


BY EDMUND LILLY, C. 1706.

TEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD



ENGLAND

in the

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

A Study in the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1701 - 1713

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Modern History in the University of Oxford for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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PREFACE

This study has reached a far different result from that originally intended. Initially, I undertook it as an examination of the strategic inter-relationship of an army and a navy in the conduct of a war. This seemed to be a manageable topic for a thesis, and the War of the Spanish Succession seemed to be a good example, as well as the origin, of the controversy between 'blue water' and 'continental' strategies. The basic English language studies for the period, G. N. Clark's The Later Stuarts and G. M. Trevelyan's England under Queen Anne provided no broad perspective into the strategic conduct of the war, and the general literature on the war seemed to divide itself into several small classes of special studies. There were numerous studies on Marlborough and his military campaigns, along with a few studies which dealt with the campaigns in Then there were studies of the navy, very few of Spain. which even mentioned Marlborough and the army, studies of the colonies, government administration, party politics, and a range of biographies. After making an initial survey of the studies which had been done, I concluded that I could fill a small gap by contrasting Marlborough's direction of the war on the continent with the ideas of his political opposition and the actual operations of the navy. In this way, I thought that I could explore an area which military and naval theorists such as Clausewitz,

J. S. Corbett and A. T. Mahan had largely ignored.

I began my work in what I considered the most important archive, the papers at Blenheim Palace. After a month or so of work in the Muniment Room and in the Long Library, it was clear that Marlborough had not directed the broad strategy of the war, although he was clearly a key figure. The very positive evidence for this forced me to take a new approach and to ask new questions. First of all, if Marlborough was not the strategic genius behind the war, how were strategic decisions reached? On the basis of the answer which I found to that question, I used all the obtainable documents that were used in the strategic decision making process to determine what national goals were and how the army and navy were used to reach them. This, in turn, led me to see that the forces were complementary to one another as well as to the use of diplomacy, money and privateers. Throughout this investigation, I was disturbed to find so little reference to the public debate over war strategy in the conduct of war policy. When I turned to a study of the debate in newspapers, pamphlets and speeches I found that public comment over the conduct and strategy of the war was not in itself the object of the debate, but a superficial aspect of the political controversy over the nature of the English government.

Having begun with a narrowly defined issue, my research has led me to a general reassessment of the English view and conduct of grand strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession. I have attempted to explore and

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to survey the range of manuscripts and I have considered some of the major problems in English war conduct. The result is a broad analysis and presentation of the general pattern of English activity in a complex war. While this broad view seems a useful one to present, the method and the results cause some regrets. My conclusion about the methods by which decisions were made has forced me away from the more easily understandable and traditional habit of linking actions to individuals. In place of naming individuals, I have had to use abstract terms such as 'England', 'the Government' and 'the ministry'. The search for broad patterns has obscured personalities, and simultaneously, it has tended to replace movement in time with a static view. However, I have chosen to take the method that I have used because the chronological analysis and narrative which would have corrected these problems could not have been presented in the space available.

Acknowledgements

This study is the result of my own research, but in the course of my work I am grateful for the assistance which so many people have offered me. In that very long list of debts, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Ivor Burton of Bedford College, London, for giving me permission to use the results of his research into the numbers of effective troops sent into different theatres of the war which he included in his unpublished thesis, 'The Secretary of War and the Administration of the Army during the War of the Spanish Succession', (University of London, 1960). Mr. Martin Gilbert of Merton College, Oxford, very

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kindly allowed me to read in his home several files relating to Marlborough that were among the Churchill Papers from Chartwell in his custody.

A number of scholars and specialists have given me general guidance. Professor R. M. Hatton of the London School of Economics pointed out to me the importance of Dutch and German writing and made some very useful criticisms of my projected plan of study. Dr. Henry L. Snyder of the University of Kansas was helpful in locating some Marlborough documents. Professor Ralph Davis, University of Leicester, kindly replied to my query on trade protection and the accuracy of trade statistics. Henry Kamen of the University of Warwick gave me some broad general advice at the outset of the study as did Dr. G. D. Ramsay of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, and Professor Geoffrey Holmes of the University of Lancaster. Professor Michael Roberts of Grahamstown, South Africa, kindly offered some very useful guidance on the general literature of Scandinavian history in this period. D. D. Aldridge of the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne gave me useful information on sources of naval material as did A. W. H. Pearsall and Dr. R. J. B. Knight of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.

Librarians and archivists were extremely helpful at every place I visited. In particular, I am grateful for the facilities of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts without whose help I should have overlooked much important material. The generosity of the Modern History Board in nominating me, in three successive years, to one of its free places at the Institute of Historical

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Research in London provided a very useful collection of reference material and a place to meet with others working in related fields. In Stockholm, my father-in-law, redaktör Gunnar Sundell, introduced me to work at Riksarkivet, and made photocopies of articles when I needed them from afar.

Anthony Sarro did a superb job in turning my rough and crowded sketches into clearly readable maps. I am grateful to Elizabeth Jenkins, Barbara Campbell and Grace Garth for typing successive drafts and to P. G. M. Dickson, Charles Ingrao, R. J. B. Knight, Piers Mackesy and Gunnar Sundell for their constructive criticism on them.

On a personal note, I am deeply grateful to S. E. Morison for giving me the initial encouragement to study at Oxford and to Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, who inspired me to persevere while I was still a naval officer on his staff. The Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, made it all possible by a generous research grant and a subsequent appointment as visiting associate professor of strategy.

Above all, N. H. Gibbs of All Souls College, Chichele Professor of the History of War in the University of Oxford, has given me the day to day advice and encouragement which has allowed me to learn. His friendship and kindness, along with that of his wife, Kate, have sustained me over the years.

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J. B. Hattendorf

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A NOTE ON DATES, QUOTATIONS AND USAGE

Readers will note that the Julian or Old Style calendar was used in England until 1752. Under this system, the new year began on Lady Day, 25 March. During the period under consideration in this study, an Old Style date was eleven days behind the Gregorian or New Style calendar which was used in continental Europe outside of Russia and Sweden. In the Gregorian calendar, the new year began on 1 January.

On service at sea, the navy normally used the Old Style familiar at home. In addition, ships' logs usually were dated so that a new day began at mid-day when the navigator determined his position by observation of the Thus, each day began 12 hours before the ordinary sun. calendar day on land. The army posted in Europe normally, but not always, used the New Style, while units posted in the colonies used the Old Style. Diplomats abroad used the New for the most part, but some used the Old. Foreign agents and diplomats in London normally, but not always, used the New. The problem may have been as confusing to contemporaries as it is to the modern student, for it became customary to double date many documents using both calendars.

In order to avoid using dates in this study which would appear as fractions, I have employed two separate policies, one for the text and one for the footnotes. In footnotes, I have used only the New Style date when documents have been double dated, but I have used the date

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written on the document for those which are dated in the original using only the Old Style. I hope this will allow a researcher to find my sources with relative ease. In the text when I have discussed events which occurred in England and the colonies, I have used the Old Style dates of the month, but I have dated the year as if it began on 1 January rather than 25 March. For events which occurred on the continent, I have used the New Style. My intention in using this procedure is to give due recognition to dates which have been generally used, both by English and foreign historians, and at the same time, make the chronology clear to the modern reader. In those cases where documentary dates and timing have become a factor in interpretation for this study, full information is included in an appropriate footnote.

In all quotations, the spelling, capitalization and punctuation has been changed to conform to modern British usage. Words which have been abbreviated or written in cypher have been spelled out in full in their modern form.

Place names are spelled in their modern anglicized form, if one is in current use. Otherwise, modern local spelling is used. In the cases where names have changed, the anglicized version of the historical name has been used.

There is a special problem in using the terms 'English' and 'British' when describing the history of this period. The Union with Scotland, in the very midst of the war, changed descriptions and official titles from English to British. However, I have not found that the Union made any critical changes to war strategy. For that reason, and for the sake of clarity, I have consistently used the term

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'English' to describe the representatives, forces and the activities of the government in London. Except in quotations, I have reserved the terms 'British' and 'Britain' to geographical descriptions.

CHAPTER I

THE MACHINERY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR

Writing half a century after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Sir William Blackstone suggested that the elements of the English constitution were like 'distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either acting by themselves would have done; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all.'¹ He was speaking of the balance of the constitution in the formulation of law by Commons, Lords and Crown. His analogy, however, is a useful description of the quite different structure which was involved in the formulation and execution of grand strategy in the period 1702 to 1713.

The conduct of grand strategy is the higher direction of warfare. It is the purposeful use of armed force to achieve broad objectives in international relations. As such, it falls within the range of the powers which were traditionally exercised by the Crown. By the 17th and 18th centuries, however, Parliament had gradually asserted its right to be consulted in these affairs. During Queen Anne's reign, parliamentary influence was present, but grand strategy was still clearly formulated within the executive

¹W. Blackstone, <u>Commentaries of the Laws of England</u> (Oxford, 1765), i. 151.

sphere of government.

Even within that area, essential contributions came from a variety of sources on many levels. The growth in the size of the central government, the development of a central bureaucracy, the dramatic increase in the strength of both the army and the navy, accompanied by the reduction in the size and influence of the court, produced a complex system to control the military.¹

During the Nine Years War, the Royal Navy had expanded from 173 ships in 1688, with a tonnage of 101,892 tons and carrying 6930 guns, to 323 ships in 1697 totalling 160,000 tons and carrying 9912 guns.² The navy in Queen Anne's reign remained substantially at the same level, but by 1714, more workers were employed in industry supporting the navy than in any other industry in the country. The army, on the English establishment alone, grew from a force of 18,568 in 1701 to a peak of 69,095 in 1709.³ At the same time, the number of diplomatic representatives abroad expanded from the 80 which served William III to 136 under Anne.⁴ The increased involvement in Continental affairs,

²J. Ehrman, <u>The Navy in the War of William III</u> (Cambridge, 1953), p. xx.

¹J. H. Plumb, <u>The Growth of Political Stability in</u> <u>England 1675-1725</u> (London, 1967), p. 119 and ch. 4 in general; general studies of these problems may be found in Clayton Roberts, <u>The Growth of Responsible Government in</u> <u>Stuart England</u> (Cambridge, 1966); G. Perjés, "Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century," <u>Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum</u> <u>Hungaricae</u>, xvi (1970), pp. 1-54.

³R. E. Scouller, <u>The Armies of Queen Anne</u> (Oxford, 1966), Appendix C.

⁴D. B. Horn, <u>The British Diplomatic Service 1689-1789</u> (Oxford, 1961), p. 44.

the management of trade and colonies overseas as well as the operations of the army and navy in widely separated areas created a situation which could be no longer effectively controlled by a small group or even by an individual. The management of these affairs was carried out by the co-operation of a variety of men in a variety of What had emerged in England was not a streamcapacities. lined system consciously designed to function smoothly in the conduct of war. It worked, but it contrasted sharply with the centralized bureaucracy created in France during this same period. Walter Bagehot remarked that 'the English offices have never, since they were made, been arranged with any reference to one another; or rather they were never made, but grew as each could.'²

The relationship of all the parts may perhaps best be seen by discussing each element separately and progressing from the centre of direction to the most distant point. An examination of English central direction must necessarily range from the Queen and her closest circle of advisers to the cabinet council, the Admiralty and the War Office. It must include a discussion of the process by which information and advice were received, instructions were drawn up as well as the part played by commanders-in-chief, diplomats and colonial governors. Recent historians have tended to assume

¹See John C. Rule, 'Colbert de Torcy, an Emergent Bureaucracy, and the Formulation of French Foreign Policy, 1698-1715' in Ragnhild Hatton (ed.), <u>Louis XIV and Europe</u> (London, 1976), pp. 261-288.

²Walter Bagehot, <u>The English Constitution</u> (The World's Classics, Oxford, 1974), p. 188. See also Mark A. Thomson, <u>The Secretaries of State 1681-1782</u> (Oxford, 1932), p. 160.

that the direction of the war lay entirely in the hands of Marlborough and his close associates.¹ An investigation into the governmental process by which the war was conducted shows that there is no reason to tarnish the deserved reputation of a great commander and a successful diplomat, but overemphasizing his role tends to ignore the fact that England fought the war as part of an alliance, and it tends to obscure the impact of two important developments in the late seventeenth century: the dramatic growth in the size of armies and navies, and the development of central bureaucracies.

War Machinery in London

The growth of the administrative side of the central government had created a variety of officials who were concerned with the management of military and naval affairs. The Navy Board, The Transport Board, The Victualling Board, The Commissioners of Sick and Wounded, and the Board of Ordnance made essential contributions. However, these offices were rarely involved directly in making strategic decisions. Direction of this sort was left, in varying degrees, to the Admiralty, the Secretary at War, the Board of Trade, Parliament, the secretaries of state, the cabinet, and the Queen.

In theory, of course, it was the Sovereign who held the ultimate authority in the formulation of strategy and policy. The contrast between William III's active role

¹See for example, W. S. Churchill, <u>Marlborough:</u> <u>His Life and Times</u> (London, 1947), i. 15-16 and Correlli Barnett, <u>Marlborough</u> (London, 1974), pp. 23, 31-32 ff.

and keen interest in foreign affairs with the more subdued role of Queen Anne has overshadowed Anne's contribution in this process. Although it is becoming increasingly apparent to historians that Anne 'was not a negligible force in the politics of her reign',¹ her precise role is difficult to define. The Queen was closely concerned with foreign affairs and was kept informed of routine dispatches privately and in cabinet. A useful example of this may be found during the peace negotiations of 1709. Secretary of State Boyle wrote Lord Townshend,

> This morning I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 4th of June, which I have read to the Queen, as I must do again on Sunday night at the Council.²

It was common practice as well to report to the Queen the opinions and actions taken in the meetings of the lords of the committee.³

It is clear that the Queen's personal influence in foreign affairs had an impact on English policy. In a private memorandum written in 1711, Robert Harley gave the 'Queen's opinion and health' as the first item in his list of domestic reasons for obtaining peace with France.⁴ However, the nature of the documents make it exceedingly

¹Paul Langford, <u>Modern British Foreign Policy:</u> the <u>Eighteenth Century 1688-1815</u>, (London, 1976), p. 5.

²Bodleian Library, MSS. Eng. Hist. d.147: Boyle to Townshend, 27 May 1709.

³See for example, Staffordshire R. O. MSS. D(W) 1778 I.2. fo.177: Dartmouth to Queen Anne, 13 October 1710, and D(W)1778/188 fo.104: Lords [Minutes], 30 January 1711.

⁴Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/10, 'Minutes, Windsor', 19 October 1711. difficult to trace the origin of any policy to the Queen herself. Unlike her predecessor, she had no Portland or Heinsius to whom she penned her thoughts on foreign policy. The available evidence reveals that no single individual in London made decisions regarding grand strategy and the general conduct of the war. The business of formulating decisions within the central government took place within the cabinet. These decisions appear to have been reached by the concensus of cabinet members, with the Queen, acting on a consideration of facts, opinions, and reports obtained from many sources. The Queen was present at every cabinet meeting. Only in a brief period following the death of Prince George in 1708 were the 'Lords of the Committee of Council' alone allowed full control of national affairs.¹ On very rare occasions when the Queen was away from London, as when she was in Bath in 1703, the lords of the committee were authorized to transact all matters relating to the expedition to Portugal.² In that case, however, the basic decisions had already been made, and the lords merely supervised the progress of affairs. Normally, the Queen meeting with the lords of the committee formed the cabinet, and the sub-committees which were formed from this group reported their recommendations and

¹Blenheim, MSS. Sunderland Letterbook, i. 233: Sunderland to Galway, 2 November 1708.

²Yale University, Beinicke Rare Book Library, Osborne Collection, C-205: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 19 August 1703.

opinions to the full cabinet for approval.¹

There appears to have been a variety of committees which dealt with various problems and which prepared matters for cabinet discussion, planned detailed arrangements, and supervised the execution of plans approved in cabinet.² For example, the preparations for the expedition to Canada were being considered in committee as early as January 1711, although the plans were not presented for the approval of the full cabinet until March.³ The existence of these committees does not by any means presuppose that they controlled all matters; they performed a significant and valuable service which was clearly accepted by those who participated. In 1709, for example, the duke of Marlborough requested reinforcements for his army in Flanders. A committee considered his request and called in the Secretary of War to discuss the matter. Two particular regiments were selected and the details of the plan were presented to the cabinet at its next meeting. In this case, the recommendation of the committee was disapproved in cabinet. The forces already in the Low Countries were thought sufficient, and the two regiments

¹For a detailed description of this process, see J. H. Plumb, 'The Organisation of the Cabinet in the Reign of Queen Anne,' <u>Trans. Royal Hist. Soc</u>., 5th series, vol. 7, 1957, pp. 137-57.

²J. H. Plumb, 'Organisation of the Cabinet . . .', p. 155.

³Staffordshire R. O., MSS. D(W) 1778/188 fo.99: Lord's Minutes, 18 January 1711; fo.134: Cabinet Minutes, 25 March 1711.

were sent elsewhere.¹

The day-to-day management of foreign affairs was left to the secretaries of state and the Lord Treasurer. These men, as well as Marlborough when he was in London, were privy to nearly all information relating to foreign affairs and the conduct of the war. But precautions were taken in restricting the availability of this information beyond a very small circle. All diplomats were directed to report their activities directly to a principal secretary of state, but in some cases they were directed to report their secret information in a separate encyphered letter that would not need to be read in a full cabinet meeting.² In addition to this practice there is clear evidence of management by small groups within the cabinet. In a fragmentary note passed between Godolphin and Nottingham during a cabinet meeting, the secretary of state

¹Blenheim, MSS. Bl-22a: Boyle to Marlborough, 8 and 12 July 1709; H. L. Snyder, <u>The Marlborough-Godolphin</u> <u>Correspondence</u> (Oxford, 1975), iii. 1308: Godolphin to <u>Marlborough</u>, 10 July 1709.

²P.R.O., SP.80/18 fo.79: Stepney to Vernon, 5 February 1702; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529, fo.41: Nottingham to Hill, 3 March 1704. I have found only two exceptions to the rule that diplomats report their activities by letter. In order to maintain secrecy in war planning, Marlborough was reluctant to report matters by letter when he was able to return to London and report in person. Secondly, in Peterborough's instructions to proceed to Rome and to prevent the Electoral Prince of Saxony from becoming a Catholic, Peterborough was told 'we can neither enjoin you to correspond with either of our secy's of state, nor limit the time of your return'. P.R.O., F.O.90/37 fos. Instructions of 22 February 1712. There is an 208-10: indication that Peterborough was sent away to prevent him from causing political difficulty while Parliament was sitting. B. C. Brown, ed., <u>Letters and Diplomatic Instruc-</u> tions of Queen Anne (London, 1935), p. 357, Anne to Oxford, 16 November 1711.

penned in his tiny, characteristic script 'I intended to speak of this when the Prince's Council go out'. To which Godolphin replied in his flamboyant hand, 'I think you had better not speak of this but to the Duke of Marlborough and me, at first, and when it has been a little digested, it will not require so much time here, as it will do now'.¹ Indeed, there was a limit to what any one committee could accomplish in managing the diverse affairs of government. A committee such as the cabinet itself, required issues to be considered in depth before a sound decision could be taken by the group as a whole. At the same time, it was necessary for those who had considered matters in detail to discuss them with other members of the cabinet, both privately and in cabinet meetings.² The inability of the cabinet to consider matters in depth was apparent in 1711, for example, when a detailed recommendation on policy had been submitted by an envoy abroad. The secretary of state passed it on to the lord privy seal requesting his opinion and commenting, 'it will be of good use to the Queen's service that your Lordship should have the opportunity of considering these matters more fully than it's possible to do when the letters are hastily read, and the contents of them but loosely debated either in Cabinet or at the

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,589, fo.395: Nottingham to Godolphin with reply, undated. See also Churchill College, Cambridge, MSS. Marl 1/3. undated memo, [?1703].

²For an example of a private conversation, see H. L. Snyder, 'Communication: the Formulation of Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Reign of Queen Anne: Memoranda by Lord Chancellor Cowper of Conversation with Lord Chancellor Godolphin', <u>The Historical Journal</u>, xi (1968), 144-160.

Committees.'

The secretaries of state were the key administrative co-ordinators of the various segments of government. They corresponded with diplomats, the Board of Trade, the Admiralty, the Secretary at War, colonial governors, commanders-in-chief at sea and on land. They managed aspects of the foreign and domestic intelligence networks and routinely met with foreign envoys. In handling this vast array of business, a division of responsibility was developed over the years as a matter of convenience among the two or three men who served as principal secretaries of state. However, the secretaries were well informed of each other's activities and their daily work routinely complemented one another. The division was a matter of administrative concern, and it changed from time to time.² When one secretary was ill or indisposed, the other secretary would handle his affairs and inform him or his staff of the action taken. In special situations, such as when the Queen was in Bath during the summer, envoys were directed to send copies of their dispatches to both secretaries.³

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/205: Hedges to Stanhope, Robinson, Vernon, Whitworth, Wick, Stepney, Raby, 19 August 1703. On this occasion the Northern secretary accompanied the Queen; the Southern stayed in London.

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¹Bodleian Library, MSS. Rawl. A.286, fo.25: St. John to John Robinson, Bishop of London and Lord Privy Seal, at Utrecht, 17 October 1711.

²See Table I for the division of responsibility in this period. E. V. Gulik, <u>Europe's Classical Balance of</u> <u>Power</u> (Ithaca, N.Y., 1952), pp. 13-14, states that this division was based on the perception of separate frameworks within European relations. This argument cannot be sustained beyond the very rough natural division between Mediterranean versus northern and central Europe. While there is logic in this division, there is no evidence to support the theory that unrelated policies were conducted in these areas.

TABLE	Ι

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The division of responsibility in foreign affairs among the Secretaries of State, in general practice 1702-12.						
SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT	NORTHERN DEPARTMENT	THIRD SECRETARY				
Algiers	Bavaria	Denmark*				
Flanders+	Brunswick-Lüneberg	Sweden*				
France	Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel	Poland*				
Genoa	Circles of the Elec- Russia*					
Morocco	toral Rhine, Swabia, Upper Rhine & Franconia					
Naples	Denmark*					
Portugal Savoy	Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire					
Sicily	Flanders+					
Spain	Hanse towns					
Switzerland#	Hesse-Cassel					
(including Grison Leages, Geneva &	Holstein-Gottorp					
Lorraine)	Imperial Diet					
Tripoli	Mecklenburg-Schwerin					
Tunis	Elector Palatine					
Turkey	Poland*					
Tuscany	Prussia					
Venice	Russia*					
Naval operations on	Sweden*					
all stations	Switzerland# (including	-				
Colonial affairs	Grison Leages, Geneva & Lorraine)	a				
Military operations in the above areas	United Provinces					
(except Flanders)	Military operations in above areas (includin Flanders) and genera military administrat	ng l				

* To the Third Secretary, June 1710 to July 1711. + To the Northern Department after June 1710. # To the Northern Department, June 1710 to July 1711.

¹This division is based entirely on usage. This list is drawn from a study of the documents in P.R.O., S.P. (Foreign) series. The details for the alterations in responsibility in 1710 and 1711 are based on S.P.104/158: Boyle to Stanyon, 20 June 1710; Memo of 14 June 1710; St. John to Manning, 24 July 1711, and S.P.104/12 fo.15v. memo of 14 June 1710. Blenheim MSS. B2-1: Queensbury to Marlborough, 23 June 1710. This modifies and expands the list in D.B. Horn, <u>Great Britain</u> and Europe in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), pp. 12-13. The secretaries of state provided the official certification for orders, but they were not by themselves the policy makers. Nearly everything which appeared in a secretary's official letter had been previously discussed and approved in a meeting of the cabinet or lords of the committee.¹ The reverse was true as well, what was received was largely shared with other members of the cabinet.² The letters from abroad as well as from government departments were read in the cabinet at the meetings of the lords of the committee, and even privately to the Queen. Marlborough and Godolphin's private correspondence was regularly shared with the secretaries of state.³

The secretaries of state were responsible for maintaining close contact with a variety of groups outside the cabinet which provided essential information and advice for the conduct of the war.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,589, fo.41: Godolphin to Nottingham, 20 July 1703.

³Longleat House, Portland MSS. iv, fo.31: Marlborough to Harley, 8 July 1706; P.R.O. S.P. 87/2 fo.19: Marlborough to Nottingham, 20 August 1702; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,891: Tucker to Ellis, 2 October 1703. These are the letters in H. L. Snyder (ed.), Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence. See also Veenendaal, Briefwisseling Anthonie Heinsius (R.G.P. 163, 1978), postscript to no. 290.

¹This statement is based on a comparison of Blenheim MSS. Cl-16; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9 and 10; Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/188 with secretarial entry books, P.R.O., S.P. 104 series; Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letterbooks. This shows that these documents, for the most part are not 'minutes' in the usual sense, but notes for the secretary to use in writing his required correspondence. See the rather full example printed in E. N. Williams, The Eighteenth Century Constitution 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 113-116.

The Board of Trade served as a source of information.¹ It received regular reports from colonial governors, drafted instructions, scrutinized public accounts for colonial expenditure, reviewed the legislation passed by colonial assemblies, considered the proposals and problems of the trading companies and offered its advice on matters relating to trade and colonial affairs. It was an entirely advisory body and had no authority to carry out its recommendations which were often ignored or overridden. Although the influence of the Board was in a period of relative decline during much of the war, it did provide recommendations on colonial defence, convoys, arms supplies, manning ships and plans for expeditions to America.² In addition, it was able to provide intelligence of enemy operations overseas.³ William Blathwayt, who had been deeply involved in colonial affairs for many years, found much to complain about in colonial policy. 'I do not bring our Council of Trade into this guilt or blame', he wrote, 'for they are but Journeymen.'⁴ The power of decision lay elsewhere, but the Board served a useful service as a source of information and advice.

²Ibid., pp. 93, 101, 104, 116.

³P.R.O., C.O. 138/13 fo.321: Popple to Burchett, 15 February 1711.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/65: Blathwayt to Stepney, 27 March 1702.

¹For a detailed study of the Board in this period see Ian K. Steele, <u>Politics of Colonial Policy: The</u> <u>Board of Trade in Colonial Administration 1696-1720</u> (Oxford, 1968), pp. 85-148.

The Post Office¹ provided an administrative centre for secret intelligence. Here were located the Secret and Private Offices which opened suspicious inland mail, and the 'Foreign Secretary' who opened foreign correspond-The Deciphering Branch dealt with encrypted disence. patches and letters culled from a variety of sources at home and abroad. All this information was passed on to a secretary of state. The Post Master, London, also served as an intermediary to whom secret agents serving abroad could send their reports for the use of the secretaries of state and the cabinet.² Not all foreign intelligence was managed through the Post Office. On some occasions, special agents were sent abroad to obtain particular information or to perform special functions; 3 in other cases, private correspondents would regularly report information. A number of these informants were merchants, among whom the best known to historians is John Drummond in Amsterdam who played such an important role in the

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/45V: Sunderland to Cadogan, 9 May 1709.

¹See K. L. Ellis, <u>The Post Office in the Eighteenth</u> <u>Century: A Study in Administrative History</u> (Oxford, 1958), pp. 62-3, 65-6, 127-131; K. L. Ellis 'British Communication and Diplomacy in the Eighteenth century', <u>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</u>, xxxi, (1958), pp. 158-67; J. C. Sainty, <u>Secretaries of State</u> (London, 1973), pp. 51-2; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 32,306: Deciphering Office Papers; MSS. Loan 29/209 fos.397-418: Blencoe to Harley, 22 June 1706; MSS. Loan 29/45U various deciphering office papers.

³For example, Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WWW, fos.679-88: 'Report of a voyage made from England to France and back again' [to observe French naval activities], 20 March-June 1704. See also Spring Macky, <u>Memoirs of</u> the Secret Services of John Macky, Esq., (London, 1733), pp. xii-xviii.

peace negotiations at the end of the war.¹ Drummond was one of many others who sent information. The papers of ministers have large sections of letters from such informants located in various cities. Sometimes their information took only the form of an ordinary newsletter, and in other cases, such as Drummond's, they could provide a very important channel of communication. Like all intelligence information, it was used to confirm reports, information and judgements obtained from other sources.²

Foreign envoys in London played an extremely important part within the process by which the government made decisions in grand strategy. These representatives of allied governments provided information on specific points as well as recommendations for broad policy which they obtained through instructions from their own countries. Often these proposals were made as formal memorials to the Queen through a secretary of state³ or in an audience with the Queen. However, the relationships of these representatives were not entirely limited to formal applications. Many envoys developed a range of influential contacts through which they proceeded to press the viewpoint and opinions of their governments. During the course of the war, the most important envoys were those of the major

³These are contained in P.R.O., S.P. 100 series.

¹See Ragnhild Hatton, 'John Drummond in the War of the Spanish Succession: Merchant Turned Diplomatic Agent' in R. M. Hatton and M. S. Anderson, <u>Studies in Diplomatic</u> <u>History</u>, (Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 69-96.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W)1778 i. ii. 145: Dartmouth to Queen Anne, 3 September 1710, discussing intelligence and other reports on naval activity at Dunkirk.

allies. Each in their own way attempted to influence England's decisions. In the planning for the 1704 campaign, the Imperial envoy, Graf Wratislaw, was actively seeking the support of key Ministers. Later, his successors used personal connections and the press as well as discussions in cabinet and audiences with the Queen in their efforts to influence English ministers. ¹ Other residents and envoys conducted themselves in a similar way. Marinus van Vrijbergen, the envoy of the States-General in London, paralleled his formal applications to the Queen by numerous meetings with secretaries of state, Marlborough and Godolphin. He participated in meetings of the cabinet and the lords of the committee, and on occasion, had private audiences with the Queen.² The Hanoverian resident, Graf von Bothmar, became involved in party politics in an attempt to press the Elector's point of view, much to the disgust of the Government in London.³

Foreign intelligence, colonial affairs, and the opinions of the allies were all matters of direct concern to the Government in the formulation of its policy and strategy. In addition to providing a link between the cabinet and the various sources of such information, the

¹Elke Jarnut Derbolav, <u>Die Österreichische</u> <u>Gesandtshaft in London (1701-11): Ein Beitrag zur</u> <u>Geschichte der Haager Allianz</u> (Bonn, 1972), pp. 155-170, 265-8, 271-8.

²E.g., Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WWW, fo. 513: Vrijbergen aan Griffier der Staaten-General, 14 March 1704; WWW fos. 724-5, 21 November 1704; YYY fos. 110-1, 16 September 1710; WWW fo. 692, 7 October 1704.

³Wolfgang Michael, England under George I: The beginnings of the Hanoverian Dynasty (London, 1936), pp. 10-12; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/6: Instructions to Thomas Harley, March 1712.

secretaries of state also provided the link between the cabinet and the armed forces.

The powers of the Admiralty were vested in the office of the Lord High Admiral. These powers were exercised in the name of this office alternatively by a single individual, by an individual with the advice of a specially appointed council, or by a board of commissioners. In the event that all these methods failed, the office reverted to the Crown. During the War of the Spanish Succession, all four of these methods were used to conduct Admiralty affairs.¹

For eight of the twelve war years, Admiralty affairs were dealt with by a Lord High Admiral. In 1701, King William appointed Lord Pembroke to this office, reviving an office which had been in commission since the removal of the duke of York in 1684. William's decision to take the office out of commission and return it to an individual appointment had been an effort to remove the political disputes among the commissioners which had hampered the management of the navy. However, Pembroke's term of office was brief. Within a few months of his appointment, the new Queen asked him to step down in favour of her husband, Prince George of Denmark. The circumstances of Pembroke's appointment, his experience as the senior Admiralty commissioner, and as one of the Lords Justices, allowed him to perform his duties without a formally appointed council of advisors. Prince George, however, did have a

¹For a list of the various office holders and their dates, see J. C. Sainty, <u>Admiralty Officials 1660-1870</u> (London, 1975), pp. 21-22, 32-33.

council. Both the appointments of Pembroke and Prince George were within the traditional practice of the early Tudor navy when great officers of state, not seagoing men, held the office.¹ In Prince George's case, the council was appointed apparently as a check on the growth of royal authority as well as a practical advisory council to a man who was in poor health and who had had limited experience in directly administering a department of The Prince, himself, had a keen interest in naval state. affairs and, as a young man in Denmark, had been given some naval training. The appointment of the Prince's Council in 1702² was directly modeled on the instructions and duties laid out for the duke of York in 1673. The council performed the day-to-day functions with the approval of the Lord High Admiral. All warrants, commissions and instructions were signed by the Prince, and the Admiralty secretary seems to have met with the Prince on a daily basis. The council consisted of five to seven members, two of whom were not naval officers. The business of the council could be carried on at the Admiralty office by one or more of the council members.³ Normally all of the decisions taken by the council would

¹J. A. Williamson, <u>Hawkins of Plymouth</u> (London, 1969), p. 238. P.R.O., <u>PC2/79</u> fo.129: Minutes of the Privy Council, 21 May 1702. Declaration of Prince George's appointment.

²For studies of this, see G. F. James and J. J. Sutherland Shaw, 'Admiralty Administration and Personnel, 1619-1714', <u>Bull. Inst. Hist. Research</u>, xiv (1936), pp. 10-24, 166-183. The relevant documents are in Bodleian Library, MSS. Rawl. A. 465.

³P.R.O., ADM2/28 fos.335-38: Lord High Admiral's Instruction to his Council, 23 May 1702.

be approved by the Prince. During the Prince's illness in the autumn of 1702, one member of the council was authorized to carry on Admiralty affairs.¹ The following spring and thereafter, two or more members were required to conduct Admiralty business in the absence of the Prince.² During regular business when the Prince was available and in good health, one to five members of the council met to conduct business, although they came and went during each working day as required. On the days when only one member of the council was present to conduct affairs, it was most often Admiral Sir David Mitchell.³ It was also Mitchell who was regularly called to go abroad and discuss the naval requirements and plans with the Dutch Admiralties.

Prince George, himself, played a role in the day-today affairs of the Admiralty. There is no record of the views which he expressed in cabinet meetings, but a few fragments in secretarial correspondence reveal that he did put forth his own views and that he personally made some

²P.R.O., ADM2/28 fo.302: Lord High Admiral to Rooke, Mitchell, Shovell, Hill, and Churchill, 15 March 1703.

³See for example P.R.O., ADM3/22 Admiralty Minutes, 14 October, 4, 5 October 1706; 27 January, 5 April, 21, 28, 29 July, 4, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19 August; 1, 8, 9 October 1707. Some historians have suggested that Admiral George Churchill, Marlborough's brother, was the only functional member of the Admiralty and through him Marlborough directly controlled the navy. There is no evidence for this. See P. K. Watson, "The Commission for Victualling the Navy, the Commission for Sick and Wounded Seamen and Prisoners of War and the Commission for Transport, 1702-14," (Univ. of London Ph.D. thesis, 1965) pp. 32-44.

¹P.R.O., ADM:2/29 fo.230: Warrant to the Council to Act during the indisposition of the Lord High Admiral, 31 October 1702.

appointments.¹ The Admiralty minutes show that he met in the Admiralty chambers for routine business on a number of occasions.²

At the death of Prince George on 28 October 1708, the Prince's Council was dissolved and the office of Lord High Admiral reverted to the Crown.³ All business was conducted in the Queen's name for one month. On 29 November Lord Pembroke resumed the position of Lord High Admiral after a bitter political struggle which concerned the apportionment of several offices among the Whigs and Tories.⁴ Once again Pembroke performed his duties without an advisory council. After having held the position for exactly one year, Pembroke resigned from his position bringing another political storm.⁵ The office of Lord High Admiral was

²P.R.O., ADM3/17-23. He was at the Admiralty in 1702, once; in 1704, twice; 1705, 6 times; 1707, 7 times. During the final year of his life, the council attended the Prince at Kensington Palace to conduct routine business once, and occasionally, twice a week. The exact nature and extent of his influence cannot be ascertained, but it does not appear that he was a cypher.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,356,fo.310: Tilson to Stepney, 2 November 1708. All Admiralty orders, appointments, and secretarial correspondence for this period are in P.R.O., ADM.2/1744, a volume which is out of sequence with the others for Queen Anne's reign.

⁴Brit. Lib., Lansdowne 1236, fo.251: Sunderland to [Newcastle?], 4 November 1708; Leicestershire R.O., MSS. Finch 4950: Bromley to Nottingham, 11 November 1708. B. W. Hill, <u>The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742</u> (London, 1976), pp. 118-20.

⁵See H. L. Snyder, 'Queen Anne Versus the Junto: the effort to place Orford at the Head of the Admiralty in 1709' <u>Huntington Library Quarterly</u>, xxv (1972), pp. 323-342.

¹For example, Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,59J, fo.123v.: Clarke to Burchett, 3 October 1702; Worcester College, Oxford. Clarke MSS. 7.3: Clarke to Burchett, 5 September, 30 September, 6 October 1703. See also the account of Prince George's participation at a board meeting, National Maritime Museum, MS69/028, "Proceedings of Vice Admiral Graydon."

placed in commission, and executed by a board of seven members, two of whom were required, at any time, to conduct business.¹

The business of the Admiralty, in whatever form it was managed, involved a wide variety of considerations. The most important of these for strategy were the issuing of orders to commanders at sea and gathering intelligence from reports made by the fleet. In both these areas, the Admiralty worked closely with the cabinet, through the Secretary of State for the Southern Department.² General quidance was received from the secretary of state, and the Admiralty, in turn, shared its intelligence information. The Admiralty considered the specific matters of ship In the assignments and the officers who manned them. course of planning, the Admiralty provided the secretary of state with an assessment of the equipment and the capacity of the fleet to perform a particular task. But such technical matters were not allowed to remain the exclusive province of the Admiralty. In many cases, judgements were carefully reviewed at the cabinet level.³

The Admiralty was required to regularly report the

¹The office remained in commission, except for the brief appointment of the duke of Clarence in 1827-28, until it reverted to the Crown in 1964.

²This was part of the arbitrary and informal division of labour between the secretaries. In other reigns, naval affairs were not exclusively within the Southern Department. See John Ehrman, <u>The Navy in the War of William III</u> (Cambridge 1953) pp. 306, 512-3, 606.

³These generalizations are based on a detailed examination and comparison between P.R.O. ADM.2/27-45: Admiralty Instructions; ADM.1/4087-96: Secretaries of State to the Admiralty; ADM.2/264-66: Admiralty to Secretaries of State; ADM.3/16-27: Admiralty minutes.

state of the fleet to the cabinet,¹ and in addition, all orders to any admiral or commander-in-chief were submitted to the Queen in cabinet or to a committee of the lords of the cabinet council before they were dispatched.² Representatives of the Admiralty met frequently with the cabinet council and sought from it general guidance in giving orders to ships at sea.³

Although the Admiralty's direction of affairs was controlled and modified by the cabinet, the Admiralty's function in framing the drafts of instructions and in providing technical information was an important contribution to the process by which a cabinet decision was reached. Although the Admiralty was not in a position to have the final authority in affairs at sea, its perceptions were an important influence in defining the available options which could be chosen.

The function of the cabinet in reviewing Admiralty instructions was not its only connection with the fleet at sea. There also existed a direct link between the secretary of state and a commander-in-chief, by-passing the Admiralty through a routine administrative process. First, a secretary of state directed the Admiralty to instruct an

³Blenheim MSS. Cl-5: Burchett to Sunderland, 22 February 1708, is an example of this working relationship.

¹P.R.O., ADM.1/4087 fo.39: Secretary Vernon's directions for the Admiralty to report to the King twice a week on the manning and operation of the fleet; S.P.44/104 fo.33: Nottingham to Burchett, 30 June 1702, required a weekly report; ADM.8: The monthly lists of ships and vessels in sea pay were also provided to the secretary of state.

²P.R.O., S.P.44/210, fo.11: Sunderland to the Prince's Council, 8 March 1707; Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Cabinet Minutes, 7 March 1707.

admiral that he was to receive orders from Her Majesty by the hand of a secretary of state.¹ The Admiralty issued a warrant authorizing the officer to receive such instructions. Then, the secretary of state would send instructions directly to the admiral from the Queen under her signet and sign manual. These orders would invariably require the admiral to report his activities directly to a secretary of state, who in turn would provide additional instructions. This correspondence was not necessarily reported to the Admiralty. In some cases, commanders were advised to make no mention of it to anyone other than a secretary of state.²

In normal usage this arrangement created neither a conflict in direction nor an overlap in authority between the professional and political direction of fleet movements. It was clearly a complementary system by which the two sources of direction worked together, and in which the cabinet and Crown maintained the ultimate authority. In a note to a colleague concerning the agenda for a cabinet meeting, Lord Treasurer Godolphin indicated the manner in which this duality was used:

> It might want to be considered what uses the Queen would apply this Squadron to, and what part of these services might be communicated to the Prince's Council, and the orders given to Sir George Rooke by them, and what part of

¹E.g., Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,888, fo.301: Hedges to Prince George, 8 June 1702.

²Staffordshire R. O. MSS. D(W) 1778/188, fo.110v.: Minutes 14 February 1711; P.R.O., S.P.104/79, fo.21: St. John to Wishart, 16 February 1711.

the orders ought to be secret, and sent to him by a secretary of state.¹

Thus, the Admiralty served as the administrative co-ordinators of the navy and the technical advisors to the cabinet which retained the strategic direction of affairs at sea. However, by regularly reporting the state of the navy, collecting and reporting intelligence, and framing instructions, the Admiralty played an active part in the planning and execution of grand strategy.

The army was managed through quite different offices. From 1702 until 1708, the senior officer was the 'Generalissimo of all Her Majesty's Forces by Sea and Land'.² This unusual office had no precedent and was not continued after 1708. It was created for Prince George of Denmark, and it was held by him concurrently while Lord High Admiral.

The conjunction of these two offices in the Queen's consort along with the Prince's regular attendance at all cabinet meetings,³ his signature on naval and military commissions, appointments, and instructions indicates strongly that the intention was to delegate to the Prince, as far as was possible, the duties of the Sovereign in

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,591, fo.252: Unsigned and unaddressed note in Godolphin's hand, 20 February 1704.

²P.R.O., P.C.2/79, fo.95: Privy Council minutes, 17 April 1702; Bodleian Library, MSS. Rawl. A.465: Patent of Generalissimo, 8 June 1702.

³J. H. Plumb, 'The Organisation of the Cabinet in the Reign of Queen Anne', <u>Trans. R. Hist. Soc</u>. (5th ser., vii. 1957) p. 142. M. A. Thompson, <u>Secretaries of State 1681-</u> <u>1782</u>, p. 89, has drawn an incorrect conclusion on this point.

relation to the forces.¹ Prince George has suffered greatly at the hands of historians who persistently have regarded him as the dullest of royal relations. He was often in poor health, but he had a keen interest in naval and military affairs. There is little doubt that Anne was deeply attached to him and respected his judgement. Just six months before Anne became Queen, the Prussian envoy in London reported to Berlin that he had had a rather long discussion with the Prince on public affairs, a subject in which the envoy found him 'highly educated'.² As Generalissimo, he performed an administrative function for the Army in approving appointments and assignments.³ The importance of this position was revealed at the Prince's death in 1708. At that time, the Secretary at War told Marlborough that the Prince's death had 'at present put a stop to the course of business in this office'.⁴ For a time, there was confusion as to the form and manner in which appointments, commissions and instructions were to be given, but this was resolved by giving the authority in the Queen's name.

After Prince George, the next senior officer in the

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fo.336: Bonet to Frederick I, 16 September 1701.

³Cambridge University Lib. C(H) Papers 6: Walpole to Cardonnel, 6 August 1708.

⁴Cambridge University Lib. C(H) Papers 6: Walpole to Marlborough, 2 November 1708.

¹There is insufficient evidence to make a secure argument on this point, and no authority has offered a convincing explanation. See C. M. Clode, <u>Military Forces</u> of the Crown (London, 1869) ii., pp. 256-7, 690,694-5; R. E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 5,55.

army was the Captain-General. This office was held by Lord Marlborough from 1702 until the end of 1711 when he was succeeded by the duke of Ormonde. The Captain-General was responsible 'for the commanding, regulating, and keeping in Discipline'¹ of the military. He was concerned with the basic training, general organization and welfare of all troops wherever they were stationed. Beyond matters of this nature, he did not give instructions to commandersin-chief. He did not give orders for operations outside the areas in which he was specifically designated a commander-in-chief. Marlborough's position as ambassador required a correspondence with other commanders-in-chief, but this connection was never used to direct military operations. At the same time, many officers clearly understood the importance of Marlborough's political position, and they sought his political patronage and his support for their own military plans. Unless these plans directly concerned Marlborough's own operations, he forwarded those that appeared to have merit to London, asking the cabinet to judge whether they could be practically carried out. As the senior military officer, Marlborough appropriately encouraged other commanders. However, he was careful to ensure that his encouragement backed the policies of the Government in London.²

The Secretary at War was by long practice the

¹R. E. Scouller, <u>The Armies of Queen Anne</u>, pp. 55-56.

²See the summary to this chapter for a typical example of Marlborough's role in dealing with other commanders.

secretary to the Captain-General. In this capacity, he could and did issue orders in the Captain-General's name. At the same time, he was directed to follow the orders and directions that came from the Queen and a secretary of state.¹ The position of Secretary at War had developed from a minor secretarial position through the management of William Blathwayt, who had held the position from 1683 until 1704. It had gradually increased in prestige to the point where the Secretary was often called upon to speak for the Government on military affairs in the House of Commons.² Earlier, the senior army officer had served as the liaison for the army with a secretary of state and the cabinet, and the Secretary at War was called only on occasion for special examinations.³ During Queen Anne's reign, the Secretary increasingly was called upon to provide information on the state of army affairs and the availability and condition of troops.⁴ In carrying out these duties, the Secretary at War normally dealt with the Secretary of State for the Northern Department on administrative matters. However, matters relating to the higher

³Gloucestershire R.O. MSS. D.2659/2 undated fragment [Temp. William III] by Blathwayt.

⁴For example, P.R.O., S.P.44/104, fo.222: Nottingham to Blathwayt 5 March 1703; Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/188 fo.80: Cabinet Council Minutes, 19 December 1710.

¹P.R.O., S.P.44/172, fo.150: Patent for Secretary of War, 15 February 1708.

²For a detailed study of this development, see R. E. Scouller, <u>Armies of Queen Anne</u>, pp. 10-22 and I. F. Burton, 'The Secretary at War and the Administration of the Army during the War of the Spanish Succession' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1960); G. A. Jacobsen, <u>William</u> <u>Blathwayt: a late seventeenth century English Administra-</u> tor (Oxford, 1933).

direction of the war were generally dealt with by the secretary of state in whose area the operations were to be conducted.

The participation of the Secretary at War in dealing with questions of strategy was limited to technical and administrative considerations. In comparison to the Admiralty's similar position, the Secretary at War's impact was less than that of his naval colleagues. The War Office was neither a gathering point for intelligence from abroad nor a headquarters for directing operations. The Captain-General's position in the cabinet and his presence in London when the army was in winter quarters lessened the importance of the Secretary at War by comparison. However, the Secretary continued to be a valuable source of information for the cabinet in making its decisions. After the death of Prince George, the Secretary gained more prestige, but it remained a tenuous and uncertain position.

In early 1711, when Marlborough's political position was at a low point, a committee of the lords of the cabinet council was appointed to consider the state of the army and to deal with a number of administrative matters. It was a short-lived experiment, but it was an important step in the long process by which the War Office was enhanced as an administrative centre, and by which statesmen came increasingly to depend on it for professional and technical advice.¹

¹Staffordshire R.O. D(W)1778 III/0/16, fo.75-76: Dartmouth to Portmore, 6 March 1711; P.R.O., S.P.44/109: St. John to Secretary of War, 2 March 1711; I. F. Burton, 'The Committee of Council at the War Office: An experiment in Cabinet Government under Anne', <u>The Historical Journal</u>, iv (1961), pp. 78-103.

Parliament was another very important factor in the machinery by which England conducted the war. Experience had shown that it could not formulate policy, but at the same time it could not be ignored.¹ The decision as to whether the nation would enter into war or not was a decision for Parliament. In 1701 Marlborough, among other influential men, thought that if the King should enter into war on his own authority 'we shall never see a quiet day more in England'. A dispute between Crown and Parliament on that issue would be disastrous for the country as well as make English power in Europe entirely ineffective.² Once this decision was made, the Government could formulate its own measures since Parliament and the public were not well informed about the details of foreign affairs. On occasion, information which was communicated to Parliament was modified or given incompletely for political purposes which were designed to avoid controversy.³ As long as the appropriate funds were voted and supplies could be maintained, then the Government needed to pay little regard in its conduct of the war for the 'many murmurings, and hollow

¹See M. A. Thomson, 'Parliament and Foreign Policy 1689-1714' in R. Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds.) <u>William</u> <u>III and Louis XIV</u> (Liverpool, 1968), pp. 130-39; D. H. Wollman 'Parliament and Foreign Policy 1697-1714' (University of Wisconsin Ph.D. thesis, 1970).

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,775, fo.232-3: Marlborough to Vernon, 3/14 October 1701.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 35,854, fo.9: Lord Cowper's diary, 26 November 1705.

noises of distant winds'¹ which were heard in Parliament. In the case that the necessary money was not voted, then the Government's plans were at least partially changed. In 1712, the failure of Parliament to provide for some services in Spain forced the Government to contradict its previous instructions.² The attitude of Parliament in the matter of supplies, in particular, was a critical concern for those who directed the war as well as for the allies who observed the situation in England.³

The Machinery for defence in the colonies and on distant stations

The defences of the trading posts in India, the East Indies, the eastern Mediterranean and in West Africa were left largely to the responsibility of the companies which dealt with trade in those areas: The East India Company, the Levant Company, and the Royal African Company. In Africa, 'separate traders' were allowed into the trade upon payment of a 10 percent levy on English and colonial exports and certain imports. The proceeds of this were to be applied to the maintenance of the forts on the African coast.⁴ In fact, these forts were of little military value. In 1706, Fort St. James at the mouth of the River Gambia

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7059, fo.39v.: Harley to Stepney, 31 October 1704.

²P.R.O., FO.9/37, fo.222: Dartmouth to Chetwynd, 1 April 1712.

³Blenheim, Sunderland Letterbook, i. p. 245: Sunderland to Galway, 23 November 1708; Blenheim MSS. Al-14: Marlborough to Godolphin, 13 July 1704; P.R.O., FO.9/37, fo.135: Dartmouth to Peterborough, 18 May 1711.

⁴I. K. Steele, <u>Politics of Colonial Policy</u>, p. 126.

needed to be put into 'a condition to withstand the assaults of an enemy and vermin.'¹ Another was reported by the inhabitants to be 'in a ruinous condition this 8 or 10 years and they are afraid of being murdered by its fall.'² In planning one of the very few naval expeditions to attack French settlements in West Africa, the Admiralty directed the naval officers involved to work closely with the agents of the Royal African Company. The warships were directed to take and destroy the French settlements near Cape Verde, Sénégal and Gorée. The concerns of the Company were most important, and this order was to be modified if the agent in the area wished to take over Gorée. In that case, only Sénégal was to be destroyed.³

When the trading companies found that they could not protect their own trade, they applied for assistance to the Admiralty through the Board of Trade. In general, the major threat to trade was in home waters and in the seas near the major areas of fighting. On distant stations, the companies were often able to provide for themselves the best protection and intelligence about the enemy. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Levant Company carefully obtained information about enemy privateers and warships operating along the trade routes. Information came from the British envoy in Constantinople, consuls, and company

¹P.R.O., T.70/5, fo.22v: John Snow to Thos. Pindar, 2 December 1706.

²P.R.O., T.70/5, fo.42v: Extract of Andrew Thompson's letter, Anamabo, 4 March 1708.

³P.R.O. ADM.1/4089, fo.8: Nottingham to Prince's Council, 2 July 1703.

agents. The agent at Leghorn, in particular, was required to send timely news to the Company's fleet and, if possible, to maintain several vessels on patrol in order to report French movements.¹ In the western Mediterranean, close to the fighting in Spain and Italy and the major French bases, this information was shared with the naval officers who were assigned to convoy duty. The course of action which was to be taken in protecting trade was decided by the naval commander in conference with his captains with assistance of information provided by the Company.²

In America, the situation was somewhat similar to that of the trading companies in other areas, but the threat from the enemy was much greater. Each of the colonies, on the mainland and in the West Indies, was expected to provide its own military defence and to maintain the necessary forces and fortifications from the revenue of its own taxation. In order to achieve this, governors were sent out with commissions as captain -general as well as vice-admiral within their respective colonies. Typically, a governor was given the power 'to levy, arm, muster, command and employ all persons whatsoever' for the defence of the colony both on land and at sea as well as to transport such forces to any other colony as required for mutual defence.³ Many governors were also authorized

¹P.R.O. S.P.105/115: Levant Company to Agent at Leghorn, 26 November 1703; to [Robert Sutton], 14 June 1705.

²National Maritime Museum, LBK.44: Baker to Norris, 15 May 1710.

³P.R.O., P.C.5/3, fo.562: Instructions to Robert Hunter, Governor of Virginia, 17 April 1707.

to issue letters of marque and reprisal and to maintain vice-admiralty courts. Colonial assemblies were encouraged to provide for their own defence and such legislation was readily given the royal assent.¹

The concept was logical, but problems were numerous. Royal colonies and governors appointed by the Crown would more readily follow direction from London in these matters than colonial proprietors and colonial assemblies.² Tn order to rectify the situation to some degree, the Government in London attempted to augment the forces available in the colonies and to establish a more effective system of defence in America. In a report in 1702, the Board of Trade pointed out the disparity in defence preparations taken by Crown colonies and proprietary colonies. Referring to the proprietary governments in the Bahamas, Carolina, Maryland, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the Board noted that those colonies were 'in a state wholly defenceless' and unwilling to take any action to remedy the situation.³ However, the ability of the colonies to provide for their own defence varied considerably. In order to provide some measure of general security, a scheme of contribution in terms of men and money was worked out in London for each of the colonies on the American mainland. In addition, the Crown advanced

¹For example, P.R.O., P.C. 5/3, fo. 451: Privy Council Minutes, 13 December 1705, Approving an Act of Antiqua.

²For a summary of these difficulties see G. H. Gutteridge, <u>The Colonial Policy of William III</u> (London, 1966), pp. 179-81, and C. M. Andrews, <u>The Colonial Period</u> of American History (New Haven, 1938), iv. 374-89.

³P.R.O., C.O. 324/8, fo. 30v: Board of Trade to King William, 24 January 1702. East and West New Jersey surrendered their proprietary charter in early 1702.

money for the immediate repair of certain frontier forts.¹

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Some colonies were more exposed to attack than others, and some served as the security for others. The New York frontier forts, for example, were the only security from French attack on Virginia.² The frontier of Massachusetts was the security for Connecticut.³ Yet, despite encouragement from London, there was little desire for co-operation among the colonies. Some colonists in Maryland saw that they were so well protected by other colonies that there was no need at all to send a military man there as governor.⁴ In Pennsylvania, despite the urgent pleas of the lieutenant-governor, the Assembly refused to contribute any men to a joint expedition with Massachusetts, to defend their own coastline, or even to encourage the Indians who had offered their assistance in defending the colony.⁵

Naval forces which were sent to the colonies in America were typically supplied with general instructions to protect Her Majesty's colonies 'in such manner as upon consulting the Captains under your command, and a mature consideration by you and them of the intelligence you receive, shall be judged may most conduce to the annoying the Enemy, and

¹P.R.O., P.C.5/3, fo.171: Instructions to Cornbury, 1702. L. W. Labaree, (ed.) <u>Royal Instructions to British</u> <u>Colonial Governors 1670-1776</u>, (New York, 1967), i. 412.

²P.R.O., P.C.2/79, fos.148-9: Instructions to Nicholson, 11 June 1702.

³P.R.O., P.C.5/3, fo.362: Instructions to the Governors of Connecticut and Massachusetts, 23 March 1703.

⁴Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/285: Memorial recommending Tobias Bowles as Governor of Maryland, no date.

⁵Newberry Library, Ayer MSS. 701: Gookin to Nicholson and Vetch, 17 June 1709.

protecting her Majesty's Plantations, and the trade in those parts'. In addition, the commander was directed to consult the governors of the colonies in the area where he was serving and seek their recommendations as well as obtaining information from them. This was also to be considered at a council of war with the captains.¹ A certain number of ships were regularly left 'to attend' on the colonies for their security. When such ships were left when the main squadron was cruising elsewhere, the governor of the colony was authorised to give direct orders to them for the defence of the colony.²

The direction of military and naval forces in the colonies and on distant stations was, thus, largely in the hands of local authorities. Operating under broad general directives, the forces were dependent on the information, initiative, and resources available to them locally. The government in London attempted to co-ordinate these affairs only when it was apparent that local resources were inadequate. Additional forces were sent to augment those provided by the trading companies and colonies usually when it was apparent that they could not themselves provide what was necessary.

The Machinery for England's conduct of the war on the Continent and in European waters

Time and distance were as much a factor in controlling forces in Europe as they were in more distant areas, but

¹P.R.O., ADM. 2/34, fos.352-61: Instructions to Captain W. Kerr, 27 March 1706.

²For example, P.R.O., ADM. 2/1049: Lord High Admiral to the Governor of the Leeward Islands, 15 February 1704.

there were also additional complications. As in other areas, it was a matter of prudence and necessity that instructions from London be considered at the scene of action in the light of practicality and recent events. Commanders-in-chief were directed to govern themselves

> . . . by the advice and opinion of a Council of War, which Council shall consist of Flag Officers when such matters are to be therein proposed and debated as relate only to the Service at Sea, and of the said officers, and the Commanders-in-Chief, and other General Officers of Our Land Forces, when such things are to be considered of as relate to the Service both at Sea and Land.¹

Operating under similar instructions in 1706, Lord Peterborough, Commander-in-Chief in Spain, complained to the Ministry that he was uncertain what action he should take without having exact directions from his superiors in London. In reply, Godolphin asked him,

> . . . is it possible My Lord, to give positive orders at so great a distance, and upon services so remote, without their being liable to be very inconvenient and even absurd before they come to be executed, and an order may be very well grounded and reasonably given in May or June, with regard to the position of affairs at that time, and yet that position and those affairs may be so changed before July or August when this order comes to be executed, as to render it neither practicable nor reasonable. . . .²

The war council was an important aspect in the execution of orders for it was on the reasoning and authority of a council that an order could be modified according to the

¹B. Tunstall (ed.) <u>The Byng Papers</u> (Naval Records Soc., lxviii, 1931), p. 203: Instructions to Byng, 8 July 1708.

²New York Public Library, Montague Collection: Godolphin to [Peterborough], 15 August 1706.

situation at the scene of action. It was standard practice to submit the minutes of war councils to higher authority in support of actions taken. This practice was brought into question early in the war by the court martial of Rear-Admiral Sir John Munden for failure to follow his orders in attacking the French squadron at Corunna in May 1702.¹ Although Munden was cashiered from service, his acquittal was based on the validity of a war council's judgement in such circumstances.²

When the navy was operating jointly with a Dutch squadron, the procedures to be followed in war council were specified by treaty.³ Decisions were to be reached by a strict majority of votes. However, the treaty stipulation that three Dutch ships were to be supplied for every five English ships insured English predominance in war council. A Dutch refusal to participate on the basis of conflicting orders or an absence of orders from the Hague, could reduce the possibility of success for English forces acting alone.⁴

Frequently, it was impossible to know in London what particular forces were capable of doing in a specific situation. In that circumstance only a broad indication could be given and the specific operation had to be worked

²P.R.O., ADM. 1/5264: Courts Martial Reports, 1702.

¹Gloucestershire R.O., MSS. D1833/X4, p. 45: Rooke to Clark, 29 June 1702.

³The Treaty of Westminster, 3 March 1678, and the supplementary agreements of 26 July 1678 and 29 April 1689 which laid down the procedures were renewed by the Treaty of 11 November 1701.

⁴An example of such a consideration can be seen in Blenheim Palace, MSS. C2-33: Whitaker to Sunderland, 16 October 1708.

out at the scene. In 1705, for example, the States-General voted a resolution urging England to join the Dutch in sending immediate aid to the Duke of Savoy. In response to this, orders were sent to the English commanders in Spain and the Mediterranean directing them to apply to the King of Spain and the Duke of Savoy for direction and guidance. The secretary of state commented that this 'is as much as could be done, or at least all Her Majesty thought fit, it not being possible at this distance to judge of the present circumstances and position of affairs in Catalonia'. As events unfolded, it proved impossible to assist Savoy as planned since the Spanish campaign had not resulted in the easy victory that had been expected.² Such situations were not uncommon. In 1704, a council of war decided that it was impracticable for the fleet to attempt to carry out its instructions for an attack on Cadiz without an adequate supporting army. Instead, the council decided to take advantage of the weak defences of Gibraltar.³ When news of the success of this operation reached London, the Lord High Treasurer remarked in a letter to Richard Hill in Savoy, 'Our last news from Sir George Rooke gave an account that he had possessed himself of Gibraltar, which I suppose you hear sooner than we; I know not how far it is tenable, or can be of use to us; those

¹Blenheim, MSS. Al-25: Hedges to Marlborough, ll September 1705.

²New York Public Library, Montague Collection: Godolphin to [Peterborough], 15 August 1706.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5440, fo.197: Council of War of Flag Officers on Board HMS <u>Royal Katherine</u>, 17 July 1704.

at Lisbon will be the best judges and directors of that matter'.

Such judgement and direction had to be soundly based on authoritative information as well as on a firm understanding of national policy and objectives. In dealing with affairs of this nature in Europe and in the Mediterranean, commanders-in-chief necessarily joined with diplomats. The Government in London expected that diplomats and senior officers working together would have the necessary information and judgement to make the appropriate decisions.² For example in the summer of 1711, there was some suspicion that Portugal might make a separate peace with France. When the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Portugal wrote home for directions what he should do if such a situation arose, he was told by the secretary of state,

> . . . you are to consult with the Ministers of the Queen and the States residing at Lisbon, and the Admirals in the Mediterranean what measures are proper to be taken, your Lordship is on the spot where these things are transacted, you have a perfect knowledge of the situation of the public affairs, and I am therefore to desire you will propose what you conceive must adviseable to be done at such a conjuncture, upon which at present I can 3 not send you any further instructions.³

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529, fo.57: Godolphin to Hill, 15 August 1704.

²For detailed studies of the diplomatic service at this time, see D. B. Horn, <u>The British Diplomatic Service</u> <u>1689-1789</u> (Oxford, 1961) and H. L. Snyder "The British Diplomatic Service during the Godolphin Ministry," in Hatton and Anderson, eds., <u>Studies in Diplomatic History</u> pp. 47-68.

³P.R.O. S.P. 104/111, fo.137: Dartmouth to Portmore, 26 June 1711.

The Queen's envoys provided important information which directly facilitated the conduct of naval and military operations. Envoys served as verifying authorities for the particular needs of their respective courts and judged the appropriateness of the requests which those courts made to English commanders. At times, envoys were specifically instructed to provide intelligence to the fleet.¹ The ability of envoys to serve this function was largely dependent on their ability to obtain reliable information.

course, they received their own instructions from London as well as further instructions, gazettes, newsletters and advice from the secretary of state. Equally important were the complementary sources of information. Many envoys obtained information from secret agents which they employed for the purpose, and all envoys abroad were directed to correspond regularly with English ministers at other courts for their 'better Information and Direction'.² Not all this information was obtained by direct correspondence at the senior level. The letters written among diplomatic secretaries and by them with the under secretaries of state in London, provided information which was regularly passed

Of

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37529, fo.76: Hedges to Hill, 4 May 1705.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D. 649/8/1: Instructions to John Chetwynd, a typical example.

on to senior diplomats and commanders.¹ The burden to provide information for others could become irritating. One man complained to a friend at another post,

Were you and I divines, lawyers, physicians, sharpers, stockjobbers, pickpockets, or any other thing in the world, but just what we are, we should take care to let as little of our profession as possible enter into our correspondence. . . .²

English diplomats abroad were not merely sources of information for admirals and generals, they were highly influential and active participants in war councils.³ In one case, Richard Hill, a member of the Lord High Admiral's Council as well as the envoy at Turin, retained direct control of two frigates and two galleys in the Mediterranean in 1704-05.⁴ Others served in dual capacities as diplomat and commander-in-chief: Lord Galway in Portugal; Stanhope, Peterborough and Argyll in Spain; Marlborough at The Hague. Others were officers closely connected to a commander-in-chief: Rear-Admiral Sir George Byng in Algiers, Lord Cutts in Holland, Cadogan in Flanders and

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 38,500, fo.255: Henry Watkins to H. Walpole, 19 June 1710.

³For example, Blenheim MSS. C2-17, War Council held with land and sea officers and Portuguese representatives at Methuen's home in Lisbon, 20 December 1706.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529: Hedges to Hill, 3 November 1704. Staffordshire R.O. D649/15: Chetwynd to Peterborough, 23 August 1705.

¹For example, Staffordshire, R.O., MSS. D649/8/17 Henry Watkins to Chetwynd, 7 September 1710; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 38,499,fo.8: Watkins to H. Walpole, 7 August 1710, reporting letters read to Marlborough.

Holland.1

The co-operation of the allies in the conduct of operations was a critical matter to the success of many Lacking a centralized, allied command with the plans. authority to direct operations, matters had to be settled through a continual process of war councils and negotia-It was a method which often irritated the duke of tions. Marlborough who saw that it destroyed secrecy in planning and dispatch in execution.² Despite Marlborough's impatience with the process and its implicit denial of complete authority, the necessary consultation, negotiation, and conflicting viewpoints among the allies remained modifying influences on the course of operations throughout the war. Time and distance, the situation of affairs on distant stations, the initiative of commanders and diplomats, joined with the pressures and needs of the allies in creating a situation in which plans envisaged and orders issued in London could easily be modified.

In the area of planning future operations, ministers abroad and commanders-in-chief played similarly important roles. On one occasion, London was left in some doubt as to what course actually had been taken. In 1707, the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Squadron was killed when his flagship was wrecked in the Scilly Isles as he was

¹For a list of diplomats in this period, see D. B. Horn, <u>British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789</u>. (Camden Soc., 3rd ser. xlvi. 1932).

²B. van 't Hoff (ed.) <u>The Correspondence 1701-1711 of</u> John Churchill First Duke of Marlborough and Anthonie <u>Heinsius Grand Pensionary of Holland</u> (Utrecht, 1951), pp. 198-99, Letter 318. Boston Public Library, Ms. K.5.5: Marlborough to Somerset, 30 August 1703.

returning to England. Secretary of State Robert Harley wrote to the English resident minister in Holland, 'As to our Marine Affairs the unfortunate loss of Sir Cloudesly Shovell has left us for some time in the dark for what he had concerted with the States' Flag concerning the continuance of ships at Lisbon, and the operations in those seas'.¹

On occasion, even the plan for the negotiation of treaties was left to those who were abroad. Being provided with the broad lines of policy, Lord Galway could be instructed in relation to a new military treaty with Portugal, 'The Queen leaves the Schemes of the new Treaty entirely to your Lordship and Mr. Methuen'.² Similarly Marlborough was given entire authority to negotiate the details of troop agreements at The Hague.³

The Dutch capital had a special importance. The close relationship of England and Holland as well as its own geographical position made it a key location for the conduct of negotiations with the allies. In many ways it was 'the Centre of Business and Intelligence',⁴ as Harley called it. Marlborough's association with King William and his long service at The Hague, between 1701 and 1711, gave him a special position in addition to his duties as a commander-

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 15,866, fo.66: Harley to Dayrolle, 6 December 1707.

²Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letterbook, i, pp. 164-65, Sunderland to Galway, 20 April 1708.

³P.R.O., FO.90/37, fo.4: Dartmouth to Chetwynd, 11 July 1710; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/45M: Instructions to Pultney, 1706; Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letterbook, i, p. 160: Sunderland to Marlborough, 13 April 1708.

⁴Brit. Lib., Stowe MSS. 248, fo.1: 'Mr. Harley's Plan for conducting the Business of the Public', 30 October 1710.

in-chief, ambassador plenipotentiary, Captain-General, and member of the cabinet in London. Marlborough had been deeply involved in the negotiations for the Grand Alliance. Shortly after William III's death, he had been sent to The Hague to give special assurances to the allies that England would honour all her treaties and agreements to carry on the planned alliance. He sailed on this mission with 'a full Gale of favour' and had in effect the position of an 'Ambassador General' who could give instructions to other ministers abroad.¹ The secretary of state advised envoys that this authority was given only 'on this occasion . . . as the exigency of affairs shall require'.² It was clearly a temporary authority given in a difficult situation to ensure that all appropriate action was taken in carrying out the details of a basic decision that had already been made in London. This was not to be the ordinary method which Marlborough would follow. Ordinarily, Marlborough was authorized only to give instructions to other envoys in regard to the details of troop treaties. Throughout the war, he took extraordinary care in obtaining authority and approval for his actions.³ In general, he confined his work to relations with Holland and Germany, but the central position of The Hague and the negotiations conducted there

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7074: Ellis to Stepney, 13 March 1702.

²P.R.O., S.P.104/89, fo.230: Manchester to Blackwell, 13 March 1702.

³The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, pp. xxiii-iv. For examples of this, see Sir G. Murray, Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, from 1702-12 (London, 1845), i, p. 168; ii, p. 9; iv, pp. 146-7, 216-17.

relating to Spain, the Mediterranean, Italy, and overseas involved him also in a wider sphere.¹ As a distinguished personality and a victorious commander, Marlborough carried a special prestige abroad. The Government at home rarely lost an opportunity to employ his remarkable talents in support of difficult negotiations.

Marlborough served, like his colleagues in other areas, as a proponent of English policy as well as being a recipient of suggestions from the allies. Much of the work of envoys abroad was to persuade the allies to conduct the war along the lines which England believed was best. Although a number of factors could easily deflect the plans made in London, there was a persistent effort to persuade others to join in England's grand strategy for the war. Like other responsible officers abroad, diplomats had to proceed on their own initiative, on occasion, in the light of what they believed would be an acceptable course of In a private letter to Harley, John Methuen action. lamented the problems he had faced in bringing Portugal into the Grand Alliance. 'I was to struggle with a strong French party here,' he wrote, 'who were supported by all the arts and other methods of France which I could no way deal with but by giving the King of Portugal hopes of everything from the Allies.'2

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7074: Ellis to Stepney, 23 December 1701; <u>Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence</u>, <u>p. xxxii</u>.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/45Y: John Methuen to Harley, 1 July 1704. Another example of Methuen's initiative may be seen in his use of unauthorized funds to support the defence of Gibraltar during the 1704-05 siege. Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, MS. E82, f.LI: Methuen to Simpson, 6 February 1705.

Initiative of this type was not fully approved by all and could easily cause a storm when the Government came to review the situation. There were some who apparently opposed the initiative of diplomats, on principle. Robert Harley admitted to Lord Raby that one of the reasons for his dismissal as secretary of state in 1708 was his belief that ministers abroad were not independent enough. Two years later, Lord Raby could note that 'they have been much less so since'. Indeed there were limitations as to how far a diplomat or commander could go in taking the initiative, but there were no clear guidelines to follow for those who undertook the task. It was largely on this point that the Government in London objected to Lord Peterborough's conduct in Spain and Italy during 1706-07.² Peterborough's conflict with the Ministry is a clear illustration of the dilemma faced by a commander on distant service. On the one hand it was impractical for the Government to give exact directions, and it was forced to rely on the judgement of responsible men at the scene. On the other hand, a commander risked his appointment if his initiative and action were not accepted by the Ministry at home.

