged as a crass blunder, in that the contractor

1 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.17 - 18.

2 Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 ff.2 - 3.

3 Ibid. f.6. Standing Orders, 10 August 1760, Add. MSS. 28855 f. 10.

4 Pownall to Martin, 22 March 1763, T/1/424 f.342.

5 Pownall to Martin, 5 April 1763, T/1/427 f.462.

6 Intelligence relating to the Commissariat, (May 1761), Add. MSS. 32922 f.420. Peirson's Answer to Complaints relating to the Commissariat, 6 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32923 f.394.

7 The Treasury told Peirson in June 1761 that it was not practicable to make arrangements for the immediate payment of these accounts, Instructions to Peirson, (Clause 6), 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/4.

introduced the vouchers into his own accounts.¹ But even if there were almost insuperable difficulties in getting to the root of the problem, some improvement could have been made by relatively simple reforms, such as issuing commanding officers with printed books of numbered receipts, so making forgery less easy.²

Although contractors' accounts were settled with greater promptitude, it is clear from the situation described above that they were frequently not verified with the requisite degree of care and accuracy. Thomas Halsey liquidated a large part of Uckerman's accounts on the basis of general, rather than of specific and detailed receipts,³ an action which Hulton believed inconsistent with the duties of a certifying commissary, who should have examined the original vouchers.⁴ In such a situation it was impossible to be certain that the forage had actually been delivered, and even if it had, that the time limits and other conditions had been observed, and that the deliveries had been made on the specific account for which the contractor claimed payment.⁵

1 Hatton to C.W. Cornwall, T. Bradshaw & C. D'Oyly, 31 October 1765, T/1/444 f.409. Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.11.

2 Although printed receipt forms were sometimes used when the troops received forage from magazines in 1760 and 1761, some examples being found in SP/9/226, it was apparently not until June 1762 that steps were taken to extend the system to receipts given for foraging, Memorial of Howard to Ferdinand, 3 June 1762, T/1/417 f.60.

3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.127 - 128.

4 Hulton to Martin, 18 August 1761, Add. MSS. 32927 f.90.

5 Some contractors made deliveries to the same magazine under more than one contract, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.154 - 155, and in the absence of fully detailed accounting could present their receipts for the agreement which allowed them the most advantageous terms.

As with the system of inspection and supervision it was only in 1761 - 1762 that a more comprehensive and accurate form of account was brought into existence, deriving once again from Pownall's work in establishing the department of control. In the first place, the changes involved the initiation of an exact record of all the forage in the commissariat's possession at any given time, together with its precise whereabouts, this information being contained in the 'journal' and 'grand ledger' kept in the department,¹ and permitting for the first time not only a detailed verification of all forage accounts, but also the organization of the Army's supply on the basis of accurate statistical information. These records were compiled from details forwarded regularly by the magazine keepers, who in turn were ordered by Pownall to keep no less than five books of accounts, including their own general ledger, and giving, in addition to the crude particulars of all entries and issues of provisions to and from the stores in their charge, more detailed analyses, as for example of the quantities drawn by each regiment, corps and other service attached to the Army,² so that they could be more speedily and accurately charged with what they had received. Needless to say, all accounts were to be based on full and adequate authorities and to be justified by comprehensive receipts and vouchers, while the magazine keepers were to compile an exact numerical record of such documents, making copies where necessary.³

1 The journal was the current daily record of all deliveries, issues and other movements not only of forage but of bread and meal as well, while the grand ledger gave the comprehensive monthly state of affairs. Examples of the journal are found in T/38/806 - 808, and of the ledger in T/38/809 - 811.

2 T/1/413 f.365. They were also to keep two other books of cash receipts and expenditure.

3 Ibid. ff.365 - 367.

In the office of control itself a number of commissaries were employed in the processing of the paper work involved in these changes.¹ Among the tasks performed were posting receipts to the accounts of the various branches of the military service and calculating the quantities of forage drawn by them,² scrutinizing magazine keepers' accounts of receipts and issues and checking the same against other records in the department, verifying all vouchers and receipts presented by deliverers in justification of their claims to payment, and examining, liquidating and certifying such accounts themselves after comparing them with the grand ledger.³ Individual commissaries were assigned to each specific aspect of this work, and were provided with the detailed instructions and rules of conduct, which were so characteristic of Pownall's efforts to redefine and clarify administrative responsibilities.⁴ Thus for the first time the accounting branch of the commissariat was raised to the position of primary importance which it merited; it now possessed sufficient staff, free to give their undivided attention to its affairs, and with the opportunity to become proficient in the execution of specialized aspects of a highly complex business. The beneficial effects of such changes were legion, but one of the most important was that contractors could no longer use bought receipts in claiming payment for deliveries, as all

1 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 ff.108 - 111.

2 Some idea of the complexity and volume of this work can be gathered from Frederick Stanton's report that on the basis of the magazine keepers' accounts for May, June and July 1762, he posted to approximately 450 different headings 98,450 rations of barley, 1,888,031 rations of oats, 2,034,856 rations of hay and 1,258,146 rations of straw, T/1/420 f.213, 31 December 1762.

3 Add. MSS. 38335 ff.108 - 111.

4 Ibid. Instructions to the Commissary of Check and the Commissary General of Accounts, 1762, T/1/420 ff.112 - 117.

vouchers presented now had to make reference to a specific contract and account and could be verified against the exact magazine record.¹

Pownall's work was not accepted without criticism by some of his colleagues. Mason charged him with establishing unnecessary offices and appointing superfluous staff, with the insinuation that he was only interested in building an empire for himself, but these opinions seem to have been strongly influenced by personal jealousy and professional rivalry.² More specific criticism came from Hulton, who believed that the system for magazine keepers' accounts was too complex to be efficiently executed,³ apparently arguing in particular that it was unnecessary for them to keep general ledgers.⁴ These views may have been based on the fear that minor officials were incapable of performing the advanced actuarial exercises demanded of them, that they would have no time to keep their voluminous accounts up-to-date, and that they would be constantly at their desks when their presence elsewhere might do more to facilitate the supply of the Army. Pownall, however, was not unaware of these dangers, and before bringing his system into operation had sent Boyve on a tour of the magazines to instruct the staff in their accounting duties,⁵ while his intention was that every magazine keeper should be assisted by a

1 Pownall to West, 18 November 1761, T/1/413 f.359.

2 Memorial of C. Mason, 17 March 1764, T/1/433 f.148/115.

3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.52.

4 T/1/413 f.359.

5 Pownall to Martin, 9 February 1762, T/1/418 f.310.

qualified book-keeper who would undertake most of the paper work.¹ It may well be that the system of accounts introduced in 1761 - 1762 retarded certain aspects of forage supply, especially in connection with the movements of provisions in and out of magazines, and although this was apparently contrary to the best interests of the Army, it was nevertheless essential for upholding those of Britain in a more effective way than in previous years. And yet the prevention of unnecessary losses and the greater knowledge of the exact quantities and of the precise whereabouts of forage was bound to facilitate the supply of the troops, as was the greater speed with which the new fully-staffed accounts branch could expedite deliverers' claims, despite having to subject them to rigid checks. Altogether Pownall's reforms benefitted all parties involved in forage supply, administration and consumption with the sole exception of those who wished to act slackly or dishonestly, and it is a tragedy that no one in the Treasury or the commissariat fully appreciated the need for such changes until it was almost too late. Lessons were only slowly learned as a result of bitter experience.

Although Pownall had made adequate arrangements for the current service, there still remained the issue of how to deal with the vast backlog of unsettled forage accounts from previous years, and the thorny problem of what to do about a number of accounts, which had been examined, liquidated and even paid, but which belonged to con-

¹ Commission and Instructions to Book-Keepers, 1762, T/1/420 ff.120 - 121. The theory was not always translated into practice, Circular Letter to Magazine Keepers, 1762, *ibid.* f.123.

tractors who had been accused of fraud.¹ In connection with the latter, the Treasury decided at the end of 1761 to appoint a commission of enquiry to investigate the charges and to submit the relevant accounts to re-examination.² The bulk of this work was carried out in 1762 by Cuthbert and Hulton, with Fuhr, who had made many of the accusations, acting as assessor,³ although reports continued to be issued until 1764, long after the commissariat's return to England.⁴ The Commissioners went about their tasks in a determined if not ruthless way: armed with powers to demand contractors' books and papers, they also summoned people to appear before them for interrogation and arrested a number of suspects.⁵ The severity of their actions was paralleled by the harshness of their decisions, for out of accounts worth £1 million examined by them they recommended deductions amounting to £245,000.⁶ Not surprisingly their actions were the subject of considerable complaint,

1 Memoranda Resulting from Fuhr's Examination etc. before the Treasury, 27 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32930 ff.96 - 103.

2 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.64 - 69. Minutes of Resolutions, 29 October 1761, Add. MSS. 32930 f.140.

3 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.119. There were originally five Commissioners of Enquiry, but Harvey and Watson, two military officers, were given leave to retire after a short time, and Cockburn, who was given temporary direction of the commissariat on the retirement of Peirson early in 1762, does not seem to have exercised his commission, T/29/34 f.251, 25 March 1762. Fuhr quarrelled with the Commissioners, who accused him of trying to bring their office under Pownall's influence, and eventually arrested him, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.118 - 120.

4 Memorandums Relative to the Case of Mr. Uckerman, T/1/437 f.322.

5 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.61, 72 - 73 & 80.

6 Ibid. f.173. The Commissioners only had the power to make recommendations to the Treasury, Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, T/1/417 f.119.

not least from Prince Ferdinand, who feared that the stop put to the settlement of the accounts of some of the most substantial contractors would have a disastrous effect on the Army's forage supply.¹ Although there can be no doubt that the Commissioners unearthed and proved the existence of a great deal of fraud, especially in connection with bought receipts and collusions between contractors and magazine keepers, they were not above criticism, for their guiding principle that all contractors were guilty until they proved themselves innocent led them to jump to a number of unjustified conclusions. Thus they assumed that if receipts did not bear the contractors' names they must have been bought, although when great entrepreneurs employed large numbers of subdeliverers it was quite normal and legitimate for the latter's names to appear on the vouchers.² On other occasions the Commissioners' ignorance of the full details of cases led to unwarranted deductions, as when extensive deliveries made by Uckerman to the troops were disallowed because they were vouched by the general receipts of magazine keepers instead of by the military authorities. In fact this situation was quite regular, for the commissariat had assigned several magazine keepers to supervise these particular deliveries on the spot.³ Nor were the Commissioners completely fair to the British commissaries who examined and certified accounts before 1762, accusing them of negligence in settling on the basis of general receipts instead of on that of particular

1 Granby to (Commissioners of Enquiry), 21 July 1762, T/1/417 f.85.

2 Answer of Fraser, 4 April 1765, T/1/451 f.48.

3 Remarks of Commissioners of Enquiry on Two Certificates Granted to Uckerman, 10 August 1764, T/1/444 f.345. Answer of T. Halsey, 21 April 1765, *ibid.* f.354. D'Oyly, Bradshaw & Cornwall to C. Lowndes, 6 November 1765, *ibid.* f.356.

vouchers,¹ thus ignoring the fact that before the establishment of the department of control such detailed documents and records were not always available.²

But the Commissioners' criticisms went even deeper, for they also passed judgment on the formulation and modification of contracts by the commissariat. Finding Hatton's agreements with Councillor Redecker lacking precision in time, place, species of provisions and price, they chose to interpret the commissary general's orders as instructions to a commissary of supply, arguing that the supplier was entitled to no more than the prime cost of the forage and reducing his demands accordingly.³ The Commissioners also held that Hatton had had no right to modify the time limits in connection with one of Uckerman's contracts, and thus made large deductions for late deliveries.⁴ On review, however, the Treasury was advised against accepting either of these decisions, for the Commissioners for Examining German Demands were of the opinion that although Redecker had received from Hatton such general and unlimited orders as would cover any deliveries of forage he chose to make in late 1761 and early 1762, they none the less constituted an undoubted authority,⁵ while the Commiss-

1 Hulton to Martin, 18 August 1761, Add. MSS. 32927 f.90. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.127 - 128.

2 On another occasion Hulton himself admitted that he had had to settle accounts at least partly on the basis of magazine keepers' general receipts, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.25.

3 Hulton & Cuthbert to Redecker, 4 February 1763, SP/9/230.

4 Hulton & Cuthbert to (Treasury), 16 October 1764, T/1/444 f.446.

5 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Lowndes, 29 November 1765, T/52/109 ff.170 - 171.

ioners of Revision ¹ argued that the movements of the Army, together with the inability of the commissariat to fulfil its obligations to contractors by providing transport and effecting speedy payment, made a certain flexibility in connection with time limits obligatory.²

In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that the Commissioners of Enquiry did valuable work, not only saving significant sums of money, albeit far less than they had wished,³ but shedding light on shady practices and inducing a more critical attitude towards claims in general. If their suspicions were sometimes exaggerated, it was perhaps a natural reaction to the frightening revelations of fraud and dishonesty, and the fact that many of their recommended deductions could not be upheld on grounds of natural justice may simply reflect the inadequacy of the evidence, rather than the erroneous nature of their opinions. Nevertheless, the fact that many of their decisions had to be revised by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands and the Commissioners of Revision, while clearly demonstrating the Treasury's determination to be scrupulously fair, meant that much of their effort had been wasted.

1 Most of the work of reviewing the recommendations of the Commissioners of Enquiry was undertaken by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, Charles Wolfran Cornwall, Pownall and Cuthbert, but because the two latter were interested parties to a number of Uckerman's accounts, these were examined by Cornwall, D'Oyly and Bradshaw, who were known as the Commissioners of Revision, T/29/37 f.7, 5 June 1765.

2 Answer of Fraser, 4 April 1765, T/1/444 f.437. D'Oyly, Bradshaw & Cornwall to Lowndes, 15 November 1765, *ibid.* f.464. Fraser's statement that time limits were never meant to be adhered to, and were only supposed to act as a goad to contractors, was presumably an exaggeration.

3 Only £55,000 of their recommended deductions of £245,000 were upheld, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.190.

With a few exceptions despatched by Pownall in Germany,¹ the unsettled forage and magazine accounts on which payment was claimed were eventually submitted to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands in London. Faced with a formidable collection of voluminous papers and intricate accounts, the first part of their work was to decide whether demands were based on legitimate and adequate authorities. In this connection they insisted on specific orders from the British commissariat before entertaining claims,² and rejected all demands for forage taken by force by the troops,³ for reimbursement of contributions levied on enemy states,⁴ for granary hire, of which they said it had always been understood 'that the Kings Magazines were entitled to free quarters as the unavoidable consequence of War',⁵ and for interest on outstanding accounts.⁶ Secondly, the Commissioners re-

1 He settled the accounts of the German regiments for vacant rations on the basis of a composition, as the inadequacy of the records made mathematical accuracy impossible, Pownall to Martin, 5 & 22 April 1763, T/1/427 ff.461 & 422.

2 Pownall, Cornwall and Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 25 February 1765, T/52/109 f.33, where the orders of Prince Ferdinand unconfirmed by the commissariat were rejected as an insufficient authority.

3 Report of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands on the Demands of Count Mirfeldt, T/29/36 f.142, 20 November 1764. The Commissioners also refused to allow the rather special demands which arose from enemy seizure of British forage and its forced sale to local inhabitants, who claimed reimbursement when allied troops recaptured the area and the commissariat retook possession of its property, Report on the Demands of Mr. Recke, T/29/36 ff.168 - 169, 3 December 1764.

4 Report on the Demands of the Bishopric of Hildesheim, T/29/35 f.306, 20 February 1764.

5 State of the Demands of Sundry Inhabitants of the Country of Hanover in Pownall, Cuthbert & Cornwall to Lowndes, 10 February 1766, T/52/109 f.159.

6 Report on the Demands of Mr. Rappard, T/29/36 f.161, 27 November 1764. Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 22 March 1765, T/52/109 f.60.

solved that all receipts and vouchers presented in verification of accounts must conform to rigid standards before they could be accepted. Among the reasons for the rejection of such documents were their signature by unauthorized persons,¹ their lack of essential detail,² their failure to mention or to adhere to time limits and to conform to the geographical areas laid down in the authorities on which they were based,³ and the strong supposition that they were of a fraudulent nature.⁴ Reductions in the sums demanded were also made or recommended when unjustified prices were charged,⁵ when evidence of provisions of poor quality was found,⁶ when rates of exchange were calculated to Britain's disadvantage,⁷ and when errors in arithmetic were detected.⁸ All this is sufficient evidence of the Commissioners' strictness and of their determination to uphold British interests, there being very

1 Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 12 May 1764, T/52/56 f.475. Account of a Demand of the Country of Hanover in Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Lowndes, 9 December 1765, T/52/109 f.294.

2 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson re. Demands of A.H. Keston, 6 April 1764, T/52/56 f.472. A receipt which did not mention the species of forage delivered was rejected.

3 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 9 May 1765, T/52/109 f.79. The Commissioners apparently used detailed maps to verify the places of delivery, Pownall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 21 September 1764, T/52/109 f.6.

4 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 23 November 1763, T/52/56 f.83.

5 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 31 March 1764, T/52/56 ff.65 - 66. The city of Mühlhausen had charged the prices allowed in Hesse-Cassel instead of those allowed for deliveries in neutral countries.

6 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 10 November 1764, T/52/109 f.14.

7 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 12 March 1765, T/1/444 f.250.

8 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 22 March 1765, T/52/109 f.69.

few accounts from which they did not make deductions, in some cases very substantial ones. Yet at the same time they went out of their way to be fair to the commissariat's creditors, and thus they allowed accounts without proper authorities¹ and accepted receipts outside the official time limits, as long as there were valid reasons for these exceptions to the rules.² Unlike the Commissioners of Enquiry they ordered the payment of bought receipts as long as they were not forgeries at what seemed to be fair prices, considering the fact that they represented forage for which Britain was financially liable, and that the purchasers had actually expended money on them.³ Finally, errors of calculation to the deliverers' prejudice, however small, were methodically corrected.⁴

In the course of these detailed and painstaking investigations, in which the Commissioners frequently had to base their conclusions on evidence which was far from complete and direct, they were sometimes presented with intractable problems, apparently defying any accurate solution. One of the best examples was the accounts

1 Uckerman was allowed sums of money for sacks, which he had purchased to transport oats to safety, without a specific order from the commissariat, in view of the fact that his prompt action had avoided substantial losses, Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 18 August 1764, T/1/433 No.75, f.306/129.

2 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 20 June 1765, T/52/109 f.284. In another case where the delay had been a short one the Commissioners ordered payment, but reduced the price allowed, Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to (Treasury), 19 January 1765, T/52/56 f.483.

3 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 12 March 1765, T/1/444 ff.250 - 251.

4 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, (27 June 1765), T/52/109 f.145.

of Sir Lawrence Dundas and Richard Oswald for the forage drawn from commissariat magazines for their train horses, for which they were to be charged at the rate of 6d per ration.¹ As receipts for the issue of forage had not been posted to the accounts of the various services between 1759 and 1762, the Commissioners proceeded on the basis of a hypothetical charge against Dundas of one ration per day for every horse which he had maintained, and because the search in the records for this figure took so long, they accepted Oswald's statement of the maximum forage charge against himself without verification.² From these total charges various deductions had to be made for the estimated periods when the contractors had supplied their own forage, and when their animals had received provisions at no cost from the fields or as a result of contributions. The Commissioners assumed that most services had been supplied with magazine forage for six months in every year,³ an estimate which both Granby and Peirson considered equitable.⁴ Cuthbert, however, did not agree with his fellow Commissioners, and in a dissenting judgment argued with cogent reasons that a period of six months was too short and allowed the contractors an unfair advan-

1 Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 14 March 1764, T/1/432 No.25, f.218/55. The arrangement did not apply to the forage of the great foreign artillery train, which was provided at government expense, Reasons Offered by Mr. Cuthbert . . . , 12 June 1764, *ibid.* No.28, f.208/62.

2 T/1/432 No.25, f.218/55. Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 19 June 1764, *ibid.* No.29, ff.211 - 213/65 - 67.

3 T/29/36 ff.11 - 12, 10 July 1764. The great foreign artillery train was assumed to have received forage from these sources for ten months in every year.

4 *Ibid.* f.117, 24 October 1764.

tage.¹ He also made the simple but somewhat startling discovery that a sum of no less than £10,555 could be saved on Dundas' accounts by adopting a different method of calculating the value of the forage, which he had supplied to the great foreign artillery train.² In a true spirit of compromise the final agreement apparently endorsed the latter proposal, but rejected Cuthbert's other objections.³ Ultimately, the Commissioners showed perseverance and skill in arriving at a settlement acceptable to all parties, but there was no certainty as to its accuracy, and the way in which large sums of money could change hands according to different interpretations of conditions during the war or new mathematical insights is to say the least disturbing. Such were the disadvantages of what Pownall called settlement by '*modus negotiandi*' rather than by '*modus computandi*'.⁴

In May 1766,⁵ some two and a half years after they had opened their office, the Commissioners for Examining German Demands concluded their investigations. By contemporary administrative stand-

1 He argued '*inter alia*' that no contributions had been imposed on most provinces which were the seat of war after 6 February 1761, that it was impossible for the various kinds of free forage to have lasted for as long as half the year, and that the provision train in particular, plying from magazine to magazine, must have taken its forage mostly from commissariat sources, T/1/432 No.28, f.207/61.

2 Ibid. ff.208 - 209/62 - 63. See Appendix V.

3 Ibid. In 1766 the final calculations on the account were still made on the basis of six months supply of magazine forage each year. State of Adjustment between the Crown and Dundas, T/1/451 f.33. Adjustment of the Demands of the Crown against Dundas, ibid. f.39.

4 Pownall to Jenkinson, March 1765, ibid. f.42.

5 The Treasury revoked the Commissioners' authority on 2 May 1766, T/52/58 f.55, 15 July 1766.

ards such a speedy consummation might seem to reflect an almost indecent haste, although any suspicion that it was therefore the result of negligence is immediately dispelled by a review of the Commissioners' settlement of forage accounts, where the indefatigability, attention to detail, technical expertise and balanced judgment, which were constantly brought to bear on their work, are abundantly illustrated. And yet the need to establish such a commission, which was far removed in time and place from the accounts which it examined, and which in the absence of concrete statistics and facts frequently had to resort to deductions and inferences, to principles of natural justice and to abstract mathematical exercises of composition, stands as unflattering proof of the inadequacy of the system of forage accounts, operative in Germany in the critical middle period of the war. The Commissioners made the best of a bad job, but much of their work should never have been necessary.

CHAPTER V

BREAD

"Famine makes greater havock in an army than the enemy, and is more terrible than the bayonet." ¹

Bread was the staple item of the eighteenth century soldier's diet and if all other provisions failed, which was by no means an unknown occurrence, he relied on it to keep body and soul together. Not surprisingly therefore military commanders set great store on the regularity of bread supplies, and tended to react to any serious break-downs in this sphere with more than a little displeasure. For the British soldier the standard allowance or 'portion' was 1½ lbs. per day,² while German troops in the Seven Years War had a somewhat more generous daily ration of 2 lbs.³ The latter's bread was made of rye, which was more plentiful and cheaper than wheat in Germany, and had the additional advantage of remaining edible for nine days, while a wheaten loaf did not keep well for more than five.⁴ The British troops who had fought on the Continent in Queen Anne's time had been supplied with rye bread, presumably for reasons of economy and simplicity, while during the Austrian Succession War the soldiers' bread had been made of one third rye and two thirds wheat.⁵ But the military authorities were generally opposed to what they considered a false economy in supplying the British soldier with the standard German 'ammunition' bread,⁶ made

1 T. Simes, A Treatise on the Military Science, which Comprehends the Grand Operations of War (1780) p.6.

2 T/29/33 f.67, 13 July 1758.

3 Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/413 f.368.

4 R. Peirson to Duke of Newcastle, 27 September 1760, Add. MSS. 32912 f.162.

5 T/29/33 f.68, 13-July 1758.

6 The word 'ammunition' simply means that the troops were provided with the bread, and does not imply another use to which this hard, black substance might conceivably have been put.

from flour ground with the husk, and described as dry, hard, black and bitter.¹ Such unpalatable provisions were frequently held responsible for the sickness which inevitably dogged a British army abroad, Lord Ligonier being of the opinion that rye bread had caused more deaths in the Spanish Succession War than the sword of the enemy, while the Duke of Marlborough, the British Commander-in-Chief in Germany in 1758, warned bluntly:- 'I hope the Bread will be all Wheat, or half Our Men will dye of Fluxes on the March'.²

On distant manoeuvres and expeditions, when the troops were likely to remain far removed from the Army's bakeries, it was common to issue them with biscuit,³ which although equally unappetizing was also practically indestructible. Under normal conditions, however, bread rations came in the form of six-pound loaves,⁴ which were carried in knapsacks, and were supposed to last the British soldier four days and his German comrade-in-arms three. The Army's rations were sometimes cooked in the ordinary bakehouses of a town, which were hired or commandeered for this purpose,⁵ but such facilities were rarely adequate from the point of view of both size and situation, and it was thus common for new stone or brick ovens to be constructed,⁶ with some sort of

1 Letter of a French Officer in the Cantonment of Xanten, 24 August 1761, Add. MSS. 32927 f.251.

2 T/29/33 ff.67 & 71, 13 & 20 July 1758.

3 T.O. Hunter to Newcastle, 7 March 1759, Add. MSS. 32888 f.394.

4 Proposal of L. Dundas for Furnishing the Hessian and British Troops, 9 January 1759, T/1/395 f.421.

5 C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Prince Ferdinand, 9 July 1759, F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg, (1859 - 1872), Vol.III, pp.349 - 350.

6 Ferdinand to Commissariat, 28 August 1760, *ibid.* Vol.IV, p.423. T/29/36 f.105, 18 October 1764, re. the demands of the village of Ulff.

shelter in which to store the various ingredients and utensils used by the bakers.¹ Such buildings might well have to be protected and guarded against marauders, whether from the enemy or from one's own troops and camp-followers.² If the main army moved too far from its bakeries, or they were threatened by the approach of hostile forces, they had to be demolished, and as many of their materials and contents as possible transported for re-establishment in a more convenient or safer place, an extensive and difficult task. Frederick Halsey ruefully commented:-
 "... the Bakery has been removed & ye. Ovens broke down, & rebuilt 3 times since I have been here,³ when a Bakery is removed, the Director of ye. Bakery, principal Bakermasters, 6 Underbakerms., Forty Bakers & 250 under baker(s) & assistants must march with it, wch. is not a very easy operation;....".⁴ Such manoeuvres naturally involved some lapse of time before production could be resumed.

Flour for the baking of bread was amassed in magazines and depots, and transported to the bakeries in hired or train wagons,⁵ which might carry loads of between eleven and twelve hundredweights.⁶

1 T/29/36 f.105, 18 October 1764, mentioning that tiles were used in the building of ovens. State of the Magazines, 23 November 1759, T/64/96 f.268. A major item of equipment was the large coppers used for mixing the dough.

2 Standing Orders, 1 June 1760, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/100.

3 He had been at Gross Reckum for some two weeks.

4 F. Halsey to T.H. Noyes, 10 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.

5 This was one of the major functions of the provision or proviant train, although it is possible that the bakery train, which was primarily meant to carry utensils and equipment, could also be used for this purpose. See below p.260.

6 In a contract between M. Hatton and the Councillors of the Hessian Chancery, 13 July 1760, T/1/405 f.444, it was stipulated that the wagons hired were to carry a minimum of 12 quintals each, a quintal weighing between 108 and 110 lbs.

When grain had been purchased it had first to be taken to mills for grinding, a process which might cause considerable delays, especially during dry periods when there was insufficient water in the streams to turn the wheels.¹ Both flour and grain in transit had to be protected against the elements and were normally carried in stout sacks, although it might be considered necessary to pack flour in casks which were hopefully waterproof.² The other major item required by the Army's bakeries was firewood, which was burned in vast quantities³ and frequently had to be transported long distances. Once the bread was baked it had to be delivered to the troops, and for this purpose all British and German regiments were assigned a certain number of bread wagons, which could carry between two hundred and two hundred and fifty loaves each,⁴ and which would normally be covered and sometimes fitted with wicker baskets to prevent the provisions being spoiled while on the road.⁵ The bakery was usually situated some ten to twelve miles to the rear of the main army,⁶ a distance which might take the wagons the best part of a day to cover, so that allowing one day for loading, unloading

1 F. Halsey to President von Massow, 13 May 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031. Frederick the Great's soldiers were provided with handmills for grinding their own grain, R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation: the Reform of the British Army, 1795 - 1809, (1963) p.260, but no reference has been found to their existence in the Combined Army.

2 Hatton to S. Martin, 3 September 1758, T/1/384 No.54.

3 The common unit of measurement for firewood was the 'clafter' of three wagon loads, Certificate of J.A. Warnecke, 12 November 1765, SP/9/223.

4 R. Oswald to C. Hotham, 22 December 1760, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/11. An Estimate of the Charges that will Attend the Furnishing an Army of 40,000 Men, 23 January 1758, Add. MSS. 32878 f.191.

5 Ferdinand to the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, 24 July 1759, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.III, p.393.

6 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand's Orders relating to the Numbers of Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment, 11 September 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

and resting the horses, the troops could have their bread delivered either to their positions in the field or to a nearby magazine at least every three days. But if, as sometimes happened, the Army or the magazines were two days' march from the bakery, there would be difficulties in achieving a regular supply unless the wagons were sufficiently numerous to be divided into two sets in order to effect deliveries in relays.¹ When the wagons had to cover long distances and there were in addition delays caused by poor roads and bad weather, the soldiers' provisions might well arrive stale or even mouldy.²

In the last part of the war the Combined Army consumed in theory some ninety tons of bread each day.³ Actual consumption must have been somewhat less than this figure, for effective numbers were always less than strengths on paper, but the extent of the difference should not be exaggerated. Although the sick and wounded in hospital were counted as non-effective, they continued to consume bread albeit in smaller quantities, while if there was no need to supply those men who had been captured by the enemy, there was still a corresponding number of French prisoners of war who had to be fed. Moreover, there were additional and supplementary allowances, such as those made to the women and children accompanying the troops,⁴ and to soldiers endur-

1 Add. MSS. 32878 f.191.

2 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.125, 2 November 1761.

3 This figure is based on 23,327 British troops and 73,504 Germans, see above pp.31 - 33, the former consuming $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. and the latter 2 lbs. of bread per man per day. The 5,591 drivers and other personnel attached to the trains, see below Appendix VII, and approximately 600 employees of the commissariat and the magazines, see above pp.59 - 60 have been allowed 2 lbs. per man per day. The exact figure is 86.78 tons.

4 Standing Orders, 18 October 1761, Add. MSS. 28855 f.66.

ing conditions of particular hardship,¹ which increased the total consumption but which cannot be precisely calculated. At no time were all the Army's extensive needs met by supplies from its own bakeries, for there were many corps and detachments, which because of their separation from the main body of troops, were obliged to purchase their sustenance from civilian bakers or local inhabitants, while from 1758 onwards a considerable proportion of the Army's bread each year was provided by occupied enemy states in the form of forced contributions.² Nevertheless, over a period of just under three years in the last part of the war the bakery which served the German troops produced a total of 36,443,837 portions of bread of 2 lbs. each, or an average of 11,407 six-pound loaves each day.³ This task, necessitating the employment of three hundred bakers,⁴ was a far more complex and delicate operation than the supply of crude forage, and one whose magnitude should not be underestimated. And yet bread always remained an item of secondary importance in the budget of non-military supplies, calculations for 1759 showing that the estimated cost of providing the Combined Army with

1 In November 1761 the British troops were allowed an extra half pound of bread per day for as long as they kept the field, Extracts from Prince Ferdinand's Orders relating to the Numbers of Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment, 10 November 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

2 It was estimated in 1759 that five months supply in each year could be obtained in this way, Computation of the Expenses of the Extraordinary Services of the Combined Army in Germany for the Campaign 1759, T/1/395 f.7.

3 General View of the Accounts of the Foreign Bakery in T. Pownall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 16 March 1765, T/52/56 f.454. The accounts were for a period of 1,065 days from 1 May 1760 to 31 March 1763. On individual days the production of bread might rise as high as 15,000 loaves, Etat de la Boulangerie à Gemünden, 18 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/8/16.

4 Sir J. Cockburn to G. Howard, 28 May 1762, T/1/417 f.427.

forage was almost seven times the cost of supplying it with bread.¹

The general policy adopted by the Treasury and its commissaries for the supply of bread may be examined firstly from the point of view of the nature and quality of the provisions and the methods of production adopted. Although the Board originally hoped that the British troops could be weaned to a diet of rye bread by gradually introducing it in increasing proportions,² it eventually yielded to the weight of military opinion, and contrary to the practice of both the Spanish Succession and the Austrian Succession Wars, agreed to supply the more expensive wheaten bread to which the men were accustomed at home.³ But this willingness to subordinate considerations of strict economy to those of the welfare of the troops and of military efficiency, did not extend to a proposal that the bread of the German contingents should come in the form of smaller four-pound loaves.⁴ Among the arguments in favour of such a change were the fact that large loaves sometimes remained unbaked in the middle and caused sickness in the ranks,⁵ and that three or four days' supply of bread

1 8,716 British troops consumed 66,277.92 six-pound loaves per month at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. per day, while 61,697 German troops consumed 625,539.01 six-pound loaves per month at the rate of 2 lbs. per day, see above pp.31 - 32. Wheaten bread cost 8d and rye bread 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ d per six-pound loaf, see below pp.239 & 242, making a total monthly cost of £16,544/10/7 $\frac{1}{2}$. Hunter's estimate for the monthly cost of forage was £112,000, T/1/395 f.7.

2 T/29/33 f.68, 13 July 1758.

3 Ibid. ff.71 - 72, 20 July 1758.

4 Add. MSS. 32878 f.191. A similar change for the British troops would have required the production of three- or four and a half-pound loaves to last for two or three days.

5 Ibid. If the bakery was working under pressure there might well be a temptation to undercook the bread.

could quickly become inedible on long marches in persistently wet weather even with the protection of a knapsack,¹ while there were some soldiers who were unable to prevent themselves consuming their entire ration as soon as they received it and so going hungry for two or three days.² Smaller loaves would not only have been more expensive to produce, but their more frequent delivery would have required many additional bread wagons, although it may be suggested that the failure of the Treasury and the commissariat to adopt the proposal derived less from such considerations as from the fact that the military authorities were sceptical about the overall advantages to be gained from the change. Bread deliveries were difficult enough to effect with any regularity, and when the wagons did arrive it was no doubt regarded as prudent to take as many days' supply as possible.