Despite limitations, it was essentially a decentralized system by which those in the field could significantly influence the conduct of the war. Most importantly, it

¹Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/45M: Raby to Harley 30 September 1710.

²Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Draft Sunderland to Peterborough, c.9 December 1707. For a brief narrative of these incidents, see William Stebbings, <u>Peterborough</u> (London, 1890), pp. 105-37.

was largely on the insight, recommendations and understanding of those who served abroad that the Government in London based its decisions. The reports from abroad were the eyes and ears of the Government. In many cases, they provided England's understanding of events abroad as well as the logic behind grand strategy.

Summary: The Process of Decision Making as seen in the Planning for the Capture of Port Mahon, 1708

One may summarize the process by which decisions were reached by briefly outlining one typical example. Let us select for this purpose the capture of Port Mahon which was so important for the naval war in the Mediterranean.¹

The strategic value of the island of Minorca with its large harbour at Port Mahon had been understood in London for some time. As early as 1701, the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt had proposed taking the island as part of his plan to encourage the revolt of the Catalans.² In 1704, Jean Philippe Hoffman, the envoy of King Charles III in London, proposed it again in a memorial to the Queen, and the idea was referred to the Prince's Council for consideration.³ In 1706, the fleet under Sir John Leake planned to take it with the other Balearic Islands, but

¹The most recent detailed accounts of this action are H. T. Dickinson, 'The Capture of Minorca 1708', <u>Mariner's Mirror, 1</u>i (1965), pp. 195-204, and David Francis, <u>The First Peninsular War, 1702-13</u>, (London, 1975), pp. 267-72, both of which are based on printed sources.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 9720, fo.84: Stepney to Blathwayt, 3 August 1701.

³P.R.O., S.P. 100/10 Memorial of 4/15 August 1704; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9 sec. 5 Minutes, 4 August 1704.

in the end was unable to devote the forces to do so.¹ More than a year later, the cabinet debated the issue 'whether it would not be right to make ourselves masters at Port Mahon and to instruct Sir J. Leake to the purpose',² but no instructions were issued at that time. During that same winter, the envoy in Spain, James Stanhope, had returned to England on personal business. In March 1708, he was ordered to return and he went with a commission as commander-in-chief as well as envoy. Enroute back to his post, Stanhope accompanied the duke of Marlborough to The Hague, planning to reach Spain overland and consulting the allies enroute. At The Hague he joined Marlborough, Prince Eugene and the Dutch deputies in their planning conference for the 1708 campaign. Both Marlborough and Stanhope reported the results of the conference to London where their letters were dealt with, at first, by the two secretaries of state, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Treasurer.³ One of the major points of discussion at The Hague conference was the urgent need for the fleet to operate in the Mediterranean during the winter when it could support the army in Spain. The Dutch, in particular, were strongly in favour of the idea and thought it a very practical proposal. While the army in northern Europe went into winter quarters, the mild winter weather in the south afforded the best time for military operations

³Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, p. 953.

¹Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 63/19: Leake to Stanhope, 24 September 1706.

²Blenheim MSS. Cl-16:Cabinet Council Minutes, Kensington, 28 December 1707.

in the Peninsula. While the Army was active in Spain and Portugal, the fleet was needed to support it, but winter was the most dangerous time for the large ships-of-theline to be at sea in the Atlantic. Without a major base in the Mediterranean with a safe harbour, repair and supply facilities, it was practically impossible during the winter to support from England military operations in Spain. This problem was discussed at a meeting of the cabinet in April 1708, and referred to the Prince's Council for advice.^{\perp} In addition, further information and advice was sought from Stanhope and from the Dutch.² Stanhope pressed for using Porto Spezia in Italy as a fleet base, and on this point he wrote to Marlborough and Godolphin to secure their support for his views. Marlborough passed his letter on to the secretary of state, commenting that he approved of the plan in general, but did 'not enter into the particulars of what he writes . . . you will be the best judges at home how far that can be comply'd with'.³ Little progress was made in London. The Admiralty delayed making its report, and the Dutch offered little concrete information for carrying out the proposal they had supported so strongly.⁴

¹Blenheim, MSS. Cl-16: Minutes Cabinet Council, Kensington, 11 April 1708; P.R.O., ADM. 1/4091 fo.622: Sunderland to Prince's Council, 13 April 1708.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 15,866,fo.106v: Sunderland to Dayrolles, 13 April 1708; Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letterbook, i. p. 162: Sunderland to Stanhope, 13 April 1708.

³Blenheim MSS. Marlborough Letterbook, xxi, pp. 203-4: Marlborough to Sunderland, 17 May 1708.

⁴Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letterbook, i, pp. 171-2: Sunderland to Stanhope, 14 May 1708.

Godolphin saw the great value of the plan, but wondered 'how can it be done with safety?'. Cadiz was surely a better location, away from the major French base at Toulon which could so easily sever the links between Spain and Italy.¹

In Spain, the military situation had not improved. The lack of supplies and ready money threatened the ability of the army to take the field. Portugal was becoming an increasingly unreliable source of supply, and the navy was urgently needed to bring relief and to establish safe and dependable communications from other areas. As one officer with the army put it, 'if the Fleet should not come Time enough . . . we shall be oblig'd to knock all our horses in the head for want of forage and defend Tarragona and Barcelona with the foot as long as we can'.² In this situation, King Charles III wrote to London urging that the stationing of the fleet in the Mediterranean was absolutely essential to maintaining himself in Spain. On receipt of this letter, Godolphin and the lords of the committee prodded the Admiralty to produce its recommendations on the subject, but Godolphin himself remained quite pessimistic on the matter.³ The Prince's Council responded immediately that there was no port readily available in allied hands which could safely be used to winter the Anglo-Dutch fleet. The Italian and Spanish ports were not suitable; however,

¹Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 66/7: Godolphin to Stanhope, 11 May 1708.

²Blenheim MSS. C2-15C: [?] to Sunderland, 18 June 1708. ³Blenheim MSS. A2-38: Godolphin to Marlborough, 22 June 1708.

they believed that if Port Mahon could be taken, then the squadron could safely winter there.¹ Godolphin immediately recommended to Stanhope that he and the forces in Spain 'should dispose yourselves without loss of time to be masters of Port Mahon.'² When this was accomplished then London could arrange for a fleet to be sustained there. Meanwhile, James Craggs was sent from Spain to solicit the support of the Government for wintering the fleet in Italy, and the Admiralty unsympathetically reviewed further information on the Italian ports.³ When Marlborough received a copy of the report from the Prince's Council in mid-July he, too, wrote Stanhope urging him to take Port Mahon.⁴

By late August, Godolphin's letter arrived in Spain reporting the opinion of the Prince's Council along with his own encouragement to take Port Mahon. Upon its receipt, Stanhope took action. He went immediately to King Charles III and consulted him on the plan. The fleet under Sir John Leake was just in the process of an assault on Sardinia. While troops were embarking at Barcelona, both Stanhope and King Charles sent urgent messages to

¹Blenheim MSS. Cl-6: Burchett to Sunderland, 23 June 1708.

²Kent R.O. Stanhope MSS. 66/7: Godolphin to Stanhope, 22 June 1708.

³Kent R.O. Stanhope MSS. 67: J. Craggs to Stanhope, 14 September 1708, and Memorials to Lord Sunderland; Blenheim Cl-6: Burchett to Boyle, 19 August 1708.

⁴Blenheim MSS. Marlborough Letterbook xxi, pp. 406-7: Marlborough to Stanhope, 15 July 1708; p. 418: Marlborough to Sunderland, 16 July 1708.

Leake requesting his assistance.¹ The letters were received on board Leake's flagship near Cagliari, shortly after its surrender to the allies, and these requests were immediately considered at a council of war. The council agreed to set aside other plans and proceed immediately to Minorca.² It was obvious to those on the scene that the value of the capture of Sardinia would be ruined if a fleet were not available to maintain the security of regular grain supplies from that island to the army in Spain.³

In October the news arrived in London by express that Port Mahon had fallen to the allies on 30 September.⁴ The dispatch which brought the news from Stanhope also included an unexpected development. 'It is my humble opinion,' Stanhope wrote, 'that England ought never to part with this island, which will give the Law to the Mediterranean both in Time of War and Peace'. For this reason, Stanhope allowed only English troops to man the garrison, but he made no other move which would disturb the allies.⁵ Immediately upon receipt of the news, the Ministry ordered naval stores and victuals sent from Portugal, and Stanhope was ordered 'to

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5443, fo.284: Council of War Minutes, 18 August 1708 (o.s.) on board H.M.S. <u>Elizabeth</u>.

³Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 66/2: Stanhope to Marlborough, 24 August 1708.

¹Blenheim MSS. C2-32: Charles III to Leake, 23 August 1708; C2-15C: Stanhope to Sunderland, 28 August 1708; Stanhope to Leake, 24 August 1708.

⁴Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letterbooks, ii, pt.i., p. 182: Sunderland to Lord Mayor of London, 18/29 October 1708.

⁵Blenheim, MSS. C2-15c: Stanhope to Sunderland, 30 September 1708 (n.s.).

keep secret any thought of keeping Port Mahon in our hands after Peace'.¹ In December, the cabinet considered the matter further, and Stanhope was ordered to initiate appropriate negotiations with King Charles III to obtain Minorca 'as some sort of security for the charges and expences' which England had been at for the war in Spain.² Negotiations on this point continued for some time and were eventually included in the peace negotiations at Utrecht. It was not until November, 1712, that the island was publicly taken in the name of Queen Anne.³

In this example, one can see the numerous factors at work in the process by which decisions were made in grand strategy. One may see the influence of the allies in promoting the project, the importance and relation of the existing military and naval situation, the initiative of a commander-in-chief, the importance of the advice of an agency such as the Admiralty, the impact and cautiousness of key members of the cabinet such as Marlborough and Godolphin, the administrative co-ordination by the secretary of state, the strategic relationship between army and navy, the manner in which the cabinet considered proposals that were made to it, and the way in which it built practically

¹Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Cabinet Minutes, Kensington, 19 October 1708; Sunderland Letterbook, i., p. 277: Sunderland to Galway, 19 October 1708; p. 229: Sunderland to Stanhope, 20 October 1708.

²Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letterbook, i., p. 256: Instructions to Stanhope, 9 December 1708; MSS. Cl-16: Minutes Cabinet Council, Cockpit, 7 December 1708. Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 69: Memorial to King Charles III, 18 May 1709.

³Bedfordshire R.O., MSS. WY. 899, p. 6: Argyll to the Jurate and Vicar-General, 12 November 1712.

upon them in the light of actions taken in the field. The lines of command and control for the armed forces coincided with those of strategic decision making. Sir William Blackstone's analogy to powers of mechanics may not be entirely acceptable to a more sophisticated age of engineers, but it is clear that the elements which impelled the machinery for grand strategy created an effect which was distinct from what any one acting by itself might produce, and at the same time, partook of each and was formed out of all.

CHAPTER II

ENGLAND'S STRATEGY OF ALLIANCE

The student of grand strategy will find no single collection of documents which preserves evidence of the assumptions, ideas, and purposes relating to England's contribution in the War of the Spanish Succession. One longs for a detailed series of full cabinet minutes or the discovery of the secret papers of a strategic directorate in Whitehall. One is left, however, with only the barely legible scribblings of an occasional minister jotting notes for himself at a cabinet meeting, a mountain of orders and instructions, legions of reports, the humdrum routine of interdepartmental correspondence, and the bits and pieces of personal letters strewn in record offices and libraries across the country and in America. If one is to know anything of England's grand strategy in this war, it seems that it must come through the process of deduction whilst sifting through the papers of those who actively participated in the process by which grand strategy was made and carried out. The manner in which decisions were reached within the English government has been outlined in Chapter I. The remainder of this study is based on both the public and private correspondence among the participants in that process. The foundation of this study in that wide range of documents is based on the belief that no single individual expressed fully the

concept of English strategy, and that the interchange among government officials, taken as a whole, represented both the process by which decisions were made as well as the expression of the Government's viewpoint in the conduct of the war.

The lack of strategic planning documents in a twentieth century style makes it necessary to construct artificially an outline of England's basic strategic view from disparate sources and varied documents. From these sources, an attempt is made in this chapter to demonstrate the underlying concept upon which English strategy was based. No attempt is made to deal with this issue on a psychological or sociological level, but rather it is based on the conscious expression of responsible men. The general picture which emerges does not necessarily reflect the actual outcome of events, but it represents the basic concensus among these men of their stated intentions.

English interests and objectives in The Spanish Succession Issue

For decades, the central concern in seventeenth century European politics had been the decline of Spain as a great power, and the subsequent rise of other nations to take her place on the world stage. While the France of Louis XIV was clearly the major power at the end of the century, other nations were deeply concerned about

their own positions in a further growth of French power.¹ The death of the Spanish King Charles II, on 1 November 1700, brought to an end the line of the House of Habsburg in Spain. Charles had survived far longer than anyone had expected, but his death created a critical situation. One dynasty had ended in Spain, another was needed to take its place. The prince who would succeed to the Spanish throne and who would rule the weak nation with its vast territories around the world, would be in a position that carried little power of its own in Europe. The political and family connections which the new prince brought with him to the throne, however, could profoundly affect the other European nations by bringing the Spanish dominions and the trade with Spain and her territories under the control of one of the major powers.

Both England and the Dutch Republic were deeply concerned. On one hand, the Spanish Netherlands served as a bulwark of defence for the Dutch if it were controlled by a third power such as an independent Spain or Bavaria. Under French control, it could be the avenue of attack from France as it had so often been in the past. The power

¹Studies of English diplomacy in the period 1698-1701 may be found in M. A. Thomson, 'Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', in Hatton and Bromley, William III and Louis XIV, pp. 140-161; S. B. Baxter, William III (New York, 1966), pp. 364-401; Wolfgang Michael, 'The Treaties of Partition and the Spanish Succession' in <u>Cambridge Modern History</u> (New York, 1908), v. 372-400; Sir George Clark, 'From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession' in <u>New Cambridge</u> Modern History (Cambridge, 1970), vi. 381-409; J. W. Smit, 'The Netherlands and Europe in the 17th and 18th Centuries' and J. R. Jones, 'English Attitudes to Europe in the 17th Century' in J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossman, eds., <u>Britain</u> and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia (London, 1968), pp. 13-55.

which controlled the Spanish Netherlands controlled also the mouth of the Scheldt with its trade entrepôts and the port of Dunkirk which could so easily be used to threaten England and to interrupt Anglo-Dutch sea links in the North Sea. On the other hand, the Dutch and English trade pattern in America, Asia, the Mediterranean, and to Spain herself could be diminished or even cut if Spain became dominated by France. If another prince succeeded to the Spanish throne, it could be preserved or expanded. As early as 1698, William III had made it clear to France that a Bourbon succession to the entire Spanish monarchy would mean a war with England and the Dutch Republic, as well as with the Empire which opposed that succession on dynastic grounds. In the years between 1698 and 1701, England was actively involved in diplomatic negotiations which sought a solution to the problem. In the agreements which were reached, England sought to establish a partition of Spanish territory which would give the Maritime Powers a reasonable assurance that they would not be excluded from any area of trade even though the agreements gave them no specific rights.

On All Saints' Day, 1700, King Charles II of Spain died, and the following day his will was opened in the presence of a large group of nobles. The document declared that no part of the Spanish monarchy was to be divided from the main body. The world-wide interests and possessions of Spain were to be maintained for the next generation of Spaniards. The renunciations by marriage into the house of Bourbon were declared valid only to prevent the union of the Spanish and French Crowns in a

single person and not a renunciation which would prevent a French prince from succeeding to the Spanish throne. Philip, duke of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV, was named in the will as the successor to Charles II as King of Spain. Failing him, the succession would pass to his younger brother, the duke of Berry, and thirdly to the Habsburg Archduke Charles.

The decision was in the hands of France whether the will of King Charles would be accepted or whether the principles of the previous Partition treaties would be followed. After the news of the will was received in Paris, the subject was considered in detail by the French government. Opinion on the proper course of action was divided; however after a full consideration, Louis XIV accepted the will and proclaimed his grandson, the duke of Anjou, as King Philip V of Spain.

After the acceptance of the will, it would be eighteen months before a war was actually declared. Public opinion in England was divided on the issue. A large number of people opposed any war as something which would ruin the nation's commerce and believed that England should not enter into a war unless she were attacked.¹ Others saw that there was little that England and Holland could do if Parliament insisted on disbanding the army.² There was a possibility that France would

¹F. J. L. Krämer, ed., <u>Archives ou Correspondence</u> <u>inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau</u> (Leyde, 1909), III, <u>iii, p. 296. William III to Heinsius, 14 December 1700.</u> [Hereinafter abbreviated, '<u>Archives...Orange-Nassau</u>'.]

²Leicestershire R.O. Finch Box 4950, unsigned, undated letter. [Temp. mid-1700.]

overrun Spain and that England and Holland would fight among themselves for the riches of the Indies. Preventing France from having 'such accession of riches to their Empire, whereby they will be enabled to give laws by sea and land to all Europe', could be achieved by using the English and Dutch navies.¹

As Stadholder as well as King, William's first concern was to prevent the Spanish Netherlands from falling into the hands of France.² By the very nature of the events, William saw that despite opinion at home Europe would not long remain at peace. He thought that the wisest course of action was to make preparatory agreements with the northern crowns and with as many of the German princes as possible.³ Backed by Dutch opinion, he encouraged the States-General to begin negotiations in these matters although he was prevented from doing so in England. The impeachment of several ministers by Parliament in the previous year for their part in the partition treaties made it clear that English involvement in these continental affairs was not approved by Parliament.

It was not until the sudden movement of French troops into the Spanish Netherlands during the night of 5 and 6 February 1701 that English opinion changed to a strong

¹See Godfrey Davies, 'The Reduction of the Army after the Peace of Ryswick, 1697', <u>Journal Soc. Army</u> Hist. Research, (1950), 28. 15-28.

²Archives . . . Orange-Nassau, III, iii, 242: William III to Heinsius, 19 November 1700.

³Archives . . Orange-Nassau, III, iii, 305: William III to Heinsius, 17 December 1700; p. 374: 21 January 1701.

determination to prevent French encroachment.¹ Secretary of State Hedges made this clear when he told the English representative at The Hague,

> You will see by the proceedings of both Houses of Parliament, and especially the Commons that we are awake and sensible of the too great growth of our dangerous neighbour, and are taking vigorous measures for the preservation of our selves, and the peace of Europe.²

In order to achieve these aims, Parliament authorized the King to enter into negotiations with other powers in Europe and to conclude the necessary alliances. In June 1701, Marlborough was instructed by the King to continue these negotiations at The Hague 'for the Preservation of the Liberties of Europe, the Property and Peace of England, and for reducing the Exorbitant Power of France'.³ These elements were the basic points upon which England proceeded in her negotiations for the treaty which provided for the Grand Alliance of 1701. The treaty itself outlined the basic issue in its preamble. While objecting to Louis XIV's claim to the Spanish throne for his grandson, the treaty deplored the movement of French forces into the Spanish Netherlands, the Duchy of Milan and the West Indies. Most importantly, the allies feared that the succession of Philip in Spain would be a union between France and Spain which would 'within a short time become

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 141: l'Hermitage aan Staaten-General, 12 February 1701.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/69, fo. 132v: Hedges to Stanhope, 21 February 1701.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/69, fo. 152ff: Instructions to Marlborough, 26 February 1701.

so formidable to all that they may easily assume to themselves the dominion over all Europe'.¹ The menace of France in Europe was the basic issue, and it was so important that it was repeated by the Queen at her accession when she declared to the Privy Council in March 1702,

> I think it proper upon this occasion of my first speaking to you to declare my own opinion of the importance of carrying on all the preparations we are making to oppose the great power of France. And I shall lose no time in giving our Allies all assurances that nothing shall be wanting on my part to pursue the true interest of England, together with theirs for the support of the common cause.²

The central issue for England was to remove French capacity to dominate Europe. It was not known with certainty whether France had definite plans to expand her position and control, but it appeared to England that if given the opportunity, she would attempt it. England's objective was to prevent a situation before it occurred. In his last speech to Parliament, King William had clearly explained the meaning of the situation for England. By the placing of the duke of Anjou on the Spanish throne, France had put herself in a position by which she could dominate Europe. William believed that France would become the real master of Spain and that Louis XIV could dispose of Spanish affairs as if they were his own. The imminent expansion of French power in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and overseas was a threat. Although peace continued in name, the other nations of Europe were forced

¹A. Browning, ed., <u>English Historical Documents</u>, <u>1660-1714</u> (London, 1953), viii, 873, 'The Treaty of <u>Grand Alliance</u>, 1701'.

²P.R.O., C.O. 324/8, fo. 40: 'Her Majesty's Gracious Declaration at Her first sitting in the Privy Council at St. James', 8 March 1702.

to arm themselves and to prepare for war in order to defend themselves from possible attack. This sudden growth of French power affected England in her most sensitive areas, the King said,

> In respect to our Trade, which will soon become precarious in all the valuable Branches of it; in respect to our Peace and Safety at Home, which we cannot hope should long continue, and in respect to that part which England ought to take in the Preservation of the Liberty of Europe.¹

The English representative in Switzerland had put the issue more bluntly. 'Nothing but force or some blow to the French prosperity will make them tractable . . .,' he wrote, 'You can have no security but their weakness.'²

The physical security of the Dutch Republic was directly threatened by the French troop movements into the Spanish Netherlands. The connection between the security of Holland and that of England had been long understood as had the strategic importance of the Channel's far shore for England's defence.³ There was a clear danger if an enemy obtained unimpeded control of the continental coast east of the Dover Strait. After all, it had been a 'Protestant', easterly wind which had allowed William to sail past the English Fleet, immobilized by wind and tide in

¹Journal of the House of Lords, xvii, p. 6, 31 December 1701.

²P.R.O., S.P. 94/75: Aglionby to Mr. Secretary, 13 July 1701.

³See for example, H. A. Lloyd, <u>The Rouen Campaign</u> <u>1590-92</u> (Oxford, 1973), pp. 37, 70; J. E. Neale, <u>Queen</u> <u>Elizabeth I</u> (New York, n.d.), pp. 237-8. the Thames estuary, and to land at Torbay in 1688.¹

The methods of William's invasion were well remembered a dozen years later as were also the reasons for his succession to the throne. The death of Anne's son, the young duke of Gloucester, meant the end of the Stuart dynasty in England and the need to settle the succession anew.² In 1701, Parliament made provision for this in the Act of Settlement. After Anne, the Crown was to go to the nearest Protestant heir, the dowager Electress Sophia of The right of Parliament to regulate the succes-Hanover. sion had been established only in 1689, and it had been tacitly accepted by Louis XIV in the Peace of Ryswick in The Act of Settlement by Parliament was an expres-1697. sion of English opinion; it was no guarantee against foreign intervention in the English succession. The presence of William's predecessor, the Catholic James II, at the court of Louis XIV was not reassuring in any way. The Prussian representative in London observed that the union of France and Spain presented a direct threat to the protestant interest in England. Indeed, many believed that the continued growth of Catholic power abroad was a threat to destroy Protestantism in England.³ In Vienna,

¹Clyve Jones "The Protestant Wind of 1688: Myth and Reality," <u>European Studies Review</u>, 3 (1973), p. 216.

²For a general studies of this see, M. A. Thomson, 'The Safeguarding of the Protestant Succession, 1702-18' in Hatton and Bromley, <u>William III and Louis XIV</u>, pp. 237-251; J. P. Kenyon, <u>Revolution Principles</u>, <u>The Politics of</u> <u>Party 1689-1720</u> (Cambridge, 1977), and G. E. Gregg, "The Protestant Succession in international politics, 1710-16," (University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1972).

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fos.6-7: Bonet to Frederick, 21 January 1701.

George Stepney despaired that he could never persuade the Emperor to assist wholeheartedly in England's objectives. He feared that the Emperor would achieve his own goals secretly through the mediation of the Pope and the Jesuits, 'and then leave us to struggle as well as we can for our Liberties and Religion whenever France or Spain shall join together to impose upon us a Prince of Wales, a Duke of Berry or anybody else'.¹

A few days following the signing of the Grand Alliance at The Hague, James II died. Immediately, Louis XIV proclaimed his son as King James III of England, Scotland and Ireland. The immediate and unqualified public recognition of the old pretender as King shocked England. William immediately ordered the absolute revocation of the English ambassador in Paris without taking leave of the court² and at the same time, he ordered the dismissal of the French representative in London. The French recognition of the 'pretended Prince of Wales' puzzled Englishmen and left grave doubts as to French intentions. The recognition seemed a direct challenge to Parliament's right to regulate the succession to the throne and to the very principles established by the settlement of the Glorious Revolution. Coming at a time when relations were very tense in Europe and when Louis XIV had just forbidden his subjects to trade with England, it seemed the greatest provocation possible to England short of an outright attack. Amazed by this

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 9720, fos.3-5: Stepney to Blathwayt, 1 June 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 21,489, fo.51: A. Stanhope to Blathwayt, 23 September 1701.

series of events, the English representative at The Hague commented, 'Whom God designs to destroy he infatuates first, and makes them do their own business themselves'.¹

At home, Parliament was stirred to take direct action. Early in 1702, the House of Commons passed a resolution which asked King William to insert, in all treaties of alliance with other powers, an article which stated that no peace shall be made with France until England

> shall have reparation for the great indignity offered by the French King, in owning and declaring the pretended Prince of Wales King of England, Scotland and Ireland.²

The addition of this article to the treaty of Grand Alliance, and its subsequent ratification by the Emperor and the Dutch Republic,³ was recognition by the allies of one of England's major objectives. She sought the acknowledgement by the European powers that the parliamentary title of a protestant line to the throne of England was superior to the hereditary title of a catholic line. In seeking this acknowledgement, England was attempting to remove the threat of foreign intervention in an issue which had already been settled satisfactorily at home.

In the treaty of Grand Alliance, the Emperor agreed to allow the Dutch and English to have title to any conquests which they should make in the West Indies. While there was some popular support for this idea in England

²Commons Journals, xiii, p. 665, 10 January 1702.

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 21,489, fo.51: A. Stanhope to Blathwayt, 23 September 1701.

³P.R.O., S.P. 108/131: Emperor's ratification, 22 March 1702; S.P. 108/337: Dutch ratification, 8 June 1702.

and in Holland, the Government was clearly aware of the practical difficulties which it implied. Secretary of State Vernon advised Marlborough to keep this provision secret during the negotiations because the poor condition of defences in the English West Indian colonies made them highly vulnerable to a retaliatory attack by the French.¹ William Blathwayt, who had had much experience in the management of colonial affairs, was in Holland as the King's private secretary when the article was being discussed at The Hague. The Spaniards in the West Indies, he believed, 'will never endure our having the civil and ecclesiastical governments, nor is it valuable to us but on the contrary. . . . '² The article would have to be carefully worded in order to express properly English interests. If it were improperly worded it could possibly defeat English objectives and even lead to the destruction of trade rights in that area.³ In Blathwayt's opinion, the proper objective for England was to 'desire nothing more than that all that Dominion belonging to Spain be declared to be vested in the House of Austria under the protection of England and Holland till the Emperor or the Archduke be in a condition to maintain it themselves'. ⁴ Blathwayt believed that the

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,775, fo.55: Vernon to Marlborough, 5 August 1701. On the condition of the colonies see, Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 34,348, fo.135: Christopher Codrington to Board of Trade 8 June 1701.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/63, fos.346-7: Blathwayt to Stepney, 26 August 1701.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 9,722, fo.128: Blathwayt to Marlborough, 28 August 1701.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/63, fo.432: Blathwayt to Stepney, 9 September 1701.

Emperor's offer in the treaty was too liberal for English interests. Since the Spaniards in America would undoubtedly loath the government of heretics (as certainly they viewed Anglicans), 'they will rather choose the House of Bourbon, than liberty under Protestants'. Under those conditions, the Spanish West Indies would be far better under the House of Austria with freedom given to English trade.¹

Very much in line with Blathwayt's views, the squadron in the West Indies was instructed to protect English trade in the areas and to defend the colonies The Admiral was told 'to improve the opportunity there. of the strength' he had with him by attacking and seizing enemy ships 'annoying them at land', and treating them as enemies in retaliation for the orders that the French had to attack English possessions in America. No authorization was given to seize territory in the name of England.² In February 1702, even before the declaration of war, Admiral Benbow was directed to encourage the Spanish colonial governments in the West Indies to withdraw from the subjection of France and 'to assure them that if they will assert their own Liberty, we will be ready to give them all assistance and protection'. If they declared for the House of Austria, England would maintain good correspondence and protect their trade in accordance with the treaties made with the Emperor. However, if they sought to establish

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/63, fo.331: Blathwayt to Stepney, 19 August 1701.

²Huntington Library, MSS. BL343: Lords Justices Instructions to Selwyn, 23 October 1701.

a government of their own, Benbow was directed to disengage them from all dependence on France. The most effective way by which a mutual confidence could be developed, the Admiral was advised, was by establishing a free trade with Englishmen.¹ After war had been declared, and England had entered into direct negotiations with the Dutch concerning the joint naval forces which would be conducted in the West Indies, Secretary of State Lord Nottingham instructed Marlborough,

> . . . we do not pretend to make conquests there for ourselves to support the interests of the House of Austria, . . . we shall reap no private benefit but that of a free trade there which in case of success can never be denied us. . . .

It was not dominion, but trade which England sought. The article in the treaty of Grand Alliance was the result of negotiations for that more important objective. The basic agreement by the Dutch and English to obtain for the Emperor, the Spanish Netherlands, the Duchy of Milan, the islands, Naples and Sicily was reciprocated by the Emperor yielding in return to the Dutch and English what they could take in the West Indies. As Blathwayt had noted, this was too generous, for the territories which the Allies proposed to procure for the Emperor were those which they themselves sought to have in the Emperor's hands as a barrier against France or as necessary to the safety of their carrying on

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/206-7, fos.13-15: Instructions to Benbow, 19 February 1702.

²Northamptonshire R.O. Finch-Hatton, MSS. 275, fo.34: Nottingham to Marlborough, 26 June 1702.

trade in the Mediterranean.¹

The basic objectives which England sought on entering the war were the maintenance of the security of the British Isles and the continuation of the English government without interference from abroad. In that regard, in particular, she sought the acknowledgement of the Protestant succession to the English throne. Thirdly, England sought to maintain and to improve her commercial prosperity by asserting the claim of her subjects to free and unhindered trade.

In achieving these ends, England used two means to characterize publicly her objectives. In terms of practical politics, she supported the Habsburg candidate for the Spanish throne,² and in theoretical terms, she explained her position in terms of a European balance of power.

The violent opposition of Parliament to the Partition treaties of 1698 and 1700 had taught the Government not to risk that policy again and to face the impeachment proceedings which previous ministers of state had undergone. In negotiating the treaty of Grand Alliance the Government was aware of objections which could be made to the treaty. Sending back the ratification of the Treaty under the great seal, Secretary Vernon congratulated

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/63, fo.152: Stepney to Blathwayt, 10 August 1701.

²Many historians have assumed that support for gaining the entire Spanish monarchy was the major English objective following the Portugal treaty in 1703, and not merely a means to another end. See for example, P. J. Welch, 'Maritime Powers and the Evolution of War Aims of the Grand Alliance', (University of London, M. A. thesis, 1940).

Marlborough on the success of his mission,

... you will be satisfied that all who have been acquainted with it approve it and tho it implies a kind of partition I hope it will not be clamoured at as the last was...

Parliamentary opinion at home was only one reason for being cautious in dealing with the topic of partition. More importantly to the conduct of foreign relations, the idea of partition was suspect among some of the Allies. The Emperor had consistently demanded the entire Spanish monarchy as the Habsburg inheritance. At the same time it was obvious to the English Ministry that the Italian territories of Spain were much more interesting to the Emperor than the Indies or Spain itself. The English support for the earlier partition treaties, and the wording in the Treaty of Grand Alliance, made the Emperor suspicious that England's interest in Spain was merely to divide it. However, England's major strategy was to establish a strong alliance as the means to achieve her basic objectives. The urgent need to create and to maintain an effective alliance was a key point which coloured much of England's diplomacy in 1701 and in the years which followed. In order to obtain the Emperor's support for the Grand Alliance, England repeatedly assured the Emperor and his representatives that nothing would be more prejudicial to the present state of affairs than the partition of the Spanish monarchy.² The course of events since 1700

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,775, fo.140: Vernon to Marlborough, 9 September 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,058, fo.151: Hedges to Stepney, 20 November 1702.

had altered somewhat England's view of partition. It was apparent that French military movements would prevent the favourable partition of the Spanish monarchy which had been conceived earlier. A war which placed the Habsburg candidate on the Spanish throne over the entire Spanish inheritance would ensure that England would achieve her objectives. At the same time, negotiations to bring Portugal into the Grand Alliance brought out Portuguese fears that she would be gravely endangered if she supported the Allies during the war and then was left open to revenge from a Spain which had been partitioned and returned to the Bourbons after the war. ¹ The English commitment in the treaty with Portugal to the restoration of Spain to the Archduke Charles was not a major change of policy. The statement of it was the price of a Portuguese alliance, and it expressed a viable political means by which England could achieve her ends. The treaty with Portugal, however, was not a strong enough expression of this means to suit all. Lord Nottingham remarked to George Stepney that there was still room for the Emperor to be suspicious of England. The words of the Portuguese treaty and all the negotiations were carried out with the intention of obtaining the entire monarchy, however, the forms of the renunciation involved in this treaty specified only Spain and the Indies, not the entire monarchy. In order to reassure the Emperor completely, the Queen was willing to add to the treaty of Grand Alliance another

¹D. Francis, <u>The Methuens and Portugal 1691-1708</u> (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 118-19.

article which expressly excluded the House of Bourbon from every part of the Spanish monarchy. While instructing Stepney to begin negotiations on this point, Nottingham explained his private reasons for supporting this action. The partition of the Spanish monarchy he said, particularly if Milan were assigned to the Emperor, would in all probability cause difficulties for England. The Emperor would be encouraged to pursue further conquests in Italy which would make the Italian princes turn toward France for protection and disturb Spain. Therefore, Nottingham concluded, it could not be in England's interest to allow any course of action which might separate Naples and Sicily from the Spanish monarchy. If this should occur, it might well cause a disruption of English trade in the Mediterranean and prolong the war far beyond England's ability to bear.¹ When Stepney received this letter, he replied that England's assurance that 'no part of the Spanish Monarchy shall remain under any Branch of the House of Bourbon' was the principle most likely to convince the Emperor to do what England proposed in sending a military expedition to Spain with the Archduke Charles.² In 1705, some Dutchmen began to doubt England's purposes in supporting the idea to obtain the entire Spanish monarchy. They suspected that it was only a ruse to lengthen the war for profit instead of securing a proper barrier to the Dutch Republic. In disgust at this

¹Northamptonshire R.O., Hatton-Finch MSS. 277, fo.30-31: Nottingham to Stepney, 1 June 1703.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/21, fo.34v: Stepney to Hedges, 13 June 1703. **Stepney's Talics**.

viewpoint, Secretary Harley commented,

. . . there cannot be a cleaner proposition than that it is the only way to a secure peace, and if the honest people of Holland will not give way they may have it quickly, instead of a rotten whimsical Barrier. They ought to know that England has a way of being secure without giving so much attention to those projects.¹

In the viewpoint of the English Government at the outset of the war, it was apparent that England's support for obtaining the entire Spanish monarchy was an acceptable means by which she sought to achieve the conditions to achieve her larger goals. Spain, itself, was not the major concern, but support for the entire Spanish monarchy under a Habsburg prince would block French ambitions at the same time that Spain remained relatively weak. While the Emperor's ambitions for his son and his family would be satisfied, the Emperor, himself, would be prevented from obtaining any further power in Italy. The Spanish Netherlands would continue to serve as a defensive area of safety for the Dutch. At the same time, a strong defensive alliance against France could be created in Europe which could have the support of most of the key nations. By balancing Habsburg and Bourbon interests in this way, England saw a way to secure her own safety and to maintain her trade abroad.

Throughout the period, English statesmen continually referred to the theory of balance of power in justifying their policies, but this was no vague theoretical notion.

¹Blenheim MSS. Al-25: Harley to Marlborough, 15 December 1705.

It was an expression of a setting in international relations in which England could best achieve her specific goals and objectives.¹ Marlborough's instructions to carry out negotiations at The Hague in forming the Grand Alliance specified England's objectives and declared that Parliament had assured the King that it would support any agreement made for the Preservation of the Liberties of Europe.² In considering the possibility of peace negotiations in 1706, the secretary of state spelled out more precisely what the Government meant. 'The Queen and States have no other aim,' he wrote, 'than to restore the Balance of Power in Europe that everyone may securely enjoy what appertains to them by right.'³ In another document, he spoke of 'restoring such a Balance of Power as may lend to our common security, and not leave the rights and liberties of Europe precarious or liable to be insulted by any one Potentate.'⁴ And again he wrote,

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/69, fo.152: Instruction to Marlborough, 26 June 1701.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9/34: Undated memo in Robert Harley's hand.

⁴Longleat House, Portland MSS., v: Draft Instructions to Marlborough, 10 April 1706.

¹The objectives of balance of power diplomacy, in general, have been the subject of an extensive debate. For summary articles concerning this point, see Werner Hahlweg, 'Barriere-Gleichgewicht-Sicherheit: eine Studie über die Gleichgewichts-politik und die Strukturwandlung des Staatensystems in Europa, 1646-1715', <u>Historische Zeitschrift</u>, 187 (1959), 54-89; Jacob Viner, 'Power versus Plenty as objectives of foreign policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth century', <u>World Politics</u>; (1948), 1-29. An extreme view, charging England with using balance of power diplomacy as a means to achieve her own form of universal monarchy through sea power may be found in Adolf Rein, 'Uber die Bedeutung der überseeischen Ausdehung für das europäische Staatensystem', <u>Historische Zeitschrift</u> 137 (1928), 28-90.

'This is our interest. We have no views but security to ourselves and security to our allies in the just enjoyment of the Liberty and rights of each nation.'¹

For England, then, the objectives which she sought in maintaining her security at home, in defending her national, political independence within Europe, and in promoting the growth of her trade required a situation in which no single power was in a position to threaten England's position. The possible union of France with Spain presented a direct threat to obtaining this necessary condition, and the best way to prevent this in terms of the current European political situation seemed to be by establishing the Habsburg contender firmly on the Spanish throne and by ensuring his inheritance of the entire Spanish monarchy. In practical terms, this view was one which was most likely to gain England the support of allies whose assistance was necessary to prevent the expansion of French power into Spain and Spanish Terri-This in turn would prevent French dominatories abroad. tion of maritime trade in America, the Mediterranean, and

Spain, itself, by establishing a government in Spain which was inclined to be friendly to England and her allies. It would remove the threat to the security of England and the Dutch Republic represented by French control of the Spanish Netherlands. Finally, it would bring international recognition to the Revolution settlement in England while at the same time directly defeating the foreign power which

¹Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9/37: Memorandum, 31 August 1706.

openly supported the Jacobite cause. In practical terms, England's emphasis on the idea of the balance of power within Europe and her support for the Habsburg inheritance of the entire Spanish monarchy were both means by which she sought to maintain and to use her power in order to ensure her own security, independence and profit.

The Necessity for Alliance

The events which occurred between 1700 and 1702 reveal that England had a particular concept of the method and function which an alliance against France would serve. Without an effective alliance, England felt extremely uneasy about the conduct of a war. No single document has been found which adequately expresses England's strategy of alliance, but one can piece together the reasons for an alliance through its usage during the War of the Spanish Succession. In a letter to the Secretary of State, George Stepney expressed some of the dangers as well as the necessity for the alliance, when he wrote,

> . . . unless the allies can be brought to concert their operations and to act in favour of one another, according as they see the danger to be most urgent; the French will make their advantage of our distractions, and after they have been allowed to destroy the circles of Franconia and Swabia (which have frequently and justly been reputed the 2 bastions of the Empire) they will be at leisure to attack the Confederacy on another side with the superiority of force and with the like success.

The value of the alliance was not merely as a security or defence against French armies. It was designed as a

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/20, fo.354: Stepney to Hedges, 9 May 1703.

means of active pressure against France. As England conceived it, the war would be fought and the ends of the alliance achieved by the participation of all the allies in an offensive war of direct attack on France. Throughout the entire course of the war, England continually urged her allies along this course of action. Secretary Boyle's directions to Palmes at Vienna in 1709 were typical '. . . Her Majesty is extremely solicitous that all the members of the Confederacy should make their utmost efforts in this conjuncture for carrying on the war against France with vigour, which without doubt is the only effectual means to obtain a good Peace'.¹

After the battle of Blenheim, Harley had advised the English envoy to the States General, 'that an unactive war . . is the dangerousest council they can follow and a vigorous prosecution of the late success will sooner restore them trade and peace'.² England consistently maintained that an active, strategically co-ordinated use of armed force was necessary if the allies were to achieve their objectives through warfare.

An active, offensive war was an essential ingredient to the grand strategy for the war, but that alone could not achieve success. France was the major power in Europe; it was no simple matter to challenge her militarily. William III saw the nature of the problem and designed the alliance to deal with it. On the Stadholder's encouragement, the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: Boyle to Palmes, 27 December 1709.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/72, fo.38: Harley to A. Stanhope, 30 December 1704.

States General urged the Imperial Diet 'to declare war against France, that the Princes concerned therein may be required to furnish their quota and that those troops which the Emperor designs for the Rhine may be sent hither early, so that the enemy may be attacked on all sides at once'. This very point was elaborated on again when Stepney wrote two months later to announce the news that the King of the Romans would command the Imperial Army on the Rhine, in person. 'We may hope,' he wrote, that 'our armies in Italy and in the Netherlands may have a fair field action, not being likely to be overpowered with unequalled numbers, since the French will have full employment on all hands.'² The key point in English strategy was the maintenance of active armies in several theatres which would force France to disperse her troops. It seemed hardly possible to the English Government that victory could be achieved on the continent by one army As the treaties with Portugal were about to be alone. concluded in 1703, Nottingham advised Marlborough that the ability of the allies to comply with the provisions of this new treaty would depend largely on the success which they had together in the war. 'I do not doubt of success in the parts under your command,' the secretary of state wrote, 'yet I fear even that will not be sufficient for such a detachment from your army as this treaty will require unless matters in Germany be more prosperous than

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/201, fo.3: Stepney to Hedges, 28 December 1701.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/18: Stepney to Vernon, 8 March 1702.

as yet seem likely.'¹ From the very outset of the war, it was clear that no one theatre of the war overshadowed others. In the English view, it was the balance amongst the different theatres which would defeat France. In June 1706, Secretary Hedges advised Methuen, '. . . it is absolutely necessary for his [Charles III's] interest in particular, as well as that of the whole Confederacy that the war in Italy be kept up for should the duke of Savoy by reduced and that war at an end, the French would then be at liberty to pour their forces into Spain'.² An English diplomat in Savoy made a similar comment in 1704:

> . . . the Enemies have now above 100 Battalions and so many Squadrons of horse which melt like snow in this warm sun every summer, which are of infinite expence to the French King, and which will be upon the Rhine or the Maese next summer, if nothing is done to employ them here.³

Following the disastrous allied defeat at Almanza in Spain, Lord Sunderland wrote Marlborough with a similar thought in mind. 'I am glad to find,' he wrote, 'you will take the field as soon as tomorrow, all our hopes is that you in Flanders, and the duke of Savoy on that side will retrieve our misfortune in Spain.'⁴ Shortly after receiving the news of the failure of the Toulon expedition in the same year, Godolphin expressed again the same basic

¹P.R.O., S.P. 49/209, fo.26: Nottingham to Marlborough, 2 April 1703.

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/8/2, fo.125: Chetwynd to Hedges, 26 August 1704.

⁴Blenheim MSS. A2-24: Sunderland to Marlborough, 9 May 1707.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/207, fo.109: Hedges to Methuen, 11 June 1706.

Spain can't be supported this winter without Prince Eugene and some troops from Italy and Italy can't be made useful next year to the Common Cause, but by putting the Duke of Savoy at the head of an Army to act offensively against France. . . When these things are well provided for France will be less able to have any great superiority either upon the Rhine or in Flanders. . . !

The point to be noted here is that not only was England fully aware of a relationship among the fronts, but also that the need to strike France within her own borders was an important part of this strategy. In discussing plans for the campaign of 1707, Marlborough touched on this point with the Deputies of the States-General. 'The Court of Vienna should be immediately writ to,' they agreed, 'to dissuade them from the Expedition of Naples, and to press them in the most earnest manner to proceed with the greatest vigour on the design of entering France, as the only means left to redress our affairs in Spain. . . . '² Despite the interest of some of the allies in obtaining territory and defeating French forces in places such as Naples, England saw such expeditions as secondary and less important ones. Her strategy was designed to achieve a position in which the allies could directly injure France, and force her to change her general policies.

This consistent policy of strategically related

¹Blenheim MSS. A2-23: Godolphin to Marlborough, 7 September 1707.

²P.R.O., S.P. 87/2, fos.589v.-90: Marlborough to Harley, 10 May 1707.

military operations continued after Godolphin's fall from power in 1710. Shortly after the change in the Ministry, Secretary Boyle outlined the policy to be followed after the allied victories at Almenara and Saragossa. He ordered the diplomats in Vienna to press the Imperial Court to keep its army in Piedmont in the field as long as possible, '. . . Her Majesty thinking it of the greatest importance for improving our late great success in Spain to give as much diversion as possible to the enemy on all sides. . . .'¹

By 1711, when the Harley Government was firmly in power, Secretary St. John repeated the same strategy when he ordered Lord Peterborough to encourage the duke of Savoy to lead a powerful diversion into Provence or Dauphiné.

> Many advantages would result to the Common Cause from such a measure. Spain would be relieved; our Army in Flanders would be able to penetrate further into the enemy's country, and France would be in no condition to act offensively on the Rhine and to penetrate one side into the Empire whilst the King of Sweden does the same thing on another.²

As the English government saw clearly that the relationship between the allied armies was the key to victory, it saw, at the same time, that the lack of strategic co-ordination meant defeat. Allied forces could not keep the field if the French were allowed to bring their overwhelming forces to bear in a single theatre. Secretary

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: Boyle to Palmes, 29 August 1710.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 13 February 1711.

St. John stated this view very clearly to Lord Raby when he noted, 'If the French should reinforce their Army on the Rhine from Dauphiné, We ours from Flanders, and the Duke of Savoy remain in a state of inaction, our condition would be bad indeed'.¹

It was essential to the basic strategy of the Alliance that the allies concert their operations and act in support of one another. In this way, they could thwart danger as well as take advantage of opportunities to defeat France. This idea was illustrated in 1711 when Queen Anne signed her instructions for Charles Whitworth's special mission to Vienna at the time of the Imperial Election. '. . . You will urge the situation of our affairs in general both in Flanders and on the Rhine as well as in Spain, 'Whitworth was told, 'and show that there is no scheme so likely to give immediate ease to the War in all parts, and particularly in Spain, as a vigorous diversion on the side of Piedmont. . . . '² The Government in London saw that a vigorous attack on southeastern France, at that juncture in the war, could substantially alter the 'face of affairs'. In order to be effective in these operations, the allies needed to make France realize that her borders were not secure, and that she was threatened on all sides by armies willing to move against her simultaneously. Whitworth was ordered to emphasize to the Imperial Court, 'The danger we run of losing the fruits of the treasure we have spent and

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo.107: St. John to Raby, 8 May 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/214, fo.209: Instructions to Whitworth, 29 May 1711.

A picture emerges from the evidence which shows England's grand strategy clearly based on an alliance which was intended to conduct an offensive war on all sides of France. English statesmen and commanders understood that the allied armies in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries were interrelated in so far as they contributed to dividing French forces and preventing France from concentrating her superior strength on any one front.

England's broad conception of war strategy required resources far beyond the capacity of any single nation to supply. England and Holland were the leading financial centres of Europe.² Together they were 'the two branches'³ of the war which provided the major proportion of the money to finance the war. Although England and Holland were, in this sense, the most important of the allies, the strategic conception for fighting the war required additional allies. They were required for two major reasons: first, the geographical position of France; and second, a source for fighting men.

In 1702, George Stepney wrote to the secretary of state recommending an Austrian plan for a drive from Trier

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/214, fo.209: Instructions to Whitworth, 29 May 1711.

²For a general survey of this subject, see P. G. M. Dickson 'War Finance 1689-1714', in the <u>New Cambridge</u> Modern History, vi, Ch. 9.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9, section 22: Memorandum, 19 October 1705.

into Northern Lorraine and Luxembourg. 'If you consider the situation of those countries on the map,' Stepney wrote, 'you will agree that the mortal wound may be given on that side.' Although the Austrians had proposed a detachment from Marlborough's army in the Low Countries, Stepney suggested

> A detachment of our German auxiliaries may be most proper for that service, I mean the troops of Lüneberg, Prussia, Hesse or Münster who will have but a short march directly from Maestricht or that neighbourhood, and will have the benefit of good winter quarters.¹

Troops, geography and position relative to France were the most important considerations in England's view of the allies. One may see another example of this in the first year of the war when thought was being given to attracting Bavaria into the alliance. 'If the proper methods be taken for it, 'Godolphin wrote, 'we may gain the elector of Bavaria to our side, but unless we can have the advantage by it of strengthening Prince Eugene's army in Italy, I doubt we may pay too dear for his friendship.'² The additional troops which Bavaria could provide would be useful only if they could be used to create a force superior in numbers to that which the French could gather. The existence of an additional army in Bavaria would be of little use by itself. The availability of additional troops from the allies was necessary to fill out the numbers and to make

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 226: Stepney to Hedges, 11 October 1702.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,588, fos. 155-8: Godolphin to Nottingham, 30 August 1702.

an effective and superior force in the field. In 1703, Stepney underlined the use of these additional troops when he commented, that with additional auxiliary troops 'our forces will be at least equal to the French both on the Rhine and in Italy'. The same viewpoint, in a slightly different context, may be seen in 1707 when the Government was considering its strategy in the event that the allied attack on Toulon should succeed. In that case, it was apparent that the primary need was to reinforce the duke of Savoy's army in order to maintain his position on French territory. 'There is no easier way of doing that, than by inducing the Venetians to enter into the Alliance and to let us have some ten or twelve thousand of their troops,' the secretary of state wrote.² In that way, a clear superiority in numbers could be maintained. In assessing the strategic situation in any theatre, it was common to calculate in terms of troop numbers, using the total number that could be put into the field from all sources. The important point was the number of effective men in the field that could face the French from whatever source they could be obtained. It was on the basis of this manner of calculating relative strength that army commanders usually assessed the chances of their success in battle.³

³For example, Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xxi, pp. 6-7: Marlborough to Stanhope, 15 November 1707.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/21, fo.28: Stepney to Hedges, 9 June 1703.

²Blenheim, Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 89: Sunderland to Manchester, 5 August 1707.

An example of this line of thinking may be seen in 1710, when the cabinet was considering a proposal to move 2000 cavalry troops from Italy into Spain. This, Secretary Boyle wrote, 'would have the consequence either of reducing us to act defensively in Piedmont, or to give over the thoughts of making any diversion on that side next year, unless they could be replaced from the Emperor's other Dominions'.¹

Despite the financial wealth of England and Holland together, the two nations alone could not produce what was necessary to conduct a war on such a vast scale. The geographic position and the soldiers which the other allies could provide were essential elements in England's conception of the grand strategy for the war. But the war was not seen entirely in terms of the army. The navy had an important part in the concept of the grand strategy.

In terms of party politics and public opinion in England, the army and navy symbolized alternative strategies to the war.² In actual practice, however, and in terms of the basic conception of English grand strategy, the two armed forces were complementary. Nottingham, the High Tory secretary of state told Marlborough,

> I am biased by an opinion that we shall never have any decisive success, nor be able to hold out a war against France, but by making it a sea war,

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: Boyle to Palmes, 19 August 1710.

²See Chapter VII below, 'The Public Debate and War Strategy'.

and such a sea war as accompanies and supports attempts on land.¹

Nottingham was neither suggesting here England's involvement as a mere auxiliary to the war, nor a concentration on a colonial war, nor a 'guerre de course'. He was speaking specifically of amphibious attacks on France and the English treaty obligation to Portugal. At the same time, he was underscoring the point that there was a fundamental and valuable connection between the two armed forces.

Even before war was declared, England had seriously considered the problem of sending a fleet to the Mediterranean which could support the Imperial army in Italy. In September of 1701, Secretary Hedges wrote to Stepney,

> You will not want arguments to justify our proceeding in not sending a fleet into the Mediterranean this year, from the want of ports for their security, which is a most material alteration of the case from what it was last war, and that the season is too far advanced for us to do any service there.²

Shortly after Queen Anne's accession to the throne, Count Wratislaw, the Imperial Ambassador in London, proposed to the Queen that the fleet be sent to Naples in 1702, for support of the Empire. The proposal was disapproved for the same basic reason. The fleet could not 'go so far as Naples not having any Port in the way without being exposed to the utmost dangers of the sea'.³ The

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/209, fo.26: Nottingham to Marlborough, 2 April 1703.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/200, fo.206: Hedges to Stepney, 5 September 1701.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/224: Answer to Count Wratislaw's Proposal, 18 April 1702. need for naval bases was a real and practical consideration in implementing grand strategy. The value of the fleet in the Mediterranean was clearly understood, the problem during the first few years of the war was the practical difficulty in accomplishing the task. The need for a base somewhere between England and the Mediterranean was essential, but the ability to obtain this base depended upon the success of operations and upon conditions abroad. In 1702, Admiral Sir George Rooke received discretionary orders to detach a squadron into the Mediterranean after the capitulation of Cadiz. This squadron was to be ordered, in particular, to assist the Imperial army by maintaining supply lines across the Adriatic.¹ Concerning this matter, Sir Charles Hedges wrote to his colleague Nottingham,

> As for the sending a squadron to the Mediterranean, I think there is no reason to be in pain; if we have not Cadiz they will not go and if we have it, 'tis left to their judgement there, who will certainly consider the services they are to undertake, and what is feasible, as well as the time of returning to Cadiz, and refitting there for the next spring, and they have already been told the reasons for making the detachment, and of Her Majesty's design of having a fleet in the Mediterranean next year, and having better advices of the motions of the Count de Tolouse, than we can have at this distance, must consequently be the best judges whether it be fit to make a detachment or not.²

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,925, fos.80-1: Instructions to Rooke, 21 August 1702.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,588, fo.251: Hedges to Nottingham, 20 September 1702.

The failure of the Cadiz expedition and the necessity for the fleet to return to England for a winter base prevented entry into the Mediterranean in 1702. The plans for the fleet in the Mediterranean in 1703 were carried through. It was to be an allied fleet of both Dutch and English ships. By late May the Dutch squadron had not yet appeared in England to sail on the expedition. Concerned over this delay, Nottingham urgently wrote to Grand Pensionary Heinsius to encourage its prompt sailing. Attempting to persuade him of the importance of this expedition to grand strategy, Nottingham emphasized points which described much of the continuing value of the fleet in the Mediterranean:

> The prospect of prevailing with the Governments on the Coast of Barbary to break with France and in consequence to make peace with the States.

The succouring of the Cevennois with arms, ammunition and money which we have on board our squadron for that purpose for the revolt of these Protestants against France.

The assistance of the Sicilians particularly of Palermo who have given assurance of revolting upon the appearance of our Fleet.

The assistance of the Emperor to transport his troops . . .

But above all, to induce the Duke of Savoy to declare for the House of Austria by giving such diversions . . . to the French in Italy. . . A fleet in the Mediterranean was necessary to encourage the Duke of Savoy by letting him see how zealous we were to support the House of Austria everywhere, and I doubt it is necessary too to satisfy the Emperor that we have no thought of a partition which the Court of Vienna has long most unreasonably suspected and this suspicion will be perhaps increased rather than diminished by the treaty with Portugal of which the first fruits have an immediate relation to Spain.¹

In order to achieve these and similar objectives, it was necessary to ensure that the fleet could move effectively in carrying out its functions. The strategists of the day believed that in order to do this, it was necessary for the English fleet to be superior numerically to the French fleet. The obvious way in which the French could be superior was to join their Mediterranean fleet with this Atlantic fleet. English commanders had strict and continuing orders to prevent this occurrence. 'There may be some danger,' Sir Cloudesley Shovell's orders in 1703 read, 'in case the French, when you are in the Mediterranean, thinking themselves inferior to you, should attempt to repass the Straits, you are to have a careful eye on the motions of their Fleet and endeavour by all means possible to hinder their repassing and coming towards Portugal. . . . '² Secretary Hedges emphasized one aspect of the objective of preventing these fleets from joining when Shovell was given authority to seek out the French fleet on the coast of Spain, Portugal or elsewhere, if they had left the Mediterranean. 'Although it be not so in express words in your Instructions . . . if you think yourself superior and can have an advantage over the French fleet whenever you find an opportunity to attack them, it

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,595, fo.230: Nottingham to Pensioner, 24 May 1703.

²P.R.O., S.P. 44/208, fo.92: Instructions to Shovell, 29 June 1703.

will be looked upon here as considerable a service as any that is intended.'¹

The battle between fleets was not the sole purpose for the allied fleets' presence in the Mediterranean. John Methuen complained that some naval officers failed to realize this

> . . . in truth our commanders at sea are very unwillingly brought to think that there is any other service for a fleet at sea than fighting the enemy's fleet so that if the French do not come out they think they have done enough. . . .²

Sir Philip Meadows echoed the same sentiment when he commented, 'I hope the Confederate Fleet will not ride Masters again in the Mediterranean in vain. . . .'³ There were important services that the fleet could perform beyond the direct engagement of the enemy fleet, but there were limitations as well to what it could do. While waiting impatiently to begin the naval campaign in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1706, Admiral Sir George Byng commented,

> The day burns away. If in any summer • we may reasonably expect to do service with our fleet in winning over by persuasion, or otherwise by force the islands, or any part of the coast, sure it should be this in which we are this early in our sea campaign, and superior we think in our naval force, though when all's done ships are but [ill suited] tools to win towns withall if no land is to be purchased by the fruit

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/208, fo. 93-4: Hedges to Shovell, 2 July 1703.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,057, fos. 212-3: J. Methuen to Godolphin, 4 June 1706.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/29: Meadows to [Boyle?], 11 April 1708. of our summer's toil.¹

From the very outset of the war, the strategy of fleet operations in the Mediterranean had a direct relation to the conduct of the war on the continent. The ability of the allied fleet to provide transportation and naval support for the armies near the Mediterranean was an essential part of the concept. In 1707, for instance, Secretary Harley illustrated this when he wrote Sir Philip Meadows, then envoy in Vienna,

> The remoteness from us [in England], will make it very difficult to send a sufficient supply of troops and in good time . . . We may have reason to hope they [the Imperial-German troops] will have success in their attack on Naples and consequently that Kingdom will be continued to King Charles with a small part of those troops, and therefore the remainder may be transported very early by Our Fleet into Spain for the service of King Charles . . . this will be a means to recover those parts of Spain. The English troops which are already gone to Portugal I hope will be able to preserve that Court in our Alliance, and the Diversion the Duke of Savoy will make will afford the Germans an opportunity of succeeding in Spain. . .

This one example of many instances may serve to illustrate the direct relationship which the Mediterranean Fleet had to the overall strategy on the continent. The ability of the navy to freely perform this kind of assistance without major opposition from the enemy was its key contribution. The inter-relationship of the different

¹Gloucestershire R.O., MSS. D340a C27/8: Byng to Thomas Reynolds, 18 May 1706.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/39: Harley to Meadows, 14 June 1707.

theatres and the necessity of using the Alliance as a resource were linked in southern Europe through the navy's capacity to undertake this duty in the Mediterranean.

In addition to surrounding France and forcing her to disperse her armies to meet multiple threats, England included in her basic conception of strategy an idea for the economic isolation of France.¹ Through this she attempted to cut off French resources and to reduce French ability to prosecute a war effectively against the allies. This was reflected in diplomacy through her insistent demand for a prohibition of commerce and financial transactions between merchants in France and those in allied countries. Complementing this, the English navy attempted to prevent the supply of money reaching France from America.

In the autumn of 1701, Admiral Sir George Rooke was ordered by the Ministry to gain intelligence about French Fleet movements because

> . . . from several concurrent advices having just cause to apprehend that the French King intends to seize likewise as the forts in the Spanish Netherlands all the effects of the Spanish Flota expected home in a short time, the better to enable him to carry on a war.²

Writing to the Governor of Jamaica, Secretary Lord Nottingham commented, 'you will easily imagine the vast advantage to Her Majesty if it were possible to interrupt the French squadron in its return with the Spanish

¹See Viviane Barrie, 'La prohibition du commerce avec la France dans la politique anglaise à la fin du xvii^e siècle.' <u>Revue du Nord</u>, 59 (1977), 343-64.

²P.R.O., S.P. 44/206-7, fos.1-4: Instructions to Rooke, 12 August 1701. This was the <u>Flota</u> which was eventually attacked at Vigo in 1702.

Flota. . .' The Governor was ordered to gain all intelligence that he could and send it to England as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Caribbean Squadron, '. . that all imaginable care may be taken to meet and take and destroy . . . the flota'.¹

Distant operations in the Caribbean and North Atlantic had this aspect which was directly related to the conduct of the war on the continent. The attack on the silver fleet was undoubtedly designed to complement allied operations in order to prevent its cargo from being used to support the enemy war effort.²

Conclusion


England's basic objectives in entering the war were to secure her own safety, to prevent foreign interference in the Revolution settlement and to secure and maintain her trade abroad. In order to achieve these goals, English statesmen believed that there must be a balance of power in Europe which would hinder any one nation from interfering with the normal development of another nation. While this might also bring benefit to others, it would specifically allow England to achieve her primary objectives. The major threat to obtaining this political situation in Europe was posed by the potential growth of French power through the inheritance of the Spanish throne

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,591, fo.9: Nottingham to Selwyn, 15 May 1702.

²H. Kamen, 'The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702', <u>Bull. Inst. Hist. Res.</u>, C (1966), 165-173, argues that the Spanish under Philip V benefited most from the attack. However true this may be, it was certainly not England's intention.

by the French king's grandson. The inheritance by a Bourbon prince was not in itself a threat, but military and political events indicated that the potential danger would become a reality. The practical military problem which England faced was the problem of how to deal with France's military strength. The basic strategic idea which England seized upon was to engage the superior strength of France on as many fronts as possible in order to compel her to divide and, thus, to weaken her forces. Since this was an objective which no single European nation could accomplish alone, the maintenance of an active alliance conducting an offensive war with several armies was the key stone to the strategy. In this manner, the campaigns in each theatre were fundamentally connected in the English understanding of grand strategy for the war. In order to maintain this type of a war, several other elements were necessary to facilitate it. Allied naval supremacy was necessary to support military operations in the Peninsula and in Italy as well as to maintain communications in all The attacks on the silver fleet were part of a areas. larger view of economic warfare which was intended to complement operations in the Continental theatre by hindering French ability to conduct the war. All of these elements were related to the same strategic goal: the engagement of France on as many fronts as possible in order to reduce her superior strength to proportions manageable by the smaller allied powers.

This concept which is broadly sketched here appears to have been the guiding thought behind England's employment of her military and naval forces. It was this concept



which lay behind England's use of her military and naval force, her financial resources and her diplomacy as the means to obtain the proper strategic position as well as influencing the use of allied forces to join with her in carrying out the strategy.

To some degree, it was an unpractical idea, for it failed to consider the problems of implementation, the varying national goals among the allies, a French counterstrategy, the impact of events and the changing political situation during the course of the war. The strategy was founded in the context of a particular stance on a specific situation in European politics. The military and naval goals which England hoped to achieve through her strategy were not the basic national objectives which she sought, but rather the means, in a particular situation, to those objectives. For these reasons, England's concept of grand strategy is an unsatisfactory explanation for all aspects of her conduct in the war. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence which indicates that this strategy remained in use until the very final stages of the war.

CHAPTER III

A WEB OF TREATIES

The formal agreements which England made with other nations during the period 1701 to 1712 established the basic international framework through which England carried out her strategy for the war. The maintenance of an alliance was essential to the English concept of the war in order to achieve a number of definite objectives. An alliance provided a means to expand her financial resources to fight the war as well as the means to provide additional men, arms, supplies, and ships which England, herself, could not supply. The alliance, in connection with other agreements, also provided geographical position from which military and naval operations could take place effectively while at the same time securing other parts of Europe from being used by the enemy to outflank the allies. The formal Treaty of Grand Alliance which had been signed in 1701 was not the only instrument which was used to achieve this goal. A series of some 130 agreements were made by England during the course of the war.¹ Although

¹See Appendix B, 'Chronological listing of England's International Agreements, 1701-13'.

they were entered into for a variety of reasons, nearly all of them related in one way or another to England's conduct of the war.¹

Each state which participated in the war had its own series of agreements which was entered into independently, and England was not directly involved in every agreement made by an ally which concerned the conduct of the war. In some cases, moreover, England encouraged her allies to enter into agreements in which she did not join. There are numerous instances in which this was done for reasons of propriety or for an advantage which could be obtained more readily by another ally than by England. In such cases, the advantage was found in the connection with the ally and not directly with England. Perhaps the most important example of such an arrangement was the treaty with Portugal. Because of a disagreement over precedence in signing the document, the treaty was signed in two series. The first was an agreement between the Emperor, Portugal and the States-General which established the basic provisions of the Portugal's entry into the grand alliance. The second treaty was between the Emperor, the States-General and England in which England confirmed the provisions of the agreement with Portugal through the other allies. These two Treaties were paralleled by a third treaty between England and Portugal which dealt largely

¹These agreements and the negotiations connected with them involve many special considerations in the relations with particular nations which are not discussed in detail. England's relations with each nation could provide separate studies in themselves. This chapter is limited to a broad overview of the agreements and their contribution to the systematic attempt to carry out a definite war strategy.

with maritime affairs.¹ Other examples include the treaties which the Dutch undertook to obtain troops in their pay alone, the treaty between Wolfenbüttel and Brunswick which took Wolfenbüttel out of the French sphere of influence, the Dutch mediation and guarantee of the Treaty of Travendahl which sought to maintain peace in the North.²

The treaties which England directly undertook with other nations fell into six general categories. First, there were the series of agreements which established the Grand Alliance as an effective military arrangement. Secondly, there were a series of agreements which were designed to protect and to secure that arrangement. Thirdly, there were a large number of agreements which were specifically designed to obtain troops for fighting the war. Fourthly, there were the agreements between England and Holland for carrying on the naval war. Fifthly, there were agreements which were used to promote English commerce and which also served as a form of economic warfare against France. Finally, there were the agreements which led to the end of the war and the Peace of Utrecht.³ The first five categories concern us here with the active conduct of the war.

¹C. Parry, <u>The Consolidated Treaty Series</u> (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1969), xxiv, p. 375.

²There is an opportunity for a study to be done in foreign archives which considers the implications to the Grand Alliance of all the separate agreements which its individual members undertook.

³See Chapters 8,9 for a discussion of these treaties and agreements in so far as they affected England's conduct of the war.

The agreements which led to the Grand Alliance began in June of 1701 with the treaty between the States-General, England and Denmark. The North was the area most vulnerable to French intrigue and King William believed that it was necessary to secure the support of Denmark and Sweden before any further arrangements were made.¹ In this agreement, Denmark was allowed to remain a neutral in the war against France although she promised to send a contingent of troops to defend the Netherlands and to support the Emperor. This promise of neutrality with a contribution of troops was, it was hoped, a guarantee that Denmark would not be drawn into the French camp and present a threat to the ability of the allies to devote all their efforts against the main French armies.

Less than three months later, the Treaty of Grand Alliance had been agreed upon at the Hague. On 7 September 1701, representatives of the King, the Emperor, and the States agreed on the general terms which would be the basis of the alliance. Very little indication was made in this document of the strategy which would be utilized for the war or the means through which it would be carried out. In Article 4, it was vaguely stated that the allies 'promised and engaged reciprocally to aid each other with all their forces, the means which would be regulated by a special convention'.² No formal agreement was ever made on

¹Archives . . Orange-Nassau, III, iii, 392-3: William III to Heinsius, 28 January 1701.

²Quotations in English from the text in Browning, English Historical Documents, viii, pp. 873-4.

this point, although the controversial 'denombrement' tentatively agreed upon at this time established the number of troops for the army to be proportioned as 102,000 Dutch, 96,000 Imperial and 40,000 English.¹

The allies agreed that in order to obtain the peace of Europe, to satisfy the Habsburg claim to the Spanish throne, and to secure the safety of the lands, commerce, and navigation of England and Holland, they should

> use their utmost endeavours to recover the provinces of the Spanish Low Countries, that they may be a fence and rampart, commonly called a barrier, separating and distancing France from the United Provinces; . . . as likewise the Duchy of Milan, with its dependencies, as a fief of the Empire and contributing to the security of his Imperial Majesty's hereditary countries; besides the ingdoms of Naples and Sicily and the lands and islands upon the coasts of Tuscany in the Mediterranean, that belong to the Spanish dominions and may serve to the same purpose. . . .

Beyond these specifications, there was no formal agreement among the major allies which clearly outlined at the beginning of the war the manner in which military force would be used against France.

A further article of the treaty stated that 'all the Kings, Princes, and states who have peace at heart and who wish to enter the alliance will be admitted'. All the principalities within the Empire, in particular, were

¹Common's Journals, vol. 13, p. 664, and <u>Marlborough</u>-Godolphin Correspondence, p. 13, note. 1.

²Browning, <u>English Historical Documents</u>, viii. 873-4.

encouraged to join. In England's view, this clause was a key one in her policy toward other European states. She actively encouraged as many states as possible to join. There was strength to be found in numbers, of course, but there were some additional practical considerations. France saw that the loose structure of the Empire left the Emperor unable to direct it as a whole without extensive agreements and negotiations. The Emperor spoke for Austria, but not for all the princes in the Empire. France attempted to use this situation and to offer some of the German princes a guarantee of their safety if they supported France against the allies. In early April of 1701, even before the Treaty of Grand Alliance had been signed, George Stepney commented on the French tactics:

> . . . by formenting the unhappy Divisions which are already between many Princes of the Empire and their Chief, and improving those seeds of discord to that degree, as may at present render the House of Austria incapable of pursuing their pretentions.1

It was apparent that the French were capable of engaging these princes of the Empire at an early stage and then be able to prevent them from joining in the alliance which the Maritime Powers and the Emperor were proposing. For that reason it was essential that the separate princes be joined to the Alliance in their own right as well as through the Emperor. In addition, it was understood that the Emperor would not allow any prince

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/62, fo. 20: Stepney to [?], 18 April 1701.

of the Empire to remain neutral in case of a war with France.¹

The process of establishing an effective military alliance which could carry out the broad conception in the Treaty of Grand Alliance was a laborious one that was not completed until 1704. The task of securing the allegiance of the German princes continued up to that year. The Circles of Franconia, Swabia and the Rhine acceded to the Alliance in the autumn of 1702 and the Bishop of Münster joined in the following spring. Through 1704, the most serious problem in the Empire remained the French support for the elector of Bavaria and the revolt of the Hungarians against the Emperor. Efforts to solve these difficulties concerned the allies deeply.² The problems in Germany were not the only concerns of England. She was particularly interested in rounding out the Alliance by gaining Portugal and Savoy to the Alliance. The addition of Portugal to the Grand Alliance had been mentioned very early on and an article concerning the desirability of it had been included in the Treaty of Grand Alliance. The defeat of the allied forces at Cadiz in 1702 underscored the necessity to obtain a naval base close to the entrance to the Mediterranean. Cadiz had been a major base for the allies in the Nine Years War;³ the denial of

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 34,357, fo.12: Aldersey to Blathwayt, 2 August 1701.

²See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of these problems.

³For a study of the importance of Cadiz, see John Ehrman, 'William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy, 1692-4', <u>The Cambridge Historical Journal</u>, ix (1949), pp. 271-92.

its use now meant that an alternative had to be found if effective naval operations were to be undertaken in the Mediterranean. Although Lisbon was another 350 miles away from the Straits of Gibraltar, it was the closest suitable harbour after Cadiz. After extensive negotiations,¹ Portugal joined the Grand Alliance.

In the Treaty of Defensive Alliance with Portugal, the Maritime Powers agreed to use their diplomacy to prevent Spain or France from attacking Portugal or Portuguese territories abroad. If that failed, and either France or Spain made war on Portugal, the Dutch and English agreed to maintain and arm a contingent of 12,000 soldiers in Portugal. The agreement also specified that if France or Spain should make war on the Queen or the States, Portugal would be obliged to join the war. In that circumstance, the allies agreed to maintain the same 12,000 man force in Portugal.

The Treaty of Offensive Alliance, concluded on the same day, provided that the three confederates, the Empire, the Queen and the States, would endeavour to place the Archduke Charles, second son of the Emperor, in possession of Spain as King Charles II had possessed it. That is to say, Spain would not be partitioned between the House of Bourbon and the House of Habsburg. In this endeavour, Portugal would not be required to participate offensively, except in Spain itself. Portugal would not be required

¹See A. D. Francis, <u>The Methuens and Portugal</u>, pp. 161 ff.

to have more than 12,000 foot and 3,000 horse in the field in Spain. The King of Portugal would be required, in addition to these troops in his own pay, to raise 13,000 soldiers in order to bring the total Portuguese forces to 28,000 men of which 5,000 would be horse and 23,000 foot. In return, the Allies would arm and pay the 13,000 Portuguese troops at the rate of 1 million silver Philips per year for as long as the war lasted. An additional 500,000 would be paid upon ratification of the treaty in order to prepare the Portuguese army for the first year. To complement these forces, the Confederates agreed to furnish, arm, pay, and maintain for each year during the war, 12,000 veteran foreign troops of which 10,000 would be foot, 1,000 horse, and 1,000 dragoons.

The twenty-first article specified that

. . . neither peace nor truce shall be made but by mutual consent of all the confederates, and they shall not be made at any time while the most Christian King's grandson, the Dauphin's second son, Philip, duke of Anjou, or any other prince of the House of France remains in Spain, nor yet unless that the crown of Portugal do entirely possess and reign over all . . territories and appurtenances which it now possesses, as well in as out of Spain. . . ¹

Portugal was not required to declare war until the Archduke Charles actually arrived in Portugal with all the aid that the Allies had promised for the support of

¹Browning, <u>English Historical Documents</u>, viii, p. 878.

the war.¹ By secret articles, certain towns in Estremadura, Galicia, and territories in South America along the Río de la Plata were ceded to Portugal in perpetuity.

Having settled these points, the agreement went on to spell out the strategy by which the war was to be fought. At the same time that Portugal invaded Spain, the Maritime Powers agreed that they would invade the coast of Spain with a strong fleet, 'that the Enemies Forces may be divided, and so the Sum of the Expedition be rendered more easy'.² The principle that would be applied to the larger scale of grand strategy for the entire war,

> For the same reasons, the Confederates shall be bound vigorously to make war, as well in the Low Countries and the Upper Rhine, as in Italy, at the same time that Portugal shall carry its armies into Spain; and this shall thenceforth be continued in the same manner, during the other Years, while the War shall last.

This was the first formal agreement which the major allies signed that specifically stated the grand strategy for the war. With the means now available to enter the Mediterranean, as well as the addition of a Portuguese force, the great strength of France could be divided, and thus weakened, by several active armies.

The price of Portuguese participation was very high, and it was a price that did not find easy acceptance among

²Article 26. Quoted from G. M. Trevelyan, <u>Select</u> <u>Documents for Queen Anne's Reign</u> (Cambridge, 1929), p. 19. ³Article 27. Ibid.

¹Article 25.

the allies.¹ Despite the reluctant ratifications, how-The ever, the Confederates saw value in the agreements. scale of the agreements with Portugal was quite different than those with the smaller German principalities, but the methodology and purpose were similar. Through subsidies, arms, and additional soldiers, an army was created to fight offensively against France. Simultaneously, the agreement opened the way for the long desired support for the Imperial army in the Mediterranean. Having been granted the safety of Lisbon harbour, Dutch and English warships had available a secure base for repairs and supplies. The lack of a base had been the principal reason which had prevented the Maritime Powers from supporting the Imperial army in Italy. With Lisbon available, allied naval operations in the western Mediterranean became practicable.

Some months after the signing of the treaties with Portugal, the strategic ring around France was completed with the addition of Savoy. In October 1703, the duke of Savoy broke his alliance with France and shortly thereafter signed an agreement with the Emperor by which Savoyard and Imperial troops would act together. Savoy had been eyed with suspicion in England ever since the duke had abruptly left the Alliance during the Nine Years War, leaving the other members to make peace on their own terms. The presence of the allied fleet in the Mediterranean and the victory of the allied armies in Germany at the Schellenberg, and later at Blenheim, allowed the allies to support Savoy

¹Francis, <u>Methuens and Portugal</u>, pp. 180-83.

more effectively. In August of 1704, the Queen and the States agreed to provide a subsidy for the duke of Savoy of 80,000 ducats per month and 100,000 ducats to fund a levy in order to bring an army into the field. The Queen agreed that she would pay two-thirds of the sum specified in the Treaty, and in several separate articles, agreed to support the territorial claims of Savoy.¹

It was readily apparent that the treaty with Savoy would induce France to send additional forces into Italy. Therefore, the allies would need a much stronger army than that already serving there. A treaty with the King of Prussia in November 1704, contracted for 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to act with the Imperial and Savoyard troops in Italy. A subsidy was agreed upon at 300,000 crowns which was to be paid at Amsterdam in twelve payments of 25,000 crowns each.

The Queen engaged an additional 3,000 Prussians to serve with the 17,000 already on the Rhine and agreed also that if more troops were needed, Prussia would be given preference as a source. England promised in return to support Prussian claims to have the right of inheritance to High Gelderland ascertained and the portion of Bavaria and Cologne adjusted. Additionally, the Government promised to obtain the arrears of 23,600 crowns in subsidy money from Parliament.

With these arrangements, not only were the preparations

¹A summary of Savoy's long range objectives may be found in Spencer Wilkinson, <u>The Defence of Piedmont 1742</u>-<u>1748</u> (Oxford, 1927), pp. 1-13.

for the campaign of 1705 made, but more importantly, the Grand Alliance was completed. It had taken four years to develop the practical military relationship which had been foreshadowed in the conception of William III's policy. From 1705, the military agreements which were made were continuations and adjustments to the situation which had now been completed.

An example of one refinement to this arrangement was the 1707 agreement which facilitated the movement of troops from northern Europe to Italy and Spain. In order to obtain this, the Queen and the Emperor joined in a treaty with the Grisons League in order to obtain free passage of troops between Lombardy and the Tyrol through the Alpine passes.¹

The basis upon which England participated in the Alliance extended to more than just a consideration of ships, men and geography. A key element was England's close association with the Dutch Republic. As already suggested the Hague was an important diplomatic center. Dutch advice and knowledge was important to William III in the formulation of the Alliance, and Dutch diplomatic negotiations were a direct complement to English policy. There is little doubt that England saw a fundamental connection with the Dutch in William III's lifetime, but even

¹Agreement of 13 March 1707. For a commentary on the key position of the Grisons for military movements in an earlier period and for useful maps, see Geoffrey Parker, <u>The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659</u> (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 70-77. Another significant point about this treaty was that it was the first separate treaty which England made with the Emperor. All previous agreements were made jointly with the Dutch.

after his death there was a need to continue the relationship for the practical purposes of war strategy. In the summer of 1703, the 'special relationship' between England and the United Provinces was formally strengthened by negotiations for the renewal of treaties and alliances made during the previous forty years. The English Commissioners, Lords Pembroke, Buckingham, and the two Secretaries of State, Lord Nottingham and Sir Charles Hedges, dealt with the representatives of the States-General, Frederik van Reede and Willem van Hamen. By the agreement which resulted, the two nations reaffirmed the treaties and agreements made in a variety of different circumstances between 1667 and 1701. No longer sharing a King and Stadtholder, the Dutch and English attempted to confirm 'the political strategic factor, which made for collaboration, and . . . overshadowed the economic factor which made for divergence'.¹

Of course, the economic aspect of the Anglo-Dutch alliance must be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, competitive trade between the merchants of the two nations was a divisive factor. On the other hand, economic co-operation between the two was a necessary support for the political and strategic aims which they sought. In the War of the Spanish Succession, the Dutch were not the great investors in the English national debt that they would become later in the eighteenth century. During the war, there was little evidence of large or permanent investments

¹G. J. Renier, <u>Great Britain and the Establishment of</u> <u>the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-15</u> (London, 1930), p. 10.

by foreigners in England, but there was Dutch interest in limited and speculative investment.¹ The experience of the Nine Years War illustrated the great financial assistance which England could obtain from the Dutch in the maintenance of an army on the continent. At that time there were no English contractors who could effectively victual, transport and clothe the army abroad. Although this financial connection was unpopular in England, Dutch credit and contractors were necessary to the task.²

The Dutch were important partners in agreements which were made for troops, commerce and naval affairs. These specific matters will be discussed later in the chapter. At this point, however, one can see the general concept of grand strategy in terms of the series of agreements which established and secured the Grand Alliance as an effective military arrangement. The idea of dividing French forces through the use of widely separated armies was a simple one, but putting the idea into practice was an extremely complex problem. The close political and financial connection with the Dutch was one factor which made it practicable to put an effective army on the continent and to sustain close relations with a number of other European However, a more broadly based alliance was needed states. to obtain the necessary troops and the geographical position which was required. The German princes were important

¹P. G. M. Dickson, <u>The Financial Revolution in England</u>: <u>A Study in the Development of Public Credit 1688-1756</u> (London, 1967), pp. 304-11.

²Charles Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce & Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 90-99.

sources for men who could be hired into military service, and the Emperor was a key figure in mobilizing armies in Italy and on the Rhine. The strategic geographical position in the Mediterranean and the completion of the ring of allies around France depended on some additional Anglo-Dutch finance and naval resources were factors. important items as were German troops, but the most important matter was to establish an effective naval force in the Mediterranean. Without it, Savoy and other Italian states would not readily have the security to join the without if Alliance and to complete the ring. In addition, effective military operations in Spain could not be conducted by the allies. In order to establish the naval position from which these advantages could be obtained, it was necessary to have a base for naval operations in that area. Following the failure of the Cadiz expedition, English hopes to obtain a port rested on the treaties with Portugal. In order to acquire this base as well as to calm the fears of other allies in their own treaties, England had to agree to certain provisions for the benefit of the allies which they demanded as the price of their participation in the war. Portugal's demand was for an assurance of her own security stated in terms which would prevent a Bourbon from succeeding to the Spanish throne. Other allies had lower demands which included financial support or territorial gains. All were the prices which England agreed to pay in order to obtain the objectives which she sought, but none altered English war aims. Very few of England's ultimate war objectives were included in the treaties which she undertook with her allies. Instead, the Grand Alliance

was based on an agreement over the general nature of the military threat which France posed, a consensus of opinion in regard to the strategy which England proposed, and a consideration of some of the particular concerns of each ally. In this manner, the basic structure of the Alliance was developed for carrying on an offensive war against France which was designed to encircle her and to prevent her from concentrating her force to make a numerical superiority of troops in any one area.

In order for this arrangement to succeed, it had to be protected and secured from outside interference. One strategy used by France to interrupt the plans of the Alliance was to divert the contribution which member states could make by fostering revolts and by encouraging threats from Scandinavia, Turkey, the Barbary States, the Pope and the Italian princes. England dealt with these problems in various ways, and one method was to enter into agreements whose main purpose was to secure the alliance and to allow it to carry out its designed function without distraction.

Negotiations were carried out to conclude several agreements for this purpose. Not all the negotiations succeeded. Genoa and Venice failed to reach any agreement despite repeated English initiatives on the matter. English involvement and arbitration in the talks between the Hungarians and the Emperor caused increasing bitterness

in Vienna toward England.¹ In northern Africa, the Barbary States presented a direct threat to the commerce of the maritime powers as well as being potential French allies who could make naval operations in the Mediterranean difficult. Repeatedly through the war, England sent naval officers to Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis to obtain treaties which ensured peace and friendship. The Barbary States also provided a valuable source of corn and supplies for the army in Spain and a watering port for the navy. These objectives in dealing with the Barbary States involved commerce and trade as well as logistics and strategy. For that reason there is little wonder that the government went to great lengths to ensure that peace was maintained with those states during the war period.² In 1704, for example, impressive gifts were sent to the Emperor of Morocco which included a large double microscope with the inscription in Arabic, 'God hath created strange and wonderful things for our instruction, and His power is in all Generations'. At the same time, a fine repeating clock which played Arabic tunes was also presented, engraved with the Emperor's title and the inscription:

> From the Most Glorious Empress Anna of the Christians.³

¹Marsha Lee Frey, 'Austria's Role as an Ally of the Maritime Powers during the early years of the War of Spanish Succession, 1701-06', (Ohio State University Ph.D. thesis, 1971), pp. 210-11.

²For a general study of English relations on the Barbary coast, see Sir Godfrey Fisher, <u>Barbary Legend</u>: <u>War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415-1830</u> (Oxford, 1957), ch. xv, 'Our Relations with the Regencies, 1682-1912'.

³P.R.O., S.P. 71/15, fos. 157-64: J. Jones to Nottingham, 13 March 1704.

These gifts were part of negotiations which continued throughout the period and which sought to maintain the Barbary States, as well as others, from distracting the allies from applying their full force against France. More often than not, these efforts were expressed in diplomatic negotiations rather than in direct agreements. It is a major theme in English diplomatic correspondence at this time with nations beyond the ones which directly circled France: the Italian States, Turkey, Russia, Denmark, Poland and Sweden. One prominent agreement did come from these negotiations, i.e., over the threat which was posed by the Great Northern War to the conduct of the war against France.¹ In 1710, the Emperor, the Queen and the States-General signed a joint declaration which clearly defined their interest in maintaining the neutrality of Imperial lands in the Northern War. By this agreement, the princes whose territory bordered that of the Northern powers were given some assurance that their territory would remain safe while their troops were contracted for service against France. In August 1710, this policy was given structure by a general convention which set out a detailed plan by which an army of 15-16,000 troops would act in the principalities bordering on the Oder and Elbe, or wherever they were required in order to maintain the safety of the Empire from the Northern War. The joint declaration of this deterrent force, a force which was never deployed, was designed both as an assurance to the

¹For a discussion of this problem in general, see Chapter IV.

allies who felt threatened and as a warning to the Northern powers not to allow their troops to create an incident. The intention in all of this was to rescue the Grand Alliance from distractions which would cause a substantial diversion of their effort from their principal military strategy: dividing the French force into several theatres and maintaining a local superiority in troop numbers over the divided French forces.

One of the key problems in achieving the strategic objective was that of contracting for the appropriate number of soldiers to maintain local superiority. England and Holland did not have sufficient men to meet the requirement, but they did have the money to purchase the use of troops from other princes and to subsidize others who could effectively lead an army in the field. The numerous troop treaties which England negotiated through Marlborough at The Hague were extremely important to the achievement of England's grand strategy. The procurement of troops, the payment of subsidies and the agreements for levy money, forage, and other practical matters were designed to carry this out.¹ As pointed out earlier, these troop treaties were used as one means to tie princes to the Grand Alliance and to prevent them from coming under French influence. This was an additional benefit which did not overshadow the more practical matter of obtaining additional troops and maintaining several effective armies in the field at once. England encouraged the use of these troops in a variety of areas.

In 1708, for example, agreements were made by England with Prussia and Hesse-Cassel for troops in Italy, with the Emperor for troops in Spain, and with Hanover and Saxony for troops to act in the Low Countries. In addition to these agreements which were made or renewed during that year other earlier agreements provided for auxiliary troops already in service. The Dutch had an entire series of troop treaties of their own,² as well as agreements which were made jointly with England for a similar purpose.

In all these arrangements the princes from whom troops were obtained used these agreements to secure some additional objectives of their own. Money was only one consideration; in addition, England was required to agree to

¹The use of the money which the German princes obtained through the troop treaties is a matter of some controversy among historians writing in German, but the subject has stirred little comment in English. See Max Braubach, <u>Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im</u> <u>Spanischen Erbfolgekriege</u> (Bonn and Liepzig, 1923); Gert Brauer, <u>Die hannoverisch-englischen Subsidienverträge</u> <u>1702-1748</u> (Aalen, 1962), pp. 16-115; Gustav Otruba, 'Die Bedeutung englischen Subsidien und Antizipationen für die Finanzen Österreichs 1701 bis 1748', <u>Vierteljahrschrift</u> <u>für Sozial-und Wirtshaftsgeschichte</u>, lx (1964), 195-207.

²For lists of troops in Dutch pay alone, see J. W. Wijn, <u>Het Staatsche Leger</u>, Deel viii, band i,pp. 677, 683-85; band iii, pp. 339-40.

stipulations such as the King of Prussia's demand, as an heir of William III, to maintain for himself the contested title of prince of Neuchâtel.¹ Recognizing the raising of the elector of Brandenburg to the dignity of King of Prussia was implicit in the very language which was used in the agreements with that state and an important aspect in successful negotiation with Prussia.

Troop treaties were the normal method² by which additional forces were obtained to augment England's own military contribution and to complement similar agreements made by the Dutch. In addition to troop treaties, however, commercial treaties were used to achieve a specific purpose in carrying out English grand strategy. Of course, trade and commerce have their own ends which lie outside the scope of this study, yet there is a clear relationship with grand strategy. It would be wrong to over-emphasize the place of these elements as driving forces in international affairs, but conversely it would be just as incorrect to dismiss them as irrelevant. It is clear that the desire for the expansion of overseas trade and the

¹Agreement of 19 March 1708.

²The agreements did not always reflect the situation in the field. At one point the Secretary at War noted that the treaties required 4,000 Imperial foot to be sent to Spain. When 16,000 Germans and Italians were to be sent over, the Secretary at War requested that treaties be made to cover these troops; P.R.O., S.P. 94/230, fo. 51: Memorandum: Troops hired for service in Spain, 28 November 1710.

maintenance of commercial relations abroad was a motivation for England's participation in the war. It was one of several factors, including the maintenance of the protestant succession, which were the basis for England's national identity. One writer analyzing England's commercial progress in this era asserted, 'The Balance of Trade, I cannot too often repeat it, is in Fact the Balance of Power'. Indeed, commerce was certainly one of the major elements which required protection from the continuing growth of France, and one method by which national independence could be maintained was through a commercial agreement among European nations against France. Commerce had a special importance for the English and Dutch and, for this reason, held a crucial place in the Treaty of Grand Alliance.² If commerce was the lifeblood of independent England, it was also a weapon, a tool of warfare and a means of strengthening the Alliance against France.

England's attempt to use commerce as part of the war effort against France had chequered results. It was a process which required the co-operation of allies as well as outright warfare on French trade. Some allies, such as Denmark, expressly stated that they would allow no restrictions on their trade in an attempt to harm France.³

¹Malachy Postlethwayt, <u>Great Britain's True System</u> (London, 1757), p. 234.

²See Preamble and Articles II, V, VI, VIII and IX of Treaty of Grand Alliance, 1701, also G. N. Clark, 'War Trade and Trade War, 1701-1713', <u>Economic History Review</u>, i (1927), pp. 262-80.

³Treaty of Alliance between Denmark, the States-General, and Great Britain, 15 June 1701.

In its troop treaty of 1703, Holstein-Gottorp included a separate article¹ which specified that the Duchy of Schleswig, which was not a part of the Empire and therefore not formally a party to the war, would have the same freedom of trademenjoyed in Denmark. After lengthy diplomatic negotiations, the three major allies agreed in 1703^2 to a prohibition of commerce and letters of exchange with France for one year. The intent was to harm French ability to conduct the war however, as Denmark had fore-seen, the prohibition of commerce with a major trading power had a bad effect on both sides.

A more successful use of commerce in solidifying the alliance was the treaty with Portugal³ and the subsequent commercial treaty⁴ which had such a lasting effect for the wine and woolen trades. The commercial results of those treaties were far more effective than anticipated. The strategic element in them, however, was clearly designed within the context of the war against France. In October 1702, Secretary of State Hedges wrote to George Stepney in Vienna encouraging him in the task of obtaining stronger Imperial support for the Portuguese alliance. The Emperor had taken the lead in negotiations with Portugal, but as they progressed he seemed satisfied to leave Portugal as

⁴Treaty of Commerce with Portugal, 27 December 1703.

¹Treaty between the States-General, Great Britain and Holstein-Gottorp, 15 March 1703.

²Treaty between Great Britain, the Emperor and the States-General, 11 April 1703.

³Treaties of Offensive and Defensive Alliance, 16 May 1703.

a neutral. If she were allowed to remain neutral, Hedges wrote,

It is transferring all the trade to Portugal and tempt even our own subjects to trade and yet they must be exposed to the French privateers and men of war. It is prolonging the war by making the Portuguese carriers of all naval stores to France and the product of France to all other countries no place being so conveniently situated to assist the French as Portugal is. If we let Portugal hope for this, they will never think of coming into the great alliance because they will receive so much advantage without any hazard. Pressuring the King of Portugal to come into the war will probably make them consider their interest in the acquisitions they may make allotted [to them at the peace] which perhaps may be of greater consequence to them than a neutrality. . .

Aside from other considerations, the establishment of strong commercial ties could serve to crowd out enemy commerce and the support the enemy found for sustaining the war. Even strict commercial rivalry between the allies and France had overtones which contributed to sustaining allied power at the expense of France. In these terms it was another way of attacking French power. At the same time, a commercial alliance, such as that with Portugal, complemented military strategy directly. In this case, Portugal was essential to any plan which involved sending the fleet into the Mediterranean or which related to military operations in Spain.

Commercial agreements which might possibly have tied

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,058, fo.141: Hedges to Stepney, 27 October 1702.

some of the wavering princes of the Italian peninsula were attempted, but no agreement was signed. Other types of commercial arrangements were made by treaty also. The treaties with the Barbary States made specific mention of the safety of English seamen and ships in the Mediterranean.¹ An agreement with Portugal in 1705² facilitated the sailing of post office packets which carried commercial as well as diplomatic and military mail. The town of Danzig concluded a treaty of commerce with England to carry on the trade in naval stores.³ Russia made a reciprocal declaration on taxes levied on ships trading between England and Russia.⁴ The city of Hamburg made an agreement concerning the herring trade.⁵ And in the very midst of the war, England and France agreed not to attack each other's fishing boats in the Channel.⁶ All of these specifically commercial agreements were designed to protect and to facilitate the safety of trade during wartime. Without successful commercial arrangements, there was little hope that the strategy for the war could be carried out. Successful and profitable commerce was the foundation stone upon which England depended in order to finance the war through taxes, lotteries, credit and loans.

²Signed 20 February 1705. ³Signed 22 October 1706. ⁴Signed 31 August 1710. ⁵Signed 31 January 1711. ⁶Agreed in June 1708.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 71/15, fos.145-6: Instructions to Leake, 21 February 1704; S.P. 44/212: Dartmouth to [? Norris], 28 July 1710.

The last major category of agreements which England entered into for carrying on the war against France was the category of treaties which promoted naval operations.

The major source of supplies to maintain the Navy came from the Baltic region. Here iron, hemp, wire, pitch and tar, masts and copper were obtained which were essential to putting ships to sea. The agreements which made this trade possible were signed before the reign of Queen Anne. But it was Sweden and Denmark who controlled the trade, not only by the fact that much of the material came from their own lands in Livonia, Finland and Norway, but by the fact that they controlled the shores of the Sound through which all such trade had to pass enroute to England. In this manner, the trade of Königsberg in East Prussia and other Baltic ports came under their control as well.¹

The basic agreement which involved the operations of the fleet during the War of the Spanish Succession was the perpetual Alliance between England and the States-General signed in November 1701. Essentially, this document renewed the arrangements made during the Nine Years War. It provided that a stated proportion of ships would be supplied by each nation during the war. The ratio settled upon was three Dutch ships for every five English ships.

¹J. Ehrman, <u>The Navy in the War of William III</u>, pp. 54-67. On this subject in general, see K. G. Hildebrand, 'Ekonomiska syften i Svensk expansionspolitik (1700-1709)', <u>Karolinska</u> Förbundets Arsbok (Stockholm, 1949), pp. 7-40.

The total number of ships which would be employed in any year was to be adjusted annually according to the needs and services required. During the first years of the war, Admiral Sir David Mitchell went to The Hague to make these annual arrangements. Later, in 1711 and 1712, Admiral Sir James Wishart performed this duty. In attempting to meet the requirements of these agreements, the Dutch were rarely able to deliver the large number of ships which England required. On this point, Secretary Harley advised George Stepney when he was sent to succeed Alexander Stanhope at The Hague in late 1706,

> Neither Mr. Stanhope nor he [Mitchell] could ever produce so great a number [ships] as was thought requisite here. However, it is fit the Queen should keep her claim. . . I know you will do your best to procure the States to set out as many ships as they can, though I believe there is very little prospect of their doing more than they did last year, if they will keep up to that.1

British public opinion was particularly bitter on the subject of Dutch naval support,² but the Government was pragmatic about the ability of the States to provide the necessary ships. In the spring of 1711, Secretary St. John told Admiral Wishart that since the Dutch would not agree to the English proposal for a strong Anglo-Dutch squadron in the Channel to blockade Dunkirk, except in so far as to agree to appointing a separate squadron for the North Sea which would join the Channel Squadron in case of emergency,

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,059, fo. 115: Harley to Stepney, 7 December 1706.

²Douglas Coombs, <u>The Conduct of the Dutch:</u> British opinion and the Dutch Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession (The Hague, 1958), pp. 35-39, 52-54, 80-81, 92.

the Dutch contribution was not to be entirely rejected. Wishart was directed,

> You will however continue to press them as far as you can in decency to make the most vigorous effort by Sea that is possible, and then conclude an agreement with them upon the best foot you can, without staying, for any further orders from hence.¹

There were several reasons for the lack of ships from Holland. To some degree the problem was simply the inability to meet the high English demands, but there was a more basic problem as well. The English concept of naval strategy was not fully shared by the States. James Dayrolle, the English resident at The Hague, reported to the Secretary of State in 1708 that the provinces of Zeeland and Friesland would probably not meet their naval quotas for the coming campaign. Secretary Harley expressed the English government's view when he replied,

> It can not but look strange that Zeeland should be backward in furnishing their quota, because of their situation, and that the world is sufficiently apprized of the multitude of their Privateers not only in these seas, but also in those more remote, and there will seem to be too much reason for this suggestion, that private advantage makes them neglect the Public. As to keeping the French squadron in Dunkirk, it is so far from being impracticable, that it has been effected more than once, and your [<u>i.e.</u>, the Dutch] Admiralties seem rather to choose to employ their ships in convoys than in that $service.^2$

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/79, fo.34: St. John to Wishart, 6 March 1711.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 15,866, fo.80: Harley to Dayrolle, 10 January 1708.

To some degree, privateering answered the needs of Zeeland better than the naval policy encouraged by England. England's continual insistence on a blockade of the major French ports, Dunkirk in particular, was regarded by Holland as a wasteful use of resources. In their view, greater use of convoys was the proper way to protect trade. The difference was never resolved; the best that England could hope for was to obtain as many ships as possible in the circumstances and then to fill in with others to meet the needs of her own conception of strategy. The arrangements with the States concerned the naval resources which England had available to carry out the naval war, and inability to obtain the maximum number of ships England desired was a restraint on her naval strategy.²

The agreements with the Dutch were not the only commitments which involved the active use of naval force during the war. The Treaty of Grand Alliance dealt with the matter obliquely, but nevertheless clearly, when it stated the Allies resolution to recover,

> . . . the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily and the islands upon the coasts of Tuscany in the Mediterranean, that belong to the Spanish dominions . . . and which will also be of advantage to the navigation and commerce of the subjects of the King of Great Britain and of

²This is discussed further in Chapter 5.

¹See J. S. Bromley, 'Some Zeeland Privateering Instructions. . . ' in Hatton and Bromley, <u>William III</u> and Louis XIV, pp. 162-6.

the United Provinces.¹

Article six explicitly stated,

It shall be lawful for his royal Majesty of Great Britain and the Lords the States-General, by common advice, and for the benefit and enlargement of the navigation and commerce of their subjects, to seize by their forces what lands and cities they can, belonging to the Spanish dominions in the Indies; and whatsoever they shall take shall be their own. . . .²

Both the Mediterranean and the West Indies were areas of obvious naval involvement from the very outset of the war. As already noted, the means by which a force could be maintained in the Mediterranean was a matter of key importance underlying the treaties with Portugal. Although this point was not explicitly made in the treaties themselves, it was clearly one of the English motives for making them. Secretary Hedges expressed it when he commented to Stepney, 'there is an absolute necessity to Engage them [the Portuguese] as a Party [to the Grand Alliance], if there be any thoughts of sending a fleet into the Levant next spring and it's to be considered how useful such an associate will be if any thing further be to be on Spain. . . .'³

The Defensive Alliance with Portugal provided for naval as well as military matters. The treaty expressly

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,058, fo.141: Hedges to Stepney, 27 October 1702.

¹Browning, <u>English Historical Documents</u>, viii, p. 874. Article 5.

²Browning, <u>English Historical Documents</u>, viii, p. 874. Article 6.

stated the obligation of the Maritime Powers to maintain a sufficient number of ships in Portuguese ports to defend her ports, coasts, and commerce.¹ Special emphasis was placed on the protection to be given to Portugal's overseas territories.² The ships necessary for these tasks would be 'subject to the command' of the King of Portugal or his viceroys and governors abroad.³ Another article required Portugal to maintain ten warships for its own defence. These would remain on the Portuguese coast, except in a case where France alone, and not Spain, declared war. Then the Portuguese ships could co-operate with the Confederate Fleet.⁴

The Treaty of Offensive Alliance with Portugal repeated the assurances of allied protection for Portugal and her overseas dominions.⁵

The English interpretation of these clauses is important. Taken at face value, the articles might seem to give Portugal full command and control of the ships in Portuguese waters. While the negotiations for the treaty were under way, Secretary of State Lord Nottingham advised Methuen that he might agree to the articles as long as the King of Portugal did not literally expect the fleet to remain in the ports of Portugal under his orders. A fleet in

¹Browning, <u>English Historical Documents</u>, viii, p. 875. Article 4, Treaty of Defensive Alliance, 16 May 1703.

²<u>Ibid</u>., Article 5.

³<u>Ibid</u>., Article 6.

⁴Ibid., p. 876. Article 13.

⁵Ibid., p. 877. Articles 18 and 19, Treaty of Offensive Alliance, 16 May 1703.

port, 'will be there to no manner of purpose, either for his or our interest'. If Portugal would be satisfied with assurances of allied defence for her coast, English and Dutch ships 'whose port shall be Lisbon, to be more ready upon all occasions, is so plainly our own interest as the most commodious for their fitting and cleaning, and for intercepting all the trade of France with Spain. . . .'¹ With this interpretation then, England agreed to the articles.

Thus, England's naval agreements were clearly designed to complement her own resources by obtaining the additional ships and advanced bases with which she could carry out grand strategy as she conceived it.

Conclusion

Each nation engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession had its own series of international agreements through which it participated in the war, and certainly England's treaty commitments in this period indicated a degree of independence from the other allies. Of the 131 treaties, agreements and conventions which England entered into during this twelve-year period, only 18 were jointly signed by the three major allies. The English and Dutch made 7 between themselves, and together they contracted 36 with other princes. The Queen and the Emperor had four between themselves and three more with another prince. England alone entered into 63 agreements with other states.

The subjects of these agreements and treaties dealt

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/209, fo. 29: Nottingham to Methuen, 13 April 1703.

with several matters, but broadly speaking 42 agreements concerned the establishment of the Grand Alliance and maintaining its security, 68 were related to troop procurement, 13 were devoted to commerce, 3 concerned naval operations and another 11 were concerned with the terms of the general peace settlement.

Confining the view to England's policy, as found in this web of treaties, one may discern a consistent policy through which her particular strategic view was established and maintained. The Treaty of Grand Alliance provided the basic union of the three principal powers in the struggle against France. The close relationship between England and the Dutch Republic provided both money and ships as well as troops. The addition of Portugal and Savoy to the Alliance completed the strategic ring around France and complemented the military efforts of the three principal powers by providing the bases from which effective naval operations could support military operations in Italy and in Spain. The numerous troop treaties supplied the men who were essential to ensuring numerical superiority in the several theatres surrounding France as well as forestalling French attempts to disrupt the strategy of alliance being employed against her. The engagements with the Barbary States and the Northern powers sought to ensure a further security against distracting threats which would divert forces from the fight against France. While all these treaties directly related to the conduct of the war, a series of commercial treaties complemented this work by obtaining the munitions and materials of war and

ensuring the commercial prosperity which was essential for England to support her allies, hire and field her troops, and put her fleet to sea.

The relationship which England developed with her allies was complex, and to some degree haphazard; considerations other than war strategy are often apparent in relations with another nation. However, the underlying strategic conception employed was a simple one, and one that had been clearly foreshadowed in the Nine Years War. Despite simplicity of conception, it took more than three years to reach the practical agreements and to field the forces which were necessary to put it into action. The price which had to be paid in obtaining this goal varied from agreement to agreement. That demanded by the German princes was relatively low compared to that sought by Portugal. In all cases, those states involved sought particular gains through their relationship with the allies in the war against France. The German princes desired money, a fortress or town here or there, the recognition of a title or inheritance, or the payment of old debts. Savoy saw the opportunity to gain territory and ensure independence, while Portugal asked a very high price in demanding not only protection and territorial concessions as well as arms and money, but additional assurance that reprisals would not be taken against her in the future. Throughout the course of these agreements one may still detect, amongst numerous other considerations, the single strand of purpose which motivated England's grand strategy: the freedom to grow and develop as an independent nation. A11

of these agreements were part of the means to create a situation in which French military power could be divided and subdued, thereby forcing France to retreat from a position which threatened English security at home and commercial development abroad. Blood and treasure, as well as gratifying the princely ambitions of others, were the prices that England was willing to pay for this object as long as there was no interference with English goals.

The agreements alone, however, reflect only one aspect of England's attempt to carry out her grand strategy. The words of her diplomats, the use of her money, the employment of her army and navy, all complemented these agreements in a larger dimension.

CHAPTER IV

DEALING WITH SOME OBSTACLES TO ENGLISH GRAND STRATEGY

In order to chart the shifting moods, motivations and opinions within the alliance, it would be necessary to investigate in depth the conduct and objectives of each ally. Such detailed discussion is far too broad a subject to include here, yet it is important to emphasize that in a strategy which rested on the joint contribution of all the allies, England's primary strategic concern was to mobilize all allied resources and to direct them toward France. The Alliance was bound together by the availability of Dutch and English money for purchasing troops or equipment and a general consensus that war against France was an appropriate means to their own ends, if not as some charged, an end in itself. This divergence of objectives and the danger from outside threats were the major obstacles which England encountered in trying to implement her grand strategy. One could select innumerable examples to illustrate specific instances of English policy in countering these problems. I have arbitrarily chosen four specific problems which England faced during the (1) the elector of Bavaria, (2) the Hungarian war:

revolt, (3) the Pope, and (4) the Great Northern War. All of these illustrations are connected in one way or another to Austria, but they have been chosen because they illustrate variations in method and approach to a common problem. These problems should not be understood as more important than other examples of the same policy which might be directed toward Portugal, the Dutch Republic, or Italy, although the Habsburg monarchy was a key consideration in English strategy. England emphasized consistently the importance and inter-relationship of all parts of the Alliance. This chapter compares a variety of incidents in order to illustrate a consistency in English purpose.

Bavaria

In the first three years of the war, Bavaria was a matter of serious concern to England. If Maximilian II Emmanuel, the elector of Bavaria, could be persuaded to join the Grand Alliance, his army would make an important contribution, but if he actively took the side of France, he could be a serious threat to the ability of the Alliance to act jointly against France.

In a private letter to Secretary Hedges in the autumn of 1702, George Stepney explained to the ministry his understanding of the situation. The elector of Bavaria was jealous, he said, of the success

of his colleagues, the elector of Saxony in becoming king of Poland, the elector of Brandenburg in becoming king of Prussia, and the elector of Hanover in obtaining the opportunity to succeed to the English throne. The elector of Bavaria sought a similar position for himself and his family after the Spanish throne had been lost at the death of the elector's son. He was quite willing to exchange Bavaria for the rule of Naples and Sicily, if the Emperor would agree. In order to obtain this object, the elector was willing to come into a perpetual alliance with the Emperor. This claim to the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, however, was rejected by the latter. With frustrated ambitions, the elector listened with care to the diplomatic appeals from Louis XIV, who fully realized the importance of Bavaria to the Grand Alliance. '. . . Notwithstanding, the Elector, made his demands very high on purpose,' Stepney believed, 'that France It seems they have been agreed to might refuse 'em. without any abatement, whereby the Elector had the consolation to find that France set a value on his friendship, though the Emperor had little regard for it.'

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fos. 141-3: Stepney to Hedges, 30 August 1702. See also S.P. 80/20, fos. 78-88: Stepney to Hedges, 7 February 1703, for a more detailed view of the English view of the situation. For Bavarian objectives see D. A. Gaeddert, 'The Franco-Bavarian Alliance during the war of the Spanish Succession,' (Ohio State University Ph.D. thesis, 1969), pp. 189-199.

In retribution for the Emperor's rejection of his claim on Naples, the elector seized the city of Ulm. 'That disappointment over Naples has drove him to despair and tempted him to begin a diversion which cannot fail but end in his ruin, and that of his family,'¹ Stepney prophesied. Whatever the distant future might bring, 'this flame in the Empire,'² was a serious obstacle to the war against France. The Imperial Army on the Rhine was not strong enough to quickly put down a Bavarian revolt.³ The Imperial Court became more and more disturbed by the defection of the elector of Bavaria, 'not being able to guess where his rage may end'.⁴ It was reported that although Bavaria might be ravaged by war, the elector had received firm assurances from France that he would be satisfactorily indemnified. Some said that the Bavarian army was heading to the north, others to the south, 'either way he will occasion great distractions in the Empire', Stepney lamented, 'for we are not in a

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 171: Stepney to Hedges, 16 September 1702.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 162: Stepney to Hedges, 13 September 1702.

²Ibid.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 202: Stepney to Hedges, 27 September 1702.

condition to oppose him'. However, measures were taken to remedy this. For example, the 6,000 Imperial recruits intended for the army in Italy were diverted for service against Bavaria.² Such action created a serious problem for the strategy of alliance as Marlborough foresaw when he commented to Godolphin, 'if the Emperor can't force the elector of Bavaria this winter to quit the French interest, I believe it will be impossible to strengthen Prince Eugene's army so as to put him in a condition of acting offensively.'³ There was still hope that Bavaria could be brought into the Grand Alliance and that her troops would complement the Habsburg armies in Italy and on the Rhine. In Stepney's view, the addition of Bavarian troops to the allied side in the war against France would improve the situation 'to that degree that we shall have the world before us'.⁴ The court in Vienna agreed that the Bavarian problem must be quickly solved, but there was a strong feeling that it must be done by force. In London Wratislaw told a secretary of state

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 202: Stepney to Hedges, 27 September 1702.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 250: Stepney to Hedges, 21 October 1702.

³Blenheim, MSS. Al-14: Marlborough to Godolphin, 21 November 1702.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 408v: Stepney to Hedges, 23 December 1702.

that Bavaria could be subdued in one of two ways. A detachment of 15,000 men could be made from the allied army in the Low Countries or Prince Eugene and his army could be recalled from Italy, leaving only troops enough to secure the passes for a return to Italy in the spring.¹

Despite such considerations, no firm action was taken to quash Bavaria. In the midst of this indecision, Stepney wrote to London urging that England supply money to maintain the Imperial armies during the crisis.² The Queen, however, was not interested in supporting the Imperial armies to subdue Bavaria by force, for in the end, England 'would lose her charges'. On the other hand, the Queen was anxious to assist the Emperor in reducing Bavaria by 'fair means' which would allow Bavaria to add strength to the Grand Alliance.³ It was a serious and delicate situation that was becoming a major obstacle for England's grand strategy for the war,⁴ and one which

¹Northamptonshire R.O., Hatton-Finch MSS. 275, fo. 152: Nottingham to Marlborough, 2 October 1702.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/20, fos. 1v-2: Stepney to Hedges, 3 January 1703.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/224: Hedges to Stepney, 8 January 1703.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/20, fo. 32: Stepney to Hedges, 10 January 1703.

England believed would best be resolved peacefully.¹ In early January 1703, Stepney discussed the matter at length with Austrian ministers in Vienna and reported,

> Prince Eugene agreed with me that the war in Bavaria ought to be ended at any rate, otherwise the army in Italy would be overpowered by numbers, or at least we [the Empire] should not be in a readiness to act in conjunction with our fleet by the time appointed.²

The co-ordination of the army and navy in southern Europe as well as the ability of the allies to act offensively in several theatres at once was at stake. The elector of Bavaria's success was already on the verge of frightening the Circles of Franconia and Swabia into neutrality, a move which would effectively disable the Alliance and end the war in Germany. 'The great and important article of Bavaria,' Stepney wrote, was one 'on which the stress of the whole war seems to depend.' It was clear to Stepney, that the threat from the elector of Bavaria 'must be destroyed before we can form any other attempt'.³

The cabinet in London agreed with Stepney's view. The overall plan which the Emperor had laid for the forthcoming campaign in 1703 outlined a strategy in which the army in Savoy would be supported by the Anglo-Dutch fleet. Viewing

³Ibid.

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677YY, fo. 301: Hedges to Ambassador of the States-General, 3 December 1702.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/20, fo. 78: Stepney to Hedges, 7 February 1703.

the prospects, Sir Charles Hedges commented, 'we can not comprehend how the Emperor can make any effort that way, unless Bavaria be first reduced which, according to the method of proceedings against him hitherto, seems not very likely to be effected.'¹ At the same time, there was growing irritation among the English that the Emperor was merely using the Dutch and English to do his own work. The detachments of allied troops to assist the Empire in defending himself were making it difficult to provide for other parts of the war.²

By the summer of 1703, however, little progress had been made to subdue Bavaria. The Empire was unable to oppose effectively the elector's move into the Tyrol.³ The Bavarian threat to Ratisbon, the seat of the Imperial Diet, and the continued attacks on Habsburg lands had turned the Austrian court against a negotiated settlement of the dispute with Bavaria. Indeed, the Bavarian situation seemed to be causing greater damage to the Empire than the French themselves had done. 'Those are injuries that are treasured up against the day of wrath,' Stepney wrote, 'and we have few examples in German history to prove such crimes have gone unpunished.'⁴ Despite such a strong feeling in Vienna, the government in London still favoured

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,058, fo.195: Hedges to Stepney, 5 March 1703.

²Churchill College, Cambridge, Chartwell MSS. 28/146: Marlborough to ?, 24 May 1703.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/21, fo.107: Stepney to Hedges, 4 July 1703; fos. 178-84, 1 August 1703; fo.198, 8 August 1703.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/20, fo.278: Stepney to Hedges, 1 September 1703.

a negotiated settlement.¹ Bavaria demanded nothing less than the cession of the Kingdom of Naples to Maximilian Emmanuel in exchange for Bavaria.² The demand was far too high for Vienna to accept. The Imperial court began to see that its best hope lay in convincing England and the States-General to assist the Empire further. Without such assistance, it was clear that the Imperial Army could not prepare itself for the next campaign.³

Some of the princes of the Empire agreed that England must be dissuaded from insisting on a peaceful negotiation. Meeting in Frankfurt in January 1704, the elector of Mainz, the elector Palatine, Prince Lewis of Baden, and Count Sinzendorf strongly told the English envoy to the Circles of the Empire 'that without the immediate assistance of Her Majesty and the States-General, the Empire would be lost'.⁴ It was further reported that unless an effective army was placed on the upper Rhine during the campaign of 1704, the Alliance would begin to fall apart. The duke of Württemberg would probably leave the Alliance, and if French forces in Swabia and Franconia should join, the Imperial Circles there would also follow suit.⁵ The Alliance showed

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/70, fo.277: Hedges to Stepney, 5 November 1703.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/22, fo.163: Whitworth to Hedges, 5 January 1704.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/70, fo.291: Whitworth to Hedges, 25 November 1703.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 81/88, fo.255: Davenant to Hedges, 9 January 1704.

⁵P.R.O., S.P. 80/22, fo.167v: Davenant to Hedges, 17 January 1704.

clear signs of strain and weakness, and the military situation was no better. During the campaign of 1703, the French had shown themselves to be quite strong on the Rhine and the Danube. English representatives in Germany were aghast at the failure of the Imperial forces and the German princes to join together to make an effective resistance. 'I know not whether the several Princes, their Ministers, or their Generals are most to blame, ' one man reported, 'but their luxury, their impotence, and their indolence will certainly be fatal to 'em all.'¹ It even appeared as though the French could easily reach Frankfurt.² Despite these strong pressures to join in reducing Bavaria by force, London persisted in its policy of supporting peaceful negotiations with Bavaria. An opportunity to do this came in discussions which the King of Prussia initiated with the elector of Bavaria concerning Prussian prisoners of war held by Bavaria. Under the pretext of these discussions, Prussia attempted to persuade the elector to quit the French interest. While in the process of this negotiation, Prussia requested that the Queen and the States give him authority to make an offer in their names which could later be agreed to by the Emperor.³ Prussia appeared to be largely motivated by a fear that settlement of the Bavarian issue by force would

¹Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 81/3: Davenant to A. Stanhope, 2 December 1703.

²Staffordshire R.O., D649/8/2, pp. 47-8: J. Chetwynd to N-m, 13 December 1703.

³P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fos.222v-3: Raby to Hedges, 15 January 1704.

make the Emperor too strong amongst the German princes.¹ Perhaps for this very reason the Emperor failed to support the Prussian initiative enthusiastically. The lack of co-operation which Berlin saw in this, as well as the failure in obtaining the payment of troop subsidies due from the Emperor, made the king of Prussia resentful and cast doubt on whether Prussian troops would be allowed to join the forthcoming campaign.² The prospects for success in following this path seemed doubtful.³ Mindful of the advantages to be found in subduing Bavaria, it became clear to the government in London that some direct action would have to be taken to support the rapidly decaying military position of the Empire if English grand strategy were to be successful. The Emperor's envoy had already embarked on a campaign to secure the assistance of the Dutch and English.⁴ With these considerations in mind, Marlborough was sent to The Haque to discuss the plans for the forthcoming campaign.⁵ While in The Hague, Marlborough solicited the advice of Prince Lewis of Baden⁶ and

¹P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo.400: Raby to Harley, 14 June 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo.242: Raby to Hedges, 16 February 1704.

³For a general survey of relations with Prussia, see Marsha and Linda Frey, 'The Anglo-Prussian War of 1704', Canadian Journal of History, xi (1976), pp. 283-94.

⁴Franz Mathis, 'Marlborough und Wratislaw vor der Schlacht von Höchstädt. Neue aspekte zum Feldzug 1704,' (D. Phil. thesis Innsbruck, 1972), pp. 371-73: Wratislaw to Leopold, 18 January 1704.

⁵Churchill College, Cambridge, Earle MSS. 2/7/12: Cadogan to Earle, 1 January 1704.

⁶Badische General Landesarchiv, Ab. 46/3885/lla: Marlborough an Ludwig, 12 January 1704.

discussed general matters with the Dutch, but no firm operational plans were made. At home, the government took steps to ensure that the basic concept of the alliance could be maintained. There was a fear that Bavaria might attempt to make an alliance with Savoy in a desperate attempt to secure his goals from the Emperor. The English envoy in Turin was instructed to do all in his power to prevent any connection between Savoy and Bavaria, and to assure Savoy that England would vigorously carry out her plans for the war against France.¹ This precaution proved unnecessary for Bavaria soon made it clear that she would stand and fall with France,² not with an independent alliance. While this was the public stance of the elector of Bavaria, some observers believed that if an army appeared on the frontiers of Bavaria, the elector would, nonetheless, come to terms with the Emperor and the allies, particularly if it appeared as though he was about to be attacked in his own country.³

By early February 1704, it was becoming apparent to the Maritime Powers that the Emperor required direct assistance with the Bavarian problem. Henry Davenant thought that if additional funds were not sent immediately to the Emperor and the German princes in order to put their forces in the field, the French would possibly cross the

¹Northampshire, R.O. Finch-Hatton MSS. 279, fo. 12: Nottingham to Hill, 4 January 1704.

²Staffordshire, R.O., MSS. D649/8/2, p. 56: Chetwynd to Nottingham, 25 January 1704.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/71, fo. 133: Whitworth to Hedges, 2 February 1704.

Rhine and take Philippsburg. While he was irritated by the idea of assisting those who, in his opinion, had failed to help themselves, it was still in the interest of England to assist them. He viewed the Empire as 'a decayed constitution, but not without a cure'. In order to return it to a good state of health, he believed, 'First, we must apply the cordial of money and then Her Majesty's representations to the several states of the Empire'. While these thoughts were occurring to some Englishmen, reports were received that the French were forming in great strength at Strasbourg and Breisach. Their objectives were not known, but Freiburg-im-Breisgau and Philippsburg seemed the logical points for the French to attack from those places.² The increase in forces along the upper Rhine was matched also on the lower Rhine. Seeing their own frontiers left exposed by detachments to the Empire, the States-General requested that part of their forces be returned to maintain the safety of the United Provinces.³

While the military situation was deteriorating, the Emperor initiated another round of negotiations with the elector.⁴ In English eyes, these were extremely important talks since they directly involved the two conflicting

¹Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 31/3: Davenant to A. Stanhope, 31 January 1704.

²Badische General Landesarchiv, Ab. 46/3885, p. 23. Propositions de . . . Margrave de Bade faites à Baron d'Almelo. [27 January 1704].

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/22, fo. 190: Whitworth to Hedges, 19 January 1704.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 50: Stepney to Hedges, 26 February 1704.

sides. The Queen directed her envoy in Vienna that,

Our principal aim is to gain him [the elector of Bavaria] by almost any means that are practicable. . . . If you can bring the Emperor to give the elector of Bavaria satisfaction, and to gain him, it is not material whether it be done by giving up Milan, Tyrol or an equivalent in any other country, provided the Elector be effectually gained and brought over to the interest of the allies.¹

In the spring of 1704, the German princes reaffirmed their earlier opinions and began preparations for the ensuing campaign which would be designed to defend Franconia and Swabia. The English envoy at Hanover reported that 'they were of opinion that the greatest efforts of this campaign ought to be made upon the upper Rhine and upon the Danube, and till the elector of Bavaria be reduced there is no hopes of securing the Empire against the French'.² Prince Lewis of Baden had proposed in early February that the army under his command act offensively on the upper Rhine and on the Moselle for a diversion into Lorraine. The war council in Vienna headed by Prince Eugene disapproved of this scheme believing also that the war against Bavaria must take place on the Danube and that the Imperial forces were not strong enough to act offensively in all areas. The Emperor's army was lacking good engineers, artillery and ammunition. With all the auxiliary forces employed in assisting the Imperial army, the enemy would be free to attack Marlborough's or Baden's

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/203, fo.222: Additional Instructions to Stepney, 24 March 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 81/16: Poley to Hedges, 4 March 1704.

forces. Prince Eugene believed that in order to avoid this, a force proportionate to the French stationed in Alsace should be kept on the upper Rhine to observe and to follow the French if necessary. The troops coming from Prussia would allow sufficient forces to be detached to the Danube while still leaving the necessary forces on the Rhine. The major forces then could operate against the elector before the French could send him assistance.¹ The army of the Maritime Powers could guard the Low Countries, and in April, advance to the Moselle, which would serve as a diversion for the operations in the Empire and in Italy.²

In mid-February, these plans and proposals for the operation were sent off to Marlborough to discuss with the States-General at The Hague.³ They were agreed to there, but it was readily apparent that the reinforcements provided by Prussia would be the key to making the concept work.⁴ In March, following the failure of diplomatic negotiations with the elector of Bavaria, the Emperor made a direct proposal to the Queen and the States-General requesting this active assistance against Bavaria. Wratislaw continued to make strong pleas in London and in

¹Bruyninex to Heinsius, 2 February 1704. Quoted in E. Ritter, <u>Politik und Kriegführung ihre Beherrschung</u> <u>durch Prinz Eugen 1704</u> (Berlin, 1934), p. 183. P.R.O., S.P. 105/71, fo. 198: 'the answer returned to the Prince of Baden's project of operation' Secret. [10 February 1704] P.R.O., S.P. 80/22: Whitworth to Marlborough, 13 February 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/71, fos. 263-6: 'Observations concerning the next campaign by Prince Eugene,' 20 February 1704.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/22, fo. 22v: Whitworth to Hedges, 13 February 1704.

⁴Churchill College, Cambridge, Erle Mss. 2/7, fo. 14: Cadogan to Erle, 29 February 1704.

The Hague supporting the request and Graf Lecheraine was sent specifically to present the case to the Maritime Powers. The English and Dutch were in agreement that all preparations should be made speedily.¹ There was some doubt in the councils at London whether the operations should begin on the Marne or on the Moselle² and how far English forces should go in support of the This was a question which had to be worked Empire. out carefully with the Dutch, and Marlborough was ordered to go immediately to The Hague and confer on this matter. The English government did not wish to make any public reply to the Emperor's request for assistance from the English troops in the Low Countries, but the Queen believed it 'a thing very necessary to be done'. Marlborough was given strict orders to press the Dutch to agree to send a force to speedily reduce the elector of Bavaria, 'without which all is in appearance like to be lost on that side'.³ While at The Hague in early April, Marlborough, the Dutch and Wratislaw agreed on the general plan of operations.⁴ It was agreed that the English forces would go toward the Moselle and Coblenz. At the same time, the States-General voted to pay one-third of the cost of subsidizing the

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677WWW, fo. 513: Vrijbergen to Griffier, 14 March 1704.

²Churchill College, Cambridge, Erle MSS. 2/7, fo. 15: Cadogan to Erle, 18 March 1704.

³Blenheim, MSS. Al-15: Instructions to Marlborough, 4 April 1704.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677WWW, fos. 744-5: Vrigbergen to Griffier, 4 April 1704.

circle of Swabia for the year, and in addition countermanded its orders for the Dutch troops to return from the Danube and the upper Rhine.¹ With this assistance and some additional auxiliary troops from Brunswick-Lüneberg, it appeared possible to defend the Rhine and to prevent the French from joining Bavaria.²

While preparations were being undertaken to put these plans into effect, Prince Lewis of Baden proposed to the court in Vienna that the three allied armies act in conjunction with one another. He proposed that Prince Eugene command one army near Donauwörth on the western Bavarian frontier. Prince Ludwig himself intended to enter Bavaria on the Iller south of Ulm. A third army, he proposed, should be commanded by Marlborough and would undertake the If the Dutch would agree to allowing their seige of Ulm. troops to assist, Marlborough could advance toward the Moselle, and then in a surprise move, move up the Rhine, and join forces to lay seige to Ulm.³ At first, Marlborough agreed only to march as far as Coblenz,⁴ but would continue to the Danube and Ulm if it were necessary.⁵ However, it is clear that Marlborough and the ministry in London had

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WWW, fos. 568-9: Vrijbergen to Godolphin, 20 April 1704.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,066, fos. 5-6: Davenant to Stepney, 22 April 1704.

³P.R.O., S.P. 81/88, fos. 261 -68: Davenant to Hedges, 11 May 1704 with Memoire de S.A. La Prince de Bade pour My Lord Marlborough.

⁴Badische General Landesarchiv, Abd. 46/3,885, fo. 77: Wratislaw an Baden, 13 May 1704.

⁵P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fos. 268v-9: Stepney to Hedges, 24 May 1704.

been convinced by Lecheraine and Wratislaw that the march to the Danube was an essential task.¹ Although the Austrians had been successful in making their point to Marlborough, he was uncertain of the reaction of the Dutch in his taking their troops so far away from the Low Countries. For this reason, Marlborough took it upon himself to keep his real intentions secret from the Dutch. He believed if he proposed his action at The Hague, it would be disapproved, so he planned not to announce his plan to the States-General until after he had crossed the Rhine at Coblenz. Confiding in the duke of Somerset, Marlborough wrote,

> I should not be thus rash in taking all this upon myself, were I not very confident that if I did not make this march the Empire must be ruined, which would at last prove very fatal to England.²

The Government in London was clearly aware of the proposals put forward by the Austrian diplomats. The correspondence of English envoys such as Stepney and Davenant to Ministers of State as well as Marlborough's own letters to Godolphin, Somerset and his wife indicate that senior members of the cabinet, and probably the Queen, had not been kept in the dark about the planned march to the Danube. Moreover, at

¹For Marlborough's agreement to follow Lecheraine's plan, see Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,063 fo. 52: Cardonnel to Stepney, 29 April 1704, but for a more balanced view of Austrian diplomacy on this point see Mathis, 'Marlborough und Wratislaw,' pp. 158-60.

²Boston Public Library, MS. K.5.5. No. 15: Marlborough to Somerset, 3 May 1704. See also No. 17 on the same subject: Wratislaw to Somerset, 6 May 1704 and West Sussex R.O., Petworth House Archives MSS. 14: Wratislaw to Somerset, 3 July 1704. Marlborough made the same argument when he wrote Heinsius from Coblenz. <u>Heinsius-Marlborough</u> Correspondence, No. 173, pp. 105-6.

the time he resolved to take his army into Germany, Marlborough requested from Godolphin the Queen's approval for his action.¹

From Marlborough's point of view, his action was justified. When the French and Bavarian armies joined in the Black Forest, it became imperative that his own army continue into Southern Germany. At that time, Marlborough was already at Coblenz. Under those circumstances, the States-General approved the march of their troops with Marlborough, but took precautions to ensure that a sufficient portion remained on the lower Rhine for protection of the United Provinces.² The general plan of operation was to leave a sufficient force at the lines of Stollhofen to prevent the French from passing the Rhine below Philippsburg. In this way, the elector would be caught between two armies advancing into Bavaria. He would either have to divide his force and to risk being defeated by a larger army or maintain his force together and let the other advancing army ravage his country and possibly attack Munich, his capital.³ The success of this plan

¹Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 21 April 1704, p. 282.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fos. 323-4: Resolution of the States-General, 27 May 1704.

³Churchill College, Cambridge, Erle MSS. 2/7, fo. 16: Cadogan to Erle, 30 May 1704; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 22,196, fos. 17-18: Cadogan to Raby, 30 May 1704.

depended on preventing further French reinforcements for Bavaria.

The promise of Marlborough's movement into Germany was something which the government in London hoped would encourage the princes of the Empire to take vigourous action in the campaign. In particular, the English hoped that the Emperor and the elector Palatine would 'duly value this new mark of her Majesty's friendship'.¹ On 26 May, Marlborough's army marched from Coblenz up the Rhine. By the time it left Wiesloch in early June, the secret plan was known to all.

In the meantime, the movement of the allied armies was used as a bargaining point in continued negotiations with Bavaria. Prussian envoys were directed to communicate the progress of their talks directly to Marlborough during his march,² while Marlborough himself was given letters of credit and full powers from the Queen to deal directly with the elector.³ By late June, however, it appeared that the negotiations conducted by Vienna were on the verge of success. A tentative agreement was reached between the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fos. 268v-9: Stepney to Hedges, 24 May 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo. 369: Raby to Hedges, 31 May 1704; fo. 372, 3 June 1704.

³Brit. Lib., Landsdowne MSS. 849, fos. 234-5: Drafts of Commission to Marlborough, 26 May 1704. P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo. 417: Raby to Harley, 28 June 1704; Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, p. 320.

Emperor and Bavaria, but there was some speculation that the elector was using the negotiations as a ploy. Stepney advised Marlborough, 'I must own that Prince always appeared to me to have gone too far ever to think of a conciliation and I still suspect his design of capitulating is only to gain time till he can receive another succour from France.'¹ The cabinet in London had reached the same conclusion. Secretary Harley wrote to Stepney on hearing the news of Bavaria's latest move, 'I believe the Duke of Marlborough will not be amused with a treaty to lose time, and therefore, we expect every moment to hear of further progress into the Elector's country.'² Bavaria was already in a position of considerable military advantage with an army behind the rivers Danube, Lech, and Iller. It was already clear that the joint operation of several armies would be required to defeat him, and at the same time, there was strong evidence that the French would exploit the situation by sending a second army to reinforce the elector. 3

With full realization of this problem, the allied armies moved as quickly as they could and in early July, Prince Lewis and Marlborough defeated the Bavarian army at the Schellenberg near Donauwörth. 'This battle tho' of great consequence,' wrote Henry Davenant, 'is no way

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fos. 368-72: Stepney to Marlborough, 2 July 1704; S.P. 87/2, fo. 84: 'Pretensions de Monsr. l'Electeur de Baviere.'

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 10: Harley to Stepney, 18 July 1704.

³P.R.O., S.P. 81/88, fo. 235v: Davenant to Harley, 15 June 1704.

decisive for the fate of the campaign will depend upon preventing the French in their design of sending another reinforcement to the Elector.'¹ The French under Tallard had already crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg and were marching into Germany when the news of Donauwörth was reported.

Away from the battleground, English representatives persisted in their view that the campaign against Bavaria was only a small link in a larger chain. 'I have reminded our ministers at the Imperial Court,' George Stepney wrote,

> that the French have the same advantages by their numbers and situation over the Duke of Savoy, as the allies have over Bavaria; and therefore we ought not to think our work done if we have some advantage against the Elector, but rather should resolve to pursue the war in Italy with more vigour, if we expect to reap any benefit of our alliance with H.R.H. [the Duke of Savoy] and to recover any part of the Spanish monarchy.²

In leading the Anglo-Dutch contribution to the war against Bavaria, Marlborough kept clearly in mind the objective of separating Bavaria from the French. He was ready to use severe measures if necessary, and at the end of July Marlborough lamented the failure of the negotiations to obtain Bavaria and the necessity to increase the pressure on him. 'The Elector continuing obstinately to the interest of France, we find ourselves

¹P.R.O., S.P. 81/88, fo. 299v: Davenant to Harley, 6 July 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 423: Stepney to Hill, 22 July 1704.

under the necessity of burning and destroying his country.'¹ Having placed the army so as to control the Danube from Ulm to Passau, Marlborough hoped to secure a position which would readily allow him to enter Bavaria and, at the same time, to prevent France from sending further assistance, or even to find sustenance for the army already in Bavaria. Marlborough reported that in this situation, '. . . our whole business has been to burn and destroy the Elector's country. . . He can expect nothing less than the ruin of Bavaria for his obstinancy and breech of promise. . .'²

On 13 August, Prince Eugene and Marlborough defeated the elector and the French army under Tallard at the battle of Blenheim. Further French reinforcements from Villars were checked, and a major disruption within the Empire had been removed. In their enthusiasm for the victory, ministers in London did not lose sight of the broad strategic purpose for which all this had been undertaken. Writing to Richard Hill at Turin, Secretary Hedges remarked, this will

> secure you from returns of any apprehensions, for we are all of opinion here that we shall soon hear of Prince Eugene with a good army in Italy, and if Sir George Rooke should give the Count de Toulouse a good blow, it would remove our fears.³

¹P.R.O., S.P. 87/2, fo. 113: Marlborough to Harley, 31 July 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 87/2, fo. 117: Marlborough to Harley, 3 August 1704.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529, fo. 56: Hedges to Hill, 15 August 1704. The reference to Rooke anticipated the Battle of Malaga, 13/24 August 1704. In English eyes, the battle of Blenheim removed the Bavarian threat to the Empire, solidified the alliance and released Imperial troops for other services. The battle was the means to reach other ends, but the ability to obtain these goals rested clearly on the co-operation of the allies. Secretary Harley emphasized this point when he wrote to Stepney in Vienna,

> . . . I shall be very sorry if the Battle of Höchstadt [Blenheim] should have the effect to let your court subside in their former insensibility. I hope they will take care both of peace in Hungary and war in Italy; for though the Devil be now cast out, if he be suffered to enter again, he will bring seven worse spirits with him.

The problem for England remained in persuading her allies to pursue the grand strategy which she perceived.²

England's fond hopes of obtaining Bavarian troops for the Grand Alliance were doomed to failure.³ The elector of Bavaria followed the French back into France leaving the electress in Bavaria until she herself capitulated in mid-November. His troops were to be dispersed, if they could not be brought through the Black Forest to France.⁴ In Bavaria, itself, there remained a smouldering resentment

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,059, fo. 33: Harley to Stepney, 5 September 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 81/88, fo. 325: Davenant to Harley, 17 August 1704; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7,059, fo. 27: Harley to Marlborough, 18 August 1704; fo. 31: Harley to Stepney, 5 September 1704.

³Blenheim MSS., Marlborough Letter Book, xv, pp. 12-13: Marlborough to Harley, 8 September 1704.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 87/2, fo. 195: Cardonnel to Harley, 31 October 1704. from the defeat. Few soldiers came forward to join with the Imperial Army, and there was some suspicion that a revolt would be imminent there if the elector should return.¹

Despite this disappointment, England's major concern following Blenheim was to resume the grand strategy against France and, in particular, to get Imperial forces to act in Italy as the necessary complement to the other theatres of the war. The entire Blenheim campaign had been undertaken in order to secure the Empire from a distraction which had prevented it from effectively using its forces against France. The deployment of Imperial forces, however, was still hindered by another problem: Hungary.

The Rákóczi Revolt in Hungary

The expansion of Imperial control to the east in the reign of Emperor Leopold I, the conflict between the Turks and the Emperor, the evolution of a 'dual monarchy' in Hungary, Hungarian territorial claims, and the position of Magyar liberties in relation to Imperial authority are issues which lay at the heart of the revolt in Hungary against the Empire. For England, these were matters which were little understood and of less concern. Yet, ending the revolt was a matter of the deepest interest in London. English interest centred on two points:

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/74, fo. 99: Stepney to Shrewsbury, 15 November 1704; S.P. 105/75: Stepney to Harley, 24 January 1705.

supporting the protestants in Hungary and preventing the revolt from being a diversion to the use of Imperial troops in the war against France. As the revolt progressed between 1703 and 1711 it became an increasingly serious obstacle to English grand strategy.

Soon after Rákóczi and Berczényi had escaped from prison and returned to Hungary in 1703 to lead the revolt, George Stepney surveyed the Imperial position in the war against France. He saw the various problems of the Empire: difficulty in Bavaria, the lethargy of the Imperial army, and the revolt in Hungary. 'We want but one disorder more to be in as miserable a state as possible,' he wrote.¹ In the back of his mind, he had speculated that this one disorder more might be Turkish support for the Hungarians and a renewal of the war in the east which had ended only five years before. In Berlin, Lord Raby sympathized with the Imperial position, 'the misfortune of the poor Emperor is but too plain for the rebels are almost at the gates of Vienna, and the elector of Bavaria with the French are ready to enter his hereditary countries on the other side, so that he can hardly find a place in his dominions where he can be safe.'² In his own reports Marlborough assured the secretary of state that he entirely understood the seriousness of the Hungarian problems to the success of the war, and that he lost no opportunity in pressing the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/21, fo. 253: Stepney to Hedges, 22 August 1703. For a study of the Rákóczi revolt, see C. Ingrao, 'In quest and crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1705-1711,' (Ph.D. thesis Brown University, 1975), pp. 306-94.

²P.R.O., S.P. 90/2, fo. 206: Raby to Hedges, 18 December 1703.

Imperial envoys to urge their court to appease the Hungarians. He believed, however, that diplomatic pressure would not be effective while Hungarian demands were so unacceptably high.¹

The English envoy in Vienna was ordered to present Marlborough's campaign against Bavaria as a special favour to the Emperor, which could be appropriately reciprocated by quieting the disturbances in Hungary.² This line of approach was repeatedly used by England, but it met with little success. As Marlborough progressed toward the Danube, Stepney continued to hear reports that if the confederate armies should defeat the elector of Bavaria, Prince Eugene would probably be ordered to Hungary with a large army to suppress the revolt. Stepney diplomatically told an Imperial courtier that he was

> fully persuaded such designs were far from the Emperor's inclinations and true interest, which was to come to a speedy conclusion with his own subjects, and if the Elector of Bavaria should chance to be defeated, then to turn all the force that can be spared out of the Empire toward prosecuting the war in Italy.³

The cabinet in London hoped that the further action which it had taken in sending Lord Galway with additional forces to Portugal would also be seen as a further assurance of English support for Habsburg interests. They hoped it

¹Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xiv, p. 254: Marlborough to Harley, 29 June 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 2: Harley to Stepney, 30 May 1704.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 327: Stepney to Harley, 18 June 1704. Report of a conversation with Count Kaunitz. would deserve the repayment of peace in Hungary. The allied success against Bavaria led London to believe that the Hungarians would be more willing to make peace; ¹ it was logical to conclude that the defeat of such a very powerful prince would have an effect on less powerful dissenters within the Empire. But the situation proved to be quite different. On the one hand, this success seemed to lead some in Vienna to 'a persecuting spirit' encouraging the use of large detachments of the Imperial army in Hungary.² On the other hand, the Hungarians now seemed to be even less receptive to the idea of making a peaceful solution. Following Donauwörth, it was apparent that neither France nor Bavaria was likely to provide any direct support for the Hungarian revolt. However, Stepney speculated that they might now turn to seek support from the Turks.³ In late August 1704, Stepney and the Dutch envoy at Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel Bruynincx, jointly approached Count Kaunitz attempting to learn more about Imperial policy toward the Hungarian revolutionaries and 'to improve any fair opportunity' that the Hungarians might have in reaching a peaceful solution.⁴ But all seemed to be of no avail. In late November, Secretary Harley ordered Stepney, at the Queen's express command, that he 'in the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 9: Harley to Stepney,
4 July 1704.
²P.R.O., S.P. 80/23, fo. 423: Stepney to Hill,
22 July 1704.
³P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 1: Stepney to Harley,
2 August 1704.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 32v: Stepney to Harley, 20 August 1704.

most warm and engaging terms press' the Emperor to make peace in Hungary. 'All the zeal and affection that Her Majesty hath showed to the interest of the House of Austria,' Harley lamented,

> all the success which heaven hath blessed Her Majesty's arms with will be to no purpose, for not only the Turk will necessarily be brought into the War on one side, but the French will be strengthened on the other side and Her Majesty her allies will be weakened if not disabled from affording assistance to those who will do nothing towards their own deliverance, but rather embarrass their own affairs and weaken others.¹

The remote affairs of Hungary could well have been the rock upon which English grand strategy foundered. In English eyes, the spectre of renewed war between the Turks and the Empire was increased by Austrian insistence on putting down the Hungarian revolt by force. The failure of the Imperial court to react to this situation and to put clear priority on the war against France caused an increasingly cynical English attitude toward the Empire's contribution to the war. Richard Hill echoed the common sentiment when he remarked, 'we owe little, God knows, to the Emperor, who can neither make peace in Hungary, nor war in Lombardy.'² For the moment, the war in Italy was to be sustained only by the hope of the 8,000 Prussians for which Marlborough had negotiated.³

³The treaty with Prussia signed 28 November 1704.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 26: Harley to Stepney, 21 November 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. 92/27, fo. 7: Hill to Hedges, 4 January 1705.