As regards the methods of producing bread the most significant issue which engaged the attention of the commissaries concerned the provision of portable iron ovens, which although somewhat expensive to purchase,³ and requiring two wagons each to move them,⁴ made it much easier to relate production to the position of the troops in the field, and also avoided the considerable waste of time and effort involved in demolishing, removing and rebuilding permanent bakeries.

1 T/29/34 f.56, 30 April 1761.

2 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.129, 10 November 1761.

3 Certificate of P. Faber to A. Röhl, 29 June 1760, T/1/427 f.400, giving the cost of six new portable ovens as 3,552 dollars 16 groschen 6 pfennigs. The current rates of exchange at this time were 4 dollars to the ducat, 5 guilders 5 stivers to the ducat, Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218, and 10 guilders 15 stivers to the £, PMG/2/4 f.156. Thus the cost of each oven was £72/5/9.

4 One was for the oven itself and the other for the implements, utensils and tents of the bakers, Hunter to Martin, 11 March 1759, Add. MSS. 32889 f.2.

The Hanoverian commissariat had used these field ovens in 1757 and 1758, but it seems that the British authorities had had no experience of this valuable and more flexible means of supply.¹ At the beginning of 1759 the Hanoverian Chancery of War proposed to lend the twenty-six ovens which it had maintained to the British commissariat, which was now directly responsible for all bread supplies.² Despite the fact that the only additional expenditure involved would have been the cost of providing and maintaining the necessary wagons, Hunter refused to take more than twenty ovens and would have preferred to have made do with only sixteen, a fact which he reported to the Treasury with some emphasis on the saving which he had achieved.³ Yet it seems unlikely that the Superintendent of the commissariat was practising a false economy, for had that been the case he would have experienced much more difficulty than he did in sending a detachment of field ovens to help supply the army in Hesse-Cassel two months later.⁴ As in other spheres he seems to have found that efficiency did not demand an acceptance of everything offered by the Hanoverian authorities.⁵ Nor was there any evidence of skimping on this service a year later, when despite the difficulties caused by Hunter's resignation, extra field ovens were ordered to serve the increased numbers of troops in the Army in accordance with Prince Ferdin-

1 Ibid. This seems to be the implication of Hunter's statement that the ovens were a new article of expense arising from the nature of the war in Germany.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Hunter to (Oswald), 1 May 1759, T/1/396 f.28. The letter contains no hint of any shortages in the numbers of field ovens.

5 Hunter also exercised selection in purchasing magazines from the Hanoverians and in employing the staff attached to them, Hunter to Newcastle, 7 March 1759, Add. MSS. 32888 f.393.

and's wishes.¹

A second aspect of the basis of bread supply concerned the formulation of the Treasury's precise financial liabilities. In the British army this involved somewhat fewer contortions than those associated with the supply of forage, for while some regimental officers and officials were accorded supplementary allowances in the form of extra portions of bread,² presumably translated into cash payments, there was no equivalent of the annual grant of forage money to officers.³ Gratuities were also given to German officers and N.C.Os. under the heading of 'vacant portions',⁴ a term which, as in the case of vacant rations of forage, covered other payments, including those made for bread not consumed by non-effective men⁵ and a reimbursement of the cost of provisions, which for various reasons the troops had been obliged to purchase for themselves.⁶ The Treasury pursued identical policies towards vacant rations and portions, showing in the long run commendable fairness to German interests, but unable to effect any fundamental reform in a system which had undoubted financial and administrative drawbacks

1 Ferdinand's Demands in Hatton's Correspondence, 1760, T/1/405 f.321. The document refers to the numbers being increased to twenty-five, an addition of eleven ovens, so suggesting that by this time some had been either lost or destroyed. Three other ovens were ordered for the service of the British reinforcements, Hatton to Martin, 20 May 1760, *ibid.* f.199.

2 Rations to the Officers of Dragoons, 6 October 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/59.

3 See above p.147.

4 Treasury to Hunter, 25 October 1762, T/1/417 f.108.

5 *Ibid.*

6 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.148.

for Great Britain.¹

British troops were charged the fixed sum of 5d for every loaf supplied, deducted from their pay before issue,² and there is no evidence that the Treasury ever considered alleviating this heavy financial burden on the private soldier, representing no less than 15% of his wages.³ The question of a similar deduction from the pay of the German troops was much less straightforward. No contribution was demanded from the Hanoverians for the bread supplied by the Treasury after 24 December 1758,⁴ but the case of the Hessians was different as they were allowed higher basic rates of pay.⁵ During the Austrian Succession War the Hessian forces maintained by Britain had been stopped 1½d per man per day as a contribution towards the cost of the bread supplied,⁶ but at the opening of the Seven Years War no decision was made as to whether this was to continue. In May 1759, after two years' supply had already taken place, Hunter raised the problem with the Treasury and receiving no reply wrote again in July,⁷ although it was not until the

1 For a detailed discussion of this issue see above pp.148 - 151.

2 Journal of Corporal Todd, f.91, 11 September 1761. The regimental authorities had to account for these sums with the Treasury's commissary, who could presumably use the money for partial payment of the bread contractor. Standing Orders, 30 September 1758, Baker Baker MSS. Vol.VI, 66/189.

3 1½d out of 8d per day, see above p.22, n.3.

4 Until this date they supplied their own bread and received a supplement to their pay as a contribution towards the cost, Hessian Bread, (1759), Add. MSS. 32887 f.176.

5 T/29/35 f.246, 26 December 1763.

6 Add. MSS. 32887 f.176.

7 Hunter to Martin, 13 May 1759, T/64/96 f.122. Hunter to Treasury, 6 July 1759, T/1/395 f.251.

end of the year after a second reminder ¹ that the Board recognized the importance of the issue, only to state that for the moment it could not come to any resolution.² One possible reason for this procrastination is that the matter would have been delicate to negotiate in the middle of hostilities, when a vigorous defence of British financial interests could well have upset the Hessian authorities and made them less disposed to commit any more troops to the struggle.³ Nevertheless, after the end of the war, when Britain's bargaining position was strengthened by the existence of substantial debts to Hesse-Cassel, the Treasury was able to insist that a deduction for bread supplied be made as part of the general settlement of accounts.⁴ Had this decision been reached earlier, it might have proved possible to subject the Hessian troops to the British system of deductions before pay was issued,⁵ so providing a greater measure of financial liquidity, and thereby facilitating the payment of accounts for the supply of bread and flour.⁶

1 Hunter to (Martin), 7 November 1759, T/64/96 f.266.

2 Martin to Hunter, 7 December 1759, *ibid.* ff.269 - 270.

3 The negotiation of the Hessian subsidy treaty in 1755 might also have been considered an inopportune moment to raise the issue as the Landgrave had demanded higher rates of pay for his troops. C.W. Eldon, England's Subsidy Policy Towards the Continent During the Seven Years War. (1938) pp.30 - 31.

4 T/29/35 f.246, 26 December 1763.

5 Such a change would have necessitated the issue of Hessian pay by a British official in Germany instead of it being paid to the Landgrave's agent in London, Hunter to Treasury, 6 July 1759, T/1/395 f.251.

6 The exact sum of money involved is uncertain, but it was almost certainly in excess of £100,000. 12,012 Hessian troops served from 1 January 1757 to 16 January 1759 = 746 days; 19,004 from 17 January 1759 to 31 March 1760 = 440 days; and 22,396 from 1 April 1760 to 31 December 1762 = 1,005 days, see above pp.30 - 32. This represents a total bread requirement of 39,830,692 daily portions. Assuming that no more than half of this was provided by official sources, the rest coming from contributions, which it had been estimated could account for five months' supply each year, T/1/395 f.7, self-supply and rations not drawn for non-effective men, the sum involved at the rate operated in the Austrian Succession War would have been 19,915,346 x 1½d = £124,470/18/3.

The third aspect of the formulation of general policy concerned the methods by which bread was supplied. On campaign and in encampments the British army and the foreign troops in British pay were usually supplied by means of a contract with a private merchant.¹ But in 1757 and 1758, despite the delegation of full powers to make such agreements, the British commissaries, Amherst and Boyd, arranged for the bread of the Hessian and Prussian contingents for which they were responsible to be provided by the Hanoverian authorities as an extension of the supply of their own troops.² But it seems that no prices were fixed in advance,³ and the fear that Britain would eventually be handed a large and politically embarrassing bill for these supplies was presumably the reason why, with the despatch of the first British troops to Germany in July 1758, the Board decided to look for a contractor, firstly making private enquiries, and when these proved abortive placing advertisements in newspapers. The latter produced identical and reasonable tenders from Richard Oswald and Abraham Prado,⁴ although the Treasury informed Boyd that it felt that it might still be best to engage the Hanoverian commissariat, and even allow a price marginally higher than that offered by the two merchants, as long as certain provisos were met.⁵ This statement seems to suggest that, although the Board's lack of

1 See above pp.10 & 25 - 26.

2 J. Amherst to Baron Steinberg, 7 March 1757, T/1/375 No.27, f.59.

3 See below p.239.

4 Draught Treasury Letter to R. Boyd, July 1758, T/1/385 No.76. Both men offered to supply six-pound wheaten loaves at 8d each, although Oswald's terms for bread wagons were cheaper. T/29/33 f.80, 28 July 1758.

5 T/1/385 No.76. The provisos included access to the accounts for the British commissary.

expertise and experience usually obliged it to engage private merchants for the business of army supply, there was none the less a feeling that it would be more appropriate to commit such responsibilities to the care of public authorities.¹ In the event, however, the Hanoverians refused to undertake supplies,² with the result that the Duke of Marlborough was led to complain of the constant threat that his men would go hungry.³ Finally, after a delay of some three months, an agreement was concluded with Oswald⁴ and a period of considerable uncertainty and not a little confusion came to an end.

At the end of 1758 Britain became directly responsible for the supply of bread to most of the German troops in the Combined Army, and to fulfil this obligation Hunter made an agreement with another British merchant, Lawrence Dundas.⁵ The latter negotiated the purchase of stores and equipment from the Hanoverian authorities⁶ and supplied bread until October of the same year, when his contract, which had been made for an initial period of six months, was abruptly terminated by Hunter, who now resolved to take matters into his own hands by establishing a bakery owned and managed by the commissariat, a step of

1 Oswald's lack of experience of army supply in Germany may also have influenced the Treasury's preference for the Hanoverian authorities, but had this been the only consideration Prado, who had had such experience, could have been employed. Add. MSS. 32878 f.192.

2 Boyd to Treasury, 9 September 1758, T/1/386 No.57.

3 Duke of Marlborough to Newcastle, 22 August 1758, Add. MSS. 32883 f.31.

4 Newcastle to Marlborough, 20 September 1758, T/27/27 f.384.

5 Hunter to (Martin), 31 January 1759, T/64/96 f.13.

6 Ibid.

which the Treasury unreservedly approved.¹ Dundas' stores and equipment were purchased,² and Philip Ernst Faber, who had been judged a suitable person to take over bread deliveries in Hesse-Cassel when there was a fear that Dundas' subcontractor, Uckerman, might decide not to continue, was appointed the director of what came to be known as the great foreign bakery.³ Thus Britain was committed to a method of supply which was alien to her own traditions, but which, while throwing a heavy additional burden of work and responsibility on her administrators, offered the possibility of a much greater measure of control and considerable financial savings. The ostensible reason for this significant change was the breakdown in supplies from Dundas' bakery over a period of several days, during which time the contractor had been obliged to furnish the troops with money instead of provisions, a state of affairs which had aroused the wrath of Prince Ferdinand.⁴ Although Hunter believed that the failure could be partly attributed to accidental factors, his suspicion that some measure of dishonesty and possibly carelessness was also involved⁵ helped persuade him to take a firmer grip on matters, and he was probably also influenced by Ferdinand's rooted dislike of contractors.⁶ It would be strange, however, if considerations of economy had not weighed heavily with him as well, for his meticulous att-

1 Hunter to Martin, 13 September 1759, T/64/96 ff.225 - 226. J. West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, *ibid.* f.222.

2 Sir Lawrence Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 f.1.

3 Hunter to (Oswald), 1 May 1759, T/1/396 f.28. Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.148.

4 Hunter to (Martin), 13 September 1759, T/64/96 f.225.

5 *Ibid.*

6 Ferdinand to Baron Münchhausen, 8 July 1759, Westphalen, *op. cit.* Vol. III, p.338.

ention to Britain's financial interests must have made him aware of the positive advantages to be gained from a system of supply which eliminated contractors' profits. As for the Treasury, while its main stated concern was to guard against similar breakdowns in the future,¹ in fully supporting Hunter's scheme it endorsed the view that such an objective was more likely to be achieved by means of a method of supply, in which responsibility rested fairly and squarely on the shoulders of its own employees. Unlike the system of public ownership and management, which was established for some of the transport services in 1759 only to be abandoned at the end of 1760,² the supply of bread to the German troops, representing approximately three-quarters of the Army,³ remained in the hands of the commissariat until the end of the war. But at the same time Oswald's contract for the bread of the British troops continued to operate, and the existence of two entirely separate bakeries resulted not only in duplication of effort but in administrative difficulties and frictions as well.⁴ This failure to rationalize all bread supplies on the same footing probably derived from the fact that on the whole Oswald performed his task competently,⁵ and the understandable reluct-

1 West to Hunter, 25 September 1759, T/64/96 f.222.

2 See below pp.264 - 268.

3 See above pp.32 - 33.

4 There were complaints that the commissariat sometimes favoured one bakery at the expense of the other, F. Halsey to Colonel La Chevalerie, 3 February 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030, and on one occasion a dispute over the destination of a load of firewood led to an exchange of shots between the guards of the German and British bakeries, in which a peasant driver was gravely wounded. Ferdinand to Marquis of Granby, 30 October 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/249.

5 Although there had been some complaints about failures and inadequacies on his part, the Treasury was able to refer to him at the end of the war as a useful and good contractor whom it would be sorry to lose. Martin to Howard, 10 September 1762, T/1/417 f.146. Pressure was put on Oswald on more than one occasion to continue with his contract. Peirson to Martin, 18 October 1760, T/1/405 f.84. Howard to Martin, 27 October 1762, T/1/417 f.202.

ance to change horses in mid-stream unless it was absolutely necessary.¹

The general policies adopted for the supply of bread to the Combined Army by the Treasury and its commissaries were not above criticism. On two issues, the deductions from Hessian pay and the establishment of a regular means of provision for the British troops in the summer of 1758, the Board showed a certain lack of urgency and an inability to make up its mind quickly and decisively, tendencies which compromised both its own interests and those of its soldiers. In addition, the fact that a number of policy decisions were taken simply on the basis of military opinion meant that while some important and beneficial changes, such as the supply of wheaten bread to the British forces and the use of portable ovens, were introduced, other proposed improvements for which a strong case could be made out, such as the provision of smaller loaves and a complete reform of the system of vacant portions, were simply ignored or abandoned because of lack of enthusiasm or definite opposition on the part of the military authorities. Yet despite these limitations, it is clear that British administrators were not hidebound by tradition, and that their eyes were open to the possibilities of improving supplies and providing a more effective defence of British financial interests. Both these considerations are evident in the establishment and maintenance of the great foreign bakery, the major credit for which belongs to Hunter, and although at first sight it might seem that he and more especially the Treasury drifted almost unawares into this fundamental reform of traditional

¹ Peirson to Martin, 18 October 1760, T/1/405 f.84.

methods for merely pragmatic reasons, there is some evidence to suggest a more definite commitment to the principle involved. Had Hunter's successors shared his views with equal conviction, the British bakery might also have been subjected to the same system of public ownership, but although the change remained partial, a move had nevertheless been made towards freeing an important part of army supply from its dependence on private merchants.

From matters of general policy it is necessary to turn to a consideration of the detailed arrangements which were made for bread supplies. Effective provision of the troops depended firstly on binding suppliers to carry out their obligations in the clearest and most specific ways possible, and making proper provision for the supervision of their activities. It is not possible to say to what extent these factors were operative in connection with the supply of the Hessians and Prussians in 1757 and 1758, for a copy of the detailed agreement does not seem to have survived, but the fact that Amherst admitted to the Treasury that he had believed it unnecessary to enter into any formal contract with the King's German ministers suggests that the Hanoverian authorities were simply requested to supply Britain's mercenaries in the same way as their own troops, and then left very much to their own devices.¹ Nor was Oswald's agreement of September 1758 for the supply of the British troops any more closely defined, for it was not even committed to paper because of the uncertainty of its duration.² But in February 1759 after a trial period of six months a formal

1 T/29/33 f.21, 1 March 1758. The Treasury Minute only refers to forage contracts, but it may be assumed that the arrangements for the supply of bread were based on the same principles.

2 Martin to Hunter, 16 February 1759, T/64/96 f.23.

contract was drawn up,¹ containing a number of clauses designed to ensure that Oswald fulfilled his obligations. These included requirements that he form proper depots of grain and flour so that his bakery would be kept regularly supplied, that all his provisions be open to inspection by the commissariat, which had full powers to reject those of inferior quality, and that all bread be delivered to the quartermasters of regiments, who were to issue official certificates for the exact quantities received.² It is likely that the contract of March 1759³ between Hunter and Dundas for the supply of bread to the German troops was formulated on a similar basis,⁴ and its limitation to an initial period of six months⁵ turned out to be a wise provision, for it enabled Hunter to change to supply from the commissariat's bakery in October without any difficulty.

In the course of the war a number of other more limited agreements for the supply of bread were made with merchants and local authorities and officials. It is probable that some if not many of these were largely informal, which was not in itself inappropriate if they were for relatively small quantities. Much more substantial, however, were the contracts made for the supply of grain, flour and firewood for the great foreign bakery in the last three years of the war. Taken as a whole they show little evidence of drafting inadequacy.

1 Draft Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 14 February 1759, T/1/395 ff.387 - 394.

2 Ibid. ff.388 - 389.

3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.1 - 2.

4 No copy of the contract has been found.

5 T/29/33 ff.143 - 144, 14 February 1759. Hunter to (Martin), 13 September 1759, T/64/96 f.226.

acies; weights and measures were carefully defined,¹ proper insistence was made on delivery of provisions in strong sacks,² definite time limits were fixed³ and penalty clauses carefully inserted.⁴ After the establishment of the department of control early in 1762 it was possible to incorporate other important conditions, such as the obligation to give notice to the commissariat of the location of depots before beginning delivery so that an inspection could take place,⁵ while a standardization of penalty clauses stipulated complete confiscation if the contractor engaged in fraudulent practices.⁶ On occasions some of these strict conditions were dispensed with because of the pressing needs of the Army,⁷ but this was not a common occurrence and a good case could usually be made out for such exceptions. In general the care and precision which went into the drafting of these contracts were such as must have promoted the effectiveness of supply.

Another issue of some significance is whether arrange-

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- 1 Contract between Cockburn and C. Behrend, 14 May 1762, T/1/420 f. 268. Contract between Cockburn and Councillor Suden of Waldeck, 28 June 1762, T/1/417 f.362.
 - 2 Contract between Hatton and J. Paken, 22 September 1760, T/1/405 f. 440.
 - 3 Contracts between Hatton and C. Lehman, 7 August 1760, and Hatton and Councillor Rose, 3 September 1760, T/1/405 ff.433 & 448 - 449.
 - 4 The contract between Hatton and Rose included a fine of 10 écus for every missing quintal of flour, T/1/405 f.448 - 449.
 - 5 Contract between Cockburn and I. Levi, 2 November 1762, T/1/418 f.91.
 - 6 Contracts of Cockburn, October - November 1762, T/1/417 ff.242 - 261.
 - 7 A contract between Cockburn and A. Marcus and S. Arolsen, 8 November 1762, *ibid.* f.246, permitted the contractors to dispense with the notification of the location of their depots to the department of control before beginning deliveries in view of the urgent need of the service.

ments for the supply of bread, grain and flour were made promptly and at sufficient levels to keep the troops adequately fed. As already noted, hesitancy and confusion over matters of general policy in 1758 created serious problems for the British troops and there was apparently another delay at the beginning of 1759, when it was not until nearly three months after Britain had assumed direct responsibility for the needs of the Combined Army that Dundas' contract was signed.¹ On this occasion the trouble was caused by a lack of instructions from London on the proposals offered, and this in turn was the result of an interruption in communications caused by exceptionally bad weather.² Nevertheless, Dundas had not been allowed to remain inactive, for Hunter had had the foresight to make a provisional agreement with him, which permitted the purchase of the Hanoverian stores of grain and meal and put him in a position to begin deliveries before the contract was actually signed.³ Moreover, this was the time of year when the troops were in winter quarters where most of their bread was supplied by local people, so that the full services of the contractor were not immediately required. Nor does there seem to have been any significant disruption later in the year when the commissariat's own bakery took over from Dundas, for after only a short interval Hunter was able to claim with no reservations that matters were completely in his hands and working very well,⁴ an achievement which must have owed something to timely

1 The responsibility was assumed on 25 December 1758 and the contract signed on 16 March 1759. Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.1 - 2.

2 Hunter to Martin, 4 March 1759, T/64/96 f.50.

3 There were complaints of delays in purchasing these stores, Memorial of Münchhausen to Newcastle, 13 February 1759, *ibid.* ff.15 - 16, although this must have been largely due to the need to carry out a lengthy inspection.

4 Hunter to West, 9 October 1759, *ibid.* f.237.

arrangements and effective co-ordination of the change-over on his own part and on that of Faber, the new director.

There were two major occasions in the later years of the war when complaints were made about the inadequacy of bread supplies, but it would be wrong to attribute these failures simply to a lack of vigilance or activity on the part of the commissariat in making the necessary arrangements for the purchase and transport of grain and flour in good time. Early in 1761 there were reports of severe shortages of provisions,¹ but in giving the Treasury a detailed analysis of the reasons Hatton made no mention of any lack of ingredients in the bakeries, and stressed that the root of the matter was the disruption of bread deliveries as a result of exceptionally bad weather conditions.² His view was reinforced when shortly afterwards Peirson informed the Board that:- "Our Motions of late have been so sudden & frequent that some of the English Regiments have wanted bread for a few days, not from any Want of meal or bread in the bakery, but from the Wagons not knowing where, or how, to come up With their Regts."³ In September Prince Ferdinand was able to pay the commissariat the compliment that despite a campaign in a country which resembled a desert the Army had not wanted bread,⁴ but a year later he found himself obliged to make further complaints, and on this occasion there was a specific allegation of insufficient attention being paid to the formation of large depots in the

1 Newcastle to Peirson, 13 January 1761, Add. MSS. 32917 f.275.

2 T/29/34 f.56, 30 April 1761.

3 Peirson to Martin, July 1761, T/1/410 f.76.

4 Ferdinand to Newcastle, 17 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.201.

vicinity of the Army and a consequent lack of flour in the bakeries.¹ Statistical verification is provided by figures produced by Pownall, which show that nearly 80% of the rye flour and over 60% of the wheat flour, ordered by the Commander-in-Chief for the campaign of 1762, remained undelivered at the end of the year.² Again, the reason for this abysmal performance does not seem to lie in any failure of the commissariat to make agreements for adequate quantities of provisions, but rather in the way in which deliveries were being subjected to serious delays. On 14 May 1762 Cockburn had made a substantial contract with Cosman Behrend for more than half the rye meal ordered by Ferdinand, the delivery to be completed within three months,³ and yet five months later it was reported that less than one-fifth of the provisions were to hand.⁴ The contractor's excuse was that he possessed the necessary amount of grain but could find no mills free to grind it,⁵ while the usual difficulties with carriage had obviously made matters no easier.⁶ And yet the commissariat cannot be completely exonerated, for while it must have been clear at a very early stage that Behrend was not going to fulfil his contractual obligations, no steps were taken to offer him assistance

1 Ferdinand to Howard, 16 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/9/7.

2 Of 96,000 quintals of rye flour ordered, 75,460 quintals remained to be delivered, while the corresponding figures for wheat flour were 24,000 quintals and 14,946 quintals. General Report of Magazines, 15 December 1762, T/1/418 f.63.

3 T/1/420 f.268.

4 Howard to (D. Weir), 10 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/5/22.

5 T/1/420 f.268. The commissariat found the explanation sufficiently plausible to allow an extension of the time limit.

6 Cockburn to C. Hotham, 11 September 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/13. The commissary reported that it was necessary to transport meal an incredible distance, and that it was only with the utmost difficulty that the bakery could be kept supplied.

or to make alternative arrangements. Only after Ferdinand's irate complaints, and indeed ultimatum,¹ did Howard entreat Daniel Weir at Bremen to do all he could to expedite the delivery, and to make urgent enquiries as to whether other sources of supply could not be found.²

Finally, it must be asked to what extent British financial interests were upheld by the detailed arrangements made for bread supplies. There can be little doubt that the cost of bread provided by the Hanoverian authorities at the beginning of the war was unjustifiably expensive, for the accounts for 1758 show that it amounted to nearly 10 groschen for a six-pound loaf,³ whereas early in the same year Prado had offered to supply rye bread at only 7½ groschen per six-pound loaf.⁴ Thus the argument of Amherst and Boyd that this method effected significant economies by avoiding duplication of effort⁵ is contradicted by the figures. The contract made with Oswald in September 1758 by which a six-pound wheaten loaf was to cost 8d represented a much better bargain, for it was only a penny more than the price paid in the Low Coun-

1 Ferdinand to Howard, 15 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/9/3.

2 Howard to (Weir), 10 October 1762, *ibid.* D/HV/B/5/22.

3 Journal of the House of Commons, 9 February 1761, Vol. XXVIII, p. 1,066. The total demand for bread supplied to 12,012 Hessians and 2,678 Prussians, see above pp. 31, n. 6, was 484,996 dollars 10 groschen 5 pfennigs. The daily cost per man was thus 3.26 groschen, or 9.78 groschen per six-pound loaf. As these figures are based on the troops being numerically complete and makes no allowance for provisions which from time to time the men had to purchase for themselves, the real cost must have been higher.

4 Add. MSS. 32878 f. 191. Prado's proposals were 5 groschen for a four-pound loaf, although these terms were offered for a large army and might not have been so favourable for the small contingent of Hessians and Prussians.

5 See above p. 161.

tries during the Austrian Succession War ¹ and supply in Germany was generally recognized to be a much more difficult and expensive affair.² Certainly the price was much lower than that charged by the Prussian commissariat for the temporary supply of the British contingent on their landing at Emden, which had been more than 11d per loaf,³ while the salutary effects of competition were apparent in the fact that Prado, who had proposed to deliver at 8½d per six-pound loaf in April 1758,⁴ had now reduced his price in response to the Treasury's advertisements.⁵ There is some suggestion, however, that in January 1759 the Board might have been able to obtain an even more favourable price when Dundas offered to undertake the service at 7d per six-pound loaf,⁶ but this figure was probably unrealistic, for the contractor withdrew it after his arrival in Germany, when no doubt he was more reliably informed on current market prices.⁷

When Oswald's contract was formalized in February 1759

1 Mr. Hume's Report on Two Contracts of Mr. Prado, 23 October 1758, T/1/384 No.63, ff.5 - 6.

2 Hume's Observations on the Draught of a Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 13 January 1759, T/1/395 f.201.

3 Hatton to Martin, 18 July 1758, T/1/384 No.44. A six-pound loaf cost 10 stivers, and with the £ worth 10 guilders 11 stivers at this time, PMG/2/2 f.198, this represented 11.37d.

4 Prado's Proposals, 3 April 1758, T/1/385 No.109.

5 T/29/33 f.69, 13 July 1758. See above p.228, n.4.

6 Proposal of Dundas for Furnishing the Hessian and British Troops, 9 January 1759, T/1/395 f.421.

7 T/29/33 f.142, 14 February 1759. Dundas had not arrived in Germany at the time of his original proposal for his letter of 9 January is headed 'London', T/1/395 f.432, but by 31 January he was writing from Münster, *ibid.* f.194.

he was granted a number of concessions on the basis of a report by Abraham Hume, the Commissary General in England,¹ of which the most important was the right to have wagons assigned to him for the transport of his grain and flour, or to have the cost of such carriage reimbursed.² Oswald considered this essential in view of the abnormally high transport costs which he had found to be involved in supplying bread in Germany,³ and the Treasury's motive in accepting the liability was no doubt to forestall any attempt by him to abandon his agreement in the middle of a campaign to the great detriment of the service. In this aim the Board clearly failed, for by 1760 Oswald was making severe complaints that the price of wheat had risen so much that he was losing money,⁴ and in 1761 and 1762 he announced his intention to withdraw from the agreement, although he was ultimately persuaded to continue until the end of the war,⁵ a fact which suggests that the financial terms of the contract were far from completely unfavourable to him. It is impossible to calculate the increase in the cost of a loaf represented by the obligation to pay transport costs, but it cannot have been insignificant, although it did enable the price of an 8d loaf to be maintained for over four years, thus effectively protecting the public against in-

1 T/1/395 ff.200 - 199 (sic).

2 Draught Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 14 February 1759, *ibid.* f.392.

3 *Ibid.* f.201.

4 Peirson to Martin, 18 October 1760, T/1/405 f.84.

5 Granby to Peirson, 10 September 1761, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book II. Oswald to Howard, 15 July 1762, T/1/417 f.505. Howard to Martin, 27 October 1762, *ibid.* f.202. Oswald also complained of a failure to settle accounts promptly.

flationary movements in grain prices.

The terms of Dundas' contract of March 1759 for the supply of rye bread to the German troops also seem to have represented a considerable saving compared to the previous method of supply, for a six-pound loaf was to cost $5\frac{1}{2}$ d, or 5 groschen.¹ Once again, however, the contractor was granted other allowances, including the reimbursement of transport costs, and these may well have raised the price of his bread to 7 groschen per loaf,² to which has to be added the cost of maintaining the foreign bakery train, which was the subject of a separate account. The various other smaller agreements for the supply of bread to the parties, corps and detachments of the Combined Army tended not surprisingly to show fluctuations in price. Uckerman made deliveries to the troops in Hesse-Cassel in 1759 at 5 groschen per loaf,³ in 1760 to various regiments at $6\frac{1}{2}$ groschen,⁴ while his supply of the troops stationed at Brackel in 1762, for which no price was fixed in advance and a commission of 3% was allowed, brought the price of a loaf to

1 T/1/395 f.421. Early in 1759 20,000 ducats cost £9,886/3/0, Hunter to (Martin), 25 February 1759, T/64/96 f.40, while at approximately the same time the ducat was worth 3 dollars, Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218. Thus 1d = 0.91 groschen.

2 Dundas' accounts show that he charged £99,589/1/6 for bread and biscuit supplied, and £40,399/12/10 for transport, losses to the enemy, wastage and building of ovens, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.1 - 3. The additional charges represent 40.57% of the cost of the actual provisions, and had all the items been accepted on the liquidation of accounts, the cost of a six-pound loaf would have risen to 7.03 groschen, viz. 140.57% of 5 groschen.

3 Instructions for Hatton . . . , (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.148.

4 Contract between Hatton and J.J. Uckerman, 17 October 1760, T/1/405 f.442.

9 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen.¹ These last very high prices derived partly from the fact that, as the Weser was frozen, meal had to be transported overland from Bremen to Brackel, an expense which the Commissioners for Examining German Demands felt was justified in view of the great difficulties in supplying the Army at that time.² On the other hand, an agreement made with Behrend in 1762 by Thomas Bishop, the commissariat's director of foreign hospitals, to supply bread at the equivalent of 12 groschen per six-pound loaf could only be regarded as exorbitant, and in this case the suspicion of dereliction of duty on the part of the commissary cannot be ruled out.³ Corresponding price movements may be traced in the arrangements for bread supplies which were made with local officials, and thus in 1758 a six-pound loaf from such sources might cost no more than 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen,⁴ although by 1761 it had risen to at least 6 groschen,⁵ while in 1762 payments of between 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ and 9 groschen were authorized.⁶ These progressively rising prices are largely a reflection of the general inflationary tendency of the war period, al-

1 Second Part of the Demands of Major Uckerman for Deliveries in 1762, T/1/432 No.74, f.297/177. The document states that 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen per portion of 2 lbs. was the average price charged by Uckerman, but calculations of the cost of 1,840 portions show that the price may have been 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen. As these prices were charged in gold with 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ dollars to the ducat, A0/1/1507/218, they were even more advantageous to the contractor.

2 Pownall, C.W. Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 20 June 1764, T/1/432 No.73, f.299/174.

3 See below p.315, n.3.

4 Hotham to Colonel Scott, 3 November 1758, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/8.

5 State of the Demands of the Prussian Countries in Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 25 February 1765, T/52/56 f.422. Contract between Cockburn and Bailiff Isenbart, 16 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15064(A).

6 Howard to Cockburn, 16 November 1762, T/1/420 f.8. Contract between Cockburn and Amtsrath Borries, 18 November 1762, T/1/417 f.244.

though it should not be forgotten that the increase in the real cost of bread was less than might appear as the silver dollar steadily depreciated in value against the ducat.¹

The wide variations in transport costs, which were reflected in the prices allowed by the commissariat for the supply of rye flour to its own bakery, make it hard to judge whether this part of the service was undertaken with the maximum economy. Commissaries sometimes agreed prices which exceeded those currently being charged in a particular area, although if it was their conviction that the Army was in imminent danger of wanting bread and no alternative sources of supply could be found, it is difficult to see what else they could have done.² One such agreement between deputy commissary Smith and Mr. Miltz of 12 November 1762 for rye meal at 5 dollars per quintal was condemned as exorbitant,³ although the price was not unparalleled at that time.⁴ It is conceivable that such examples represent an attempt to profiteer at Britain's expense at a time when the commissariat was smarting under Prince Ferdinand's criticisms, and desperately trying to increase the quantities of meal in hand. But such practices were not typical of the

1 The apparent increase in the cost of a portion of bread from 2 groschen to $2\frac{1}{4}$ groschen in the two examples quoted above, p.243, n.5, is $12\frac{1}{2}\%$, but as in the former case the ducat was to be valued at $3\frac{1}{2}$ dollars and in the latter at $3\frac{1}{2}$ dollars, the real increase is only 7.14%.