By the summer of 1705, the situation in Hungary had reached such serious proportions for English plans that Lord Sunderland was despatched on a special mission to establish the basis for peace between Austria and the Hungarians.¹ The government in London was quite willing to use every available argument in support of their view. Doing just that, Harley wrote to Vienna wishing Sunderland and Stepney success in the negotiations with 'those Heathen magicians which oppose you' and suggesting that if peace could not be speedily reached in Hungary, it would neither be easy to give aid to Italy 'nor will our Parliament here be ready to continue their supplies for carrying on a war to support those, who will not (though they can) help themselves.'² As Speaker of the House of Commons, as well as a secretary of state, Harley's words would carry weight when reported in Vienna.³

While both the Hungarians and the Emperor had accepted English mediation, there seemed to be a great reluctance on the part of the Austrians to accept a guarantee of Hungarian rights. Without that, there was little hope that the Hungarians would agree to any terms. Even before leaving for the continent, Lord Sunderland was pessimistic about the success of his mission. 'I fear I am going upon

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/203: Instructions to Sunderland, 28 June 1705. Sunderland was not yet a secretary of state. He received the seals on December 1706, a year after his return.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fos. 72-33: Harley to Stepney, 14 August 1705.

³However, Parliament was not in session when this letter was written. When it reconvened in October, Harley was not re-elected as Speaker.

a very fruitless errand, ' he wrote.¹

After arriving in the Empire, Sunderland found that, despite his urgent pleas, there was very little hope of preventing the Imperial army from forcefully putting down the revolt.² By December 1705, the situation had not changed. Both sides in the dispute seemed more intransigent than ever, and there were additional fears that disorders in Bavaria would further hinder the war effort against France. Prince Eugene's army in Italy was in need of every kind of support.³ Despite these difficulties, there was one ray of hope: the clash of arms in Transylvania had not brought the Turks into the war. Sir Robert Sutton, English Ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Stepney that the plague, corruption, and confusion in the government of the Ottoman Empire allowed little opportunity for direct entry into the war.⁴ Sutton believed that the Turks would go no further than merely encouraging the Hungarians to persevere in their revolt and 'favouring them underhand' with arms in Wallachia and Moldavia.⁵ By late spring 1706, Stepney had been able to make progress in mediating a two-month truce between the

¹West Sussex R.O., Petworth House Archives MSS. 14: Sunderland to Somerset, 21 July 1705.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,056, fo. 319: Sunderland to Godolphin, 9 September 1705.

³Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xvi, p. 358: Marlborough to Harley, 22 December 1705; <u>Marlborough-</u> Godolphin Correspondence, p. 514.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 80/27, fo. 250: Stepney to Harley, 26 December 1705.

⁵P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fo. 111v: Stepney to Harley, 24 March 1706; S.P. 105/77: Sutton to Stepney, 31 March 1706.

Hungarians and the Imperialists.¹ At the expiration of the truce in mid-July, the negotiations broke down and the armistice was not renewed. The Dutch and English mediators were optimistic about reaching a settlement in due course, but the prolonged period required would delay and obstruct the Imperial military campaign in Hungary. Viewing the negotiations as only a delay, the Emperor broke them off and resumed military operations.²

Shortly after this event, Stepney was transferred to The Hague to replace the incapacitated Alexander Stanhope as envoy. Soon after his arrival there, Stepney learned that the Dutch had ordered their envoy in Constantinople to exhort Turkey to a careful adherence to the treaty of Carlowitz, the treaty which had brought an end to the Turkish war in 1699. Stepney held little hope that such a course of action would be effective. 'In my poor opinion the most natural method of preserving the peace would be by persuading the Emperor to be reconciled with the Hungarians,' he wrote.³ The Hungarians were the key to preserving the peace in southeastern Europe, and Stepney went so far as to suggest that in order to prevent war, the Emperor should relinquish Transylvania entirely In Stepney's opinion, Turkey was not a natural to Rákóczi.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fos. 203-6: Stepney to Harley, 12 May 1706.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/28, fo. 347: Stepney to Harley, 13 July 1706; fo. 395 [Report of Stepney, Rechteren and Hamel Bruynincx to the Emperor at the Favourite on the miscarriage of negotiations with Hungary], 1 August 1706.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/230, fo. 101: Stepney to Harley, 28 December 1706.

ally for the Hungarians. Prince Rákóczi, himself, had told Stepney that he would not have recourse to the Turks unless there was no other alternative in attaining his qoals. With this advice in mind, the cabinet approved the instructions to the new English Ambassador to Vienna. Sir Philip Meadows was told that his major concern would be to prevent diversion from the war against France, stop the war in Hungary, and avoid Turkish interference. 'It can not but give us and our allies much concern,' the royal instructions stated, 'if we should have any ground to apprehend that there will be less force employed against France the next year than was this. The only way to prevent that is to procure an honourable peace in Hungary.'² English representations in this matter, however, had little effect. By the autumn of 1707, there were reports that additional Imperial troops were to be withdrawn from Italy and sent directly to Hungary.³ Some of the forces mentioned included the Hessian and Saxe-Gothans in English pay serving in Italy.⁴ In February, reports were received in London that the Emperor intended to use some of the Danish troops in his service in Hungary.⁵ The English diplomats in Vienna and Copenhagen were both

l_{Ibid}.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/203, fos. 247-54: Instructions to Meadows, 12 April 1707.

³Blenheim, Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 102: Sunderland to Meadows, 8 October 1707.

⁴Blenheim, Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 105: Sunderland to Meadows, 21 October 1707.

⁵P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 56: Boyle to Pultney, 24 February 1708; fo. 57, 27 February 1708.

instructed to protest against this action and to ensure that the troops were used against France. However, when it was learned in London that Denmark had agreed to the Emperor's proposal to use Danish troops in Hungary, England acquiesced in order to prevent further stress within the alliance.¹

From 1708, the English government appeared to take little interest in the Hungarian situation, enduring it as best they could. The envoy in Vienna admitted at one point that he never troubled London with news from Hungary although the court in Vienna seemed 'more concerned for the success of that war, than at what may happen on any frontier of France'.² In January 1711, however, the new Government in London renewed appeals for a peaceful accommodation in Hungary. Seeking support from the States-General, Lord Townshend was ordered to ask the Dutch to join in England's plea for an end to a war which risked Turkish interference and which served French interests.³ Despite continued assurances that had been received from Constantinople that war was unlikely, London suspected that these were only pretences for the Turks to put themselves in a good military posture to attack the Empire. The safest course to follow, Secretary St. John believed,

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 58v: Boyle to Pultney, 30 March 1708.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/30: Palmes to Boyle, 18 February 1710.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/79, fo. 14: St. John to Townshend, 30 January 1711.

was to procure peace in Hungary.¹

The defeat of James Stanhope at Brihuega in Spain and the lack of vigourous action in Italy during the campaign of 1710 placed the success of English grand strategy in doubt. The cabinet believed that in the critical campaign which would follow in 1711, the only chance of success lay in the full use of the Imperial army and an active campaign by the duke of Savoy in complement to the other armies in the Low Countries and in Spain. The settlement of the Hungarian situation was, in St. John's words, 'the great hinge of the war'.² Without the settlement there, he could see 'no prospect of reducing France, and of obtaining an honourable Peace'.³

The situation in Spain had fallen to such a level that it appeared far too difficult a situation to retrieve. St. John outlined the dilemma:

> Suppose what number of troops you please sent into Catalonia, they will have hardly ground at first to stand upon or provisions with any tolerable convenience, neither can they hope easily or in any reasonable time to be able to extend themselves blocked up by such an army, and in such a corner of the country.⁴

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Palmes, 30 January 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/52, fo. 97: St. John to Raby, 6 March 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 8-11: St. John to Raby, 6 March 1711. The situation might be saved, the Government believed, by strong action in the other theatres. As St. John put it, 'if we were able to gain a footing in France whilst we lost it in Spain, we might hope to have the opportunity of making a safe and honourable peace.'¹ The army in Flanders was reinforced by ten battalions of infantry against the increased preparations of the French.² The best opportunity appeared to be an attack in Provence or Dauphiné.³ However, the ability of the allies to gather a strong army there clearly depended on peace in Hungary and the transfer of Imperial forces to the French front.

The conclusion of a peace agreement between the Hungarian rebels and the Emperor in May 1711 raised English expectations. The object which England had sought for so many years had been achieved. The revolt was over, and English ministers moved quickly to encourage the movement of Imperial troops.⁴ What followed was to be a test of the Empire's intentions and the viability of English grand strategy. St. John put the issue clearly when he wrote,

> The Malcontents have hitherto been the scapegoats which have borne the blame of all deficiencies we have had to charge the House of Austria with. Hungary has been the gulf wherein the plunder of Bavaria, and of Mantua, the revenues of Milan and Naples, and the contributions of the Italian princes, all gained by the

¹Ibid.

²Heinsius-Marlborough Correspondence, pp. 538-9.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.

⁴Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D (W) 1778, V/188, fo. 164: Cabinet Minutes, Kensington, 17 May 1711. assistance of the Queen and States, have been swallowed up. But these excuses can no longer be pleaded. . . .

The obstacle which the Rákóczi revolt in Hungary had presented to English grand strategy had been removed, but English solutions to the problem appeared to have had little effect in reaching the desired objective. In frustration, the cabinet in London concluded that the Emperor's decision in moving the troops which had formerly been used to suppress the Hungarians would be 'a final test of their good or their bad intentions to that Common Cause where the greatest stake is their own'.² The opinion in London had turned to one of bitterness. English views on the conduct of the war in 1711 remained the same as they had throughout the course of the war, up to that point. Her military objective remained that of defeating France by dividing her forces into several theatres. As far as England could see, that might only be done if the Empire and all the allies co-operated by contributing all their forces to the war against France. Military success was dependent on having a superiority of men in each theatre conducting offensive operations. Now that peace had been achieved in Hungary, it would be to no advantage if the Imperial army remained there or if it was necessary to pay even greater subsidies for them at a time when English finances were precarious. If that were the case, St. John commented, 'the misfortune will indeed be general, but the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Peterborough, 18 May 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 115v-116: St. John to Raby, 18 May 1711. fault will only lie at the Imperial Court'.¹

In the end, English diplomacy did not achieve its objective and the failure to obtain the use of Imperial forces in the manner which she had conceived was a blow which directly affected England's ability to carry out her concept of grand strategy.

The Pope as a Threat to the Alliance, 1708-9

The Pope was in a strong natural position as a potential leader of the Italian princes. In 1702, Stepney had observed that the presence of an English squadron would be necessary in the Mediterranean,

> if the Pope should die towards the fall of the leaf (and one of his Philistines hath assured a person of consequence that it is impossible he should last longer) for you will easily imagine what an election we shall have if the French and Spanish factions continue united as at present.²

In 1704, there were indications that the French were encouraging the Pope to form a League of Italian princes who would support Philip of Anjou's claim to the Spanish territories in Italy.³ England did not become concerned about this, at first. In general, the English Government pursued the policy that 'it ought to be the Emperor's

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fo. 247: St. John to Peterborough, 22 May 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/19, fo. 90v: Stepney to Hedges, 2 August 1702. While often reported in ill health, Clement XI lived until 1721. See L. von Pastor, <u>The</u> History of the Popes (London, 1941), xxxiii.

³P.R.O., S.P. 80/24, fo. 213: Stepney to Hedges, 19 November 1704. peculiar care to manage the court at Rome at all times'.¹ However, the breakdown in relations between Vienna and Rome was reason enough for English intervention in order to maintain the strategy of the alliance.

In April 1708, a month after the Old Pretender's attempt to invade Scotland, the cabinet in London learned² that the invasion had been encouraged and partially financed by the Pope. By early May, a decision had been reached by the cabinet and instructions were drafted to Sir John Leake for the Queen's signature by Lord Sunderland. This instruction advised Leake, then commanding the Mediterranean Squadron, that besides the Pope's encouragement, promotion, and financing for this expedition, he had 'in the most public and insolent manner ordered prayers in the Church of Rome for the success of this expedition which is an affront of the highest nature to our Person, our Crown and Dignity, to the British Nation, and to all our Allies'.³ When other services in the Mediterranean allowed, Leake was directed to appear on the coast of the Papal State at Civitàvecchia or some other appropriate place and demand the sum of 400,000 crowns in reparation for his support of the Pretender. If the Pope failed to comply with this, 'his Country is to be put under military execution, which in case of refusal or delay is to be performed

¹P.R.O., S.P. 80/25, fo. 172: Stepney to Hedges, 4 April 1705.

²Blenheim, MSS. Cl-16: Cabinet Minutes, 20 April 1708,

³Blenheim, Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 169: Instructions to Leake, 4 May 1708.

by burning and destroying his ports and shipping. . . .'¹ In the covering letter which transmitted this instruction to Leake, Sunderland advised him, 'I don't doubt, but as far is consistent with the main services you are sent upon, you will execute it in such a manner as will shake a terror into the Italian Princes for the future'.² While retribution for the Catholic attack on a Protestant crown was the pretext for this action, the purpose was not merely one of vindictiveness. By a demonstration of force against one of the most influential Italian princes, Britain could set an example that would be particularly useful in maintaining either the strict neutrality of the Italian States or in encouraging them to join the allies against France.

For several months, the immediate needs of the allies in the Mediterranean prevented Leake from carrying out these instructions. The employment³ of the fleet in transporting troops, the sudden orders to attack Port Mahon,⁴ the lack of instructions from the States-General for the Dutch ships,⁵ and the taking of Sardinia, all diverted attention from the Pope. However, the Pope's key position in the formation of the league of Italian princes against

¹Blenheim, Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 169: Instructions to Leake, 4 May 1708.

²Blenheim, Sunderland Letter Book, ii, p. 168: Sunderland to Leake, 7 May 1708.

³Blenheim MSS. C2-32, Council of War on board HMS Albemarle, Vado Bay, 3 June 1708.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5,434, fos. 51v-52: Leake to Sunderland, 18 August 1708.

⁵S.M. Leake, <u>Life of Sir John Leake</u> (Navy Records Soc. lxiii, 1920), pp. 229-30.

the allies caused the cabinet in London to send Admiral Leake additional instructions. Reminding him of his previous orders, he was now told to 'demand satisfaction for the other allies who have been aggrieved'¹ and to demand the investiture of Naples for King Charles, as well as whatever additional demands the Emperor and the duke of Savoy might also wish to make.

Leake departed from the Mediterranean in early October, but left Sir Edward Whitaker with a small squadron of ships to winter at Port Mahon. The instructions were also left with Whitaker. In the months following the receipt of the orders, relations between the Pope and the Emperor had steadily declined and had finally reached open rupture. The cabinet in London chose openly to support the Emperor against the Pope.² Secretary of State Boyle wrote to Lord Raby in Berlin,

> the Queen gives her consent for the Prussian troops [in Italy] to march towards the Pope's country and appears to support the Emperor in this quarrel with no other view, than to frighten the Pope that way into accommodation, and the princes and states in Italy from joining with him, or in a case of a rupture to make so speedy an end of that war, that it may not be a clog upon the operations against France the next campaign, and I hope the taking of Port Mahon, and the Squadron of her Majesty's ships

¹Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 193: Sunderland to Leake, 23 July 1708.

²Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Cabinet Minutes, 17 October 1708. that is ordered to winter there will conduce very much to those ends!¹

Shortly thereafter, it was reported in London that war had broken out between the Pope and the Emperor. Upon hearing the news, Lord Sunderland wrote Dr. Henry Newton, the envoy at Genoa, 'I hope the Emperor will push matters so vigourously as to bring the Pope to reason, especially now that the terror of Port Mahon being in our hands will contribute not a little to it.'²

The Royal Navy had a specific task to carry out. It was reported that troops were embarking at Marseilles and at other ports on the coast of France to assist the Pope. The Squadron under Whitaker was ordered to keep a watchful eye over all shipping and to intercept neutral ships that were 'suspected of carrying any assistance to the Pope'.³ While the Imperial army with its Prussian and Saxon auxiliary troops threatened by land, the diplomatic negotiations which the Emperor had undertaken with the Pope were seconded by Whitaker's presence. The Marquis di Prié, the Savoyard and Imperial envoy in Rome, assured Whitaker that his stay in that area made the Pope very uneasy and contributed very much to the good success of the negotiations. All depended on the squadron remaining there 'since

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/51: Boyle to Raby, 27 October 1708. For similar views, see also Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 240: Sunderland to Whitaker, 12 November 1708, and P.R.O., S.P. 104/39: Boyle to Meadows, 19 October 1708.

²Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 237: Sunderland to Newton, 2 November 1708. For a study of this war, see Ingrao, 'In Quest and Crisis,' pp. 276-89.

³Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 235: Sunderland to Whitaker, 2 November 1708.

necessity and fear alone may oblige this court to give us satisfaction'.¹ The problem which remained was to disengage the Imperial army from this operation in order to secure the Kingdom of Naples so that the additional forces needed in Catalonia could be drawn from it. This could be ensured by Whitaker's continued presence off the coast and by providing ready transportation for the troops to Catalonia.² Whitaker undertook this task and publicly declared that he had come 'to have satisfaction of the Pope, and brought some bomb vessels for that purpose, and that my transports might serve to carry force along the coasts of the Ecclesiastical State'.³

Ships were deployed to intercept traffic from France to the Papal State in a blockade in which four Papal galleys with troops and arms from Avignon narrowly escaped capture. 'Nothing but a calm,' Whitaker wrote, 'could have hindered their falling into our hands.'⁴

By January 1709, the Pope had reached an accommodation with the Emperor and had acknowledged King Charles III as the rightful King of Spain.⁵ In reply to Sir Edward Whitaker's report on the operations in Italy, Lord

¹Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 67: di Prié to Whitaker, 27 November 1708.

²P.R.O., S.P. 80/29: Meadows to [Secretary of State], 22 December 1708.

³Blenheim MSS. C2-33: Whitaker to di Prié, 3 January 1709.

⁴Blenheim MSS. C2-33: Whitaker to Sunderland, 1 March 1709.

⁵Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, pt. II, pp. 268-9: Sunderland to Stanhope, 11 February 1709.

Sunderland wrote, 'I . . . am very glad the accommodation with the Pope is finished which I believe is in great measure owing to your appearing on that coast. . . . '1 While England received no reparations as a result of this, her basic objectives were met. Her primary objective in this affair was not merely to rebuke the Pope for his part in the Pretender's attempt to land in Scotland, but to facilitate England's concept of grand strategy in the war against France. When Marlborough heard the news that the Papal War was over, he commented, 'We may now hope to hear soon that the Duke of Savoy will be in a condition to make a powerful diversion in our favour.'² The distracting influence of the Pope had been removed for both the Emperor and the duke of Savoy. The presence of allied forces had had a direct effect and had served to remove an obstacle to grand strategy. With the threat of a Papal League removed, 3500 recruits could be sent to Catalonia and an additional 20,000 Imperial troops could be used to support the Savoyard army.³ The way was open for an effective Italian campaign and a reinforced army in Spain to be directed against France in 1709.

It is clear that England participated in the Papal War in order to obtain her own objectives in foreign policy. She had little appreciation for or interest in

¹Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, pt. II, p. 267: Sunderland to Whitaker, 11 February 1709.

²P.R.O., S.P. 87/3, fo. 338: Marlborough to Boyle, 22 February 1709.

³Blenheim MSS., Sunderland Letter Book, i, II, p. 268: Sunderland to J. Chetwynd, 11 February 1709. Blenheim MSS. C2-33: Whitaker to Sunderland, 1 March 1709.

the objectives which the Emperor pursued. As long as the Emperor's activities would result in a more effective war against France, England could accept them and directly support them.

Neutrality in the Northern War¹

As Europe moved toward war against France during the closing years of William III's reign, England wished to avoid conflict amongst the smaller nations of Europe. In an effort to maintain the peace, and particularly to quell the antagonism Denmark showed toward Sweden, the Swedish King made defensive treaties with England and Holland. But war was clearly imminent in the North. An anti-Swedish alliance had been formed and, in February 1700, the King of Poland invaded Swedish Livonia. In March, Denmark invaded Holstein. Following the appearance of an Anglo-Dutch squadron in the Baltic to assist Sweden in her attack on Denmark, peace was made at Travendahl in August 1700. With peace restored in the western Baltic, Charles XII moved to the east in order to preserve his empire from Poland and her Russian ally. At the same time the gradual alignment of states in relation to France had clear implications for Sweden. Denmark's treaties with the Emperor and the Maritime Powers in 1701 threatened the settlement at Travendahl by an apparent shift of support from Sweden to Denmark. The diplomatic feint by the elector of Saxony in signing a treaty with France was looked upon

¹For a general survey of Northern affairs, see R. M. Hatton, <u>Charles XII of Sweden</u> (London, 1968), and 'Charles XII and the Great Northern War' in <u>New Cambridge Modern</u> History, vi, ch. 20.

with some alarm in Sweden, although it was never ratified. In this situation, the Swedes wished to make it apparent that their primary interest was in protecting their own empire from encroachments on either side. Despite enticement from the allies, Sweden's self-interest prevented her from joining the Grand Alliance. In October 1701, however, a convention was signed in which Sweden, the States and England agreed to act together should the English and Dutch become involved in the Northern War. In the meantime, however, Sweden would do nothing and agree to nothing which would prejudice the Grand Alliance. As William Blathwayt explained to John Robinson, 'this treaty, you see, is not intended to be final, but only introductive of a more solid and substantial alliance between the two Crowns and the States.'¹

From King William's viewpoint, this agreement was some assurance that France would not engage Sweden to disrupt the allies. The intention of the allies, however, was to bring Sweden into the Alliance, not only to use her troops and military skill, but to tie Charles XII firmly to the allied cause.

In August 1703, a 'treaty of stricter Alliance and for the tranquility of Europe'² was signed by Sweden and the Maritime Powers. By this agreement, Sweden obtained a guarantee by England and the States of the Treaty of Travendahl. In return, Sweden vaguely agreed to enter into

²Signed 16 August 1703.

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 35,106, fo. 162: Blathwayt to Robinson, 8 October 1701.

negotiations for admission to the Grand Alliance 'as soon as possible', and promised to supply 10,000 Swedish troops when the war against Poland and Russia had ended. The failure of Sweden firmly to commit herself to the allied cause left a great deal of uneasiness among some of the allies, particularly those in northern Germany. The troop treaty between Prussia and England in 1704¹ expressed this By secret articles, the Queen promised the King uneasiness. of Prussia that she would use her good offices to prevent Prussia from being drawn into the Northern War. More alarming for the allies, however, was the Prussian demand to recall all their troops from allied service if Prussia were in danger of attack. In dealing with the variety of affairs in northern Europe, Secretary of State Hedges emphasized that 'Her Majesty's chief intention is to keep things quiet in those parts, that no part of the forces of the allies may be diverted from pursuing the interest of the common cause'.² England's concern for keeping things quiet led her to resist Swedish attempts to enlist her full support in backing Swedish objectives. The secretary of state told the Swedish resident in London:

> Her Majesty at the same time that she is ready to perform all acts of friendship to the King of Sweden, can not but consider the Czar of Muscovy as a Prince in Amity with her Majesty and treat him accordingly.³

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 4: Hedges to Vernon, 17 October 1704.

³Riksarkivet, Anglica 536: Harley to Swedish resident, 18 July 1704.

¹Signed 28 November 1704.

Clearly, England had no intention of involving herself in the contest in northern Europe. However, the death of the Bishop of Lübeck-Eutin in 1705 and the subsequent move by the Prince of Holstein in taking possession of the bishopric was a matter of concern to the allies. The cabinet in London immediately realized that this incident could well provoke war between Sweden and Denmark.¹ The English envoy at Hanover remarked, 'if by this means the war should break out in these parts, France alone would reap the advantage.'2 The fears of war were justified when Denmark seized Lübeck in December 1705, and replaced the Prince of Holstein, a Swedish client, with Prince Charles of Denmark.³ As George Stepney put it, 'the Devil is broke loose in Holstein.'⁴ Secretary of State Harley wrote urgently to the Hague, 'the affairs of the North are of so great consequence to the Common Cause that they be quieted, and that the resentments be not carried on to produce a War in those parts. . . .' All diplomatic efforts were urged to 'prevent the Swedes from engaging in this broil'.⁵ In the English view, it was a perilous situation which could easily disrupt the grand strategy of the war against France.⁶ In order to

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fos. 95-96: Harley to Sunderland, 9 October 1705.

²P.R.O., S.P. 81/162, fo. 16: E. Howe to Harley, October 1705.

³<u>Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence</u>, pp. 516-17.
⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/77: Stepney to Raby, 15 January 1706.
⁵P.R.O., S.P. 104/72, fo. 121: Harley to Stanhope, 18 January 1706.

⁶P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 19: Harley to Vernon, 2 April 1706.

quiet the situation, England and Holland jointly offered recompense to Prince Charles of Denmark if he would return the bishopric to the Prince of Holstein.¹ But this solution was not entirely acceptable since the Emperor had failed to confirm the Holstein-Gottorp candidate for the position.

By the autumn of 1706, an additional factor was added to English apprehension over this issue. Charles XII's success in Poland in 1705 was followed, in 1706, by a Swedish assault on Russia. Finding the Russian frontier well defended in a summer's campaign, Charles turned westward and sought to destroy the Polish-Saxon union. The movements of the Swedish army toward the west brought immediate apprehension in London where it was feared that it had been inspired by France.² When the rumours of the Swedish invasion of Saxony proved true, the Government sought to use every kind of diplomatic pressure to persuade the Swedes to leave Germany.³ 'I heartily wish,' Harley wrote to Marlborough, 'that any method may be found to get the Swedes out of Saxony, for should they take up winter quarters there, there is reason to believe France will prevail themselves of that occasion before spring.'⁴ In

¹Letters of Queen Anne, p. 188: Anne to Godolphin, 4 June 1706.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 15,866, fo. 2: Harley to Stanhope, 27 August 1706. See G. Syveton, <u>Louis XIV et</u> Charles XII au camp d'Altranstädt (Paris, 1900), pp. 252-53.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 140: Harley to Stepney, 17 September 1706.

⁴Longleat, Portland Papers v, fo. 99: Harley to Marlborough, 17 September 1706.

this situation, the alliances which the elector of Saxony had previously made with Denmark, Prussia, and Hesse might be invoked to draw forces from the allied armies in order to oppose Sweden.¹ The English Government resolved that the best course in attempting to negotiate a Swedish withdrawal from Saxony was to seek the assistance of the elector of Hanover.²

While these negotiations were in progress, the Treaty of Altranstädt was signed on 24 September 1706. By this treaty Charles XII deprived Augustus of the Polish Crown and forced his Russian allies to surrender their forces which were serving in Saxony, and at the same time, Stanislaus Leszczynski was recognized as king. Swedish diplomacy was centred on obtaining confirmation and a quarantee for this treaty from the Maritime Powers, but England was largely concerned with the impact which this treaty had on the military arrangements for the war against France. The Maritime Powers delayed recognition of Stanislaus as King of Poland in order to use this recognition as a lever to smooth over a widening breech between the Emperor and Sweden. The presence of the Swedish army in Germany, combined with Swedish reluctance to commit herself to allied goals in the War of the Spanish Succession, caused considerable suspicion of Swedish motives. At the same time, Sweden was disturbed over the Emperor having

¹Marlborough-Heinsius Correspondence, p. 265.

²Ibid., p. 266; Chance (ed.), <u>British Diplomatic</u> <u>Instructions, Sweden</u> (London, 1922), p. 31. Niedersächische Hauptstaatsarchiv, Cal. Br. 24/1669: Marlborough to George Ludwig, 29 September 1706.

taken into his service the Russian auxiliaries who had served with the Poles in Saxony, over the delayed endorsement of the Gottorp claim to the bishopric of Lübeck-Eutin, and over the lack of credibility which Sweden's repeated denials received concerning secret arrangements with France. While the Maritime Powers were relatively certain that Sweden was not secretly conniving with France, they continued to worry about the distraction which Swedish movements had created among the allies. The situation of affairs in Spain, Germany and Italy in 1707 made it absolutely necessary that matters in the north be managed so that the war there did not affect the allies. If the allies became directly involved in the conflict, it would create a situation, Harley believed, 'which in this article of time would have disconcerted all our affairs. . . . ' It was clearly possible that open conflict could develop between Sweden and the Empire. In this situation, Marlborough was sent to negotiate personally with Charles XII at Altranstädt² and to forestall any serious development of this nature. If a rupture occurred, 'it would prove fatal to the Liberty of Europe . . . the hope of settling a true balance of power in Europe would be lost, ' Harley believed.³ The tension which had been created between

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 42: Harley to Pultney, 2 September 1707.

²For a detailed discussion of this meeting, see A. E. Stamp, 'The Meeting of the duke of Marlborough and Charles XII at Altranstädt, April 1707', <u>Trans. R. Hist. Soc.</u> (new series, xii, 1898), pp. 103-116; K. G. Hildebrand, 'England och Sverige 1707. Några bidrag', <u>Karolinska Förbundets</u> Årsbok (1937), pp. 176-201.

Sweden and the Empire reached such a level in 1707 that London believed that the Emperor might recall Prince Eugene and his entire army from Italy.¹

The fear of an Austro-Swedish war was ended by the second Treaty of Altranstädt, signed 1 September 1707. At the same time, the Emperor agreed to the Gottorp candidate for the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric, thus stopping that issue from becoming a <u>casus belli</u>. In consequence of this, the Queen paid a share of £4,000 a year to Prince Charles of Denmark in return for his having given up the bishopric.²

Through Marlborough's visit to Charles XII and the treaty arrangements at Altranstädt, England had succeeded in her main objectives. A war between Sweden and Austria had been avoided, Charles XII had been removed as a threat to the operation of the Grand Alliance, and auxiliary troops were not withdrawn from allied service. All this was achieved at a remarkably low cost. The guarantees which Charles XII sought for the treaty of Altranstädt were never put in writing by England. Thus, England avoided alienating Russia and the supporters of Augustus while at the same time defeating French objectives.³ However, Sweden was left in a bad position from her point of view. She was left without a firm commitment from the allies to support her position. As the secretary in Charles XII's field

¹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 35.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/45N: Harley to Lord Treasurer, 22 September 1707.

³Jerker Rosén, <u>Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia</u>, <u>1697-1721</u>, (Stockholm, 1952) II: i, 106-11; Huntington Library, MSS. ST. 58, i, fo. 101: Marlborough to Brydges, 18 May 1707.

chancellory said of the English at Altranstädt, 'they certainly pulled our nose'.¹ Although Swedish objectives had not been achieved,² England was satisfied. One of the means to English goals was to maintain a balance of power among the northern states. For this reason, England never gave her complete support to any one side in the struggle for Baltic supremacy, but applied her power and influence judiciously among the contenders.

To the English, Charles XII was an unpredictable figure. His fate was uncertain, but in the right circumstances he could be useful to England. For this reason, James Jefferyes was sent as a volunteer with the Swedish army in its Russian campaign. He served the dual purposes of reporting to Whitehall on Charles's progress and being on the spot if success against the Tsar allowed Charles to accept an invitation to join the Grand Alliance.³

As Charles XII turned his attention to the war against Russia, England's concern with northern affairs as an obstacle to grand strategy melted away. This period of easy relations lasted until June 1709, when Charles XII's defeat by Tsar Peter at the Battle of Poltava dramatically changed the situation. Upon hearing news of this event, Augustus defied the terms of the first treaty of

¹Riksarkivet, Anglica 177: Hermelin to Leyoncrona, 9 May 1708. ('Det är ju at draga oss vid näsan.')

²Otto Haintz, <u>König Karl XII von Schweden</u> (Berlin, 1958), i, 163.

³Hatton, <u>Charles XII</u>, p. 224.

Altranstädt and reassumed the crown of Poland. He then joined Denmark and Russia in a league against Sweden. The Danish army prepared to cross the Sound and to enter Sweden, while the remaining Swedish forces in Saxony were forced to retreat into Pomerania. Charles XII, himself, fled south into Turkey.

In these new circumstances, England was pleased to learn that Denmark did not intend to withdraw her troops from allied service. But the Government in London was not put entirely at ease. 'We cannot help apprehending,' Lord Sunderland wrote to the envoy in Copenhagen, 'the ill consequences to our own affairs if they should push their designs against Sweden too far.'¹ While Danish preparations for the invasion of Sweden proceeded slowly, the English and the Dutch jointly sought to preserve peace on both sides.² Such diplomatic manoeuvres, however, proved to have little success.³ When open hostilities between the two nations began, England concentrated on retaining the Danish troops in the pay of the allies, and on discouraging Sweden from making a retaliatory attack on Saxony. Secretary of State Boyle concluded 'that this is thought to be the most probable way to hinder this northern war from having an immediate influence upon the interests of the Confederates

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 98: Sunderland to Pultney, 13 September 1709.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,635, fo. 7v: Townshend to Boyle, 14 June 1709; P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fos. 102-4: Sunderland to Pultney, 4 October 1709.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fos. 108-9: Boyle to Pultney, 8 November 1709.

in the present war against France.'¹ The threat to the security of the princes of northern Germany once again created a serious problem for the military structure of the Alliance which was largely based on hired and subsidized troops. At the same time, Savoy's increasing lack of interest in continuing an active role in the war and allied military failures in Spain created a situation in which the entire grand strategy was threatened. In order to alleviate the threat from the north to her grand strategy against France, England took the initiative and declared that she was ready to join with the Emperor and the States to put a stop to the Swedish threat and to prevent the withdrawal of any troops from allied service.² In March 1710, representatives of the Empire, the Queen, and the States-General signed a declaration and guarantee for the neutrality of the Empire and Germany in the Northern War. They agreed '. . . the Empire should not be disturbed, or anything done that may prejudice or damage the interests and advantage of the allies now in the war against France, either in recalling their troops or in any other manner.'³ Through this agreement, the allied princes were given some assurance that their territory would remain safe while their troops were contracted for service beyond their In August, the words were given military backing borders.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fos. 112v-13: Boyle to Pultney, 22 November 1709.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 117: Boyle to Pultney, 27 November 1709.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/234, fos. 39-47: Declaration of 31 March 1710.

through a general convention signed by the three major allies, the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, the bishop of Münster, the elector of Mainz, the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the duke of Mecklenburg, and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.¹

The agreement set out a detailed plan by which an army of 15-16,000 troops could act in the countries bordering on the Oder and the Elbe rivers, or wherever required, in order to maintain the safety of the Empire from the Northern War. The document specified the procedures which would be followed to call out such a deterrent force, how it would be supplied, and what each signatory would contribute. All this was a carefully designed policy to preserve the integrity of the Empire and its princes, while maintaining effective armies against France.

While this was being negotiated, London also had hopes that the Swedish troops in Pomerania could be brought into allied service. These troops were, in themselves, a threat to stability in the north. On the one hand, they were a target for the Tsar to attack.² On the other hand, the Swedish troops might themselves endanger the Empire in conjunction with the Hungarian rebels or the elector of Bavaria, if not with the assistance of the Turks.³ The presence of Charles XII on Turkish soil was reason enough

²West Sussex R.O., Petworth House Archives 15: Raby to Somerset, n.d.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/45P: 'Considerations about the Guaranty and State of Affairs in the North.' Received 4 November 1710.

¹Signed 4 August 1710.

for speculation in London. At the same time, Sweden was in danger of attack from Russia at Stockholm and from Denmark in Skane.¹ The tension which already existed between Turkey and the Empire in relation to Hungary had been a matter of serious concern for some time.² The unpredictability of Swedish intentions only added an additional element of uncertainty to the problem.³ In June 1710 when Tchlorlulu Ali Pasha was desposed as Grand Vizier by Köprülü Numan Pasha, the anti-Russian party came to Swedish interests were directed toward bringing power. Turkey into the war against Russia. Turkish sympathy for Sweden in this direction and the steps taken by the Turks to arrange for King Charles XII's return to Sweden through Poland left the cabinet in London apprehensive. In view of this, Secretary St. John warned, 'we have great reason to watch the motions of the Ottoman Port'.⁴

In November 1710, the Ottoman Empire declared war against Poland and Russia.⁵ 'The new turn which has happened at the Ottoman port by their rupture with the Muscovites has made the situation of affairs in respect to

²For the English view of events in Turkey at this time, see A. N. Kurat, (ed.), <u>The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton</u>, Ambassador in Constantinople (1711-1714), (London, 1953).

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/40: St. John to Palmes, 26 September 1710.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 104/71, fo. 111: St. John to Dayrolles, 21 November 1710.

¹Riksarkivet, Anglica 204: Gyllenborg to Queensberry, 22 August 1710.

⁵Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, pp. 23-29. For a summary of Russo-Turkish relations, see M. S. Anderson, Peter the Great (London, 1978), pp. 64ff.

the Northern War extremely dangerous,' St. John wrote.¹ The outbreak of war in distant southeastern Europe did not in itself present a threat, but it was not known how Sweden intended to use this event to further her own objectives. The 18,700 Swedish troops in Pomerania had the capacity, in a few days march, to throw the entire allied war effort into confusion. In London, the threat presented by these troops was regarded as one of 'imminent danger'. Immediate steps were taken to dissuade Sweden from using them to enter Germany or to attack the Empire. In solving this problem, England clearly was not interested in becoming engaged in another war or in becoming embroiled in the quarrels of the north. The Queen's solution was to support 'the princes chiefly concerned, than have an immediate hand in it ourselves.'² As the Dutch and the princes of the Empire were nearest to the danger and were 'best and earliest informed' of matters on this subject, England left the management of the matter entirely with the States-General and gave directions to her ministers abroad to concur in all measures which they judged necessary to maintaining the neutrality.³

In May 1711, Secretary of State Henry St. John began

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/48: St. John to d'Alais, 29 December 1710.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/48: St. John to Palmes, 29 December 1710; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fos. 143-4: Charles Whitworth's 'Memorial about Affairs of North', 11 January 1711. Number of Swedish troops in P.R.O., S.P. 75/30, fo. 38: Rosenkrantz's Memorial, 1 February 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 18: St. John to Raby, 23 March 1711.

to express uneasiness with the nation's policy in northern affairs. He believed that the management of affairs in that area had been entirely wrong and had been led astray by a lack of resolution on the part of the Dutch.^{\perp} The guarantee of the treaty of Altranstädt, he believed, was a solemn promise by England to maintain King Stanislaus on the throne of Poland. England's first move thereafter was to promote Augustus and by that action revive the troubles in the north. The neutrality of the Empire was necessary, but in order to accomplish it, England went out of Germany to cover Poland on one side and Jutland on the other, territories which there was no English obligation to defend. At the same time, the obligation to defend Sweden and Skane by the treaty of Travendahl was forgotten. England apparently disobliged the kings of Sweden, Denmark, and Poland, and the Tsar of Russia. 'We who ought to hold the balance and to give the law,' St. John exclaimed, 'are everyday bullied by our pensioners.'²

The Danes, the Poles, and the Russians all pressed to use 'the Army of Neutrality' to crush Swedish troops in Pomerania, but the Maritime Powers resisted.³ Even though there was no evidence to indicate that France was promoting this action in order to involve the Empire in a war which would distract it from fighting France, the situation was

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fos. 193-4: St. John to Whitworth, 8 May 1711.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fos. 319-22: St. John to Whitworth, 12 July 1711.

³Bodleian MS. Eng. let. e.4, fo. 63: St. John to Orrery, 24 July 1711; Houghton Library, MS. Eng. 218.1F: Orrery to Bolingbroke, 28 July 1711.

'much the same whether it proceeds from their indiscretion or their intelligence with the common enemy.'¹ Despite previous mishandling, the best course which England believed she could follow in the situation was temporising² and keeping the northern princes in the best humour possible toward the allies.³ St. John outlined the general view when he wrote to the envoy in Copenhagen,

> It is pretty hard for us who have a war of such weight on our shoulders and so great a variety of negotiations with so many different allies and of repugnant interests to manage to do anything more in relation to the affairs of the North than to keep the ferment as much down as possible by our good Offices, if we can by such means have that influence over the several parties either directly or indirectly as to keep the war from spreading and hinder new seeds or disturbances from arising, I think it is all that at present can be expected.⁴

This solution was not the position of leadership which England wished in dealing with northern affairs, but essentially the purpose of English policy remained the same. She sought to prevent the Great Northern War from having any result which would hinder the arrangements for the war against France, and at the same time she sought a balance of power in the Baltic. In addition, by keeping the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 91/7: Whitworth to Marlborough, 12 August 1711.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,358, fo. 365v: St. John to Whitworth, 7 August 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/5: St. John to Pultney, 10 August 1711.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 104/5: St. John to Pultney, 8 April 1712. northern powers neutral in the War of the Spanish Succession, England could be allowed to freely trade with Baltic ports.¹ During the remainder of the war, England showed little direct concern for Sweden. Once again Sweden began to feel that England had 'grown cold' in her disposition.² However, the Queen directly reassured Charles XII of her interest,³ and in the very last months of Anne's reign, when Sweden was in a very serious situation, the Queen protested to the Tsar,

> We cannot see the total ruin and overthrow of a nation with whom we have such alliances and in the preservation of which the interests of our people are so deeply concerned.⁴

Throughout the war, England's consistent policy was first to obtain Sweden's support in her own war against France, but failing that England sought to maintain the neutrality of the northern powers in that war and to establish a balance of power among them without embroiling herself in the issues which divided them.

¹Riksarkivet, Anglica 523: James Jefferyes to Charles XII, 26 October 1711.

²New York Public Library, Montagu Collection: Shrewsbury to Bolingbroke, 24 April 1713.

³P.R.O., F.O. 90/72: Charles XII to Anne, 15 May 1713; Anne to Charles XII, 1 October 1713.

⁴P.R.O., F.O. 90/72: Instructions to G. MacKenzie, 20 May 1714.

<u>Conclusion</u>

The four detailed illustrations which have been given here relate directly to England's policy toward the Emperor and the Austrian court in Vienna. These were not the only problems which England faced in implementing her grand strategy, but they illustrate the broad scope of considerations which lay behind her policy as well as the importance of Austria as a member of the Alliance. For the major portion of the war, one of England's most serious problems was to channel Austrian effort in the manner which the ministry in London thought most appropriate to the war against France. The major obstacles which England faced in her grand strategy were those which drew the resources of the Allies away from the main objective of the war, as she perceived it. Throughout the war there was a serious concern for the events which could prove to be a distraction of resources, what Alexander Stanhope had termed '. . . sparks easy to be quenched if undertaken speedily, yet such, if let alone may grow up to great flame'.¹ The Pope, Bavaria, Hungary, and the North each presented specific difficulties and required different solutions, although the purpose behind English policy remained the same in each case. The problems of the Pope and Bavaria required the direct intervention of English military and naval forces, while in Hungary diplomacy was fruitlessly The Great Northern War brought forth the employed. establishment of a deterrent force, 'the army of neutrality'.

¹Brit. Lib., Stowe MSS. 244, fo. 197: A. Stanhope to Hedges, 22 June 1703.

England's grand strategy required the ultimate contribution of each ally in fighting France. The variety of distractions, threats and competing priorities which the English Government found among the allies remained the greatest weakness in her strategic concept. It may be seen in these examples that English attempts to remove problems were not always successful. Even when the threat of the Papal League was removed in Italy, when Bavaria had been defeated, when the Hungarians had ceased their revolt, and when the Great Northern War no longer threatened to spill into western Europe, England had not yet achieved her objective. After achieving all of these goals, England still wanted all the allies to act together in an offensive war against France which forced her to divide the huge French army into a number of segments over which the allies could maintain a local superiority. By this method, England intended to force France into accepting the independent growth of other European states.

CHAPTER V

THE ALLOCATION OF ENGLISH RESOURCES FOR THE WAR ABROAD

In the overall concept of English grand strategy, no single area of fighting was more important than another. The conduct of English diplomacy during the war demonstrates that England persistently believed that each theatre was a necessary complement to the others. England had entered and encouraged the Grand Alliance on the basis that a war against France was an impractical task for any single nation to undertake. England's contribution to the war was, therefore, designed to be complementary to the actions of others.¹ The contribution which England, herself, made to the war was planned to achieve this directly by providing ships and soldiers in the areas which she could best support and by providing money to assist and to encourage others to carry on their complementary tasks. Based on practical considerations and on her expectations of others, England had to divide her war resources in some manner which would contribute to her concept of grand

¹Traditional English military historians have concentrated on the campaigns in Flanders. Occasionally, the English army in Spain has been seen as its strategic complement. See for example, C. T. Atkinson, 'The Peninsular "Second Front" in the Spanish Succession War', Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, xxii (1942), pp. 223-33. For the view that the war in Spain was a pointless side show to the campaign in Flanders, see Sir John Fortescue, Marlborough (London, 1932), p. 32.

strategy and at the same time sustain effective military and naval forces in an offensive war. This chapter is an attempt to define England's contribution in terms of men, ships, and money to the various parts of the war.

General War Expenditure

National finance is a vast and complex subject,¹ but a general view of war expenditure may outline some aspects of strategy without delving too deeply into the specialist aspects of financial management. Through a study of general war expenditure, it is possible to see the financial relationship between the various theatres of the war and between land and sea forces. As an exercise in statistics as well as a quantitative view of a political and military subject, it is fraught with dangers. Aside from the difficulty in determining expenditure,² financial considerations alone do not determine strategic importance or effectiveness. A comparison of figures does indicate, however, the extent of the burden carried in a particular area relative to other areas.

The general cost of the war to England has been calculated at various sums. Late in the eighteenth century, Sir John Sinclair computed it to be £59,356,801.³ In the 1950's C. T. Atkinson estimated it at £61,000,000,⁴ and more

²See 'Note on Financial Statistics', Appendix C below. ³Sir John Sinclair, <u>History of the Public Revenues of</u> <u>the British Empire</u> (3rd edition, London, 1803) ii, p. 56.

⁴C. T. Atkinson, 'The Cost of Queen Anne's War', Journal Soc. Army Hist. Research, xxxiii (1955), pp. 174-183.

¹For the best general view, see P. G. M. Dickson, <u>The Financial Revolution in England</u> (London, 1967), and 'War Finance, 1689-1714' in <u>New Cambridge Modern History</u>, vi, ch. 9.

recently P. G. M. Dickson calculated it at £93,644,560.¹ A detailed examination of total expenditure is provided in Appendices C and D and Table II summarizes this information.

TABLE II

General War Expenditure, 1703-12

Navy	37%	Transport	1.5%
Army Abroad	47%	Marines	2%
Ordnance	48	Guards and Garrisons	8.5%

Expenditure for the English Army, Foreign Troops and Subsidies, 1703-12

Spain and Portugal	32%
Low Countries	58%
Germany	.98
Italy	9.1%

Source: Shaw 'Declared Departmental Accounts,' <u>Calendar of Treasury Books</u>, vols. 17-26. When the figures are combined into only three categories as in Appendix C, the percentages vary slightly: Army - 53%, Navy - 43%, Ordnance - 4%.

An inspection of the tables will show that the army's expenditure was clearly the highest, and includes not only the support of British forces, but the expense of subsidies of foreign troops as well. Within army expenditure, the

¹This figure is based on B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, <u>Abstract of British Historical Statistics</u> (Cambridge, 1962), section xiv.

largest overall amount was spent in Flanders, and the next largest in Spain. The subsidy was relatively slight in the overall expenditure, but that for Italy was signifi-The navy is clearly second, on the average, but the cant. figures vary from 47% in 1703, 39% in 1706, and 33% in 1709 to 59% in 1711. These figures must be viewed with extreme care, however. The navy was the chief cause of the war debt, and the expenditure on the navy during the course of the war did not reflect its actual cost. At the end of 1701, the navy debt remaining from the last war stood at £1,264,722. At its height in 1711, the debt had risen to £7,231,788¹ or 27% of the navy's expenditure between 1702-12. In 1711 more than half of the sum was discharged by south sea stock, a year in which the declared accounts of expenditure were lowest. With these adjustments, naval expenditure surpassed that for the army abroad. The reason for the vast growth in the navy's debt was that the parliamentary vote for the navy was consistently the same during the Godolphin ministry. The vote provided was for 40,000 men at a rate of 30 shillings per month per man. The ordinary estimate for the navy remained constant during the war years at £180,000 yearly. However, this did not reflect the fact that more than 40,000 men were employed in order to put the necessary numbers of ships to sea. Additional expenses beyond this included the premium paid on naval stores imported from the plantations as directed by act of Parliament, the

¹P.R.O., ADM. 49/173: Navy Debt, 1701-12. Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778 v. 159: Accounts of Exceedings Yearly of Annual Charge for Navy, 20 December 1710.

interest paid on bills in course, a bounty paid for French prisoners as directed by act of Parliament, and the cost of recruiting and replacement following the damage to the fleet in the Great Storm of 1703.¹ The sum for Ordnance jumped in 1706 and again in 1711, but remained steadily at the same proportion of general war expenditure.

In providing subsidies to forces abroad, England contracted to subsidize several different princes entirely on her own account, and others in conjunction with the States-General or the Emperor. English interest in this was keen enough to lead her into assuming more than half of the cost. The chart below illustrates those agreements in which England assumed a large proportion of the cost.

TABLE III

	Years	Queen's Share	Purpose
DENMARK	1702-12	1/2	Troops
HESSE-CASSEL	1702-12	1/2	Troops
HESSE-CASSEL	1706-12	2/3	Cost of Marching Troops to Italy
SAVOY	1706-08	2/3	Bread/forage in Italy
TRÈVES	1703-12	1/2	Troops
SAXONY	1703-12	$2/3_{2}$	Troops
PORTUGAL	1703-12	$2/3^{2}_{2}$	Troops
PRUSSIA	1705-11	2/32	Troops in Italy

Annual Subsidies

¹Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778, v 159: Accounts of Exceedings Yearly, 20 December 1710. Cambridge University Library, C(H) p 20/10, fo. 4: Navy Board to Admiralty, 27 February 1714.

²Treaty agreements specified equal shares, but an additional portion was voluntarily assumed by England.

EMPEROR	1706-11	1/2	Bread/forage in Flanders
ELECTOR PALATINE PRUSSIA SAVOY	1704-11 1710-11 1706,09-11	1/2 2/3 all	Troops Recruiting Costs Extraordinary Cost of War

Source: Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 10,453, fo. 316: State of Annual Subsidies, 1711.

The figures on which the above table is based were prepared by Henry St. John from the treaty agreements as damaging evidence of the Dutch failure to participate effectively in the war. While one may reach that conclusion on the basis of the original agreement with the Dutch to share equally the cost of the war, it is perhaps more dramatically an illustration of England's commitment to support her own concept of war strategy at times when other considerations were forcing the allies to conserve their resources to attain their more immediate goals.

The overall view of war finance reveals a balanced and consistent expenditure for the various services which were required, although, on the basis of these figures alone, it is difficult to make a final judgement about the relative importance of the several parts. The cost of purchasing the services, skills, and equipment to man a navy are surely different than those required for an army. The subsidies and cost of hiring troops from abroad may have varied from one principality to another, as might the very cost of maintenance of an army in Flanders compared to that of Spain as well as the ability of the other allies to join in assisting England. The effectiveness of armies in different climates is another factor which makes these comparisons difficult. Despite these qualifications, it is important to establish that the nature and extent of English commitment to the various parts of the alliance demonstrates an abiding concern for maintaining the war in all its parts in order to attack France in several theatres.

The Army Abroad

Appendix D itemizes the change in expenditures for the army abroad and shows the relationship between the various theatres from year to year. In the context of an ever increasing expenditure, it will be noted that the army in Flanders generally took the largest proportion of money although, in 1711, this fell to nearly half of what was being spent in Spain. The following year, however, the relationship to the other areas was restored despite an inactive campaign. The campaign in the Peninsula claimed a substantial amount of money from the signing of the Portuguese treaty onwards. One noticeable exception in this was found in 1709, when the actual disbursement of funds in support of it dropped to 9% of the total. From the treaty with Savoy in 1704, expenditure in Italy maintained a relatively small, yet substantial, average. In 1709, it rose dramatically to 30% of the total, but this must be seen in the light of low expenditures in 1707 and none in 1708. The cost of the English contribution to the Toulon expedition in 1707 was carried on the navy's allotment and so is not found in army figures. The reluctance of the duke of Savoy to take action after the failure of Toulon, and his subsequent quarrel with the Emperor is

reflected in the low figure for 1708. The sudden jump in 1709 is an indication of England's desire for a rapid return to an offensive campaign after the distracting difficulties had been settled with the Emperor and the Pope.¹

Despite an obvious predominance of expenditure for the campaigns in Flanders, it is clear that English interest in Spain, Portugal and Italy was substantial and reflected her broad concept of strategy. Although the financial figures are a somewhat erratic indicator, since they are affected by a number of purely financial and political factors, on an overall view they do, however, reveal a sensitivity to the actual implementation of strategy and the relationships among the different theatres in the course of the war.

Another means of comparison in the employment of the army may be found through a comparison of troop numbers (p,206) in the various theatres. Table IV, shows the best available estimate of effective troops for each theatre.

The employment of the army between 1701 and 1703 reflects the developing character of the alliance and the slow process by which the forces were moved into the position required by the concept of the strategy. In reviewing the figures, one may see a consistent level of forces maintained in Britain which rises in 1708 after the invasion attempt in Scotland. The numbers of regiments in Ireland, however, remain relatively steady. The number of troops in Flanders remains substantially the same from 1703

¹See Chapter IV.

until 1709, when the number jumps by seven infantry regiments, but remains steady in cavalry squadrons. The number of troops in Portugal declines from the initial deployment in 1704 and then declines until it rises sharply in 1710 and 1711. A similar pattern is found in Spain, although the number of regiments and squadrons was substantially greater in Spain than in Portugal.

The number of regiments to maintain Gibraltar remained the same after the end of the siege there in 1705, while the regular forces maintained in the West Indies declined after a rise in 1703-04. These were complemented on occasion by troops which were sent on expedition, but relatively few expeditions were made in that direction; most were directed toward the Peninsula and the coast of France.

The figures shown in Table IV (p. 206) seem to indicate that interest in the army in the Low Countries remained steady, with a rise in 1709 and 1710, while there was a dip in the forces in the Peninsula which was remedied and increased in the final years of the war. Overall, this pattern would seem to reinforce the views of English diplomats in their efforts to maintain persistently an active force in a number of theatres surrounding France.

When these figures are compared to the figures for the establishment, that is for the number of troops which were voted in Parliament for different services as shown in Table V (p. 207) one may see an apparent disparity. By the votes of Parliament, one might conclude that there was a steady interest in Flanders which rose in 1709 and 1711 and leveled off again, and that concern for the Peninsula and

TABLE IV

Employment of the Army on the Continent, 1701-11

A. Infantry

	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711
FLANDERS	12	16	20	20	20	20/17	17	20	27	27	22
EXPEDITIONS	1	12/8	1/5	!	6/8	10/9	l	11	9/10	5/9	7
PORTUGAL	l I	1	1	8/4	ъ	5/9	4	6/7	8/5	2	6
SPAIN	1	1	1	1	1	12/17	21/9	6/5	5/1	13/5	14
GIBRALTAR	1	1	8	0/4	4/2	N	7	2	7	7	5
MARINES	1	3	9	Q	و	ە	Q	ە	و	ە	و
		•	- -						T er TTTTTT		

Figures indicate the number of infantry regiments. Figures shown thus, "8/6", indicate fluctuations between the beginning and the end of the year or campaign season.

B. Cavalry

	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711
FLANDERS	1	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	19
EXPEDITIONS	1	P P	P 1	1	0/5	m	1	}	0/2	1	8
PORTUGAL	1	-	1	5/7	7/2	2/0	1	0/2	3/8	12	12
SPAIN	;	!	:	1	8	8/13	13	ω	ω	10/2	3
This and the state of the second		0									

Figures indicate the number of squadrons of horse. Source: I. F. Burton, "The Secretary at War and the Administration of the Army during the War of the Spanish Succession," (University of London, Ph.D. thesis, 1960), pp. 353-76.

TABLE V

The Army Establishment Abroad, 1701-12

	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1/08	60/ T	0T/T	77/7	77/7
FLANDERS	10,010	13,295	18, 367	21,863	21,714	21,721	21,721	21,721	28,687	26,168 25,709	25,709	21,975
PENINSULA and MEDITERRANEAN			1	8,015	10,210	15,214	28,634	26,373	17,752	19,252	19,031	18, 377
SEA SERVICE		10,000 10,000	10,000	2,502	2,502	3,204	2,370	2,370	1,559	1,601	2,561	2,326

These figures have been extracted from Scouller, <u>Armies of Queen Anne</u>, Appendix C, pp. 343-68. Source: These figures reflect the number of English nationals only and include neither the foreign troops obtained by treaty, the Scottish nor the Irish establishments. These are the figures authorized by Parliament, and not the actual effective forces in the field. Note:

the Mediterranean rose to a peak in 1707 and 1708 and then leveled off. The disparity is reduced when the forces for Portugal, Spain, and Gibraltar are seen together. At the same time a proportion of men serving with the Marines and on expedition were assigned to the Peninsula. In comparing the proportions for each service, it is clear that the intention of the Government was to keep the forces in Flanders only slightly greater than the proportion allotted to the Peninsula while at the same time providing for an effective defence at home and abroad.

Naval Operations

By its very nature, a navy is a weapon of strategic versatility. Its geographical location may be readily changed and it may be employed in a variety of tasks for a variety of purposes. Because of this, the financial basis for the navy does not reflect its strategic uses in the same manner that the finance for the army does. In studying army accounts, one may determine the geographical area in which money was spent, and in doing that, one may draw a relationship to the strategic employment of the army. The money spent on the navy, however, was spent on equipment which could be used in many ways. The fleet was composed of a range of ships that could appropriately be used for services in coastal waters and on the high seas. They could join together into a fleet which could battle against an enemy's battle fleet. They could carry troops to land on enemy shores, or they could operate a small group or singly to protect trade, suppress smuggling or piracy. Financial statistics tell us nothing of this, but it is important to note that the overall expenditure was roughly divided equally for military and naval affairs. At the Treasury, there was no

sense that the war was dominated by the navy or the army. On the surface, achievements of the army far overshadowed those of the navy. There was no naval Marlborough who personified affairs at sea as the duke represented so effectively the events on land. Of course, the situation in each area was quite different. The prominent naval events of the war, the Cadiz-Vigo operation, Benbow's action in the Caribbean, the taking of Gibraltar, the Battle of Malaga, the Toulon expedition, Wager's capture of the galleons, Port Mahon and the Quebec expedition, are no match in the imagination for Blenheim, Ramillies, Malplaquet and Oudenarde. For behind these battles and incidents, however, there was a definite pattern in the broad employment of warships which was designed to complement the army. Taken together, the activities of both services were essential parts of English grand strategy.

The overall size of the navy remained substantially the same throughout the course of the War of the Spanish Succession. Its great growth had occurred between the Restoration of 1660 and the death of William III.¹ At Anne's accession in 1702, there were 224 ships on the navy books. At her death in 1714, there were 225. The proportions among the larger rates remained the same in that dozen years. The sharp drop in the number of fireships

¹John Ehrman, <u>The Navy in the War of William III</u>, pp. 625-31. Comparing the summary of ships in A. W. Tedder, <u>The Navy of the Restoration</u> (Cambridge, 1916), pp. 12-14 for 1659, and the abstracts in R. D. Merriman, <u>The Sergison</u> <u>Papers</u> (Navy Records Soc., 1xxxix, 1950), p. 365 for 1659-1702, and R. D. Merriman, <u>Queen Anne's Navy</u> (Navy Records Soc., ciii, 1961), p. 363 for 1702-14, the largest growth occurred in King William's time. See also Martin-Leake, The Life of Sir John Leake, i, p. 83.

from 10 to 1 and bombs from 13 to 4 indicates a change in tactical thinking for smaller vessels as does the rise in the number of 5th rates from 32 to 42 and 6th rates from 15 to 24. These figures, of course, are a comparison between one peace establishment with another. During the intervening war, 113 ships were built, 52 captured from the enemy and 8 converted to warships making a total of 173 additions to the navy. On the debit side, 59 were captured by the enemy and 52 were wrecked or lost. In addition to these 111, 62 other vessels were sold. The majority of those sold were disposed of following the cease fire in 1712. The decline in naval activity at this time is reflected by a sharp drop in the number of workmen in the Royal Dockyards in the latter half of 1712. It was at this point that the dockyard force returned to a peactime establishment nearly identical to that of 1701. The figures from each end of the reign conceal the great activity necessary to sustain an active navy at war, but at the same time point out that Anne's reign was not one of great naval growth. The navy was maintained as King William built it.

The number of ships on active employment remained substantially the same throughout the period. The lowest number was at the end of August 1704, when 184 ships carrying 42,886 men and 7,894 guns was reported. The highest was in December 1709, when 228 ships carrying 52,393 men and 9,800 guns was reported.²

¹P.R.O., ADM. 49/173: Navy Debt.

²See Table VI.

Weather was always a consideration in naval affairs and so the change in seasons is reflected in the numbers and sizes of ships employed. While winter brought storms with wind and ice which made it dangerous to keep the sea safely in the largest ships of the line, naval operations did not cease. They were altered to meet the changed conditions. Poor weather added danger and difficulties for those who had a defensive role at sea, but for others it could be an advantage.

TABLE VI

Ships and Men in Sea Pay, 1701-12

	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706
Ships	147	277	220	185	216	213
Total Guns Carried	6,024	8,858	9,100	8,714	9,061	9,109
Men Mustered		30,369	35,659	36,256	36,994	41,429

	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712
Ships	204	210	217	211	224	199
Total Guns Carried	8,552	8,872	6,942	8,652	8,848	7,786
Men Mustered	40,556	40,274	42,851	42,236		

Source: P.R.O., ADM. 8/7-12: List of Ships in Sea Pay. Figures are for 1 August in each year. The number of men mustered was obtained from P.R.O., T. 48/89, fo. 311. These are average figures from Michaelmas of the previous year to Michaelmas of the year listed.

Table VII shows that the fleet was employed on three major stations in support of the war on the continent. The

largest number of ships was regularly employed in the Mediterranean. The second largest number was found in the North Sea and off Dunkirk. The third largest was found in the Soundings at the western approaches to the Channel. Each of these stations made a specific strategic contribution to the overall grand strategy for the war.

As pointed out earlier,¹ naval operations in the Mediterranean were central to the Grand Alliance and provided essential support for the southern flank of the alliance. In the instructions to Admiral Sir George Rooke, commanding the Mediterranean Squadron in 1704, the Queen itemized some of the continuing purposes in having ships on that station:

- (a) To gain support for Charles III in Spain.
- (b) To demand reparations from Tuscany and Venice for injustices done to Englishmen.
- (c) To destroy French naval forces which hindered the supplying of arms, stores and men to the Imperial Army in Italy.
- (d) To persuade Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli to declare war on France.
- (e) To prevent the juncture of the French Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets and to gain intelligence about their movements.
- (f) To maintain links with English envoys in Spain, the Italian States and Barbary.²

While these orders centre on the particular problems of 1704, they also reflect some of the continuing concerns of the navy on that station. The relationship of England

²P.R.O., S.P. 44/208, fos. 126-8: Instructions to Rooke, 28 May 1704.

¹See Chapter II.

TABLE VII

Summary of the Employment of the English Fleet Abroad, 1701-12

Number of vessels (number of guns)

	1071	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712
MEDITERRANEAN/ PENINSULA	(0) 0	0(0) 57(2394) 52(2644) 64(3330) 69(3132) 93(4574	52 (2644)	64 (3330)	69 (3132)	93 (4574)	58 (2582)	36 (1786)	58(2582) 36(1786) 40(1882) 33(1358) 34(1366) 30(1486)	33 (1358)	34 (1366)	30 (1486)
SOUNDINGS	(0)0	0(0) 10(744)	8 (302)	6(312)	2 (72)	6 (254)	13 (792)	0 (0)	10(664)	19(714)	4 (344)	4 (274)
DUNKIRK/ NORTH SEA	17(668) 6(48)	6 (48)	18(328)	(0) 0	0 (0)	13 (678)	11 (596)	28(1628) 16(864)	16(864)	8 (436)	5(186) 14(768)	14 (768)

Source: P.R.O., ADM. 8/7-12: List of Ships in Sea Pay.

indicates the main armament of rates vessels. The armament for sloops, yachts, galleys, bombs, fireships, hospital ships, advice boats, and brigantines has not been included, although these vessels are included in the total number of vessels on station. Figures show total vessels (total guns) for each station on l August each year. Vessels reported in port, under repair, proceeding to or returning from station are not included. The total number of guns Note:

See Appendix E for a detailed list of ships on each station. See Table XII for a summary of the employment of the English fleet at home, on coastal patrol, convoy of coastal trade, convoy of trade abroad, the Irish station, and in the West Indies and North America.

to the states on the Mediterranean littoral, the concern for Charles III, the attempt to prevent the juncture of the two French fleets, the support for the allied army in Italy and in Spain were basic and consistently maintained interests for the fleet in the Mediterranean.

The task of preventing the two major French fleets from joining and, thus, creating a large overpowering fleet from two smaller squadrons, was the concern of the navy in the Atlantic as well as in the Mediterranean. The Toulon squadron could be dealt with best by the Mediterranean fleet. The Brest squadron was dealt with by the Allied squadron stationed in the Soundings, the western approaches of the Channel. This station was specifically assigned the task of observing French naval activity at Brest.¹

The crucial problem which underlay the concern over the juncture of the two fleets was the relative strength of the two opposing navies. If the two French fleets could join, the French would have a fleet demonstrably stronger in numbers of ships and guns to the allies at sea. It was this matter of numbers on which relative strength was based and on which victory could be calculated. Sir Cloudesly Shovell explained the point to Lord Nottingham:

> . . . the misfortune and vice of our Country is to believe ourselves better than other men, which I take to be the reason that generally we send too small a force to execute our designs; but experience has taught me that where men

¹For the background in the development of this station, see A. N. Ryan, "William III and the Brest Fleet in the Nine Year's War," in Hatton and Bromley, <u>William III</u> and Louis <u>XIV</u>, pp. 49-67.

are equally inurred and disciplined to war, 'tis without a miracle, number that gains the victory, for both in flesh, squadrons and single ships of near equal force, by the time one is beaten and ready to retreat, the other is also beaten and glad the enemy has left him; to fight, beat and chase an enemy of the same strength, I have sometime seen; but rarely have seen at sea any victory worth boasting, where the strength has been near equal.¹

This was the same point that Lord Godolphin underscored when he reminded one envoy, 'so true a maxim it is that the force must always be measured by that of your enemy'.²

In addition to its contribution in preventing a French superiority at sea, the Soundings squadron served several other strategic functions. Because of this, it was not possible to maintain a strict blockade off Brest which would prevent any movement from the port. While it was essential that intelligence of activities at the French base was obtained, it was not always advisable to join the French in battle if they did come out. In 1702, the Prince's Council emphasized this point when it directed Sir Cloudesly Shovell to find out what preparations were being made at Brest. At that time, his major task was to intercept the <u>flota</u> from the West Indies, which was thought to be heading toward Brest under convoy of French warships. If Shovell found that the French were sending so large a detachment of ships

¹P.R.O., S.P. 42/67, fo. 28: Shovell to Nottingham, 18 July 1702.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529, fo. 52v: Godolphin to Hill, 27 June 1704.

from Brest that his council of war believed it was inadvisable to intercept the <u>flota</u>, then the Lord High Admiral's Council ordered Shovell and his captains 'to place yourself with the ships under your command as shall be judged most convenient for your security and the security of the Channel and the Coasts of this Kingdom'.¹ Important as the objective was, it was inadvisable to attack unless there was a reasonable chance of victory. The defeat of the squadron in the Soundings would imperil trade and lay bare the coasts of Britain.

There were some additional strategic considerations for the Soundings squadron as well. In 1711, for example, Admiral Leake was ordered to blockade Brest and prevent the French ships from getting to sea. If they did get out, he was to intercept and destroy them. The reason for this order, however, was to prevent the French squadron from Dunkirk joining the Brest squadron.²

The squadron in the North Sea was primarily concerned with the French privateer and naval base at Dunkirk, and it was that squadron which was devoted to keeping the French in port. Although a relatively small base, its strategic location made it a matter of great interest to England. Located near the centre of the main line of sea communication between England and the United Provinces, the Dunkirk squadron was a serious threat. The port was not strictly blockaded, but it was regular practice to send a ship over

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,591, fo. 51: Extract of orders from the Prince's Council, 20 August 1702.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5,443, fos. 238-9: Orders to Leake, 16 May 1711.

to Dunkirk from England on every high tide to report anything coming out of Dunkirk. In 1704, Rear Admiral Whetstone was told, '. . . it is necessary that a squadron of her Majesty's ships should be in constant readiness in the Downs to attend the motions of the French ships at Dunkirk.'¹ In this way the English fleet could remain close by, but in the relative safety of the Downs, the fleet anchorage behind the Goodwin Sands off the Kentish coast. English policy-makers consistently defended the idea that the threat from Dunkirk was the major concern of naval operations in the North Sea. In 1708, Admiralty Secretary Josiah Burchett told Harley that the addition of seven more ships to the Dunkirk Squadron

> . . . might not only be a very great advantage to the Public in the blockading of the aforesaid port, but in following the enemy's ships, should they get out and preventing any attempts on our trade or otherwise.²

Part of the threat presented by Dunkirk was posed by privateers, 3 but this was not the only consideration. There was a danger also that French warships based there could sail to the Baltic and interfere in the Northern War, 4 or attempt to invade Britain as actually happened in

¹P.R.O., ADM. 2/31, fos. 456-8: Instructions to Whetstone, 8 March 1708.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/215, fo. 326: Burchett to Harley, 28 January 1708.

³J. S. Bromley, 'The Importance of Dunkirk (1683-1713) Reconsidered', in Commission Internationale d'Histoire Maritime, <u>Course et Piraterie</u>, i, (Paris, 1975), pp. 231-70.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,915, fo. 275: Hedges to Vernon, 21 March 1704. 1708.1

England's control of the waters around the Grand Alliance was not achieved immediately. In the early summer of 1704, John Chetwynd commented, 'The French are entirely masters now of the Mediterranean, but the Queen is absolute Mistress of the Ocean.'² After the battle of Malaga in 1704, however, England increasingly gained the ability to use the Mediterranean without being hindered by the French.

One aspect of the importance of England's ability to use the seas during the war is underscored by figures which may be found in the statistics of war expenditure for troop transportation. In the period from 1706 to 1712, this averaged 3% of the total.³ It is significant that transport became a separate and important account after 1705 when the number of troops in the Peninsula was beginning to match the number in Flanders. A peak in expenditure was reached in 1709-10 just at the point when the total number of troops in both Spain and in Flanders was changing and when England was providing the transportation for Imperial and German troops from Italy to Spain.

While the cost for transport was a significant amount, it was still a small amount when contrasted with the expenditure for the troops themselves. Thus, one may conclude that

¹B. Tunstall (ed.), <u>The Byng Papers</u> (Navy Rec. Soc. lxviii, 1931) ii, 3-198.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/8/2, p. 103: Chetwynd to Marlborough, 30 June 1704.

³Earlier separate accounts for transport have not been located. These accounts are concerned with the hiring of ships for army transport and do not include the use of naval vessels for this duty.

a large number of men were being transported at a relatively low cost. The ability to do this was achieved by maintaining the use of the sea, and the stationing of naval squadrons in the Mediterranean, in the Soundings, and in the North Sea were the means by which this was achieved.

We have seen that on the high seas the navy was used in an attempt to cut supplies of money from America and to hinder the transportation of grain and other necessary imports to France. At the same time, the navy maintained the use of the sea for transporting troops, supplies, and for communication to the different areas of the alliance. In addition to these functions beyond the horizon, the navy had other roles to carry out but these were dependent on the navy being seen by those on shore and directly involved in land affairs. One of these roles was the encouragement of revolt in France itself.

A proportion of English arms, money and support was given to the direct encouragement of revolt in France as another means of diverting French military forces from the allies. In the early years of the war, the Dutch strongly urged England to support the protestants in the Cevennes. Presenting the Dutch view to the secretary of state, Alexander Stanhope pointed out that the very presence of the fleet in the Mediterranean was an encouragement to these people. 'If further animated by some little assistance with arms, money and ammunition,' he suggested, 'we may expect greater wonders from them than they have performed hitherto, historys being full of examples that there is no resisting people so spirited as

they seem to be.'¹ In reply to such proposals from the Dutch, Lord Nottingham wrote directly to Heinsius telling him that the Queen and cabinet had good reason to believe that the people of France were well disposed to revolt in other places as well as in the Cevennes. He mentioned particularly the Bordeaux area² as one ripe for revolt.

The Cevennes, however, remained a central interest. In the summer of 1703, instructions were sent to Sir Cloudesly Shovell, commanding the Mediterranean fleet, to encourage the Cevennes and to gain further intelligence of their needs and capacity for resistance.³ It was decided by the fleet commander and his war council to send in two frigates to deliver 25 chests of arms, 1080 swords, 60 barrels of small shot, 50 barrels of gunpowder, 500 pairs of shoes, 24,000 flints and £800. The ships went into Narbonne Bay near Sète and attempted to make contact with representatives of the Cevennes. No response was made to the ships' prearranged signals and bad weather prevented a further attempt in the shallow waters of the bay.⁴ Failure at that time, however, was not the end of the policy. The prospect of a close relationship with the

²P.R.O., S.P. 44/209, fos. 33-4: Nottingham to Heinsius, 30 April 1703.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,587, fo. 139: undated memorandum 'Cevennes'.

¹Brit. Lib., MSS. Stowe 244, fo. 157v: A. Stanhope to Hedges, 27 April 1703. General studies of this revolt are A. DuCasse, <u>La Guerre des Camisards</u> (Paris, 1946) and Joseph Dedieu, <u>Le role politique des Protestants française</u> 1685-1715 (Paris, 1920).

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,591, fo. 240: Captain R. Arais's account of proceedings in Bay of Narbonne, 17 September 1703; fos. 238: Council of War on board HMS Trymph, 29 August 1703.

duke of Savoy was seen as closely connected with the alliance in general, as well as in relation to the specific issue of the Cevennes. When Richard Hill stopped at The Hague to discuss with Heinsius his assignment as Ambassador to Savoy, allied support for Savoy and the Cevennes were dealt with together. It was for both causes that the Queen agreed to bear two-thirds of the expense.¹ Although many people pressed the government to take strong measures in supporting the Cevennes, it became apparent that there was little practical hope that a successful revolt could be sustained.² Financial assistance was still sent to the Cevennes through agents in Geneva.³ During 1704, another attempt was made on Sète, but it too failed.

In 1709, there appeared to be a revived opportunity to assist the Cevennes. It was reported in London and The Hague that 10,000 were in arms and that they had been successful against the French regular army. The Dutch proposed that 30,000 livres be sent to Geneva for the Cevennes of which they would pay a third.⁴ In July 1710, an Anglo-Dutch force landed at Sète and held the French port for five days until the French army forced them back to the

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529, fo. 26: Nottingham to Hill, 2 November 1703.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,529, fo. 42v: Godolphin to Hill, 10 March 1704; Hedges to Hill, 15 August 1704. Francis, The First Peninsular War, p. 105.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/228, fo. 217: Payments made by the States-General on behalf of the Cevennes 1701-05, 31 August 1705. Total paid by the States: 30,405 Guilders.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 84/223, fo. 161: Walpole to Tilson, 3 July 1709; fo. 158v: Townshend to Boyle, 23 July 1709; fos. 184v-5, 9 August 1709.

fleet.¹

In 1710, it also appeared that it would be possible to incite a revolt in Dauphiné. England persuaded the Dutch to contribute their share of 10,000 <u>pistoles</u> to encourage and support the revolt and urged the Dutch to contribute more if there appeared to be a greater chance of success.²

A closely related use of the navy was the idea of a 'descent' on France which continually cropped up in English planning throughout the course of the war.³ This, of course, was what modern military men would call an 'amphibious assault', and it could range in importance from a tactical raid complementing the army within one theatre, to an attempt to assist a group such as that in the Cevennes, an effort to alarm the French coast, or a major landing such as the Quebec, Toulon or Cadiz expeditions.

Secretary of State Lord Nottingham was particularly interested in promoting the joint use of the army and navy in this way. Suggesting a landing at Bordeaux in 1703, he wrote, 'should it succeed so well as to induce the people to a revolt, the consequence may be very fatal to the French King, and in the meantime it is the surest method of

¹P.R.O., S.P. 87/5, fo. 256: Council of War on board HMS <u>Ranleigh</u>, 18 July 1710; fo. 254: Norris to Marlborough 27 July 1710; fo. 226: Marlborough to Boyle, 11 August 1710; fos. 249-53: Seissan to Marlborough, 23 August 1710.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/77, fo. 34: Boyle to Townshend, 25 July 1710; fo. 56, 1 August 1710.

³For example, see the numerous index entries in Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, pp. 1732-33.

diverting him from the pursuit of those advantages which he has in most places against the allies'. Nottingham's own experience as a secretary of state under King William in the Nine Year's War had convinced him that it had been a serious mistake at that time not to pursue a policy of combined operations which complemented the armies on the continent. 'I have long been of opinion,' he wrote, 'that no war can be of great damage to France, but that which is prosecuted . . . by a fleet, and an army accompanying it.'¹

Throughout the war years, a certain proportion of troops were consistently included in the army establishment under the category 'sea service'.² Even after Nottingham's departure from the government, it was a consistent part of the policy. In November 1704, Harley wrote to Stanhope telling him about the recent Parliamentary votes,

> Our supplies now are finished and our ways and means are not remote. Five thousand additional foot are to be raised to enable her Majesty to employ that number to act with the fleet, not as part of the ships' complement, but in order to make impression upon the enemy in proper places.³

He went on to order Stanhope to urge the Dutch to follow the English example and to provide for an appropriate proportion of their own troops for service at sea.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/209, fos. 33-34: Nottingham to Heinsius, 30 April 1703.

²See Table IV. The category 'sea service' is a very difficult one to define when assigning numbers. See C. T. Atkinson, 'Note 1060', Journal Soc. Army Hist. Research, xxx (1952), p. 180 and 'Reply to Query No. 697', xxix (1951), p. 187.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/72, fo. 35: Harley to A. Stanhope, 17 November 1704. Harley's figure of 5,000 troops probably refers to Marines. The use of military and naval force in this manner was not designed as an alternative to other uses, but rather as an extension and complement to them. This may be seen in the army establishment figures, and in the regularity with which this type of operation was planned and carried out during the war. In summarizing briefly these various expeditions which had strategic importance, one can see the pattern:-

In 1702, one of the very first expeditions of the war was that sent to Cadiz. The force sent included 50 ships-of-the-line and 18,801 men.¹ Although it was a tactical failure, its strategic purpose was to secure access to the Mediterranean, provide support for the southern flank of the alliance, and control resources coming from America.

In 1703, serious consideration was given to a landing on the coast of Normandy² and to another at Bordeaux³ connected with the possibility of a rising of protestants in that area. Neither was carried out, but both were designed as diversions to the French armies in the east and in Spain.

In 1704, thought was given to a descent, but the expedition to the Danube precluded the use of Dutch troops.⁴ In the Mediterranean, the absence of troops with

¹Francis, <u>First Peninsular War</u>, p. 43.

²Godolphin-Marlborough Correspondence, p. 201 and note 2.

³P.R.O., S.P. 44/208, fo. 72: Hedges to Rooke, 30 April 1703.

⁴Godolphin-Marlborough Correspondence, p. 294.

the fleet proved a difficulty, but attempts were considered to support the Cevennes and the Catalans.¹

In 1705, a number of descents were considered. Among them were Toulon, Abbeville, Saint-Valery, Barcelona and Cadiz.² An expedition to Spain with King Charles and an army, on board the fleet was undertaken. Its object was largely dependent on the situation in the Mediterranean at the time, the main alternatives being Cadiz, Toulon, or Barcelona. Eventually, it was Barcelona which was assaulted and won.³

In 1706, the main expedition undertaken was Earl Rivers to the Peninsula. Designed originally as another attempt at Cadiz, or alternatively Seville, its object was changed to support King Charles at Barcelona, after it had sailed. The change in objective was not an arbitrary one, but one caused by the changing tactical situation.⁴

In 1707, two expeditions were planned, one to Toulon and another to the west of France. The Toulon expedition became the key strategic enterprise for the year, in an attempt to relieve other theatres by a direct blow at the French naval base in conjunction with the armies of the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene and the Mediterranean fleet. When this effort failed, the expedition to the west of

¹Francis, <u>First Peninsular War</u>, p. 105.

²Godolphin-Marlborough Correspondence, pp. 428, 437, 449, 456, 457, 468, 470, 485, 504, 570.

³Francis, <u>First Peninsular War</u>, pp. 170-94.

⁴Longleat House, Portland Papers: Godolphin to Rivers, 17 October 1706; Hedges to Rivers, 29 October 1706; National Maritime Museum, CL 4/10: Hedges to St. John, 2 July 1706. France was cancelled and the troops sent to Portugal.

In 1708, there were two combined operations. One was the capture of Port Mahon and the other was the expedition under Byng and Erle to the coast of Normandy and Brit ny. The capture of Mahon was designed to provide a safe harbour for the fleet in those waters, while the descent on the north was designed, for a time, to complement Marlborough's army in an intended invasion of France following Oudenarde.² Because of a lack of allied support for the invasion, this move was cancelled and the expedition transferred to other purposes.

In 1709, an expedition was formed under Admiral Baker and General James Stanhope to attempt Cadiz. It was cancelled following the delay which allowed the defenders of Cadiz adequately to prepare for an assault.³

In 1710, a small expedition in support of the Cevennes was undertaken at Sète, and Marlborough planned a descent on Calais.⁴

The descents which were undertaken throughout the war were designed to complement the employment of the allied armies. The descent was not merely a display of potential force which might cause alarm in France, it could be a

¹<u>Godolphin-Marlborough Correspondence</u>, pp. 887-91, 903.

³Basil Williams, <u>Stanhope</u> (Oxford, 1932), pp. 87-88. ⁴Godolphin-Marlborough Correspondence, pp. 1645-47.

²W. S. Churchill, <u>Marlborough</u>, pp. 333, 352; I. F. Burton, <u>The Captain-General</u> (London, 1968), pp. 135-36. <u>Byng Papers</u>, ii, pp. 155-260; Blenheim MSS., Marlborough Letterbooks, xxii, p. 40: Marlborough to Erle, 6 August 1708.

substantial operation through which a significant military force could be supported by the navy to achieve a particular object. This point was made clear in a report of an exchange between the Dutch envoy and the Cabinet Council in 1709.

> Monsieur Vryberg proposed yesterday to the Council that his Masters were of opinion that it would be of great advantage to the allies if the Coast of France might be alarmed by appearance only of her Majesty's Fleets with landsmen on board, as well in the Mediterranean as the Ocean, but he was told that it was inconsistent with more real and substantial services to which her Majesty's forces were designed both by sea and land. . . 1

Thus, when the forces for a descent could be gathered, they were regarded as an important and substantial contribution to England's grand strategy. Some of these operations were great successes, such as the assaults on Barcelona and Gibvaltar. Others, such as Cadiz and Toulon, were notable failures. Nevertheless, it was a method of warfare which continued to be attractive to the English Government.

The use of the navy as a means to incite revolution, to stage amphibious landing, to cut French supplies, to transport troops, to maintain supplies for allied armies and to support the Grand Alliance was dependent on the ability of the navy to use the sea at will. The fleet achieved this freedom of movement by keeping the French fleet in port and by preventing the juncture of the segments of the French fleet into one large battle fleet. As with

¹Bodleian, MSS. Eng. hist. d, 147: Boyle to Townshend, 24 June 1709.

the army, the ability of the navy to maintain a local numerical superiority was regarded as the first criterion which enabled it to perform its functions. England believed that the more numerous allied ships off major French bases and in key areas would deter French naval activity, and, therefore, allow the English to carry out their concept of naval operations which complemented the army on the continent.

Anglo-Dutch Co-operation at Sea

In order to achieve numerical superiority in so many areas, the availability of Dutch warships for joint operations with the English navy was an important factor in determining the effectiveness of the strategy at sea. Table VIII summarizes the maximum Dutch contributions to the various theatres during each year. Like the English fleet, there were seasonal variations. In looking at the overall situation of the Dutch fleet, it should be noted that, in general, the total number remained relatively stable from year to year. There were large contributions to the Cadiz expedition in 1702 and the Mediterranean fleet in 1704 which brought up the totals for those years dramatically. In 1711 and 1712 there was a sharp drop in numbers. From the beginning of the war, the squadron on the Flemish coast declined steadily and after 1705, ships were no longer employed on that duty. At the same time, more ships were employed in the North Sea and on East India convoy duties. Until 1712, the Mediterranean took the largest number of ships, but only in 1703 was a squadron sent to the West Indies.

The relationship of Dutch naval activities to English was seen as something quite important in London. Not long after war was declared, Lord Nottingham wrote Marlborough telling him that the ships had sailed on the Cadiz expedition. 'We are taking what care we can,' he wrote, 'to put our home squadron in a condition to defend our coast and to offend the enemy, to this the concurrence of the Dutch is very necessary. . . . ' However, of the thirty capital ships which had been agreed on, only twenty had joined with the fifty English ships at the time Nottingham wrote. The English Government hoped that the Dutch would provide more than their specified quota and send additional ships to the West Indies in the following year in order to encourage the Spanish colonies to declare for Charles III.² The Government hoped that Dutch ships-of-the-line could be made available to complement English frigates in defending Britain from the French Dunkirk squadron under Admiral de Pointis. 3 Admiral Sir David Mitchell's negotiations at The Haque on these points met with some success during the autumn.⁴ By winter, however, Heinsius expressed some strong objections to Marlborough:

> Most of our ships and troops have left; thus the contribution is made, but very unnecessarily if they are undertaking a voyage which signifies nothing.

¹Blenheim MSS. Al-11: Nottingham to Marlborough, 7 July 1702.

²Marlborough-Heinsius Correspondence, p. 19.

³Blenheim MSS. Al-11: Nottingham to Marlborough, 7 July 1702.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,588, fos. 233-35: Godolphin to Nottingham, 15 September 1702; P.R.O., S.P. 84/225, fos. 183-6: Mitchell to Nottingham, 8 September 1702.

TABLE VIII

Summary of the Employment of the Dutch Fleet

	Mediterranean/	West	Dunkirk/	North	East Indies	Total
	Peninsula	Indies	Flemish Coast	Sea	Convoy	Ships
1702	47(1071)		19(672)			66(1743)
1703	20 (989)	12(686)	15(360)			47(2035)
1704	57(1166)		7(362)	9(444)	11(512)	84(2484)
1705	27(1460)		4 (236)	10(517)	7(332)	48(2545)
1706	29(1276)	+		10(371)	8(426)	47(2073)
1707	25(1071)			13(679)	10(498)	48 (2248)
1708	21(958)			15(736)	10(504)	46 (2198)
1709	20(948)			11(572)	17(585)	48 (2105)
1710	20 (948)			11(572)	17(585)	48 (2105)
1711	23 (896)					23 (896)
1712				23 (896)	<u></u>	23(896)

Note: The figures indicate total number of ships (estimated number of total guns) based on the detailed list in Appendix F. The total number of guns shown is the total for frigates and larger ships; it does not include bomb vessels, hospital ships, etc.

I ask you, my lord, to consider that you have desired a squadron in the Mediterranean Sea and one in Portugal, and beyond that you will be obliged to protect your coasts as well as the North Sea. Don't you think that we will have enough to do if we should have requirements either in Portugal or in Spain or some other troops at sea or will we stretch them until they meet.1

Dutch ships did not join English warships in the West Indies again during the war. The affairs of Europe laid greater claim than those of America for Dutch naval resources, but even for assignments in European waters there was not a complete agreement. England continued to press the States-General for more ships, and concentrated her efforts on increasing the size of the squadron blockading Dunkirk. The Dutch interest in this operation decreased steadily until the States no longer assigned ships to that duty after 1705. English diplomats continued to press their point, but they met with little success. In 1711, a Resolution of the States-General stated Dutch policy clearly:

> The Channel according to its situation, is more proper for Her Majesty's ships and the North Sea for those of the States, in regard to their harbours. The Channel may again this year, as in like manner it was the last be secured by Her Majesty's ships and the North Sea by those of their High Mightinesses. . . . In case of need, the Squadron of the States in the North Sea, or some ships thereof, according to the situation of affairs may at times be sent to Her Majesty's Squadron in the Channel . . . and vice-versa that each be able to aid and assist the others as matters shall require which method was practised and good effect last and former

¹<u>Marlborough-Heinsius Correspondence</u>, p. 49. Translated from French.

years.¹

While this decision was acceptable to England, it did hinder some English plans. 'It is plain,' St. John wrote to the British diplomats at The Hague, 'that for want of a greater proportion of Dutch ships of War, we are exposed to several inconveniences in our sea affairs, and her Majesty's fleet is not able to carry on this service in all parts. . . . '² If England wished to carry out her conception of grand strategy, she had to depend on her own resources, even at the expense of less important naval operations. The lords of the committee and the cabinet council were often forced to make such decisions. In 1705, for example, it was noted by the lords of the committee that in strengthening the Mediterranean Squadron at a time when the Dutch were unable to send the number which England had requested, the Queen 'entirely defurnished other services'.³ The Dunkirk squadron was temporarily dispersed and used to convoy trade. A similar instance occurred in 1706 when the Dutch would not agree to assist in a West Indies campaign. The English government accepted the difficulty that faced the Dutch in obtaining the necessary ships from their provincial admiralties, and England carried on filling in with additional ships as best she could.⁴ While ministers in London seemed to

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/237, fos. 41v-42: Extract from the Registers of Resolutions of the States-General, 27 March 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/79, fos. 26v-27: St. John to Marlborough and Townshend, 2 March 1711.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9/18: Minutes, Cockpit, 4 July 1705.

⁴See for example, Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 38,498, fo. 46: Townshend to Boyle, 9 July 1709; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9/36: Minutes, 13 and 16 August 1706.

understand in their councils the problems which the Dutch Republic faced in regard to naval affairs, it did not dampen English ardour in laying their claims before the Dutch. Strong objections were made both by diplomats and in the public press over the Dutch failure to meet their agreed quotas. By the naval treaties, the Dutch had agreed to provide three ships-of-the-line for every five ships-ofthe-line that England provided to the allied fleet.

TABLE IX

YEAR	Agreed Number of Dutch Ships- of-the-Line to be under English command	Actual Number of Dutch Ships-of-the- Line provided	Number of English Ships-of-the- Line employed
1702	44	33	74
1703	47	22	79
1704	44	18	74
1705	47	20	79
1706	46	15	78
1707	43	27	72
1708	43	25	69
1709	42	11	67
1710	37	13	62
1711	35	12	59

Dutch Ships Provided by Naval Agreements, 1702-11

Source: Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778, v. 172: Admiralty Commissioners Report on Agreements with Holland, 5 February 1712.

There was certainly justification in England's objection to the failure of the Dutch to meet her treaty obligations at several points in the war. Yet the figures in Table IX are somewhat misleading. The actual number of Dutch ships-of-the-line represent a very high percentage of all the major ships which the United Provinces put to sea each year. Those listed in Table IX are only those which actually sailed under the command of an English admiral, those which sailed entirely under Dutch command were not included.¹ Smaller ships which sailed with the ships of the line are not included either. At the same time, the total number of ships employed by the English is the total number of ships-of-the-line employed on all stations, based on a classification which apparently included some smaller ships carrying 50 guns in the category of ships-of-the-line.

The Dutch naval operations were complementary to those of England, yet the Dutch admiralties did have more difficulty in putting their ships to sea. Although England complained about their delays, she protested more strongly against Dutch reluctance to place their ships under English command and to carry out the tasks determined by England. Indeed the dispute over the number of ships reflected a disagreement about naval strategy rather than a reluctance to assist England in the war effort.

The inability of England to persuade the Dutch to contribute their naval forces without qualification had a serious consequence. Without additional support, the Royal Navy could not satisfactorily meet all the demands on it. Some services did suffer. At the first sign of the attempted invasion of Scotland in 1708, 'All H.M. ships in sea pay which are in reach and fit for service' were ordered to the Downs to oppose the attempt from Dunkirk. All other operations and convoys in the area were cancelled.²

¹Compare figures to those in Appendix F for ships with more than 60 guns.

²Byng Papers, ii, pp. 37-39.

Another incident which revealed English naval weakness occurred in 1711 when two French squadrons sailed from Dunkirk, one to the north and one to the west. In a report to the secretary of state, the lords of the Admiralty lamented, 'how much we are straitened for ships at home to answer those many services that absolutely require them'.¹ The additional ships from the Dutch were to be employed in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, thus releasing English ships for convoy duties, coastal patrol, and other duties. This strategy was based on the concept that numerical superiority was the first requirement. This alone would force the French navy to remain in port and prevent the juncture of the two main French fleets. From a position of superiority, the alliance could be encouraged and protected, the communications to its various parts maintained, the army supported, and trade protected. Without sufficient numbers of large ships, this could not be done. Having only a modicum of success in obtaining the additional ships which she wanted, England was forced to apply her maritime power selectively, where and when it was most urgently required.

Privateering

One method of complementing naval operations was the encouragement of privately manned and outfitted warships. 'Necessity has frequently put private men on noble takings,' wrote Captain Woodes Rogers, the Bristol privateer.²

¹P.R.O., ADM. 2/366, fo. 153: Admiralty to St. John, 9 August 1711.

²Woodes Rogers, <u>A Cruising Voyage Round the World</u> (ed. G. E. <u>Manwaring</u>, London, 1928), p. ix.

Privateering was certainly an opportunity for an individual to obtain riches, but it was an opportunity that was made available because of the nation's needs in fighting a war. Among the weapons of warfare, however, it was a blunt edged tool. In practice, the dividing line between privateering, piracy, and buccaneering could be thin. The name of Captain Kidd was still fresh in the memory of Englishmen at Queen Anne's accession. Despite such flagrant violations, the majority of those who took up commissions for private men of war did so within the bounds of a legitimate government policy. Table IX shows the number of letters of marque issued in each year as commissions for privately owned warships.

From the very outset of Queen Anne's reign, the government maintained a definite policy toward privateering. At the end of May 1702, an Order in Council encouraged privateering in England and Ireland by offering a reward of \pounds 10 per gun for each prize captured and, in addition, I^{-} per ton if the ship was subsequently taken into H.M. service.¹ In the early portion of the war, the Crown regulated privateers by issuing commissions, maintaining the right to revoke them, adjudicating all prizes in Admiralty Court, and accompanying the commissions or letters of marque with detailed instructions which were altered from time to time. In 1704, an Order in Council

¹P.R.O., P.C. 2/79 , fos. 189-90: Order in Council, 31 May 1702.

TABLE X

Summary of Letters of Marque Issued By The High Court of Admiralty of England

1

	Number of Ships to which letters were issued	Total of Main Armament Guns
1702	247	3,514
1703	232	2,776
1704	165	2,426
1705	115	1,766
1706	94	1,311
1707	92	1,426
1708	134	1,743
1709	146	2,068
1710	152	2,352
1711	170	2,648
1712	72	1,132

Source: P.R.O., H.C.A. 25/14-25. See Appendix G for the detailed list of which this is a summary.

Note: These figures show the total number of privateer commissions issued each year. All letters of marque were issued 'until further order', but none were recalled until privateering ceased at the end of the war. While this table provides a general indication of interest in privateering, it is not an indication of the number of privateers at sea in any one year and it must necessarily include 'double counting' for ships which changed masters. It does not include letters of Warque issued by vice-Admirating cours in the colonies.

detailed new basic orders which were to be issued to privateers. Issued by the Admiralty in early February 1705, the orders specified (A) that the holders of commissions could lawfully attack men of war, merchant ships carrying the merchandise and goods of France; (B) that Spanish ships from America and goods from Spanish America were generally exempt, but not if French goods or if contraband goods were being carried; (C) that any ship belonging to any prince at war with France and Spain, bound for ports in France or Spain, might be taken as a prize. This provision included ships of Altona, Glückstadt, Hamburg, Lübeck, Stettin, and others from the Empire as well as ships from the Baltic, the Elbe, Weser and Ems belonging to the (سمتملماست) kings of Sweden and Denmark; (D) that any ships coming from France or Spain bound for ports at war with then could be seized; (E) that all ships carrying contraband to France and Spain could be seized; (F) that all war material in Danish or neutral ships bound to the enemy was declared contraband and liable to seizure; (G) that Danish ships with proper passports were allowed free passage.

With some small changes this policy remained the government's view until 1708 when the Prize Acts was passed by Parliament.² The latter act changed government policy dramatically in that it allowed privateers' crews to divide the entire value of their captures among themselves and at the same time affirmed the Crown's discretionary power to

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¹P.R.O., ADM. 1/5,249: Order in Council, 23 December 1704; P.R.O., ADM. 1/4,090, fos. 61-68: Hedges to Prince George, 2 February 1705.

 $^{^{2}}$ 6 Anne 64,65.

grant and to revoke commissions. To some, these incentives restored to privateering all 'the old spirit of adventure which permeated our sea story in the reign of Elizabeth'.1 Certainly, the act was designed as an encouragement to privateers, and Table X shows that after an initial burst of interest, the number of new privateer commissions declined sharply until 1708 when the Prize Act provided the necessary encouragement. The number of privateers' commissions does not accurately reflect the number of active privateers at sea. Prize money was one incentive to obtain a letter of marque, but it was not the only one. In order to carry armament on a merchant vessel, one also needed authorization from the government. The East India and Levant Companies were authorized to do this for their own protection, but other masters and ship owners saw an additional advantage to having main armament. For example, the Royal African Company obtained letters of marque, but at the same time, the company's masters were warned,

> Notwithstanding this Privilege of your Letter of Marque you must take care not to expose our ships and efforts to needless hazards, but prosecute your voyage according to our Instructions and not go out of your way to attack or engage any vessels.²

Letters of marque served the practical needs of merchant vessels in distant waters, but at the same time they were a convenience to ship masters. Ships with commissions as

¹G. E. Manwaring in 'Introduction' to Woodes Rogers, <u>A Cruising Voyage</u>, p. ix.

²P.R.O., T. 70/62, fo. 140: Royal Africa Company to Captain Alexander Gaets, 8 September 1702.

privateers were exempt from impressment. They could sail during the periods of embargo on shipping,¹ and they could more safely and expeditiously sail without waiting for convoy.² From the point of view of war policy, the role of the privateer continued to be important as a complement to the navy in the destruction of French merchant vessels. In the spring of 1709, for example, orders were sent to both privateers and the Queen's ships to stop all ships carrying corn to France. In February 1711, news of Woodes Rogers' successful privateering voyage to the Pacific had reached Europe. Secretary St. John commented on the current news when he wrote to Admiral Sir James Wishart, then at The Hague negotiating the annual naval agreement,

> I am apt to think that the success which the Bristol ships have met with will revive these thoughts of privateering enterprises both here and where you are. It may not be amiss for you to propose to the Pensioner the two ways of doing this service, either on account of the Queen and the States, or in imitation of the French manner by sending ships and making a bargain with private adventurers.³

The use of privateers was clearly a conscious policy of the Government in conducting the war against France. The ever increasing cost of the war prevented further

¹P.R.O., ADM. 2/1,049, fo. 122v: Prince's Council to vice-admiral of Kent, 22 February 1703.

²Marsden, Law and Custom of the Sea, ii, pp. 220-2.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/79, fo. 22: St. John to Wishart, 16 February 1711. For French policy, see Geoffrey Symcox, <u>The Crisis of French Seapower 1688-1697</u> (The Hague, 1974), and J. S. Bromley, 'The French Privateering War 1702-13', in H. E. Bell and R. L. Ollard (eds.), <u>Historical Essays</u> <u>1600-1750 Presented to David Ogg</u> (London, 1963), pp. 203-231. large scale expenditure for ship construction or expanded naval operations. Privateers were weapons which cost the Government little, but complemented strategy.

At one time, privateering was a source of income for the Lord High Admiral. However, after 1707, Prince George and later, Lord Pembroke voluntarily forfeited part of their rights to one-tenth of the value of all prizes captured by English privateers during the war. The profits in excess of £2500 per year were forfeited to the crown.¹ This was a source of income which could be used for national purposes.

. .

The very practical provisions of the Privateering Act were designed to deal with two problems. First of all, the act encouraged the capture of enemy ships and secondly, it served as an impetus to England's strategy of attacking French supply routes and trade. Table XI shows that, in fact, the Privateering Act only maintained the results achieved by privateers at about the same level, but caused the navy to increase the number of its captures. While the Prize Act of 1708 increased the number of new commissions issued to privateers, in terms of results, it was most effective with the navy.

Although no direct evidence has been found to confirm the supposition directly, it is quite possible that the Act was designed to encourage the manning of the navy by the

¹P.R.O., ADM. 2/1,049, fo. 369 and ADM. 2/1,050, fo. 33.

TA	BLE	XI

Summary	of	Prize	Cases	in	the	High	Court	of	Admiralty

	A. Captures by	B. Captures by	C. Total Value of
	Privateers	Warships	Prize Goods
1702	44	194	€ 16,027
1703	161	127	£ 276,220
1704	237	136	£ 115,049
1705	194	128	£ 96,084
1706	151	90	£ 45,508
1707	203	64	£ 55,390
1708	177	127	£ 19,983
1709	176	127	£ 56,386
1710	179	139	£ 64,567
1711	174	66	£ 45,783
1712	105	89	£ 174,583

Source: P.R.O., IND. 9017-21: Calendar of Prize Cases, 1702-12. See Appendix H of which Parts A and B are a summary. Part C is based on P.R.O., C.O. 390/5, fos. 23-25: 'An Account showing the total amount or value of all goods imported to exported into and out of this Kingdom.'

incentive of additional money. A traditional problem for the navy was persuading seamen to join in the face of higher wages in merchant vessels. Impressment was not an entirely satisfactory method of manning the navy.¹ The

¹Christopher Lloyd, <u>The British Seaman</u> (London, 1968), pp. 112-172.

additional incentive offered by prize money was considerable since the scale of seamen's wages in the navy was not altered between 1653 and 1797.¹ In the navy, the ordinary seaman was paid 19 shillings per month and the able seaman was paid 24 shillings per month, if their pay was not in arrears. In the merchant navy, seamen's wages were 24 to 25 shillings per month before the war broke out but, in 1702, they rose to 30 shillings. In 1708, pay shot up to 45 and 50 shillings per month where it remained until 1712 when pay abruptly dropped back to the peacetime level again.² Under these circumstances, the opportunity to obtain prize money in addition to basic naval pay was an incentive.

While the Prize Act of 1708 had an important influence on the navy, it did not overshadow the work which privateers did. Appendix H provides a listing of the location in which prizes were taken both by warships and by privateers. From this information, one may see that most prizes were taken in the Channel west of Beachy Head by both privateers and by warships. The Thames estuary, North Sea, and Dover Strait was the second most active area for both the navy and privateers, followed by the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean, the highest number of captures for each year fluctuated back and forth between the navy and privateers during the course of the war, giving nearly equal numbers in 1707 and 1709, but leaving the navy with

¹<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 248-9.

²Ralph Davis, <u>The Rise of the English Shipping</u> <u>Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries</u> (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 136.

a higher total for the war. On the North American coast, the Newfoundland Banks, the Bay of Biscay, and the Atlantic coast of Spain and Portugal, privateers achieved greater results than the navy. However, in the West Indies, the navy captured more enemy vessels. When these data are compared to the data on the regular areas of employment for the navy,¹ one may conclude, that while privateers were most active in the same areas in which the fleet was stationed, they complemented the navy to a lesser extent in areas where fewer naval vessels could be spared for operations.

Conclusion

When English diplomatic efforts and goals are contrasted with England's actual use and employment of her own resources, it is apparent that the ministry in London was fully aware that its grand strategy could not be carried out by one nation alone.

England's direct contribution to the war on the continent was dependent on her own ability to move troops. This in turn was dependent on the ability of the navy to preserve a safe passage for the troops and munitions of war enroute to the Peninsula and along the shorter passage to Flanders. In carrying out these roles, the navy's role was largely a defensive one, maintaining a firm basis from which the army could conduct its offensive against France. The offensive role for the navy was not neglected. Joining with privateers, the navy attacked French supply lines

¹See Appendix E and Table VII.

and engaged French war fleets when they appeared. In addition, the navy was used on several occasions to present an additional threat to France by attempted landings along the coast and by inciting revolt among dissidents.

The essential problem, as England understood fighting the war on the continent, was to provide mobility for the army, to sustain communications in support of her two main armies, and to apply selectively her military, naval and financial resources where needed to sustain the overall effectiveness of the alliance in attacking France in several theatres.

CHAPTER VI

DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

English grand strategy for the war, as described in earlier chapters, was an offensive strategy designed to strike at France. While this was the major characteristic of the English concept for the war, there was a need to secure the British Isles from counter-attack and to protect the vital economic interests of the nation. At the same time that France was under attack by the allies, England needed to protect herself from invasion at home and to secure the coastal trade which was essential to the economy. Abroad, England had to defend the colonies, trading posts and sea-borne trade that were the essence of her mercantilist system. Although the strategy was an offensive one, a defensive element was clearly necessary as a complement and required a considerable expenditure of resources in order to maintain it. At times, the requirement for a proper defence hindered the application of the offensive strategy, and at other times, the offensive laid bare the defences of the nation.

Both the army and navy played a role in defence, yet Lord Haversham was correct when he told the House of Lords,

> The Navy of England is its Glory and its Guard; 'tis that which

should protect our trade and secure our coasts.¹

The Navy and the Defence of Britain

The role of the navy was a varied one which allowed ships assigned to one duty to serve simultaneously in another. For example, the ships assigned to Ireland were at once defending Ireland, yet at the same time, were busily engaged in the suppression of smuggling. The squadrons appointed for the Soundings and Dunkirk regularly provided ships for convoy duty in the Channel as well as watched the French fleet at Brest and Dunkirk.

Aside from this multiplicity of functions, there was a definite pattern of naval activity which was designed to contribute to home defence. First, there were coastal patrols. One frigate was normally ordered to cruise near the North Foreland, another in the Channel Islands, and an additional one cruised between Eddystone Light, the Lizard and Start point. Others were assigned to areas in South Wales, the mouth of the Bristol channel, the south and east coast. Two or three ships were normally assigned to guard the coast of Scotland. Before the Union this was provided by the Scots Navy,² and thereafter by the Royal Navy. The patrols were guarding against an attack by enemy warships and the incursion of privateers, as well as suppressing illegal trade

¹P.R.O., S.P. 9/248, fo. 87: Print, <u>The Lord</u> <u>Haversham's Speech in the House of Peers, Thursday</u>, <u>23 November 1704</u>.

²James Grant, <u>The Old Scots Navy, 1689-1710</u> (Navy Records Soc., xliv, 1914), pp. 252-57, 353-57.

TABLE XII

SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENGLISH FLEET FOR DEFENCE

	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712
IRELAND	12(112) 0(0)	(0) 0	5 (152)	7 (188)	7 (188)	5(124)	4 (56)	0 (0)	7 (166)	8(194)	7 (164)	6(154)
HOME WATERS: COASTAL PATROL	3(118)	3(118) 11(116)	18(352)	12 (350)	18(142) 11(78)		14 (196)	29(428)	24 (396)	25 (380)	28 (432)	25 (382)
HOME WATERS: CONVOY OF COASTAL TRADE	(0) 0	5 (188)	9 (336)	10(384)	10(374) 10(278)		19(192)	16(818)	6 (190)	12 (306)	7 (228)	13(280)
CONVOY OF TRADE ABROAD	5 (166)	5 (166) 27 (1060) 22 (1046) 15 (732)	22 (1046)	15(732)	17 (762)	9 (398)	28(1714)* 25(1230) 38(1738) 32(1690) 36(1826) 24(1254)	25(1230)	38 (1738)	32 (1690)	36 (1826)	24(1254)
WEST INDIES and NORTH AMERICA	8 (150)	8 (150) 21 (1218) 43 (1686) 15 (424)	43 (1686)	15(424)	13 (508) 17 (830)		20 (866)	28(1330) 11(576)	11 (576)	16 (834)	26 (1340) 22 (878)	22 (878)

Source: P.R.O., ADM. 8/7-12: List of ships in Sea Pay.

Figures show total vessels (total guns) for each station on 1 August each year. Vessels reported in port or under repair are not included. The total number of guns indicates the main armament of rated vessels. The armament for sloops, yachts, bombs, fireships, hospital ships, advice boats, and other vessels with light and varied armament has not been included, although these vessels are included in the total number of vessels on station. Note:

See Appendix E for a detailed list of ships on each station. See Table VII for a summary of the employment of the English fleet abroad, in the Mediterranean/Peninsula, the Soundings, and in the North Sea. This figure includes the Dunkirk and Soundings Squadrons which were temporarily on convoy duty during part of July and August 1707.

and contact with the enemy.


Complementing the patrols were ships assigned to convoy the trade in home waters.¹ The largest number of ships on this duty were on the east coast convoying the coal trade from Newcastle and Hull to the Nore. The number of ships on this duty increased steadily from three or four at the beginning of the war to ten near the end of the war. One or two frigates were frequently sent to convoy trade in the Channel from the Downs to the Soundings, while others were regularly employed in protecting the trade between Milford Haven and Exmouth, across the mouth of the Bristol Channel and around Land's End.

Despite these typical patrols, there was always concern that the removal of the main fleet from home waters would endanger the kingdom. As early as May 1702, the Lord High Admiral drew the Queen's attention to this fact when he pointed out that the decision to divide the fleet into two parts, with the largest part abroad, left the nation vulnerable to attack from the major French naval base at Brest. He urged the Queen to press the States-General to provide ships which could protect trade and guard the coast while the English fleet was abroad.²

During the early years of the war, there was growing discontent in Parliament over the adequacy of the arrangements for protecting the coast and trade. Following a

¹For a general study, see T. S. Willan, <u>The English</u> <u>Coasting Trade 1600-1750</u> (Manchester, 1938), Chapter one, in particular.

²P.R.O., S.P. 42/6: Memorial of Lord Pembroke to H.M. in council, 20 May 1702.



Parliamentary enquiry, the Cruiser and Convoy Act was passed in 1708.¹ By this act, the Admiralty was directed to employ a force of 43 ships solely for the purpose of protecting trade passing through home waters. During the first six years of the war, the merchants claimed that 1146 ships had been lost , but after the implementation of this act the complaints of the merchants dropped to nothing.²

TABLE XIII

SHIPS PROVIDED BY THE CRUISERS AND CONVOY ACT, 1708

THIRD RATE	6
FOURTH RATE	20
FIFTH RATE	13
SIXTH RATE	4
TOTAL	43

Of the forty-three vessels required, nine ships were censive stations on assigned to the north-east coast and three, to the northwest coast of the kingdom. Additional provisions were made to ensure that these ships were kept in good condition and could maintain their speed at sea by being careened at least three times each year. In order to establish and maintain the expertise necessary for operations in shallow coastal waters, the seamen in this service were prevented from serving in ships other than those in the cruising

¹6 <u>Annae</u> c. 65,**64**.Documents from the enquiry may be found in H.M.C., <u>House of Lords MSS</u>., vii, pp. 99-226.

² J. H. Owen, War st SEA under Queen Anne (Cambridge, 1938) p. 70; L.J. XVIII, p.410. However, the exact number of ships lost to the energy was a matter of disagenement during the Parliamentary enquiry. service.1

The Army and Defence

While the navy provided the most important aspect of defence, the army also made a contribution which should not be ignored. In overall war expenditure, the sum spent for guards and garrisons at home and in the colonies averaged 8% of the total expenditure during the war. The percentage remained remarkably steady as the total expenditure increased during the war. In 1708, however, there was a sharp rise from 7% to 11% which increased the sum spent by nearly 59% over the previous year.²

The army establishment as voted by Parliament shows the troop numbers intended to be stationed at home. During the first portion of the war, the numbers remained constant, but jumped by nearly 58% during the year of the attempted invasion of Scotland and remained close to the new level for the remainder of the war. For the land defence of the colonies in the West Indies, Parliament voted only a small number until 1704, when the number of troops intended for that service was increased nearly five fold. From 1706 the total voted decreased by 25% and remained at that level for the remainder of the war.

The actual employment of the army, however, reveals a somewhat different pattern.³ The number of infantry regiments actually employed in Britain showed a slight

¹Merriman, <u>Queen Anne's Navy</u>, pp. 344-46. The Cruiser and Convoy Act, 1708.

²See Appendix C.

³See Table XIV.

decline in the first three years, rose in 1704, declined slightly until 1706 when it returned to the earlier high level, then declined again until the end of the war. The number of squadrons of horse in Britain remained steady once the Army had been sent to Flanders, then declined in 1706 and 1707 when the expeditions were sent to Spain. In 1708 the number rose slightly, and then reached a peak in 1709 and 1710 when it started to decline again.

The number of troops in Ireland fluctuated slightly in an erratic pattern through the course of the war, due largely to the numbers which were sent from there as reinforcements for the continent rather than any consideration of defence. In Britain and Ireland, not all the troops were ready or even intended for purposes of defence. Some were used for recruiting, some in training, while others were garrisoned with the idea of maintaining public order. In the West Indies, the number of troops rose sharply in 1702-03 and then declined to a stable number in 1705 through the end of the war.

In contrasting Parliamentary votes with the actual employment of troops, it is clear that the Government was largely pursuing a course of action different from the ideas reflected in Parliament.¹ The sharp rise in the vote which seem to reflect a sudden concern for protection of the colonies in 1704 and for home defence in 1708 is not seen in the actual employment figures. Minimum numbers were

¹See Chapter VII for a discussion of this problem in general.

	_		_				
1712		((((TA, T23		2,756		
TTLT			T / 1 087		2, 385		
1710		101 01			2,385		
1709		18 GR)	307 1 0+		2, 385		
1708		14.141			2,400	-	-
1707		8,182			2,400		
1706		7,348			2,400		
1705		7,414			3,102	_	
1704		7,414			3,102		
1703		7, 388		((L	550		
1702		7,293			איר ר		
T0/ T		8, 097		197			
	/ סעמעונט	GARRISONS		WEST INDIES			

Scouller, <u>Armies of Queen Anne</u>, Appendix C, pp. 343-68. ч. Source:

These figures reflect the number of English nationals only, and include neither the foreign troops obtained by treaty, the Scottish nor the Irish establishments. These are the figures authorized by Parliament, and not the actual effective forces in the figure. Parliament, and not the actual effective forces in the field. No te:

TABLE XIV

THE ARMY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES, 1701-12

XΥ	
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ABJ	
H	1

EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY IN THE DEFENCE OF BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES, 1701-11

A. INFANTRY

	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	T710	1711
ENGLAND	8	9	2	9/8	6	5/7	6	13	12	12	6
SCOTLAND	2	£	ம	ß	ഹ	ம	ъ				
IRELAND	9	12	12	13/12	14	11/10	11	10	13	14/10	8
WEST INDIES	3	3/7	7/3	З	3/2	2	5	2	5	2	2

Figures indicate number of infantry regiments; figures shown thus, "8/6" indicate fluctuations between the beginning and end of the year of campaign season. Note:

B. CAVALRY

ENGLAND 20 11 11		CU/ T 40/ T	1706	1706 1707	1708	1709	1709 1710	1711
	11 11	TT	6	6	17	20	20	18
SCOTLAND 6 6 6	6 6	9	6	9				
IRELAND 16 12 12	12 10	10	10/12	12	12	14/10	10/12	10

Note: Figures indicate number of squadrons of horse.

I. F. Burton, 'The Secretary at War and the Administration of the Army during the War of 353-76. the Spanish Succession, ' (Ph.D. Thesis University of London, 1960) pp. Source:

maintained at home while making a great effort to pursue the conception of the grand strategy for the war on the continent.

At the same time little attention was being paid to coastal fortifications. At the outset of the war, the earl of Derby laid a memorial before the Queen asking for defences to be improved on the Isle of Man. After considering the problem, the Board of Ordnance reported that the fortification there had not even been manned since the time of the Revolution; and knowing nothing about the condition of things there, could make no recommendation concerning it.¹ Little was done elsewhere until the invasion scare of 1708. At that time surveys were ordered for a number of places, including Harwich, Chatham, Edinburgh Castle, Stirling Castle, and Portsmouth.² Dover Castle was found to be in fairly good condition needing only £98 for repairs, although by the War of 1739-48 the castle was reported to have become dilapidated if not ruinous.³

Portsmouth with its major dockyard and fleet anchorage at Spithead was poorly defended by fortifications. The engineer who surveyed the area reported that,

> The pernicious and mistaken notion of England's safety being wholly in Wooden Walls (contrary to the policy of other maritime kingdoms and states) has made this, as well

¹P.R.O., W.O. 46/5 fo. 106: Board of Ordnance to Romney, 20 June 1702.

²P.R.O., W.O. 55/319 contain the reports on these fortifications.

³Huntington Library, MSS. HM 774 fo. 40-41: Report on survey of Dover Castle, 23 June 1708. R. Allen Brown, Dover Castle (London, 1966), p. 42.

as the rest of her Majesty's seaports a long time neglected and gone to ruin.¹

In an age when Vauban and Coehoorn had fortified harbours on the continent, Portsmouth seemed 'like a gate without locks, bolts and bars, and lies so much open and exposed so enough to tempt an assault.'² Despite this situation, little was done to improve the defences. Several years later, Lord North and Grey reported that 'at any time this war, the enemy might have made themselves masters of Portsmouth and all its dependence with 3000 men.'³ After the war had ended, the cost of necessary repairs alone was estimated at £84,000.⁴

While little attention was paid by England to the kind of extensive fortifications which were being built on the continent, she continued to rely on her navy as the first line of defence and, even then, to concentrate on the defence of trade.

The Navy and the Protection of Trade from Distant Seas

From the outset of the war the protection of trade abroad had been better provided for than that in home waters. In their areas of operation, the Mediterranean,

¹P.R.O., W.O. 55/1548 (10): Talbot Edwards' report to the Board Ordnance, 20 March 1708.

²P.R.O., W.O. 55/1548 (10): Talbot Edwards' report to the Board of Ordnance, 20 March 1708.

³Bodleian Library, MSS. North a. 3, fo. 198. North and Grey to the Queen, no date. See also H.M.C., <u>House</u> of Lords MSS., viii, pp. 62-64: Byng to Burchett, 22 February 1708.

⁴Bodleian Library, MSS. North a. 3, fos. 235-6. Estimate of Repairs for Portsmouth, 27 December 1712.

Soundings and North Sea squadrons provided ships for the protection of trade. In addition, ships were provided for the protection of specific trades, such as that to Virginia, Turkey and Russia, but these were not enforced convoys. It was a service provided by the Queen for those who wished it, and there was no legal basis upon which merchants could be forced to accept convoy.¹ The principle of voluntary convoy was not established in the courts until late in the war, so in actual practice, there were attempts to prevent ships from sailing without convoy and to discipline those which sailed under convoy.

Convoy duty was not one which was liked by naval officers, but it was one which could have some benefits. For example, the Levant Company regularly paid the commanders of warships a gratuity of two hundred dollars for their services,² but not all merchant companies were quite so generous. The Royal African Company instructed its representatives to pay \mathbf{x} 30 to captains of men of war, and to 'be as frugal as possibly they can on like occasions, and not give but to those who well deserve it.'³ In fact, when an instance of excessive profit-taking by a convoy commander was revealed in Parliament, it raised a great outcry and resulted in the dismissal of a senior naval officer.⁴

¹P.R.O., ADM. 1/3668 fos. 126-7: Opinion of Doctor's Common's, 24 November 1711. For a broad general treatment of convoy, see National Maritime Museum, MSS. WTS/31/1: D. W. Waters, "Notes on the Convoy System."

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/115: Levant Co. to Consul Raye at Smyrna, 10 May 1703.

³P.R.O., T. 70/166 fo. 17: Advice Book, 5 September 1709.
⁴Patrick Crowhurst, <u>The Defence of British Trade</u>, <u>1689-1815</u> (London, 1977), pp. 179-80.

The Government took care to protect the most valuable trades, particularly that from the Levant, the East and West Indies, Africa, Russia, the Baltic, and America. In some cases, there were not enough warships to spare for full protection. Only a few warships could be spared to go out on the long voyage to the East Indies, so that regular convoy was not normally provided for the East India fleet except between St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope and Britain.¹

The Royal Africa Company regularly requested convoy for its trade on the coast of Africa, but its requests were not always satisfied. The area of dangers in the Atlantic may be illustrated by the experience of the sixtyfive ships which the Royal African Company sent out between 1704 and 1712 on its triangular trade between Britain, Guinea and the West Indies. Of these ships ranging in size from 80 to 470 tons and carrying between 4 and 30 guns, two were lost in storms, four were taken on the outward bound voyage to Africa, one was taken on the coast of Guinea, but later retaken, none were captured on the trans-Atlantic passage to the West Indies, but three were taken on the return from America.² One index of the danger on the return voyage to Britain may be seen in the sharp rise in freight rates for sugar from a prewar average of £3 to £7 per ton to a range of £8 to £19 per ton during the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 42/6, fo. 465: Burchett to Nottingham, 22 December 1702.

²P.R.O., T. 70/63: Ships in the service of the Royal African Company of England, 1704-1716.

war, dropping off to a low rate at the end of the war.¹ On the coast of Africa itself, the company carried the burden of the national interest in that area by maintaining the trade. Despite the derelict condition of some of the fortifications there, they did serve a purpose in preserving English interests through a somewhat ramshackle balance of power.² The Government in London recognized this and sought to assist the company as best they could. 3 Occasionally, several warships were sent to patrol the coast of Africa after having convoyed the company's ships to that area, but the risk to the trade on that coast was not high. The advantage of warships there was found in the belief that their presence was an inducement to trade for England in competition with other europeans on that coast.⁴ At the same time, there seems to have been an opportunity for warship commanders to engage in a little slave trading business for their own benefit.⁵

At times when the Admiralty could not spare warships to convoy the ships, the Royal African Company devised a set of secret and sealed instructions for each of its masters who sailed in such circumstances. These instructions were to be opened only if the ship fell into the hands

¹K. G. Davies, <u>History of the Royal African Company</u> (London, 1957), p. 202.

²<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 263.

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³P.R.O., S.P. 42/6, fo. 240-1: Lord Pembroke's report on the African Company's petition, 20 May 1702.

⁴P.R.O., T. 70/5, fo. 72: Sir Dalby Thomas to Royal African Company, 16 August 1710.


⁵P.R.O., T. 70/5, fo. 76: Seth Grosvenor and James Phipps to Royal African Company, 8 March 1711.

of the enemy, otherwise they were to be returned unopened to the company. By the instructions the master was authorized to purchase back the vessel and its cargo from the enemy. The amount authorized depended on the size of the ship and where on its voyage it was captured. Sums ranged from £1000 to £2400 if on the outward passage from London to Guinea and £1200 to £3000 on the other two legs of the voyage. The master was to agree with his captors that the sum would be paid on the safe arrival of the vessel in an African port or on return to England.¹

In other trades, the Admiralty needed to provide more protection: Close at hand, regular convoys were maintained across the North Sea to Holland and Hamburg. Others went regularly to and from Lisbon. The Russian trade was an important one for it was there that English merchants sold American tobacco and returned laden with Russian hemp and other naval stores in a rapidly developing market.² The trade to Archangel was normally convoyed for its entire voyage, the Baltic trade was convoyed to the Sound where it proceeded independently in the Baltic. The Norway trade, however, was convoyed only 30 leagues beyond Dogger Bank. To the west, the outward bound trade to America from Bristol was often convoyed only out of the danger area to a point 50 to 100 leagues at sea. For homeward bound ships, convoys patrolled at sea in the Soundings for ships returning from the Indies and America, and off the Mother Bank in the North Sea for the Baltic

¹P.R.O., T. 70/62, fos. 212-13, 220, 229, 266: Instructions to masters, 1703-04.

²For this trade in general, see Jacob M. Price, '<u>The</u> <u>Tobacco Adventure to Russia—1676-1722</u>' (<u>Trans. Amer. Phil</u>. <u>Soc.</u>, new series, 1961), vol. 51, pt. I, <u>1961</u>), <u>pp. 47-61</u>.



trade.

In addition to the convoys which were assigned to bring the trade home, small numbers of ships were assigned to stations abroad to serve under the government in those areas for local protection. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, for example, maintained control of the ships assigned to that station when they were not required for any specific duty by the Admiralty. In America, fourth or fifth rate ships were assigned singly or in pairs to New York, New England, the Leeward Islands, Jamaica Barbadoes, Virginia. A squadron was also sent out to the Newfoundland Banks each summer to protect the trade and to convoy the ships with their catch to market in Europe. While on station, the convoy commander was also the governor of the colony. These ships performed a variety of duties for the colonial governments, but only at the entrance to the Virginia Capes was a regular patrol directed by the Admiralty. A similar patrol was also maintained erratically at the straits of Gibraltar.

In addition to these specific assignments, a West Indies Squadron was appointed.¹ Based usually at Jamaica, it was a force of about seven to ten vessels. On occasion it was reinforced, as it was in 1703 to a force of thirtytwo, but that was a rare occurrence. In general the duties of the West Indies Squadron were to defend the colonies and English trade. 'Her Majesty's Kingdom being Islands the sea is their bounds, is by means of shipping

¹For a detailed narrative of operations by this squadron, see Ruth Bourne, <u>Queen Anne's Navy in the West</u> Indies (New Haven, 1939).

their walls,' wrote one memorialist.¹ Even before the war had been declared, the Board of Trade put the issue more bluntly.

> The safety of your Majesties Dominions in America depending chiefly on the Naval force to be sent at proper seasons, which may secure that trade and encourage the planters who will otherways be apt to desert their settlements. . . .

The presence of the fleet had a direct importance to the very basis of the mercantilist idea of empire. For this reason, steps were taken to prevent impressment of colonists into the Navy and to provide for the basic defences of the islands.

In theory, the colonies, themselves, were providers of their own defence, but in practice the government in London often initiated and pressed the proper measures. The Bahama Islands, for example, were seen to serve an important strategic purpose in the defence of trade since they lay in the Gulf of Florida and along the route of all trade passing to Europe from Havana and the Gulf of Mexico. Jamaica lay near the center of the Spanish West Indies and close to the French settlements.³ These were important outposts to be held in English hands as key defences for English trade. At the same time, the threat to English

¹Huntington Library, MSS. BL. 14: 'A State of the Newfoundland Fishery.' No date.

²P.R.O., C.O. 324/8. fo. 30v: Commissioners of Trade to the King, 24 January 1702.

³Spencer Library, U. of Kansas, MS. 143. Af. 32: Board of Trade Report to House of Commons, 5 February 1702; P.R.O., C.O. 324/8 fo. 59: Memorial to H.M., 17 April 1702.

interests in the area if these same positions were controlled by France was equally important. The preservation of Jamaica, was a particular concern in London, and precautions were taken to ensure its safety by sending a naval force large enough to prevent a French attack.¹ When the Bahamas fell into French hands in 1709, the cabinet ordered the Admiralty, the colonial governors in America, and the squadron commanders in the West Indies to take immediate action to repel the French.² While Jamaica was the centre of English interest in the West Indies, and the Bahamas guarded the route to Europe, Barbadoes was the gateway to the Caribbean. Standing slightly to the eastward of the other Windward Islands, Barbadoes was generally the first landfall for ships crossing the Atlantic with the Equatorial current and the easterly trade winds. For this reason, and for the easy manner in which supplies and assistance could be sent to the other English islands lying to leeward, an entire regiment was ordered to that island as a local defence.³ Among the other islands, Monserrat was defensible, but there was reported to be a danger of revolt from a high proportion of papists in the colony,⁴ and St. Christopher's was divided between both

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/204, fo. 412: Hedges to Lord High Admiral's Council, 17 June 1704.

²Blenheim, MSS. Cl-16: Cabinet Council Minutes, 20 July 1703; P.R.O., ADM. 2/266, fo. 13: Pembroke to Sunderland, 1 July 1709. [original in Blenheim MSS. C2-8 dated, 8 July 1709].

³P.R.O., S.P. 44/106, fo. 185: Sunderland to St. John, 2 February 1708.

⁴P.R.O., C.O. 324/8, fo. 59: Memorial to H.M., 17 April 1702.

French and English plantations. The security of the planters was made precarious by the very presence of French forces in the area. Upon a report that the French had sent eight men of war with a force of 2000 soldiers to the area, the governor of the Leeward Islands feared the worse. The problem was not merely to militarily hold a position, but to make the inhabitants feel secure enough to carry on with their work and trade. In the face of French reinforcements, the governor feared,

> These promising colonies will soon be deserted to the great prejudice of Navigation in particular and the interest of the Nation in general, if not in the end prove so fatal a catastrophe as to cause one of the fairest jewels to drop from the crown.¹

These considerations were the basis on which the government strove to have a force in the West Indies which was 'answerable to the force, it is said, the French have in those parts.'² The strength of this force was calculated both in terms of total numbers of ships and total numbers of guns in order to determine relative strength.³

While the first interest of England was to maintain the security of the plantations themselves so that they could perform their economic function, an equally important interest was to ensure the safety of the trade from the area. Aspects of these problems were dealt with by the

¹P.R.O., C.O. 153/9, fo. 351: Col. Johnson to Board of Trade, 13 March 1706.

²P.R.O., S.P. 42/6, fos. 139-41: Burchett to Lord, 6 June 1701.

³For example, <u>Ibid</u>., and P.R.O., S.P. 42/6, fo. 136: Admiralty Memorial to his Majesty, 5 June 1701.

squadrons assigned to home waters and by the convoys. There was an additional problem created by French privateers who attacked inter-colonial trade. In 1703, the Board of Trade brought this issue to the attention of the Queen, pointing out that this trade brought provisions from the northern colonies; without these, the islands were 'in a great measure rendered destitute,' while the French colonies which were not maintained from Europe were supplied by the pillage of English trade.¹ The value of this trade was a key matter, for as Captain Samuel Vetch pointed out, 'There is no island the British possess in the West Indies, that is capable of subsisting without the assistance of the continent. . . .'²

The English stance in the West Indies was not entirely defensive. While defence was the first concern, there was a serious interest in preventing the growth of French settlement in the area, particularly at Tobago and in the Leeward Islands.³ In addition, there was an interest in attempting to destroy French settlements. In early 1703, orders were issued for the squadron to attack Martinique and Guadeloupe, bringing the inhabitants back to England.⁴

¹P.R.O., C.O. 324/8, fo. 133v: Memorial to the Queen, 29 October 1703.

²P.R.O., C.O. 324/9, fos. 111-24: 'Canada Survey'd,' 27 July 1708.

³P.R.O., ADM. 2/34, fo. 466: Instructions to William Kerr, 16 April 1706.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 42/7: Memorials from the Prince's Council, 13 and 16 January 1703.

But the French threat was not the only problem to be faced. Early on in the war, steps had been taken to allow English trade with Spanish colonies, even during the period of prohibition of commerce with France and Spain. This was a lucrative trade for merchants as well as for the privateers who attacked it. The temptation was too great for some English privateers who were authorized to attack Spanish trade, in general. The commanderin-chief of the West Indies Squadron noted with alarm that the trading sloops were protected 'from all enemys but our own privateers, who have sometimes taken from the Spaniards the goods newly bought from our traders.'¹

England seriously attempted to halt French and Spanish trade from the West Indies and also to secure the Spanish possessions in the area for Charles III. Early on in the war it was thought that a demonstration of naval force before a major Spanish colonial centre such as Havana or Cartagena would induce the colonists there to declare their support for Charles III.² The Spanish <u>flota</u> from America was a continuing concern throughout the war. In 1701, Benbow had been detached from Rooke's squadron to cross the Atlantic in an attempt to intercept it <u>en route</u> to Spain.³ England's interest

¹Blenheim MSS. Cl-6: Extract from Rear Admiral Wager, 23 July 1708. See also Cl-9: Extract Dummer to Burchett, 31 January 1710.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,587: 'Notes for Sir David Mitchell's Instructions 29 September 1702; Addit. MSS. 29,591, fos. 267: Draft Instructions to Peterborough, June 1702.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 33,028, fo. 1: Instructions to Rooke, 12 August 1701; fo. 6: 10 September 1701.

in the flota was based on the perception that its treasure would be used by the King of France 'to better enable him to carry on a war.' The seizure of the flota by England was clearly undertaken 'for preventing so great a mischief to His Majesty's [King William's] subjects, and to all Christendom.'¹ Along similar lines in 1706, Admiral Leake was instructed to defend the Spanish galleons from any design the French may have of bringing them to France. . . . '² Leake's instructions went on to elaborate in detail the policy regarding this He was told to do his utmost to 'take, sink, burn matter. or otherwise destroy' the French fleet. If the galleons were found under French protection, he was to treat them as the enemy, capture them and bring them to England. If they were found at Portobello or elsewhere not under French protection, Leake was to persuade the captains to return to England under his protection, or if necessary, to compel them 'with as little damage to them as the nature of things will possible admit of.' If there appeared no way to make them go either to England or to Spain under English protection, then they were to be destroyed.³ The strategy behind the attacks on the silver fleet rested on a consistent and rational policy by which the English Government attempted

¹Ibid.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5,441, fos. 56-61: Instructions to Leake, 16 July 1706.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5,441, fos. 56-61: Instructions to Leake, 16 July 1706. There is a fragment of what appears to be a draft of this order in Blenheim MSS. G1-6 which shows some differences.

to sever an important source of French war finance.¹

The successful return of the <u>flota</u> in the spring of 1710 brought a rebuke to Governor Handasyd. The Board of Trade sternly remarked:

> We are somewhat surprised to hear of the arrival of the Flotilla at Cadiz, under the convoy of only two French men of war, and wonder that they should escape the observation of the Queen's ships and your privateers, so as to have no manner of intelligence of them from you.²

In their next letter to the governor, two-and-a half months later, the Board had the matter still in mind and wrote, 'that if it could have been possible that timely notice of the said Flotilla's departure from Vera Cruz had been transmitted hither, such measures might have been taken as to have intercepted that Fleet before they had got into Port.'³ The rebuke illustrates the point that London was the centre of strategic direction. Like the relationship between the Mediterranean and the Soundings stations in preventing the juncture of the French fleets, the problem of the <u>flota</u> was dealt with at both ends. In handling American strategic problems, very little effort was made to deal with them in mid-ocean; attacks were made

¹H. Kamen 'The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702,' <u>Bull. Inst. Hist. Res.</u>, 39 (1966), pp. 165-173, demonstrates that the attempt was a failure. D. A. Baugh, 'The Navy to 1714' in R. Higham (ed.) <u>Guide to the Sources of British Military History</u> (London, 1972), p. 103, comments that the Vigo affair 'was surely a prime instance of the influence of the plundering spirit on naval policy.'

²P.R.O., C.O. 138/13 fos. 103-4: Board of Trade to Handasyd, 4 April 1710.

³P.R.O., C.O. 138/13 fo. 138: Board of Trade to Handasyd, 27 June 1710.

on either side. In 1702, Rear-Admiral Sir John Munden was sent from the Soundings to attack La Coruña in Spain on the basis of a report that the duke of Albuquerque, viceroy of Mexico, was there with a force of 2,000 men for service in the West Indies.¹ Later in the same year, the attempt to intercept the silver <u>flota</u> coming from America was based on intelligence sent from Admiral Benbow in the West Indies to London. The Admiralty, then, stationed Shovell's squadron in the Soundings and the Bay of Biscay to intercept it. In case the <u>flota</u> eluded Shovell advice about these arrangements was passed on to Admiral Rooke, who was then preparing for the attack on Cadiz, and it was Rooke who eventually found the flota in port at Vigo.²

On several occasions, the Mediterranean squadron was also used to reinforce the squadron in the West Indies. Upon completion of the Cadiz operation in 1702, a squadron was detached directly for America. A similar situation occurred in the winter of 1703 when Secretary of State Lord Nottingham wrote to the Prince's Council telling them that he had consulted the Queen upon hearing reports that five French warships were at Cadiz and five more were coming from Brest bound for the West Indies. The Queen directed the Prince's Council to order Admiral Rooke 'to interrupt any such ships coming from West France to Cadiz.'

¹P.R.O., S.P. 42/6, fos. 178-9: Orders to Munden, 5 May 1702.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 29,591, fos. 53-54: 'A relation of measures that were taken to intercept the Squadron commanded by M. Chateaurenault and the Spanish galleons.'

If he found this intelligence confirmed at Lisbon, Rooke was to give orders for preventing any French plan to send a squadron to the West Indies. At the same time, the Admiralty was ordered to hasten its own plans to send an English squadron to the West Indies.¹

Among the four main stations for the navy the West Indian station was certainly the most difficult to reinforce; duties in Europe on many occasions made it difficult to spare ships for service in America. In 1708 for example, the Lord High Admiral reported to the Queen that,

> • • • • • whether a squadron of ships can be spar'd to go to the West Indies, with regard to other services, I have consider'd thereof, and do humbly report to her Majesty, that of the twentyseven sail of the line of battleships, . . . twelve are designed to go with Sir George Byng to Portugal, and the remaining fifteen to be employed under the Lord Dursley as cruisers and convoys for the protection of trade in the Channel and Soundings. But if her Majesty's service shall not require the further use of all the ships with Sir George Byng, after he has landed the Queen of Portugal, six of them may be sent on the aforesaid service to the West Indies.²

The ships which went to the West Indies were often employed on other services <u>en route</u>, for example, ships which participated in the Cadiz expedition in 1702 before sailing westward and those described above. This was

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/209, fo. 112: Nottingham to Prince's Council, 11 November 1703.

²Blenheim MSS. Cl-6: Prince George to the Queen. 6 September 1708.

quite practical since Portugal was not far off the sailing route to the West Indies.¹

In 1709, the Board of Trade was clearly aware that only a limited number of ships could be spared for the Caribbean. In reply to a letter from the governor of Jamaica, the Board commented,

> what you say of six nimble ships of war for protection of the trade would undoubtedly be of service, but we very much question that besides the squadron that attends your government, whether such a number can be spared now.²

The burden of the major operations in Europe was not the only reason which prevented further assignment of naval vessels to the American theatre. In 1709, for example, the Government's optimism toward the negotiations for the preliminary peace treaty delayed the sailing of the planned West Indies expedition for so long that it had to be abandoned. If the treaty had been accepted by France, the force was to have been used for 'the evacuating and taking possession of Spain.'³ When the treaty was rejected, it was too late in the year to send out an expedition across the Atlantic.

The protection of the North American colonies was a somewhat different problem from that of the protection of the West Indies. Naval operations on the American coast

¹H. L. Jenkins, <u>Ocean Passages for the World</u> (Admiralty Publication NP 136, 3rd edition, 1973) pp. 139-140. Chart 5308. See map between pp. **260-61**

²P.R.O., C.O. 138/13, fos. 68-69: Board of Trade to Handasyd, 25 November 1709.

³Bodleian Library, MSS. Eng. hist. d. 147: Boyle to Townshend, 27 May 1709.

was left generally to a few station vessels; the West Indies squadron rarely came north for any purpose other than the protection of the Newfoundland fishery. The colonies on the North American continent were not threatened to any great degree by French naval forces, but like the other colonies, they were open to privateering attacks on their trade. The entire assignment of stationships and the lack of stores, supplies, and repair facilities made it very difficult to provide even the necessary naval guard against privateers.¹ Despite this situation, the president of the Virginia Council could report in 1708 'that this Her Majesty's Colony is in Peace and hath no other misfortune than an extraordinary scarcity of goods and ammunition. . . .' However, the colony looked forward to the arrival of the convoy which they hoped would bring their supplies, 'being under no apprehension at present of any enemy, except some of the neighbor Indians . . . and the French annoying this coast with privateers.'2

In the southern colonies, Carolina had been more anxious to enter the war. There in the autumn of 1702, the governor sailed southward and attacked the Spanish

¹Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letter Book, iii, pt. ii, p. 123: Jennings to Sunderland, 24 June 1708; P.R.O., ADM. 1/3815: Spotswood to Board of Trade, 18 August 1710; Extract for Col. Seymour, 29 August 1707.

²Blenheim MSS. C2-33: Jennings to Sunderland, 26 March 1708.

fort at St. Augustine in Florida. After a seven week siege, the English colonists withdrew. In the following year, they again raided Spanish settlements near Tallahassee. In the north, the French attacked English settlements with Indians in Maine and Massachusetts. The land defences against attack by the French from Canada were scanty, and it was apparent that nothing effective could be done against the French on the continent without assistance from England.¹ There was a growing feeling in New York and Massachusetts that the Government in London must be persuaded to provide substantial military assistance. The theory that the colonists were to provide for their own defence had not produced practical results. With only a small military force in the colonies, it was extremely difficult to make any offensive move which would prevent the enemy from attacking along the frontier. Governor Dudley of Massachusetts told Secretary of State Lord Sunderland,

> Your Lordship will please to remember that all our people here are planters, nor have we any regular forces nor officers that have seen sieges or approaches to any European enemy—nor can they easily be governed—but we have done what was in our power.²

¹For general histories of the war in America, see Howard Peckham, <u>The Colonial Wars</u>, 1689-1762 (Chicago, 1964), pp. 60-76 and D. E. Leach, <u>Arms for Empire</u> (New York, 1973), pp. 116-64.

²Huntington Library, MSS. HM 22,287: Dudley to Sunderland, 5 March 1708.

With additional trained and professional forces, Quebec and Port Royal in Canada could be put into English hands, he argued, and place 'these colonies for ever at peace.'¹

Samuel Vetch went to England in the winter of 1706, and with the support of the governors of Massachusetts and New York, he spent more than a year in London attempting to persuade the Government to send assistance to North America. By the end of 1708, the Board of Trade was convinced by Vetch's argument² and recommended that it be approved by the cabinet. In February 1709, the Queen and the ministry approved of the plan and preparations were ordered to be made on both sides of the Atlantic. All the northern colonies, except Quaker Pennsylvania, enthusiastically co-operated and sent troops to Albany where they would rendezvous for a land attack on Montreal. Others went to join the force which would go by sea to attack Quebec and Port Royal. At home, a squadron was in readiness as early as March 1709.³ At the same time, however, there appeared a possibility that Canada could be obtained by negotiation. In the discussions with the French at The Hague, England demanded that Newfoundland

¹Ibid.