2 Frederick Halsey made it clear that it was only fear of a shortage which led him to pay what he considered to be an exceptional price. F. Halsey to Mr. de König, 10 May 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

3 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 24 October 1764, T/1/431 No.21, f.60/404. Smith was also accused of dishonesty, see above pp. 135 - 136.

4 W. Fraser to Cockburn, 28 December 1762, T/1/420 f.264.

period as a whole and calculations, admittedly hypothetical, show that between May 1760 and October 1762 bread from the commissariat's bakery was produced at a cost within the range 4.7 - 7.48 groschen per six-pound loaf, not including the cost of maintaining the bakery train.¹ This compares very favourably with the cost of Dundas' agreement of 1759, and suggests that savings had been achieved by the establishment of a system of public ownership, which eliminated contractors' profits on the actual production of bread.

The record of the Treasury and its commissaries in making the detailed arrangements for the supply of bread to the Combined Army was by no means an unsuccessful one, although it was not without blemishes, which occurred particularly at the beginning and at the end of the war. In 1757 and 1758 British interests were clearly not upheld by the plenary delegation of responsibilities to the Hanoverian authorities, with no adequate controls and safeguards and at indefinite prices. In the second half of 1762 a certain degree of inaction in the face of difficulties in fulfilling contractual obligations helped create serious shortages of meal, which must have caused considerable hardship among the troops, and which may have forced the commissariat into panic measures as a result of which its bargaining position on prices was weakened. But these failures should not be allowed to obscure the fact that on the whole adequate steps to supply the troops had been taken in good time, that careful attention had been given to binding suppliers to clearly defined obligations and that prices, while

¹ See Appendix VI.

showing a natural tendency to rise as the war dragged on, had for the most part been confined within reasonable limits.

It remains, finally, to discuss the effectiveness of the control exercised over the execution of the arrangements described above and of the accounting procedures which were adopted. By whatever means bread was provided its delivery, either directly to the troops or into magazines, required careful checks of quantity and quality, a responsibility which fell initially to regimental officers and magazine keepers, although some additional measure of supervision by senior commissariat personnel was also essential to ensure that these functions were carried out diligently and honestly. When bread was supplied from the commissariat's own bakery much more control was needed, involving not only the delivery of the finished product but every stage in its production from the provision of grain and its grinding into flour to the actual process of baking, lengthy and often complex operations which provided ample opportunities for lax administration and fraud. The fact that for most of the war period the establishment of any effective system of supervision was rendered nugatory by the failure to appoint adequate numbers of commissaries of control and magazine inspectors, or having appointed them to hold them to their proper functions, has already been noted,¹ so that it was only with the setting up of the department of control by Pownall in 1762 that the provision of bread, along with all other aspects of non-military supply, came under detailed scrutiny. The first part of Pownall's work involved a

¹ See above pp.63 - 66.

clear and detailed definition of the duties of magazine keepers in connection with the receipt, storage and issue of bread, grain and flour along lines similar to those described above in relation to forage administration.¹ A more particular problem involved the process of sending grain from magazines to local mills to be ground, in the course of which there was much waste and peculation. Pownall therefore stipulated that all grain was to be weighed before leaving the magazine and the miller made to sign for the quantity received,² while he also established the principle that no more than 2 lbs. per quintal of 110 lbs. was to be allowed as wastage in the course of grinding.³

Providing magazine keepers with the detailed factual and statistical information on deliveries and issues, so necessary to efficient administration, was another part of Pownall's work,⁴ and in this connection an important reform, suggested by him and finally put into operation in June 1762, was of considerable value in regulating the issue of bread. The only certain way to prevent military officers and train officials drawing more bread for their troops and their drivers than they were entitled to was to hold full and frequent musters, and to furnish not only magazine keepers but bakery officials and bread contractors as well with the numbers to be supplied. It is not surpris-

1 See above pp.193 - 194.

2 Report on 'Depots de Consommation' (Minden), 22 August 1762, T/1/417 f.17.

3 Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/413 f.368.

4 The plan that magazine keepers should have detailed copies of all contracts under which deliveries were being made applied to grain and flour as much as to forage, although it is not certain that it was effectively realized in practice. See above pp.193 & 196.

ing that such a methodical system was never introduced, if only because it is hardly possible to muster an army on campaign every month, and thus in 1759 Hunter had been obliged to depend partly at least on statements given 'on Parole of Honour' by military commanders.¹ In 1762, however, it was made obligatory for regimental commanders to send in returns of effective numbers at the beginning of each month, while the fact that these statistics were to be collated by the commander-in-chief of each nation in the Combined Army and then by the Adjutant-General, before being forwarded to the commissariat, provided in theory at least a series of checks on accuracy.² At the same time the first comprehensive mustering of the trains³ produced more accurate information on the numbers to be supplied in these services.

The third benefit conferred by Pownall's work was the appointment of sufficient numbers of officials to enable a proper supervision of affairs to be undertaken. His establishment of a system of district inspectors and control agents for each magazine⁴ provided a constant check on the activities of employees, not only bringing to light examples of undesirable practices,⁵ but no doubt helping to pre-

1 Hunter to Oswald, 14 February 1759, T/1/395 f.357.

2 Ferdinand to Various Commanding Officers, 3 June 1762, T/1/417 f.55.
In practice it may be doubted whether the national commanders and the Adjutant-General could do more than sign the returns and pass them on.

3 States of the Establishment of the Trains, 24 May 1762, T/1/420 ff.125 - 126.

4 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 ff.106 - 107. Pownall to West, 18 November 1761, T/1/413 ff.360 - 361.

5 These included many examples of inadequate care in storage and various kinds of confusion and fraud in connection with weights and measures. The details appear in Pownall's general reports on magazines and 'depots de consommation' in T/1/417.

vent or at least nip in the bud many others to the general benefit of bread supplies. Equally important was the fact that for the first time in its existence the commissariat's bakery was subjected to direct supervision. The only definite request for a commissary to be assigned to the inspection of this service before this time seems to have emanated from Prince Ferdinand in 1761,¹ and although this led to a sentence in Peirson's commission of June of that year empowering him to appoint such an official, no action was taken.² Early in 1762 Pownall appointed deputy commissary Meyer to supervise the workings of the bakery, allowing him the assistance of an inspector and a clerk in the execution of his multitudinous responsibilities.³ The minor officials were mostly concerned with the keeping of precise accounts, which would make it possible to check that the quantities of bread baked corresponded to the quantities of grain and flour received, although Meyer was also supposed to exercise a general surveillance over all aspects of the bakery's daily affairs and the conduct of its employees, Pownall particularly directing his attention to such matters as the unjustified disposal or sale of commissariat property in the form of stores, equipment and utensils.⁴

It may be assumed that the physical presence of the deputy commissary and his assistants at the bakery had the same bene-

1 Plan of the Commissariat as Mr. Hatton Thinks the Duke Wants to have it, (1761), Add. MSS. 38334 f.63.

2 Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/4.

3 Instructions to J.F. Meyer, T/1/420 ff.118 - 119.

4 Ibid. f.118.

ficial effects as that of control officers in the magazines,¹ although such a statement inevitably poses the question of how far Faber had conducted his affairs with efficiency and honesty over a period of two and a half years, during which he had been left very much to his own devices. In the absence of any surviving correspondence from the director, the only way to approach this problem is through the bakery's accounts. In 1762 these had not been stated and examined since the institution of the service in 1759 and Pownall, who demanded them on a number of occasions to no avail,² formed the impression that Faber had been deliberately unco-operative, with the implication that he had skeletons in his cupboard which he wished to hide.³ Right at the end of the war the director 'presumed to Offer Waggon Loads of Paper in a form that can never be receiv'd as an Account',⁴ and these voluminous records were therefore laid before the Commissioners for Examining German Demands in 1763. The latter approached the task with their usual zeal and determination, proceeding firstly to make out a charge against Faber for the total quantities of flour, sacks, firewood and bread received by him.⁵ To their surprise they found that he had in fact accounted for more than could be actually charged to him, a somewhat unusual situation apparent-

1 As the bakery was always scattered in several places such effects may not have been universally apparent.

2 Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts Appear to be, 10 January 1763, T/1/427 f.351.

3 Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 f.109.

4 T/1/427 f.351.

5 Pownall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 16 March 1765, T/52/56 f.451. The charge for bread represented provisions received from private bakeries or returned from magazines.

ly arising from the fact that his careful and assiduous administration had enabled him to make savings, which he had honestly carried to the credit of the commissariat instead of putting them in his own pocket.¹ Secondly, the Commissioners were very impressed with the fact that, although Faber could produce no vouchers for his account of losses to the enemy and destruction or waste of provisions and stores as a result of the weather and other accidents, the quantities involved represented such a small or even minute proportion of the totals which had passed through his hands as to be quite unexceptionable.² The nature of the service was such as to make some loss and waste inevitable, and it was clear that these had been kept to a minimum. Thirdly, the Commissioners drew attention to the small number of errors and overcharges in the cash accounts,³ which presumably compared very favourably with the grosser mistakes and attempted extortions in the accounts of some contractors.

Thus the general conclusion was that, despite the lack of supervision, Faber's administration of the bakery had left little to be desired, and there is no reason to suspect that his accounts were

1 Ibid. ff.451 - 452. The quantities involved were not insignificant, and included 3,072 quintals 35 lbs. of flour, 879 sacks and 130,031 portions of bread.

2 Ibid. f.451. On the meal account 10,974 quintals 76 lbs. were stated as losses to the enemy and 998 quintals 102 lbs. as spoiled provisions. Issues accounted for a total of 554,802 quintals 13 lbs. of meal, so that losses and waste represented 2.16%. Similar calculations for losses of bread yield an infinitesimal figure of 0.68%; 81,452 portions lost and 180,446 spoiled out of a total of 38,331,231 portions produced or purchased. The percentage for sacks is higher at 10.48; 23,652 lost and 5,445 spoiled out of 277,682 received. Ibid. f.454.

3 Ibid. f.453.

examined with any less thoroughness and perspicacity than the Commissioners demonstrated in dealing with other aspects of the supply of the Army. Their conclusions might be more open to challenge on the grounds that the accuracy of every detail in the accounts had not been positively proved, were it not for the fact that Pownall, who in 1762 had been highly suspicious of Faber's administration, three years later put his signature to a report which was highly complimentary to him. Nevertheless, the Treasury and its commissaries had run an unnecessary risk in leaving the bakery unsupervised for so long, and they were fortunate to have chosen as director someone of Faber's efficiency and integrity. But the story has something of a tragic ending. In 1762 Pownall's suspicions led him to order that no further sums of money were to be advanced to Faber for the running expenses of the bakery until he had presented and liquidated all his past accounts, something he was unable to do before the general settlement of all commissariat affairs after the end of the war.¹ As a result he was forced to borrow a large sum of money on his own credit to keep the service going, and actually died while under arrest for debt.² Thus the rehabilitation of the reputation of an administrator, who had served both Britain and the Army well, could unfortunately only take place posthumously.

A more detailed examination of the accounting techniques and practices adopted for various aspects of bread supply during the war reveals some further weaknesses and inadequacies. A complete

1 Ibid. Letter of Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 f.109.

2 See above p.132.

record of the quantities actually received by the troops should have been provided by the account books, which every regiment was supposed to maintain, although the pressures of strictly military affairs seem to have meant that these were not always kept fully and accurately.¹ Train directors were also presumably expected to have a record of the bread supplied to the drivers and other personnel under their command, but neither Dundas nor Oswald, the two train contractors, were able to provide such information at the end of the war.² Yet even if these accounts had existed, it would still have been necessary to check and verify them against other evidence such as the records of bread issues from the various bakeries and magazines. There can be little doubt that something along these lines was kept before 1762, if only because contractors and deliverers had to present it as the basis for the settlement of the sums due to them, while Faber and the magazine keepers needed it as the discharge for the property committed to their care.³ But to what extent such accounts always included an analysis of the particular deliveries and issues to the individual corps, regiments and services, so making it possible to check whether excessive quantities had been received, remains uncertain. It may well be that little constant effort was made to keep such a detailed record, because other evidence of the destination of deliveries existed in the form of the original receipts, given by military officers and other officials for

1 On at least one occasion Prince Ferdinand had to remind regiments of their obligation in this respect, Standing Orders, Article 138, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/289 f.46.

2 The contractors were supposed to pay for the bread their employees had received from official sources, Memorial of Dundas and Oswald, 26 November 1764, T/1/434 No.34, f.216. The possibility remains that the contractors kept such accounts but preferred to negotiate a composition, which might be more favourable to them.

3 The Commissioners for Examining German Demands would presumably have been less complimentary to Faber had he failed to keep such accounts.

the quantities of bread taken by them. These documents, normally stating the date, the place, the regiment or service concerned and the amount received, thus formed the vouchers in justification of the accounts. But to have become the basis of an analytical record of bread deliveries, they would have had to have been constantly collected in by the commissariat and 'posted' to the four hundred and fifty separate accounts of regiments and other services entitled to draw bread.¹ This was simply not undertaken before 1762,² and vast quantities of receipts remained in the hands of Faber and the magazine keepers, whose accounts had not been examined and settled when the war came to an end. After this it would still have been theoretically possible, although a labour of Herculean proportions, to have collected them in for posting, but in practice this could no longer be done with any accuracy, for many particular receipts had disappeared, having been exchanged for general ones.³

This failure to keep fully detailed records of the quantities of bread received had a number of unfortunate consequences. In general terms it made it impossible to verify whether the Army had in fact consumed more than it was entitled to, and whether therefore British money had been wasted. In addition, it meant that a number of particular accounts, such as those of the regiments for vacant portions and those for bread supplied to the employees of the trains of Dundas and Oswald, had to be settled on the basis of compositions, of whose accuracy and

1 General Report from the Office of Accounts, 31 December 1762, T/1/420 f.213.

2 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 19 June 1764, T/1/432 No.29, f.211/65.

3 Ibid.

fairness there could be no certainty.¹ Moreover, the slackness of the whole system provided those who were so inclined with abundant opportunities for fraud and dishonesty, in which connection some of the activities of Uckerman again gave rise to suspicion. For a number of his bread deliveries he had exchanged the original receipts of the troops for general receipts issued by Faber and by one, Markhard, a Prussian in the service of the commissariat, and on the basis of these vouchers had been granted certificates by Thomas Halsey, the commissary of accounts. The Commissioners of Enquiry, appointed to investigate allegations of fraud in Germany, found these circumstances highly irregular and suspicious, arguing 'inter alia' that those who had granted the receipts had had no authority to do so, that Faber had thereby been given the opportunity to use Uckerman's original receipts as vouchers for his own deliveries of bread, and that as the same original receipts had never been produced or given up, there was a strong probability that they did not represent actual deliveries but had been bought from the troops for vacant portions which they claimed were due to them.² Halsey's somewhat indignant reply to these accusations was to point out that Markhard had acted in conformity with Hatton's orders in issuing general receipts to Uckerman,³ and that Faber was a proper person to

1 Pownall to H.S. Conway, 1 January 1763, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/15. T/1/427 ff.352 & 361 - 362. The settlement of the accounts for bread supplied to the trains of Dundas and Oswald was accompanied by the same differences of opinion and finally decided on the same basis of compromise, as already described in connection with the forage deliveries to those services. See above p.213.

2 Reasons of the Commissioners of Enquiry for Deductions from the Account of Major Uckerman, 22 May 1764, T/1/444 ff.272 - 273. State of Uckerman's Account as Revised by the Commissioners of Enquiry, T/1/439 ff.263 - 264.

3 Answer of T. Halsey, Read 11 January 1766, T/1/444 f.259. The commissary probably gave such orders to facilitate the settlement of Uckerman's voluminous accounts.

give such receipts, because his knowledge of the overall state of bread deliveries enabled him to tell immediately whether the contractor's claims were justified.¹ But his major contention was that the Commissioners' case rested on mere supposition, and the Commissioners of Revision, who were appointed to make an unbiased review of Uckerman's affairs,² agreed with this view, finding it clearly impossible in the light of the evidence before them to uphold the accusations of the Commissioners of Enquiry.³ Yet this verdict was clearly one of not proven and, as Halsey himself admitted, the particular receipts on which the general receipts were based should have been carefully preserved and brought to account.⁴

Many of these weaknesses were overcome as a result of the establishment of the department of control in 1762. In the last months of the war both Oswald and Faber were issuing detailed and sometimes daily reports on printed forms of all quantities issued from their bakeries, as well as a separate account of the amounts of bread drawn by the individual regiments and train services.⁵ In the same way, Pownall's instructions to the magazine keepers bound them not only to keep a general record of bread issues, but also a full account of the deliveries

1 Answer of T. Halsey, 12 April 1765, T/1/439 f.256.

2 See above p.208, n.1.

3 D'Oyly, Bradshaw & Cornwall to C. Lowndes, 2 November 1765, T/1/439 f.270. D'Oyly, Bradshaw & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 8 July 1765, T/1/444 ff.278 - 279.

4 Answer of T. Halsey, Read 11 January 1766, T/1/444 f.259.

5 Etats de la Boulangerie, August and October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/8/12 - 19.

made to each regiment or other branch of the service,¹ while deputy commissary Stanton was put to work on the task of posting original receipts to the individual accounts of those who had drawn the bread.² These changes, coupled with the more reliable and up-to-date information on effective numbers, provided for the first time an accurate and comprehensive system of account for bread deliveries.

As in so many other spheres of the supply of the Combined Army, the introduction of these essential measures had to wait until the war was nearly over, by which time it was too late to recover much of the ground lost in previous years. As a result it proved impossible for the most part to call to an exact and accurate account those involved in the delivery and receipt of bread, grain and flour before 1762. There is thus at least a possibility that irregularities and frauds were practised and perpetrated. But while the example of Faber's faithful stewardship in no way justifies the inadequacies of the system, it does provide a salutary warning against assuming too readily that if 'a Man has an opportunity of being a Rogue he must be one'.³

1 Standing Instructions to Magazine Keepers, (1761), T/1/413 ff.365 - 366.

2 General Report from the Office of Accounts, 31 December 1762, T/1/420 f.213.

3 Answer of T. Halsey, 12 April 1765, T/1/439 f.256.

CHAPTER VI
TRANSPORT

'the great lever of the Commissariat'.¹

Mobility is inevitably the key to all military success; whatever the size and strength of an army it is no more effective than a stranded whale if it lacks the ability to manoeuvre. In eighteenth century armies, as in those of most other ages, few individuals were permitted the luxury of carriage for themselves, this concession being largely confined to officers, some officials such as commissaries and the sick and wounded.² The transport services were thus primarily concerned with the movement of heavy military equipment and stores, of essential foodstuffs for men and animals, of the tents, blankets and other items necessary for life in the open air and of medical and hospital supplies. To meet these various needs corps of permanently established wagons, horses and staff called 'trains' might be provided, or the troops simply availed themselves by means of hire or impressment of the resources of the area where they happened to be.

Trains were not a common feature of the British army, although the Treasury usually supplied bread wagons to its own troops serving abroad and to foreign troops in British pay.³ These wagons were assigned to regiments in certain proportions, and were meant to bring the basic article of the soldiers' diet from the bakery and to carry

1 Wellington's Dispatches V, 86, quoted in S.G.P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: a Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809 - 1814. (1957) p.84.

2 Other personnel such as drivers of wagons and sutlers enjoyed such advantages as part of their duties.

3 Contract between the Treasury and A. Hume, 1742, Add. MSS. 34736 ff. 23 - 25.

reserves of it on the march. But they could be used for practically any other regimental service, and Fortescue says that the term 'bread wagon' meant little more than a wagon supplied by the bread contractor.¹ During the Seven Years War in Germany the Treasury's provision of this service at first for the Hessian troops in British pay, then for the British contingent and finally at the end of 1758 for the whole of the Combined Army thus represented the execution of a traditional responsibility, although on a significantly larger scale than usual. But the Board's provision from 1759 onwards of a bakery train, which carried portable iron ovens and other bakers' utensils,² and a hospital train, which transported the sick and wounded to fixed infirmaries and carried the stores, equipment and patients of the 'flying' hospitals,³ and the supply of corresponding services for the British troops⁴ marked not only an expansion of, but a greater degree of specialization in its provision of regular military transport.⁵ The same may also have been true of a train, which was used to carry the Commander-in-Chief's equipage and

1 Sir J.W. Fortescue, The Early History of Transport and Supply. (1928) p.15.

2 Bread contractors were presumably expected to provide a limited number of wagons to move the ordinary equipment and utensils of their bakeries at their own expense, but the Treasury apparently paid for the wagons to carry the portable ovens even when the soldiers' bread was supplied under contract. T.O. Hunter to S. Martin, 11 March 1759, Add. MSS. 32889 f.2. Wagons and Horses Furnished by R. Oswald for the British Infantry and Cavalry, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

3 The existence of the hospital train in 1759 may be inferred from the letter of M. Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/405 f.171, describing the building of additional wagons for this service. See also Appendix VII.

4 Wagons and Horses Furnished by Oswald for the British Infantry and Cavalry and a Letter of Oswald, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

5 The specialization was superficially less apparent in the case of the British troops, where there was still a tendency to call all vehicles bread wagons, but definite numbers were nevertheless assigned to the specific services, *ibid*.

baggage, likewise maintained by the Treasury.¹

The British army was also provided with artillery trains, but the responsibility for the maintenance of these extensive services lay not with the Treasury but with the Board of Ordnance, which thus supplied this form of transport for the British troops in the Combined Army throughout their stay in Germany.² The Treasury's connection with artillery trains before the Seven Years War was the indirect one of simply paying for them, when they were provided by foreign governments which had hired their troops to Great Britain. Thus payments made to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel in 1757 and 1758 under the subsidy treaty of 1755 included sums for the upkeep of an artillery train.³ When therefore at the end of 1758 the Treasury undertook the direct provision and maintenance of the great foreign artillery train, originally composed of contingents from Hanover and Bückeburg but later incorporating the Hessian, Brunswick and British Legion artillery trains as well, it accepted a new responsibility.⁴ This conclusion applies equally to the Board's upkeep of the great provision or proviant train, which before December 1758 was administered by the Hanoverian

1 See Appendix VII. The normal practice was to make a financial allowance to the commander-in-chief to help meet the cost of what he was expected to provide for himself. R.E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne. (1966) p.204.

2 Journal of the House of Commons, 18 April 1763, Vol.XXIX, p.637.

3 C. Jenkinson, A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers ... (1785) Vol.III, p.49, Article IV.

4 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.149. Plan for the Control of the Hanoverian Artillery Train, 25 May 1762, T/1/420 f.128.

authorities.¹ Used to transport the forage, grain and meal involved in the formation and removal of magazines and depots, the service was described by Hunter as 'a new Sistem, not known in former Campaigns'.²

By 1762 the Treasury had at least 2,449 wagons, 5,591 employees and 17,359 horses in its trains,³ at an annual cost of £876,152/1/8,⁴ a substantial proportion of the total extraordinary expenditure on the German war. How far did the numerical levels at which these services were maintained meet the needs of the Combined Army, while paying due regard to the interests of economy? To some extent the establishments fixed themselves; the Treasury had little choice but to accept the individual artillery trains at their existing levels, and to augment the combined great foreign artillery train when military necessity obliged the supply of extra cannon.⁵ Similarly, the bread wagons and their associated services seem to have been maintained at generally accepted customary levels, based on the numbers of troops to be served, and their establishments were therefore automatically augmented as the Army grew in size.⁶ According to the contractor, Abraham Prado, the Ger-

1 T.O. Hunter to Duke of Newcastle, 22 April 1759, Add. MSS. 32890 f.249. Originally referred to simply as forage wagons, the service was known as the train of provisions by the end of 1759, Add. MSS. 32905 f.150, and also as the proviant train, see Appendix VII.

2 Hunter to (Martin), 25 January 1759, T/64/96 f.5.

3 See Appendix VII.

4 See Appendix VIII.

5 Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/405 f.171. The additional artillery train mentioned here had been made necessary by an augmentation in the Army's establishment of cannon. Prince Ferdinand to Newcastle, 14 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32903 f.264.

6 Hatton to Martin, 20 May 1760, T/1/405 f.199.

man troops in the Austrian Succession War had been allowed eight bread wagons per regiment of 700 men and thirty hospital wagons per 20,000 men,¹ on which basis the 96,831 soldiers maintained by Britain in 1762² should have had 1,252 such wagons, whereas they actually possessed 1,314 bread, bakery and hospital wagons.³ But as a new service there was less certainty about the level at which to maintain the proviant train. The Hanoverian authorities had provided 800 wagons for somewhat less than 60,000 troops in 1758,⁴ and during the next four years the intention seems to have been to maintain the establishment at 1,200 vehicles,⁵ although this figure did not in fact remain constant.⁶ Moreover, in 1761 Prince Ferdinand complained that 1,200 wagons were insufficient for the service but that the Treasury would not allow him any more.⁷ This claim is somewhat surprising in view of the Board's statement to Hunter in 1759 that it would accept whatever number of provision wagons the Commander-in-Chief considered necessary,⁸ and in fact the level of their establishment was held down more by the constant destruction of vehicles

1 An Estimate of the Charges that will Attend the Furnishing an Army of 40,000 Men, 23 January 1758, Add. MSS. 32878 ff.191 - 192.

2 See above pp.32 - 33.

3 See Appendix VII.

4 Hunter to Martin, 25 March 1759, T/64/96 f.80. See above pp.30 - 31.

5 Ibid. Letter of L. Dundas, 10 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.280.

6 In 1760 there were only 968 vehicles, Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/405 f.171, and in 1762 1,101, see Appendix VII.

7 Ferdinand to Duke of Brunswick, 23 January 1761, F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol.V, pp.33 - 34.

8 Martin to Hunter, 2 February 1759, T/64/96 f.9

in the service and the inability to replace them quickly enough,¹ than by any parsimonious attitude on the part of the Treasury and its commissaries. On another occasion Ferdinand apparently accepted that this was the truth of the matter,² and his complaint of 1761, which does not seem to have been laid before the Treasury, may well have been no more than a private and exaggerated expression of frustration to his brother. The history of other trains shows that the Board was usually willing to allow additions to establishments to meet increased numbers of troops or particularly severe and difficult services as long as the commanders and the commissariat thought them essential,³ while Ferdinand for his part usually recognized that financial resources were not limitless and made commendable efforts to keep such augmentations to a minimum.⁴ The Combined Army's train establishments were thus fixed at adequate or at least realistic levels and represented an effective compromise between the not always compatible interests of the military and civilian authorities.

The novelty of the Treasury's train commitments did not only lie in the nature and extent of the services which it supplied, but also in the way in which they were provided. The Treasury traditionally made contracts with reputable merchants for bread wagon trains,

1 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.150.

2 Extract of a Letter from Brunswick, 12 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f. 322. Ferdinand was reported as being willing to accept only 800 wagons as long as they were kept complete.

3 Peirson to Martin, 13 June 1760, T/1/405 f.65. See below p.311, n.3.

4 State of the Artillery, June 1759, T/64/96 ff.210 - 211. After augmentations in the artillery train Ferdinand reduced the establishment of the proviant train in order to avoid additional expense.

but early in 1759 Hunter was authorized to purchase on its behalf the wagons, horses, powder and ammunition of the Hanoverian artillery train, while the German authorities lent the ordnance and stores for the duration of the war.¹ The Board thus became directly responsible for the upkeep of the train at the level of its establishment and for providing forage, bread, clothing, equipment and wages for its animals and employees. Hunter appointed Casimir Bilgen to manage these affairs, and he accounted monthly for what he had spent,² presumably receiving the Superintendent's warrants in return. At the same time corresponding arrangements were made for the proviant train, which was purchased outright from the Hanoverian authorities and placed under the care of 'OverStalmeister' Ramberg, who was obliged to account in the same way.³ In December 1760 both these trains were put under contract,⁴ but on 30 July 1762 the proviant train returned to direct Treasury management,⁵ with its upkeep entrusted to Andrew Clark, who was appointed a deputy commissary for that purpose, having previously acted as chief agent to Lawrence Dundas, the late contractor for the train.⁶ In addition Richard Oswald abandoned his contracts for the Hessian and British bread, bakery

1 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.149 - 150.

2 Ibid. f.149.

3 Ibid. f.150.

4 R. Peirson to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/1/410 f.48. A part of the artillery train apparently remained in the hands of the Treasury until the end of the war, for in 1762 a distinction was made between the horses of the Crown and those of the contractor, G. Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, T/1/417 ff.437 - 438, and this explains why Bilgen received money for the train until that time, Abstract of the Several Accounts Current of C. Bilgen, 28 October 1762, T/52/56 f.39. The distinction must have been the source of some confusion.

5 Value of the Great Provision Train, 14 August 1762, T/1/417 ff. 149 - 150.

6 Howard to (Treasury), 10 August 1762, ibid. f.490.

and hospital wagons on 31 May 1762, from which date until the end of the war these services were also administered by the Treasury, with Oswald continuing to act as manager until he was replaced on 1 January 1763 by his chief agent, Peter Paumier, who was made a deputy commissary for the specific purpose of selling the trains.¹

Thus for considerable periods of the war the Treasury operated a system of public ownership and administration of its trains, which was unusual at that time. Some precedents did exist; for example the fifty wagons purchased for the transport of provisions in North America in 1757,² but the responsibilities undertaken in Germany in 1759 - 1760 and in 1762 were of far greater importance both in variety and extent, and may be seen as a significant step towards the provision of regular military transport by the government rather than by private contractors. The Treasury's policies were undoubtedly partially influenced by the inheritance of an army, in which transport services were already organized in certain clearly defined ways, and the fact that both the proviant and the Hanoverian artillery trains were in existence and fully operative meant that there was less reason than usual to employ a contractor. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the Board's attitude to public ownership was devoid of positive initiative, for it must have been influenced by the need to economize on such vast services and the avoidance of train contractors' profits as an important

1 Account of the Price of the English and Hessian Trains, 21 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.574 - 575. It is not clear whether Oswald abandoned his contract for Prince Ferdinand's baggage train, see below p.271, n.2, in 1762. Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, AO/1/520/225.

2 R.A. Bowler, The Influence of Logistical Problems on British Operations in North America, 1775 - 1782. (1971) p.262.

contribution to this end.¹ Considerations of the need to extend the direct administrative role of government, in order to provide effective control of the affairs of a largely foreign army, may also have played a part in its thinking.² Why then was the system of public ownership abandoned at the end of 1760? There is reason to believe that the change of heart emanated from Germany rather than from Whitehall, for it was at Peirson's invitation that Dundas submitted proposals for a foreign artillery train contract in July 1760,³ and the conclusion of such an agreement at the end of the year stemmed largely from this initiative.⁴ The dominating influence in persuading Dundas to accept the additional burden of the proviant train contract, although only with the allowance of an unusually high price, was apparently exercised by Granby.⁵ The ostensible reason for transferring both trains to the management of a pri-

1 Pitt's tirade against 'this insatiable Service' early in 1758 had presumably not been forgotten by someone as thin-skinned as Newcastle, W. Pitt to Newcastle, 4 April 1758, Add. MSS. 32879 f.46.

2 Both the official records and the private correspondence consulted are unfortunately silent on the reasoning behind the Treasury's decision.

3 Case for Counsel's Opinion, (1764), Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/139 ff.2-3. Contract proposals for both the Hanoverian artillery and proviant trains had been made by Sir James Cockburn and Nicholas Linwood, as well as by Dundas, early in 1760, Brief: Plaintiff's Bill of Complaint, 1764, *ibid.* 1/1/140 f.1, Memorial of Cockburn and Linwood, 18 March 1760, T/1/405 ff.384 & 386. It is not possible to say whether these proposals were made at the Treasury's invitation. Dundas claimed that Cockburn had got information that public management of the trains was to be abandoned, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/139 f.1, but there is no evidence that either the Treasury or Hunter had lost faith in the system at this time, and the latter advised rejection of the proposals as unadvantageous to the public, *ibid.* As Cockburn had gone to Germany to find some opening in army contract business, the proposals may well have been made on his own initiative.

4 Peirson to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/1/410 f.48.

5 Peirson to (Treasury), 8 December 1760, T/1/405 ff.92 - 93.

vate contractor was that their work would be more efficiently carried out when directed by 'a man of substance & character, whose reputation becomes responsible to the Duke for the exact performances of these essential services',¹ but it is probable that Peirson and Granby, who both had heavy military commitments, wished to unburden themselves of the management of the trains, which had been the subject of much complaint.²

The Treasury's handling of this affair lacked firm direction, for it was only when the contracts had already been put into operation in anticipation of its approval that the Board enquired with a measure of incomprehension why it should be thought better to put the trains under contract, when they were already fully operative under public management.³ Had this fundamental question been asked earlier, there would have been time to have reviewed the arguments of Peirson and Granby and to have investigated whether there was not a cheaper method of improving efficiency in the trains, and this in turn might have led to the discovery that the services frequently suffered from inadequate supervision and control.⁴ Instead the Treasury allowed the commissariat to present it with a 'fait accompli' on an important matter of policy, and it must have had misgivings about the considerable amount of extra ex-

1 Peirson to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/1/410 f.48.

2 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/139 f.2. Granby's lack of interest in administrative matters was widely recognized, Earl of Hardwicke to Newcastle, 4 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.269.

3 T/29/34 f.14, 15 January 1761.

4 Peirson was unable to inform the Treasury of the effective states of the foreign artillery and proviant trains, because he could not spare a commissary to go round and inspect them. Peirson to (Treasury), 7 June 1760, T/1/405 f.63. On the lack of supervision of transport services see below p.292.

penditure involved. As in the case of the train establishments, the Board was bound to rely on the advice of its commissaries in Germany, but at the same time, and above all on far-reaching questions of general policy, it had a duty to subject such advice to stringent examination, something which it had not done. That the Treasury in reality regretted the passing of public ownership of the trains is suggested by the fact that in 1762, when Dundas and Oswald insisted on giving up many of their contracts, the Board took an even wider range of transport services under its direct management with no attempt to find alternative contractors.¹ Thus despite the change of late 1760 there had been a surviving commitment to the new and significant method of supplying military transport. Later in the century such methods were to be tried again on a smaller scale for the British armies in America in 1776 and in Flanders in 1794.² On the first occasion the publicly-owned train was sabotaged by army officers, who were determined to hire their own wagons to the government,³ and on the second the Corps of Royal Waggoners eventually had to be disbanded because of its miserable condition and its inability to function effectively.⁴ Both examples point to the conclusion, equally valid for the Seven Years War in Germany, that the development of a publicly-owned and administered military transport system was impeded more

1 The Treasury's attempt to dissuade Oswald from abandoning his contract need not be interpreted as a loss of faith in public ownership, for it probably reflected a reluctance to introduce change and upheaval in essential services as the war drew to a close. T/29/34 f.274, 8 May 1762.