²P.R.O., C.O. 324/9, fos. 111-24: 'Canada Survey'd,' 27 July 1708.

³Blenheim MSS. Cl-7: 'The first proposal for America and which was ordered,' 18 March 1709.

and Hudson's Bay 'be delivered up' by France at the end of the war.¹ By May, the land forces were embarked, and Vice-Admiral Baker had received his orders to sail from England for the Saint Lawrence River.² Before the expedition could actually sail, it was halted by the expectation that France would sign the preliminary peace treaty. It was thought that the forces already embarked could be used to take possession of Spain, if necessary.³ The failure of Louis XIV to approve the treaty forced cancellation of the plans to attack The Government saw that it must increase its Canada. military pressure on France if she was to be forced The troops which had been intended for to a peace. America were in fact on the establishment for Spain, and it was thought that they should either be sent there directly or used 'for reducing of Spain by pressing France.'⁴ Upon this decision, the lords of the committee ordered an advice boat sent immediately

^LBodleian Library, MSS. Eng. hist. d. 147: Boyle to Townshend 24 May 1709; see also P.R.O., S.P. 104/75, fo. 19: Boyle to Townshend and Marlborough, 18 May 1709.

²National Maritime Museum, MSS. JOD/22: Journal of Vice-Admiral Baker, 29 April 1709; P.R.O., ADM. 1/4093, fo. 44: Sunderland to Lord High Admiral, 9 May 1709.

³Bodleian Library, MSS. Eng. hist. d. 147: Boyle to Townshend, 27 May 1709.

⁴Blenheim MSS. Bl-22b: Godolphin to Marlborough, 3 June 1709; Boyle to Marlborough, 31 May 1709.

to New England ordering the colonists to use the forces which they had gathered there and to make an attempt of their own on Port Royal, Acadia or Nova Scotia.¹ The governors of the northern colonies consulted one another, and it was decided that the expedition could not be undertaken that year, but that the forces should be held over until the following spring when further assistance might come from England.² While the governors held some hope for future operations, several colonial assemblies ordered their troops to be disbanded.

¹Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Committee of Council Minutes, Cockpit, 11 June 1709.

²Newberry Library, Ayer MSS. 574: Dudley, Nicholson and Vetch to Board of Ordnance, 24 October 1709.

³Huntington Library, HM 22,284: Dudley to Nicholson, 28 November 1709.

⁴Huntington Library, HM 22,290: Saltonstall to Nicholson, 3 February 1710.

In London, Nicholson was authorized to command forces in a new expedition. While preparations were quickly and enthusiastically made, ¹ a close examination of the project in a cabinet meeting revealed that September and October was the best time of year that one could attempt to go up the St. Lawrence River. It appeared that the uncertainty of the winds in the mid-summer made it doubtful whether an expedition could go earlier in the year and reasonably expect success. It was already too late to sail in 1710, and the expedition was cancelled, although there was no immediate service for the troops to perform in Europe.² Upon receiving the news of this second cancellation, the colonists proceeded on their own in an expedition to Port Royal during September. The poorly garrisoned fort surrendered to the colonists on 2 October, thus putting Acadia into English control. Port Royal was immediately renamed Annapolis Royal in honour of the Queen. Having tasted military success, Governor Nicholson returned again to London to plead for support in the following year. Once again he was successful in obtaining approval, but

¹Staffordshire R.O. MSS. D(W) 1778/188: Cabinet Minutes, 30 July 1710; P.R.O., ADM. 1/4094, fo. 97: Dartmouth to Admiralty, 7 August 1710.

²Blenheim MSS. B2-1: Boyle to Marlborough, 23 June 1710; Staffordshire R.O. MSS. D(W) 1778/118: Cabinet Minutes, 11 July 1710; Blenheim MSS. 132-1: Boyle to Marlborough, 11 July 1710; Boyle to Marlborough, 14 July 1710.

this time the Government agreed to a larger force.¹

In general, the strategic stance in North America was similar to that in the West Indies. In both areas, the initial and primary concern was the basic security of the English colonies and the maintenance of trade from them. The inability of the northern colonies to defend themselves by land gave rise to an increasing uneasiness among the colonists and to a growing belief that the best defence was an offense against the French colonies to the north. This argument was repeatedly made to the Government in London, and it was eventually accepted on the condition that it could be done effectively and that would not interfere with the war in Europe. The idea of an attack on Canada evolved from the strategic situation in North America and the increasing need, as the war in Europe progressed, to maintain the security of the colonies.

Conclusion

There was an important defensive element in English grand strategy which served to complement England's offensive against France. Although there was some concern for coastal fortifications, guards and garrisons

¹For examination of the 1711 expedition see Chapter IX. The subject is dealt with in detail in Gerald Graham, <u>The Walker Expedition to Quebec</u>, 1711 (Navy Records Soc., vol. 94, 1953).

at home, England's defence was primarily at sea where her navy attempted to halt invasions and to thwart French attacks on trade and on the overseas colonies. The preservation of trade, both overseas and in home waters, was a central concern to the nation.

In broad strategical terms, England's defensive strategy was complementary to her offensive war against France, yet in the practical terms of the allocation of limited naval and military resources, there was a tension created by the two requirements. In order to carry out ambitious attacks against France, it was often necessary to reduce defences at home or abroad.

In the American colonies, there was a growing desire, during the course of the war, to attack neighbouring colonies owned by the enemy. It began in the south with expeditions against the Spanish in Florida, and it also occupied the minds of colonial leaders in the West Indies. The northern colonists were content to remain at peace as long as they could, but when the war fell upon them, they joined in with schemes and expeditions against France. On the North American continent, defences were scanty. Frontier settlements could not withstand a determined Without adequate defences of their own, the assault. colonists believed that the best way to remove the enemy threat was to destroy or to capture the enemy settlements from which attacks were launched. More often than not, the colonists required substantial assistance from home

if these projects were to be carried out. The ability of the ministry in London to support these plans depended not only on advance planning, but more importantly, on the state of the war in Europe and the demand for forces in the main theatres of activity. There was little interest in extending English dominion, but there was deep concern for the safety of the existing English plantations and the trade from them.

It was trade, not dominion, which England sought. However, the defence of Britain and the protection of English interests abroad were not entirely passive undertakings. The basic interest of England was founded on the economic growth of the nation through a mercantilist system of colonies and overseas trade. In this context, the preservation of trade was also the preservation of economic expansion, but it was not 'imperialism' in its nineteenth century sense.

CHAPTER VII

THE PUBLIC DEBATE AND WAR STRATEGY

In wartime, public discussion does not necessarily For a reveal the policy and strategy of a Government. variety of reasons, much occurs which is kept secret or distorted in its presentation to the public. One must not assume that public statements by pamphleteers, or even by statesmen, were a reflection of the way things actually worked or were the foundations of policy. The most accurate definition of any policy and strategy must come from the secret councils of those who conducted the Even then, one must admit that the results of a war. strategy could be different from their intentions, whether or not those intentions were good or bad, popular or unpopular.

While public opinion does not necessarily represent the Government's view or explain its conduct, it does serve as a commentary on various aspects of the war, and as a possible influence on the Government in its conduct. In England at the turn of the seventeenth century, the Government was not yet entirely answerable to Parliament for its conduct of foreign affairs. However, the trend toward that degree of Parliamentary control was clearly discernible. It was clear already that if the Government was to obtain the financial and moral backing necessary for its policies, certain interests and groups had to be placated.

In this period, political debate may be seen from two points of view. First, there was a debate over specific issues in which sides were taken in terms of the two political parties, Whig and Tory. The difference between the two over issues of foreign and military policy had its origin in the Revolution of 1688. At that time, the accession of William III brought England into an entirely new relationship with the Continent. As the nation gradually became educated in foreign affairs, the two opposing parties developed contrasting views of England's place in European politics. The Whigs were basically outward looking while the Tories were insular in their view. $^{\perp}$ Secondly, there was a difference of opinion within the nation which cut across party lines and was termed Court and Country interests. This political division was an important one relating to the method by which ministers managed and influenced Parliament. Both parties were made up of two elements: a Court element of politicians who actively sought power and office, and a Country element of Parliamentary backbenchers who could be hostile to the growing power of the executive and the corrupting tactics of the Court.² Although the public debate over war strategy was generally characterized by the Whig-Tory division, an element of the Court and Country split was an important

¹Geoffrey Holmes, <u>British Politics in the Age of Anne</u>, (London, 1967), p. 64.

²H. T. Dickinson, <u>Liberty and Property: Political</u> <u>Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain</u> (London, 1977), pp. 91-2.

aspect of the criticism which centered on the conduct of particular individuals and certain administrative offices in the central government. The political revolution which accompanied William III's accession limited the prerogative of the Crown and enhanced the power of Parliament, but the financial and bureaucratic revolution which was developing at the same time increased the patronage available to the Crown and the Court.¹ The consequences of this development coloured aspects of the political debate over war finance and the uses of the army and the navy.

The political debate which took place was not an examination of subtle problems in international affairs and esoteric aspects of war strategy. The terms of reference used in the debate touched on these matters, but the issues of substance were those of internal English politics. Early in 1702, Lord Shaftesbury told a correspondent that all depended on the support of the English people for the war. 'They must know their cause for which they fight,' he said,

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and no <u>French-King of Spain</u> is a plain
cause, as plain as <u>no King James</u>, no
owning a <u>Prince of Wales</u>, <u>no Popery</u>
nor Slavery.<sup>2</sup>
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If the issues were made more complex to the public, if a complicated debate arose in which divisions were needed and details discussed, as they were with the Partition Treaties, the public would quickly become annoyed and lose interest. They would begin to think that they had been

¹Dickinson, <u>Liberty and Property</u>, pp. 94-95.

²P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/20, fo. 45: Shaftesbury to Benj. Furley, 4 March 1701.

betrayed, Shaftesbury believed, and they would become sullen and inactive. The nature of public opinion centered on the need to present straightforward, uncomplicated issues upon which a particular viewpoint could be built. In early 1701, a Dutch observer in London commented that it was no longer the names of the Whigs and the Tories that one cited in discussion, but whether the individuals were for peace or for war.¹ In the same year, the poet-diplomatist, Mathew Prior, drew a parallel to Aesop's Fables when he compared King William to the man with two wives of different temperament. One wife plucked out the man's grey hairs, the other, his black hairs, until his head was bald:

> The parties henpecked William are thy wives The hairs they plucked are thy prerogatives Tories thy person hate, and Whigs thy power and much thou yieldest and they tug for more Till this poor man and thou are shorn He without hairs and thou without a Crown.²

The strife between parties and the division of outlook between Court and Country were very much part of the development of political ideology and a constitutional monarchy controlled by Parliament.

The political debate in England over the War of the Spanish Succession can be divided into three broad phases. The first phase took place before the war was declared and it centered on a discussion whether England should enter the war and the proper role the nation should play in a

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW fo. 115: 1'Hermitage to Staaten-General, 11 January 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Stowe MSS. 222 fo. 124: 'Esops-Tale par le Sr. Prior, 1701'.

European war. From 1702, the public debate was largely concerned with the conduct, the support and the efficiency of the forces in the field. The third phase began about 1709 when public interest began to grow concerning the manner in which peace would be made.

The debate over the entry into the war

In early 1701, the Whigs were inclined to support the proposal to go to war, and the Tories were opposed to it. The Whigs saw that the war would preserve the protestant religion in England and serve to promote the protestant succession as well as the Revolution settlement. In short, the war would serve to protect the Whig concept of liberty.¹ The Tories opposed the war on other grounds. They believed that the war would center in distant areas such as Italy and Spain, which would be very costly. If the French should seize Cadiz and Messina, English commerce with both the Levant and America would be ruined, and the trade carried by the Spanish galleons, which was such an impetus to the purchase of English goods, would be put into jeopardy.² In the City, the merchants opposed war for they were afraid that if war should break out less than half of the 1,500 English merchant ships at sea would be able to return with their trade. This particular concern of the merchants was not shared by those in the

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fos. 47-8: Bonet to Frederick I, 4 March 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fos. 9-10: Bonet to Frederick I, 25 January 1701.

provinces, however.¹

The general public opposition to any war was largely overcome by two incidents. The first important incident for public opinion was the movement of French troops to Ostende and Nieuport, both coastal towns on the North Sea coast of the Spanish Netherlands.² The second important incident which solidified public opinion for war was the declaration by Louis XIV proclaiming the son of James II as King of England on his father's death. This followed the prohibition on English, Scottish and Irish goods into France, and together, the prohibition on trade and the proclamation of James III were seen by a large portion of the English public as an outright declaration of war.³

Once the general feeling in the country had come to accept and to approve of England's entry into war against France, the party strife was not subdued. One observer reported that the tranquility of England was broken only by the divisions between Whig and Tory, both of which equally longed for war.⁴ At the bottom of it all was a popular sentiment to humiliate France and to make a vigourous war in order to ensure a constant peace.⁵

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fo. 81: Bonet to Frederick I, 25 March 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fo. 24: Bonet to Frederick I, 11 February 1701.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 335: Saunier to Griffier, 23 September 1701.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 321: Saunier to Staaten-General, 5 August 1701.

⁵Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fos. 106-7: Bonet to Frederick I, 5 April 1701. Although the problem of procuring the entire Spanish monarchy for the Habsburg contender to the throne was not a matter of interest to the English public in 1701, in its first issue <u>The Observator</u>, a Whig newspaper, warned that the King of Spain's will left no way to prevent Spain from being over-run by France, but by a vigorous and unanimous defence by the rest of Europe. It was obvious to the journalist that France intended to conquer the whole earth, and that this must be prevented by an alliance. England, as

> . . . the head of such an Alliance may be compared to a Pilot of long experience at Sea, knows how to discover the Storm before its coming, and to prepare whatever is necessary to resist its violence. . . .

Another newspaper saw that 'France seems mightily inclined to keep in Peace whilst she aims at nothing but War. . . . In short, the French king must and will have War somewhere or other.'² The best course for England to follow was to join with the Dutch and draw as many princes as they could into their league. Urging the same advice, the residents of Sussex instructed their Parliamentary representatives, in December 1701, that France had become so powerful that not only their commerce, but their religion, their laws, their lives, liberties and property were in manifest danger of being destroyed. Immediate action was

¹<u>The Observator</u>, No. 1, 1 January 1701. See also Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW: 1'Hermitage to States-General, 19 April 1701; fo. 333, Saunier to Griffier, 16 September 1701.

²The New Observator on the Present Times, No. 2, 1-8 January 1701.

necessary.¹ By early 1703, observers could see no division between the parties in their support for the war against France, maintenance of the Alliance or affirmation of the Crown in the Protestant line.²

However, there was a difference in opinion, and it was reflected in Parliament. Some of it appeared to be the strife of rivals seeking positions of power. Undersecretary of State John Ellis commented in May 1701, after the Tories in the House of Commons had cut £100,000 from the Civil List, that the Tory ministry was put into a very difficult position. The Tories in the ministry lost a great deal of the King's confidence, 'Since they have so little authority with their party as not to be able to restrain them from doing unreasonable and extravagant things only to lessen the King.'³ It was not doubted that this would lead the King into employing the Whigs.

As the war approached, both parties welcomed it, but there was a difference in opinion between the two as to how England should participate. The Whigs wished to participate in the war as principal members of the Alliance against France while the Tories wanted to be only auxiliaries to a European war. Those who wanted to be auxiliaries were particularly concerned about trade. If England participated as a principal in the war, they argued, her trade to Spain and the Mediferremean in particular;

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 149: Instructions des habitants . . . de Sussex, 30 December 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 XX, fo. 157: l'Hermitage to States-General, 13 January 1702.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. 7074, fo. 15, Ellis to Stepney, 6 May 1701.

would be severely damaged. 1 The Whigs, on the other hand, saw the war as a means to establish English trade and commerce on a firm basis. This end, they believed, was incompatible with the reign of the duke of Anjou, who brought French commercial interests with him into Spain. In the Whig view, it appeared that all Europe was willing to make war against France and Spain in support of the house of The deployment of English and Dutch fleets into Austria. the Mediterranean would complement the victories of the Imperial army in Italy, and with strong alliances it could establish the Habsburgs firmly in control of the entire Spanish monarchy. It would be wrong, they believed, to consider dividing Spain, since that alone would turn to the advantage of Philip and would force a division in Spain which would necessarily oppose the allies. It was already apparent that Spain wished to retain her entire monarchy, and this could be easily done through strong alliances and by exhausting French finances. Forcing the duke of Anjou back to France would achieve all of the Whig's major objectives. Manufacturers in England would be encouraged through the growth of commerce in the Indies, Spain, and the Mediterranean.²

For that old scion of the Whig party, Lord Shaftesbury, the fate of Spain and Spanish possessions was the major concern. They were the key to the development of England,

¹See for example the documents in G. Holmes and W. A. Speck, <u>The Divided Society: Party Conflict in England</u> <u>1694-1716</u> (London, 1967), pp. 91-92.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 30,000E, fos. 418-9: Bonet to Frederick I, 23 December 1701.

in his eyes. 'If the world are unable to master France, and tear Spain out of its hands, France must be master of the world.' A partition of Spanish territories was not acceptable at all to Shaftesbury. He believed that whatever the French parted with at a treaty, they would fetch back through treachery, taking also the rest of Europe with them. The basic problem was that Europe had been maintained by a balance between the houses of Habsburg and Bourbon. On the surface, it appeared that the balance had been tipped in favour of the Habsburgs by the fact that one branch of the house ruled in Austria and another ruled in Spain. However, now that the Habsburg line in Spain had come to an end, any arrangement other than a renewal of the Habsburg house in Spain presented more dangers to Europe. Beyond that solution, there appeared only two other choices. The Spanish crown could fall to a member of a royal family other than the Habsburgs or the Bourbons. Alternatively, Spain could fall to a Bourbon. While some could argue that the two branches of the house of Bourbon might exist separately without direct control, as the two Habsburg branches had done, Shaftesbury rejected this argument out of hand. By its very weakness, an independent Spain without any connection at all to another power was a prey to France. And an independent Spain, which had been so disobliged by an Austria that took away her valuable provinces in Italy could do no more reasonable thing than 'wholly

¹P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/20, fo. 145: Shaftesbury to Furley, 18 March 1701.

fling themselves on France.'¹ As for the Spanish possessions in the West Indies, any kind of partition there was equally repugnant. In Shaftesbury's opinion, the proposal that England and the States-General seize some part of those territories was not a path to wealth or security. In fact, it was 'above all a most certain foundation of dissention' between the English and the Dutch.² It would destroy the relationship between those two nations by opening a rivalry between them for further conquests from each other. It would 'ruin those foundations of peace and happy correspondence which (as things now stand) may be so easily established and invited between those two nations for their mutual preservation and common interest of religion and liberty.'³ This danger would be avoided if the war was fought to make the Archduke Charles, King of all Spain. Both at home and abroad, Spaniards would see that the war was in their interest and would support the allies. If they saw it as only a war to divide the parts of Spain, the malcontents and revolutionists in Spain would seek the assistance of France, 'which is enough soon to sink us.'⁴ At the same time, Shaftesbury believed that the problem of fighting a war in another world would be such a diversion of force that it would severely endanger

¹P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/20, fo. 30: Shaftesbury to Furley, 20 August [?1701].

 2 P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/20, fo. 76: Shaftesbury to Furley, 18 October 1701.

³P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/20, fo. 24: Shaftesbury to Furley, 4 March 1702.

⁴Ibid.

home defence.

In the summer of 1701, the growing apprehension of war was causing great uneasiness in the colonies and among those with colonial interests. Reports reached England that settlers were leaving the plantations, fearing war. It was publicly reported that the governments of Jamaica and the other islands in the Antilles had demanded protection. This news, itself, caused people to complain about a Parliament which tended to ignore the plantations in favour of other interests.¹ The idea of centering war in the colonies was put forward by more extreme Tory supporters. In early November 1701,² a controversial pamphlet appeared entitled 'Reasons Against a War With France or an Argument Showing that the French King's Owning the Prince of Wales as King of England, Scotland and Ireland is no Sufficient Ground of a War.'³ In fact, this pamphlet was not against the war itself, but argued about the proper basis for the war. The author claimed that France had not broken her obligations made at Rijswick in 1698, that the title given to the pretender was only a titular honour, and that the placing of the duke of Anjou on the Spanish throne were not in themselves reasons for a nation to go to war. However, 'a breach of the balance of power is a sufficient ground of a war, ' the

³Copy in P.R.O., S.P. 9/248, fo. 82 ff.

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 315: Saunier to States-General, 22 July 1701.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 358: Saunier to Griffier, 4/15 November 1701.

author wrote.¹ He conceived the balance of power as a forming of the European powers and princes into parties and interests in such a manner that, neither separately nor conjunctively, 'no one party or power may be able to suppress another,' and by that addition to his own power grow too strong for his neighbours. The war should be with Spain, not France. For it was Spain which had seized unlawfully the Habsburg inheritance. Through war with Spain, English trade would be increased and have less competition from Spain. English plantations would be enriched by depradations on Spanish colonies. By conducting an offensive war in remote parts of the world, and being entirely on the defensive in Flanders, the damage to the enemy would be greater. The proper method to achieve English goals was to injure Spain 'in some weaker and more sensible part' so that at a peace she would be willing to exchange Flanders for an equivalent. At the same time French plans would be destroyed and her vast expenditure rendered useless when Spain will be forced to barter one part of her Kingdom to save another. . . 'Tis the Spaniard we ought to fight war, for against them we have just reasons to fight, they are far the easiest to be beaten, and from them most is to be got.'2

While the Tories argued in these terms, the Whigs largely agreed with them over the necessity of the war and its impact on English trade, but the Whigs stressed the importance of the military campaigns in Flanders and

¹Reasons Against . . ., p. 7.

²Ibid., pp. 16-17.

Germany over those in the colonies or in Spain. In some respects the difference between the two parties were subtle ones and there were shadings of opinion within the parties which reflected Court and Country interest. Those in the Country tended to be opposed to any measure which increased taxation and the power of the executive. For them, the increase in the size and power of the army, even through the hiring of mercenary troops, was a danger to constitutional liberty.¹

The rage of the political debate was heard throughout the nation. The viewpoints which were expressed were strong and clear ones, yet the effect of it all on national policy was not clear. One observer of all of it noted that the two parties so feared each other that their quarrel elevated the authority of the king who was able to balance them as he thought fit.²

The Public Debate over the Conduct of the War

During the course of the war, the party squabbles continued. Commenting on the intensity of the debate, Robert Harley noted,

> I do not believe enough in astrology to think the stars create hurricanes in men's minds, but this is certain that we have heard much fluttering in the House of Commons attended with the fowlest Billingsgate I ever heard. . . .

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 WW, fo. 210v: l'Hermitage Memorandum, 21 February 1702.

³Blenheim MSS. Al-25: Harley to Marlborough, 1 January 1706.

¹J. R. Western, <u>The English Militia in the Eighteenth</u> <u>Century</u> (London, 1965), pp. 89-103; Dickinson, <u>Liberty and</u> <u>Property</u>, pp. 105-06.

As before the war, some of this comment centered on particular individuals. Shortly after the accession of Queen Anne, the young Henry St. John told his mentor that he feared nothing from the new monarch, but his only apprehension was that those about her should increase their estates at the expense of her service.¹ Later he admitted that he had no intention of flattering Marlborough, but he did like him better than his wife or Sidney Godolphin.² Lord Treasurer Godolphin himself, had a slightly different consideration. At the time of national jubilation over the victory at Blenheim, he disapproved of the proposal to raise two statues, one of the Queen and the other of Marlborough. Perhaps with a tinge of jealousy toward his friend, but also with sobriety he believed

What merit soever a subject may have, I am doubtful that may set him upon too near an equality with one on the throne. 3

The Observator put the issue in terms of the broad argument against standing armies. Men who fight for their families and their homes fight with greater reason than those who fight for pay, the newspaper declared. At the same time, soldiers were necessary to fight an offensive war such as the present one; but it was not convenient for a nation of freeholders and tradesmen to fight a foreign war, therefore it was practical to hire soldiers to

¹Berkshire R.O., Trumbull Addit. MSS. 132: St. John to Trumbull, 12 June 1702.

²Berkshire R.O., Trumbull Addit. MSS. 133/43: St. John to Trumbull, n.d.

³Longleat House, Portland MSS.: Godolphin to Harley, [?September] 1704.

carry it on. 'But tho' soldiers may be in some cases necessary', the paper concluded,

yet the wisest States have taken care to keep them within just Bounds. . . . No Men are more mischievous to a State than Favourite Men of War. . . 1

Beyond the consideration of personalities and individual acquisition of power, there was a broader division of opinion. In 1708, Lord Sunderland, a leading Whig, catalogued his grievances and urged that the forthcoming Parliament take action to redress the nation's ills. In relation to foreign and military affairs, he noted in particular, the state of the fleet 'which is worse than ever,' and the management of defence in the attempted invasion of Scotland. This last, in particular, was most objectionable. The pardoning of Lord Griffin's part in the invasion scheme appeared to be a declaration that the ministry intended to support the succession of James III to the throne. For the Whigs, that, in itself, was 'an end of the Revolution and the Protestant Succession.'²

If the public discussion of international, military, and naval issues was rooted in such purely English considerations, it was also limited by inaccurate and incomplete information of events. For example, at the House of Lords enquiry into the Cadiz-Vigo expedition in 1702, the secretary of state ordered the duke of Ormonde not to reveal his full instructions, as they indicated plans which might

¹<u>The Observator</u>, ii, No. 82, 15-19 January 1704.

²Brit. Lib. Lansdowne MSS. 1236 fo. 224: Sunderland to [?], 9 August 1708.

later be put into effect.¹ At times, there appeared to be a distortion of news in the London Gazette. From time to time, the envoys abroad who supplied information in the form of newsletters complained that the official news issued by the Government was quite different from what had been reported.²

The major work which Parliament did in relation to the war was voting money to carry out the war policy. While some historians have argued that supply was voted without critical examination of the Government's demands, it seems more likely that Parliament accepted the government's estimates without question so long as they did not exceed the previous estimates.³ The establishments for Flanders were carefully examined when they were first proposed, as were those for Spain and the Navy. In dealing with financial affairs in Parliament certain political interests had to be satisfied. The Speaker of the House of Commons noted that of all the various interests in Parliament, 'the members for the West have a great influence . . . especially in the granting of money.'⁴ These men represented the merchants and tradesmen of Bristol and the west country who were particularly concerned about naval and maritime affairs.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/104: Nottingham to Ormond, 17 November 1702.

³Burton, 'The Secretary at War . . .,' p. 82.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 7059, fo. 45: Harley to Stepney, 10 November 1704.

²For example, Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,914, fo. 131: W. Greg to [? Ellis], 19 June 1703.

At the very outset of the war, it was apparent that many wished to learn from the experience of the Nine Years War, and to take greater care in maritime affairs. The disastrous loss of the Smyrna convoy in 1693 at Lagos Bay was long remembered as was also the political storm which it caused. Lord Nottingham had been forced to give up the seals of secretary of state because of it. It appeared that, at Nottingham's return to office in 1702, he had taken all this 'very much to heart' and that with increased naval discipline and efficiency such incidents would be avoided in the future.¹ The court martial of Sir John Munden, and the execution of the rebellious captains under Benbow in the West Indies, were both met with public enthusiasm as steps which would force the navy to improve. But the early naval failures at Cadiz was severely criticized at home by the Whigs.² Rooke's subsequent attack on the Spanish <u>flota</u> at Vigo recovered some prestige for the navy, and there were those who later attempted to compare his achievements to Marlborough's on land. The victorious campaign ending at Blenheim in 1704 occurred at the same time as the capture of Gibraltar and the naval battle in Malaga Bay. Both Marlborough and Rooke earned a vote of thanks from Parliament, but that, too, was a matter of political controversy. Rooke was a prominent Tory, and was a ready target for Whig criticism of the navy. Shortly after Malaga, a song was composed to the tune of Lillibulero and

¹Berkshire R.O., Trumbull Addit. MSS. 133/7: St. John to Trumbull, 14 August 1702.

²Berkshire R.O., Trumbull Addit. MSS. 133/13: St. John to Trumbull, 13 October 1702.

summarized the political view of a battle which had not been a decisive defeat to the French, but which effectively asserted English power in the Mediterranean and saved Gibraltar:

> Who did not extol our conquest Marine? Courage and conduct, Rooke and Toulouse. 'Twas the sharpest engagement that ever was seen, Refrain. An action so glorious was never yet known, Refrain. Where no ship was taken and no trophy won, Refrain. We conquered the French, but had they been beat, Refrain. Our conquest tho' glorious had been more compleat, Refrain. Your Hero abroad no laurels has got, Refrain. Yet he triumphs at home and is victor by vote, Courage and Conduct, Rooke and Toulouse.¹

The opinion of the Whigs in their criticism was closely associated with their views of the Revolution. In the debate over the Sacheverell trial, James Stanhope had made it clear that the consequence of the doctrine which Sacheverell preached was a threat to the authority of Parliament, the proper administration of public affairs and the conduct of arms on land and sea. It would be the end of a good administration which sought peace with honour, for at the critical moment when the nation was about to reap the fruit of its labours, dissension at home could destroy it. 'Union alone can perfect that great work,'² Stanhope declared. Beyond such general criticism relating to the ability of the nation to fight the war, the Whigs also made a connection to the war with party

²Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 37: [Notes for a speech].

¹Hertfordshire R.O., MSS. D/EP F30, pp. 365-6: Cowper Diary.

views on the Protestant succession, the Church, and other issues. This was seen, for example, in the controversy over the various occasional conformity bills. In Parliament, a number of members attempted to 'tack' on to a money bill, another bill regarding occasional conformity which had been defeated by the Lords. There were 134 members who voted to do this.¹ Although the issues directly involved in the bill lay beyond the scope of military and naval affairs, they were associated with the war and seen in the eyes of the Whigs as a great boost to the enemy and were directly connected to the manner in which the war was conducted. A popular song entitled 'The French King's Cordial,' dramatized this view using words which the Whigs imagined Louis XIV might speak:

> Tho' Marlborough has ruined my cause I'll soon the matter restore For amongst their makers of laws I've 134.

But then my affairs at sea Look better than heretofore Great officers then agree With the 134.²

Prominent Tories such as Rochester, Nottingham and Harley were concerned about the conduct of the war and attacked the ministry's policy of fighting a war in Flanders. Reporting the views of people in northern England, Harley told Godolphin that they complained most about the mismanagement of the fleet and the uselessness of an

¹Hertfordshire R.O., MSS. D/EP/F130, pp. 367-8: Cowper Diary.

²P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/21, fos. 434-5: 'The French King's Cordial', verses 2 and 9. Sung to the tune of 'Simon the King.'

offensive war in the Flanders.¹ In a speech more than a year after his departure from office, Lord Nottingham proclaimed that England bore the burden of the war, but alone of the allies, was deprived of trade. He recognized the brilliant victory at Blenheim, but he believed that little had been achieved by it but the capture of Landau. Savoy was left exposed, and the following year, English troops were subjected to a fruitless march while no assistance was sent to Italy. In Flanders the Dutch would not fight; in Portugal, English plans were defeated by faulty intelligence of the enemy's strength. In Spain, the attack on Barcelona would prove fruitless if France were able to maintain a force superior to the allies. For then, Charles III would be 'in a snare, and France has put an end to this and all war that ever can be waged for the liberties of Europe.'² The following year in 1706, Nottingham was still apprehensive for the colonies abroad. 'In the midst of our triumphs,' he wrote, 'perhaps it will be considered a fault to lament over our misfortune in the West Indies.'³ He feared that the failure to protect the islands would eventually result in their loss.

On the other hand, the Whig Lord Halifax criticised English obligations in Portugal. 'I have

¹Blenheim MSS. B2-33: Harley to Godolphin, 21 September 1703.

²Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. 4959, p. 132: [Notes for a speech, 2 November 1705].

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778 I. 2., p. 73. Nottingham to Dartmouth, 29 June 1706.

always thought, Methuen was the ruin of our affairs in Spain. He was truly the minister of Portugal and not of England.'¹ Most seriously, Methuen was responsible, in Halifax's eyes, for diverting the war from the West Indies which could have enriched England and damaged Spain most severely. It was Methuen, he argued, who led England into carrying the war into a place where no assistance could be obtained, while Portugal profited and France had the silver of the Indies.

In 1707, the criticism of the management of naval affairs became intense in Parliament. In the House of Lords, Lord Haversham pointed out the relation between the navy and trade. 'Your fleet is the security and protection of your trade,' he said, 'and both together are the wealth, strength, security and glory of Britain.'² He went on to point out that it was an advantage for Prince George to remain as Lord High Admiral for he was beyond the reach of party politics. For Haversham, the remedy was to be found in a change of ministry, for it was the present ministry who were 'the root of all our misfortunes.'³ But in the Lords, only his Tory colleagues Rochester and Nottingham could be found to second that indictment.⁴

¹Longleat House, Portland MSS. viii, fo. 62. Halifax to [?], 27 January 1706.

²William Cobbett, <u>Parliamentary History of England</u> (London, 1806-20), vi, p. 598.

³Ibid., p. 599.

⁴Longleat House. Portland Misc. MSS. fo. 188: [Godolphin to Harley, no date].

In early 1708, the issue was brought out again when Lord Wharton moved in the Lords that a fresh enquiry be made into naval affairs. In the debate which followed, Lord Somers stressed the point that England 'must be undone if the sea affairs stood longer on the present foot.' A committee was established to hear the complaints of the merchants. A full scale attack on the Admiralty followed with complaints centering on the damage to trade caused by the impressment of merchant seamen for the navy, the inadequacy of convoy assignments, and accusations that naval commanders would withhold their protection from masters who did not pay them.² These were just complaints, but at the bottom of the attack was an attempt by critics to gain political Recent changes and new appointments had influence. replaced a rather broadly based ministry with one which was dominated by close followers of those already in power. An attack on the Admiralty, particularly on the Tory Admiral George Churchill, brother of Marlborough, was calculated to achieve a position of power and influence for some of those who had been excluded. While little, in fact, was achieved in this direction, the debate resulted in Parliament passing the Cruiser and Convoy and America which altered the Navy's deployment of ships and provided for more trade protection and coastal patrol. The death of

Acts

¹P.R.O., PRO. 30/24/21, fos. 17v-18: Sir J. Crompley to Shaftesbury, 20 February 170**8**.

²William L. Sachse, Lord Somers: A Political Portrait (Manchester, 1975), pp. 253-4; House of Lords MSS. 1706-08, pp. 99-334.

Prince George in the midst of the criticism against the Admiralty allowed the fray to subside. A new allotment of offices followed with the Whigs having Wharton appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland and Somers lord president of the Council, while the Tory Lord Pembroke was again made Lord High Admiral, and Godolphin continued at the Treasury.¹

The public debate over the management of the navy and the protection of trade was not merely an argument for a 'blue water' strategy. It expressed a deep belief that defence should be the first priority and that the nation and her trade must be secure before other projects were undertaken. This viewpoint was expressed within the context of a political battle to achieve quite unrelated objectives in party politics at home. The attraction of a large segment of the public to measures which concerned trade and finance was expressed in other ways. Although the Whigs often attacked those who made their fortunes by speculation, they defended the whole system of public credit and finance which had developed. Many went so far as to insist that the ability of the Government to borrow on credit was the best means by which the war could be supported, and thus one of the major means to defend the Revolution settlement and the Protestant succession. The Tories, on the other hand, attacked the credit system and the national debt with little regard for any connection which might be made with the basic problems of war finance

¹ Brit. Lib. Lansdowne MSS. 1236, fo. 251: Sunderland to Newcastle, 4 November 1708; Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. 4950: Bromley to Nottingham, 11 November 1708.

or the Revolution.¹

Another prominent subject in the public debate over the conduct of the war was the campaign in Spain. The defeat of Lord Galway at Almanza, in April 1708, focused public attention on affairs there. Both the defeat at Almanza and the recent recall of Peterborough as commanderin-chief provided the Tories with ammunition. Lord Rochester opened the debate in the Lords by objecting to the attempt to attack France in the Netherlands. There was little point in taking the 'bull by the horns,' when one could be on the defensive there and move 15-20,000 troops into Spain. In the House of Lords, Marlborough objected to Rochester's suggestion pointing out the need to hold the places already won and to ensure that the Dutch remained He advised the Lords that no reduction of force active. could take place with safety in the Low Countries; but agreements had been made with the Emperor to send additional forces into Spain, and he hoped these might be commanded by Prince Eugene. Marlborough implied that there was no need to choose between Flanders and Spain; both objectives could be achieved. The Dutch republic could be defended, and Spain could be reinforced through the assistance of the allies. Surely, then, there would be no peace without Spain. The Whigs led by Lord Somers lost no time in obtaining the approval of the House of Lords for the proposition

> That no peace can be honorable or safe, for Her Majesty and Her

¹Dickinson, <u>Liberty and Property</u>, pp. 85-86.

Allies, if Spain and the Spanish West Indies be suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon.¹

At the close of debate, Somers was appointed to the select committee which drew up the address to the Queen.² In this form, the commitment to exclude the House of Bourbon was extended to the entire Spanish monarchy, and it won approval in both the House of Commons and in the Queen's reply to the address. In both Houses, Tories and Whigs approved of the policy. In effect, it was a compromise policy which ensured that each group would achieve its own interests. One side was given some assurance that the growth of trade would be protected and that the war in Spain would go on. At the same time, it denied no protection to the Dutch, and it was a defence of the Revolution settlement.³ To the Queen and the ministry, the resolution provided strong public approval for the nation's diplomacy and strategy, even though neither its broader implications nor its detailed aspects had been discussed in Parliament.

In the public view, the achievement of English goals required the assistance of the allies, and largely depended on their ability to fight the war. Yet at the same time, the public had little sympathy with the allies' own objectives and reacted with hostility toward them when

¹Lords Journals, xviii, p. 395.

²Sachse, <u>Somers</u>, p. 257.

³For an example of typical opinions on Spain as they appeared later, see Holmes and Speck, <u>The Divided Society</u>, pp. 92-94.

English aims were delayed or thwarted.

The Government was well aware of the importance of the allies to the grand strategy, and it knew that the subsidies that England provided were an important motivation. The difficulty which the Government faced in this was the growing hostile public opinion toward all the allies which worked against the payment of the arrears in subsidies. In the autumn of 1704, the Speaker of the House of Commons remarked that although he personally supported the payment of the debts to the allies, he saw that it would be far better to delay the vote on it until another opportunity when the allies could more safely be assured of having payment.¹

It was the Tories who were most critical of the allies throughout the war. Lord Nottingham blamed the lack of protection for the coal trade, the absence of convoys and the inability of the nation to meet its naval commitments entirely on the Dutch.² The need for so great a number of English ships acting together and the need to take ships from other services to do this, as well as the lack of men and money was due, in his opinion, to the Dutch not meeting their quotas. 'This indeed seems to be the source of all our grievances at sea,' he told an election audience. His views were parallelled by Lord Haversham who told the House of Lords:

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/4 fo. 5v: Harley to Vernon, 17 November 1704.

²Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. 4959/121 pp. 6-7: [Election speech, ? 1705].

Let our supplies be never so full and speedy, Let our management be never so great and frugal, Yet if it be our misfortune to have Allies that are so slow and backward as we are zealous and forward that hold our hands, and suffer us not to take any opportunity that offers, that are coming into the field when we are going into winter quarters, I cannot see what it is we are reasonably to expect.1

Later, a committee of the whole was formed on the Lords to consider the state of the nation. The Tories demanded to know the causes for allied failures to take advantage of French weakness on the Moselle and in Flanders. Throughout, the Dutch and the Germans bore the brunt of Tory criticism. The Whigs replied that such criticism was unnecessary, and that it tended only to weaken the alliance by causing resentment. It was improper for the House to censure or complain of the allies, and the Government maintained that its particular duty was to manage all treaties and alliances. During this debate, the ministry was able to pass a general resolution that the Queen would maintain good relations with the allies in order to prosecute vigourously the war against France.² This resolution prevented the criticism of the allies from causing serious difficulty, and preserved the Government's prerogative in foreign affairs. Despite this remedy, a strong undercurrent of criticism toward the allies continued. It was said of the Emperor

¹John Carter Brown Library; Marchmont Collection, v: Lord Haversham's speech, 15 November 1705.

²Cobbett, <u>Parliamentary History</u>, v. p. 475; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 35,854 fo. 8: Cowper Diary, 22 November 1705.

that 'the very crown totters on Ceaser's head, the Gothic beak; the Roman Eagle crouches and dares not expand her wings.'¹ Similar attacks were made on all the allies in an attempt to place the blame for all the shortcomings of the war on unco-operative allies. Among the general population, this stream of criticism began to grow into a resentment that England had poured out her treasure and, for it, had achieved neither appreciation nor reward. In the final years of the war, some groups related this feeling to the objectives for which England had fought the war.

In general, the public debate in England during the course of the war did not come to any serious consideration of the Government's broad concept of war strategy. While some supported the involvement in continental affairs as something which had a direct benefit to England, others criticized the vast expense involved, the inefficiency of the bureaucracy, the attitudes and conduct of individuals, and most importantly, demanded further protection for trade. For the greater part of the war, the most serious concern raised by the public debate was the problem of how the nation could effectively defend itself and its trade while at the same time conducting an offensive war against France.

Public Opinion and the End of the War

In the final years of the war, the public debate shifted its center of interest from the effectiveness of

¹<u>A Review of the State of the British Nation</u>, v. 16, 19 October 1705. Count Wratislaw's objection to this may be found in P.R.O., S.P. 100/10.

the ongoing conduct of the war to the conduct of the war in terms of how it would be ended. From the early days of the war many Englishmen had suspected that the allies might prematurely conclude the war by making a separate peace with France. In February 1704, wagers ran at £20 on £100 that the Dutch would make a peace. Rumours of this nature combined with fears that the allies would obtain advantages over England by agreeing to a separate peace. For the larger portion of the war, the popular view of ending the war concentrated on the advantages which others might obtain through 'defecting' from the This theme was not a dominant one, but it did alliance. fit closely with the general criticism of the allies which was prevalent, and it seemed to offer a plausible explanation for the suspect actions of the allies.

It was not until late 1708 and 1709 that the war began to appear to the general public as a serious burden. Commenting on the rumour of peace in January 1709, one informed observer remarked that it was not the surmise of the undergraduate in politics, but the conclusion of wise heads that every honest man wished for a safe and honourable peace.¹ The debate in Parliament which produced the slogan 'no peace without Spain,' had a direct effect on popular thinking about the end of the war. Lord Stair commented,

> ... sure we cannot think after all our Votes of Parliament of making peace with France, having

¹Berkshire R.O., Trumbull Addit. MSS. 132: Tucker to Trumbull, 21 January 1709.

Spain in the hands of King Philip, unless we be willing at the same time to receive a King from the great Monarch.¹

While the debate itself had resulted in an acceptable compromise between those who wanted to be on the defensive in Flanders and to increase troops in Spain and those who thought it unwise to reduce troop strength in Flanders, the popular conclusion which was drawn from the debate in Parliament was that Spain was the most important objective. Flanders and the army, Spain and the navy had come to symbolize opposites. In the public debate, there was little reflection of the unified grand strategy which sought to surround France and to defeat French power through a combined effort of military and naval forces.

The fall of Godolphin from power in August 1710 and the subsequent change in the ministry caused great concern in some quarters. The public reacted to the change with a great deal of fear and suspicion. Although it was understood that the Tories wanted peace, there was no clear understanding what policy the new Government would follow in conducting the war.² The report of an allied victory at Almenara in Spain encouraged some Whigs to think momentarily that neither the other party nor the allies could sell the nation out to France in a disadvantageous peace.³ Despite that, stocks fell very low and the

¹Huntington Library, MSS. ST. 58, vi: Stair to Brydges, 28 July 1710.

²Kent. R.O., Stanhope MSS. 84/1: Walpole to J. Stanhope, 22 August 1710.

³Brit. Lib., Lansdowne MSS. 1236 fo. 255: Sunderland to [Newcastle], 31 August 1710.

Government found it very difficult to obtain money. It was a serious situation. As James Craggs put it, 'unless the new ministers can stop the people's fears and obtain some credit, they or the nation must soon be entirely undone.' The change in ministry had made it appear that a change in war policy was the natural consequence. James Stanhope was not wrong when he said that it 'raised the courage of our enemy's,'² and at the same time, both the allies and population at home lacked confidence. Writing in retirement, Godolphin analysed the situation. The political disorders and divisions, at home, and the disgrace of the ministers who had always appeared most zealous for the war had given the French, though quite exhausted, a new life. The major result from the change in ministry and the accompanying political battle was the lack of public confidence in giving credit to the Government. This, Godolphin believed, was not the absence of his own personal influence in financial management, but rather the absence of the confidence which he gave as someone firmly in support of the alliance and the war against France. His removal, he thought, seemed to serve as an indication to others that the interests of the allies were declining. Public credit which was raised and chiefly supported by a commitment to the war thus, naturally, declined as confidence in England's steadfastness declined. While not doubting the new ministry's intention

¹Kent. R.O., Stanhope MSS. 73/18: Craggs to Stanhope, 9 September 1710.

²Kent. R.O., Stanhope MSS. 73/18: Stanhope to Craggs, 18 November 1710.

to carry on, he noted that confidence in England could not be restored unless there was confidence by all in the ministers whom the Queen chose to employ, 'which was the true and solid foundation of bringing the public credit to so great a height in England.'¹

The dissolution of Parliament which naturally followed the change in ministry was a confirmation to the allies of the unreliability of the English government. The allies began to suspect the purposes behind English diplomatic moves. The Dutch, in particular, believed that a new election in England would be particularly damaging to the war and formally protested to the Queen. Dutch fears were well founded, but when news of their action became public many Englishmen were angered. The Tory Examiner trumpeted

> Can the <u>Dutch</u>, while they are assisting us to reduce the exorbitant Power of <u>France</u>, treat <u>England</u> as if we were a Feudatory Kingdom?²

While the allies were concerned about the direction of English politics, most people in England deeply resented any foreign involvement in or even expression of opinion about English affairs. For the allies, the decline of Marlborough's political position at home appeared to be a sign of a new approach to the war. When Marlborough's dismissal was first rumoured abroad, Godolphin remarked

> When this is more certainly known will France so much as harken to any proposals for a general peace, but expect

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,055, fos. 434-9: Godolphin to [? Harley], 17 December 1710.

²The Examiner, No. 4, 24 August 1710.

the allies shall treat separately, as they will certainly be obliged to do, for they always looked upon the duke of Marlborough as the great <u>Cement</u> by which the whole Confederacy was held together.1

In the following year, the Government moved more dramatically toward peace with France. Tories such as Nottingham violently opposed the course which was being In a series of speeches, the opponents of the taken. ministry denounced the policy, arguing that England was not bargaining from a position of strength but, by offering to make a treaty, the nation was unnecessarily admitting that it could not continue the war. At the same time, this move by the ministry left a suspicion that some secret and evil motive was behind it all.² The Whigs opposed the peace, and claimed that all the papists and friends of the pretender were for it. Some tried to expand this and to suggest that all who supported the peace were papists and that the underlying question here was 'whether the friends of France be the best and truest Englishmen.'³ There was even a hint that the ministry was following the directions of France as the first step in extirpating the Protestant religion and restoring the pretender. One speaker noted that it was not a question of peace or war, and that this was not a proper distinction between Whig and Tory; if this were so the Tories would continue to support

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 28,055 fos. 434-9: Godolphin to [? Harley], 17 December 1710.

²Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. Box 4959, p. 135: 'Speech against the Peace.'

³Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. Box 4959, p. 136: [notes, 1711].

the war. But it was the Tories who desired peace, and it seemed that their opinion contradicted their earlier practice without an obvious foundation. By following this path, the Tories were doing more toward the destruction of the Church of England than the Whigs ever did and 'in so doing, are more properly Whigs both in principle and practice than ever the Whigs.'¹

Apart from these domestic considerations which dominated the public debate, there were serious doubts as to the very arrangement for peace. Lord Nottingham claimed in the House of Lords that there was 'no security and peace, but the French King's word.' In his opinion there should be 'no real security but his inability.'² The renunciation of Philip V to any claim to the French Throne seemed to be a fallacious and insecure basis for a peace. It was largely on the insecurity of the arrangement that opponents attacked the peace initiative. Some believed that no peace could be safe for England which was not treated in concert with the allies.³ At the same time, others thought that the proposed treaty gave far more than was asked and could not help but end in another war.⁴

It was in the context of this debate that Jonathan Swift wrote his famous and influential pamphlet on the

¹Ibid.

²Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. Box 4959, p. 136: 'Heads of my speech in Parlt con Peace'.

³Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. 4960, p. 137: Notes, 1711. [In Godolphin's hand?]

⁴Leicestershire R.O., Finch MSS. 4959, p. 136: 'Notes for speech'.

<u>Conduct of the Allies</u>. Swift brilliantly argued the ministry's case for ending the war 'without Spain'. Playing upon popular sentiment, he attacked the contribution which Marlborough had made in Flanders, demonstrated that the disasters in Spain had been the result of an inefficient ministry, showed that the allies, but not England, stood to gain from a protracted war, and encouraged further distrust of the Dutch and Austrians. In short, Swift argued that

> No Nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domestic Enemies; or treated with so much Insolence, Injustice and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.¹

Swift's pamphlet was one of the most popular pieces written in the era, and it effectively captured the mood of the moment in England. Something which the Harley ministry used to its fullest extent.

Public opinion in England during the reign of Queen Anne was neither a voice to be ignored nor a command to be obeyed, it was a tool to be used for political purposes.² And yet the public debate over the war strategy rarely considered foreign and military affairs on their own terms or in any depth. There was a complete absence of any general comprehension of the totality of the war effort or of the relationships of the many parts

¹The Conduct of the Allies (London, 1711).

²Coombs, <u>The Conduct of the Dutch</u>, p. 384.

to the whole. In almost every case, the discussion of the war by the public was part of internal and purely English considerations in the struggle for power between the parties, the succession to the English throne, and the principles of the 1688 Revolution settlement. The polarization of public opinion between supporters of the army and supporters of the navy was not based on strategic considerations. True, the public interest in trade protection made one important contribution to the discussion, but equally important were the political groupings over the relative importance of certain personalities in English politics, the growth of the central government, the increasing cost of the war, the appropriateness of a standing army, the commercial importance of Spain and the Low Countries to England. Historians have tended to view the political debate over this war as the classic statement of the difference between 'blue water' and 'continental' strategies. The debate which took place was, in fact, quite remote from the actual strategy which the Government was conducting. While ministers sought to harmonize the strategic use of the army and the navy, the political dialectic between maritime and continental schools of thinking reflected political strife, preconceptions and prejudices in England over the broad nature of government. At the same time, public opinion about foreign and military affairs, however shallow and distorted in understanding, was important to ministers who could use it to bolster their own political positions.

The public debate, which involved military and naval issues, concerned more directly the conflict and strife relating to the Revolution settlement than strategic alternatives in the conduct of war.

CHAPTER VIII

ENGLISH CONDUCT OF THE WAR DURING THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, PART I: 1705-1710

Since war is rarely considered an end of its own, it must be seen in terms of its origins and objectives, its conduct throughout, and the method through which it is brought to a conclusion. Warfare is not something which is isolated from other human activities; it is closely tied to a wide variety of political, social, economic and cultural considerations. As surely as a war is rooted in the period of peace which preceded it, so the quest for the peace which would follow the war has a clear influence on the strategy by which a war is conducted. From the very outset of the War of the Spanish Succession, there is no doubt that the English ministry had a general conception of the kind of peace which it wanted to achieve. However, it was not until the summer of 1705 that serious discussions were begun to consider the practical basis on which a peace might be formed. Starting from that date, the development of English war conduct may be divided into two portions. The first is that associated with the Godolphin ministry, and the second is that associated with the Harley Government after August 1710.

There were distinct differences between the two ministries, yet at the same time, there were some important similarities in foreign and military policy. While supporters of the Harley ministry would not admit any resemblance to its predecessor, both ministries valued equally the basic national war aims of securing England's safety, preventing foreign interference in English politics and securing and encouraging English trade abroad. Both saw that these objectives could best be achieved through a balance of power in Europe, and both saw themselves as the key leaders in creating that arrangement.

At the same time, the differences between them were considerable, but these differences were more apparent in terms of party political strife and the struggle for power within the nation than in the ideas and intentions which lay behind the conduct of the war. The most obvious difference between the two was the Harley ministry's readiness to agree to a peace, although it was not a commitment to peace at any price. Secondly, the Harley ministry's attitude toward the succession to the throne was somewhat different from the Godolphin ministry's, and these views coloured certain aspects of foreign policy. On the one hand, the Godolphin ministry firmly backed the succession of the Hanoverians and the Parliamentary title to the throne established by the Act of Settlement. In contrast, the Harley Government showed a strong interest in supporting the hereditary title of James III, although it placed the condition of acceptance of the Church of England on his succession.

Equally important in contrasting the approaches of the two ministries was the difference in the political,

military, economic and diplomatic situation which the two The Godolphin ministry had devoted its efforts to faced. the establishment of an alliance system with a clear strategic concept of defeating France and balancing French power through an independent, Habsburg Spain. On the other hand, the Harley ministry came to power on the wave of widespread war-weariness and financial difficulty within England at the time of the failure of peace negotiations at Gertruydenberg. Although there is firm evidence to show that the new ministry sought to carry on with the basic strategy and aims that had been previously used, while at the same time being more favourable to reaching a satisfactory peace, the Government found that its very appearance on the scene created deep suspicions in the allies abroad and, at home, lessened the ability of the Treasury to obtain the financial credit necessary to support the war. This loss of faith and confidence in two important sectors made it increasingly more difficult to provide the strong leadership of the Alliance which both ministries believed it was appropriate for England to make. The continued reluctance of the allies to heed English desires for the use of allied military and naval forces against France, the military failures in Spain and the renewed threat of interference from the powers engaged in the Northern War created doubts in London as to the effectiveness of the Alliance. The increasing suspicion among all the allies that several of them were secretly conducting separate peace negotiations in order to obtain advantages over each other seemed to threaten the collapse of the entire system upon which the Godolphin ministry had

rested the nation's grand strategy. Moreover, within nine months after the new ministry came to power, the death of the Emperor and the prospect that the Archduke Charles would succeed to both Spain and Austria completely changed the ministry's views on the proper means by which England and the Alliance could establish together a balance of power.

While the intentions and objectives of the two ministries remained largely the same in their conduct of the war during the search for peace, the course of events created quite different situations and resulted in the use of different methods to reach the same goals.

War Conduct and Peace Proposals, 1705-1710¹

During the Godolphin ministry there were several opportunities to consider peace plans. On each occasion the ministry was consistent in believing that the continued application of its grand strategy would bring France to the terms which England desired. The application of military force by all the allies was an essential part of the concept by which England sought to secure her objectives through a balance of power based on an independent, Habsburg Spain. She persistently encouraged the allies to persevere in carrying out her grand strategy as the best means to achieve the objectives of the alliance, as she saw it. Each case was a slight variation on the same theme.

¹For a detailed study of the Dutch view of this period, see Johanna Storck-Penning, <u>Het Grote Werk</u> (Groningen, 1958).

In the summer of 1705, Marlborough lamented to Heinsius that if the Dutch deputies had been more co-operative, France would have undoubtedly agreed to the kind of peace which England wanted. The lack of a vigourous campaign in that year, he believed, made it difficult to persuade France of the conditions which England sought for peace. A secure and lasting peace was the primary consideration that England desired. Marlborough believed that it must include provision for King Charles to succeed to the Spanish throne, that the Dutch should have garrisons for their own defence in Antwerp, Namur and Luxembourg, that Savoy should be cared for, and that something should be done for the advantage of Protestants.¹ A few months later, the Secretary of State, Robert Harley, stressed that the basic criteria of a lasting peace was that it be 'just, honorable, and safe.'² By this he meant that it be an agreement which was beneficial to all the allies, and that it prevent the junction of France and Spain through which France could recruit her strength and exert herself against the allies.

Following the victory at Ramillies in 1706, the cabinet considered further action, and apparently some plans were made for an invasion of France at that time. Secretary Harley drafted his ideas about the declaration which the allies would issue to the French people during such an invasion. The suggested declaration reflected some of

¹<u>Marlborough-Heinsius Correspondence</u>, p. 203. Letter 324.

²Algemeen Rijksarchief, [British Library Microfilm M828]. Harley to Heinsius, 15 November 1705.

the broad considerations which England had about the war. At the beginning, he noted that the ambition of France threatened 'the liberty of so many great Kingdoms in Europe.' In fighting France, the Queen and the States-General had no other aim than to restore the balance of power so 'that every one may securely enjoy what appertains to them of right.' Beyond those considerations, the inhabitants of France would be restored to all their ancient liberties and privileges, they would be assured of protection and good treatment, and at the same time have an increase in trade.¹

In late August, a peace proposal was considered in London. Harley believed that it was justifiable for England to press as far as was reasonable that the Spanish monarchy not be dismembered. If England firmly insisted upon it, he believed that France was in such a great need of peace that she would not prevent a treaty being concluded. One important consideration in this was that if Naples should fall to the duke of Anjou by a partition of Spanish possessions, it would greatly endanger English commerce in the Mediterranean by increasing French maritime strength in an area close to the major French base at Toulon. In addition, the security of Savoy, Portugal and the Dutch Republic needed to be ensured, while England obtained a treaty of commerce and security for her trade by the demolition of Dunkirk. As an additional protection against the Jacobites, the pretender was to be sent out of

¹Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9, sec. 34: [Undated memo.]

France to Rome.¹ At a cabinet meeting to consider these issues it was decided that it was impossible to hinder any plan for peace, therefore it was important to give a reasonable one which would not prevent the allies from joining in. All agreed that nothing should be asked beyond what led to the security of England and her interests abroad. Among those items, Dunkirk, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay were the important matters upon which the security of English trade at home and in America lay.² The chief security for preserving the conditions which were obtained from France lay in the preservation of the Alliance, and particularly the close relationship between England and the States-General. The other allies were not unimportant in achieving this end. It was obvious to Godolphin that Savoy was a key in balancing the power of France, and it was essential to prevent Savoy from defecting to France as she had done in the Nine Years War. This presented an additional reason why the Spanish monarchy should not be partitioned. If the duke of Anjou were given Sicily and Naples, not only would trade be endangered but Savoy and all Italy would be forced to take direction from France in order to ensure their own security.³ In obtaining these, England wanted to attack France simultaneously in Italy, in Spain, and in Flanders. Godolphin, for one,

¹Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9, sec. 36: 'Some short heads of remarque upon the French proposal,' 26 August 1706; sec. 37: [Memorandum], 31 August 1706.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/9, sec. 37: [Minutes], 31 August 1706.

³Algemeen Rijksarchief, [Brit. Lib., Microfilm M-848]: Godolphin to Buys, 3 September 1706.

believed that no negotiations should be undertaken with France until the campaign was over. While he recognized that the financial burden on England and Holland was very great, the credit of the two allies remained good. At the same time, France was much more exhausted and had neither money nor credit. In these circumstances, England believed that there would not be any need to make a peace which was insecure or which would lead to a future war.¹

While these discussions were going on inside the government, public opinion and the uncertainty of the allies' position made it difficult to carry out England's strategy with ease. Secretary Harley complained, 'Does France hope to prevail itself of the factions in the Seven Provinces or of the Divisions of England? . . . Does France send its emissaries abroad to disseminate jealousy and to foment divisions . .?'² The victory at Ramillies was the factor which Marlborough believed would 'effectually stop the mouths of such as were inclinable to a peace that could neither have been secure nor lasting.'³ Despite that victory there remained a degree of jealousy and suspicion among the allies. The Dutch, in particular, were concerned about the extent of England's commitment to defending the Low Countries.⁴ A similar uncertainty in

1_Ibid., and Godolphin to Buys, 23 September 1706. 2Algemeen Rijksarchief, [Brit. Lib., Microfilm M-848]: Harley to Buys, 30 April 1706.

³Blenheim MSS. Marlborough Letter Book, xvii, p. 176: Marlborough to Sunderland, 3 June 1706.

⁴Surrey R.O., MSS. Somers Kl2: [Portland to Somers], 11 June 1706.

Vienna about England's commitment to Austria led Harley to exclaim, 'I heartily wish . . . that we may not be in danger both from our enemies and allies.'¹ Both were opinions which waxed and waned with the course of events.

The failure to reach any peace agreement with France The in 1706 left England determined to continue the war. rising costs and general weakening of the English economy were already apparent and there was a clear need for additional resources in the future. In November, 1706, the first private instructions were sent off to English diplomats in Spain to begin negotiations for England to obtain the <u>Asiento</u> 'in payment for support and supplying Gibraltar.' At the same time, steps were taken to secure Spanish control in Italy by pressing King Charles to obtain the investiture of the Duchy of Milan in his own This was something which England believed 'will name. give great umbrage to the Allies in case it should be deferred.'² While taking these long range steps, England continued to encourage the other allies to fight the war vigorously. The Empire was implored to send additional troops to Spain. In doing this the English envoy in Vienna was told to remind the Emperor pointedly that the restoring of Spain to the House of Austria was one of the fundamental articles of the Grand Alliance.³ The strong support of Parliament for carrying on the war was

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/39, fo. 139: Harley to Stepney, 27 August 1706.

²Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 85/3: Private instructions to James Stanhope, 21 November 1706.

³P.R.O., S.P. 104/39: Harley to Meadows, 2 August 1707.

underscored by the unanimous address of the Commons. English envoys abroad were told to show copies of the address as evidence of English commitment 'to procure a just balance of power and consequently a firm and lasting peace in Europe.'¹

In the field, General Cadogan saw 'both sides heartily in earnest for the war.'² In talks with the French during an exchange of prisoners, he found not even a hint about peace. The French talked only of war and destruction rather than giving up any part of the Spanish monarchy. As to the other allies, Cadogan shared some suspicion that the Dutch might possibly attempt to make a separate peace, but it appeared to be impracticable for them to do anything without England since all that France had as yet offered would go to the Emperor. Without joining forces with England, she would gain nothing for herself. Whether the Dutch liked it or not, he believed they would actively participate in the war. 'They are afraid to make peace on the terms France proposes, 'Cadogan said, 'and they are afraid to make war in the vigourous manner England proposes.'³ Marlborough looked at the broad situation with resignation. He was disappointed that the Emperor and so many of the allies thought that England and Holland should bear the burden of the war. 'God only knows how this will

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/4, fo. 47v: Harley to Pultney, 25 November 1707.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 22,196, fos. 119-20: Cadogan to Raby, 29 December 1707.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 22,196, fo. 129: Cadogan to Raby, 19 January 1708.

end,' he told Heinsius, 'but we must do our best.' A peace was very much a matter of consideration as the allies bent to the task of preparing for the 1708 campaign. There was some speculation that France would not attempt any serious military operations that year, but Marlborough believed that she would attempt to act in Spain and Portugal as well as in Flanders. Even though she gained no advantage she could still obtain a reasonable peace, he thought. And if France could win a few battles then she could attempt to force a more favourable peace agreement.² Looking beyond the immediate campaign, Godolphin advised Marlborough that in securing a proper defence for the Dutch, England was particularly concerned about her own trade and that in order to protect English interests Ostend should remain in the hands of an independent Spain and Dunkirk should be demolished.³

The war was actively pursued between late 1706 and early 1709. There was no serious consideration of a final peace agreement except peripheral references during routine negotiations among the allies. In early 1709, however, France again showed that she was willing to discuss terms. The harvest of 1708 had been a poor one, and by the end of the winter it was apparent that there was a great scarcity of grain on the Continent. The

¹<u>Marlborough-Heinsius Correspondence</u>, p. 362. no. 593. ²<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 379, no. 621.

³Blenheim MSS. A2-38: Godolphin to Marlborough, 16 April 1708.

English Government realized that the prohibition of corn imports into France would be one way to force France to a The first problem was to stop the export of grain peace. from England to Spain. Grain had been one of the major items which had been used to encourage English trade in the Peninsula. The passes for this trade were ordered revoked, and the trade in grain redirected to the allies. In order to do this, grain was declared contraband.¹ Orders were then sent to Ireland and to English diplomats in Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Hamburg and Danzig to prevent the carrying of all grain or provisions to France.² The Queen issued orders in council that privateers and warships were to stop all ships laden with grain for France. ³ Upon reports that the French sought to import corn from the Baltic, the Dutch were asked to join with an English Squadron which had been sent to the Danish Sound to prevent the French from sailing. The Mediterranean Squadron was given specific orders to prevent France from obtaining grain from the Barbary states.⁴ In the Channel, in the

³Marsden, <u>Law and Custom</u>, ii, p. 210: Order in Council, 28 April 1709.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 44/210, fo. 153: Sunderland to Lord High Admiral, 11 June 1709; Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Cabinet Minutes, 10 June 1709; Bl-22a: Boyle to Marlborough, 10 June 1709; Bl-22b: Godolphin to Marlborough, 14 June 1709.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/108, fo. 22: Sunderland to Council of Trade, 21 February 1709; Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letter Book, i, p. 276: Sunderland to Galway, 16 March 1709; ii, part i, p. 249: Sunderland to Lord High Treasurer, 22 March 1709.

²P.R.O., S.P. 82/24, fo. 215: Robinson to Boyle, 9 April 1709; S.P. 104/4, fo. 83v: Boyle to Pultney, 12 April 1709; S.P. 104/204: Boyle to Robinson, 26 April 1709; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 15,866, fo. 165: Boyle to Dayrolles, 19 April 1709; Blenheim MSS. Cl-16: Minutes Cabinet Council, 10 April 1709.

North Sea, and in the Mediterranean, the navy was ordered to halt all grain shipments to the French 'as the most present means (in case they can avoid fighting) to bring them to reason.'¹

At the same time as these actions were taken, Marlborough and Townshend had been sent to The Haque to negotiate a preliminary agreement with the States-General before beginning negotiations with the French. At the outset of these discussions, England stated her basic interests and objectives for a peace. First of all, England believed 'that no peace can be safe and honorable unless the whole Spanish monarchy be restored' to the Habsburg House. Secondly, the French were to recognize the title of the English Crown to all its realms, and to the Protestant succession as established by Parliament. With this acknowledgement, England also demanded that the pretender be removed from French dominions. Thirdly, for the security of England and the preservation of her trade, the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk were to be demolished. Fourthly, Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay were to be returned to England. These four items were the essential objectives which England sought, and without them England would not agree to a peace. It was understood, however, that additional demands would be made by all parties during peace negotiations, but these would not be as important.² Although England and Holland agreed on these matters, the

¹Blenheim MSS. Bl-22b: Godolphin to Marlborough, 17 June 1709.

²Blenheim MSS. Bl-16: Instructions to Marlborough, 21 March 1709; Instructions to Marlborough and Townshend 2 May 1709.

French refused them as a basis for peace negotiations. Louis XIV objected on a number of grounds, but he was most strongly opposed to the article of the agreement which required the duke of Anjou to evacuate Spain. This refusal left England in some doubt as to French objectives, but the Government in London agreed that France had only a choice between agreeing to the proposals already made or to much higher demands from the allies. The allied armies were ready to march as the blockade of grain supplies was pushed into effect. Lord Sunderland commented,

> by our advices, the French troops as well as the country are in such a miserable condition, that either the King of France must comply with what the allies shall think necessary to demand of him, or there seems nothing can hinder our army from marching to Paris.¹

England was certain that this failure to come to an agreement would only harm France, and it seemed to mean that France would have to accept harsher terms in the end.² With negotiations at a standstill England turned to other means. 'It seems as if all expedients towards peace were at present at an end, and that the sword must continue to decide the quarrel,' Secretary of State Boyle wrote.³ Believing that the French refusal was only a delay to recuperate her forces, the Government thought that the allies should renounce the preliminaries as a basis for

¹Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letter Book, i, pt. iii, p. 3: Sunderland to Galway, 2 June 1709.

²Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letter Book, i, pt. iii, p. 5: Sunderland to Palmes, 3 June 1709.

³Blenheim MSS. Bl-22a: Boyle to Marlborough, 7 June 1709.

agreement with France and that the war in all areas should be carried on vigourously. This action, the ministry believed would draw the French back into negotiations. The cabinet expected that France would probably propose giving several towns in Flanders as security until Spanish territory could be evacuated by Philip, but that would not be acceptable to England. As Secretary Boyle wrote, 'no cautionary towns are of much significance in this case, unless such as are maritime and essential toward reducing Spain by force.'¹ It was apparent that France was not yet serious about making any agreement to give up Spain, and England wished to use the threat of renewed military action as the strongest incentive she could use to force France to evacuate Spain.

This conviction presented several difficulties for England since it was apparent that the other allies were not entirely in agreement with her on the importance of obtaining the entire Spanish monarchy. This lack of interest among the allies raised the fear that peace could be made by the others but England would be left fighting the war alone in Spain. In considering this problem, Lord High Treasurer Godolphin believed that England would be less and less capable every year to continue the war alone, but that she was better able to do it than either her enemies or her allies. Despite that belief in England's strength, he thought that it was far better to continue the war in conjunction with the allies than allowing them to leave the

¹Bodleian Library, Eng. hist. d. 147: Boyle to Townshend, 3 June 1709.

war in Spain, thus leaving them entirely out of a war and laying the entire burden of expence on England. Godolphin believed that the direct assistance of Savoy and the Emperor was all that was necessary to assure victory in Spain but, at the same time, he felt that they had been so undependable in the past that their assistance could not be depended upon. In this circumstance, Dutch assistance was essential to maintain the war.¹

In June 1709, allied forces took the field with the specific purpose of forcing France to accept allied peace England encouraged all the allies to use their terms. maximum effort against France. Her own war plans were altered, and the expedition which had been intended to capture Canada was ordered with other forces to assault Cadiz.² In Flanders, the army undertook the siege of Tournai. However, the allies faced serious difficulties in carrying out their plans. In its fortified camp, the French army in Flanders could not advantageously be brought into battle.³ At the same time, the planned invasion of France and the capture of Paris was halted by the difficulty in supplying the army from afar.⁴ Marlborough, himself, did not agree with those in London who wished to carry on the war vigorously. He hoped that some

¹Blenheim MSS. Bl-22b: Godolphin to Marlborough, 6 June 1709.

²Blenheim MSS. B1-22a: Sunderland to Marlborough, 7 June 1709.

³Blenheim, Marlborough Letter Book, xxiii, pp. 287-8: Marlborough to Stanhope, 31 July 1709.

⁴G. Perjés, 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy . . .', p. 24.

compromise could be reached on the point of forcing Philip to evacuate Spain. The Dutch had little interest in supporting that issue wholeheartedly, ¹ and Marlborough feared that the campaign in Flanders would be forced to end prematurely for want of forage.² In London, however, the Government was determined not to show that England had any need for peace.³ There was every appearance that France would renew the negotiation very soon, 4 and England stood ready with proposals to obtain the Spanish towns necessary to force Philip from Spain.⁵ The indication that France was going to renew negotiations put great pressure on the discussions between the English and Dutch over the preliminaries for the peace. The Dutch had become increasingly obstinate over the English proposal to include an article on the Spanish monarchy in the Barrier treaty which was being negotiated between the English and the Dutch as part of a preliminary agreement among themselves.⁶

It was more than obstinacy on the part of the Dutch; it was a suspicion about England's intentions. The rumours that England was secretly attempting to obtain Minorca and

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 38,498: Townshend to Boyle, 2 July 1709.

²<u>Marlborough-Heinsius Correspondence</u>, p. 444, No. 754. ³Bodleian Library, MSS. Eng. hist. d. 147: Boyle to Robinson, 15 July 1709.

⁴Blenheim MSS. Bl-22b: Godolphin to Marlborough, 28 July 1709.

⁵Bodleian Library, MSS. Eng. hist. d. 147: Boyle to Robinson, 15 July 1709.

⁶P.R.O., S.P. 84/233, fo. 176v: Townshend to Boyle, 2 August 1709. See also R. Geikie and I. Montgomery, The Dutch Barrier 1705-1719 (New York, 1968), pp. 99-164. the West Indian trade for herself were not taken well by the Dutch when England was discussing with them the need to secure the entire Spanish monarchy.¹ The English envoy negotiating the preliminaries, Lord Townshend, believed that this alone would destroy the Alliance with the States-General, by increasing the jealousy between the two commercial nations.² Horace Walpole, Townshend's secretary, wrote to James Stanhope in Spain,

> I am sensible that your passion for the Queen's and your country's service might supply you with very good reasons to frame a project so advantageous for England, but I can as frankly assure you that had her Majesty ratified it at this juncture it would have undone us here.³

It was apparent that the Dutch would not be willing to carry on the war to recover Spain in its entirety if the purpose of it was only to serve English interests. The West Indies trade was a lucrative one which Holland expected would recoup the Republic's vast war expenses.⁴ The Government in London continued to press for obtaining the entire Spanish monarchy and to disregard the warning signs of suspicion from the Dutch. England believed that an agreement could be reached with France which promised that Spain would

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/233, fo. 199u: Townshend to Boyle, 23 August 1709. For the French view, see John C. Rule, 'France and the Preliminaries to the Gertruydenberg Conference, September 1709 to March 1710,' in Hatton and Anderson, Studies in Diplomatic History, pp. 97-115.

²P.R.O., S.P. 83/122, fo. 117: Townshend to Boyle, 6 September 1709.

³Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 70/2: Walpole to Stanhope, 11 September 1709. Entirely Secret.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 38,498, fos. 70-71: Townshend to Boyle, 6 September 1709.

be given to Charles III, even though the French continued to assert publicly that it was not in their power to give towns for that purpose on the Spanish coast. Even if the French agreement should be an empty one, Godolphin believed, once allied forces had been released from the war with France, they could turn their full attention to Spain and subdue the Spaniards quickly should they not readily support Charles III.¹ This proposal, however, was not acceptable to the Dutch who believed that the best terms to be obtained from France would leave the duke of Anjou in Spain, and that any attempt to make peace with France before the Spanish issues were settled would weaken the allies' ability to negotiate.²

The victory of the allied army at Malplaquet in September 1709 brought instant jubilation to the English,³ and for the moment, it encouraged some of the Dutch to be stronger in their support of the war.⁴ Despite concern over the large number of casualties suffered at Malplaquet, the Government at home was certain that this victory would bring the French to the negotiating table if military operations were continued and negotiations for a new set of

¹Hertfordshire R.O., MSS. D/EP/F54, fos. 144-5: Godolphin to Cowper, 17 August 1709; Huntington Library, ST. 58, iv, fos. 197-8: Cardonnel to Brydges, 23 September 1709.

²Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 38,498, fo. 68: Townshend to Boyle, 3 September 1709.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84,233, fo. 229: Walpole to [Tilson], 13 September 1709.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 84/233, fo. 233v: Townshend to Boyle, 17 September 1709.

preliminaries were threatened.¹ At the same time, England intensified her sea campaign against grain imports to France. The Government believed that, as Lord Sunderland put it, 'it is of the last importance in the present situation of affairs to deprive the enemy of such means of subsisting'.² The Mediterranean squadron captured thirty French ships taking supplies to the French army, and additional orders were sent to prevent Genoese and Papal vessels from carrying grain to France.³

The shortage of grain also made allied military operations difficult. Serious thought was given in England to the possibility of obtaining grain from New England, New York and Pennsylvania in order to supply the army in Portugal and Spain.⁴ Eventually, however, a favourable contract was obtained in Genoa. It was so necessary that the commander-in-chief in Spain told the admiral who would convoy the shipment of it, 'upon the performance or nonperformance of this contract will depend on our armies subsisting or not subsisting."5

Despite all the favourable signs, France showed little

⁴Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letter Book, ii, pt. i, pp. 345-6: Sunderland to Council of Trade, 30 October 1709. ⁵Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 69: Stanhope to Whitaker,

¹Blenheim MSS. B1-22b: Godolphin to Marlborough, 17 September 1709.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/211, fo. 15v: Sunderland to Whitaker, 9 September 1709.

³Blenheim MSS. Sunderland Letter Book, i, pt. iii, p. 37: Sunderland to W. Chetwynd, 11 October 1709; p. 43: 21 October 1709; pp. 52-3: 29 November 1709; p. 43: Sunderland to Palmes, 21 October 1709; P.R.O., S.P. 84/233, fo. 346: Townshend to Boyle, 26 November 1709.

⁴ December 1709.

enthusiasm to enter into peace discussions during the campaign season. When it was over, the French did enter into negotiations at Gertruydenberg. Throughout these talks, England remained optimistic for it seemed that France was in such poor condition that she must reach peace terms by the summer of 1710, at the latest. To Englishmen, France seemed to be exhausted, while the allies remained united. The war in the north had not interfered with the allies' conduct of the war, and all the Dutch provinces now firmly backed the war. 'We may now depend on the peace being made very soon, and in the manner we desire,' General Cadogan wrote.¹ In London, the Government was certain that as soon as allied armies entered the field, France would immediately agree to an acceptable peace. However, the cabinet council prepared for a French proposal to accept a partition of Spain. If that proposal was made, Marlborough was told not to make any commitment but to refer it to the Queen for her commands.²

The increasing political debate in England over the war, during the spring and summer of 1710, brought a new dimension to the negotiations. Observers saw the dismissal of Lord Sunderland as secretary of state, followed by the removal of Godolphin, Marlborough's loss of prestige and the subsequent call for a general election as indications of a deep division in England over war strategy. The Whigs continued to support the war strongly, but it was

¹Huntington Library, ST 58, v, p. 129: Cadogan to Brydges, 17 February 1710.

²Blenheim MSS. B2-8: Godolphin to Marlborough, 5 March 1710.

also evident that their grip on political power was slipping. The simultaneous weakening of English financial credit caused France to break off the Gertruydenberg discussions abruptly, in March, following the Sacheverell trial and the sudden growth of Tory sentiment for peace in England.

Conclusion

Throughout the period 1705-1710, the English attitude toward the war was characterized by the belief that it could be concluded satisfactorily with intense military and naval pressure on France through the alliance strategy. The Godolphin ministry believed that its strategy had been increasingly successful and that, with a bit more time and a bit more pressure, the alliance strategy would force France to accept the terms which England sought. Essentially, these terms were the establishment of a balance of power in Europe through an independent Spain, the secure establishment of the Protestant Succession in England, and the protection and encouragement of English trade, at home In 1710, a new obstacle appeared in addition and abroad. to those inherent in the alliance strategy itself. The lack of political support for the Godolphin ministry made it difficult to present a credible position to either the allies or the enemy.

CHAPTER IX

ENGLISH CONDUCT OF THE WAR DURING THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, PART II: 1710-1713¹

The Continuation of the Old Ministry's Strategy

The appointment of a new ministry under the leadership of Robert Harley was completed by the autumn of 1710. Despite the mandate of the general election, the new ministry faced two major problems in conducting the war. The change of the management at the Treasury had made the allies suspicious about England's intentions, but most importantly, financiers were reluctant to give credit to the new Government. The Bank of England refused to lend money for new contracts at a time when the national revenue was short £1,177,146, the navy debt stood at £5 million and the Civil List debt was £600,000.²

Henry St. John, the new secretary of state, told his friends that he would maintain his Tory principles in the new Government, but he warned that a pilot was often obliged to steer a western course in order to arrive at a

¹For a detailed discussion of the diplomatic events, see A. D. Maclachlan, 'The Road of Peace, 1710-13' in G. Holmes (ed.) <u>Britain After the Glorious Revolution</u> (London, 1970), pp. 197-215, and 'The Great Peace: Negotiations for the Treaty of Utrecht 1710-13' (Cambridge University Ph.D. thesis, 1965). The standard work is Ottokar Weber, <u>Der Friede von Utrecht</u> (Gotha, 1891).

²Kent R.O., Stanhope MSS. 83/8: 'Une relation Succincte des affaries publiques depuis la 8^{me} d'Aout 1710 jusque à ce 8^{me} de Juin 1714.' Enclosed in Oxford to [Queen Anne?], n.d; Shaw, <u>Calendar of Teensury Books</u>, XXV, pp. XXV, XXVIII, XII.

port which lay to the north.¹ The first major military move of the Government was to speed five regiments of reinforcements from England to Spain. These troops were above and beyond the necessary numbers required by treaty obligations. They were sent to ensure an active war in Spain and were paralleled by additional Dutch and English naval reinforcements for the Mediterranean.² In that area, the cabinet discussed the advisability of an attack on Sicily. Approving the basic idea of it, the commanderin-chief, Mediterranean, was directed to undertake it only if it did not hinder more important affairs, and 'that all things relating to Spain are to be understood to be so.'³ Marlborough and Prince Eugene concluded agreements for additional imperial troops to be sent there while Savoy and Portugal were strongly urged to make the utmost effort in Spain.⁴ At the same time, French initiatives were being explored as possible avenues for peace negotiations.⁵

The new Government viewed the European situation with some alarm. The Northern War had subsided after Charles XII's defeat at Poltava, but the new ministry was suspicious

¹Berkshire R.O., Trumbull Addit. MSS. 133/41: St. John to Trumbull, 31 August 1710.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/77, fo. 88v: St. John to Townshend, 14 September 1710.

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/188, fo. 47: Cabinet Council Minutes, 20 October 1710.

⁴Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/188, fo. 85: Cabinet Minutes, 25 December 1710.

⁵G. M. Trevelyan, 'The Jersey Period of the Negotiations,' <u>E.H.R.</u>, xlix (1934), pp. 100-105. Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778, i, ii, p. 153: Jersey to Dartmouth, 15 September 1710. that Charles XII might have agreed with the French to attack the Empire from Turkey as soon as war broke out again in Poland, as it seemed that it would. The Hungarian difficulties continued, but there, too, the ministry was suspicious that the Emperor was unnecessarily prolonging The duke of Savoy's request for assistance from them. the Emperor had not been met and Savoy could not put its army in the field effectively. The English ministry blamed the Austrians and believed that if the Emperor continued his stance much longer, England may 'justly say, that he gives up the Common Cause, and that he renounces the Spanish monarchy.' It seemed obvious to Secretary of State St. John that England and Holland alone could not continue to fight the war without the co-operation of Savoy and the 40-50,000 Imperial troops in Hungary. In addition it was impossible for England to continue to carry such a great portion of the financial burden of the war; if the war was to continue as planned the other allies would have to be persuaded to take a greater share in providing ships and men as well.² These were practical obstacles which the ministry believed could be overcome; the basic strategy remained the same. For the campaign of 1711, an offensive and vigorous war was urged in Spain and Portugal, in Savoy, and in Flanders. The Government was convinced that unless this were done there was no prospect

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/32, fo. 94: St. John to Raby, 13 October 1710.

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/77, fo. 87: St. John to Townshend, 7 November 1710.

of reducing France or of obtaining an honourable peace.¹ If the duke of Savoy could lead an army into Dauphine or Provence, then the situation in Spain would be retrieved. 'The Treasure we have spent, and the Blood which we have spilt in the course of this furious War will purchase that security for which both have been so profusely lavished,' St. John wrote.² The fate of the war, however, depended on the co-operation of the allies. The new ministry encouraged the allies to join heartily in the war, although at the same time, there was a clear realisation that peace was not far off and that England did not have the strength to continue the war for any great length of time. The financial distress of the Government as well as the pressure of political interests at home encouraged the ministry to seek additional advantages from the forthcoming peace which would bolster commercial growth.

One important and popular project was the plan proposed by Samuel Vetch to secure the North American colonies. Henry St. John began secretly to make plans for this expedition as early as December 1710, apparently after a plan to attack Guadeloupe in the West Indies had been temporarily laid aside.³ The success which the colonists had had in attacking Port Royal in the previous year encouraged the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/78, fos. 9-10: St. John to Townshend, 10 November 1710; S.P. 104/79, fo. 33: St. John to Marlborough and Townshend, 16 March 1711.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D 649/8, fo. 18: St. John to Peterborough, 16 February 1711.

³P.R.O., ADM. 2/366: Admiralty to Secretary of State, 13 December 1710; ADM. 1/4094, fo. 283: St. John to Admiralty, 26 December 1710.

Government to undertake another expedition against Quebec, The new ministry saw clearly that French Canada was a threat to the English colonies. At that time, the French monopolized the American fur trade. The American whale and cod fisheries were both believed to be important training grounds for the mariners of France. These activities and the continued growth of French power in America threatened to overwhelm the English settlements. Englishmen imagined that there was the chance that the French settlements in Canada and Newfoundland would connect with the settlements on the Mississippi, perhaps grasping even the gold mines and trade of Mexico. The English colonies would be completely surrounded, and eventually be drawn into the French empire. The seizure of Canada would drive out England's only European competition in America. With the Indians coming under English subjection, however, their trade, along with the whale and cod fisheries, could be brought to benefit England. In addition, the nation could securely supply its West Indian plantations, and establish an active trade from America to Portugal, Spain, Italy, and even France itself. Naval stores to serve all Europe could be developed, and the unfavourable balance in that trade could be shifted to England's benefit. With these ideas in mind, the Government undertook to recover Canada and Newfoundland, to preserve Annapolis Royal and Nova Scotia in English hands, and 'to subdue and endeavor to drive out of our said countries and islands for ever' the

subjects of France.1

The planning and execution of this expedition was carried out with the utmost secrecy. Only the principal secretaries of state were allowed to give orders upon it, and it was not discussed in a full cabinet meeting until April, although an inner group which included the Queen, Harley, St. John, and Dartmouth had been involved in planning it since December. St. John termed it 'my favorite project, what I have been driving on ever since I came into business.'² While enthusiastic about the plan, St. John was fully aware of the dangers which lay in it as well as the benefits to the nation if it succeeded. He believed that, in case of failure, it would be particularly prejudicial to his own career as he had failed to obtain the usual forms and orders 'Which are necessary safeguards in a government where the best designs are converted into crimes, if they want success.'³

St. John believed that England had borm the greatest burden in the war which the allies had been fighting for nearly a decade, and at the same time, she was the only one to reap no particular advantage beyond the general benefit which all Europe would share by the defeat of France. He was firmly convinced that

> We have exhausted ourselves with little or no concurrence from any of our allies to support the war

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/213: Instructions to Robert Hunter, Governor of New York, 6 February 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 44/213: St. John to Hunter, 6 February 1711.

 $^{^{3}}$ <u>Ibid</u>.

in Spain, as if we were singly concerned in the event of it. We have laid forth our utmost strength in the Netherlands, as if obtaining that barrier was not our remote, but our immediate security. Gifts, loans, and subsidies have been scattered from hence through the whole extent of the Alliance, as if we were defending provinces of our own, or as if we were ourselves a province to each, and obliged to comply with the demands of the superior state.¹

The feeling that England was losing out while others gained more substantial rewards from their victory was not an indication of any change in the basic principles upon which England entered the war, it was something additional to The defeat of France through the strategy of allithem. ance, and a multi-pronged attack that forced her to divide her armies always lay at the heart of England's war effort. The new ministry believed that it was 'high time to do something in particular for Britain, by which the enemy will receive as great and as essential a prejudice as he has done by any of those operations the sole benefit whereof resulted to some of our Confederates.'² Many projects had been proposed by which England could obtain some substantial benefit, but the ministry believed that the expedition to Canada seemed to be the most feasible and the most advantageous. At the same time, it carried with it the enticing gleam of empire. As St. John put it,

> if one supposes the French driven out from Canada, and the Queen Mistress of the whole Continent

¹<u>Ibid</u>. ²<u>Ibid</u>. of North America, such a scene opens itself, that the man who is not charmed with it, must be void of all sense of the honour of the grandeur and prosperity of his country.1

It was only the beginning for, in St. John's mind, it was the prelude to establishing a carefully regulated, productive colonial system which could be accomplished by a uniform plan of colonial government. Internal dissension, proprietary interests, and French threats could all be removed by success in this expedition. The news that a powerful French squadron was sailing toward Canada speeded English efforts.²

While plans went ahead for the Canadian expedition, the ministry moved in other areas to obtain additional benefits. The duke of Argyll was directed to preserve Port Mahon in English hands as reimbursement for the nation's war expenses in Spain and steps were taken to ensure that Gibraltar would be a free port for the encouragement of English trade.³

While the war was pushed in Europe and simultaneous steps were taken to achieve greater commercial benefits for England, the ministry also attempted to develop closer relations with the Dutch. Through William Buys and John Drummond, the ministry sought to establish firm support for English policies by privately giving the Dutch an

¹<u>Ibid</u>.

²P.R.O., ADM. 1/4095, fo. 29: St. John to Admiralty, 2 April 1711.

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/14, pp. 43-45: Instructions to Argyll, 21 February 1711. assurance that England would stand by the States-General, both in peace and in war. England only desired to be let into the whole secret of any peace negotiation which the Dutch might enter into.¹

By the winter of 1710-11, the new ministry had clearly embarked on its basic war policy. It clearly intended to continue the basic grand strategy which the Godolphin ministry had employed and to reinforce close relations with the Dutch. At the same time, however, it sought to establish clearly the basis for obtaining advantages for England in peace negotiations by positioning her military forces. For this purpose, the Canadian expedition was being planned, and the commanders at Gibraltar and Port Mahon were ordered not to admit foreign troops within the fortifications. In order to obtain these advantages, however, the Alliance had to be maintained intact as the only basis for a strong negotiating position. By early spring, the ministry had moved ahead in all of these areas and was strongly urging the allies to enter the field. Simultaneously, England firmly believed that peace was necessary, and it appeared to English observers that none of the allies were both willing and able to continue the war for any great length of time. The allies showed little enthusiasm. The Dutch delayed sending their contribution to the Mediterranean.² There were difficulties in getting an agreement with the allies for feeding the Imperial and

¹Algemeen Rijksarchief, [Brit. Lib., Microfilm M-828]. St. John to Buys, 23 January 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 29: St. John to Vrijbergen, 30 March 1711.

Palatine troops in Flanders, Prussian troops had been stopped in their march to join the allied army,¹ and Savoy was not yet in condition to put its army in the field.²

While England attempted to mobilize the allies, France showed serious interest in discussing peace terms. When the new ministry had come into office, the French had initiated³ a channel of communication through the Abbé Gaultier and Lord Jersey to establish the basis upon which peace negotiations could be opened. While views had been exchanged, no serious proposals had been made. In February, the French expressed their reluctance to begin negotiations with the Dutch, and England had offered to serve as an intermediary on the basis that the allies would jointly consider the proposals.⁴ In late March, there was also an indication that the French had asked the duke of Lorraine to serve as an intermediary with the allies, if necessary.⁵

The Reassessment of Strategy upon the Emperor's death

As England was attempting to mobilize the allies as a means to establish a strong position in the peace negotiations, an incident occurred which forced her to reassess her own strategic objectives in the war. Emperor Joseph I

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/12, fo. 38: St. John to Orrery, 22 March 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 20: St. John to Raby, 23 March 1711.

³G. M. Trevelyan, 'The Jersey Period . . .,' p. 101. ⁴Ibid., p. 105.

⁵Houghton Library, MS. Eng. 218.27, p. 13: Marlborough to Orrery, 30 March 1711.

died unexpectedly in April 1711, and England saw that serious repercussions could follow. On one hand, England believed it was essential for the new Emperor to be someone who could not fall under French influence and who would support the allies. For this reason, England strongly supported the election of Joseph's brother, the Archduke Charles, although it appeared that there was some strong opposition to him among the German princes. On the other hand, Charles's position as the allies' candidate for the Spanish throne presented the problem that Austria and Spain would have the same monarch. This was something which had as far reaching consequences, in English eyes, as the proposal that a Bourbon under the control of France would rule Spain.

During the Gertruydenberg peace negotiations, the major obstacle to agreement had been the allied demand for the complete restitution of Spain. The new ministry understood that the demand for French guarantees on this point had been the stumbling block, and in the course of the secret exchange of views through Gaultier and Jersey, had indicated that the strength of England's views on this point was tied to the allied military position in Spain. After the allied evacuation of Madrid and the defeat at Brihuega, Lord Jersey had indicated that England would no longer insist on the restitution of the entire Spanish monarchy to Austria, or if she did, it would be only a weak and <u>pro forma</u> demand. More important to England were assurances for the safety of her commerce.¹ When taken in

¹Trevelyan, 'Jersey period . . .', pp. 102-3.

the context of the ministry's broad position, it appears that the Government intended to continue her basic strategy for her original objections, but use the military situation in Spain as the basis for bargaining over the partition of the Spanish monarchy during the negotiations. The succession of Charles in Austria, however, made this an untenable position for England since a partition on this basis would still give the Emperor far too much power in European politics.

England's position on this matter developed as the events unfolded. Immediately upon hearing from Marlborough the news that the Emperor was seriously ill, the Queen met in cabinet to discuss the policy which the nation should follow in case of his death. The first decision of the cabinet was that the Queen write to the States-General and assure them that she would act in concert with them in the entire matter. Secondly, the Queen was to advise the Dutch that she believed King Charles should be firmly supported in his claim to the Imperial throne. Secretary of State St. John was ordered to send letters to all the electors in the Grand Alliance notifying them that the Queen proposed the King of Spain as Emperor. These letters were to be sent to The Hague and held there until the Emperor Joseph's death, and then sent out. Orders were sent to the Admiralty and to the commander -in-chief in the Mediterranean ordering them to give all assistance in

¹Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/v/188, fo. 143: Cabinet Minutes, St. James', 13 April 1711; fo. 146: Lord's Minutes, 16 April 1711; fo. 147: Lord's Minutes, 17 April 1711; P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 50: St. John to Marlborough, 13 April 1711.

transporting Charles from Spain. Then, the envoy to Savoy was privately assured that the Queen would support the 1703 treaty in relation to the duke of Savoy's succession to the Spanish throne on the failure of a Habsburg candidate, but at the same time, Marlborough was told to discuss this point with the Dutch without revealing the Queen's opinion. The duke of Argyll was ordered to take precautions to ensure that the military situation in Spain remain 'upon the foot they are at present,' since the sudden death of the Emperor could abruptly alter the situation there.

Five days after the first indication of the Emperor's illness arrived, an express was received announcing that In an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the he had died. Oueen ordered immediate assurances sent to King Charles that she supported his election as Emperor 'to the utmost of her power.'¹ The problem itself was a difficult one which brought forth strong opinion. Lord Somerset told Harley in no uncertain terms, 'the same person cannot, nor must not pretend to both' being Emperor and King of Spain.² Looking at the problem clearly, the ministry decided to assure Savoy secretly that England would take all measures to use the present circumstances to the advantage of the house of Savoy.³ This assurance was made secretly in order to preserve the effectiveness of the Alliance. Prussia and

Longleat House, Portland MSS. vi, fo. 38: [Shrewsbury to Harley] 17 April 1711; Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/v/188, fo. 148: Cabinet Minutes, 18 April 1711.

A Ibid.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/197, fo. 100: Somerset to Harley, 22 April 1711.

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/v/188, fo. 150: Lord's Minutes, 23 April 1711.

Savoy both objected to continuing the war if the Imperial and Spanish crowns were to be on the same head, and there were reports that Portugal and Prussia were already engaged in separate peace negotiations.¹ If England were to declare publicly for King Charles as emperor and king, Savoy might turn to France in disgust. On the other hand, by publicly supporting the duke of Savoy, Austria might drop the Alliance and think themselves well satisfied to keep what they had obtained in Italy. Certainly, Austria would not fight for a Savoyard succession in Spain, but in order to keep Savoy active, as Lord Raby noted, 'the duke of Savoy's ambition must be flattered to make him vigourous.'2 An offensive by Savoy into Provence or Dauphiné still appeared the best military move which could be made there. In order to do this, the English envoy in Vienna was ordered to press this objective at the Imperial court. At the same time, England believed that Imperial plans to conquer Sicily with the assistance of the allied fleet in the Mediterranean might well satisfy Imperial ambitions and lead them to drop the Alliance and not continue to fight. Therefore, if the Empire could be dissuaded from the Sicilian expedition and Savoy stirred into action by the prospect of the Spanish monarchy coming to the house of Savoy, England's immediate military objectives could be achieved.³

¹New York Public Library, Montague Collection: Bolingbroke: [summary of Lord Strafford's Letters]. ²P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 76: St. John to Raby, 24 April 1711. [Raby's comment on margin]. ³P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 66v: St. John to Peterborough, 24 April 1711.

The departure of King Charles from Spain created another difficulty. His sudden departure might leave the Spaniards with the view that Spain was abandoned, the Catalans might declare for Philip V and the Portuguese might either declare neutrality or, at worst, make a separate peace. However, if Charles was to get to Vienna and attend to his election as Emperor, he needed the assistance of the allied fleet for his journey. It was a delicate situation, but the Dutch and English decided to give the fleet orders to assist him in getting to Italy, but not allow him the command of the fleet which might allow him to make an expedition to Sicily.¹ England's immediate military concern was to ensure that France did not attempt to take advantage of this situation and attack the Empire. For that reason, efforts were made to prevent the withdrawal of any allied forces from Flanders and to encourage the army into action in Savoy. By these means, the ministry in London believed France would not be able to withdraw forces from any other area in order to make an army large enough to attack the Empire.²

While all these matters were being considered in London, the French made their first substantive proposition for peace.³ Immediately upon receiving it, the Queen sent

²P.R.O., S.P. 104/78, fo. 23v: St. John to Marlborough, 23 April; fo. 24: 27 April 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fos. 9-11: 'First proposition of France', 22 April 1711.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 75: St. John to Raby, 24 April 1711; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/457: 'Account of what passed between Queen's minister and secretary of King of Portugal', 20-28 April 1711.

the proposal to The Hague for consideration by the States-General. The secretary of state told the English envoy in The Haque to keep the matter a secret and to assure the Grand Pensionary that England would act entirely in concert with the Dutch. Although the French document showed an 'air of compliance' toward England and not to Holland, the ministry in London believed that this would not cause any difficulty so long as the two nations understood each other and acted together.¹ While these negotiations were in progress, it appeared that the army could not operate effectively in support of the ministry's policy. The cause was a financial one. Upon arriving in Italy, enroute to take up the command in Spain, the duke of Argyll reported that there was no available money to put the allied army in the field. 'I have neither address enough to persuade the King of Spain to think himself supported, 'Argyll despaired, 'when the troops are ready to mutiny for want of pay, nor have I skill sufficient to make an army starve and serve.'² While Argyll thought himself less fortunate than the army in Flanders,³ it too was finding it nearly impossible to support the auxiliary troops.⁴ St. John put the problem bluntly to Peterborough,

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 80 and S.P. 105/285, fo. 5: St. John to Raby, 27 April 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 94/230, fos. 63-66: Argyll to Dartmouth, 9 May 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 94/230, fo. 73: Argyll to Dartmouth, 14 May 1711.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 104/12, fo. 55v: St. John to Orrery, 22 May 1711.

certain it is that no good will is wanting no pains are spared, but . . . be sure that our credit has been strained till it is ready to crack, that our specie is exhausted, and that our friends are mortgaged at home whilst abroad there are none of the Allies that act up in any proportion to us.¹

In this situation, England could do little more than press the Imperial court to strengthen the armies on the Rhine and in Italy.² The balance of power in Europe was still the objective which England sought, and the ministry believed that the position of Savoy and the independence of Spain were key matters in this. As the summer of 1711 passed, it was becoming more and more apparent that successful military operations in Spain could not be carried Argyll reported that he could neither enlarge allied out. footing in Spain as ordered nor preserve the present position under the current circumstances there. The difficulty of the military situation and the lack of money required entirely new measures for the war in Spain.³ Argyll lamented that the Spaniards seemed to have no more interest in England 'then the providing of great sums of money for them to embezzle.'⁴ In Flanders, Marlborough reported that the French were putting a great train of artillery into the field to attack Cambrai and Douai at

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 128-29: St. John to Peterborough, 22 May 1711.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/14, pp. 160-1: Dartmouth to Argyll, 18 May 1711.

³Cambridge University Library, Addit. MSS. 6570, fos. 10-13: Argyll to Dartmouth, 2 July 1711, n.s.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 94/230, fo. 88: Argyll to Dartmouth, 2 July 1711. the same time that allied troops were forced to leave the field for need of forage. The only effective means to prevent the French from gaining advantage would be to winter the allied army in that area, thereby causing the French to winter in the same area at considerably greater expence. This, Marlborough thought, might induce the French to peace.¹

While the military prospect was not good, Savoy remained the key to the general situation. If the entire Spanish monarchy was vested in Charles III, as originally conceived, or even partitioned so that Spanish territories in Italy went to the House of Habsburg, England believed that Savoy would immediately become the vassal of France in order to secure Savoyard security in Italy. Thus, Savoy, which had been such an important element in maintaining a European balance, would be employed in destroying it. Therefore, the Government in London came to the conclusion that the fundamental 'system of the war is essentially altered.'² The proposition that the Spanish monarchy should be won for the Habsburgs was no longer a viable basis on which England could conclude the war.

While this point in English war objectives was altered, the need for an alliance to conclude the war did not change. Robert Harley, now earl of Oxford and Mortimer, told William Buys in all earnestness that 'a league offensive and defensive between England and

¹Longleat House, Portland MSS. iv, fo. 122: Marlborough to Harley, 5 July 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fos. 106-7: St. John to Orrery, 24 July 1711.

Holland'¹ was important to have after the peace as well as during the peace negotiations. Anxious to preserve this close connection, Oxford told the Dutch that England had requested that France make a proposal for a general peace that could be agreed to by the Dutch and discussed on the continent.² Remembering the treatment which the Dutch had received during the last peace negotiations, both Grand Pensionary Heinsius and Willem Buys requested that Marlborough not be allowed into the secret of the peace negotiations.³ Their request was readily agreed to in London, no doubt with satisfaction that so opportune a development in terms of English politics would be so acceptable to the allies.

As the possibility for serious peace negotiations grew, the military situation seemed to grow steadily worse. The Government was not encouraged by the lack of progress in pushing forward the grand strategy of the war. Only Marlborough's seige at Bouchain and the initial reports from Walker in Canada seemed to bring any encouragement. In general, the allies failed to meet England's expectations in Spain, Italy, and Germany. 'To give six millions with so little fruit,' an undersecretary of state noted with disgust, 'Lord have mercy upon us; what bubbles do

¹Algemeen Rijksarchief, [Brit. Lib., Microfilm M-848], Oxford to Buys, 7 August 1711.

²Ibid., St. John to Buys, 17 August 1711.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/198: St. John to Harley, 4 September 1711.

our allies make of us.' Despite the dissatisfaction with the way the war was progressing and the suspicion with which the English ministers regarded the sudden enthusiastic interest which the court in Vienna showed toward carrying on the war in Spain, England held to her basic objectives in the first preliminary demands made on France. Insisting first on recognition of the Queen's succession to the English throne, the proposal went on to ask for a new commercial treaty with France, the demolition of Dunkirk, the cession to England of Port Mahon, Gibraltar, St. Christopher, Hudson's Bay and Newfoundland, and securing the Asiento to England.² Having reached a tentative agreement on these points, the Government took military action to secure both Gibraltar and Port Mahon for England.³ While the general military situation in Spain was merely 'playing a very bad game to the best advantage,'⁴ the Government seemed fully aware of military operations on the broad scale. Although the duke of Argyll deeply resented the inability of the ministry to support the army more effectively in Spain and suspected that 'they either do not or will not comprehend the state

¹Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/7, fo. 23: Tilson to Chetwynd, 24 August 1711.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/6: 'Reponse de la France Six Demandes Preliminaries pour la Grant Bretagne plus particularies,' 27 September 1711; P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 133: Preliminary Demands.

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/14, pp. 194-5: Dartmouth to Argyll, 11 September 1711; 0/17, p. 209: Dartmouth to Jennings, 10 October 1711.

⁴Cambridge University Library, Addit. MSS. 6570, fo. 46v: Argyll to Dartmouth, 24 September 1711.

of affairs,'¹ the Queen and her cabinet were convinced that no long term benefit could be achieved there militarily.

The Imperial court, in particular, was dissatisfied with England's evident change in policy toward Spain and objected strongly to what was regarded as a denial of England's treaty obligations to obtain the entire Spanish monarchy. The English reluctance to make preparations for a renewed effort in Spain in 1712 brought additional charges. The English Government replied to these charges without any direct reference to the basic problem which it saw in the union of Spain and Austria. The jealousy which arose among the allies from the discussion about England's role in the war, the Government pointed out, was a weakening of the confederacy to such a degree that each of the participants felt they had reason to make a separate peace.² England agreed that an immediate peace was a necessity, but she insisted that it should be a general peace made by the allies as a group, not separately.³ While the ministry sincerely believed the importance of this, the French insisted on negotiating only with England. In the face of this situation, the cabinet decided to act as an intermediary, but not agree to a separate peace.⁴ In doing this, ministers

¹Cambridge University Library, Addit. MSS. 6570, fo. 47v: Argyll to Chetwynd, 26 September 1711.

³Bodleian Library, MS. Eng. Lett. e. 4, fo. 125: St. John to Orrery, 9 October 1711.

⁴Brit. Lib., Loan 29/10: Memoranda, 17 September 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 84/240, fos. 52-53: Strafford to St. John, 7 October 1711.

believed that they were performing their duties as leaders of the Alliance. However, the moves which England had made toward securing some commercial and teritorial advantages added to the criticism which the allies directed toward England. It seemed to those in London that the allies wanted to put the burden of the war on England, and at the same time prevent her from securing any advantage for herself. The French agreement to the preliminary proposals increased Allied suspicion even more, and the ministry went to great lengths to assure the allies that England would neither agree to a peace separately nor use the preliminary as anything but a foundation for peace.² In a meeting with Willem Buys at Windsor, Oxford carefully explained that the military situation abroad was so poor that it was impossible to succeed in obtaining a military solution. The Spaniards opposed the allies, in the first Portugal, Germany, and Spain were bleeding England place. white. At home, the reasons for peace were equally strong. The Queen's opinion and health argued for it, as did the inability to obtain funds, the political factions, and the political difficulties presented by Marlborough continuing in command.³

England believed that France had accepted general principles which were consistent with the objectives of the Grand Alliance and that specific negotiations could be

^LLongleat House, Portland MSS. v, fo. 253: Oxford to Marlborough, 30 October 1711.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/371: Oxford to Argyll, 30 October 1711.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/10: Memorandum, Windsor, 19 October 1711.

opened for the particular matters which each ally desired.¹ The Dutch agreed that peace was necessary. The only reservation which they had was over the method by which the peace would be negotiated and feared that they might be required to accept a dictated peace. The Queen, however, was not interested in settling the interests of others any more than she would accept others settling The ministry proposed that each nation her interests. procure its own interests from France, and that all the allies would support those demands as a matter of course. The negotiation of a joint arrangement between all the allies and the French would be an unnecessary delay to a settlement, the Government believed.² While all these arrangements were being made, England firmly believed that it was necessary to prepare for an active campaign in 1712 in order to be able to negotiate from a position of strength.³ The English envoy in Vienna implored the Imperial court to send 8,000 men from Hungary to fight against France and offered $\pounds40,000$ for the march of these In the Low Countries, England also proposed that troops. the army winter on the French frontier as an additional threat to France. Although neither plan was accepted by the allies,⁴ the ministry continued to encourage

¹P.R.O., S.P. 104/5: St. John to Pulteney, 23 October 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 161: St. John to Strafford, 23 October 1711; fos. 201-2: 26 October 1711.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 17,677 YYY, fos. 220, 229: St. John to Buys, 26 October 1711.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 204: St. John to Raby, 26 October 1711.

preparations for an active and vigourous campaign in 1712.¹

The Reluctance of the Allies to follow English Leadership

The failure of the allies to accept heartily either the English proposals for peace or the proposals for continuing the war, left Englishmen with a feeling of deep frustration and considerable bitterness. It was easily concluded that 'if they can't make war must we not make peace.'² Despite objections from the allies, the cabinet resolved to develop a method by which an acceptable peace could be reached. The previous experience of leaving the negotiations in the hands of the Dutch was seen in London as one reason why they had failed twice previously.³ Firmly taking the initiative, England attempted to connect both the proposals for peace and the preparations for the next campaign in an agreement with the Dutch.⁴ It still seemed possible to achieve the basic objectives, if the Confederacy could be persuaded to act together in simultaneously making preparations for war and continuing the peace negotiations. By remaining united and firm, England believed the allies could exact what demands they pleased

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fos. 211-12: St. John to Buys, 26 October 1711.

²Brit. Lib., Stowe 224, fos. 194-207: Strafford to Electress Sophia, 28 October 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 213: St. John to Strafford, 30 October 1711.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 273: St. John to Strafford, 2 November 1711. from France.¹ The English viewed unanimity of action, in both war and peace, as the key to achieving this. As time went on, however, it was apparent that the allies were suspicious of the method which England proposed. By conducting the peace negotiations, many were suspicious that England would gain far greater advantages than others, and they seemed to think that whoever made a separate peace first would benefit the greatest. The guestion was not 'whether we shall have a peace or not, but who shall first have the advantage of making it.² The Government in London saw the danger of a rush for peace. Faced with the impracticality of either continuing the war or concerting detailed peace preliminaries, the English ministry sought to take the lead and to negotiate a peace with France that would be acceptable and fair to the other allies and still achieve English goals. The Dutch agreed to England's proposals and began to prepare for the new campaign as an insurance against the precarious peace discussions.³ While the negotiations proceeded through the winter of 1711, English diplomats pressed the allies to develop their war effort. England hoped that they would be encouraged to prepare with greater vigour than ever before as a means to promote the success of the peace negotiations. The ministry believed that the appearance that the allies were

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/240, fo. 73v: Strafford to St. John, 13 November 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 288: Strafford to St. John, 15 November 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fo. 209: St. John to Strafford, 21 November 1711; S.P. 105/258, fo. 347: Extract of Register of States-General, 21 November 1711.

actually able to carry on the war would make the French 'come to what terms we can reasonably desire.'¹ In order to achieve this end, English military commanders were advised to carry on as they had in previous years, act in concert with the allies to prepare magazines and to guard the frontiers. Although new expenses should be avoided, if there was no firm progress toward peace by spring, the army would take the field, as a last resort, in order to force the French to agree to terms.² Objections to the Government's policy were heard both at home Portugal objected that any peace without and abroad. obtaining the entire monarchy of Spain for the House of Habsburg was a specific violation of its treaties with England, and the House of Lords declared in an address to the Queen that no peace was safe or honourable without Spain. Their views, however, had little influence with the Queen or the ministry. Undersecretary George Tilson commented,

> I take her Majesty's designs to be so just and honorable, that it must be the fault and diffidence of her Allys which must any way weaken her utmost efforts for their service. I don't find that the foucade in the House of Lords is like to influence much. As the Queen and Ministry is steady, no₃ other power can break their designs.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 212v-13: St. John to Strafford, 23 November 1711; S.P. 105/279, fo. 439: Strafford to St. John, 27 November 1711.

²P.R.O., S.P. 84/240, fo. 131v: Strafford to St. John, 27 November 1711.

³Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/8/7, fo. 9: Tilson to Chetwynd, 11 December 1711.

The interference of foreign envoys in England in an attempt to raise public opinion to follow the lead of the House of Lords caused only further resentment. It was said that 'the Emperor cares not if we sink under our load provided he have all entire and what must poor England have in this scramble: hungry honour, meager glory for our millions?'¹ The court in Vienna objected strongly to English measures and planned to send Prince Eugene on a mission to London to dissuade them,² but Grand Pensionary Heinsius privately advised that England should continue firm in her course of action despite Austrian views.³ With this encouragement, an agreement was made between the Dutch and English jointly to carry on the war and to negotiate the peace at a general congress.

In response to the Empire's solicitations for a renewed war effort on the old plan, the ministry objected that it would be dangerous to carry it out. The campaign of 1711 had shown the French army to be superior to the allies in Flanders, and if the French were defensive on the Rhine they could detach forces from there which would overwhelm the allies in Flanders. All the force which the Empire could possibly supply for the Rhine would not be enough to besiege the French fortress at Strassbourg. The siege of that place was the only effective offensive move the allies could make on the Rhine. In Italy and in Spain,

¹Ibid.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/214, fo. 59: Strafford to St. John, 12 December 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fo. 530: Strafford to St. John, 12 December 1711.

the proposed Imperial reinforcements would not increase the superiority of numbers in those theaters to make any substantial difference over the previous years' campaigns. The additional cost which this proposed offensive would bring to England and Holland was unacceptable.¹ While the actual conduct of military operations was not practical or desirable, England believed that during the peace negotiations it was of great importance to appear united and capable of military action. Every demand made to the French should 'be backed by the concurrent force of the entire confederacy.'² By proposing this method, the English ministry hoped that it had struck a balance between the options of continuing the war on a basis which would entirely ruin England or of proposing a treaty of peace that would be entirely unsatisfactory to the allies.³ The ministry was particularly encouraged in knowing that Grand Pensionary Heinsius approved of England's plan, and Heinsius had assured the English envoy that peace was indispensibly necessary. He agreed that a continuation of the war would risk the objectives of all the allies, and it was probable that the allies would neither be able to perform their promises nor be able to re-establish confidence among themselves. At the same time, the Great Northern War once again presented a threat to the

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fos. 599-601: Strafford to St. John, 22 December 1711.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/39: Instruction to Lord Privy Seal, 23 December 1711.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/241, fos. 244v-45: St. John to Strafford, 28 December 1711; Brit. Lib., Stowe MSS. 224, fo. 265: Strafford to Electress Sophia, 18 February 1712.

effectiveness of the Alliance. There seemed little hope of improvement and Heinsius thought it best to obtain the best peace possible by allowing Philip V to remain in Spain and to establish a good basis for Anglo-Dutch commerce.¹ With this strong encouragement, ministers could agree that 'tis fit it should be seen that tho' we are for peace, we are only for a good one.'²

In Vienna, the Imperial court welcomed England's plea for a vigourous campaign in 1712, and quickly proposed measures which, a few years earlier, would have been welcomed in London. Prince Eugene's visit to London and The Hague in the winter of 1711-12³ was designed to carry forward these proposals, but England was determined only to give the appearance of war preparations, not actually to engage in any extensive campaign. As Undersecretary Tilson put it,

> we are jaded with the load of the war and must get over it—let our wise Lords think as they please, for if we were to fight till the moot point of Spain were determined, we might soon battle it entirely in forma pauperis.⁴

The keystone of English policy was close and friendly

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/243, fo. 24: Strafford to St. John, 5 January 1712.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/8/7, fo. 3: Tilson to Chetwynd, 15 February 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/258, fos. 599-604: Strafford to St. John, 22 December 1711; P.R.O., S.P. 100/10: 'Points dont sa Majestie Imperiale et Cattolique a chargé La Prince Eugene de Savoye', 25 January 1712; See also Max Braubach, <u>Prinz Eugen von Savoyen</u>, (Wien, 1964), iii, 77-99.

⁴Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/8/7, fo. 2: Tilson to Chetwynd, 29 February 1712.

relations with the Dutch. As winter turned to spring in 1712, it became increasingly obvious that suspicions were growing and contributing to a basic misunderstanding with the Dutch.¹ Deeply concerned over this turn of events, the ministry used all available means to assure the Dutch of England's honourable intentions. Thomas Harley, the Lord Treasurer's cousin, was sent on a special mission to quiet Dutch fears that England would take advantage of the allies at the peace. He was directed to advise them that the Queen would demand the Asiento, Port Mahon, and Gibraltar, and if the Dutch would agree to those points she would adjust trade to Spain and the Spanish dominions on the same basis it had been during Charles II's time. Pointing out that long negotiations were a detriment to a peace settlement, Harley was to emphasize that the secret conferences which England was holding were an effective method which might 'amount to a real security and a reasonable satisfaction for the several princes and states engaged with it.'² Harley was to justify the Queen's demands and her policy toward ending the war. However, he was to stress that the most important and the most difficult point was to prevent the union of Spain and France.

Harley was also sent to discuss matters with the French and with the elector of Hanover. The French were advised that England was ready for peace, but that public

^LBrit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/199, fo. 20: Drummond to Oxford, 8 March 1712.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/6: Additional Instructions for Mr. Harley, 4 March 1712.

opinion was based on the assurance that the peace would give just satisfaction to all of the allies. 'If in this opinion, our people should be unfortunately disappointed,' the instruction read, 'there is reason to fear that they may return to the same eagerness for the prosecution of the war, as they have formerly showed'.¹ While continuing the game of bluff with France, and the campaign to regain Dutch confidence, the ministry took time also to lecture the Hanoverian court at Herrenhausen. The future King George I was advised that if he continued to allow his diplomats to become involved in English party policies, his interest in the succession would be sacrificed to that of a party by measures which tended to set him at the head of one party, in opposition to the other.² The ministry believed that this intrusion into internal politics by foreign diplomats had caused the House of Commons not to vote a full supply for the war.³ The unexpected vote on reduction in war spending had taken the military operations out of the ministry's hands, 4 and made the allies dependent on Parliament. Despite this setback to the ministry's plans, the Government still believed that if the Dutch and the other allies would join with England and trust in her negotiations, a satisfactory peace could be reached.

Despite the additional assurances of Lord Strafford,

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/6: Instructions to Mr. Harley; Huntington Library, ST. 57, vi, p. 209: Brydges to Drummond, 14 March 1712.

⁴Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/6: Instructions to Mr. Harley.

the English envoy at Utrecht, and John Drummond, the confidant of Lord Oxford, the Dutch remained deeply suspicious and jealous of English commercial advantages. ¹ The English Government remained steadfast in pursuing its policy. Admiral Wishart sailed for The Hague where he began his annual negotiation for the naval quotas, and the usual conferences were begun to provide for the army's forage and to renew the troop treaties.² The severe spending restrictions imposed by Parliament did not stop the Government from carrying out its bluff tactics against France.³ England assured the Dutch that she was willing to purchase their friendship, at any expense that did not sacrifice the interests of her own subjects.⁴ The duke of Ormonde, the new captain-general who had replaced Marlborough in January, was sent to convince the States-General, in early April, that he was prepared to pursue the war vigourously in the next campaign.⁵ By these gestures, the Government hoped that Dutch fears would vanish.⁶ While making these assurances to the Dutch, the

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,621, fo. 46: St. John to T. Harley, 22 March 1712.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,621, fos. 50-51: St. John to Lords Plenipotentiary, 12 April 1712.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 84/243, fo. 126: Strafford to St. John, 16 March 1712; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/199, fos. 22-25: Drummond to Oxford, 15 March 1712.

²Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. A. 286, fo. 69: Strafford to Lord Privy Seal, 23 March 1712.

⁵Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778, v, 197: 'Abstract of duke of Ormond's orders and letters,' April-July 1712.

⁶Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,621, fos. 50-51: St. John to Lords Plenipotentiary, 12 April 1712.

Government took precautions to ensure that Port Mahon and Gibraltar would remain in English hands. The garrison commanders and the naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean were secretly ordered to protect their positions from all foreign powers and, in order to prevent surprise, allow only English troops to enter the fortifications.¹

The negotiations in Holland seemed to bring some indications of success. Thomas Harley reported that Heinsius had told him that the security of the Dutch Republic 'is and must be by joining with the Queen'.² Those in favour of peace in the Dutch Republic gave assurances that if the Queen persisted in her policy, those who objected to the method would quickly approve of the result and join in the settlement which England would make.³ While the ministry believed that it had gained the backing of the Dutch,⁴ the negotiations with France neared a satisfactory conclusion on keeping separate the crowns of France and Spain. The military situation, particularly in Flanders, remained a precarious one. There were indications that a dispute might break out over the command of the allied army, even before all the troops were in the The French, on the other hand, had a much stronger, field.

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to Jennings, 15 April 1712.

²Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/199: T. Harley to Oxford, 14 April 1712.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. 40,621, fo. 60-1: T. Harley to [St. John], 24 April 1712.

⁴Bodleian Library, Rawl C. 391, fo. 8: [Robinson] to St. John, 27 April 1712.

better supplied, and better posted army.¹ In this situation, Ormande was ordered to be very cautious about engaging in any action unless he had a very apparent and considerable advantage.² Although a general uneasiness continued between England and the States-General as the army took the field, there were repeated indications that France would reach a settlement³ and that the Dutch would accept the arrangement made by England. In early May 1712, the negotiations reached a critical stage. Louis XIV agreed to accept two alternate plans for the Spanish Succession. In the first plan, Philip V would retain his right of succession to the French crown, but would agree to evacuate Spain and the Indies in favour of the duke of Savoy. In compensation for giving up Spain, he would receive Piedmont, Monserrat, Savoy, Nice, and the mainland portions of the kingdom of Sicily. The island itself would revert to the house of Austria. The alternate choice was for Philip to keep Spain and the Indies, but renounce any right to the French succession for himself or his children. The decision was to be made by Philip V. The English ministry believed that he would choose to evacuate Spain since that arrangement would benefit France and the house of Bourbon more than the other plan. However, both

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/259, fo. 511: Strafford to St. John, 30 April 1712.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fos. 198-9: St. John to Ormonde, 25 April 1712.

³Staffordshire R.O., D 649/8/19 fo. 18: St. John to Peterborough, 2 May 1712; P.R.O., S.P. 105/259, fo. 535: Strafford to St. John, 3 May 1712; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 22,204 to 142v. [Papers relating to Utrecht], 6 May 1712; Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/199 fo. 47v: Drummond to Oxford, 10 May 1712.

proposals satisfactorily provided for the principal problem in preventing European domination by either a Bourbon or a Habsburg.¹ While the ministry in London waited for a courier to travel between Versailles and Madrid with these proposals, they saw that the entire negotiation could collapse if a military contest developed which showed either weakness on the part of the allies or gave the French any advantage. Therefore, the Government ordered Ormonde to avoid engaging in any siege or hazarding any battle. 'The Queen cannot think with patience of sacrificing men when there is a fair prospect of attaining her purpose another way, 'Ormonde was instructed. 'Besides, she will not suffer herself to be exposed to the reproach of having retarded by the events of a campaign a negotiation which might otherwise have been as good as concluded in a few days'.² While keeping this a secret from the allies in order to try to prevent any bad effects from public discussion of the order, the French were notified through the Abbé Gaultier and de Torcy .³ Initially there was little difficulty in maintaining an inactive army in Flanders,⁴ but as the time lengthened, the allies became more and more uneasy.

¹Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 40,621, fos. 72-73: St. John to Harley, 17 May 1712.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/265: St. John to Ormonde, 10 May 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 254: St. John to de Torcey, 10 May 1712. Received by Villars, 25 May 1712.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 230: Ormonde to Bolingbroke, 12 May 1712.

The Dutch deputies objected strongly to Ormonde's inaction and apparent lack of interest in the campaign. Ormonde, himself, found it increasingly difficult to carry out his orders under such criticism, when all preparations for the campaign had been made,¹ but the ministry firmly repeated their orders to him and gave the French assurances that England would not engage in a battle.² At home, a debate in Parliament over the orders to Ormonde earned a vote of confidence.

While the campaign in Flanders was suspended, the cabinet ordered the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to assist Imperial troops in evacuating Catalonia and returning to Italy. Transports were ordered to move regiments from Gibraltar to Port Mahon, and the remaining English forces were to be sent to England to be disbanded. When Catalonia was evacuated, Admiral Jennings was instructed to proceed to Sicily and to assist the duke of Savoy in taking possession of that island. When these duties were completed, the squadron was to return to England leaving two ships to defend Minorca, and additional two for the protection of shipping, in case war should break out with the Barbary states.³

When the courier returned from Madrid, ministers in

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 330: St. John to Ormonde, 27 May 1712; fos. 318-24: Deputies of States-General to Ormonde, 4 June 1712; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 49,970: St. John to Torcey, 28 May 1712; MSS. Loan 29/199: Ormonde to Oxford, 4 June 1712.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 338: St. John to Ormonde, 28 May 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to Jennings, 20 May 1712.

London were surprised to learn that Philip had chosen the option to renounce his right to the succession of the French crown and to remain as king of Spain. Although this decision did not promote the duke of Savoy in position as they had hoped, Philip's decision was a satisfactory basis upon which England could agree to peace. Immediately upon receiving the news of Philip's decision, the Government began negotiations with France for a cease fire in the Low Countries.¹ While this agreement was being concluded, England agreed not to act against the French in any manner and, at the same time, refused the French proposal that the army under Ormonde act in conjunction with the French in relieving the Imperial-Dutch siege of Quesnoy.² However, the ministry took precautions against being caught off guard by France. If Louis XIV refused to agree to execute the articles regarding Spain and to English occupation of Dunkirk, then Ormonde's army would be freed from all restrictions and could act against France. All the allies were asked to join in the cease fire agreement, but England would not delay her action while the allies decided. The duke of Ormonde was given strict orders that upon receipt of the news that Dunkirk would be surrendered to England, 'your Grace will have no more to do, than to declare the suspension between Great Britain and

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/360, fo. 39: Articles proposé par sa Matie la Reine de la Grand Bretagne pour une suspension d'armes, 6/17 June 1712.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/365, fo. 371: St. John to Torcy, 6 June 1712; fo. 374, 7 June 1712.

France'.¹ On the supposition that France would agree to the proposals, preparations were made for the English army to take possession of Dunkirk in 'the safest and best manner, and this not only with respect to the enemy, but to the Allies'.²

In London, the final arrangement for a cease fire was reached on 14 June 1712. The ministry sincerely believed that it had reached a settlement that was fair and basically acceptable to all the other allies, while at the same time satisfying English war aims. At home, it was readily apparent that the Whigs would not be pleased about the settlement, although there were strong indications that both houses of Parliament would accept the agreement with sufficient majorities. It was obvious also that the Dutch would strongly object to England's occupation of Dunkirk.³ Ormonde was told to be cautious, 'Nothing can be more dreadful to the Dutch than this town in English hands; consider therefore the temper they are in'.⁴ If there was any indication that the Dutch might use their army to prevent the occupation, the plan was to be kept a secret and troops sent directly from England to occupy Dunkirk.

Louis XIV accepted the English proposals for the

¹Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/309, sec. 4: St. John to Ormonde, 7 June 1712.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 422-3: St. John to Ormonde, 11 June 1712.

³Bodleian Library, Rawl. A. 286: Strafford to Lord Privy Seal, 14 June 1712; Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,272, fo. 117: St. John to Lord Privy Seal, 14 June 1712.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 426: St. John to Ormonde, 14 June 1712.

suspension of arms and the form of the Spanish renunciation on 22 June 1712.¹ By this agreement, Dunkirk was ordered given up and Philip's renunciation was to include a provision that Savoy succeed to the Spanish throne upon the failure of a Bourbon succession, in order to avoid a future situation in which Spain might become part of the Imperial dominions.²

Immediately upon receiving word that Louis XIV's orders for evacuating Dunkirk had been received by the governor of that fortress, Ormonde declared a cessation of hostilities in the Netherlands.³ Taking all precaution against a Dutch retaliatory attack on the English army enroute to Dunkirk, troops were embarked in transports convoyed by a squadron under Admiral Sir John Leake and ordered to occupy Dunkirk, 'in order to establish a suspension of arms in the Netherlands and to prepare the way for a general cessation.'⁴

Throughout these events, England stood ready to support the allies. The Government believed that it had obtained the best general agreement which could be obtained, and although the ministry declined to specify the further interests of the separate allies, she believed that England

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fos. 438-41: Torcy to St. John, 11/22 June 1712.

²Bodleian Library, Rawl. A. 285, fos. 178-81: Spanish Renunciation.

³Brit. Lib., MSS. Loan 29/307, sec. 4: St. John to Ormonde, 27 June 1712.

⁴Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 5443, fo. 261: Instructions to Leake, 3 July 1712; fos. 256-7: Admiralty to Leake, 2 July 1712; fo. 258: 3 July 1712; P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fos. 544-6: St. John to Ormonde, 5 July 1712. had made the opportunity for them to obtain reasonable satisfaction from France. As long as the allies would co-operate and desist from forcing the English Government into taking extreme positions, the Queen would support them in obtaining their own objectives.¹ The ministry in London was angered by the failure of the Dutch and the Austrians to agree readily to the measures which England The separation of the auxiliary troops by had taken. Prince Eugene and the continuation of the campaign in the Low Countries by the other allies, led St. John to remark bitterly, 'they will venture all to force the Queen, rather than secure all by coupling with her. Let the consequences be what they will. . . . I pray God, they do not find reason to repent their rash concils and inflexible obstinancy'.² While some such as St. John personally considered the idea of turning the English army against the allies,³ the cabinet decided that it was far better to continue as the ministers believed they had from the very first, equally just and equally firm towards all parties, toward the French as well as the allies. The cabinet decided that it would not be proper to co-operate with the French against the allies, no matter how great the provocation the allies had given, in the hope that the allies

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/260, fo. 95: St. John to Lord Privy Seal, 30 June 1712.

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 604: St. John to [?], 11 July 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 84/243, fo. 242: Strafford to St. John, 17 July 1712.

would eventually come into the peace arrangement.¹ While the allies continued to act in an unco-operative manner, Ormonde was ordered to retain the towns of Ghent and Bruges as a protection for the English army while Dunkirk was being reduced.²

In the Mediterranean, there had been no cessation of Admiral Byng was directed to attack the enemy and arms. operate as he had previously done. ³ Additional precautions were taken to ensure that Minorca was safely guarded and kept in English hands.⁴ In anticipation of a cease fire in the Mediterranean, English troops in Spain were ordered to remain together in garrison at Tarragona, a convenient position from which to guarantee the preliminary treaty. The army commander in Spain was directed to maintain possession of that town until further order, and if the army had withdrawn from Tarragona, it was to be seized.⁵ At sea, the cease fire would have to take place in different places at different times. In order to remedy the difficulty posed by time and distance, passports were to be issued by both sides and orders given to all warships and privateers to respect them. At the same time, a French convoy of grain from the Levant was to be allowed to pass

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 640: Bolingbroke to Ormonde, 19 July 1712.

²Huntington Library, MSS. HM 12,548: Bolingbroke to Ormonde, 22 July 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 44/216: Dartmouth to Admiralty, 8 July 1712.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to Barrymore, 8 July 1712; Instructions to Argyll, 20 July 1712.

⁵P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to Barrymore, 19 July 1712.

safely while the French agreed to allow the safe passage of the English trading fleets.¹ Additional orders were given for the squadron to support the agreement with France. The Admiral commanding the Mediterranean squadron was ordered to refuse all requests by the Emperor to provide transportation of Imperial troops to Spain. However, any request to assist in removing the Empress or Imperial troops from Spain was to be complied with readily.²

In late July, France and England agreed to a general suspension of arms by sea and land, but the Queen refused to ratify it immediately.³ Bolingbroke was sent to Paris in order to adjust some of the matters relating to Savoy which remained the final obstacle to agreement.⁴ Finally, on 18 August 1712, the Queen declared in council that she had ratified the suspension of arms to last from 11 August until 11 December.⁵ The English envoys at Utrecht were immediately notified and told that 'if any of the allies are desirous to enjoy the benefit of this cessation, Her Majesty is willing to propose it to the Court of France'.⁶

¹P.R.O., S.P. 44/216: Dartmouth to Jennings, 12 July 1712.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/17, p. 267: Dartmouth to Jennings, 1 August 1712.

³Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,272, fo. 155: Bolingbroke to Lords Plenipoteniary, 29 July 1712.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fos. 720-8: Instructions to Bolingbroke, 31 July 1712.

⁵P.R.O., P.C. 2/84, fos. 1-3: Privy Council Register, 18 August 1712.

⁶Brit. Lib., Addit. MSS. 37,272, fo. 162: Dartmouth to Lords Plenipoteniary, 18 August 1712.

English forces in Spain were directed to publish the truce and to separate themselves from the other allies although the English troops were to remain in the field as a single body until further orders.¹ By early September, the orders and agreement for a suspension of arms in the colonies were sent to America.²

The Use of English forces after the cease fire

After the hostilities had ended, England continued to use her military forces in order to assure that the peace was settled as she wished it. In the Low Countries, Ormonde was ordered to keep Bruges and Ghent and to allow no foreign troops in those cities. 'The Queen has received so much ill usage with respect to the commerce of her subjects in the Netherlands, 'Bolingbroke wrote, '. . . she is resolved to treat upon that head with these pawns in her hand.'³ And in Spain, Lord Lexington, who was negotiating the final agreement with Spain, was instructed that the cession of Minorca and Gibraltar to England was to be done with the same care as the cession of Sicily to the duke of Savoy.⁴ The Government gave Austria and France every assurance that England would facilitate the return of Imperial troops from Spain and that she would ensure that there would be no obstruction

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to C-in-C, Catalonia, 21 August 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/265, fo. 776: Bolingbroke to Ormonde, 9 September 1712.

⁴P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to Lexington, 10 September 1712.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/17, p. 281: Dartmouth to Admiralty, 9 September 1712.

to it.¹ At the same time, the English diplomats at Utrecht objected that the recall of Dutch ships from the Mediterranean would endanger the German forces left in Catalonia² by exposing them to attack by the French and Spanish.

The military situation in Spain was not what the ministry had hoped it would be. The army had been unable to secure Tarragona as a place of retreat by the time that the cessation of arms had been announced in that area.³ Despite the difficulties presented, arrangements were made to transport the Imperial troops from Catalonia, and plans were laid for the fleet to assist Savoy in taking Sicily.⁴

In Portugal, the withdrawal of English troops became enmeshed in the prolonged negotiations for a cease fire between Portugal, Spain and France. The suspension of arms was declared in the Queen's name at Lisbon on 24 October,⁵ and a general suspension of arms between the other belligerents was agreed to at Utrecht on 8 November 1712.⁶ The English troops in Portugal were ordered to march across

¹P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Additional Instructions to Argyll, 13 September 1712.

²Bodleian Library, MSS. Rawl. A. 286: Strafford to Lord Privy Seal, 11 September 1712; Prior to Strafford and Lord Privy Seal, 23 October 1712.

³Spencer Research Library, U. of Kansas, MS. Gl5, ii, p. 72: Jennings to consuls, 18 September 1712; pp. 77-8: Jennings to Argyll, 21 September 1712.

⁴P.R.O., F.O. 97/37: Dartmouth to Peterborough, 14 October 1712; C.O. 174/15, fo. 47: Argyll to Dartmouth, 21 October 1712.

⁵P.R.O., S.P. 89/22, fo. 169: Pearce to Dartmouth, 8 November 1712.

⁶Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. A. 286, fo. 235: [Lord Privy Seal] to Bolingbroke, 8 November 1712.

Spain to Gibraltar where they would man the garrison.¹ The Government in London remained deeply concerned about the settlement of affairs relating to Spain. While much of this was handled at Utrecht, Lord Lexington in Madrid played a significant role. He admitted, however, that he treated 'with all the disadvantage that ever man did, for I am not master of Spanish, and none of the ministers understand anything else.'² By early November, Lexington had obtained the basis for the final agreement with Spain by which Philip V renounced his right to the French throne, and in case of failure of the present settlement, agreed that the Spanish crown would devolve on the house of Savoy. In reviewing the agreement, Secretary of State Lord Dartmouth believed that it had been stated in such binding terms that

> so firm a foundation is thereby bid for the future peace whereof the Crowns of Great Britain, France, Spain, and other powers are to be guarantees, that her Majesty has not the least apprehension that such an establishment can ever be shaken by any attempt of the house of Austria.³

With this basic step firmly taken, English troops were withdrawn from Catalonia and garrisoned at Port Mahon by

²P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Lexington to Dartmouth, 31 October 1712.

³P.R.O., S.P. 105/269: Dartmouth to Lexington, 7 November 1712. See also Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D (W) 1778/I/ii, fo. 349: Dartmouth to Queen Anne, 4 November 1712.

¹Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/15, pp. 49-50: Dartmouth to Lexington, 23 October 1712; Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl A. 206, fo. 228: Lord Privy Seal to Bolingbroke, 1 November 1712.

the end of November 1712.¹

Although English military activity had ceased in Spain, the Government still attempted to use the Mediterranean squadron as an influence on the final peace settlement. At Utrecht, English diplomats proposed neutrality for Italy, and while negotiations were proceeding on this point, the order for the English fleet to transport the Imperial forces from Catalonia was rescinded.² However, the threat which England saw these forces presenting to the settlement in Italy seemed largely imaginary since the Imperial forces under Starhemberg refused to evacuate Spain.³ The final settlement had still not been made by the expiration of the cease fire in early December, but the diplomats at Utrecht were able to agree to an extension of the cease fire until 11 April 1713.⁴

The disposition of Sicily remained to be dealt with, and it presented an essential point in England's concept of maintaining the balance of power. In order to ensure that Savoy obtained the island as England had intended, Admiral Jennings was instructed to prevent the transportation of any troops except those of Savoy, from Naples or any other part of Italy, to Sicily. The ministry believed

¹Spencer Library, U. of Kansas, MS. G15, ii, p. 117: Jennings to Dartmouth, 24 November 1712.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D(W) 1778/iii/0/17, p. 294: Dartmouth to Jennings, 10 November 1712; P.R.O., F.O. 97/37: Dartmouth to Peterborough, 13 November 1712.

³Bedfordshire R.O., MS. WY/899, p. 17: Argyll to Prior, 2 December 1712.

⁴P.R.O., P.C. 2/84, fo. 53: Privy Council Register, 11 December 1712.

that an attack on Sicily by any other power would jeopardize English commercial interests in the Mediterranean. Despite the original intention of the ministry to withdraw the fleet from the Mediterranean, it was kept on station in order to supervise the safe transfer of Sicily and the final transportation of Imperial troops out of Catalonia. The proclamation of peace was made by the Queen in Council on 4 May 1713,¹ but it was not until July that Admiral Jennings could report that he had satisfactorily transported the Imperial troops from Spain and that H.M.S. <u>Blenheim</u> had carried the duke of Savoy to his new territory.²

The War of the Spanish Succession was over, but England continued to use her fleet to ensure that the Utrecht settlement was maintained. Queen Anne underscored the point in her speech from the throne in March 1714:

> Our situation points out to us our true interest, for this country can flourish only by trade, and will be most formidable by the right application of our Naval Force.³

England believed that a new balance of power in Europe had been established by the use of military and naval power, it could now be maintained by the appropriate use of the navy. Already the settlement was threatened. The Catalans were reluctant to accept the peace, and Sweden was in danger of destruction from Russia.

³H.M.C., <u>Lords</u> <u>MSS</u>. x, p. 225.

¹P.R.O., P.C. 2/84, fo. 101: Privy Council Register, 11 December 1712.

²Staffordshire R.O., MSS. D649/8, fo. 20: Jennings to Chetwynd, 2 July 1713.

Conclusion

Throughout the war, England consistently sought to use the Grand Alliance as the most effective means of attacking France and forcing her to disperse her formidable forces. The Harley ministry used this strategy in its early efforts to bring France to the negotiating table. Continued military defeat in Spain along with doubt over the ability of the other allies to continue to fight the war prevented England from placing all her hope on her military and naval strategy. The election of the Archduke Charles as Emperor presented a dilemma for English strategy. As Emperor, Charles secured Austria's position in the war against France, but if the grand strategy were to be carried to its logical conclusion, the balance of power would be upset by bringing Spain, Italy, and the Indies under direct Austrian control. In this difficult situation, England tried to use the Alliance as the most effective means to put pressure on France, while at the same time attempting to secure from this position of strength, a peace which was advantageous to the allies but which was based on a balance of power. Once a cease fire had been achieved, England carefully employed her forces in the Mediterranean in a way which prevented the juncture of Spain and the Empire under Emperor Charles VI, while at the same time procuring the special commercial and territorial arrangement which England sought. From the very outset of the war, England had sought to win an independent Spain, unfettered to any major power in Europe in order to facilitate the growth of English commerce and to secure

political independence from any major European power. Although the means to this goal were altered in 1711, the goal was achieved.

In initiating the arrangement which resulted in the Utrecht agreement, England saw herself as the leader of the Alliance. She sought what she considered a fair and equitable peace for the allies, while at the same time reaching her own goals. The ministry quite sincerely believed that it was acting responsibly toward the allies, but in doing so it failed to understand the nature of the allies' varying points of view.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

England participated in the War of the Spanish Succession as a member of the Grand Alliance, but her conduct of grand strategy demonstrated that her viewpoint was different from that of her allies. From the very outset of the war, England had a clear view of the ends she wished to accomplish in the war and the means by which she intended to achieve them. It was the means, the grand strategy which England wished to use to defeat France, which was the basis upon which the Alliance was built and held together. The allies agreed to defeat France, and they wished to achieve particular dynastic, financial, diplomatic, territorial or military goals as part of the Alliance. England utilized these desires, but rarely employed her own ultimate objectives as the basis for agreement with the other allies. At the beginning, there were no great difficulties, but as the war progressed tension slowly developed and the allies became suspicious of England's motives. Eventually, when England realized that her grand strategy was no longer appropriate to achieve her aims, the Alliance collapsed.

Throughout the war, England saw herself as the leader of the Alliance, and she saw herself acting jointly with the Dutch as her closest supporters. However, England's view and conduct were based upon her own national viewpoint, not a broader European or allied concept of affairs. Like others, she saw herself as the centre of things, and she showed difficulty in fully appreciating the viewpoint, the needs, the ambitions, and the threats which her allies felt. Most importantly, the English ministry failed to understand how its own pursuit of long standing goals appeared as a threat to the allies. While the Government in London appreciated certain allied ambitions to the point of using them as incentives to participate in the war, England appeared to assume that her own concept of a European balance of power as the necessary condition for national independence, commercial growth, and international influence was equally compelling and important to the allies. In the same way, she failed fully to appreciate the competing goals of the allies which distracted them in carrying out her concept of grand strategy. While these are not unusual problems in relations between nations, they were causes of growing tension between England and her allies in the War of the Spanish Succession. In many cases, of course, joint allied achievements satisfied each ally, but the reasons for satisfaction may well have been different. The Blenheim campaign, for example, was undertaken by Marlborough and the ministry at the instigation of Germans and Austrians, but its purpose in English eyes was not merely to rescue Austria from attack but to maintain the Alliance and to facilitate allied military operations against France in Spain, Italy, and Germany in order to achieve England's goals.

Viewed from other perspectives, the English view and conduct of the war appeared rather different from the way

it was seen from within the ministry. As a court favourite, key diplomat and victorious general, Marlborough was regarded by many as the cement of the Alliance. Abroad he was often regarded as the all powerful director of England's war effort, not more mundanely as an important figure in a complex, bureaucratic process of decision making. The decline of his political influence and the change in ministry were interpreted as an abrupt change in English war policy, not as the result of internal political and court quarrels. The new ministry's policy was seen as one of peace at any price, not as the ministry itself believed, a determination to reach an expeditious peace through the established war strategy and a peace which was just to all the allies. Marlborough's brilliant victories in Flanders overemphasized in men's minds the importance of that theatre and obscured the concept which lay behind the way in which the nation actually used her diplomacy, her money, her men and her ships. Public opinion was seen as something which determined policy. In this understanding, the public debate over war policy seemed to reflect serious strategic alternatives based either on the army or the navy, Flanders or Spain, continental or blue water strategies. The public debate was not viewed as something which served more subtle ends in the political life of England.