2 Bowler, op. cit. p.262. H. Le Mesurier, A System for the British Commissariat, (1796), printed in R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation: the Reform of the British Army, 1795 - 1809. (1963) p.273.

3 Bowler, op. cit. pp.262 - 266.

4 Glover, op. cit. p.273.

by an inability to put conceptions effectively into practice than by an inherently timid and conservative outlook. Despite the somewhat exceptional circumstances of the Combined Army, which helped lead the Treasury to its first significant experiment in this sphere, such conclusions apply to an age not usually associated with forward-looking administrative ideas.

As already noted, the traditional method of supplying trains by contract always existed side by side with the system of public ownership. In 1757 and 1758 the bread wagons of the Hessian troops in British pay were provided by the foreign merchants, David Mendes Da Costa and Abraham Prado,¹ but before the end of the latter year this service had been taken over by Oswald,² who also supplied the bread, bakery, infirmary and hospital wagons of the British troops³ and Prince Ferdinand's baggage train.⁴ Early in 1759 another British contractor, Dundas, undertook the provision of bread wagons for the troops of Hanover and Brunswick⁵ and bakery and hospital wagons for all the German

1 Contract between J. Amherst and D.M. Da Costa, 27 April 1757, T/1/375 No.32, ff.68 - 69. A. Prado to R. Boyd, 13 October 1758, Add. MSS. 32884 f.348.

2 Martin to Oswald, 30 October 1758, T/27/27 f.397.

3 Martin to Hunter, 16 February 1759, T/64/96 ff.22 - 23. On 31 August 1758 the Duke of Marlborough made an agreement with Prado to supply the British bread wagons, T/1/385 No.88, and although the Treasury rejected this, his horses may actually have performed some services, Martin to Boyd, 27 October 1758, T/27/27 f.396. For the bakery, infirmary and hospital wagons see Wagons and Horses Furnished by Oswald for the British Infantry and Cavalry and Letter of Oswald, 1 October 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

4 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.149.

5 Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.7 - 8.

contingents.¹ All the above contracts of Oswald were terminated on 31 May 1762,² but those of Dundas lasted until the end of the war. In addition to these extensive commitments Dundas held contracts to supply the foreign artillery train from 19 December 1760 until the end of the war and the proviant train from 20 December 1760 to 30 July 1762.³

The formulation of these agreements by the Treasury and by the commanders and commissaries, to whom the contracting power was delegated subject to the Board's approval, was in many ways effectively and efficiently achieved. The contracts were promptly made, with one exception after the arrival of the first British forces in 1758, when the Duke of Marlborough finding himself without bread wagons was forced into a hasty agreement with Prado on unfavourable terms.⁴ In this case the Treasury seems to have persisted too long in the hope that the Hanoverian commissariat would undertake supply.⁵ Secondly, the contracts were usually based on solid foundations, for the Board took great care to see that its contractors were men of standing, reputation and experience. Although Oswald had already been a bread contractor to the Hessian troops in England in 1757,⁶ it was probably the Treasury's insistence on

1 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 f.149. Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/405 f.171.

2 Account of the Price of the English and Hessian Trains, 21 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.574 - 575. There is no specific reference to the abandonment of Ferdinand's baggage train, although Oswald seems to have sold all his train interests.

3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.13 - 15 & 19 - 21.

4 Marlborough to Newcastle, 29 August 1758, T/1/384 No.53. Mr. Hume's Report on Two Contracts of Mr. Prado, 23 October 1758, *ibid.* No. 63, ff.8 - 9.

5 Short Narrative of Treasury Proceedings for Supplying Troops in Germany, 23 October 1758, T/1/386 No.73.

6 Martin to Oswald, 17 March 1757, T/27/27 f.279.

his lack of experience of contracting abroad, which led him to offer to take Graham, a colonel in one of the Scots Dutch regiments, into partnership as a guarantee of effective execution.¹ Thirdly, an opportunity to make a constant review of the provision of transport services was given by the practice of limiting contracts to six-month periods,² but the Treasury also showed itself fully aware of the need for stability and continuity, on one occasion warning Dundas that if he did not continue the proviant train agreement for longer than the minimum period he was never to expect the government's favour again.³ Fourthly, there is evidence that contracts were carefully drafted and that precise conditions of service were worked out in detail, so that the contractor was not allowed to escape his full obligations.⁴ But at the same time there was an occasional and unfortunate tendency to leave contractual loop-holes, of which one serious example was the failure to bind Dundas and Oswald to pay for the bread delivered from commissariat sources to the employees of their trains.⁵ It may also have been a lack of definition in the proviant train contract, which allowed Dundas to maintain at the public's expense 45 wagons and 106 employees of the train to make running repairs to damaged vehicles instead of carrying forage.⁶ The con-

1 Draught Treasury Letter to Boyd, July 1758, T/1/385 No.76.

2 Martin to Hunter, 16 February 1759, T/64/96 ff.22 - 23.

3 T/29/34 ff.168 - 169, 8 July 1761. After this ultimatum Dundas retained the contract for more than a year after the expiry of the minimum period of six months.

4 The draught of Oswald's contract of 14 February 1759 for 150 bread wagons is a good example of detailed and careful formulation of terms, T/1/395 ff.390 - 394.

5 T. Pownall to C. Jenkinson, March 1765, T/1/451 f.41. The Board eventually had to resort to the practice in Flanders during the Austrian Succession War as a foundation for this charge, and even this depended on the willingness of the contractors to accept liability, T/29/35 f.410, 24 May 1764.

6 Pownall to Peirson, 31 August 1761, Add. MSS. 32927 f.302.

tractor's statement that such a reserve had been 'clearly understood' in his contract ¹ suggests that the document left some room for different interpretations, although the apparent failure of any copy to survive makes it impossible to be categorical.²

Important as such considerations were, the major issue in contract formulation was the price allowed. Advertisements inviting tenders were one way of keeping prices down and were sometimes used by the Treasury,³ but they were not the invariable rule,⁴ and the Board apparently preferred to make discreet enquiries among reputable merchants, asking them to submit proposals.⁵ Reliability could not be sacrificed in the interest of the lowest possible price, and advertisements 'do in their Nature bind the Lords to accept of the lowest Offer from whomsoever it shall come, altho, as the Subsistance of the Forces, must depend upon the exactness, and punctuality of the Contractor, the Character of the Person contracting is a Consideration no less essential to be regarded than the cheapness of the Contract'.⁶ Informal approaches did not completely eliminate competition, although they did facilitate the practice, of which Sir James Cockburn complained, when he claimed that Dundas had persuaded him to withhold proposals for the foreign artillery and provi-

1 Letter of Dundas, 10 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.281.

2 It is possible that lax supervision of the execution of the contract was more to blame. See below pp.291 - 292.

3 T/29/33 f.80, 28 July 1758.

4 Dundas to Treasury, 9 January 1759, T/1/395 f.432.

5 Short Narrative of Treasury Proceedings for Supplying Troops in Germany, 23 October 1758, Add. MSS. 33047 ff.164 - 165.

6 T/29/33 f.64, 10 July 1758.

ant train contracts with the deliberate intention of keeping up the prices.¹ This may have allowed Dundas to secure 9/9d per wagon per day for the proviant train in December 1760,² as earlier in the year Cockburn and Linwood had offered to undertake the service at 9/0d for six months and 8/6d thereafter.³ Had the train been maintained at the latter rates a considerable sum would have been saved in the nineteen months during which Dundas held the contract. Nevertheless, in view of the particularly onerous nature of the services of this train, which kept it almost constantly in motion, it is possible to justify the higher price allowed to Dundas, while the apparently advantageous offer of Cockburn and Linwood may have represented the sort of unrealistic proposals from inexperienced contractors, which the Treasury was so anxious to avoid.⁴ Nor were contract prices consistently high, for the rates at which Dundas supplied the foreign artillery train were considerably cheaper than those agreed for the British artillery train in Germany by the Board of Ordnance,⁵ while the standard price of 9/0d per day allow-

1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/140 ff.2 - 5. In this tortuous affair there is no conclusive proof that Dundas persuaded Cockburn not to propose on promise of a share in the contracts, and then refused to honour his word once those contracts were safely made in his name.

2 Dundas was allowed 1 ducat per day per wagon, and in his accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 f.13, calculated the ducat at 5 guilders 5 stivers and the £ at 10 guilders 15 stivers. Hence 1 ducat = 9/9.21d.

3 Memorial of Cockburn and Linwood, 18 March 1760, T/1/405 f.386.

4 At this time Cockburn was looking for any possible opening in army contracting business on behalf of himself and his partners, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/140 f.1.

5 Dundas supplied the foreign artillery train at the following daily rates:- 1/8d per horse, 1/0d per driver and 2/6d per conductor, Abstract of an Account of the Hire of Horses and Pay of Conductors and Drivers in the Foreign Train of Artillery, 6 April 1763, AO/3/124. The respective rates for the British artillery train under the Board of Ordnance's contract with Oswald and Mill were 1/10d, 1/6d and 3/0d, Journal of the House of Commons, 18 April 1763, Vol.XXIX, p.637.

ed for bread wagons ¹ was cheaper than the average price paid to transport contractors in Germany and the Low Countries during the Austrian Succession War.²

In addition to payments for the hire of trains, contractors were fully indemnified for horses, wagons and equipment lost to or destroyed by the enemy, or worn out by services of exceptional severity.³ Such compensation was on the whole justified, but the system did involve a difficult if not impossible distinction between damage caused by abnormally severe conditions and that arising from ordinary wear and tear, for which the Treasury was not liable.⁴ Not surprisingly contractors tended to place all damage not due to the enemy in the former category, although their claims did not necessarily imply dishonesty, simply representing the widest possible interpretation of terms, which lent themselves to different definitions. In deciding this issue, commissaries must have experienced considerable difficulties and they seem on the whole to have taken the easy way out by simply accepting the contractors'

1 Oswald was originally allowed 10/0d per day per wagon for the British and Hessian bread wagons, Martin to Oswald, 30 October 1758, T/27/27 f.397, Draught Contract between the Treasury and Oswald, 14 February 1759, T/1/395 f.391. This price must have been reduced in view of Peirson's statement that one ducat, or approximately 9/9d, see above p. 274, n.2, was 9d more than the cost of wagons supplied by Oswald, Peirson to (Treasury), 8 December 1760, T/1/405 ff.92 - 93. The change probably occurred when the contracts were renewed after the initial period of six months.

2 Allowance Paid the Contractors for Carriages in Germany and Flanders during the Course of the Last War, 12 May 1760, PRO/30/8/89 f.277. The average price paid for wagon contracts over a period of four years in the earlier conflict was 5.06 guilders, or approximately 9/5d, calculating the £ at 10 guilders 15 stivers, the standard rate of exchange for soldiers' pay throughout the eighteenth century, T/29/33 f.63, 10 July 1758.

3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.11 - 12, 17 - 18 & 23 - 26.

4 Instructions to the Commissary General of Accounts, 1762, T/1/420 ff. 115 - 116.

claims. This conclusion is suggested by Pownall's reminder to the commissary general of accounts in 1762 that such a distinction must be made,¹ by the almost exact correspondence in Dundas' accounts between his claims for compensation and the payments made to him² and by the size of the sums paid to the same contractor on these accounts.³ No doubt the commissariat could have enforced the principle of the Treasury's policy more strictly, but it might have been more satisfactory if the Board had tried to negotiate with the contractors an agreed percentage level of losses, arising from normal wear and tear, which figure would then have been deducted from the total cost of loss and destruction in the trains. Presumably agreement would have been difficult to reach, but had such a negotiation succeeded the commissariat would have had a far clearer and simpler set of administrative principles to apply, and a not insignificant sum of money would probably have been saved.

Train contracts seem to have been highly lucrative affairs, for despite the lack of fully detailed, accurate and comparable statistics there is evidence that they produced gross profits in the region of $14\frac{1}{2}$ - 17%.⁴ In Dundas' case this meant windfalls of over £163,000,⁵ which permitted the purchase, improvement and lavish decorat-

1 Ibid.

2 Out of total demands of £414,083/17/9 for compensation on all his train contracts, see Appendix VIII, a mere £6,010/0/0 was rejected from the proviant train account by the commissariat, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.17 - 18.

3 Compensation always represented significant percentages of the cost of upkeep of Dundas' trains. See Appendix VIII.

4 See Appendix IX.

5 Ibid.

ion of properties such as Aske and Moor Park and a brazen ostentation in his style of life.¹ Contemporaries commented on his 'German pillage' and believed that his gains were the result of gross extortion at the very least.² Without venturing to defend the morality of such financial operations, it may be pointed out that a train contract was considerably more onerous than a forage or bread contract, involving constant direction and supervision of wagons and horses scattered in many different places and major problems associated with the repair of vehicles and the replacement of animals. Overheads were consequently high and a heavy burden of hard work and responsibility rested on the contractor's shoulders. The Treasury thus had to pay a considerable price for the services and expertise of the private merchants, who had the critical task of providing its troops with their essential means of mobility. With the exception of the proviant train, whose higher price can be justified, Dundas was merely paid the traditionally generous rates which all train contractors enjoyed. The difference in his case, however, was that no previous contractor had been involved in these affairs on such a grand scale, and the tidy sum of just under £3,000 per annum, which could be secured by supplying 100 wagons at 9/0d per day each with a profit of 17%, and at which no eyebrows would probably have been raised, was small beer compared to the massive gains of 'the Nabob of the North'. And yet the one was not more acceptable or unacceptable than the other. Only in the payment of excessively generous sums for loss and damage did Dundas enjoy

1 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Eds., The History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1754 - 1790, (1964) Vol.II, p.358. North Riding Record Office, Annual Report 1971, pp.13 - 16.

2 North Riding Record Office, Annual Report 1971, p.17, citing an article in the 'Morning Post'.

an unjustified advantage, but while this had clearly added to his profits, there is no reason to suppose that there had been any intention on his part to extort or defraud.

The Treasury's train contracting policy merits neither eulogy nor severe censure. It followed a traditional pattern with no real attempt to find new methods or techniques, and within these limits the formulation of appropriate conditions and terms of service was largely although never completely successful. From the Board's point of view the prices paid were a mixture of the average, the advantageous and the expensive, and while some better bargains might have been struck, although always at the risk of less effective execution, there is no evidence of extravagance on the part of the guardians of the public purse. It is clear that train contracting was by definition an expensive way of providing military transport, and that it always allowed extensive profits to those fortunate enough to receive the government's favour. As such, it was a far less appropriate system for the Treasury's extensive new commitments in the Seven Years War in Germany than for the much smaller provision of trains in the British army and in previous conflicts. To keep public expenditure under control and to avoid massive profits for private individuals, the new situation required a system of public ownership, with which the Treasury had experimented but which it had failed to maintain with consistency.

Trains, by whatever method they were supplied, were the permanent core of the military transport service, but they were never provided at a level sufficient to meet the Army's total needs and it was

therefore always necessary to have recourse to local resources. Country carriage, as it was called, was more flexible if less reliable than trains, for it could in theory be used where, when and for whatever length of time it was required. Its scale varied from the thousands of wagons, used for special expeditions and sieges, down to small numbers of horses and carts, which were attached to regiments to augment the bread wagons and were employed in many diverse services. Local transport also operated on water, for with a few insignificant exceptions the Treasury neither owned boats nor hired contractors to supply them on a large scale.¹ The Board did not commit itself to pay for all the services performed by local transport for the troops in its pay. Throughout the war subjects of enemy states had their carriages requisitioned with no prospect of reimbursement, such resources being regarded as part of the legitimate spoils of war.² In neutral and allied countries the Treasury accepted a liability to pay for wagons and boats used to carry the Army's artillery with its equipment and stores, and also the commissariat's provisions, which might have to be moved to places nearer to the positions of the troops or safer from enemy attack.³ It did not, however, hold itself responsible for the wagons taken by the regiments, which might pay for such services if they thought fit, nor those used by the contractors to effect the delivery of the provisions which they had agreed to supply,⁴

1 Some boats owned by the Treasury were built for service on the Werre, Fulda and Weser, but by the end of the war the commissariat was unaware of their existence, Pownall to Martin, 18 March 1763, T/1/424 f.234.

2 Prince Ferdinand's Paper of 24 April, Observations upon it, 1760, PRO/30/8/90 f.125. It was, however, thought fair to allow bread and forage for the peasant drivers and horses of enemy states after three days' service.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

The framework, within which local transport operated, was thus a complex one, and must have been the subject of some bewilderment to those ordinary people whose animals, wagons and boats were used for the various services, and who might find that they had a claim for payment against the Treasury, against German or British military authorities, against private contractors or against no one at all, with some measure of uncertainty as to the category into which they fell. This was certainly one reason why local transport was not provided with that willingness and alacrity which were so essential to the war effort, but there is no evidence that the Treasury sought any fundamental rationalization of the traditional and confused system which it had inherited. Perhaps the major factor, which encouraged local people to keep their precious transport resources well away from the none-too-gentle hands of the military and the commissariat, was the refusal to pay any compensation for horses which were killed or which died in the course of the service. The Treasury's adherence to this principle ¹ provided a stark contrast to the generous treatment of train contractors, although any concession to compensation in the vast sphere of local transport would almost certainly have opened the flood-gates of expenditure and abuse, and the Board was probably wise to shrink from a course of action, whose financial implications could hardly be foreseen. There was, however, a certain flexibility of mind in Whitehall, illustrated in the willingness to make an extra allowance to cover the cost of bread and forage supplied to the drivers and horses engaged in assisting regimental movements.² This de-

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

cision was justified on administrative as well as on humane grounds, and must have done something to improve the efficiency of these services by discouraging desertion.

To encourage the optimum provision of local transport services and equally to protect British financial interests, it was essential to establish and publish the rates of pay which were to be allowed. There was, however, unnecessary delay in deciding this important matter, for it was only after Prince Ferdinand had stressed the need to fix definite tariffs early in 1760 that the Treasury authorized him to undertake this important work,¹ and even then it was apparently not until 1761 that a tariff was published for the transport of provisions on the river Weser, the Army's supply lifeline.² The commissariat had apparently done nothing to clarify this issue or at least lay the problem before the Treasury without waiting for the Commander-in-Chief to complain, although its attitude no doubt stemmed partly from the fact that its own authority over the provision and direction of local transport was somewhat tenuous. It had been the Board's original intention to invest its commissaries with full powers to levy such transport in Germany, but a clause to this effect in Hunter's commission was struck out by the Attorney and Solicitor General, presumably on the grounds that the Treasury had no such authority to delegate in a foreign land.³ Commissaries thus had to request the transport which they needed from local

1 Ferdinand to Marquis of Granby, 24 April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 f.121. Ibid. f.125.

2 Extract of a Letter from Hildesheim, 3 April 1762, Add. MSS. 32936 f. 383.

3 Draught Commission to Mr. Hunter, 1758, T/1/385 No.120, f.5.

governments and officials,¹ who in turn issued the necessary orders to their subjects. Military commanders made similar requests or demands, but they enjoyed the advantage of having a means of compulsion at their disposal if local people proved reluctant to co-operate. Furthermore, if the Treasury had intended that its representatives in Germany should be responsible for assigning local transport resources to the Army's various and rival needs, an assumption suggested by the Board's desire to grant plenary powers to Hunter, its wishes were again frustrated, for this function was exercised by the military command,² which in turn delegated some of its responsibility to the Commission for Regulating Carriage. The latter operated at Münster in 1760 and 1761 and was apparently composed largely of German officials and officers.³ In addition, President von Massow of the Chamber of War of Minden also exercised a potent influence over the direction of local transport services, more in his capacity as a leading Prussian official and a close confidant of Prince Ferdinand than on his position in the commissariat.⁴ Thus it is clear

1 Although commissaries might talk in terms of requisitioning transport, pleas that their orders be obeyed demonstrate their lack of authority, E. Blakeney to Regency of Bentheim, 19 October 1760, T/1/405 f.300.

2 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand's Orders relating to the Numbers of Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment, *passim*, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

3 The director of the Commission was a Mr. de König, F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030, and another member was a Colonel Wense, Blakeney to Chamber of Minden, 24 February 1761, T/1/410 f.264. The predominance of German officials in the Commission is suggested by the fact that the contractor, Mamberg, mistook it for the Regency of Münster, F. Halsey to Hatton, 18 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030, but its exact composition is uncertain.

4 Ferdinand had given Massow charge of all meal and forage transports in Hesse-Cassel as early as 1759, C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Chamber Representative von Roeder, (27 December 1759), Westphalen, *op. cit.* Vol. III, p.943. Although Massow was primarily concerned with the organization of the local transport of the Prussian territories, where he exercised political authority, his general influence was such that Frederick Halsey could apply to him to expedite the sending of a contingent of the proviant train, F. Halsey to Massow, 18 April 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

that in these matters British commissaries played second fiddle, and while Ferdinand was always sympathetic to their needs,¹ their attempts to keep the Army well-supplied by the speedy movement of bulk quantities of provisions were often impeded and undermined by their being obliged to rely on the authority of others, both to obtain transport and to provide the compulsion to keep it in the field.²

Some of the unsatisfactory aspects of this situation could have been avoided. It was obviously unwise as the Treasury realized somewhat late in the day to allow a German official like Massow to exercise such extensive authority over local transport without specific instructions,³ while Frederick Halsey's suggestion that a small detachment of cavalry and hussars should be permanently attached to the service of the commissariat and subject to its orders,⁴ so that the commissaries could promptly enforce the production of the quotas of local transport assigned to them and prevent the drivers absconding, could have been acted upon, despite the reluctance to allow civilians to command military personnel. Yet ultimately the commissariat could not be given that full authority, which would have done much to eliminate its difficulties, for only the Commander-in-Chief could assess the overall transport needs of the Army, and assign limited local resources to the respective military and logistical services in fair proportions, while

1 Standing Orders, 9 May & 24 September 1760 & 25 January 1761, Add. MSS. 28855 ff.1, 18 & 29.

2 F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030. F. Halsey to Peirson, 24 January 1761, *ibid*.

3 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. MSS. 32935 f.136. Another German official, Redecker, was given a more definite responsibility, Instructions to Mr. Redecker, 25 April 1760, T/1/405 ff.250 - 252.

4 F. Halsey to Peirson, 24 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

only local officials had the requisite political authority to command and organize effectively the transport services which their subjects could provide. Unfortunately, neither a foreign general nor the authorities of foreign states could be made fully responsible for their actions to the British government.

Viewed as a whole the policies of the Treasury and its commissaries towards local transport were certainly not above criticism. While the Board showed itself not unwilling to make some improvements in the traditional pattern of payment for these services, it seemed to be in no hurry to clarify its obligations, and its employees in Germany did not really appreciate the urgent need to establish recognized tariffs. In these ways a certain spirit of 'laissez-faire' is apparent and was hardly an appropriate reaction to the problems raised by Britain's vast new commitments. Moreover, starting from the premise that its commissaries should have full control of local transport, the Treasury seems to have been largely unaware that what power and influence they might have exercised had been progressively eroded by the activities of German officers and officials. In justice, however, it must be remembered that when Britain assumed direct responsibility for a multi-national army under a German commander and campaigning in foreign fields, it committed itself to the maintenance of a service which by definition it could not fully control. Administratively the decision was indefensible, but military and diplomatic necessity overrode such considerations.

From the general policies which governed the provision

of transport in the Combined Army it is necessary to turn to a consideration of the efficiency with which the various services were executed. The problem may be simply stated as getting the optimum amounts of transport into the field, and keeping them in a serviceable state in the right places at the right time. No statistics have apparently survived for the period of public management of the foreign artillery and proviant trains in 1759 - 1760, although the general consensus of opinion that matters were badly managed at that time suggests that the established numbers of wagons were not always available.¹ During the second period of public management returns for the proviant train show that it was kept between 81.56% and 86.19% complete.² Some of the trains under contract apparently had a more impressive record than this, although there is reason to regard with some scepticism figures showing that at various times between 1760 and 1762 Dundas' bread, bakery and hospital wagon trains were maintained at a level of 96.61% of the official establishment, with a corresponding figure for the proviant train in 1761 and 1762 of 98.47%.³ When Oswald gave up his transport contracts on 31 May 1762, he transferred to the Crown from his trains a greater number of wagons and horses than the establishments stipulated, thus suggesting, although not proving, that he had kept effective reserves from which shortages in the establishments

1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive, ZNK X 1/1/139 f.2. Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.150 - 151.

2 Rapports du Service Journalier du Proviant Train, 2 July 1762 - 4 December 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/6/1 - 39. In this period the minimum number of wagons in service was 898 and the maximum 949, out of an establishment of 1,101 wagons, see Appendices VII and X.

3 See Appendix VIII and below pp.291 - 292.

were quickly made up.¹ It is of course impossible to test with any mathematical accuracy the success with which the maximum quantities of local transport were obtained, but while it is clear that the Army was frequently assisted by an extensive provision of such services,² it is equally certain that on numerous occasions only a derisory proportion of those resources was made available for its use.³

There was little point in providing transport at optimum levels if it was immediately rendered useless by damage or even completely destroyed as soon as it went into service. Figures for the proviant train under public management in 1762 show an average of 12.97% of wagons in repair over a period of five months,⁴ although on one occasion the figure rose as high as 24.89%,⁵ while in January 1761, soon after the train had been put under contract, Prince Ferdinand claimed that only 14.11% of its wagons were fit for service.⁶ Loss and destruction of anim-

1 Account of the Price of the English and Hessian Trains, 21 July 1762, T/1/417 ff.574 - 575. He handed over 716 serviceable wagons and 3,288 serviceable horses, together with 13 unserviceable wagons and 205 unserviceable horses. The establishments of the British and Hessian bread, bakery and infirmary wagons and of Ferdinand's baggage train stood at 681 vehicles and 3,002 horses, see Appendix VII.

2 The Hanoverian authorities claimed that their subjects had provided 1,400 wagons for the Wesel expedition in late 1760, *Précis des Arrangemens pris par la Regence de Guerre à Hannovre*, SP/100/17.

3 Peirson to Treasury, 1 September 1760, T/1/405 f.77. F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

4 See Appendix X.

5 On 9 November 1762 224 out of 900 wagons were in repair, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/6/33.

6 Ferdinand to King Frederick of Prussia, 16 January 1761, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.V, p.29. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Army claimed that out of 900 proviant train wagons only 127 were fit for service, although it should be remembered that he was sometimes prone to exaggeration. See above pp.263 - 264.

als in the same train under public management ran at the high monthly rate of 12.38% between July and October 1762,¹ although as this occurred at the height of the campaigning season, the annual percentage loss including the calmer winter period would have been somewhat less. Statistics for the trains under contract show a similarity to these figures. In August 1761 Pownall found over 16% of Dundas' proviant train wagons in repair, a proportion which the contractor did not find exceptional because of the particularly severe nature of the service in which they were engaged,² while monthly losses of horses in the train during the period of the contract's duration amounted to 8.57%,³ a figure which represented the annual replacement of approximately all the animals. Of the total cost of all Dundas' train contracts 25.15% represented compensation for destruction and loss of horses, vehicles and equipment.⁴ Life in the trains, whether under public management or contract, was clearly no bed of roses. Nor presumably were the sufferings of local transport any less severe, despite the impossibility of measuring them accurately. At the end of 1760 Peirson referred to 'the total demolition of the country carriage',⁵ and it is easy to imagine that when even the peasant drivers were abused, beaten and starved by the troops,⁶ their property was not treated with greater respect. The desertion rate among local wagons engaged in the service of the Army was consequently very high, and Freder-

1 See Appendix XI.

2 Letter of Dundas, 10 September 1761, Add. MSS. 32928 f.280.

3 See Appendix XI.

4 Dundas was paid a total of £1,232,398/4/2 for the upkeep of his trains and he claimed £414,083/17/9 in compensation. See Appendix VIII.

5 Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/1/405 f.90.

6 Ferdinand to Granby, 24 April 1760, PRO/30/8/90 f.120. Standing Orders, 25 August 1760, Add. MSS. 28855 f.12.

ick Halsey's description of how time was wasted in rounding up peasant wagons, which had absconded two or three times in the course of a short journey, undoubtedly illustrates a common occurrence.¹

If then transport services were frequently executed imperfectly or with a considerable waste of resources, what were the causes of these failures, which could obviously have an adverse effect on the war effort, and how far were the commissaries to blame for them? The physical geography, climate and rudimentary communications network of north-west Germany, together with the nature of the Combined Army's campaigning,² were all influential factors in creating the sort of chaos and havoc so vividly described by Frederick Halsey.

"The disagreeable news of our want of Success at Wesel, met me upon the March, & wch. was evidently (provided) by the inexpressable misery that presetd. itself in every part of the road, to wch. ye very worst roads in any pt. of Sommersetshire, before any turnpike took place cannot be compared for badness: a transport of a large train of Artillery accompanied with 1000 heavy amunition waggons had past it in very rainy weather marchg. to Wesel, besides heavy baggage, all this artillery & amunition I met returning in the like kind of weather, & as it was a kind of retreat, no halt coud. be made or time lost; in every 50 Yards laid or stuck a dead or dying Horse or Ox, & every 100 Yards a broken Waggon or Carriage, besides several Cannons Mortars &c, our Horses blunderg. thro' the Mire, stumbling every 20 steps over Bombs Canon Balls

1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 24 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

2 See above pp.37 - 39 & 42 - 44.

& powder Barrells, wch. were stuck & buried in the Mire, but which was still more miserable in every Village, one heard of drivers & peasants dyg. thro cold & fatigue of marchg. thro' such roads & weather night & day, in short it was such a scene, as no one that has not seen it, can form an Idea of." ¹

Equally destructive of valuable resources was epidemic disease among draught animals, whose close physical association in military service encouraged the rapid spread of infection. Early in 1761 practically all the eight hundred oxen, which had been purchased to draw the siege artillery, were wiped out or rendered useless in this way.² The moderate transport reserves of the campaigning area could thus be stretched to the utmost, and as early as 1760 it was alleged that the losses of carriage in the previous year had been so great that there was insufficient dry wood in Westphalia to build the necessary replacements.³ Nor were matters helped by the existence of a plethora of independent and semi-independent political and administrative authorities in the area, all concerned to uphold their separate jurisdictions, and making it necessary to hire local transport in small parcels with much duplication of effort and waste of time.⁴

And yet to emphasize such factors is not to justify an attitude of stoic resignation, on the basis of which commissaries might

1 F. Halsey to T.H. Noyes, 10 November 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029.

2 Peirson to Newcastle, 4 September 1760, Add. MSS. 32911 f.49. Peirson to Martin, 28 January 1761, T/1/410 f.49.

3 Hatton to Martin, 20 May 1760, T/1/405 f.199.

4 F. Halsey to Peirson, 12 February 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

have echoed the sentiments of the Spanish councillor, who reputedly believed that if God had intended rivers to be navigable He would have made them so. There are insufficient surviving records to permit a detailed examination of the work of large numbers of commissaries in battling against the odds, and the activities of Frederick Halsey, the one significant exception to this statement, are chronicled by himself with an inevitable personal bias. But after making allowances for some exaggeration Halsey still appears as an active and determined official. His understanding and resourcefulness can be seen in his recognition of the value of the Münster canal as a means of partially overcoming the unreliability of road and river transport, and his determined efforts to provide craft for the exclusive use of the commissariat on that waterway, and to keep it open even in midwinter by employing a gang of workmen to smash the ice.¹ Such exertions certainly eased the supply situation in and around Münster in 1760 and 1761. He also had some success in conducting delicate diplomatic negotiations with local authorities, by which transport resources were made available for the use of the commissariat,² while at the same time he knew how to bring pressure to bear on German officials, who proved reluctant to carry out orders and agreements.³ There must have been other commissaries, such as Hatton, who were at least equally active in attempting to overcome the various obstacles to the movement of supplies,⁴ although it would be unrealistic to pretend that there were not others like Blakeney, whose efforts to direct and control trans-

1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 9 January 1761, *ibid.* F. Halsey to Blakeney, 12 February 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 12 February 1761, *ibid.*

3 F. Halsey to Hatton, 21 January 1761, Halsey MSS. 15030.

4 Hatton's energy and capacity for hard work were generally recognized, see above p.127.

port services from his desk presumably achieved far less than the constant activity in the field of his more energetic colleagues.¹ Yet the maximum effort and exercise of administrative skill could never guarantee the smooth passage of supplies, and countless obstacles and adverse circumstances were always liable to frustrate a commissary's plans and arrangements, however carefully formulated and diligently executed.²

Far less inevitable, however, were fraudulent and slack practices in the administration of transport services, for which the pressing necessity and confusion of war were an ideal breeding-ground, and the failure to settle accounts accurately and promptly. Throughout the war there were constant complaints about mismanagement and malpractice in the trains, whether under contract or public management. As early as 1758 Boyd accused Da Costa of gross negligence in administering the Hessian bread wagons, claiming that the vehicles were in a shattered condition and many of the horses fit only to be given to the dogs,³ while a year later Hunter warned Hatton of his suspicion that the affairs of the proviant train had been 'subject to Frauds & Bad Practices' on the part of the Crown's employees.⁴ Levett's investigations of the administration of all the trains towards the end of the war suggested that the services had frequently suffered from the introduction and employment of unfit or broken-down draught animals and negligence in the proper shoeing

1 Hatton to F. Halsey, 18 September 1760, Halsey MSS. 15121. F. Halsey to Hatton, 9 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030.

2 Early in 1761 Frederick Halsey was unable to prevent magazines and depots of provisions falling into the hands of the enemy despite frantic efforts to save them. F. Halsey to Hatton, 7 February 1761, *ibid.*

3 Boyd to Treasury, 28 June 1758, T/1/386 No.41.

4 Instructions for Hatton, (1759), Add. MSS. 32905 ff.150 - 151.

of horses, while the practice of double mustering had enabled the contractors to receive payment for non-existent animals to the extreme detriment of the interests of both the Army and the British government.¹ In the sphere of local transport the fact that peasants were often pressed into difficult and dangerous services created a groundswell of resentment, which found its easiest expression in the pilfering of provisions and equipment in transit, while the position of influence occupied by German officials, such as Massow and Redecker, created a situation in which favouritism towards one's friends and clients on the one hand, and strict adherence to the interests of the Army on the other were not always compatible.²

It was thus the duty of both the Treasury and the commissariat to do all in their power to check and discourage such practices, although as with other branches of the service it was only at the end of the war that anything like an effective supervision of the Army's transport began, when Pownall appointed Levett to the control of the trains.³ The commissary was provided with a number of clerks and assistants,⁴ and two agents, Rosell and Gervais, who were permanently attached to the foreign artillery and proviant trains respectively in order to supervise the details of their daily upkeep and management,⁵ developments which

1 Plan for the Control of the Hanoverian Artillery Train, (1762), T/1/420 ff.128 - 129. The existence of such practices casts doubt on the high percentages for the effective states of Dundas' trains, see above p.285, although the contractor was never accused of fraud in this respect either by Pownall or by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands.

2 A Short Sketch of the Evils arising under the Commissariat in Germany, 8 February 1762, Add. MSS. 32934 f.236.

3 State of the Office of Control, (27 June) 1762, T/1/417 f.351.

4 Ibid.

5 Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, T/1/417 f.437. The spelling of the two names is subject to much variation.

must at least have provided a discouragement of fraud and malpractice, although they also created a certain amount of tension inside the commissariat. The rejection and destruction of a number of train horses as unfit for service on the orders of Rosell was strongly criticized by Howard, who expressed great concern as to what might happen if the Army was ordered to make a sudden movement,¹ while Gervais was accused of demanding an unnecessary multiplicity of reports and a general lack of co-operation.² These contentions further illustrate the difficulty of reconciling the exigencies of the service with the need to eliminate all possible opportunities for fraud. While resident agents were not apparently appointed for the bread, bakery and hospital wagon trains, these services also came under the purview and scrutiny of Levett and his assistants in the last months of the war, but no additional personnel were assigned to the supervision of local transport. Perhaps the extent and variety of the latter's services would have made effective control a near-impossible task, although the mere existence of a responsible official might have provided some discouragement to bad practices. Nevertheless, by the end of the war some of the opportunities for favouritism and fraud had been removed by the resignation of Redecker from his position of director of all traffic on the Weser in November 1761,³ and the termination of the unchecked influence which Massow had exercised over local transport services in general at the beginning of 1762.⁴

1 Howard to Pownall, 26 September 1762, T/1/417 f.298.

2 Howard to Martin, 3 October 1762, T/1/417 f.438.

3 Exposé of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/313 f.285.

4 Draught Letter of Newcastle to Ferdinand, (March 1762), Add. MSS. 32935 f.136. It is assumed that the request that the Commander-in-Chief restore to the British commissariat full powers over land carriage and river navigation was directed against Massow's influence.

The creation of an effective system of control not only enabled a greater measure of supervision of transport services to be undertaken by specialized staff, but by providing more accurate and detailed statistical information than had previously been available had equally beneficial effects. In 1760 Peirson had told the Treasury that he could send no details on the numerical states of the trains because he was unable to inspect them,¹ but by the second half of 1762 the state of the proviant train was being recorded in twice-weekly returns on printed forms,² and that of the foreign artillery train in a similar way.³ Such information provided a far more solid foundation on which to base payments for services under contract, and at the same time provided the commissariat and the military command with a much clearer picture of the exact level of train resources at their disposal. At the same time, Pownall's introduction of a comprehensive 'journal' and 'grand ledger', detailing the movement of all government provisions in and out of magazines and depots and incorporating an exact record of the transports involved,⁴ provided the commissariat with precise information on the quantities of goods in its possession and their exact whereabouts. Thus in addition to being able to see where and how available transport resources were being employed, it was also far easier to detect thefts occurring during transit, and to identify unjustified or fraudulent demands by local people and officials for transport services which they claimed to have executed.

1 Peirson to (Treasury), 7 June 1760, T/1/405 f.63.

2 Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/6/1 - 39.

3 Ibid. D/HV/B/6/49 - 59. It is probable that similar records of other trains were kept at this time, but none have come to light.

4 See above p.201.

There were delays at various times during the war in the settlement and payment of transport accounts. Pownall commented in 1762 that some country carriage accounts had been outstanding for years,¹ and it was not in fact until 1765 that a considerable sum of money was paid to Prussian provinces for transport services performed in 1757, 1758 and 1759,² while a number of Bremen shippers had to wait almost as long for the settlement of their extensive demands.³ Such delays were contributory factors to the withholding of local transport,⁴ and must also have encouraged dishonesty and fraud. By 1761, however, there was a greater recognition on the part of the Treasury and the commissariat that such a situation was equally damaging to the interests of the Army and of the British government. One result of this was the appointment of Henry Hulton as commissary of accounts with special responsibility for the payment of freights on the Weser,⁵ and the extent of the backlog of unsettled accounts for services on this vitally important supply line was clearly demonstrated, when the commissary's office was besieged by such a mob of government creditors that he had to station his clerk at an upstairs window and make the claimants climb up a ladder as the only way to deal with them one at a time.⁶ The attempt to effect a speedier sett-

1 Pownall to Martin, 16 July 1762, T/1/420 f.105.

2 Account of Demands of Prussian Countries in Pownall, C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 25 February 1765, T/52/56 f.420. The sum allowed was 150,312 dollars 11 groschen 6 pfennigs in gold, which @ 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ dollars per ducat, the standard rate of exchange for the gold dollar, = 54,658.97 ducats.

3 Pownall, Cornwall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 31 March 1764, *ibid.* f.142. The sum allowed was 32,469 ducats 1 dollar 24 groschen.

4 F. Halsey to Hatton, 26 December 1760, Halsey MSS. 15030.

5 Peirson to Martin, 22 August 1761, T/1/410 f.82.

6 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.49.

lement of these accounts continued in 1762, when Leonard Collings replaced Hulton, and although cash shortages created further delays,¹ definite improvements had been brought about, which it may be assumed resulted in a greater efficiency of transport services on the river.

The accounts of the trains under contract seem to have been settled with more regularity throughout the war, and although there were some periods when payments for Dundas' bread, bakery and hospital wagons fell into arrears,² a general view of the whole extent of his train contracts shows that he was paid with surprising promptitude at intervals of never much more than two months and frequently of one month or less.³ It is true that he had to wait until 1765 for the final settlement of his accounts, but the sums of money which were thus delayed were mostly for services performed in the last months of the war,⁴ and it is not possible to claim that shortages of cash had jeopardized the effective execution of his train contracts during the major period of hostilities. In connection with the trains in public ownership there was certainly one difficult moment, when early in 1760 Hatton had his warrants for the expenses of these services refused by the deputy paymaster, so causing a considerable delay in the purchase of replacement horses and other preparations for the coming campaign.⁵ But this was something

1 L. Collings to Howard, 5 August 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/5/11.

2 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.7 - 8. For example, between payments on 3 July 1759 and 25 February 1760 he received only one other warrant on 9 October 1759, during which period he was owed approximately £6,000 per month.

3 Ibid. & ff.13 - 16 & 19 - 22.

4 Ibid.

5 Hatton to Martin, 9 April 1760, T/1/405 ff.170 - 171.

of a temporary confusion, arising from the fact that Hunter's instructions to his deputy did not correspond with the Treasury's views on the granting of warrants.¹ Of more long-term significance was the deficit of £11,344/19/4 at the end of the war on Bilgen's receipts of money for the expenses of the foreign artillery train,² and although three-quarters of this sum was made up of supplementary expenses,³ the accounts for which were probably presented too late for immediate settlement, this hardly justifies the failure to provide cash for their payment until 1764.⁴ A similar situation might well have developed in connection with the administration of the proviant train in late 1762, for Clark's accounts show that his expenditure was already exceeding his receipts in the brief period during which he was responsible for the service.⁵ Thus the directors of the Treasury's train services were not usually in the position to be able to discharge all their creditors promptly.

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The scope of the system of supervision and detailed

1 Newcastle to Granby, 25 April 1760, ADD. MSS. 32905 ff.78 - 79. See above p.77, n.3.

2 T/52/56 f.38, 25 July 1764.

3 Ibid. f.39. For the years 1759 - 1762 Bilgen had supplementary expenses of 4,712 ducats 32 groschen, 5,030 ducats 1 dollar 29 $\frac{1}{4}$ groschen and 9,129 ducats 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen, a total of 18,871 ducats 2 dollars 28 $\frac{3}{4}$ groschen. Altogether his charges came to 24,845 ducats 1 dollar 9 groschen 2 pfennigs.

4 Bilgen in fact complained that he was unable to get the money which the British government owed him. C.H.P.E. von Westphalen to Ferdinand, 6 July 1762, Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.VI, pp.221 - 222.

5 Declared Account of A. Clark, 3 June 1767, AO/1/519/224. Ignoring sums of money received and expended in connection with the sale of the train after the end of the war, Clark spent £29,920/15/0 on upkeep and maintenance, while a further sum of £3,218/9/5 included contingent expenses. His receipts from various sources were £24,613/18/11, £661/14/10, £26/12/10 and £1,715/9/3, a total of £27,017/15/10.

record of transport services was enlarged and its efficiency improved in the course of the war, while certain limited steps were taken to encourage the speedier settlement and payment of accounts. These changes made it easier to uphold and protect British financial interests and had beneficial effects on the numerical levels of resources available for the Army's use. But improvements had been long delayed, and for a large part of the war the work and administration of the trains both under contract and private management had gone unsupervised, while ignorance of the precise details of the multitudinous and disparate tasks undertaken by local transport had made it impossible to provide any real control of its activities and any solid foundation for the settlement of its accounts. Such considerations make it legitimate to wonder whether the improvements introduced at the end of the war were not tantamount to locking the stable door after a number of the horses had bolted.

CHAPTER VII

HOSPITALS

'.... these distressfull scenes are enough to shock humanity'.¹

Few accounts of eighteenth century military life are complete without a vivid if not lurid description of the sufferings of the wounded and of the even greater numbers of sick,² who came under the care of the army medical services. Although there can be no doubting the existence of profound and widespread misery, it should not be forgotten that much of it was unavoidable. War by its nature must always cause appalling injuries, and the conditions in which it had to be waged at that time inevitably led to the appearance of virulent epidemic diseases in the course of campaigns, while in both cases limited or erroneous medical knowledge could do very little to promote the patients' recovery, and may often have retarded or even prevented it. Less inevitable, however, were the ruthless economies which might be made in the numbers of medical personnel employed and in the facilities with which they were provided for the execution of their responsibilities. It seems to have been generally recognized that it was cheaper to recruit a new soldier than to attempt to cure or to rehabilitate a sick or injured one,³ although presumably not every government was prepared to carry the implications of this principle as far as the reputedly enlightened Fred-

1 F. Halsey to R. Peirson, 26 March 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

2 H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century. (1977) p. 97. Figures for the Combined Army in Germany in 1759 show that of the 6,682 men who died or were invalided out of the service, 2,862 or 42.83% had been killed or wounded in battle, while 3,820 or 57.17% had died or been incapacitated as a result of disease. F.O.W.H. von Westphalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg. (1859 - 1872) Vol.III, p.951.

3 E.E. Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. (1926) p.11.

erick the Great, who issued orders that those soldiers who would be incapable of future military service should simply be left to die.¹ Furthermore, even if a relatively adequate structure of medical care existed on paper, it could be easily paralysed by the sort of inefficient and dishonest administration which dogged so many aspects of military activity,² so that neither the financial interests of government nor the welfare of patients was promoted. This chapter seeks to examine the record of the Treasury and its commissaries in providing and administering a part of the medical services of the Combined Army in the light of these considerations.

It is somewhat difficult to obtain an overall assessment of the size of the problem involved, for the numbers of incapacitated soldiers tended to fluctuate within fairly wide limits according to the nature of the campaigning, obviously undergoing a significant increase after a major engagement,³ the season of the year and the nature of the weather, and the extent of epidemic disease.⁴ Moreover, as the Treasury was never directly involved in supplying and administering the

1 C. Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great. (1974) p.140.

2 In Prussian military hospitals the sick and wounded were allegedly plundered at will, *ibid.* p.139.

3 The battle of Minden in 1759 left as many as 2,700 dead and wounded, Sir R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War. (1966) Appendix XXX, p.514. A more detailed analysis of the casualties at the battle of Wilhelmsthal in 1762, *ibid.* Appendix XXVII, pp.509 - 510, shows that 28.42% were killed and 71.58% wounded, and on this basis there would have been 1,933 injured men to care for after Minden. Savory's figures show that the Combined Army's total casualties in the course of the war amounted to 18,800, *ibid.* Appendix XXX, p.514, which using the same proportions would have included 13,457 wounded.

4 Early in 1761 a contagious fever raging in Paderborn was affecting exceptionally large numbers of men, Peirson to Duke of Newcastle, 6 February 1761, Add. MSS. 32918 f.305.

medical services of the British troops,¹ general returns of the numbers of sick and wounded in the Combined Army as a whole give an exaggerated picture of the extent of the precise responsibilities of the Board and its employees. Detailed returns, distinguishing the different national contingents, and some adjusted figures show that in 1759 and 1760 the numbers of German sick and wounded were somewhat in excess of 5,000,² while by the second half of 1761 they had risen to over 8,600.³ It seems probable therefore that at any given time during the last four years of the war the number of German soldiers needing medical treatment would be between five and nine thousand. The real cost of supplying and maintaining the Army's medical services is also difficult to ascertain, as expenditure was accounted for under several different and disparate heads, while some of the moneys disbursed for the upkeep of hospitalized soldiers could be reclaimed from the patients themselves or from their regiments.⁴ But working on the basis of crude overall costs it appears that in the period 1759 - 1763 the general running expenses of the foreign hospitals amounted to approximately £42,000 per annum,⁵ to which sum has

1 Such matters remained entirely the concern of their military commanders and officers, see below p.309.

2 Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.III, p.125. Return of Prince Ferdinand's Army of 1 September 1760, Add. MSS. 32911 ff.11 - 12.

3 On 1 June 1761 the whole Army contained 12,457 sick and wounded men, State of the Allied Army, Add. MSS. 38333 f.107, while the figure for the British troops alone on 1 August 1761 was 3,830, The Returns of British Forces Serving in Germany, PRO/30/8/89 f.305. Westphalen, op. cit. Vol.V, p.1,124.

4 See below pp.306 - 307 & 331.

5 During this period the commissariat's director of foreign hospitals paid or was allowed a total of £126,958/14/7½, Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218, while the post-war settlement found further sums amounting to £41,820/14/5 still outstanding, Accounts of Bishop, 28 March 1777, T/52/109 f.316. This gives a total of £168,779/9/0½ spread over some four years.

to be added a maximum of some £36,000 per annum for the service's established wagon train,¹ a figure of roughly £20,000 per annum for the supply of provisions under contract to the Hanoverian hospitals,² and unknown but probably relatively smaller sums for the pay of established medical officers and for various regimental allowances.³ Thus all told it seems likely that German medical expenses were in the region of £100,000 per annum, and as such were financially of less significance than the aspects of supply which have already been discussed.

An examination of the structure of eighteenth century military medical services shows that they existed at two distinct levels; that of a regiment or corps and that of an army as a whole.⁴ Regimental establishments included physicians, apothecaries and surgeons, who exercised a permanent responsibility for the welfare of troops in

1 In 1762 the foreign hospital train contained 15 four-horse and 111 six-horse wagons, see Appendix VII. At a cost of 9/0d and 13/0d respectively per wagon per day, and calculating on the basis that the train was maintained 96.61% complete and that 29.14% of its effective cost had to be paid as compensation for loss and damage, see Appendix VIII, it required an annual sum of £35,929/13/9 to maintain it. The cost would have been less in earlier years when the establishment was smaller.

2 The contract, which was held by the same merchants during the last four years of the war, was settled at 32,923 ducats, or £16,078/13/6 at the standard rates of exchange of ducat : 5 guilders 5 stivers, and £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers, for a period of slightly more than a year in 1762 - 1763. This figure, however, represented a significant reduction by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands of the original sum of 64,230 ducats, or £31,368/2/9, reported due to the contractors by Bishop, and also of the figure of 44,230 ducats, or £21,600/13/11, certified by the commissary of accounts in Germany, see below pp.315 - 319. It must be assumed therefore that the accounts for the period 1759 - 1761, which were not reviewed by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, were settled on a more expensive basis than those of 1762 - 1763.

3 As for example the chests of medicines allowed to each German regiment for the first year of a campaign, T. Pownall & C.W. Cornwall to C. Jenkinson, 26 March 1764, T/52/56 f.336.

4 Ibid. f.337.

peace-time as in war, and during the latter cared for the men in what were somewhat ambitiously called 'regimental infirmaries',¹ which were little more than ordinary quarters set aside for the sick and wounded with the provision of a few extra comforts.² The great drawback of this system was that, when an army was ordered to move, each regiment had to engage in a frantic search for wagons to carry those unable to walk, with much resultant delay and the compromising of other important transport services.³ It was to avoid some of these difficulties that during war-time general hospitals serving all regiments were brought into existence. These consisted, firstly, of mobile or peripatetic establishments, which maintained a position some ten or twelve miles in the rear of the army with the bakery⁴ and collected up the sick and wounded, those with minor complaints and injuries being returned to their regiments when better, while more serious and chronic cases were transferred to other accommodation.⁵ These so-called 'flying hospitals' thus provided some temporary shelter, but were primarily used as ambulances. Secondly, there were the fixed or garrison hospitals, to which the flying hospitals sent patients as necessary, and which were established at appropriate sites in towns and villages and maintained as long as the position of the army allowed.⁶ They might accommodate as many as a thousand

1 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand's Orders Relating to the Number of Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment, 1 September 1758, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

2 Standing Orders, 29 July 1760, Add. MSS. 28855 f.10.

3 Ibid. 29 July 1760 & 25 January 1761, ff.10 & 29 - 30.

4 Extracts from Prince Ferdinand's Orders Relating to the Number of Carriages Permitted to Attend each Regiment, 11 September 1761, Dundas of Beechwood MSS.

5 Ibid. 1 September 1758.

6 The problems of moving these institutions with their inmates and bulky stores meant that they sometimes had to be abandoned to the enemy, T/52/109 f.329.

patients,¹ although the latter would rarely be found under one roof, being dispersed in whatever military, municipal or private quarters and lodgings could be found.²

Both fixed and flying hospitals employed large numbers of personnel, including the physicians, apothecaries and surgeons charged with the patients' treatment, in which they were assisted by auxiliary staff, known variously as mates, matrons and nurses.³ Secondly, it was common to assign a number of military officers to the hospital service to maintain discipline and good order and to take care of the arms, equipment and uniforms of the sick and injured.⁴ Finally, there were the directors, purveyors, quartermasters, storekeepers and clerks,⁵ assisted no doubt by various labourers and workmen, who were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of the wide range of stores, equipment and provisions which the hospital service required. Included under these headings were considerable quantities of medicines and drugs, surgical supplies and various hospital utensils.⁶ In addition, patients were usually furnished with blankets and a bedstead, the latter frequently the light Indian variety known as a charpoy,⁷ while brooms and

1 F. Halsey to Peirson, 26 March 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

2 T/52/109 f.328.

3 Bishop to T. Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 ff.235 - 236. Establishment of the British Hospitals Germany, 26 December 1761, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/227. AO/1/1507/218.

4 T/1/412 ff.235 - 236.

5 Establishment of the British Hospitals Germany, 26 December 1761, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/227.

6 T/1/412 ff.235 & 237.

7 T/52/109 f.328. In this document the word appears as 'charpie'.

soap were supplied for cleaning and disinfection.¹ Among the varied items of diet, which might be provided for the patients, were bread, meat, dairy produce, pulses, sugar, lemons, spices, herbs and beer, while other material comforts in the form of heating, lighting, tobacco and spirits also figured in the hospital budget.² Finally, significant sums had to be spent on general administrative costs, maintenance and repair, the burial of the dead and the carriage of patients, stores and equipment.³

A proportion of the costs involved in the many and varied services described above came under the heading of ordinary expenditure. Such was the case with the pay of the regimental medical officers and of some of the staff of the fixed and flying hospitals.⁴ In the course of campaigning, however, as it became necessary to augment, sometimes significantly, the establishment of medical personnel, additional officers and staff were charged to extraordinaries,⁵ as were the chests of medicines which were allowed to regiments or corps for the first, although not for subsequent campaigns of a war,⁶ and all equipment, stores and drugs used in the hospitals, together with the latter's general running costs.⁷ Provisions supplied to hospital patients were also charged

1 Estimate of Deliveries made by C. Behrend in Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to C. Lowndes, 10 February 1766, T/52/109 f.267.

2 Ibid.

3 AO/1/1507/218.

4 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 f.236. Bishop's comments refer to the staff of the Hanoverian hospitals, whose salaries were included in the estimates voted by Parliament after April 1758. Similar arrangements existed for the Hessians from an earlier date.

5 Ibid. Additional allowances during war-time to those maintained on the ordinary establishment were also charged to extraordinaries.

6 T/52/56 f.336.

7 T/1/412 f.237.

to extraordinaries, although as the authorities recouped from regimental funds the men's subsistence, that proportion of their ordinary pay which provided their food, it was only the cost of special diets and other supplementary comforts which represented a real additional expenditure.¹

It can thus be seen that despite the smaller sums of money involved medical services were as complex a matter as any other aspect of military administration. Considerable numbers of staff, performing a variety of functions in many different and often isolated places, needed close and effective supervision both of their activities and of the accounts which they rendered of a wide range of goods and equipment, supplied for the service and committed to their care. One particular aspect of these affairs, the keeping of a meticulous daily record of the numbers of men in hospital, was a 'sine qua non', for it not only provided the justification of most expenditure in the hospitals, but it was also the only means of ensuring that the men's subsistence money was in fact transferred to the authorities which actually fed them, instead of disappearing into the bottomless pit of the regimental purses.

Britain quickly came to assume full financial responsibility for the medical services of the Combined Army. From the beginning she was bound by treaty to pay or reimburse the regimental expenses, both ordinary and extraordinary, of the Hessian troops employed by her, while from April 1758 onwards she undertook similar obligations towards the

¹ Sir J. Cockburn to S. Martin, 25 March 1763, T/1/427 f.80. Memorandum for T. Bradshaw, July 1768, SP/81/158/3.

Hanoverians and their allies, as well as responsibility for the extraordinary hospital expenses of the Army as a whole.¹ During these first two years decisions as to the framework within which the medical services operated and the formulation of the general policies governing their administration seem to have been left largely in the hands of the German civilian and military authorities. It is true that Britain controlled the numbers of medical officers attached to the regiments, for their appointments were subject to parliamentary approval, while at the same time the Treasury's commissary attached to the service of the Hessian troops exercised a general responsibility for the provision of extraordinary medical services. But in the case of the latter neither Amherst nor Boyd had the time and perhaps the inclination to play an active role,² while the commissary attached to the Hanoverian troops in April 1758 was only charged with mustering them.³ Such regimental expenses were, however, limited and largely customary, although it was otherwise with the extraordinary hospital expenditure of the Army as a whole, where considerations such as the numbers of beds to be made available, the appointment of supplementary medical, administrative and domestic staff, the provision of transport services, and the quantities of stores, equipment, drugs and provisions to be supplied were extremely flexible. Leaving such matters to the German authorities ran the risk of compromising British interests, whose safeguarding really required an

1 See above p.31.

2 See above pp.164 - 165. Their correspondence is devoid of references to medical and hospital services.

3 See Appendix I (Durand).

active and informed commissary on the spot.¹ It was only in December 1758, with the decision to assume direct responsibility for all aspects of the supply of the Combined Army, that this necessity became a reality.

The position of Hunter, the new superintendent of commissaries, did, however, involve one anomaly from the beginning, in that he was given no authority over the hospital services of the British troops in Germany, whose administration for the rest of the war remained in the hands of their medical and military officers.² This situation, which inevitably involved duplication of effort, was not ideal, and early in 1760 Prince Ferdinand, in requesting the establishment of a new flying hospital to serve the greatly increased numbers of troops in the Army, proposed that all hospitals be brought under the direction of the commissariat, so that Hunter could take a global view of their administration and costs.³ The matter was discussed in London at a meeting between the British Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary to the Treasury and Hunter himself, where Granby's view that 'the Troops in General will prefer being separate, as not used to each others manner of practising Physick' prevailed.⁴ Furthermore, when shortly after his appointment, Hunter sought the Treasury's advice on the methods to be adopted for the day-to-day administration of the foreign hospitals, the Board recommend-

1 It is conceivable that between April and December 1758 the Hanoverian authorities consulted the Treasury directly on matters of hospital provision and expenditure, but no examples of this have come to light in the official correspondence, and even if its advice had been sought, the Board would have had no detailed information at its disposal on which to formulate a decision.

2 Peirson's Answer to Complaints Relating to the Commissariat, 6 June 1761, Add. MSS. 32923 f.395.

3 Prince Ferdinand to T.O. Hunter, 5 February 1760, T/1/405 f.377.

4 Minutes at a Meeting of Lord Granby, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Martin, 27 March 1760, Add. MSS. 32904 f.49.

ed that it be left in the hands of the German officers 'already stationed in that Department and familiar with it',¹ and one result of this was that the Hanoverian and Hessian hospitals continued to all intents and purposes to act as separate entities. Thus no attempt was made to weld the hospital services of the Combined Army into a single unit in the interests of administrative efficiency. This failure probably derived from the highly specialized nature of the service and the relatively small amounts of money involved, in the light of which the Treasury and its commissaries may have felt it better not to disturb established traditions or arouse national prejudices.

Hunter had hoped that the Treasury would provide him with a commissary, who could direct and supervise the running of the foreign hospitals, and in February 1759 he requested that 'a proper person of Experience and Integrity' be sent from England for this purpose.² When the Board was unable to offer him any assistance or even suggestions,³ he chose Thomas Bishop, who had acted briefly as assistant to the director of British military hospitals in Germany.⁴ Nothing is known about Bishop's background and earlier experience, although he had been recommended to the Secretary at War by Robert Adair, later Surgeon General of the Army,⁵ as one 'whose Character is fair in the World; a Man of Sense and Activity'.⁶ Unlike the British director of military hospit-

1 Martin to Hunter, 23 February 1759, T/64/96 f.29.

2 Hunter to (Martin), 11 February 1759, *ibid.* f.27.

3 Martin to Hunter, 23 February 1759, *ibid.* f.29.

4 Short State of Documents as Relate to the Expenses of the Foreign Hospitals, (1766) T/1/445 f.125. Colonel Parker to C. Hotham, 6 November 1758, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/8.

5 Gentleman's Magazine, Vol.LX, 1790, p.282.

6 R. Adair to Viscount Barrington, 12 October 1758, W0/1/976 f.48.

als in Germany in the last part of the war, who was a practising surgeon,¹ there is no reason to suppose that he possessed any medical skill or qualifications, and although the description of him as 'an inferior Clerk to Mr. Hunter'² seems somewhat exaggerated, it soon became clear that he was not of sufficient weight or standing to deal on equal terms with the German medical and military authorities, and this may well have been a major reason why Britain's control over the establishment, structures and practices of the foreign hospitals remained extremely limited throughout his administration. It is true that early in 1760 the commissariat and the Treasury were fully consulted on the proposed expansion of the flying hospital and gave their unconditional approval to Ferdinand's plan for the augmentation of the service,³ but for most of the time the German authorities were able to exercise considerable freedom of action in deciding the range of services to be provided, for example by establishing independent hospitals and appointing supplementary staff to man them without reference to British officials.⁴ A similar state of affairs existed in connection with matters of detailed expenditure, for as Bishop quite frankly admitted the Hanoverian hospitals continued to be run by their own officials on a basis 'agreeable to their ancient Custom as prescribed by the Rules of the Chancery'.⁵ Yet this never meant that

1 Declared Account of P. Burlton, Director of the British Hospitals in Germany, 9 May 1761 - 30 June 1763, AO/1/1507/221. Warrant Appointing Burlton, 22 July 1758, SP/44/190 f.375.

2 State of the Commissariat, Add. MSS. 38335 f.176.

3 Ferdinand to Hunter, 5 February 1760, T/1/405 f.376. M. Hatton to Martin, 9 & 10 April 1760, *ibid.* ff.171 & 180. Hatton to Hanoverian Chancery of War, 10 May 1760, Halsey MSS. 15029. Bishop to Granby, 14 May 1760, T/1/405 f.101. Staff, stores, equipment, medicines and transport were all augmented with the Treasury's permission, and Bishop produced estimates for the various items to be purchased.

4 Bishop to John West, 11 November 1765, SP/9/231. T/52/109 ff.320 - 322.

5 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 f.235.

he was prepared to commit Britain to the repayment of any expenditure which the German authorities cared to regard as traditional, a claim which was put forward by the Hessians when they asserted:- 'we were told that you Sr, as Intendant, had no concern at all of the regulations of our Hospital but onley to take Care for the Payment of the Extraordinaire Expenses thereof'.¹ The particular question at issue in this connection was the Hessian claim that all patients were subsisted on a full diet and that Britain was obliged to reimburse this expenditure, part of which no doubt represented a perquisite of the hospital officers. Bishop, however, refused to accept the argument 'Whence they wou'd ridiculously infer that every Sick man in their Hospitals must eat whether he ought or has any Appetite or not',² and thus maintained the principle that the economies of the establishments under his care must conform to a generally acceptable and equitable pattern. Unfortunately, this dispute dragged on until the very end of the war, when the Hessian authorities were still asserting that Britain had no concern with such matters and refusing to supply the information and statistics which Bishop required,³ and in the course of this long struggle the commissary seems to have received very little effective assistance from either his superiors in Germany or the Treasury itself.⁴ Thus for four years Britain was kept in the dark about important aspects of the arrangements governing a major branch of the service for which she was financially liable.

1 Letter of Mr. Commissary Schmidt, 16 September 1760, T/1/405 f.208.

2 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 f.238.

3 Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts Appear to be, 10 January 1763, T/1/427 f.357.

4 It was, however, always difficult for Britain to assert her full financial rights against her mercenary allies in the middle of hostilities.

Altogether, therefore, while after 1758 this country in theory controlled the general levels of provision of hospital services and the detailed regulations by which they were administered, in practice such control remained incomplete and indirect as it had been in the first two years of the war. In addition, the acceptance of the traditional administrative and financial pattern, the precise details of which in the case of the Hessians remained shrouded in deliberate obscurity, precluded any attempt to effect changes and reforms in the interests of greater efficiency and the promotion of the welfare of patients. Finally, while Britain's financial interests were partially safeguarded by the fact that expenditure incurred by the independent action of the German authorities had to be justified on grounds of necessity and equity in the settlement of accounts, such a process was obviously more arduous and complex and more likely to allow some unwarranted claims to escape detection, than the specific authorization or rejection of expenditure at the precise moment of its occurrence by the direct intervention of a responsible British commissary. But Bishop was never able or allowed to play such a positive role.

Turning from these general considerations to the detailed arrangements by which the hospitals many and varied needs were supplied, it is again apparent that the part played by British commissaries was to a large extent a limited and restricted one, for throughout the war most requirements, with the exception of a considerable proportion of food-stuffs, were purchased by the German authorities. Before the assumption of direct responsibility for the supply of the Combined Army in

December 1758 such a state of affairs was unavoidable, except in the case of the Hessian contingent, where the low profile adopted by the British commissaries nevertheless ensured that these matters would be left in the hands of the hospital officials.¹ But it is more surprising to find that, while after 1758 the commissariat's director of foreign hospitals occasionally took direct action for the supply of goods, as for example in ordering medicines to individual hospitals,² such concerns remained for the most part the preserve of the Hanoverian and Hessian officers. Bishop wrote of the latter 'Medecines, Hospital Goods &c. they furnish themselves with and account for as they find occasion for it'.³ It is conceivable that this principle was originally established as a result of Bishop's lack of medical knowledge,⁴ although there can have been no insuperable obstacle to his informing himself on such matters, and another possible consideration was the fact that it was more convenient for the officials of detached and frequently isolated hospitals to purchase their own medical requisites in limited quantities in the immediate vicinity. In this way heavy transport costs were avoided, although any financial advantage to be gained by purchases in bulk was inevitably lost, and no guarantee could be given of the regularity of the supply of items so essential to the welfare of the patients. Moreover, the British commissariat exercised no influence over the prices and other

1 The extraordinary expenses incurred by the Hessian hospitals were in fact not reimbursed directly by Britain but by the Hanoverian authorities, which subsequently claimed repayment from the Treasury, Pownall & Cornwall to Jenkinson, 26 March 1764, T/52/56 f.337.

2 T/29/36 f.290, 17 March 1765.

3 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 f.238.

4 Such a conclusion is suggested by the fact that he made the contracts for the supply of ordinary provisions to the Hanoverian hospitals from the beginning of his administration. See below.

contractual conditions which were agreed, so that the tenuous nature of their immediate control of hospital affairs was again apparent.

In one sphere, however, Bishop made a more positive and direct contribution, for the food-stuffs of the Hanoverian fixed and flying hospitals were supplied under contracts between himself and the merchants, Cosman Behrend and Cosman Lehman, the first agreement being made in 1759 and subsequently renewed at six-monthly intervals until the end of the war.¹ There is no detailed information on the terms of these arrangements in the early part of the period, but the accounts of the deliveries made under the contracts of 6 January and 12 June 1762 were submitted at the end of the war to the scrutiny of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, whose investigations brought to light a number of disturbing circumstances. In the first place the prices agreed for some provisions seemed to be exorbitant, while Bishop's commitment in other cases to pay current market rates instead of fixing actual prices² had been the basis of serious overcharging by the contractors. Altogether, the prices seemed 'extravagantly high', some being treble and almost all of them double the usual rates.³ Bishop produced a number of different justifications for the prices which he had allowed, pointing out 'inter alia' that the contractors had delivered goods of superior quality, that the small quantities involved represented a loss to them if

1 State of Business in the German Office, May 1765, Add. MSS. 38204 f. 249. Contract between Bishop and Messrs. C. Behrend and C. Lehman, 20 January 1761, SP/9/223. The Hessian authorities continued to make their own arrangements for the supply of food-stuffs.

2 Contract between Bishop and Behrend and Lehman, 6 January 1762, SP/9/223.

3 T/29/35 f.433, 5 June 1764. T/29/36 f.16, 16 July 1764. To take one example, rye bread at 2 groschen per lb., or 12 groschen per six-pound loaf, was more expensive than any other contractual agreement. See above pp.242 - 244.

charged at normal prices, and that the mere presence of hospitals in an area had an inflationary effect on the market.¹ Furthermore, he contended that overheads had been exceptionally high, for deliveries especially to flying hospitals involved considerable transport and labour costs, while losses to the enemy of provisions in transit had also been at the contractors' charge.² Although there was some validity in this last argument, in that most other contractors were allowed full compensation for goods captured by the enemy,³ the Commissioners were singularly unimpressed by the replies. They were sceptical as to whether best butcher's meat for example had actually been delivered, commenting that hospitals only used meat to make soups and broths, and stating that, although the delivery of small quantities might well be commercially unprofitable, the accounts showed that most provisions had been supplied in bulk.⁴ The Commissioners did not comment specifically on the claim that prices were always high in the vicinity of hospitals, although they might have argued that such tendencies could be minimized by purchasing in small quantities over as wide an area as possible, and they could also have added that all contractors were obliged to make deliveries at their own expense, and that agreed prices always included an allowance for transport

1 Bishop to Commissioners for Examining German Demands, (undated), T/52/109 ff.102 - 103.

2 Ibid. f.104.

3 Contracts of Cockburn, October - November 1762, T/1/417 ff.242 - 261.

4 Cuthbert's Remarks on a Contract and Certificate granted by Bishop to Behrend and Lehman, (undated), SP/9/223. The fact that Pownall, one of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, did not sign the reports was probably because as director of the department of control he had approved the certificate granted to the contractors, the revision of which was now being undertaken, and not, as Lehman suggested, because he did not agree that the prices were exorbitant. Memorial of Lehman, Read 27 January 1766, T/1/449 ff.192 - 193.

costs.

Seeking corroboration of the evidence of overcharging found by the Commissioners, the Treasury wrote to Peirson and Cockburn, both of whom according to Bishop had confirmed the arrangements,¹ although their replies showed quite clearly that they had exercised no effective control over hospital contracting activities and had simply rubber-stamped whatever agreements Bishop had cared to make.² Cockburn wrote that he had 'never interfered with Mr Bishop in any degree in the management of the foreign Hospitals further than to desire that he would on all occasions make the most advantageous terms he could for Government it was impossible for me to give any direction in a department I did not understand'.³ Thus it appears that Bishop's superiors had been content to allow him to make contracts involving considerable sums of money on whatever terms he thought proper, a freedom of action which no other commissary of his standing enjoyed, and faced with his inability to give any satisfactory explanation of his agreements, the Treasury decided that, despite the regularity and validity of the contracts, the prices charged would have to be subject to revision and deduction.⁴ This arduous task was undertaken by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands over a period of nearly a year, as a result of which deliveries made to flying hospitals were admitted at the rates charged in view of the difficulties and dangers inherent in this form of supply, and where

1 T/29/35 ff.433 - 434, 5 June 1764.

2 Cockburn to T. Whately, 10 July 1764, Peirson to Whately, 13 June 1764, T/52/109 ff.105 - 106.

3 Ibid. f.106.

4 T/29/36 ff.15 - 16 & 204, 16 July & 18 December 1764.

possible other prices were adjusted according to what information could be found on the actual state of the market in the various places where the deliveries had been made. But in a number of cases reliable figures could not be found, and the contractors' charges had to be allowed to stand.¹ A second major objection of the Commissioners to the accounts of Behrend and Lehman concerned the vast amount of provisions which had been delivered, for Bishop's agreements engaged the contractors to supply what was necessary without mentioning specific quantities, and this had produced some decidedly suspicious figures of consumption, as for example in the relatively small garrison hospital at Münster, where the patients had apparently been getting through 58 lbs. butter, 45 lbs. best refined sugar, 60 quarts wine and brandy and 25 lbs. tobacco each day.² The Commissioners therefore recommended further significant reductions in the sums to be allowed, basing their calculations on the accounts of the numbers of patients maintained in the hospitals and the official tables of diet and provisions to which they were entitled, 'for it cannot be supposed, that the Contractor had an unlimited Power, to throw into the Hospital what Quantities of each kind of Provisions he pleas'd; nor had a Subdirector of a Hospital proper Authority to order more in than was necessary'.³ Altogether, for exorbitant prices and excessive deliveries the sum of 44,230 ducats, reported due to the contractors in Germany, was reduced by more than 25% to 32,398 ducats, a saving of over

1 Letter of Cornwall & Cuthbert, 30 November 1765, T/52/109 ff.96 - 97.

2 Cuthbert's Remarks on a Contract and Certificate granted by Bishop to Behrend and Lehman, (undated), SP/9/223.

3 Ibid.

£5,700.¹

It is thus clear that Bishop's contracting activities in the last year of the war were not above reproach. He had allowed some unjustifiably high prices, and by making open-ended agreements in which other prices and the quantities to be delivered had not been fixed in advance, he had permitted the contractors to mount a comprehensive campaign of extortion. It is true that much of the threatened loss was recovered as a result of the investigations of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, although the previous agreements with the same contractors between 1759 and 1761 were never subjected to this close scrutiny, and there remains a strong possibility that excessive payments were made on the earlier accounts. In Bishop's defence it can be argued that the fluctuating numbers of patients in hospital made it impossible to estimate the quantities of provisions required, although this does not relieve either him or the commissary of accounts in Germany of the charge of having allowed many unjustified prices and deliveries in their examination of the accounts. The implications of this situation are that if the British director of foreign hospitals was unable to keep a tight rein on contractual terms and prices, it is unlikely that German officials, with even less incentive to do so, were any more successful in formulating stringent and economical bargains for the supply of stores,

¹ C.W. C(ornwall) & D. C(uthbert) to C. Lowndes, 30 November 1765, SP/9/223. It should also be pointed out that the certificate for 44,230 ducats granted by Legh, the commissary of accounts in the department of control, already represented a reduction of 20,000 ducats on the sum originally reported due to the contractors by Bishop, an adjustment which was probably made largely on the basis of inadequate vouchers, Abstract of an Account of Provisions Delivered to the Foreign Hospitals by Behrend and Lehman, 1 June 1763, SP/9/223. The saving is calculated according to the standard rate of exchange of ducat : 5 guilders 5 stivers and £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers.

equipment and medicines. Thus while the picture of hospital contracting activities which emerges is limited and not clearly defined, there are strong hints that the prevailing state of affairs was not such as to protect and further British financial interests.

Turning from these matters relating to the general framework within which the hospitals operated to the day-to-day administration of the service, it is obvious that some effective system of supervision and control of the activities of both German officials and the British director himself was essential if efficiency and honesty were to be fully promoted and encouraged. It is conceivable that Bishop as part of his work made visits to individual establishments and perhaps even general tours of inspection,¹ although as the hospitals were numerous, scattered and frequently mobile, it seems improbable that he could have executed such functions on any regular and adequate basis on his own. Yet throughout his administration his superiors saw fit to provide him with no more than one clerical assistant, who was clearly not of sufficient standing to be entrusted with supervisory responsibilities.² The activities of those concerned in the supply and general administration of the hospitals might have been subjected to proper supervision had Cockburn and Thomas Halsey, who were originally appointed commissaries of control in May 1760 and charged 'inter alia' with the in-

1 His admittedly scanty correspondence is devoid of references to such activities.

2 In An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany 1759, T/1/397 f.67, Bishop was allowed one clerk to help him, and The State of the Commissariat, Add. MSS. 38335 f.176, suggests that this establishment remained unchanged for the duration of the war.

spection of these affairs, ever acted in their intended capacities,¹ or had any of the first effective commissaries of control, who began work in May 1761 under Peirson's direction,² been given a similar responsibility. And even when in 1762 a comprehensive and active department of control was brought into existence, no commissary was assigned to the foreign hospital service until the very last days of hostilities, at which stage Pownall's nomination of Webb really came far too late to achieve any beneficial effects.³ Thus it was accurately said of Bishop that 'after Mr. Hunter left Germany, he remain'd in this Business without any Controle, during the whole of the second Commissariat, & was indeed only Nominally controll'd at the latter end of the Third & last Commissariat',⁴ a state of affairs which, in view of the fact that he was a relatively minor official acting in the triple capacity of contractor, certifying commissary and paymaster,⁵ was to say the least inappropriate and unwise. In fact after 1759 Bishop's status itself was dubious, for he had been appointed by verbal orders of Hunter with no written commission, and after the latter's departure from Germany continued to execute his functions for three years on an informal basis. So tenuous were his relations with his superiors that when Howard took

1 Instructions to T. Halsey and Cockburn, 13 May 1760, Halsey MSS. 15027. See above p.65.

2 Warrant for a Commission to Peirson, 3 June 1761, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/4. There is no evidence that Peirson assigned a commissary of control to the foreign hospital service.

3 Pownall to Granby, 14 October 1762, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book I. The fact that Webb was in charge of the accounts branch of the office of control suggests that the supervision he was supposed to exercise was one based on reports and statistics rather than on actual inspection.

4 State of the Commissariat, Add. MSS. 38335 f.176.

5 State of Business in the German Office, May 1765, Add. MSS. 38204 f. 249.

charge of the commissariat in 1762 he felt obliged to enquire of the Treasury, 'I beg to know what he (Bishop) is, and what must be done with him'.¹ The Board somewhat bemusedly described this state of affairs as strange, although it seems to have been more mystified by Bishop's readiness to act without any personal security than by the risk to the public interest, inherent in a situation which apparently allowed him total freedom of action.²

The way in which both the officials and the director of the foreign hospitals were left very much to their own devices tempts one to seek the reasons in inefficiency if not indifference, and clearly after 1759 some indications of such faults and failings are not lacking. Nevertheless, it may be suggested that the tendency at all administrative levels to push hospital affairs into the background and conveniently allow them to manage themselves derived partly from their intricacy and specialized nature, combined with the fact that relatively small sums of money were involved. This consideration, while not totally exonerating those concerned, at least reflects some attempt, albeit negative, to concentrate the limited manpower and resources of the commissariat on matters of more vital concern. And when in 1762 the hospitals were the one major branch of the commissariat's responsibilities to be left outside the new system of control, it was almost certainly because by then it was too late to do anything to remedy previous failings and omissions. Thus Pownall's description of their affairs as uncontrolled and

1 G. Howard to (Treasury), 18 June 1762, T/1/417 f.395.

2 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, *ibid.* f.118.

uncontrollable ¹ was a cry of despair, which at the same time recognized the realities of the situation.

The lack of any proper system of control meant that the only effective check on the administration of the German hospital authorities lay in the statistical reports and accounts which they were obliged to furnish. Bishop's description of the information which he required of the Hanoverian officials suggests that it was sufficiently detailed and analytical to provide a comprehensive picture of their management, always assuming that it was regularly and accurately provided.² As already noted, one matter of vital importance was the keeping of a detailed current account of the actual numbers of sick and wounded in hospital, for any over-estimate in this connection automatically justified overcharging on the accounts of food, medicines, stores and equipment, while an under-estimate was no more to Britain's advantage as it led to the regiments being under-charged for the reimbursement of the subsistence money of their men maintained in hospital. Bishop therefore insisted that each of the separate Hanoverian hospitals provide a weekly general list of the patients in its charge, and a fully detailed one, presumably giving names and regiments, each month, while at the same time a cross-check could be kept on this information through the lists drawn up by the individual regiments of the men sent to the hospitals and the latter's own registers of entries and discharges.³ It was the

¹ Memorial Representing the State in which the Accounts Appear to be, 10 January 1763, T/1/427 f.356.

² Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 ff.237 - 238.

³ Ibid.

existence of such records which enabled the Commissioners for Examining German Demands to prove the charge of excessive deliveries of provisions by Behrend and Lehman, and consequently to save a considerable sum of money.¹ But if the Hanoverian authorities seem to have acted with regularity in these matters, it was quite otherwise with the Hessians, for it was only after a lengthy and acrimonious dispute that the fixed hospital at Cassel eventually provided Bishop with a fortnightly account of the numbers of sick and wounded maintained, although without details of names and regiments, while the other Hessian establishments resolutely refused to provide the necessary information.² It thus remained quite impossible to check the justice of Hessian hospital expenditure, and Bishop complained at the end of 1761 'as they refuse to give me actual proofs of the number of men subsisted, they may even allot a certain quantity of Provisions for the consumption of men non-existing, & perhaps too, of the dead'.³ No way was found out of this impasse for the duration of the war, and it was not until 1777, after a lengthy investigation of all the Hessian hospital accounts, that Bishop was able to pronounce that despite previous difficulties and lack of co-operation it did not appear to him that the number of patients maintained had been overstated, or that the expenses were greater than if the service had been more immediately under the direction of the British commissariat.⁴ In the absence of the detailed statistics on which this conclusion was

1 Other statistics demanded by Bishop included the numbers of hospital staff employed, the quantities of stores and utensils, tables and lists of the consumption of provisions and accounts of the hospital train. Ibid.

2 Bishop to J.G. Lorentz, 5 March 1761, T/1/410 f.163.

3 Bishop to Pownall, 6 November 1761, T/1/412 f.238.

4 Report of Bishop on Demands for Hessian Hospitals, 28 March 1777, T/52/109 f.318.

based it is impossible to verify its accuracy, but it is perhaps significant that Bishop's statement was not categorical and only offered an opinion. On the other hand the adamant stand which he had taken in connection with this matter during the war¹ makes it unlikely that he would have passed accounts, which were either totally inadequate or which bore the hallmarks of an attempt to defraud. It thus seems unlikely that Britain's financial interests were seriously compromised in this connection, but the fact that the whole basis of Hessian hospital expenditure remained obscure throughout the war, and then took a further fourteen years to elucidate and establish was both inefficient and risky.

Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that the Hessian authorities complained of Britain's failure to reimburse their legitimate hospital expenses,² although the problem of cash-flow in the service had deeper roots than the mere insistence on prescribed accounting forms. On his appointment in 1759 Bishop was instructed to pay the salaries of extraordinary hospital officers and employees and the bills for goods supplied and services rendered, for which purposes sums of money were issued to him on the understanding that he accounted monthly with Hunter for his administration.³ The original intention in making these arrangements was probably to relieve the Hanoverian and Hessian

1 His attitude had called down upon him the wrath of the Hessian authorities, who had threatened to report him to his superiors in London. Lorentz to Bishop, 21 February 1761, T/1/410 f.171.

2 Lorentz to Bishop, (11 February 1761), *ibid.* f.173.

3 An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany 1759, T/1/397 f.67. Bishop's accounts with the Exchequer, AO/1/1507/218, show that he did not make payments to the provision contractors for the Hanoverian hospitals. These were presumably ordered by the financial director of the commissariat.

authorities of the need to advance cash for the hospital services, but this hope was never realized for Bishop was not provided with sufficient funds each month, so that an increasing debt was incurred and the hospital officers were obliged to borrow money.¹ By the end of 1759 the deficit on the Hanoverian hospital account alone already stood at some £2,300,² and it continued to increase in the course of 1760, when after obtaining about £2,800 in April Bishop received no further cash for the current expenses of the service until September.³ Moreover, during the same period the augmentation of the establishments of the fixed and flying hospitals, requested by Prince Ferdinand and authorized by the Treasury, was financed by the issue of approximately £18,600, whereas Bishop had calculated the real cost to be some £21,000.⁴ This continuing slide into the red was recognized as unsatisfactory, and at the end of 1760 Granby stated his intention to issue sums of money in advance when the outstanding hospital debts had been discharged, although this hope prov-

1 Bishop to Granby, 18 November 1760, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book I.

2 AO/1/1507/218. In the course of 1759 Hunter granted Bishop warrants totalling 109,250 guilders, or between £10,022/18/8 and £10,355/9/0, calculating £ : 10 guilders 18 stivers and 10 guilders 11 stivers, the limits of the rate of exchange at the time, PMG/2/3 ff.185 - 188. The expenses of the hospitals during the same period came to £12,414/12/6. Bishop was also supposed to receive sums of money from the Hanoverian authorities for the subsistence of men in hospital, but these accounts too fell into arrears, see below p.329.

3 AO/1/1507/218. In April the cash had been obtained by Hatton in the form of a bill drawn on Pye and Cruickshanks for 30,000 guilders, or £2,790/13/11, calculating £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers, the current rate of exchange, PMG/2/4 f.155.

4 AO/1/1507/218. 200,000 guilders, or £18,604/13/0, calculating £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers, the current rate of exchange, PMG/2/4 f.156, were issued for this service in May 1760, whereas Bishop estimated the cost to be 153,800 dollars, Bishop to Granby, 14 May 1760, T/1/405 f.101. Assuming the ducat to have been worth 3.583 dollars at this time, the mean between $3\frac{1}{2}$ and $3\frac{2}{3}$ dollars, quoted as the rates of exchange current in early 1760, AO/1/1507/218, and calculating ducat : 5 guilders 5 stivers and £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers, 153,800 dollars = £20,963/6/8.

ed to be largely forlorn.¹ An overall view of the cash situation in 1761, 1762 and 1763 shows the issue of just under £44,000,² while during the same period hospital expenses amounted to at least £60,000.³

It is not difficult to envisage the evil effects of this state of affairs on the hospital service and above all on the welfare of the patients, but if first-hand evidence is required it is found in Frederick Halsey's description of conditions at Fritzlar early in 1761.

"Mr. Keidel directr. of the Hann. Hospital having recd. H.S.H. ⁴ orders to transport all the sick immediately to Perkelsheim has been with me to represent the distressful condition of the sick for want of Money, he has at prest. about a thousand sick here, has exhausted all his Credit. in borrowg. money to get a few necessaries for them, & can upon his own Credit. get no more; those that are allready transported he

1 Bishop to Granby, 18 November 1760, Rutland MSS. Granby Letter Book I. One warrant of 100,000 guilders was issued in January 1762 partly as an advance for future expenditure, AO/1/1507/218.

2 Warrants were issued as follows; 24 April 1761 - 73,500 guilders, 25 June 1761 - 103,950 & 52,950 guilders, 30 August 1761 - 90,000 guilders, 4 November 1761 - 30,000 guilders, 17 January 1762 - 100,000 guilders, 24 July 1762 - 21,000 guilders, AO/1/1507/218, a total of 471,400 guilders, or £43,851/3/3, calculating £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers. Sums of £16,182/11/1 $\frac{1}{4}$, received from the Hanoverian Chancery of War as a reimbursement of the subsistence of patients maintained in the hospitals, and 39,519 guilders 14 doits, for sales of hospital stores and provisions, are not included in these calculations as they were not received before the service came to an end. Ibid. Cockburn to Martin, 25 March 1763, T/1/427 f.80.

3 Bishop accounted for expenditure as follows; January - November 1761 - £38,551/1/11 $\frac{1}{2}$, December 1761 - January 1762 - £3,630/0/7 $\frac{1}{4}$, February - December 1762 - £14,570/16/11, 1763 - £3,171/5/11 $\frac{1}{2}$, a total of £59,923/5/5 $\frac{1}{4}$, AO/1/1507/218. The real amount involved was in fact more than this, as a proportion of two sums of £9,713/14/5 and £853/9/4, which are not assigned to a specific period, also belonged to the years in question.

4 His Serene Highness Prince Ferdinand.

cou'd give no more than Six mariengss. ¹ pr. man pr. day to carry them thro' to Perkelsheim & considering the country they must march thro' where allmost all necessaries of life have been consumed & are wanting, I fear those poor creatures will have the misfortune of having Famine addd. to their sufferings".²

It was such sorry conditions which led Halsey on this occasion, as some months previously, to ignore strict accounting propriety and grant certificates for advances of money to the hospitals, commenting that it was ridiculous to give the certificate before the money was paid, but that it was the only way to relieve the misery involved.³ By such means the additional sufferings of the sick and wounded might be occasionally and partially alleviated, but these palliatives were scarcely an effective remedy for the disease.

While it helped the patients, Halsey's conduct ran the risk of compromising British financial interests,⁴ which must also have suffered from inflationary tendencies, induced by the calculation that payment of accounts might well be significantly delayed. A more particular example of the harmful effects of cash shortages comes from the end of the war, when because of lack of money to pay arrears of salary to the extraordinary hospital employees and to settle the other outstanding debts of his office, Bishop on leaving Germany allowed the hospital establishments to remain in existence for some months at considerable and

1 Mariengroschen.

2 F. Halsey to Peirson, 26 March 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031.

3 F. Halsey to Colonel de Lachevallerie, 3 November 1760, *ibid.* 15030.

4 It was for a similar action that he was dismissed in 1762, see above pp.133 - 134.

unnecessary expense.¹ His reasons were firstly, the hardship which would be caused to employees if they were discharged without payment for their services,² and secondly, the fear, which he afterwards used in justification of a refusal to return to Germany, that had he wound up the business and closed his office an angry horde of creditors might have attempted to arrest him for debt and seize his papers.³ As Bishop pointed out, such difficulties would not have arisen had the German authorities been willing to reimburse the considerable sums of money which they had been paid for the subsistence of men who had in fact been maintained in the hospitals, but they insisted that they could not make this adjustment until their other outstanding financial claims on Britain were settled.⁴ Eventually, the Hanoverians were persuaded to pay the salaries of employees who had worked in their hospitals, although this left the others in 'a distressed Situation',⁵ while Bishop's clerk was presumably able to get his papers safely to England on payment of some £300 demanded for office expenses.⁶ The Treasury felt that their commissary had acted laxly in this matter by allowing hospital expenditure to continue when it was no longer necessary, and strictly speaking its view was justified, but at the same time the moral obligation and fears which governed Bishop's behaviour are understandable, and had the necessary cash been

1 Bishop to Cockburn, 19 March 1763, T/1/425 f.149. T/29/35 f.118, 6 July 1763.

2 Bishop to J. Dyson, 22 July 1763, T/1/424 f.199.

3 T/29/35 f.128, 22 July 1763.

4 Bishop to Cockburn, 19 March 1763, T/1/425 f.149. Cockburn to Martin, 25 March 1763, T/1/427 f.80.

5 Bishop to Dyson, 22 July 1763, T/1/424 f.199.

6 Bishop to C. Jenkinson, 27 August 1763, T/1/425 f.145. There is no report of any attempt to seize the papers.

available he would not have found himself in such a problematic situation.

In all the ramifications of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, it is evident that the failure to bring the accounts of the foreign hospitals to a prompt and regular settlement in the course of the war was a root cause of the chronic shortages of cash which afflicted the service. For this the Hessian authorities must bear a large measure of responsibility because of their refusal to present their accounts in an acceptable form, and it is possible that the Hanoverians were also partly to blame for failing to send in punctually full details of all expenses, although the geographical dispersion of the hospitals may have made this difficult to achieve. And yet this is only one side of the coin, for at the same time shortages of cash were a basic reason for the failure to settle accounts which had been properly presented,¹ while this in turn had the effect of preventing an accurate assessment of monthly expenses, on the basis of which information adequate sums of money could be made available. Thus debts were not paid and the full extent of Britain's financial liability for the service remained an unknown quantity. In this situation of actuarial inefficiency the inherent tendency to regard hospital expenditure as of secondary importance, and to channel the always inadequate supplies of cash towards what were considered more vital services could only be reinforced.

The end of hostilities marked only the beginning of a

¹ Bishop to Granby, 14 May 1760, T/64/97 f.3.

lengthy and arduous process to adjust and settle the foreign hospital accounts. Debts amounting to 108,653 dollars were owed to the Hanoverian authorities,¹ who in turn owed Britain a similar sum for the subsistence of their troops in hospital.² The Hessians for their part claimed to have expended no less than 476,620 dollars on their hospitals, of which they demanded reimbursement and from which an unknown sum had to be deducted for the subsistence of their men.³ On top of all this 78,120 dollars was owed to various claimants for services involving the transport of patients, stores and equipment.⁴ In January 1764 the Treasury directed Bishop to proceed to a speedy casting up of his accounts and to deliver them from time to time to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands,⁵ and at some time in the course of that year he must have complied with these orders, although in March 1765 the Commissioners reported that they were unable to undertake an examination and statement of the accounts because Bishop had acted as contractor, certifying commissary and paymaster, so that he alone could be the proper judge of his financial administration.⁶ In arguing thus the Commissioners seem to have somewhat overstated the case, for although the fact that Bishop had acted in a triple capacity made it impossible to subject his accounts to the usual checks and verifications, there was in fact no reason why they

1 Estimate of the Debts Due on Account of the Foreign Hospitals, 16 July 1766, T/1/452 f.298.

2 Bishop to Cockburn, 19 March 1763, T/1/425 f.149.

3 Memorandum for Bradshaw, July 1768, SP/81/158/3.

4 T/1/452 f.298.

5 T/29/35 ff.283 - 284, 30 January 1764.

6 State of Business in the German Office, May 1765, Add. MSS. 38204 f. 249.

could not have reviewed the appropriateness of their form, the accuracy of their calculations and the validity of their vouchers, and as a result of these investigations produced an interim report. Instead, in recommending that Bishop be called to account before the Auditors of the Imprests for money advanced to him, and claiming that a by-product of this process would be a clarification of the accounts and a revelation of outstanding claims, the Commissioners seem to have been at least partially concerned to unload a difficult and tedious problem on to someone else's shoulders, a move which was to have most unfortunate consequences. For in accepting these recommendations, the Treasury almost inevitably postponed any clarification and settlement of the accounts to the Greek Calends by submitting them to the course of the Exchequer, which pursued its inexorable ways oblivious of time. On the contrary, the office of the Commissioners worked more speedily, not only because of the limited nature of its tasks but because its employees were experts and specialists in matters concerning army supply in Germany. This consideration was soon shown to be of some significance when the Auditors of the Imprests demanded the translation of the vouchers in German which accompanied the accounts, so necessitating the employment of a notary and causing further delays when Bishop objected that the total cost of the work would be exorbitant.¹ Eventually the Treasury ordered him to employ one of the clerks of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands,² clearly the most sensible arrangement and one that should have been adopted in the first place. Further difficulties arose almost immediately, for no sooner had the Auditors begun their examination than they found large quan-

1 S. Schomberg to Bishop, 26 February 1766, T/1/450 f.382. Memorial of Bishop, 28 May 1766, *ibid.* f.383.

2 Grey Cooper to Bishop, 3 July 1766, T/27/29 f.339.

titles of unpaid accounts, which they claimed they had no authority to consider,¹ so effectively destroying the hope that Bishop's examination before the Exchequer would clarify the general state of his accounts. Faced with this dilemma Bishop suggested that it would be best to report the state of his accounts to the Treasury, and he was ordered to proceed on this basis.² More than three years had now passed since the winding up of the hospitals in Germany and no progress at all had been made towards a settlement. Already in 1765 the Treasury had said that it was of great importance to the public interest to bring the account to a speedy conclusion, and by stating its determination to admit of no further delay 'under any Pretence whatsoever' ³ had suggested that matters had not been undertaken with the maximum efficiency. Certainly it should have been possible to have recognized much earlier the precise nature and form of the accounts, in order to decide the most appropriate and effective way of dealing with them.

It was perhaps inevitable that Bishop's actual examination and statement of his accounts would be a protracted affair, but few can have envisaged that it would take no less than eleven years. The delay was occasioned largely by the intrinsic difficulties of the Hessian hospital accounts, which had not been reviewed for any part of Bishop's four-year administration and involved an examination of the detailed reports of the directors of the separate branches of the service.⁴

1 Memorial of Bishop, 30 September 1766, T/1/445 f.517.

2 T/29/38 f.142, 2 October 1766.

3 T/29/37 ff.7 - 8, 5 June 1765.

4 Memorandum for Bradshaw, July 1768, SP/81/158/3.

The Treasury for its part, despite its avowed intention to brook no delay, was not prepared to accept these accounts in a partial or inadequate form, and even after nine years of effort in 1775 went as far as to order a complete revision of all the reports presented by Bishop, so that a fuller and more accurate state of the situation could be drawn up.¹ Thus it was not until March 1777 that the accounts were finally accepted by the Board, which in July of that year authorized payment of the balance of £41,820/14/5 which appeared due to various claimants.²

As a result of these prolonged labours by Bishop a number of unjustified or excessive demands were eliminated from the foreign hospital accounts,³ although this was no more than the minimum expected of any accountant, and the inordinate time taken lessens the enthusiasm for the achievement. Moreover, the final report showed a number of signs of settlements effected on the basis of probability rather than of positive proof. For example, in stating the Hessian accounts Bishop specifically admitted that he had often been obliged to accept figures for the numbers of sick and wounded maintained in hospital as given in the reports of the individual directors without checking them, although he

1 T/29/44 f.308, 7 July 1775. Two years previously Bishop's accounts had again been submitted to the Auditors of the Imprests for their opinion, and it was as a result of their report, and a long series of interviews with all concerned, that the orders for a general review were issued. T/29/43 f.280, 28 January 1774, *ibid.* f.412, 23 June 1774, T/29/44 f.16, 22 July 1774, *ibid.* f.79, 15 November 1774, *ibid.* f.148, 17 February 1775, *ibid.* f.298, 5 July 1775.

2 T/52/109 f.315, 30 July 1777.

3 Among the demands rejected as unjustified were claims for the upkeep of prisoners-of-war, *ibid.* ff.319 & 324, for losses of and damage to property, such as boats and houses, used by the hospitals, *ibid.* f.327, and for items which should have been at the expense of the medical officers, *ibid.* f.323.

affirmed that when he had been able to do this he had found no discrepancies.¹ In addition, the acceptance of some accounts simply because payment had been strongly solicited by a high-ranking military officer was irregular, especially in one case where Bishop went as far as to say that he would have rejected the demand had it not been earnestly recommended by the Duke of Brunswick himself.² Thus there were aspects of the final settlement, which were based on grounds other than those of Britain's strict liability, and others which were upheld either without proof or at best with evidence which was purely circumstantial.³ Such a denouement was far from satisfactory, but by 1777 it was the only way to bring an otherwise interminable affair to any sort of conclusion.

1 Ibid. f.318. It would seem that the word 'mentioned' in the phrase 'the numbers of sick actually mentioned in the hospitals' should read 'maintained'.

2 Ibid. ff.319 - 320 & 322. The account recommended by the Duke was for the expenses of a separate hospital established at Boden Verden, which Bishop felt had been superfluous as there were existing hospitals in the neighbourhood.

3 That a very considerable proportion of these accounts lacked normal justifications and proofs is suggested by the fact that, when in July 1774 Bishop presented the Treasury with a list of demands against which there were no objections or doubts, they amounted to only £3,432/18/4, T/29/44 f.26, 28 July 1774, whereas his final report recommended payment of over twelve times that sum.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

It has been observed that 'war is always conducted in a muddle as a contest between rival systems of inefficiency',¹ a premise which does not seem to lack ready and abundant supporting evidence from all periods in the history of every country. Thus much historical writing on military subjects is composed of gloomy catalogues of failures, leading directly or indirectly to death, injury, suffering, hardship, material destruction and waste of resources, frequently with few positive results to show for it, and so containing all the elements of a large-scale tragedy. Moreover, as there is often a tendency to seek explanations for this sorry state of affairs in the realm of human inadequacy, error and incompetence, sometimes of the most grotesque sort, war comes to assume more the characteristics of a tragicomedy, in which the gods apparently mock the follies of feeble men. Such analyses accord well with modern conceptions of the futility and obscenity of war and the belief that man is, or should be, master of his own destiny, but while containing a measure of truth they are nevertheless partial. Military affairs and wars have rarely been an unmitigated record of disaster, and the historian's vision is of necessity clouded and his judgment biased if he approaches his task only looking for or highlighting those examples which suit his preconceptions, and ignoring or failing to give due recognition to the elements and examples of success and achievement which are to be found. Furthermore, any explanation of military failure

1 P. Addison, New Statesman, 2 September 1977, p.311.

which does no more than identify human mistakes and inadequacies must be regarded as superficial, satisfying a primordial need to find a scapegoat, but hardly providing an historical explanation of any depth and refinement. Finally, an adequate analysis of the affairs of armies and the events of war must always take proper account of the severe and often unique difficulties of military administration in the field, where conditions are sometimes such as to make the attainment of any normal degree of efficiency impossible, as well as of the obstacles presented by established and traditional bureaucratic forms on the one hand, and political and financial realities on the other.

In examining the detailed work of the Treasury and its commissaries in supplying non-military goods and services to the Combined Army in Germany during the Seven Years War, it has been assumed that the twin tests of the efficacy of such operations are whether the arrangements made are such as to encourage the optimum provision of essentials, and the extent to which such provision is achieved with the greatest possible measure of economy. The two are not necessarily contradictory, for the latter, as well as upholding the financial interests of suppliers, also safeguards the best interests of consumers, who must suffer directly if the limited sums of money available are wasted, and indirectly if spendthrift policies exacerbate the inflationary tendencies always inherent in a war situation. This study has concentrated on four aspects of such matters for special consideration, in the first of which, the formulation of general policies, British administrators enjoyed a fair measure of success. There is little if any evidence of a reluctance to

provide adequate quantities of provisions and levels of service, or to introduce and maintain appropriate qualities and standards, as a consequence of that short-term and short-sighted quest for economy which can be so detrimental to effective administration. Moreover, in the experiments dispensing with the services of private contractors for the provision of bread and train services, the Treasury and some of its commissaries made attempts to undertake supply by means of a more closely controlled and economical system of public ownership and management, not found in the British army because of the prevalence of anti-military prejudice. Such developments, while not entirely the result of the positive initiative of British administrators and not adhered to with consistency throughout the war, none the less represent significant and forward-looking experiments with new methods of army supply. On the other hand, the failure to extend Britain's control over all aspects of policy formulation and the resultant freedom of action allowed to German civilian officials and military officers, a situation not calculated to encourage maximum efficiency and minimum costs, was much less satisfactory, while in these and other essential matters the Treasury sometimes showed an unhealthy inclination to provide little direction, or to procrastinate when faced with awkward and difficult problems, the prompt resolution of which would have avoided future troubles and complexities.

In connection with the detailed arrangements for supply, the Board and its employees made a fundamentally unsatisfactory start in 1757 - 1758, characterized by vague and uneconomical agreements, unnecessary delay and considerable confusion, while in 1762 the Treasury made

a dramatic intervention in forage supply arrangements, which was badly misjudged and devoid of any beneficial effects. After 1758, however, contracts and agreements as a whole were promptly made and drafted with care and precision, while any remnants of slackness which still remained were eradicated by the work of the department of control in 1762. Examples of what may be justly considered to be artificially inflated prices are to be found in all areas of supply in all periods, while the basis on which compensation was awarded to train contractors appears to have been unnecessarily generous. But making allowances for these factors and for the example of the hospital services, the details of much of whose supply either remained outside the direct control of the responsible commissary or was uneconomically managed by him, the evidence does not warrant the general conclusion that British officials profligately wasted their country's resources, or that suppliers were permitted to wage a continuous and successful campaign of extortion, both of which premises figured prominently in the battery of opposition arguments against government foreign policy.

Although the execution of these general policies and detailed arrangements was far from totally unsuccessful and inefficient before the final period of the war, the practical details of implementation received inadequate emphasis and were left unnecessarily to chance before that time. It was only with the establishment of the department of control that a formal and effective framework of supervision was brought into existence, and even then, as in most other instances, the hospital services remained outside the main stream of developments.

It was thus only very late in the day that it proved possible to overturn the assumption that matters of control were of secondary or even peripheral importance, to whose value lip-service might be paid, but which were top of the list of sacrifices if staff shortages and pressure of work demanded an economy of effort. All parties must share the blame for this mistaken under-emphasis; many commissaries for not seeing beyond the limited point of view that the extra effort required would make their tasks more difficult and complex, although it would in fact have improved the efficiency of supply and saved money, and the Treasury for failing to realize or refusing to recognize before 1762 that the efficiency of its work in Germany was being badly compromised by slackness in execution. And yet the fact that important and far-reaching reforms were introduced at the end of the war, when a fatalistic resignation that it was too late to make any significant or beneficial improvement might have been expected in an age still associated with the principles of 'quieta non movere', is evidence of a genuine commitment to the upholding of high standards, however imperfectly the theory was sometimes translated into practice.

Similar conclusions apply in the sphere of records and accounts, where it is difficult not to feel considerable ill-ease at the way in which incomplete statistical information and vast arrears characterized so many branches of supply until almost the end of the war. Ignorance of the exact state and levels of provisions and services and a steadily growing backlog of accounts were certainly not solid foundations on which to build an efficient administrative system, and while

shortages of both staff and cash were influential in bringing about this state of affairs, some of those involved placed too much reliance on the belief that everything could be safely postponed to a final day of reckoning and judgment at the end of hostilities. But that this view was not universally held is again proved by the creation and work of the department of control, which did a great deal to correct the worst abuses. Much effective work was also done by the Commissioners of Enquiry, despite the fact that their judgments tended to lack balance, while it is difficult not to be impressed by the achievements of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands. Presented with a truly daunting task, they tackled it with determination, perseverance and ingenuity, and in nearly six hundred reports, issued in a relatively short space of time, settled the outstanding accounts with justice and as much accuracy as was humanly possible, as a result of which demands amounting to over £6,600,000 were reduced to less than £1,300,000.¹ Of course the work should never have been necessary, but that does not detract from the actual achievement of Pownall, Cornwall and Cuthbert.

Some of the inadequacies noted above would not have arisen or become so serious had the administrative structure which was created to execute Britain's responsibilities been more perfectly formed. Failures to appoint the necessary numbers of staff to the commissariat at an early date, to assign them specialized functions, to endow super-

¹ T/29/37 ff.59 - 60, 5 July 1765. Their work continued until May 1766 and the final totals were somewhat larger than these figures.

ior officials with the powers essential for carrying out their tasks and to pay inferior employees more than a pittance of a wage were all factors which compromised efficiency. And yet here again improvements were made, albeit slowly, as the war progressed, so that by 1762 there existed a well-staffed and coherently organized body, possessing powers of independent action and justifying for the first time the title of 'commissariat'. In this process of evolution it took the Treasury some time to grasp the importance of some basic lessons, and to appreciate that the true interests of both the Army and Britain lay in such developments, but if the Board was a slow learner it was nevertheless ultimately receptive to the need for change and improvement. Failures were also sometimes attributable to personal inadequacies among those who staffed the commissariat, and examples of lack of understanding, effort, attention to detail and judgment are all to be found, although much less frequently than is often imagined. The commissaries as a class do not merit that tarnished reputation for scandalous incompetence and dishonesty, which they enjoyed with soldiers and the general public at the time, and which has on the whole continued to be accepted by historians. In men such as Hunter and Pownall the commissariat possessed administrators, who came from a background of experience and success in the public service and brought to their tasks much ability, perspicacity and determination. If therefore there are reasons to see a significant development in the emergence of the commissariat as an institution and to trace the presence of professional standards and performance on the part of at least some of those who staffed it, the ultimate tragedy of the story is that the

new structure was unceremoniously demolished at the end of the war and its employees dispersed to various other occupations. Through its continued existence the commissariat could have improved the understanding of the basic problems and the practical difficulties of army supply, and nurtured on a corporate basis the standards of professional competence to which many of its members aspired. Instead, two decades later in the American War of Independence, a conflict in which the logistical problems were far more intractable, many of the lessons had to be relearned, and this time the accompanying experience was a far more bitter one.

Much recent research has convincingly demonstrated that the administrative institutions of the eighteenth century were often sadly lacking in vitality and efficiency. Conservative in outlook, clinging to traditional forms and seeking to maintain and preserve established practices as their principle of action, or rather inaction, they were inevitably somewhat lethargic in operation and slow to appreciate and respond to the need for change and reform. It has not been the purpose of this study to attempt to prove that the operations of the Treasury and the commissariat do not fit into this pattern, for while it has been at pains to point out that the record was by no means devoid of success, it has also shown the presence of some of the administrative inadequacies typical of the age. Yet to be able to see these failures in their true context and to start to provide some explanation of why they occurred, it is essential to give due recognition to the preconceptions and concerns, which governed the thinking of British administrators and influenced

their decisions and actions, and equally to the severe practical difficulties and obstacles, which were involved in the actual task of supplying the Combined Army in Germany. Thus it was hard for the Treasury to escape from the restrictions imposed by an age in which acute suspicions of armies and all things military and antagonism to placemen were dominant political themes. In addition, the Board was inevitably torn between its duties and obligations as the upholder of British interests and the guardian of the public purse, and the need to do nothing to upset the military situation in Germany, on which the continued resistance of Frederick the Great and consequently the whole global strategy of the war depended. Finally, it found itself charged with the maintenance of a large multi-national army, whose Commander-in-Chief was a foreigner and not a servant of the British Crown, campaigning in a country, where despite the Hanoverian connection, British administrators had no real authority and influence, and with which communications provided not a few obstacles. Some of these difficulties affected the work of the commissariat, which also had to face all the problems associated with supplying an army which sometimes campaigned from one end of the year to the other, whose troops rarely acted as a single unit and were frequently engaged in rapid diversionary manoeuvres, operating in an area where agricultural resources were not limitless, the transport network somewhat rudimentary and which was characterized by a notorious political and administrative fragmentation. Nor should it be forgotten that the commissariat's employees had to work under conditions of great physical and mental stress and strain, deriving from the pressures, hardships and dangers involved

in supplying an army in the field, and from which their counterparts in civilian spheres, comfortably ensconced behind their desks, were happily exempt. With all these factors in mind, one is tempted to apply Johnson's dictum that 'it is not done well, but you are surprised to find it done at all' to the supply of the Combined Army. In this way the imperfect record of British administrators can be seen in a truer perspective, which enables due credit to be given to the successful aspects of their work and due recognition to the elements of vitality which it contained.

APPENDICES

Appendix ISuperior Commissariat Officers ¹

- 1) AMHERST, Colonel Jeffrey, 1717 - 1797.²

Appointed to have the care and inspection of providing and contracting for bread, bread wagons, forage, firing and straw for the Hessians @ £3 per day, 22 February 1757³ - 4 January 1758.⁴

- 2) AMMON, Councillor. (Prussian official)

Acted as a commissary to the army stationed at Münster in 1761.⁵

- 3) ARNOLD, Charles.

Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761⁶ - 12 August 1763.⁷

- 4) BILGEN, Casimir. (Prussian)⁸

Inspector and controller of the great foreign artillery train @ £1 per day, February 1759⁹ - late 1762.¹⁰

1 This list is composed of commissaries with salaries of at least £1 per day and German officials who held commissariat positions of responsibility. It does not include the names of the three British Commanders-in-Chief, the Duke of Marlborough, Lord George Sackville and the Marquis of Granby, who exercised commissariat functions by virtue of their military office.

2 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.I, p.357. The military ranks given are the most senior held by the individual during his period of service in the commissariat.

3 Warrant appointing Colonel Amherst, 22 February 1757, T/1/375 No.23, ff.51 - 52. Amherst to Treasury, 2 March 1758, T/1/384 No.32.

4 The date of his successor's instructions, Treasury to R. Boyd, 4 January 1758, T/1/388 No.5.

5 Pro Memoria and Rapport, Recd. 29 September 1761, Add. MSS. 33048 ff.149 - 150.

6 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.

7 T/52/55 ff.283 - 284, 3 November 1763.

8 Add. MSS. 33048 f.150.

9 T.O. Hunter to (S. Martin), 11 February 1759, T/64/96 f.26. An Account of Offices under the Superintendent of the Combined Army in Germany, 1759, T/1/397 f.66.

10 G. Howard to (Treasury), 10 August 1762, T/1/417 f.486. Howard said that it was not prudent to dismiss Bilgen until his accounts had been settled.

5) BISHOP, Thomas.

Director of fixed and flying hospitals to the foreign troops @ £1 per day, 1 May 1759¹ - 7 July 1763.²

6) BLAKENEY, Edward, 1716 - 1799.³

Commissary general @ £3 per day, 9 June 1760⁴ - 21 April 1763.⁵

7) BOYD, Colonel Robert, 1710 - 1794.⁶

Commissary to supply the Hessians with bread, bread wagons, forage, firing and straw @ £3 per day,⁷ 4 January 1758⁸ - 28 December 1758.⁹ Commissary of musters to the Hessian troops @ £3 per day, March 1759¹⁰ - 25 December 1762.¹¹

8) BOYVE, Jerome. (Swiss)¹²

Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £2 per day, April 1762¹³ - 13 August 1763.¹⁴ First clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands @ 10/0d - 12/6d per day,¹⁵ 18 October

1 T/1/397 f.66. Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218.

2 T/52/55 f.218, 12 September 1763.

3 Burke's Irish Family Records. (1976) p.124.

4 T/52/50 f.478, 9 June 1760.

5 T/52/55 f.341, 22 December 1763.

6 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army (1763) p.8. The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.II, p. 1,007.

7 J. West to Boyd, 12 May 1758, T/27/27 f.334.

8 Treasury to Boyd, 4 January 1758, T/1/388 No.5.

9 The date of his successor's appointment, T/52/49 ff.312 - 314, 28 December 1758.

10 T/29/33 f.160, 21 March 1759.

11 T/52/55 f.132, 5 July 1763.

12 Memorial of J. Boyve, 30 September 1765, T/1/444 f.222.

13 Ibid. T/29/34 f.284, 18 May 1762.

14 T/52/55 f.341, 22 December 1763.

15 T/29/35 f.185, 10 October 1763. T/29/36 f.145, 20 November 1764.

1763¹ - February 1766.²

9) BROMFIELD, Charles.

Deputy commissary in the office of control³ @ £2 per day, 24 May 1762⁴ - 4 August 1763.⁵

10) BROWNE, Lieutenant-Colonel James.⁶

Commissary for settling the expenses of maintaining prisoners of war, March 1760⁷ - 22 November 1763.⁸

11) CLARK, Andrew.

Deputy commissary of supply @ £2 per day, 1 August 1762 - 11 December 1764.⁹

12) COCKBURN, Sir James, 1729 - 1804.¹⁰

Commissary of control and commissary general @ £3 per day, May/June 1760.¹¹ Commissary general of supplies @ £5 per day, 25 March 1762¹² - 23 August 1763.¹³

1 The salaries of the secretary of the Commissioners for Examining German Demands and presumably their other clerical officers were calculated from this date, T/52/55 f.464, 7 May 1764. T/29/35 ff.185 - 186, 10 October 1763.

2 His appointment must have been terminated when he suddenly left the country at this time, Boyve to Grey Cooper, 17 February 1766, T/1/451 ff.292 - 293.

3 Letter of T. Pownall, 24 June 1763, Add. MSS. 38335 f.111.

4 T/52/53 ff.466 - 467, 1 June 1762.

5 T/52/55 f.331, 16 December 1763.

6 Ibid. f.369, 16 January 1764.

7 T/29/33 f.307, 26 March 1760.

8 T/52/55 f.369, 16 January 1764.

9 Declared Account of A. Clark, 3 June 1767, AO/1/519/224. He was granted an extension of salary for attending the Commissioners for Examining German Demands, and for making up and translating the vouchers of his accounts.

10 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Eds., The History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1754 - 1790, (1964) Vol.II, p.229.

11 T/52/50 f.479, 2 May 1760. R. Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/1/405 f.61.

12 T/52/53 f.350, 7 April 1762.

13 T/52/55 f.282, 3 November 1763.

13) COLLINS or COLLINGS, Leonard.

Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1 per day, mid-1762¹ - c. June 1763.²

14) COLSWORTHY, John Ollivant.

Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 21 July 1762³ - 27 June 1763.⁴

15) COSNE, Colonel Ruvigny de.⁵

Commissary for settling the claims of the Duke of Brunswick and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel @ £3 per day, 31 July 1762⁶ - 23 July 1763.⁷

16) CRAWFORD or CRAUFURD, John.

Acted as a book-keeper in 1759⁸ and probably continued to serve in this capacity until becoming deputy commissary in the office of control @ £2 per day, mid-1762⁹ - 29 June 1763.¹⁰

17) CUTHBERT, David, d. 1768.¹¹

Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 9 May 1761¹² - 12 August 1763.¹³ Acted as a Commissioner of Enquiry from late 1761 onwards.¹⁴

1 State of the Office of Control, 1762, T/1/417 f.351. This document was sent to the Treasury on 16 July 1762, T/1/420 f.105, and describes appointments made by Pownall after he became director of the office of control in March 1762.

2 Add. MSS. 38335 f.113.

3 T/52/54 ff.112 - 113, 21 July 1762.

4 T/52/55 f.133, 5 July 1763.

5 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army (1763) p.7.

6 T/52/54 f.350, 10 January 1763.

7 T/52/55 f.290, 14 November 1763.

8 T/1/397 f.66.

9 T/1/417 f.351.

10 T/52/55 f.399, 22 February 1764.

11 Sir W. Musgrave, Obituary Prior to 1800, 6 Vols. (1899 - 1901) Vol.II, p.127.

12 T/52/52 f.361, 20 June 1761.

13 T/52/55 f.284, 3 November 1763.

14 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.70.

Commissioner for Examining German Demands @ £2 per day,¹ 21 September 1763² - 2 May 1766.³

18) DURAND, Major-General James.⁴

Commissary to muster the King's troops in Germany @ £3 per day, April 1758⁵ - August 1760.⁶

19) DYER, John or Samuel.⁷

Deputy commissary in the office of control⁸ @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761⁹ - 4 August 1763.¹⁰

20) ELLIOT(T), William Nassau.

Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761¹¹ - March/April 1762.¹²

21) FABER, Councillor Philip Ernst. (German)¹³

Director of the foreign bakery,¹⁴ October 1759¹⁵ - 1763.¹⁶

1 T/52/56 f.213, 22 October 1764.

2 T/52/55 f.463, 7 May 1764.

3 T/52/58 f.55, 15 July 1766.

4 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1761) p.4.

5 T/29/33 ff.39 - 40, 19 April 1758.

6 T/52/51 f.181, 22 September 1760. Earl of Holderness to Peirson & Boyd, 15 August 1760, SP/87/30 f.155.

7 A memorial of Samuel Dyer, 14 November 1763, T/1/428 f.70, states that he was appointed a deputy commissary in May 1761, but this appears in the Treasury warrant book as John Dyer, T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761, until 1 July 1762 when it changes to Samuel Dyer, T/52/56 f.198, 28 September 1764. As no reference has been found to both names serving at the same time it is assumed that they are one and the same person.

8 Add. MSS. 38335 f.111.

9 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.

10 T/52/56 f.198, 28 September 1764.

11 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.

12 Martin to W.N. Elliot, 30 March 1762, T/27/28 f.273.

13 Add. MSS. 33048 f.150.

14 No positive information on his salary has been found, but it is unlikely that he was paid less than Bilgen.

15 Instructions for Hatton (1759) Add. MSS. 32905 f.148.

16 Add. MSS. 38335 f.109.

- 22) FAWCETT or FAUCITT, Lieutenant-Colonel William,¹ 1728 - 1804.²
Commissary @ £3 per day, 25 March 1762.³ Commissary for collecting together, depositing and keeping in safe custody at Hanover all the vouchers on which commissaries in Germany granted certificates for money @ £5 per day, 29 April 1763⁴ - 18 June 1766.⁵
- 23) FRASER, William, d. 1802.⁶
Deputy commissary @ £3 per day, 9 May 1761⁷ - 11 April 1763.⁸
- 24) FUHR, Johann Philip. (German)⁹
Accountant @ £1 per day, 1759 - 1760.¹⁰ In 1761 he acted as assessor to the Commissioners of Enquiry,¹¹ and in 1762 was paid £3 per day.¹²
- 25) GUNN, Cornet William.¹³
Deputy commissary @ £1 per day from August 1762.¹⁴ Date of termination of employment unknown.

- 1 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1761) p.11.
- 2 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.VI, p.1,125.
- 3 T/52/53 f.372, 28 April 1762.
- 4 T/52/55 ff.33 - 34, 29 April 1763.
- 5 T/52/57 f.506, 24 June 1766.
- 6 J.C. Sainty, Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Vol.II, Officials of the Secretaries of State, 1660 - 1782. (1973) p.79.
- 7 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
- 8 T/52/55 f.1, 29 June 1763.
- 9 Fuhr was described as a German who had lived for many years in England, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.5.
- 10 T/1/397 f.66. Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/1/405 f.91.
- 11 Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.119.
- 12 Martin to Howard, 8 July 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/4/12.
- 13 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1763) p.30.
- 14 Howard to Treasury, 15 August 1762, T/1/417 f.493.

- 26) HALSEY, Frederick, c. 1727 - 1762.¹
 Commissary of accounts @ £3 per day, 2 May 1760² - March 1762.³
- 27) HALSEY, Thomas, ?1731 - 1788.⁴
 Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 2 May 1760⁵ - October/November 1762.⁶
- 28) HATTON, Michael, c. 1714 - 1776.⁷
 Commissary, salary unknown, 1 July 1758.⁸ Commissary @ £3 per day, 28 March 1759.⁹ Commissary general @ £5 per day, 2 May 1760¹⁰ - April 1762.¹¹
- 29) HIGGINS or HIGGONS, Thomas.
 Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761¹² - 18 June 1763.¹³
 Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands @ 7/6d - 10/0d per day, February 1764¹⁴ - 2 May 1766.¹⁵

- 1 J. Foster, Alumni Oxonienses: the Members of the University of Oxford, 1715 - 1886. (1888) Vol.II, p.591.
- 2 T/52/50 f.480, 2 May 1760.
- 3 T/29/34 f.235, 2 March 1762.
- 4 Namier & Brooke, Eds., op. cit. Vol.II, p.568.
- 5 T/52/50 f.479, 2 May 1760.
- 6 Treasury to Howard, 22 October 1762, T/1/417 f.123.
- 7 Duke of Newcastle to Earl of Hardwicke, 1 May 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.196. Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. XLVI, 1776, p.386. There is no conclusive proof that the Michael Hatton who died in 1776 was the commissary.
- 8 Accounts of M. Hatton, 1758 - 1760, Orlebar MSS. OR/1869.
- 9 T/52/50 ff.369 - 370, 12 February 1760.
- 10 Ibid. f.477, 2 May 1760.
- 11 State of the Commissariat, Add. MSS. 38335 f.177.
- 12 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
- 13 T/52/54 f.395, 28 July 1763.
- 14 T/29/35 f.313, 23 February 1764. T/29/36 f.145, 20 November 1764.
- 15 T/52/58 ff.54 - 55, 15 July 1766.

- 30) HOWARD, Lieutenant-General George,¹ 1718 - 1796.²
 Superintendent of commissaries @ £10 per day, 25 March 1762 - 26 February 1763.³
- 31) HULTON, Henry, d. 1790.⁴
 Commissary @ £3 per day, 11 June 1761⁵ - 12 August 1763.⁶ Acted as a Commissioner of Enquiry from late 1761 onwards.⁷
- 32) HUNTER, Thomas Orby, c. 1716 - 1769.⁸
 Superintendent or director of forage, provisions, necessaries and extraordinaries @ £10 per day, 28 December 1758⁹ - 15 April 1760.¹⁰
- 33) JOHNSTON, Colonel James.¹¹
 Commissary for mustering the foreign troops in the army in Germany @ £3 per day, 1 May 1761¹² - 25 December 1762.¹³
- 34) KYD, Robert, d. 1793.¹⁴
 Deputy commissary @ £1/5/0 per day. Date of appointment unknown - 4 August 1763.¹⁵

- 1 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1763) p.4.
- 2 Namier & Brooke, Eds., op. cit. Vol.II, p.645.
- 3 T/52/55 f.11, 12 April 1763.
- 4 Musgrave, op. cit. Vol.III, p.275.
- 5 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.
- 6 T/52/55 f.284, 3 November 1763.
- 7 T/29/34 f.197, 1 December 1761.
- 8 Namier & Brooke, Eds., op. cit. Vol.II, p.656.
- 9 T/52/49 ff.312 - 314, 28 December 1758.
- 10 T/52/51 f.490, 4 March 1761.
- 11 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1763) p.6.
- 12 T/52/53 f.269, 8 March 1762.
- 13 T/52/55 f.104, 29 June 1763.
- 14 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XI, p.348.
- 15 T/52/55 f.355, 9 January 1764.

35) LEACH, Joseph.

Deputy commissary in the office of control ¹ @ £2 per day, 16 June 1762 ² - c. June 1763. ³ Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands @ 7/6d - 10/0d per day, ⁴ 18 October 1763 ⁵ - 2 May 1766. ⁶

36) LEGH, Peter

Commissary in the office of control ⁷ @ £3 per day, 25 March 1762 ⁸ - 19 September 1763. ⁹

37) LEVETT, John.

Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 9 May 1761 ¹⁰ - 4 August 1763. ¹¹

38) MASON, Charles.

Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, 9 May 1761. ¹² Commissary @ £3 per day, 24 March 1762 - 23 March 1763. ¹³

39) von MASSOW, President of the Chamber of War of Minden. (Prussian official) ¹⁴

1 Add. MSS. 38335 f.113.

2 T/52/54 f.19, 16 June 1762.

3 Add. MSS. 38335 f.113.

4 T/29/35 f.185, 10 October 1763. T/29/36 f.145, 20 November 1764.

5 See above p.350, n.1.

6 T/52/58 ff.54 - 55, 15 July 1766.

7 Add. MSS. 38335 f.111.

8 T/52/53 ff.391 - 392, 7 May 1762.

9 T/52/55 f.293, 25 November 1763.

10 T/52/52 f.361, 20 June 1761.

11 T/52/55 f.422, 23 March 1764.

12 T/52/52 f.325, 11 June 1761.

13 T/29/35 f.6, 12 November 1762. T/52/55 f.67, 7 June 1763.

14 A Relation of the Most Material Parts of the Treasury's Correspondence with the Commissariat in Germany, Dashwood MSS. D/D/19/6 f.1.

He had no official position in the commissariat, and there is no evidence that he received any salary from British sources. But between 1759 and 1762 at the invitation of Prince Ferdinand and various British commissaries he exercised a far-reaching and even dominant influence over many aspects of army supply.¹

- 40) von MEYEN, Director of the Chamber (of War) of Cleves. (Prussian official)²

No details of any salary have come to light, but he exercised important commissariat responsibilities in 1759,³ 1760⁴ and 1761,⁵ and may have continued to serve in the early part of 1762.

- 41) MEYER or MEJER, Frederick. (Assumed to be German)

Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1 per day, mid-1762⁶ - c. May 1763.⁷

- 42) MUDIE or MOODIE, John.

Commissary @ £3 per day, 5 July 1762⁸ - 4 August 1763.⁹

- 43) OSWALD, Richard, 1705 - 1784.¹⁰

Commissary @ £3 per day, 19 February 1759 - 8 June 1760.¹¹ Superintendent of the English and Hessian wagon trains @ £3 per day,

1 Ibid. ff.1 - 5. Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, f.11. Prince Ferdinand to Newcastle, 22 April 1760, Add. MSS. 32905 f.32.

2 Add. MSS. 33048 f.149.

3 Hunter to Martin, Recd. 29 December 1759, T/64/96 f.289.

4 Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/1/405 f.61.

5 Add. MSS. 33048 f.149.

6 T/1/417 f.351.

7 Pownall to J. Dyson, 15 May 1763, T/1/427 f.190.

8 T/52/54 f.65, 5 July 1762.

9 T/52/55 f.390, 1 February 1764.

10 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XIV, p.1,223.

11 Declared Account of R. Oswald, 16 January 1794, A0/1/519/223.

1 June 1762 - 31 December 1762.¹

44) PAUMIER, Peter.

Deputy commissary for the sale of wagon trains and stores @ £2 per day, 1 January 1763 - 31 October 1763.²

45) PEIRSON, Colonel Richard,³ d. 1781.⁴

Supervisor, director and controller of commissaries @ £5 per day, 8 May 1760.⁵ Director general of all commissaries @ £8 per day, 3 June 1761⁶ - 28 June 1762.⁷

46) POWNALL, Thomas, 1722 - 1805.⁸

Commissary of control @ £3 per day, 9 May 1761.⁹ Director of the office of control @ £5 per day, 25 March 1762¹⁰ - 7 July 1763.¹¹ Commissioner for Examining German Demands @ £2 per day,¹² 21 September 1763¹³ - 2 May 1766.¹⁴

47) RAMBERG, 'OverStalmeister'. (Assumed to be German)

Director of the great provision or proviant train, 1759 - 1760.¹⁵

48) REDECKER, Councillor Francis. (Prussian official)¹⁶

1 Ibid.

2 Declared Account of P. Paumier, 3 July 1777, AO/1/520/225.

3 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1761) p.6.

4 Musgrave, op. cit. Vol.V, p.8.

5 T/52/50 ff.493 - 494, 8 May 1760.

6 T/52/52 ff.295 - 298, 3 June 1761.

7 T/52/54 f.282, 23 November 1762. His salary was paid until this date.

8 Namier & Brooke, Eds., op. cit. Vol.III, p.316.

9 T/52/52 ff.360 - 361, 20 June 1761.

10 T/52/53 f.349, 7 April 1762.

11 T/52/55 f.170, 28 July 1763.

12 T/52/56 f.213, 22 October 1764.

13 T/52/55 f.463, 7 May 1764.

14 T/52/58 f.55, 15 July 1766.

15 Add. MSS. 32905 f.150. No positive information on his salary has been found, but it is unlikely that he was paid less than Bilgen.

16 Pro Memoria of F. Redecker, 22 November 1765, SP/9/230. Add. MSS. 33048 ff.149 - 150.

Commissary for the direction of the transport of the depots on the Weser @ 6 écus per day, 25 April 1760¹ - November 1761.²

- 49) RODEN, Councillor. (Prussian official)³
Commissary @ £1 per day, 1759⁴ - 1761.⁵
- 50) ROSS, Alexander.
Inspector of magazines, 1759.⁶ Assistant deputy commissary of control @ £1 per day, mid-1762⁷ - 15 September 1763.⁸
- 51) SCHEEDLER, J.G. (Assumed to be German)
Director of the great provision or proviant train, 1760.⁹
- 52) SMITH, George.
Deputy commissary @ £1 per day,¹⁰ 1762¹¹ - February 1763.¹²
- 53) STANTON, Frederick.
Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1 per day, mid-1762¹³ - mid-1763.¹⁴ Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands @ 7/6d per day, February 1764.¹⁵ Date of termination of emp-

- 1 Mémoire pour Servir a l'Instruction du Sieur Redecker, 25 April 1760, T/1/405 f.252. His salary was approximately £1, Mémoire of Baron Münchhausen, 26 February 1760, T/64/96 f.301.
- 2 Exposé of Councillor Redecker, 7 December 1762, Hotham MSS. DDHO/4/313 f.285.
- 3 Add. MSS. 33048 f.149.
- 4 T/1/397 f.66.
- 5 Add. MSS. 33048 f.149.
- 6 Peirson to Martin, 16 September 1761, T/1/410 f.151.
- 7 T/1/417 f.351.
- 8 Pownall, C.W. Cornwall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 13 October 1764, T/52/56 f.273.
- 9 He had replaced Ramberg, q.v., by August 1760, Marquis of Granby to Newcastle, 7 August 1760, Add. MSS. 32909 f.300. The train was put under contract at the end of the year, see above p.267.
- 10 State of the Commissaries in the Department of Sir J. Cockburn, 25 February 1763, T/1/425 f.41.
- 11 D. Weir to Howard, 4 October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/5/22.
- 12 T/1/425 f.41.
- 13 T/1/417 f.351.
- 14 Add. MSS. 38335 f.114.
- 15 T/29/35 f.313, 23 February 1764.

loyment unknown.¹

54) TOZER, Aaron.

Deputy commissary in the office of control @ £1 per day, mid-1762² - mid-1763.³ Clerk to the Commissioners for Examining German Demands @ 7/6d - 10/0d per day,⁴ 18 October 1763⁵ - 2 May 1766.⁶

55) TROTTER, Joseph.

Deputy commissary @ £1 per day, 8 - 27 June 1759.⁷

56) TURTON, Ensign Thomas.⁸

Deputy commissary @ £2 per day, September 1762.⁹ Date of termination of employment unknown.

57) VOSS, Councillor. (Prussian official)¹⁰

Acted as an adviser to the commissariat and commissary 1760 - 1761.¹¹

58) WEBB, Colonel Richmond, 1714 - 1785.¹²

Accountant general in the office of control @ £3 per day,¹³ 25 March 1762¹⁴ - 21 September 1763.¹⁵

1 He received no payment when the office of the Commissioners was wound up, T/52/58 ff.54 - 55, 15 July 1766.

2 T/1/417 f.351.

3 Add. MSS.38335 f.114.

4 T/29/35 f.185, 10 October 1763. T/29/36 f.145, 20 November 1764.

5 See above p.350, n.1.

6 T/52/58 ff.54 - 55, 15 July 1766.

7 Certificate of Hunter, 29 June 1765, T/1/444 f.242.

8 A List of the General and Field-Officers as they Rank in the Army, (1763) p.45.

9 Howard to Martin, 24 September 1762, T/1/417 ff.464 - 462 (sic).

10 Add. MSS.33048 f.150.

11 Ibid. Peirson to Martin, 2 June 1760, T/1/405 f.61.

12 The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.XX, p.1,014. Webb retired from the army in 1758.

13 T/1/417 f.351.

14 T/52/53 ff.350 - 351, 7 April 1762.

15 T/52/55 f.282, 3 November 1763.

59) WEIR, Daniel, d. 1781.¹

Commissary @ £3 per day, 25 March 1762² - mid-1763.³

1 R.A. Bowler, The Influence of Logistical Problems on British Operations in North America, 1775 - 1782. (1971) p.⁴⁴, n.2.

2 T/52/53 ff.351 & 374, 7 & 28 April 1762.

3 Add. MSS. 38335 f.113.

Appendix II Inconclusive Information on Commissaries' Backgrounds.

There are references which suggest possible backgrounds for four of the commissaries listed in Appendix I, although no corroboration of them has been found. Thomas Bishop may have been the tide-surveyor of that name at Weymouth.¹ John Ollivant Colsworthy possibly came from a mercantile background, for in 1765 he wrote a letter offering inside information about the commercial and financial activities of French agents.² It is tempting but impossible to identify Peter Legh with the elusive M.P. of that name, who was the head of one of the oldest Cheshire families.³ Finally, Aaron Tozer may have been the Exeter bookseller and publisher of that name or a relative of the same.⁴

1 Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 1742 - 1745, Preserved in the Public Record Office. (1903) p.445.

2 Calendar of Home Office Papers of the Reign of George III, Preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office, 1760 - 1765. (1878) No. 2,042, p.631.

3 Sir L.B. Namier & J. Brooke, Eds., The History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1754 - 1790. (1964) Vol.III, p.32.

4 I am indebted to Mrs. M.M. Rowe, the Area Archivist of the Devon Record Office, for information on the name of 'Tozer'.

Appendix III Value of J.J. Uckerman's Forage Contracts, 1759 - 1761.

Contract of 20 September 1759.¹

guilders

Some 25,000 complete rations
were to be delivered daily for
approximately two months @ 15
stivers per ration. Calculat-
ing 25,000 rations per day for
61 days =

1,143,750

Contract of 3 June 1760.²

95,000 complete rations weekly
for two months @ 15 stivers
per ration. Calculating for a
period of nine weeks =

641,250

Contract of 25 August 1760.³

30,000 rations of oats daily
at various places on the Weser
for 97 days @ 7 - 8 stivers
per ration. Calculating an av-
erage price of $7\frac{1}{2}$ stivers per
ration = 1,091,250 guilders.

2,000,000 rations of oats to
be collected at Bremen and
delivered to various places on
the Weser. Calculating an av-
erage price of $7\frac{1}{2}$ stivers per
ration = 750,000 guilders.

1 T/64/96 ff.232 - 233.

2 T/1/405 f.404.

3 Ibid. f.446.

100,000 rations of oats at guilders
Bielefeld @ 7 stivers per
ration = 35,000 guilders.

50,000 rations of hay and
straw at Bielefeld @ 6
stivers per ration =
15,000 guilders.

300,000 rations of oats at
Minden @ 7 stivers per rat-
ion = 105,000 guilders.

300,000 complete rations at
Vlotow @ 14 stivers per
ration = 210,000 guilders.

300,000 complete rations at
Lemgo @ 13 stivers per rat-
ion = 195,000 guilders.

Total cost of this contract = 2,401,250 ¹

Contract of 25 May 1761.²

1,000,000 rations of oats @
9 stivers per ration =
450,000 guilders.

220,000 rations of hay @ $4\frac{1}{4}$
stivers per ration =
46,750 guilders.

Total cost of this contract = 496,750

¹ The calculations of the cost of this contract found in Add. MSS. 33048 f.57 have been ignored, for by mistakenly taking rations of oats for complete rations and by giving the cost of 300,000 complete rations at Vlotow as £194,000 instead of £19,400 (£ : 10 guilders $16\frac{1}{2}$ stivers), they arrive at the enormous and erroneous total of £541,285/14/3. At the same rate of exchange this would represent 5,859,417 guilders 16 stivers.

² T/1/410 f.254.

Contract of 11 June 1761.¹ guilders

1,000,000 rations of oats @
8 $\frac{1}{4}$ stivers per ration =
412,500 guilders.

1,500,000 rations of oats @
9 stivers per ration =
675,000 guilders.

Total cost of this contract = 1,087,500

Contract of 7 December 1761.²

6,000,000 rations of oats @
10 stivers per ration = 3,000,000

Total cost of all contracts = 8,770,500³

The sterling value of this sum depended on the rate of exchange, which from September 1759 to December 1761 fluctuated between 10 guilders 8 stivers and 11 guilders to the £.⁴ But the average value of the £ in this period was usually taken to be 10 guilders 14 stivers or 10 guilders 15 stivers,⁵ at which rates the value of 8,770,500 guilders was

1 Ibid. f.252.

2 No copy of this contract seems to have survived but Hulton stated that it was for six million rations of oats, Journal and Copy Book of Henry Hulton, ff.82 - 83, and a letter of T. Pownall and C.W. Cornwall to C. Jenkinson, 31 March 1764, T/1/431 No.3, f.151/5 gave the price as 10 stivers per ration.

3 This figure does not represent the full extent of Uckerman's involvement in forage supply, for his contract of 20 September 1759 was extended for an unknown period after its expiry, T.O. Hunter to S. Martin, 22 November 1759, T/64/96 f.275, while he held other contracts of which full details have not been traced, M. Hatton to T. Halsey, 25 December 1760, T/1/444 f.342.

4 PMG/2/5 ff.257 & 299. PMG/2/6 f.231.

5 Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218.

between £815,860/9/2 and £819,672/17/10.

The quantities of forage involved in these contracts were as follows:-

<u>Date of</u>		<u>No. of Rations</u>		
<u>Contract</u>	<u>Complete</u>	<u>Oats</u>	<u>Hay</u>	<u>Straw</u>
20/9/1759	1,525,000			
3/6/1760	855,000			
25/8/1760	600,000	5,310,000	50,000	50,000
25/5/1761		1,000,000	220,000	
11/6/1761		2,500,000		
7/12/1761		6,000,000		
	2,980,000	14,810,000	270,000	50,000

Breaking down the complete rations into their component parts gives the following totals:-

Oats 2,980,000 + 14,810,000 = 17,790,000.

Hay 2,980,000 + 270,000 = 3,250,000.

Straw 2,980,000 + 50,000 = 3,030,000.

17,790,000 rations of oats @ 8 lbs. per ration = 63,535.71 tons.

3,250,000 rations of hay @ 10 lbs. per ration = 14,508.93 tons.

3,030,000 rations of straw @ 5 lbs. per ration = 6,763.39 tons.

63,535.71 tons of oats represents 296.9 days' supply for every horse in the Combined Army on the basis of a total daily consumption of 214 tons of oats.¹

¹ See above p.145.

Appendix IV Cost of Shipping Grain from England to Germany in 1762.

The following accounts give details of the purchase and shipment of grain by merchants acting as agents on commission.

Invoices of Shipments by J. Tierney.¹

4,186 $\frac{1}{8}$ quarters of rye
 13,153 quarters of barley
 17,498 $\frac{3}{8}$ quarters of oats

 34,837 $\frac{5}{8}$ quarters

Total cost = £30,865/2/0.

Average cost per quarter = 17.72 shillings.

Invoices of Shipments by J. Tierney.²

10,090 $\frac{6}{8}$ quarters of oats.

Total cost = £9,091/15/6.

Average cost per quarter = 18.02 shillings.

Accounts of Amyand, Rucker & Co.³

110,923 quarters of wheat, rye, barley and oats.

Total cost = £100,897/8/0.⁴

Average cost per quarter = 18.19 shillings.

Accounts of F. Gare.⁵

15,865 $\frac{1}{8}$ quarters of oats.

Total cost = £13,445/19/0.

Average cost per quarter = 16.95 shillings.

1 Recapitulation of 31 Cargoes, 30 June 1762, T/64/98 f.17.

2 Recapitulation of 11 Cargoes, 16 November 1762, T/64/99.

3 Amyand & Co's. Accounts of Corn Sent to Bremen, 16 November 1762, T/1/420 f.15.

4 Figures taken from the docket of the document.

5 Accounts of F. Gare, 11 October 1762, T/1/420 f.178.

Thus the overall average cost of a quarter of grain was 17.72 shillings.

1 quarter = 272 lbs.¹

1 ration of oats = 8 lbs.

1 quarter = 34 rations.

Thus if one quarter of grain cost 17.72 shillings, one ration would cost 6.25d. But because of wastage one quarter of grain might produce only 28 rations,² and thus the average cost of each ration would be 7.59d. In 1762 the value of the £ fluctuated between 10 guilders 10 stivers and 11 guilders,³ and thus 7.59d = 6.64 stivers at the former rate and 6.96 stivers at the latter.⁴

Gare was also awarded a contract for 500,000 rations of oats at $7\frac{3}{4}$ stivers per ration,⁵ and it would thus appear that purchases on commission were the more advantageous method of supply.

All the above costs and prices were for deliveries at Bremen, from whence the provisions had to be shipped up the Weser to the various positions of the Army. The accounts of a number of shippers⁶ yield the following figures for the cost of transporting one last

1 T/29/34 f.221, 4 February 1762.

2 Peirson to Martin, 4 March 1762, Add. MSS. 32935 f.220.

3 PMG/2/6 ff.231 - 232 & 271 - 273.

4 These figures do not reflect completely accurately the cost of a ration of oats as they are based on the prices of other kinds of grain as well. But using the accounts of Tierney and Gare, which are for oats alone, and calculating 28 rations per quarter, the figures are 7.49d and 6.55 - 6.87 stivers, so that the difference is marginal.

5 Accounts of F. Gare, 11 October 1762, T/1/420 f.178.

6 Specification of Certificates Granted for the Payment of the Freights of the Weser, June - July 1762, Howard Vyse MSS, D/HV/B/5/9 A & B.

of oats:-

Bremen - Nienburg	4 dollars. ¹
Bremen - Minden	7.5 dollars. ²
Nienburg - Minden	3.5 dollars. ³
Nienburg - Hameln	9.88 dollars, ⁴ 9.75 dollars ⁵ and 9.51 dollars. ⁶ Average = 9.71 dollars.
Hameln - Höxter	5.13 dollars. ⁷

Hence the cost of transporting a last of oats from Bremen to various places was:-

Nienburg	4 dollars, which @ 3 dollars per ducat ⁸ = 1.33 ducats, which @ 5 guilders 5 stivers per ducat ⁹ = 6.98 guilders.
Minden	7.5 dollars, which at the same rates = 2.5 ducats = 13.13 guilders.
Hameln	13.71 dollars, (i.e. 4 + 9.71) which at the same rates = 4.57 ducats = 23.99 guilders.
Höxter	18.84 dollars, (i.e. 13.71 + 5.13) which at the same rates = 6.28 ducats = 32.97 guilders.

1 Ibid., Certificate No.46, 61 lasts $2\frac{1}{2}$ kimptens @ 244 dollars 3 groschen, Certificate No.47, 60 lasts @ 240 dollars. As one kimpten weighed 24 lbs., Report on the Magazines, 20 November 1761, T/1/410 f. 239, and one last produced 288 rations of 8 lbs. each, Peirson to (Treasury), 27 December 1760, T/1/405 f.90, one last contained 96 kimptens.

2 Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/5/9, Certificate No.56, 91 lasts @ 682½ dollars, and Certificate No.108, 36 lasts @ 270 dollars.

3 Ibid., No.87, 33 lasts @ 115½ dollars.

4 Ibid., No.83, 36 lasts @ 355 dollars 28 groschen.

5 Ibid., No.170, 33 lasts @ 321 dollars 27 groschen.

6 Ibid., No.175, 31 lasts 84 kimptens @ 303 dollars.

7 Ibid., No.52, 32 lasts @ 164 dollars, No.147, 34 lasts @ 174 dollars 11 groschen.

8 Ibid. The rate of exchange used in these accounts.

9 Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, AO/1/1507/218. Sir Lawrence Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive, ZNK X 1/1/6 f.13.

Thus if one last produced 288 rations,¹ the following sums must be added to the cost of each ration for freight charges between Bremen and the various points of delivery:-

Nienburg	0.48 stivers.
Minden	0.91 stivers.
Hamelu	1.67 stivers.
Höxter	2.29 stivers.

And if the cost of a ration delivered at Bremen by the Treasury's agents varied between 6.64 and 6.96 stivers according to the rate of exchange, its price higher up the Weser was as follows:-

Nienburg	7.12 - 7.44 stivers.
Minden	7.55 - 7.87 stivers.
Hamelu	8.31 - 8.63 stivers.
Höxter	8.93 - 9.25 stivers.

When taking into account the many additional charges involved in transporting grain, such as demurrage, warehouse hire, renting of sacks, labourers' wages and expenses of land carriage, Peirson calculated that the real cost of a last of oats was:

Nienburg	£12/3/8, ² which with the £ @ 10 guilders 10 stivers = 8.88 stivers per ration and with the £ @ 11 guilders = 9.31 stivers per ration.
Minden	£12/16/6, ³ which at the same rates = 9.35 and 9.80 stivers per ration.

1 T/1/405 f.90.

2 Détail des Fraix qu'il y a à faire pour transporter un Last d'Avoine depuis le port de Bremen, Add. MSS. 32935 f.235.

3 Ibid. f.234.

Hameln £13/19/0,¹ which at the same rates = 10.17 and 10.66 stivers per ration.²

Thus although it is impossible to discover the quantities of provisions sent to different places on the Weser, and so to calculate the exact cost of the whole operation to the Treasury, the above figures strongly suggest that the Board gained very little, if anything, by annulling Uckerman's contract.³

1 Ibid. f.231.

2 Peirson's figures do not include an estimate for Hörter.

3 The Treasury's contract with Gare to deliver oats at Bremen was certainly more expensive than Uckerman's agreement with the commissariat, for if freight charges as detailed above are added to his contract price of 7½ stivers, together with a further 25% for supplementary charges, the approximate level suggested by Peirson's figures, the price of a ration was in excess of 10 stivers anywhere on the Weser.

Appendix VForage Accounts of the Great Foreign Artillery Train.

The train was supplied with forage at the government's expense, and by the end of the war Dundas had been paid the sum of £12,666 for provisions which he had purchased himself for this service. Had he supplied all the forage consumed by the animals of the train it was calculated that he would have been owed £336,722/2/11, although it was estimated that in fact he had only expended one sixth of this sum.¹

Thus the first method of calculating the amount owed to Dundas was as follows:-

£336,722/2/11 - £12,666 = £324,056/2/11, of which one sixth =
£54,009/7/2.

But according to the second method:-

One sixth of £336,722/2/11 = £56,120/7/2 - £12,666 = £43,454/7/2.
Difference = £10,555.²

In the end the Commissioners for Examining German Demands seem to have adopted the second method, as suggested by Cuthbert, although the saving was diminished by other changes in the calculations concerned with the cost of bread supplied to the trains.³

¹ Reasons Offered by Mr. Cuthbert, 12 June 1764, T/1/432 No.28, ff.208 - 209/62 - 63. Adjustment of the Demands of the Crown Against Sir L. Dundas, T/1/451 f.40.

² T/1/432 No.28, ff.208 - 209/62 - 63.

³ State of Adjustment ... between the Crown and Sir L. Dundas, T/1/451 ff.33 - 34. Ibid. ff.39 - 40. A Treasury Minute of 22 March 1765, T/29/36 ff.299 - 300, eventually accepted £17,000 as the sum due from Dundas, a figure which presumably represents a rounding off of the £17,520/16/4, reached by calculations incorporating the second method.

Appendix VICost of Bread Produced by the Great Foreign Bakery.

The accounts of the bakery as stated by the Commissioners for Examining German Demands show that 554,802 quintals 13 lbs. of meal were received between 1 May 1760 and 31 March 1763, of which 43,857 quintals 68 lbs. were redelivered to magazines and 2,009 quintals 52 lbs. sold,¹ thus leaving 508,935 quintals 1 lb. used for baking bread.

In these years the lowest price for a quintal of rye meal which has been traced is $2\frac{1}{2}$ dollars² and before November 1762 the highest 4 dollars 6 groschen.³ Thus at the lowest price the total quantity of meal used in the bakery would have cost 1,272,337 dollars 18 groschen, and at the highest price 2,120,562 dollars 14 groschen.

The bakery used or purchased 277,682 sacks,⁴ which at a low price of $16\frac{1}{2}$ groschen per sack⁵ amounted to 127,270 dollars 33 groschen, and at a high price of 20 groschen per sack⁶ 154,267 dollars 28 groschen.

1 Summary State of the Cash Accounts of the Foreign Bakery in T. Pownall & D. Cuthbert to C. Jenkinson, 16 March 1765, T/52/56 f.454. The quantity sold was made up of 1,564 quintals 62 lbs. lent to Uckerman and charged to his account, and 444 quintals 98 lbs.

2 Contract between M. Hatton and C. Lehman, 7 August 1760, T/1/405 f. 433.

3 F. Halsey to Mr. de König, 10 May 1761, Halsey MSS. 15031. Examples of higher prices can be found in November 1762, see above p.135, but these are discounted as isolated examples of possible profiteering.

4 T/52/56 f.454.

5 T/1/405 f.433.

6 Contract between Hatton and J. Paken, 22 September 1760, *ibid.* f.440.

13,657 $\frac{1}{4}$ clafters of wood were burned, which at a low price of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ dollars per clafter ¹ cost 34,143 dollars 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen, and at a high price of 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ dollars per clafter ² 37,557 dollars 15 $\frac{3}{4}$ groschen.

The cash accounts of the bakery show that between 1 October 1759 and 10 September 1762 expenses amounted to 55,631 ducats 2 dollars 31 groschen. From this sum 9,935 ducats 2 dollars 32 groschen is deducted for sums paid to the troops for vacant portions, ³ leaving a total of 45,696 ducats ⁴ for actual bakery expenses.

The accounts of provisions cover a period of 1,065 days, while the cash accounts are for 1,076 days. Taking a daily average of cash expenditure and reducing the total by eleven days gives a figure of 45,228.85 ducats, which @ 3 $\frac{1}{3}$ dollars per ducat = 150,762 dollars 30 groschen, and @ 4 $\frac{2}{3}$ dollars per ducat = 211,067 dollars 34 $\frac{1}{2}$ groschen. ⁵

Hence:-

	<u>Minimum Costs</u>		<u>Maximum Costs</u>	
	dollars	groschen	dollars	groschen
Meal	1,272,337	18	2,120,562	14
Sacks	127,270	33	154,267	28
Wood	34,143	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	37,557	15 $\frac{3}{4}$
Expenses	150,762	30	211,067	34 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total	<u>1,584,514</u>	<u>13$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>2,523,455</u>	<u>20$\frac{1}{2}$</u>

1 State of the Accounts for the Supply and Subsistence of Luckner's Corps, 15 September 1763, T/1/428 f.44.

2 State of the Demand of the Bishopric of Hildesheim, in Pownall & Cuthbert to Jenkinson, 11 March 1765, T/52/56 f.497.

3 Ibid. f.453.

4 Making an adjustment of one groschen.

5 These are the rates of exchange of the dollar in late 1759 and early 1762 quoted in the Declared Account of T. Bishop, 3 January 1789, A0/1/1507/218. No figure is given for late 1762.

The bakery produced a total of 36,443,837 portions of bread of 2 lbs. each,¹ so that the cost of a six-pound loaf on the basis of the minimum and maximum costs was 4.7 and 7.48 groschen.

¹ T/52/56 f.454.

Appendix VIINumerical Levels of Train Services in 1762.

John Levett's 'States of the Establishment of the Trains',¹ reproduced on the next page, although the most detailed survey to come to light, is not a complete record. It gives no account of the numbers of carriages and carts in the foreign artillery train,² nor of superior officers in most of the other services. Neither of these omissions, however, affects the calculations in Appendix VIII, as payments in the foreign artillery train were based on the numbers of personnel and horses and in all other trains on the numbers of wagons.

What Levett calls the 'British Bakery and Infirmary Trains' presumably included bread wagons.

The document contains one obvious error in assigning 726 drivers and 237 horses to the foreign hospital train. This has been corrected to 237 drivers and 726 horses and the totals adjusted accordingly.

1 T/1/420 f.125, 24 May 1762.

2 Although Levett calls it the Hanoverian artillery train, it included the Hessian, Brunswick and Bückeburg contingents, *ibid.* f.127.

	Waggons of 4 Horses	Waggons of 6 Horses	Stall Masters	Schaffers	Farriers	Waggon Masters	Masters of Harness	Drivers	Horses
Hanoverian Artillery Train			44	184	8	2	9	2,400	6,731
Proviant Train	1,010	91	33					1,192	4,586
Hanoverian Bread Waggon Train	358	3						364	1,450
Brunswick Bread Waggon Train	86	6						102	388
Foreign Bakery Train	28	60						150	476
British Bakery and Infirmary Trains	415							480	1,810
Hessian Bread Waggon Train	218	14	4	37				277	990
Foreign Hospital Train	15	111						237	726
Train with His Serene Highness	3	31						68	202
Total of the Trains added together	2,133	316	81	221	8	2	9	5,270	17,359

Appendix VIIITotal Cost of Trains in 1762¹Daily Upkeep as per EstablishmentsForeign Artillery Train²

	£	s	d
6,731 horses @ 1/8d each	560	18	4
2,400 drivers @ 1/0d each	120	0	0
247 other personnel @ 2/6d each ³	30	17	6
Total daily cost of upkeep	711	15	10

Proviant Train⁴

1,010 four-horse wagons @ 9/9.2d each ⁵	493	4	4
91 six-horse wagons @ 14/1.3d each ⁶	64	3	10
Total daily cost of upkeep	557	8	2

Other Wagon Trains⁷

1,123 four-horse wagons @ 9/0d each	505	7	0
225 six-horse wagons @ 13/0d each	146	5	0
Total daily cost of upkeep	651	12	0

1 These calculations apply to the period before June and July 1762, when a number of trains were taken into public ownership.

2 Establishment of the train as in Appendix VII. Prices from Abstract of an Account of the Hire of Horses and Pay of Conductors and Drivers Employed in the Foreign Train of Artillery, 6 April 1763, in the letter of Sir J. Cockburn to R.P. Taylor, 17 April 1763, AO/3/124.

3 A few high-ranking officials were possibly paid more than 2/6d per day.

4 Establishment of the train as in Appendix VII.

5 Sir Lawrence Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 f.13. Dundas gave the price of a four-horse wagon as one ducat, and calculated 292,531.18 ducats to be worth £142,864/1/10.

6 This price is calculated on the basis that when a four-horse wagon cost 9/0d, a six-horse wagon cost 13/0d. Abstract of an Account of the Pay of Wagons Furnished by Dundas, 6 April 1763, in the letter of Cockburn to R.P. Taylor, 19 April 1763, AO/3/124.

7 Ibid. For the price of Oswald's trains see above p.275, n.1. Establishments of the trains as in Appendix VII.

Effective Daily UpkeepForeign Artillery Train

For 183 days between 25 June and 24 December 1762 Dundas charged £112,890/13/8 for the upkeep of the train,¹ or £616/17/9 per day. The train was thus kept 86.67% complete.²

Proviant Train

For 303 days between 1 October 1761 and 30 July 1762 Dundas charged £166,302/12/5 for the upkeep of the train,³ or £548/17/1 per day. The train was thus kept 98.47% complete.

Other Wagon Trains

For 395 days between 5 November 1760 and 4 December 1761⁴ Dundas charged £128,283/11/0 for the upkeep of a number of these trains,⁵ or £324/15/4 per day. In his services he had 487 four-horse wagons and 180 six-horse wagons,⁶ which at 9/0d and 13/0d per wagon per day respectively amounted to a total daily cost of £336/3/0. These trains were thus kept 96.61% complete, and assuming that comparable figures applied to Oswald's trains, the effective daily cost of the upkeep of all these services was 96.61% of £651/12/0, or £629/10/3.

Thus the effective daily cost of the upkeep of all trains was £1,795/5/1.

1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.21 - 22.

2 When Dundas undertook the contract for this service in 1760 an unascertained part of the train remained in public ownership, so that this percentage is too low.

3 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.13 - 16.

4 Ibid. f.7. The figures for 1762 in the account are insufficiently detailed to be used in these calculations.

5 Ibid.

6 See Appendix VII; figures for the Hanoverian and Brunswick bread wagons and the foreign bakery and foreign hospital trains.

CompensationForeign Artillery Train

Altogether Dundas charged £514,470/18/6 for the upkeep of the train and £176,659/8/9 compensation for losses and damage.¹ Thus the amount of compensation expressed as a percentage of the cost of upkeep was 34.34%, which of £616/17/9 = £211/16/9.

Proviant Train

Altogether Dundas charged £310,114/11/8 for upkeep and £118,578/17/0 compensation for losses and damage.² Thus the amount of compensation expressed as a percentage of the cost of upkeep was 38.24%, which of £548/17/1 = £209/17/8.

Other Wagon Trains

Altogether Dundas charged £407,812/14/0 for upkeep and £118,845/12/0 compensation for losses and damage.³ Thus the amount of compensation expressed as a percentage of the cost of upkeep was 29.14%, which of £629/10/3 = £183/8/10.⁴

Thus the total daily cost of compensation in all trains was £605/3/3.

Hence the total daily cost of the trains, comprising both upkeep and compensation, was £1,795/5/1 + £605/3/3 = £2,400/8/4, and the total annual cost amounted to £876,152/1/8.

1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.19 - 26. The accounts for the upkeep of the train include the sum of £34,580/0/0 paid for compensation in 1761. This sum has therefore been deducted from these accounts and added to the compensation accounts.

2 Ibid. ff.13 - 18. The sum of £69,451/9/0, paid to Dundas when the train was taken back into public ownership, has been deducted from the total charge for the upkeep of the train.

3 Ibid. ff.7 - 12.

4 This calculation assumes that levels of compensation were the same in Oswald's trains.

Appendix IXGross Profits on Train Contracts

On 25 June 1762 Dundas entered into a partnership with four of his assistants for carrying on his contracts for the foreign artillery train and for the foreign bread, bakery and hospital wagon trains.¹ From that date until their termination the contracts yielded a profit of £49,968/0/0.²

The profit was declared before any charge had been made for the forage and bread supplied to the animals and employees of the trains from the Crown's magazines and bakeries. A deduction of 6d per ration was eventually made for forage thus taken by the animals of the wagon trains,³ where in 1762 there were 2,936.94 effective horses,⁴ which for the 213 days of the partnership⁵ carried out 625,568.22 days' service. As in the whole period of Dundas' contracts his wagon train horses performed 6,247,414 days' service,⁶ 10.01% of this total took place during the period of the partnership. The final forage charge against Dundas for all his wagon train horses was £78,092/13/6,⁷ of which 10.01% is £7,817/1/6.

1 Agreement of L. Dundas with J.F. Collier, C. Ogilvy, A. Clark and A. Geddes, 24 July 1762, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/124.

2 Sir L. Dundas, J.F. Collier, C. Ogilvy, A. Clark and A. Geddes, their General Account in Company, 16 August 1764, *ibid.* ZNK X 1/1/126.

3 Adjustment of the Demands of the Crown against Sir L. Dundas, T/1/451 f.39. No deduction was made for forage taken by artillery train horses.

4 The Hanoverian and Brunswick bread wagon trains, the foreign bakery train and the foreign hospital train had a total establishment of 3,040 horses, see Appendix VII, and the services were maintained 96.61% effective, see Appendix VIII.

5 The contracts were terminated on 23 January 1763, Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 f.9.

6 This figure is obtained by calculating the number of sixpences in £156,185/7/0, the sum that Dundas would have owed the Crown had he drawn forage from its magazines for every day's service of every wagon train horse for which he was paid. T/1/451 f.39.

7 *Ibid.*

Dundas was charged £26,406/18/0 for bread supplied by the Crown to his employees for the duration of all his train contracts.¹ The foreign artillery train contract lasted for 807 days,² the proviant train contract for 588 days,³ and the wagon train contracts for 1,450 days.⁴ In 1762⁵ the foreign artillery train had 2,294.15 effective personnel, the proviant train 1,206.26 and the wagon trains 824.08.⁶ Thus the total number of days' service performed by all Dundas' train employees was 3,755,575.88. During the period of the partnership the foreign artillery train employees performed 254 days' service and those of the wagon trains 213 days' service, a total of 758,243.14, which represents 20.19% of 3,755,575.88. Thus the charge for bread during the period of the partnership was 20.19% of £26,406/18/0, or £5,331/11/1.

The total charge for forage and bread during the period of the partnership was therefore £13,148/12/7, which deducted from the stated profit of £49,968/0/0 = £36,819/7/5.

From 25 June 1762 until the end of the contract Dundas charged £144,004/11/4 for the upkeep of the foreign artillery train.⁷

1 Ibid.

2 19 December 1760 - 5 March 1763, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.19 - 22.

3 20 December 1760 - 30 July 1762, *ibid.* ff.13 - 16.

4 4 February 1759 - 23 January 1763, *ibid.* ff.7 - 9.

5 Dundas had presumably employed fewer personnel in previous years, when the numerical strength of the Combined Army and therefore of his trains had been less, but as Levett's figures for the numbers of superior officers in the proviant and wagon trains are apparently incomplete, some balance is struck between these two unknown quantities.

6 The establishments of personnel and their percentage effectiveness were as follows: foreign artillery train, 2,647 and 86.67%; proviant train, 1,225 and 98.47%; wagon trains, 853 and 96.61%. See Appendices VII and VIII.

7 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 f.21.

and from 25 March 1762 until the end of the contracts £101,685/3/0 for the maintenance of the wagon trains.¹ The proportion of the latter sum for the period of the partnership, viz. 213 days out of 305 days, was £71,012/18/2. Thus the total payments for the upkeep of all trains under the partnership was £215,017/9/6.

So it appears that Dundas and his partners made profits of £36,819/7/5 on charges of £215,017/9/6, or 17.12%.

Altogether Dundas charged £1,232,398/4/2 for the upkeep of his trains,² from which is deducted £78,092/13/6 and £26,406/18/0 for the forage and bread supplied by the Crown, leaving £1,127,898/12/8. Assuming that profits of 17.12% were made on all contracts throughout the war,³ total profits amounted to £193,096/4/9. Four-fifths of the profits of the partnership, or £29,455/9/11, did not go to Dundas, whose profits were thus £163,640/14/10.

The trains supplied by Oswald in 1762 contained 636 four-horse wagons and 45 six-horse wagons.⁴ At 9/0d and 13/0d respectively per wagon per day the contractor would have received £67,506/6/0 for 214 days' service, and assuming that the trains were 96.61% effective,⁵ the actual cost would have been £65,217/16/9, on which compensation for losses and damage at 29.14%⁶ would have been £19,004/9/6.

1 Ibid. f.9.

2 £514,470/18/6 for the foreign artillery train, £310,114/11/8 for the proviant train and £407,812/14/0 for the wagon trains, see Appendix VIII.

3 This can only be an assumption as no information has been found on the profits of the proviant train.

4 The establishments of the British bakery and infirmary trains, the Hessian bread wagon train and Prince Ferdinand's baggage train, see Appendix VII.

5 The figure for Dundas' equivalent services, see Appendix VIII.

6 Ibid.

As a commissary administering the same trains from 1 June to 31 December 1762, viz. 214 days, Oswald disbursed or was allowed the following sums.¹

	£	s	d
466,040 guilders 10 stivers ²	43,352	12	1
335,077 guilders 5 stivers 4 pennings ³	31,169	19	6 $\frac{1}{4}$
For differences in the rates of exchange and losses on currency exchange	99	10	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
	1,988	5	11
	118	11	8
Salary, including one month's additional pay	735	0	0
Contingent charges and expenses	97	13	5 $\frac{3}{4}$
Fees and charges of settling accounts	98	1	0
	200	0	0
	<u>77,859</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>6$\frac{1}{2}$</u>

From this total certain sums relating to periods after 31 December 1762 have to be deducted.⁴ Despite the fact that the expenses concerned are said to be for periods running into the middle of 1763, it may be assumed that all train services of the Combined Army had come to an end by 31 March 1763,⁵ which is therefore taken as a hypothetical terminal date in the following calculations.

1 Declared Account of R. Oswald, 16 January 1794, A0/1/519/223.

2 £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers.

3 Idem.

4 Presumably Oswald continued to advance money for the service of the trains after this date, as Paumier had only been appointed to sell them, see Appendix I.

5 The last British troops left Germany on 23 March 1763, Sir R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War, (1966) p.447, and a month later it was reported that the trains had been disbanded and sold, T. Pownall to S. Martin, 22 April 1763, T/1/427 f.422.

	guilders	stivers	pennings
Sundry expenses of Hessian bread wagons from 1 June 1762, amounting to 49,676 guilders 8 stivers 4 pennings.			
1 June 1762 - 31 March 1763 = 304 days; proportional deduction for period of 90 days, 1 January - 31 March 1763 =	14,706	16	10
Sundry expenses of Hessian trains from 13 September 1762, amounting to 1,130 guilders.			
13 September 1762 - 31 March 1763 = 200 days; proportional deduction for period of 90 days as above =	508	10	0
To P. Paumier for sundry expenses of English and Hessian trains from 18 July 1762, amounting to 8,583 guilders 13 stivers.			
18 July 1762 - 31 March 1763 = 257 days; proportional deduction for period of 90 days as above =	3,005	18	15
To J. Levett for wages of a 'schaffer' from 7 June 1762, amounting to 346 guilders 2 stivers 4 pennings.			
7 June 1762 - 31 March 1763 = 298 days; proportional deduction for period of 90 days as above =	104	10	10
Bread delivered to the drivers and servants of the trains from 1 June 1762, amounting to 32,507 guilders 4 stivers.			
1 June 1762 - 31 March 1763 = 304 days; proportional deduction for period of 90 days as above =	9,623	16	13
Pay for his secretary from 1 June 1762, amounting to 4,912 guilders 15 stivers.			
1 June 1762 - 31 March 1763 = 304 days; proportional deduction for period of 90 days as above =	1,454	8	10
	<hr/> 29,404	<hr/> 1	<hr/> 10

One further charge of 2,617 guilders 12 stivers 4 pennings, representing an advance to J. Mill for the pay of his secretary, is deducted in its entirety as it relates to the expenses of the British artillery train.¹

Total deductions thus amount to 32,021 guilders 13 stivers 14 pennings, or £2,978/15/3.²

Thus the real cost of the public management of the trains from 1 June to 31 December 1762 was £77,859/14/6½ - £2,978/15/3 = £74,880/19/3½.

But this figure includes the cost of making good excessive losses and damage in the trains, which under the contracts formed a separate compensation account. Assuming that such charges were the same under contract and public management, the cost of the simple upkeep of the trains under public management was £74,880/19/3½ - £19,004/9/6 = £55,876/9/9½.

Thus the difference between the cost of the contracts and the cost of public management, representing Oswald's profit, was £65,217/16/9 - £55,876/9/9½ = £9,341/6/11½.

Profits of £9,341/6/11½ on payments of £65,217/16/9 represent 14.32%.

1 Mill was Oswald's partner in the contract for the British artillery train, Journal of the House of Commons, 18 April 1763, Vol. XXIX p. 637.

2 £ : 10 guilders 15 stivers.

Appendix XWagons in Repair in the Proviant Train in late 1762¹

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Wagons in Repair</u>	<u>Total No. of Wagons</u>
2 July	26	900
9 July	20	900
13 July	13	900
16 July	24	900
20 July	44	900
23 July	52	900
31 July	61	900
3 August	62	900
7 August	66	900
13 August	91	900
18 August	112	900
20 August	118	900
28 August	104	900
1 September	83	900
4 September	89	900
8 September	49	900
11 September	65	900
15 September	79	900
17 September	96	900
22 September	119	900
24 September	137	900
29 September	158	900
1 October	139	898
12 October	203	898
15 October	176	898
19 October	158	900
22 October	168	900
2 November	167	900
5 November	187	900

¹ Rapports du Service Journalier du Proviant Train, Howard Vyse MSS.
D/HV/B/6/1 - 39.

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Wagons in Repair</u>	<u>Total No. of Wagons</u>
9 November	224	900
13 November	183	949
16 November	188	929
23 November	218	929
28 November	180	931
1 December	182	921
4 December	182	906

Average No. of Wagons in Repair = 117.31.

Average Total No. of Wagons = 904.42.

Average Percentage of Wagons in Repair = 12.97%.

Appendix XIPercentage Losses of Proviant Train HorsesUnder Public Ownership

The general reports of the state of the train show losses of 1,725 horses over a period of four months between July and October 1762.¹ This represents a monthly loss of 431.25 horses at a time when the average effective monthly establishment of healthy and sick animals was 3,482.25.²

Thus the average monthly loss of horses was 12.38%.

Under Contract

The total value of the train when it was transferred to the Crown by Dundas on 30 July 1762 was £69,652/5/0, of which £48,334, or 69.39%, represented the value of horses.³

For the whole period of his proviant train contract Dundas claimed £118,578/17/0 compensation,⁴ of which 69.39% = £82,281/17/3. The value of each horse was £11,⁵ and £82,281/17/3 thus represents 7,480.17 animals.

The contract lasted for 19.33 months from 20 December

1 Rapports Généraux du Train des Vivres, July - October 1762, Howard Vyse MSS. D/HV/B/6/40 - 43. The monthly figures were July - 113; August - 256; September - 626; October - 730.

2 Ibid. The monthly figures for healthy and sick horses respectively were July - 3,449 & 183; August - 3,410 & 142; September - 3,144 & 230; October - 3,090 & 281.

3 Value of the Great Provision Train, 14 August 1762, T/1/417 f.149.

4 Sir L. Dundas' Pocket Book of Accounts, Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.17 - 18.

5 T/1/417 f.149.

1760 to 30 July 1762,¹ and so the monthly loss of horses amounted to 386.97.

The train's establishment stood at 4,586 horses² and it was kept 98.47% complete.³ Thus the number of effective horses was 4,515.83.

The monthly loss of horses therefore represented 8.57% of the effective state.

1 Zetland (Dundas) Archive ZNK X 1/1/6 ff.13 - 16.

2 See Appendix VII.

3 See Appendix VIII.

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