Both the basic strategic concept which England pursued at the outset of the war and the different arrangement which she agreed to in the Utrecht settlement were primarily concerned, in England's view, with the position of Spain in European politics. Both were concerned with maintaining

Spanish independence from the control of any great power as the means by which a balance of power could be maintained in Europe. In little more than a century, English policy toward Spain had altered dramatically. Under Elizabeth, Spain was directly challenged; under Anne, the Spanish empire was preserved. However, the ultimate purposes of such contrasting policies were not so different. Both were attempts to assert and maintain England's position in Europe. A weak, independent Spain served at Utrecht to check French growth. Spain could now be exploited as the center of the old system of European overseas trade and be remoulded into the Atlantic economy which the English and Dutch were developing.¹

An analysis of the economic, political, diplomatic, naval, and military aspects of the English view and conduct of the War of the Spanish Succession reveal that England consistently attempted to use all her resources in an effort to obtain her own, peculiarly English objectives. International diplomacy, finance, military and naval force were all used in a complementary fashion to achieve these ends. With singularity of purpose, the successive Governments which managed the war were motivated by the fact that the nation's strategic problem was concerned with the balance of power in Europe as the best practical arrangement through which the nation could maintain her

¹See Vincent T. Harlow, <u>The Founding of the Second</u> British Empire (London, 1952), p. 10; Jan De Vries, <u>The</u> Economy of Europe in Age of Crisis, 1600-1750 (Cambridge, 1976), chapter 4; and Ralph Davis, <u>The Rise of the Atlantic</u> Economics (London, 1973), chapter 11-12.

national security, political independence and commercial growth. English seamen, soldiers and diplomats served, within their own spheres, to achieve those ends.

APPENDIX A

Dramatis Personae:

An alphabetical listing of Englishmen mentioned in the text with the offices held relating to the conduct of grand strategy.

- Aglionby, William: Switzerland, envoy-extraordinary, November 1702 - April 1705.
- Anne: Queen of England, 8 March 1702 1 August 1714.

<u>Argyll</u>, John Campbell, duke of: c.-in-c., forces in Spain, 29 May 1711 - 1713; Minorca, governor and c.-in-c., garrison, 7 June 1712 - 24 August 1713.

- Blackwell, Sir Lambert: Tuscany, envoy-extraordinary, April 1697 - May 1705.
- Blathwayt, William: secretary at war, August 1683 -19 April 1704; secretary to King William III when in Holland.
- Boyle, Henry: secretary of state (Northern Department), 13 February 1708 - 20 September 1710.
- Brydges, James: Prince's Council, 29 March 1703 10 June 1705; paymaster of H.M. forces.
- Burchett, Josiah: Admiralty secretary, 24 June 1702 28 April 1741.
- Byng, Admiral Sir George: commissioner of the Admiralty, 8 November 1709 - 30 September 1712; Algiers, envoy, October 1703.
- Cadogan, Lieutenant-General William: Flanders, envoyextraordinary and plenipotentiary, November 1707 -January 1711; United Provinces, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, January 1708 - December 1710.
- Cardonnel, Adam de: secretary to the duke of Marlborough.
- Chetwynd, John: Savoy, credentials, December 1705 June 1706; envoy-extraordinary, October 1706 - September 1713.
- Chetwynd, William: Genoa, resident, August 1708 March 1711; envoy-extraordinary, March 1711 - February 1713.

- Churchill, Rear-Admiral George: commissioner of the Admiralty, 4 April 1701 - 25 January 1702; Prince's Council, 22 May 1702 - 28 October 1702.
- Clarke, George: secretary to the lord high admiral, 20 May 1702 - 24 October 1705; commissioner of the Admiralty, 20 December 1710 - 30 September 1712.
- Codrington, Christopher: governor, Leeward Islands, 1699 1704.
- Cornbury, Edward Hyde, Baron: governor of New Jersey, 1703 - 1708; governor of New York, 1702 - 1708.
- <u>Cresset</u>, James: Brunswick-Lüneberg (Hanover), envoyextraordinary, March 1694 - September 1703.
- Dartmouth, William Legge, Lord: secretary of state (Southern Department), 14 June 1710 - 16 August 1713. Created earl of Dartmouth, September 1711.
- <u>Davenant</u>, Henry: circles of the electoral Rhine, Swabia, Upper Rhine and Franconia, secretary of mission, April 1703 - October 1711; Brunswick-Lüneberg (Hanover), credentials, July - October 1709.
- Dayrolles, James: United Provinces, resident, September 1706 November 1712.
- Dudley, Joseph: governor, Massachusetts Bay, 1702 1715.
- Earle, Lieutenant-General Thomas: c.-in-c., forces on expedition, 1 May 22 December 1708.
- Ellis, John: undersecretary of state, 1695 1705.
- Fairborne, Admiral Sir Stafford: Prince's Council, 8 February 1706 - 19 June 1708.
- Galway, Henry de Massue de Ruvigny, earl of: c.-in-c., H.M. forces in Spain, 21 November 1706-08; c.-in-c., H.M. forces in Portugal, 3 July 1704 - 23 August 1710; Portugal, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, April 1708 - September 1710.
- George, Prince of Denmark: lord high admiral, 20 May 1702 -28 October 1708; generalissimo of all Her Majesty's land forces, 8 June 1702 - 28 October 1708.
- <u>Godolphin</u>, Sidney, Lord: after December 1706, earl of Godolphin; lord high treasurer, 8 May 1702 -August 1710.
- <u>Granville</u>, George: secretary at war, 28 September 1710 27 June 1712.
- Handasyde, Thomas: governor of Jamaica, 1702 1711.

- Harley, Robert: speaker of the House of Commons; secretary of state (Northern Department), 18 May 1704 -10 February 1708; lord high treasurer, 30 May 1711 -July 1714; created earl of Oxford and Mortimer, July 1712.
- Harley, Thomas: Brunswick-Lüneberg, credentials, July -October 1712; United Provinces, credentials. Cousin to Robert Harley.
- Haversham, John Thompson, baron: commissioner of the Admiralty, 4 April 1701 25 January 1702.
- <u>Hedges</u>, Sir Charles: judge of the High Court of Admiralty; secretary of state (Northern Department), 5 November 1700 - 29 December 1701, 2 May 1702 - 17 May 1704, (Southern Department), 27 April 1704 - 3 December 1706.
- <u>Hill</u>, Brigadier-General John: c.-in-c., forces in Canada and America, 1 March 1711 -
- Hill, Richard: Prince's Council, 22 May 1702 28 October 1708; Savoy, envoy-extraordinary, January 1704 -December 1705; Board of trade, 1696 - 1702.
- Jennings, Admiral Sir John: c.-in-c., Mediterranean, January 1711 - November 1713.
- Leake, Sir John: commodore, Newfoundland, 1702; Prince's Council, 19 April - 28 October 1708; commissioner of the Admiralty, 8 November 1709 - 30 September 1712.
- Lexington, Robert Sutton, baron: Spain, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, October 1712 -December 1713.
- Lewis, Erasmus: undersecretary of state, 1704 1714.
- <u>Manchester</u>, Charles Montagu, earl of: France, ambassador extraordinary, June 1699 - October 1701; secretary of state (Southern Department), 4 January - 2 May 1702; Holy Roman Empire, credentials, April - May 1707; Venice, ambassador extraordinary, 1707 - 08.
- <u>Marlborough</u>, John Churchill, duke of: Raised from earl to duke of Marlborough, December 1702; captaingeneral of Her Majesty's land forces, 14 March 1702 -31 December 1711; c.-in-c., English forces in the Low Countries, 9 March 1702 - 31 December 1711; Bavaria, plenipotentiary, June - July 1704; France, plenipotentiary, November 1705; United Provinces, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, July - October 1701, March 1702 - December 1711; Sweden, plenipotentiary, April 1707.
- <u>Meadows</u>, Sir Philip: Holy Roman Empire, envoy-extraordinary, June 1707 - August 1709; Board of trade, 1696 - 1714.

- Methuen, John: lord chancellor of Ireland, 1697 1703; Portugal, ambassador extraordinary, April 1702 -July 1706.
- <u>Methuen</u>, Paul: Portugal, envoy-extraordinary, October 1697 - April 1706, ambassador extraordinary, November 1706 - August 1708; Savoy, envoy-extraordinary, June -September 1706; Spain, envoy-extraordinary, July -October 1705, May - June 1706; commissioner of the Admiralty, 8 November 1708 - 19 December 1710; Morocco, envoy-extraordinary, May - June 1705. Son of John Methuen.
- <u>Mitchell</u>, Admiral Sir David: commissioner of the Admiralty, 4 April 1701 - 25 January 1702; Prince's Council, 22 May 1702 - 18 April 1708; United Provinces, credentials for naval discussions, 1702 - 07.
- <u>Newton</u>, Dr. Henry: Tuscany, envoy-extraordinary, May 1705 -March 1711; Venice, envoy-extraordinary, May 1705 -March 1711.
- Nicholson, Francis: governor of Virginia, 1698 1705; c.-in-c., forces in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, 20 October 1712 -
- Nottingham, Daniel Finch, earl of: secretary of state (Southern Department), 2 May 1702 - 27 April 1704.
- Ormonde, James Butler, duke of: c.-in-c., forces on board the fleet, 1702; captain-general of H.M. land forces, 26 February 1712 - 30 September 1714; c.-in-c., English forces in the Low Countries, 1 January 1712 - 21 December 1712.
- Orrery, Charles Boyle, earl of: Flanders, envoy-extraordinary, April 1711 - July 1712, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, July 1712 - June 1713; United Provinces, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, March - August 1711.
- Palmes, Francis: Brunswick-Lüneberg (Hanover), credentials, March 1708; Holy Roman Empire, envoy-extraordinary April - August 1708, April - May 1709, January 1710 -March 1711; United Provinces, credentials, February -March 1708.
- Pembroke, Thomas Herbert, earl of: commissioner of the Admiralty, 4 April 1701 - 25 January 1702; lord high admiral 26 January - 20 May 1702, 29 November 1708 -7 November 1709.
- Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt, earl of: c.-in-c., forces on board the fleet, 31 March 1705 - ; Spain, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, June 1706 -February 1707; Holy Roman Empire, credentials, February - April, June, August - December 1711; Savoy, credentials, April - May 1711, March 1712.

- Poley, Edmund: Brunswick-Lüneberg (Hanover), envoyextraordinary, December 1703 - September 1705.
- Portmore, David Colyear, earl of: c.-in-c., forces in Portugal, 24 August 1710 - 22 October 1712.
- Prior, Matthew: France, credentials, July August 1711; plenipotentiary, August 1712 - March 1715.
- <u>Pulteney</u>, Daniel: Denmark, envoy-extraordinary, January 1707 - February 1715.
- <u>Queensberry</u>, James Douglas, duke of: third secretary of state, 3 February 1709 - 6 July 1711.
- <u>Raby</u>, Thomas Wentworth, baron: created earl of Strafford, 1711; Prussia, envoy-extraordinary, June 1703 - May 1705, ambassador extraordinary, May 1705 - April 1711; United Provinces, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, April 1711 - November 1714; France, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Utrecht negotiations, January 1712 - 1714.
- <u>Robinson</u>, Rev. John: Sweden, minister resident, November 1696 - December 1702, envoy-extraordinary, December 1702 - June 1709; Poland, envoy-extraordinary, January 1703 - September 1707; elevated to bishop of Bristol; appointed lord privy seal; France, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Utrecht, January 1712 -
- <u>Rooke</u>, Admiral Sir George: commissioner of the Admiralty, 4 April 1701 - 25 January 1702; Prince's Council, 22 May 1702 - 10 June 1705. c.-in-c., Cadiz expedition, 1702; c.-in-c., Soundings squadron, 1703, 1705; c.-in-c., Mediterranean, 1704.
- St. John, Henry: secretary at war, 20 April 1704 -24 February 1708; secretary of state (Northern Department), 21 September 1710 - 17 August 1713; created viscount Bolingbroke, July 1712.
- Selwyn, William: governor of Jamaica, 1702.
- Shovell, Admiral Sir Cloudesly: Prince's Council, 26 December 1704 - 18 April 1708. c.-in-c., Soundings, 1702, 1704, 1706; Joint c.-in-c. expedition to Spain, 1705, c.-in-c., Mediterranean, 1707.
- Shrewsbury, Charles Talbot, duke of: France, ambassador extraordinary, January - August 1713.
- Stanhope, Alexander: United Provinces, envoy-extraordinary, April 1700 - September 1706.
- Stanhope, Major-General James: c.-in-c., H.M. forces in Spain, 26 March 1708 - 8 December 1710; Spain, envoyextraordinary and plenipotentiary, May 1706 - December 1707, May 1708 - December 1709, May - December 1710; Minorca, governor and c.-in-c., garrison, 1708 - 1710.

- Stanyan, Abraham: Holy Roman Empire, credentials as joint mediator with envoy of States-General in dispute between Emperor and Savoy over Milan, January - June 1712; Switzerland, envoy-extraordinary, August 1705 - March 1714.
- Stepney, George: Holy Roman Empire, envoy-extraordinary, 4 May 1701 - May 1705, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, May 1705 - September 1706; United Provinces, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, November 1706 - August 1707; Bavaria, credentials, June 1704; Hesse-Cassel, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, February 1707; Flanders, envoy-extraordinary and plenipotentiary, March - August 1707.

Strafford, see Raby.

- Sunderland, Charles Spencer, earl of: Holy Roman Empire, envoy-extraordinary, August - November 1705; secretary of state (Southern Department), 3 December 1706 l June 1710.
- Sutton, Sir Robert: Turkey, ambassador, March 1702 -September 1717.
- Tilson, George: undersecretary of state, 1708 1738.
- Townshend, Charles, viscount: United Provinces, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, May 1709 - March 1711; France, plenipotentiary, 1709.
- Vernon, James: secretary of state (Southern Department),
 5 November 1700 4 January 1702; secretary of state
 (Northern Department), 4 January 1 May 1702.
- Vernon, James, Jr.: Denmark, envoy-extraordinary, May 1702 - November 1706.
- Vetch, Samuel: governor, Nova Scotia, 1710 1712.
- <u>Walpole</u>, Horatio: United Provinces, secretary of embassy, May 1709 - March 1711.
- <u>Walpole</u>, Robert: Prince's Council, 11 June 1705 18 April 1708; secretary at war, 25 February 1708 - 27 September 1710.
- Whitworth, Charles: Imperial Diet at Ratisbon, resident, May 1702 - September 1703; Holy Roman Empire, in Charge of affairs, October 1703 - March 1704, September -November 1704; ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary on the occasion of the Imperial Election, July -September 1711; Russia, envoy, March 1705 - August 1709; ambassador extraordinary, August 1709 - April 1710; ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, October 1711 - June 1712; Prussia, credentials, May -June 1711; Poland, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, June, October 1711; commissioner to treat with France for a commercial treaty, 1713.

William III: King of England, 1689 - 1702; Stadtholder; captain-and admiral-General of Holland, 1672-1702.

<u>Wishart</u>, Admiral Sir James: Prince's Council, 20 June -28 October 1708; commissioner of the Admiralty, 20 December 1710 - 30 September 1712; United Provinces, credentials for naval discussions, February -April 1711, March - April 1712.

Worseley, Henry: Portugal, envoy extraordinary, 1713.

APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF ENGLISH

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, 1701-13

NOTE

Although no complete collection of Treaties has been published, I have used C. Parry, The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1918 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1969) as the basic and most readily obtainable reference to the text of agreements. Documents which are found in that collection are referred to by abbreviation (e.q., a treaty found on page 69 of volume 29 would be referred to as 'CTS, 29, The text of agreements which are not contained p. 69'.) in that collection have a reference to a manuscript source. Where possible I have used a reference to documents in the Public Record Office, but not all documents for this period have been preserved there. This appendix is a collated list of treaties found in P.R.O., S.P. 108 Treaties; S.P. 103 Treaty papers; F.O., 95/523-25 Treaties; S.P. Foreign series; IND. 6908C State Paper Office Manuscript Calendar 'Report on the Political and Diplomatic History of Great Britain . . . 1697-1727, ' by John Bruce, 1801; Blenheim Palace MSS. Marlborough Letterbooks, vol. 9, 'Military Treaties, 1706-11'; Blenheim MSS. B2-28 Original Treaties; British Library, Addit. MSS. 19,518. Troop Treaties, 1689-1702. It expands the list for the period 1701-13 in C. Parry and C. Hopkins, Index to British Treaties, 1101-1968 (London, 1970).

The following list includes neither agreements of surrender and capitulation nor the joint Anglo-Dutch directives relating to the government of the Spanish Netherlands nor the agreements reached in the annual Anglo-Dutch naval discussions. ____

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		J <u></u>	т	
Reference To Full Text	CTS, 23 P. 337-39	CTS, 23 P. 485 P.R.O	F.N.U., S.P. 71/15. fos.29,237	CTS, 24 P. 11
Entry into Force	On ratification	Immediately		On ratification
Ratification Dates	21 Jul 1701 by Denmark			2 Oct 1701 by England
Duration	Until 14 Jun 1711			
Summary of Provisions	Treaty of Alliance. Confirms alliance of 1690. Denmark to close ports to Privateers and warships except those with convoy of more than 40 ships. Recognize 9th Electorate, Denmark will not enter a treaty that disturbs North or Germany. Danish liberty of commerce confirmed. 300,000 of commerce subsidy to be paid by England and States. 12,000 troops to be sent. Secret arti- cles specify 4,000 additional troops to be in readiness if needed.	Additional articles to treaty of peace and commerce of 17 August 1700. Terminated Article 2 of that treaty. Continues truce of 25 February	August 1700 ry 1701. Renev	Second Grand Alliance
Signatories	Denmark, States- General	Algiers Emperor	Morrocco Morrocco	Emperor, States- General
Date (N.S.) and Place Signed	15 Jun 1701 COPENHAGEN	10 Aug 1701 ALGIERS c. Sep. 1701	C. SEP. 1/01	7 Sep 1701 THE HAGUE
#	2	ω 4	7	ъ

CTS, 24 p. 29 hud TSLENHEIM B2-28, FI-I2.	CTS, 24 P. 55	00 1	CTS, 24 P. 75 AUD Bleuhsim B2-28	Blenheim MSS. B2-28	P.R.O. S.P. 108/214 and S.P. 103/26 Bicului B2-25
Immediately	On ratification	On ratification	On ratification		On ratification
2 DEC 1701 by Swepen		14 February 1702 by Prussia by Evglavd 25 March 102 by Durch	14 February 1702 by Prussia	19 January 1702	27 February 1702 by Hesse- Cassel
	Forever				
Confirmation of previous treaties. States General and England to pay 200,000 thalers as previously agreed. Dutch to be responsible for 300,000 crowns borrowed by Sweden. Commissioners to agree how confederates may assist sweden if war in North should con- tinue. Allies agree to do nothing or agree to nothing to prejudice Alliance.	For common security and defence, naval affairs to be regulated by Treaty of Whitehall of 29 April 1689.	Treaty of Alliance. Accession To GRAND AlliANCE. CONJIEME TREATIES of 20 May 1690 And 21 August 1700.	Treaty of Subsidy To provide 5000 men.	Separate article on command of Prussian troops.	Hesse Cassel to furnish 6,000 men to be paid by England and States. Hesse Cassel will supply an addi- tional 3,000 to this number. In secret articles, maritime powers agree to use good offices to per- suade Emperor to garrison Rhein- fels with Hesse-Cassel troops instead of Imperial troops.
Sweden, States- General	States- General	Prussia, States- General	Prussia, States- General	Prussia	Hesse- Cassel, States- General
7 Oct 1701 THE HAGUE	LL Nov 1701 THE HAGUE	30 Dec 1701 THE HAGUE; 20 Jan 1702 LONDON	30 Dec 1701 THE HAGUE 20 Jan 1702 LONDON		
٥	7	ω	6	10	11

12	18 Feb 1702 Coun on spree	Prussia	Accession to Grand Alliance				P.R.O., S.P. 108/403
13	22 Mar 1702 VIENNA 22 APR 1702 THE MAGUE	Emperor, States- General	Ratification of separate article to Grand Alliance regarding the Pretender.				P.R.O., S.P. 108/131
14	22 Mar 1702 Nordlingen	Associated Circles of the Empire	Accession to Grand Alliance with Conomus Relative to secuenty of the Associated Ciecles, share of Advantages obtained by allies, and Nocolinger Association Aggerments.		20 JUNE 1702 by England		P.R.O., S.P. 103/26
15	12 Apr 1702 THE HAGUE	States- General	Articles relating to Pretender		8 June 1702 by States- General	On ratification	On P.R.O., ratification S.P. 108/337
16	14 Apr 1702	Prussia	Confirmation of treaties already concluded.				P.R.O., S.P. 108/404
17	18 Apr 1702 THE HAGUE	Empire, States- General	Agreement to declare war against France and Spain on 15 May 1702.			Immediately	CTS, 24 p. 173
18	21 Apr 1702 BRAUNSCHWEIG	Wolfen- büttel	Accession to the Grand Alliance. Queen and States guarantors of treaty between Brunswick and Wolfenbüttel of 20 April 1702.				P.R.O., 5.P. 108/216
19	29 Jul 1702	Deumark	Agerement with duke of Würzembern ou payment of Davies Tribops with Provision for 21,270 Rebate.				Blenheim B2-28
50	8 May 1702 THE HAGUE	Trèves, States- General	Treves to provide 3 battalions and allow passage of allied troops, construction of magasins.	Duration of the war	4 June 1702 by Trèves	On ratification and acces- sion to Grand Alliance	On CTS, 24 ratification p. 187; F. A.O. and acces- SP 108/218 sion to Grand Alliance
21	V & May 1702 LONDON 6 May 1702 THE HAGUE	Trèves, States- General	NEARLY I DENTICAL TO NO.20, BUT DIFFERENT DATES OF SIGNING AND RATIFICATIOU.		2 June 1702 by Trèves	On ratification	Brit. Lib. Addit. MSS. 19,518 fo. 61; P.R.o., 5.R. 108/217
22	21 Jun 1702 THE HAGUE	Brunswick- Lüneberg	Convention for supply of 10,000 men to serve on lower Rhine		20 June 1702 by England	On exchange of ratification	

23	22 Jun 1702 Ehcentstein	Trèves	Accession to Grand Alliance			Immediately	P.R.O., S.P. 108/221
24	24 Jun 1702	Circle of	Accession to Grand Alliance				P.R.O.,
	NACULINGEN	Franconia					S.P. 108/219
25	10 Jul 1702	Brunswick-	Separate article to no. 22				P.R.O.,
	NIJMEGEN	Lüneburg					S.P. 108/220
26	4 Aug 1702	Circle of	Accession to Grand Alliance				P.R.O.,
	CONSTRACE	Swabia					S.P. 108/222
27	29 Sep 1702	Mainz and	Accession to Grand Alliance				P.R.O.,
	ZNHW	Circle of					S.P. 108/223
		Lower Rhine					
28	16 Nov 1702	Brunswick-	Convention for supply of	For the	10 Dec 1702	on	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE	Lüneberg,	troops to be paid by	Year 1703	by Bruns-	ratification	S.P. 108/224;
		Zell	England: 700 horse in		wick; 15 Dec		Blenhsim
			2 regiments, 9300 foot in		1702 by Zell		82-28
			12 regiments. Renews		1		
			T				
29	12 Dec 1702	Brunswick-	Separate article to no. 28.		10 Jan 1703	On	P.R.O.,
	NOUNOI	Lüneberg,				ratification	S.P. 108/224
	2 Jan 1703	Zell					
	THE HAGUE				by Zell		
30	13 Mar 1703 THE HAGITE	Münster, States-	To supply 2,400 men for a subsidu inintlu naid bu			On ratification	P.R.O., c p 108/275
- 		General	Oueen and States of 60.000				
)))	crowns.				
32	15 Mar 1703	States-	20,000 addition troops to be			On	CTS, 24
	THE HAGUE	General	employed in campaign of 1703.			ratification	p. 321
33	15 Mar 1703	Holstein-	Four regiments totalling	Duration	26 Mar 1703	on	•
		Gottorp,	2,880 men to remain in pay	of war	by King of	ratification	p. 327
		States-	of England and States for		Denmark on		
		General	duration of war. Separate		behalf of		
					Holstein-		
			OI LIAGE LO SCUTESWIG.		Gorrorp		

34	18 Mar 1703	Münster	Accession to Grand Alliance				P.R.O., c D 108/236
			والمتعاوية والمتحافظ والمتعارية والمتحالية والمتحافظ والمتحافظ والمتحافظ والمحافظ				3.F. 100/220
35	27 Mar 1703	Saxe-	2 Regiments of foot, 2 regiments	Until	3 April 1703	on	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE	Gotha,	of Dragoons, a total of 2,600	2 mos.	by Saxe-	ratification	S.P. 108/227
		States-	men to serve in pay of England	after	Gotha		and
		General	and States.	peace			s.P. 103/26
36		Ностон		LEALY	6 Anril 1703	6	P R O
0	JA L	nesser	A DALLALION OF SUU TO DE PIU-		CONT TTTAN		
	THE HAGUE	Cassel,	vided in addition to 9,000		by Hesse-	ratification	S.P. 108/228
		States-	provided by no. 11, on same		Cassel		
		General	conditions.				_ I
37	11 Apr 1703	Emperor,	Prohibition of commerce and	One yr		Immediately	CTS, 24
	THE HAGUE	States-	letters of exchange with France		- 10 2 2		p. 347
		General	and Spain from 1 June 1703.				
38	16 May 1703	States-	Treaty of Defensive Alliance	Perpetual	26 July 1703	On	CTS, 24
	LISBON	General,	confirmed previous agreements		by England	ratification	p. 375
		Portugal	and agreed to protect Portugal				
			in case of attack.				
39	16 May 1703	Emperor,	of Offensive Alliance.	During		On arrival	CTS, 24
	LISBON	States-	Agreed to put Archduke Charles	war	by England		p. 375
		General,	on Spanish throne by an offen-			Charles in	
		Portugal	sive war in Spain.			Spain	- 1
40	17 May 1703	Elector	Provides 7,000 men for service		5 Jun 1703	On	CTS, 24
	THE HAGUE	Palatine,	in pay of England and States.		by Elector	ratification	p. 409
		States-			Palatine		
		General					
41	20 Jun 1703	States-	Renewed peace of Breda, 31 July		4 Sep 1703	on	CTS, 24
	WESTMINSTER	General	1667; Treaty of Navigation and	_	by States-	ratification	p. 421
			Commerce, 31 July 1667; Treaty		General		
		_	of Westminster, 19 February 1674;				
			Marine Treaty of London, 1 October	<u>ل</u> ا			
			1674; Declaration at The Hague,				
			01	-			
			Accommodating Differences between				

CTS, 24 P. 421	CTS, 24 P. 451	P.R.O., S.P. 108/230			P.R.O., S.P. 108/231	CTS, 25 p. 37
On ratification	On ratifications within two months			Immediately	On ratification	On ratification
4 Sep 1703 by States- General	P				4 Jan 1704 by Bruns- wick; 5 Jan 1704 by Zell	2 May 1704 by Portugal
	As for the Treaty of 30 Jan 1700			Forever	For 1704	Forever
Dutch and English East India Com- panies, 18 March 1675; Defensive League of Westminster, 3 March 1678; Treaty of Whitehall, 29 April 1689; and Treaty of Alliance, 11 November 1701.	To reaffirm previous treaties and improve friendship. Agreed not to aid or abet each others ene- mies. At a peace with Russia and Poland, or sooner, Sweden will supply 10,000 men to be paid by maritime powers. If war still in progress levy money to be paid also. None of the powers shall make peace without participation of others. Separate article pro- vides for further negotiations to include Emperor in agreement.		Articles of Peace. All ships of war shall have free use of each other's ports for repair, etc.	Confirmation of peace. Commer- cial articles.	Renews Troop Treaty 22,28.	Commerce
States- General	Sweden, States- General	Mecklen- burg	Tunis	Algiers	Brunswick- Lüneberg, Zell	Portugal
20 Jun 1703 . WESTMINSTER	16 Aug 1703 THE HAGUE	14 Sep 1703 Rostock	23 Oct 1703 TUNIS	28 Oct 1703 ALGIERS	20 Nov 1703 LONDON 24 Dec 1703 THE HAGUE	27 Dec 1703 LISBON
41 Cont.	42	43	44	45	46	47

	TURIN	Savoy	Accession to Grand Alliance. Eng- land to Pay 66,666 crowns plus 53,333 crowns monthly subsidy from 3 October 1703. Savoy to maintain an army of 12,000 foot, 3,000	Until 2 Mos after Peace Treaty	10 Aug 1704 by Savoy	On ratification	CTS, 25 P. 97
_	4 Aug 1704	Savoy	cle			on	P.R.O.,
	NIXUT		Treaty between Emperor and Savoy relating to Vaudois.			ratification	s.P. 108/444
	18 Nov 1704 TURIN	Savoy	Separate Article to no. 48 regarding Pretender		21 Nov 1704	On vatification	
 -	28 Nov 1704	Prussia	ws t	For one		15 January	CTS, 25
	NTTNAA		no. 9. Secret articles that Queen would use best endeavours to pre-	Year		1705	p. 215
			vent Prussian involvement in war				
			between Sweden, Russia and Poland. Prussia maintains right to recall				
			her troops if her territory				
			attacked. England agrees to				
+-	30 Dec 1704	Brinewi ck-	The man accompate version and the			T	4 6 0
	NDON	Lüneberg.	22.28.46	CU/ 1 703		тшиеататету	F.K.U., c d 108/331
	1	Zell					
	20 Feb 1705	Portugal	Establishment of Post Office			Immediately	CTS, 25
	LONDON		packet service to Portugal.				p. 227
<u> </u>	20 Jun 1705	Catalonia	Treaty of Alliance against duke			Immediately	CTS, 25
	GENOA		of Angers.				p. 263
	6 Nov 1705	Algiers	Confirmation of peace made in			Immediately	
	ALGIERS		1682				S.P. 71/4,
							fos.79-80
	3 Dec 1705	Prussia	•			on	P.R.O.,
	BERLIN		troops in Italy. In secret			ratification	s.P.108/405
			סי				

ەد Cont.	3 Dec 1705 BERLIN	Prussia	effectually' in case of attack. 20 crowns/man to be paid by			On ratification	P.R.O., S.P. 108/405
			emperor.				
57	8 Dec 1705	Brunswick-	Renews nos. 22,28,46,52	For 1706		On	P.R.O.,
-+	HANOVER	Lüneberg				ratification	S.P. 108/232
58	20 May 1706	Hesse-	Confirms and renews nos. 11, 36.	One Year	26 May 1706	On	P.R.O.,
	CASSEL	Cassel,	An additional four squadrons of		England;	ratification	S.P. 108/233
		States-	horse with 720 men to be pro-		22 May 1706		
		General	vided. Secret article reserves		Hesse-		
			right of troop recall.		Cassel		
59	26 Mar 1706	Elector	Provides for augmentation of		1 June 1706	On	CTS, 25
	THE HAGUE	Palatine,	3,000 men to 7,000 already in		by Elector	ratification	p. 449
		States-	Italy.				
		General					
60	22 Oct 1706	Danzig	Commerce		9 Nov 1707	on	CTS, 25
	DANZIG				by Danzig	ratification	p. 493
61	18 Nov 1706	Brunswick-	Renews nos. 22,28,46,52,57.	For Year	27 Nov 1706	On	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE	Lüneberg		1707	ЪУ	ratification	S.P.108/235
					Brunswick		
62	24 Nov 1706	Prussia	Renews nos. 51,56 for troops	For Year		On	P.R.O.,
	THE REGUL		in Italy. England agrees to	1707		ratification	S.P.108/406
			use good offices to obtain				to sish analysis of
			payment of 20 crowns/man due				CID AND NEW
			from Emperor.				
63	24 Nov 1706	Prussia,	Troops in joint pay of maritime	FOR YEAR			Blenheim
		States-	powers for service in Low	LOLI			Marl letter-
		General	Countries				books, ix,
							fo.65
64	26 Feb 1707	Algiers	nfirme			Immediately	P.R.O.,
	ALGIERS		8 April 1682				S.P.108/19
65	13 Mar 1707	Emperor,	to impe	So long		Immediately	CTS, 26
	COIRE	Grisons	and other troops of the allies	as af-			p. 27
·			through the country of Grisons.	fairs of			I
				Milan re-			
				main as			
				-			

P.R.O., S.P.108/236	CTS, 26 P. 91	P.R.O., S.P.103/26	P.R.O., S.P. 103/26	P.R.O., S.P.108/19	P.R.O., S.P.108/237	CTS, 26 P. 181
On ratification	On ratification	on arrival of Troops at the Mediae.	on Rarification	Immediately	On ratification	Immediately
7 Apr 1707 by Hesse- Cassel	16 Sep 1707 by England; 9 Jan 1708 by Spain				22 Apr 1708 by Hesse- Cassel	
	Forever	LOLI 202	these years		For 1708	
Amplification of no. 58. Hesse- Cassel troops to remain in Italy until November. Subsidy paid by England and States augmented to 100,000 crowns per year. Subsidy for wagons increased to 104,904 crowns 20 sols per year. Separate article on replacement of Rhein- fels Battalion, secret article agrees to support Hesse-Cassel claim to Rheinfels fortress at peace treaty.		For Bothmar's dragoons in pay of England and States at 22,400 crowns per month.	Troops in Low Countries: 4 REGIMENTS of foot, 3 REGIMENTS of horse or dragoous AND STALF fore service of States-General or England ANYWHERE but Spain and Italy.	Confirms peace of 1682	Renewal of nos. 11,36,58,66. Troops to be employed wherever needed. Two-thirds paid by Queen, one-third by States.	Agreement to send 4000 imperial armed and clothes from Vado in Italy to Catalonia. Transport at England's expense. Subsidy
Hesse- Cassel, States- General	Spain	Brunswick- Lüneberg, States- General	Saxony, States- General	Algiers	Hesse- Cassel, States- General	Emperor
25 Mar 1707 THE HAGUE 27 Mar 1707 at BRUSSELS at BRUSSELS	10 Jul 1707 BARCELONA	29 Aug 1707 Soigwies 27 Aug 1707 The Hague	20 Apr 1707 The hague	26 Nov 1707 ALGIERS	10 Mar 1708 BRUSSELS; V7 Apr 1708 THE HAGUE	14 Apr 1708 THE HAGUE
 9	67	89	69	70	71	72

ely CTS, 26 p. 181	P.R.O., cion S.P.108/238	rion S.P.108/238	P.R.O., S.P.108/ and F.O.95/5 fos.2-1	See no. 99	CTS, 26 p. 266	P.R.O., s.P.108/239
Immediately	On ratification	On ratification	On ratification			On ratification
	12 May 1708 by Brunswick	12 May 1708 by Brunswick	30 Apr 1708 by Prussia; 16 May 1708 by England			12 Feb 1709 by Brunswick
	For 1708	For 1708		During war	For 1709	For 1709
of 20 crowns/man for replacing this corps in Italy. Queen agrees to pay 3000 imperial troops, 1200 Italians and 1300 Palatines in Dutch pay. States to reimburse. Army to be speeded into action. Fleet authorised to purchase and convoy grain from Genoa to Catalonia.	Renews nos. 22,28,46,52 ,57,6 1	Continuation of Bothmar's regiment in joint pay of England and States. 28 Florins per head/month of 42 days. Renews no. 68.	Troops command enced b ist in I ihâtel s ile: 56 ears of ears of g troop	Establishes reciprocal liberty of fishing on coasts of France and England.	Bread and forage for imperial troops.	Continuation of nos. 22,28,46, 52,57,61,73
Emperor	Brunswick- Lüneberg	Brunswick- Lüneberg, States- General	Prussia, States- General	France	Emperor, States- General	Brunswick- Lüneberg
14 Apr 1708 THE HAGUE	14 Apr 1708 THE HAGUE	14 Apr 1708 THE HAGUE	O_1 : C_1 I_2	June 1708	l Jan 1709 MERLEBECKE	14 Jan 1709 THE HAGUE
72 Cont.	73	74	75	76	77	78

P.R.O., S.P.108/239	CTS, 26 P. 289	P.R.O., S.P.108/240	P.R.O., S.P.108/408	P.R.O., S.P.108/409	CTS, 26 p. 317
On P ratification S		On ratification S	On ratification S	On ratification S	0
		12 Mar 1709 by Saxony 1 Mer 1709 by Eugland	12 Apr 1709 by Prussia	20 Apr 1709 by Prussia	
For 1709		One year	For 1709		
Continuation of Bothmar's regiment. Renews nos. 68,74.	2467 men to be marched to Finale under no. 72. In consideration of difficulty Queen will pay additional 20 escu/man because of difficulty of furnishing in areas of empire near sea.	Augmentation of Saxon troops in Low Countries for a total of one regiment of horse, two regiments of dragoons and four of foot.	Continuation of nos. 51,56,62,75. Agree to use good offices to obtain arrears due from emperor for accommodation of troops in empire and to obtain imperial confirmation of Prussian claim to Neuchâtel.	Augmentation of 6225 men to serve in Low Countries at 60,000 guilders per month providing force would pass Meuse by 1 May. Claim to Neuchâtel reaffirmed.	
Brunswick- Lüneberg, States- General	Етрегог	Saxony, States- General	Prussia, States- General	Prussia	Emperor, States- General
14 Jan 1709 THE HAGUE	20 Jan 1709 THE HAGUE	22 Feb 1709 THE HAGUE	31 Mar 1709 THE HAGUE	12 Apr 1709 THE HAGUE	28 May 1709 THE HAGUE
79	80	81	т œ	84	85

86	10 Jul 1709	Trèves	One regiment of infantry of 700 men	For 1709			P.R.O.,
	TOURNAI		to enter Queen's pay on reaching				S.P.108/241
							and
			modified 18 and 25 July 1709, to be				Blenheim
			paid 11,014 livres, 9 sols per				Marlborough
			month. Plus one month's pay for				Letterbook,
			march.				ix, p. 191,194,204
87	29 Oct 1709	States-	For settling a barrier against		5 Dec 1709	On	CTS, 26
	THE HAGUE	General	France and securing the Protestant		by States	ratification	p. 425
			succession in England.				
88	7 Nov 1709	Trèves	Continues no. 86. One battalion	For 1710		Immediately	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE		of 701 to continue in pay at				S.P.108/241
			11,408 livres 4 sols per 42 day				
			month. Troops to be recalled if				
			Coblenz or Ehrenbreitstein invested.				
89	8 Nov 1709	Brunswick-	Continuation of nos. 22,28,46,52,57,	For 1710		ų	Marlborough
	THE HAGUE	Lüneberg	61, 73, 78.			ratification	Letterbook,
							ix, p. 211
06	8 Nov 1709	Brunswick-	Continuation of Bothmar's regiment.	For 1710		uo	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE	Lüneberg,	Renews 68,74,79.			ratification	S.P.108/242
		States-		,			
		General					
91	9 Nov 1709	Denmark	Dowry of Queen				P.R.O.,
	COPENHAGEN						S.P.108/549
92	1 Mar 1710	Münster &	Renewal of accession to Grand			Immediately	P.R.O.,
	- HADERCISOK N	Paderborn	Alliance on the raising of Francis				S.P.108/243
			Arnold to Bishopric of Münster				
			following the death of Frederick				
			Christian.				
63	21 Mar 1710	Emperor,	Joint declaration of interest in			Immediately	CTS, 26
	THE HAGUE	States-	maintaining tranquility in the				p. 449
		General	North and in Germany.				
94	14 Apr 1710	Emperor	Emperor to raise 1700 recruits to			Immediately	CTS, 26
	THE HAGUE		complete imperial corps serving in				p. 465

	4 Apr 1710	Emperor	Catalonia. Oueen to pay 20 crowms/			Tmmediatelv	CTS, 26
H	THE HAGUE	1	oney to Prince rovide transpor			7	す
IL E	7 May 1710 THE HAGUE	Saxony, States- General	4 BI.	For One Year		Immediately	P.R.O., S.P.108/244
mД	30 May 1710 DOUAI	Saxony	Two additional regiments to be in Queen's pay for service in Low Countries. To be paid in advance for one long month for march. To be sent to Roermond or Maastricht.			Immediately	P.R.O., S.P.108/244
m F	3 Jun 1710 The mague	Prussia, States- General	lews nos. 51,56,62,75,83. Dops to be continued in Italy	For 1710			P.R.O., S.P.103/26
4 H	4 Aug 1710 THE HAGUE	Emperor, States- General	Convention for troops to maintain neutrality of the North.			Immediately	CTS, 26 p. 493
8 4	8 Aug 1710 ALGIERS	Algiers	Confirmation of Peace				P.R.O., S.P.71/4 fo. 107
A	Aug 1710	France	Re-establishes no. 76 to stop hos- tilities against fishing vessels in the channel for mutual benefit of both nations.		Ratified by France, 4 Sep 1710	15/26 Sep 1710	0 - 0 - 0
S M R S	20 Aug 1710 MOSCOW; 31 Aug 1710 ST.PETERSBURG	Russia	Declarations on reciprocity of taxes levied on Russian ships in England			Immediately	CTS, 26 P. 499
ЦЦ	5 Oct 1710 HE HAGUE	Brunswick- Lüneberg	Continues 22,28,46,52,57, 61,73,78,89 Levy money raised from 67,200 to 75,600 florins.	For 1711	Ratified 24 Dec 1710 by Brunswick	On ratification	P.R.O., S.P.108/245

P.R.O., S.P.108/245	P.R.O., S.P.108/134	CTS, 27 P. 15	P.R.O., S.P.108/246	P.R.O., S.P.108/134	CTS, 27 P. 49	P.R.O., S.P.108/247	P.R.O., S.P.103/26	
On ratification	Immediately	Immediately	Immediately	Immediately	On ratification	Immediately		Immediately
Ratified 24 Dec 1710 by Brunswick					Ratified 29 May 1711 by Hamburg			
For 1711			For 1711			For 1711	For 1711	
Continues 68,74,79,90.	Modifies no. 94. Recruits to be increased to 2000 and to arrive at Finale in March 1711. Three weeks notice to be given to Queen's envoys in Turin and Genoa to arrange convoy to Spain. Troops to be in Queen's pay from embarkation.	To provide bread and fodder for imperial troops in Low Countries.	Continues nos. 86,88.	Modifies nos. 94,104. An addi- tional 500 men to be added to the 2000 for Spain.	Convention for the herring trade.	Renews nos. 69, 81, 95.	Renews no. 96.	Modifies nos. 94,104,107. An additional 500 to bring total to 3000 for Catalonia, on the same terms.
Brunswick- Lüneberg, States- General	Етрегог	Emperor, States- General	Trèves	Empire	Hamburg	Saxony, States- General	Saxony	Empire
THE HAGUE	29 Oct 1710 THE HAGUE		30 Nov 1710 THE HAGUE	7 Dec 1710 THE HAGUE	31 Jan 1711 HAMBURG	24 Mar l711 THE HAGUE	24 Mar 1711 THE HAGUE	27 May 1711 WARDE
TUJ	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111

112	30 May 1711	Öttingen	One battalion to serve at same	Until [Ratified	On	P.R.O.,
	ÖTTINGEN		liary tro	C	26 July	ratification	S.P.103/26
		_	except that while serving in	1712	1711 by		
			Germany will be paid 22% less for the agio.		Ottingen		
113	2 Jun 1711	States-	1 ()				Blenheim,
	LEEUWARDEN	General	of French deserters.				Marlborough
							Letterbook,
							ix, p.265
114	28 Dec 1711	Brunswick-	Renews nos. 22,28,46,52,57, 61,	For 1712	Ratified	On	P.R.O.,
	NOGNOI	Lüneberg	73, 78, 89, 102.		25 Jan	ratification	S.P.108/248
					1712 by Brunswick		
115	28 Dec 1711	Brunswick-	Renews nos. 68,74,79,90,103.	For 1712	Ratified	on	P.R.O.,
	TONDON	Lüneberg,	For Bothmar's regiment.		25 Jan	ratification	S.P.108/248
		States-			1712 by		
<u> </u>		General			Brunswick		
116	14 Jan 1712	Trèves	Renews nos. 86,88,106.	For 1712		On	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE					ratification	S.P.108/249
117	25 Jan 1712	Brunswick-	Troop treaty.	For 1712		Immediately	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE	Lüneberg,					S.P.108/250
		States-					
		General					
118	24 Mar 1712	Saxony,	Renews nos. 69,81,95,109	For 1712		Immediately	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE	States-					S.P.108/251
		General					
119	24 Mar 1712	Saxony	Renews nos. 96,140.	For 1712		Immediately	P.R.O.,
	THE HAGUE						
120	19 Aug 1712	France	Agreement to suspend hostili-	Until	23 Aug	On	CTS, 27
	PARIS		ties for 4 months.	22 Dec 1712	1712	ratification	p. 315
						Tmm 23 : 0 + 0]	
121	London,	France	no. 120 prolonged.			ттеататету	CTS, 2/
	14 Dec 1712 VERSAILLES			22 APT 1713			۲۶۲ • d
-							

777	30 Jan 1713	States-	Guarantee for Protestant succes-		2 Feb 1713	On	CTS 27
	UTRECHT	General	nd barri		_ >	ratification	ന
			United Provinces.				
					by States-		
123	8 Mar 1713	Savoy	Declaration of commerce and		21 Mar 1713	on	CTS, 27
	UTRECHT		navigation with the two Sicilies.			ratification	- (°)
124	14 Mar 1713	Emperor	Evacuation of Catalonia Avd			On	
	UTRECHT	Spain,	Neutrality of Italy with separate			ratification	p. 409;
		France					Bienheim B2-28
125	26 Mar 1713	Spain	Asiento. The supply of black	Until		1 May 1713	CTS, 27
	MADRID		slaves to Spanish West Indies	1 May 1743		1	V
T			given to the English company.				
126	27 Mar 1713	Spain	Preliminary Treaty of Peace.			On	CTS, 27
	MADRID					ratification	p. 455
127	11 Apr 1713	France	Treaty of Peace and Friendship.		18 Apr 1713	On	CTS, 27
	UTRECHT				by England	ratification	p. 475
					and France		
128 	11 Apr 1713	France	Treaty of Navigation and		9 May 1713	On	CTS, 28
	UTRECHT		Commerce.		by England and France	ratification	p. 1
129	9 May 1713 UTRECHT	France	Additional Articles to no. 127.			Immediately	CTS, 28
130	14 May 1713 Westminster	Spain	Provisional Treaty.				P.R.O., S.P.108/473
131	13 Jul 1713	Spain	Peace and Friendship.	Forever	31 Jul 1713	On	CTS, 28
	UTRECHT				by England	ratification	p. 295
					4 Aug 1713 by Spain		
132	26 Jul 1713	States-	Regulation of trade in Spanish			Immediately	CTS, 28
	UTRECHT	General	Low Countries				p. 355

133	2 Nov 1713	France	Postal treaty.	27 Nov 1713	On	P.R.O.,
-	PARIS			by England	ratification	S.P.103/15
134	9 Dec 1713	Spain	Navigation and Commerce.	21 Jan 1714	23 Feb 1714	CTS, 28
	UTRECHT			by England;		p. 429
				23 Feb 1714		
				Exchanged at		
				The Hague		

APPENDIX C

GENERAL WAR EXPENDITURES

	T / 10	1703	1704	1705	1706
ARMY 1,	1,101,860 (33%)	1,769,723 (48%)	2,106,626 (54%)	2,146,050 (52%)	2,741,354 (55%)
NAVY 2,	2,094,431 (63%)	1,723,537 (47%)	1,630,402 (42%)	1,771,967 (43%)	1,949,283 (39%)
ORDNANCE	116,732 (4%)	173,169 (5%)	156,601 (4%)	182,780 (5%)	271,200 (6%)
ANNUAL TCTAL 3,	3,313,025 (100%)	3,666,431 (100%)	3,893,630 (100%)	4,100,798 (100%)	4,961,837 (100%)

	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712
ARMY	3,188,198 (55%)	3,183,158 (60%)	3,969,490 (62%)	4,463,374 (62%)	4,853,290 (38%)	2,836,653 (59%)
NAVY	2,296,747 (40%)	1,908,762 (36%)	2,117,039 (33%)	2,421,873 (34%)	7,476,288 (59%)	1,776,137 (38%)
ORDNANCE	286,829 (5%)	228,735 (4%)	282,475 (5%)	275,500 (4%)	334,374 (3%)	134,761 (3%)
ANNUAL TOTAL	5,771,776 (100%)	5,320,656 (100%)	6,369,905 (100%)	7,160,747 (100%)	12,663,952 (100%)	4,777,553 (100%)

Parl. Papers 1868-69, xxxv, pp. 27-47. Figures in pounds sterling. The year is taken from 30 September to 29 September. SOURCE: -

A NOTE ON FINANCIAL STATISTICS

 \pounds 7,561,000 were used fund part of the previously include the war expenditures from "hidden sources" such as the Civil List and secret service accounts. disbursements were partially used to offset the debt and, thus, do not reflect accurately the cost of any given year's There are various figures which one might use in discussing war expenditure, among these are Parliamentary votes, The picture is complicated by a rapidly rising war debt which was not reflected in the Parliamentary vote. Exchequer Exchequer disbursements and departmental declared accounts. None of these, however, give a completely accurate view. for the services. The declared accounts, themselves, conceal some payments on the debt, but at the is shown dramatically in this table for 1711 when some same time do not activity. This contracted debt

to two major factors. First of all, these figures include the balance of undisposed tallies on hand at the end of each Appendix v. pp. 289-90. However, even this explanation must remain a distinctly tentative conjecture without a careful given in <u>Parliamentary Papers</u> are consistently higher than those given by other sources. This is due l. Secondly, the accounting periods employed in Exchequer disbursements, and departmental declared accounts were not the same. See J. E. D. Binney, <u>British Public Finance and Administration 1774-92</u>, (Oxford, 1958) the exact procedures which were employed in each of the contemporary accounts. accounting period The figures examination into

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1707	1 706 462 (E7e)	(27C) COF'OC7'T	B	1,123,487 (45%)		67 456 (3 <u>\$</u>)	10.51 052110	2.487.406 (100%)
1706	1 JOI 247 (54%)	(27C) 17C/T07/T	1	744.054 (31%)		363_964 (15%)	INCT FOR ICOS	2.389.365 (100%)
1705	1 441 895 (72%)	(0.71) C/0/TEE/T		387,710 (19%)		178.356 (9%)		2,007,961 (100%)
1704	1.178.401 (66%)	(30) LOU 12	10.71 100/70	384,117 (21%)		203,355 (11%)		1,796,880 (100%)
1703	1,022,223 (83%)	23.255 (2%)		187,678 (15%)		I		1,233,156 (100%)
	LOW COUNTRIES	GERMANY		PORTUGAL/	SPAIN	ITALY		TOTAL:

	1708	1709	1710	1 111	1712
LOW COUNTRIES	1,263,551 (53%)	1,521,997 (60%)	1,741,268 (49%)	1,435,718 (33%)	1.441.710 (62%)
GERMANY	1	1	1		-
PORTUGAL/ SPAIN	1,120,103 (47%)	216,877 (9%)	1,535,461 (43%)	2,543,667 (59%)	749,468 (32%)
ITALY	I	758,950 (31%)	289,207 (8%)	341,336 (8%)	143,277 (6%)
TOTAL :	2,383,654 (100%)	2,497,824 (100%)	3,565,936 (100%)	4,320,721 (100%)	2,334,455 (100%)

W. A. Shaw (ed.) Calendar of Treasury Books, Vols. 17-25 'Declared Accounts' for the Army Abroad. These figures include the costs of both British and foreign troops as well as subsidies to the rulers in the various theatres. Figures in pounds sterling. SOURCE: NOTE:

Where identifiable, expenditures from the Civil List and Secret Service Accounts, which directly supported etc.' Since expenditures for Spain and Italy quite often appeared in the accounts for the Low Countries, the sums have been adjusted to reflect the amount spent for the purpose of the theatre names. It will be noted that the figures in this table in this chapter do not correspond exactly with the totals which Shaw lists as total disbursements for the 'Army in the Low Countries, Army in Spain and and naval operations, have also been included. Portugal, military

See note with that figures presented here do not correspond exactly to those in Appendix C. The appendix.

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u> </u> -			<u> </u>
Convoy of Trade Abroad	2-42 1-32 1-28 1-22	2-70 3-60 13-48 1-46	1-64 10-54 3-50 2-48 3-36 2-32 1-24	9-54 2-50 1-42 2-36 1-32	1-64 8-54 1-50 1-48 1-36 1-36 1-24 1-12	1-70 2-64 2-54 1-36 1-32 1-24 1-0ther
Home Waters: Convoy of Coastal Trade		1-72 2-32 1-24 1-24	3-54 1-42 1-32 1-28 3-24	3-54 1-50 2-42 1-36 1-18 1-18 1-10	3-54 1-32 2-28 4-24 1-10 1-10	1-70 1-64 1-54 2-24 1-18 1-18 1-10 2-others
Home Waters: Coastal Patrol	(Channel Is.) 1-70 1-48 1-other	1-46 1-22 2-24 7-others	2-64 1-54 1-48 1-34 2-32 1-24 1-24 1-24	2-50 1-42 4-24 1-22 1-18 1-18	1-42 1-32 2-24 1-22 1-14 1-8 1-8 11-others	1-32 2-24 1-22 7-others
Ireland	2-32 2-24 8-others		1-36 2-32 1-28 1-24	2-36 2-32 1-28 1-24 1-others	2-36 2-32 1-24 1-other	1-36 2-32 1-24 1-other
Dunkirk; North Sea	1-80 1-70 1-66 1-48 2-60 2-48 1-44 3-32 2-24 3-0thers	6-48	1-64 3-54 1-42 1-36 1-24 11-0thers			1-70 3-64 4-54 1-50 1-48 1-48 1-24 1-24
Soundings		1-100 3-80 4-70 1-64 1-60 1-60	1-70 1-64 2-54 1-32 1-28 2-others	1-70 3-54 1-48 1-32	1-48 1-24	2-70 1-60 1-54
West Indies/ North America	1-48 2-42 3-28 3-28	1-70 2-64 6-60 1-54 7-48 1-46 1-46 1-46 1-46 1-46 3-24 9-others		9-others 4-54 1-36 3-32 1-28 2-24 4-others	1-70 1-64 4-54 2-42 2-28 1-18 2-0thers	1-70 2-64 7-54 1-48 1-48 1-42 4-32 4-32
Mediterranean/ Peninsula		1-100 1-96 4-90 6-80 13-70 1-66 1-66 1-62 2-60 4-32 3-24 21-others	4-96 8-80 15-70 4-64 1-50 1-50 1-36 1-10	12-others 5-96 10-80 4-64 6-54 6-54 3-42 3-42 2-36 1-24 13-others	2-100 4-96 6-64 5-80 5-80 6-54 1-48 3-42 2-36 3-32 2-24 2-24 20-0thers	3-100 8-96 8-96 17-70 8-64 8-54 2-48 2-42 7-32 2-42 7-32 2-36 6-24 5-24 5-24 51-others
	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706

Employment of the English Fleet

(Number of ships - number of guns on one ship)

I Mec	1707	1708	1709	1710	1171	1712
Mediterranean/ Peninsula	1-100 2-96 9-80 11-70 2-64 6-54 1-40 1-40 1-36 4-24 4-24 16-others	1-96 7-80 8-70 3-54 1-42 1-36 1-36 1-28 1-14 7-others	1-100 1-96 4-80 11-70 3-64 4-54 2-42 2-36 1-32 1-others	2-80 9-70 -64 3-54 3-42 2-36 1-32 2-24 9-others	1-96 3-80 8-70 3-64 4-54 2-42 1-36 1-32 1-0thers	1-96 1-96 4-70 4-70 4-70 8-54 1-56 1-40 1-40 1-36 1-20 2-32 1-20 3-others
West Indies/ North America	1-70 2-64 7-54 1-36 4-32 4-24	1-70 1-66 1-66 9-54 1-50 1-50 1-36 2-33 1-30 1-28	1-66 1-64 4-54 3-42 1-36 1-24	3-64 6-54 5-42 1-36 1-24	2-80 1-70 3-66 5-64 7-54 2-42 1-36 1-36 2-32 2-32 2-others	2-66 1-64 6-54 6-54 2-32 1-30 1-28 1-28 1-28 1-28 1-28 1-16 1-0ther
Soundings	2-80 4-70 2-64 1-60 2-50 2-32		2-80 2-70 4-64 2-54	1-110 1-100 3-80 1-70 1-66 2-64 1-other	1-80 3-70 1-54	3-70 1-64
Dunkirk; North Sea		1-96 3-80 4-70 5-64 1-60 1-60 1-48 1-48 3-32 3-32	1-64 4-54 1-42 1-36 1-36 1-32 1-24 (To the Baltic) 3-54 1-42	2-64 4-54 1-50 1-42	1-80 1-54 1-24 2-14 2-14	1-70 1-66 4-64 5-54 1-50 1-32 1-32 1-24
Ireland 0	1-32 1-24 2-others		1-54 1-36 1-32 1-24 1-20 2-others	1-54 1-36 1-36 1-32 1-28 1-28 1-20 2-others	1-64 1-42 1-28 1-20 2-others	1-64 1-42 1-28 1-20 2-others 2-others
Home Waters: Coastal Patrol	1-54 1-40 3-24 1-22 1-8 7-others	2-54 1-50 1-42 1-36 2-32 4-24 1-18 1-18 1-14 16-others	1-80 2-42 1-36 4-24 4-24 1-16 1-14 2-12 3-10 8-others	3-42 1-36 4-24 4-14 3-12 3-10 6-others	1-64 1-64 1-42 1-36 1-28 5-24 1-16 5-14 3-12 2-10 8-0thers	1-42 2-32 5-24 3-20 6-14 2-12 2-12 2-10 4-others
Home Waters: Convoy of Coastal Trade	1-36 2-28 3-24 1-18 1-10 1-other	2-70 1-66 4-64 3-54 1-36 2-24 1-10 1-10	1-54 2-32 3-24	1-54 1-54 1-42 1-32 1-28 5-24 1-18 1-12 1-0ther	1-54 1-54 1-36 1-32 2-24 1-16	1-54 1-42 1-36 1-36 2-24 1-16 1-16
Convoy of Trade Abroad	4-64 4-54 1-40 (See Note A)	1-70 2-66 4-64 10-54 1-24 1-28 1-28 1-28	2-70 2-66 3-64 11-54 2-48 7-42 5-32 5-32 1-18 1-18 1-10	1-80 1-24 6-70 1-18 2-66 3-64 9-54 9-54 1-48 3-42 1-36 1-36 4-32	2-70 1-18 1-66 1-14 5-64 1-12 14-54 1-12 1-48 1-48 6-42 1-40 2-36 1-34 1-34 2-24	2-80 4-70 9-54 1-48 4-42 2-32 2-24

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APPENDIX E (Cont'd)

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Appendix E (Cont'd)

Source: P.R.O., ADM. 8/7-12. List of ships in sea pay. See Table VII on p. 213 and Table XII on p. 248 for summaries of figures. The number of guns for sloops, fireships, hospital ships, advice boats, bombs, and others with light and varied armament has not been included. Figures are for 1 August of each year.

<u>Note A</u>: In addition to these nine ships, the Soundings Squadron was ordered to convoy the trade to Lisbon and the Dunkirk Squadron was ordered to convoy the trade to Russia. These squadrons were to return to station when these convoy duties were completed.

<u>A General Note on Fleet Statistics</u>: It is extremely difficult to determine exactly the number of ships at sea ready for action at any one time. The best, readily available evidence has been used here from the monthly lists of ships in sea pay. There are grave difficulties in using this information. While it appears to be relatively accurate in reporting the movements of vessels in home waters, it becomes increasingly inaccurate the farther away a vessel was employed. In general, naval operations were more extensive in summer than in winter, and for that reason, I have provided information here for one summer month in each year. Despite the problem of slow and inaccurate reporting, and the risk of giving an inaccurate representation by sampling only one month, I have included this information because it still provides a representative impression of fleet operations using the same data which was available to the central government at the time.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE DUTCH FLEET

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APPENDIX F

There are a	TTATATATA	50			
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THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE DUTCH FLEET

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1706	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	East Indies Convoy (8) 4 64 1 52 1 44 2 36-38	TOTAL SHIPS: 47 1712	Number Sea 1 1 1 1 9 2 1 1 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	TOTAL SHIPS: 23
1705	Number Guns Mediterranean 9 (27) 4 92-94 9 70-72 9 1 3 52-54 1 36 1 0 1 36 10) 3 64 1 36 64 1 36 1 1 36 1 1 36 1 1 36 1 1 36 1 1 36 1	Flemish Coast (4) 3 64 1 44 1 44 (7) 1 64 3 52 2 44 1 24	S: 48	Number Guns Mediterranean (23) (23) 4 72 8 64-66 1 52 1 9 0thers	:CATUC
1704	Number Guns Spain & Portugal 90 (57) 1 90 1 68 8 60-64 8 60-64 5 50-54 1 38 0thers 36 1 38 0thers 36 1 36 1 36 90 1 64 5 90 1 64 5 91 1 64 5 1 64 5 50-54 1 6 6 6 5 50-54 24	Flemish Coast 1 72 (7) 1 72 3 60-64 2 2 40-444 1 1 18 1 East Indies Convoy 2 64 (11) 2 64 3 Frigates 3	ω Ο	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c } \hline & & \hline & & \hline & & & \hline & & & & \hline & & & & \hline & & & & & \hline & & & & & & \hline & & & & & & \hline & & & & & & & & \hline & & & & & & & & \hline & & & & & & & & & \hline & & & & & & & & & \hline & & & & & & & & & & & \hline &$	
1703	Number Guns Spain & Portugal (20) (20) 11 64-94 1 52 34 2 34 6 Others West Indies 1 70 5 60-64 6 50-52	Dunkirk (15) 2 70-74 4 60-64 4 50-54 3 34-44 2 Others	TOTAL SHIPS: 47 1708	NumberGunsMediterranean (21) 1 (21) 192 (21) 192 (21) 156 (21) 156 (15) 77 (15) 272 (15) 272 (15) 272 (15) 244 (15) 244 (10) 264 (10) 364 (10) 364 (10) 440-44	
1702	Number Guns (47) 4 90-94 7 7 72 7 7 72 7 7 72 7 7 72 7 7 72 7 7 64 2 50 3 3 36-44 0thers* (19) 3 72 8 50-54 22 8 50-54 22 2 40-444 2 2 2 40-444		TOTAL SHIPS: 66 1707	NumberGunsMediterranean(25)2 (25) 290-92 5 72-747 7 60-641 7 60-641 1 36 9 1 36 9 (13) 1 72 (13) 1 72 1 72 34 1 72 34 1 24 24 1 24 24 1 24 24 1 24 24 1 24 24 1 24 24 2 34 24 1 24 24 2 34 24 1 24 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 24 2 34 2 34 2 34 2 34 2 34 3 34 2 34 3 34 2 34 2 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 <td>SOURCE: J. C. de</td>	SOURCE: J. C. de

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SOURCE: J. C. de Jonge, <u>Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen</u>, (Zwolle, 1869). Deel iii, Appendices xxi-xxv; Deel iv, Appendices i-iv. * Bombs, hospital ships etc.

APPENDIX G

Letters of Marque Issued by the High Court of Admiralty

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	2-40	1-36	1	- 1	1–26					1		1	- 1	1		1	1-3	1				
	1-44	1-34	10-30	2-28		11-24	4-22	6	6	24-16	15-14	21-12	18-10	8 - 8	6-6	1						
	2-36	7-30	1-28	6-26	9-24	1-23	5-22	16- 20	6-18	27-16	8-14	17-12	1-11	20-10		5-6	1	2-2				
	1-42		- 1	2-26	8-24	1		9-18			- 1	1	9 - 8	1	11-4	1	+ 				ble entry.	this data.
		5-30			1-22	15-20	8-18	12-16	4-14	1	13-10	20-8	5-6	18-4	4-2	1-1				_	or illegible	summary of
	1	5-30	1-26	6-24	14-20	9-18	18-16	3-14	6-12	14-10			9-4		21*						npt listed,	X for a si
		1-36	1	1-26	3-24	2-22	1-21	13-20	1-18	18-16	6-14	10-12	12-10		5-6		5-2				Patereros, n	See Table
	2-40	1-36	1-34	9-30			6-24	1-22	14-20	3-18	13-16	9-14	4-12	13-10	7-8	12-6	1	1	4-1		only,	25/14-25.
-	1-40	1- 32	10-30	- 1	3-26	\sim	- 1	24-20	5-18	20-16	12-14	6-12	24-10		13-6	9-4		4 − *			small arms	H_C_A_
	1-42	1–36	1-35	1-34	12-30	5-26	- 1	5-22	20-20	15-18	44-16	17-14	30-12	24-10	15-8	16-6	11-4	Ŧ	1-1		armament,	P.R.O.
	1-50	12-30	1-28	5-26	1	5-22	29-20	11-18	34-16	2-15	20-14	33-12	24-10	22-8	ł	13-6	5-4	5-2	5-1		No main	
<u> </u>																		<u> </u>			*	1

A TOT A SUMMARY OF THIS GATA. erder ees r.k.U., n.U.A. 22/14-23. source

years indicated here are in the new style, although clerks normally, but not consistently, used the This inconsistency is a possible cause for a small error in the accounting of letters of marque The figures show the number of newly commissioned privateer ships in each year for each number of each individual letter of marque. All letters of marque were issued 'until further order'. The These figures are taken from the Admiralty warrants which authorized the issued in January to March in each year. guns carried as main armament. old style. issue of calendar No te:

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APPENDIX H

LOCATIONS OF PRIZES CAPTURED, 1702-12

APPENDIX H

Locations of Prizes Captured, 1702-12

CAPTURES BY PRIVATEERS A.

Undeter- mined Location	ε	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	m		1	2	1	-	1	-	-	2	2	2	
Pacific	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	9		1		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	
West Africa	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1		1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	!	1	
Mediter- ranean	1	ω	16	ω	7	17	ი	25	13	22	13		1	2	23	12	17	18	48	24	22	œ	A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL
West Indies	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	1	7	1	1		8	1	2	ŝ	11	5	ε	1	г	е	A second s
North Ameri- West can Coast & Indi Newfoundland Banks	ł	1	5	4	25	25	œ	2	39	25	15	MEN-OF-WAR	10	9	9	e	9	2	8	4	10	1	And a summer of the second sec
Bay of Biscay, Atlantic Coast of Spain, Portugal Canary Is, Azores	-1	14	œ	£	2	24	35	59	59	56	31	B. CAPTURES BY MEN-OF-WAR	36	12	21	8	TO	3	3	3	TT	9	
North Sea Thames Estuary Dover Strait	£	35	40	43	16	27	4	2	4	1	4		38	38	21	14	13	6	21	39	17	17	
Channel (West of Beachy Head), Soundings, Bristol Channel, Irish Sea	37	103	167	136	101	105	96	83	52	69	39		102	66	63	87	30	23	44	55	76	29	
	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712		1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	•

Calendar of Prize Cases in the High Court of Admiralty, 1702-1712. P.R.O., IND. 9017-9021: Source:

in enemy ports, floating at sea, or salvaged from wrecks are not included, werare cases heard in coloural Vice Admulty The vessels include warships, naval auxiliaries, privateers, fishing vessels, merchant ships and others taken in action at sea. The chart does not include prize cases of enemy vessels driven into ports by the stress of weather or accident and there seized by civil authorities. Cases of prize goods obtained Note:

allocation of numbers to distant stations, the Mediterranean, West Africa, and Pacific, may be regarded as the most accurate. The most difficult to determine were the cases in the Channel Bay of Biscay In some cases, the exact location is precisely mentioned, The evidence used here quite clearly identifies whether a vessel was captured by a privateer or by a warship. However, the assignment of the area in which the capture is made is more tenuous, and this but in others the location has been conjectured on the basis of the port of departure, declared port of destination, the port into which the prize was taken, normal sea routes, size and type of vessels included and the delay between capture and the beginning of court action. In this regard, the The most difficult to determine were the cases in the Channel, Bay of Biscay, portion of the data must be used with care. and enroute to and from America.

The dates here are the New Style year. The records are dated in Old Style, but from 1710 on, there appears to be an inconsistency in the use of the Old Style which may possibly result in error here. The dates here are the New Style year.

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¹This collection has been transferred to the British Library where it is presently being reorganized.

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d.	150	Letters	to	Cardonne	21,	1705

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D340a Ducie papers
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MS.	P294:1	Somers to Cowper(?), c. 26 September 1705
MS.	P452:1	Scarborough to Cowper(?), 28 July 1706
MS.	P232:1	Newcastle letter, 2 August 1707
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4959-60 4963	Parliamentary and Political Papers Papers relating to Foreign Relations and Affairs

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H-175 Richard Hill letters to George Stepney, 1704

National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

AGC/7/6-9 AGC/13/3	Jennings letters to Baker, 1710-11 Instructions issued by Shovell
AGC/15/1-10	Torrington letters
AML/A/5	Board of Trade Report, 1708
AND/5	Rooke Journal (a draft faircopy of the first
	87 folios of JOD/24)
BGR/1	Letters of Sir George Rooke to Commissioners
	of Victualling
CAD/D/17	Papers referred to by the Lord High Admiral
	in his answer to the report of the House of
	Lords, 17 December 1707

National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (continued)

CLU/10	Miscellaneous (includes instructions to Shovell and Rooke, 1706)			
JOD/22	Journal of Vice-Admiral Baker			
JOD/24	Rooke Journal, 1700-13 Januarv 1704/5			
HSR/1/4	Wager Journal, 1708			
LBK/44	Letterbook of Vice-Admiral Baker,			
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MC 65/002				
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SER/89	Abstract of Admiralty Orders 1660-1716			
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MS. 516	Lister letter to Pringle 14 February 1710 enclosing copy of Board of Ordnance to			
	Sunderland, 17 January 1710			
MS. 574	Joseph Dudley, F. Nicholson, S. Vetch Memorial to the Board of Ordnance,			
WG (24.25	24 October 1709			
MS. 634-35	Memorial of Lt. Gov. Ingoldsby of New York to S. Vetch, 4 July 1709			
MS. 701	Lt. Gov. Charles Gookin of Pennsylvania to Nicholson and Vetch, 17 June 1709			
MS. 724	John Pickering, 'The way and manner yt St. John's was taken according to ye best infor- mation Could gett of both french and English,' June 1709			

New York Public Library, New York City, N.Y., USA

New York Public Library (continued)

Montague Collection File box 7 (Montagu) File box 10 (Bolingbroke) File box 11 (Utrecht)

<u>Niedersächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Magazin Pattensen,</u> Hannover, West Germany

Cal. Br. 24 Äussere Angelegenheiten: 98 Allianzen, 1699-1703 1643-1696 England 1701-13 (reports of Beyries and Kreyenberg)

Northamptonshire Record Office, Northampton

Finch-Hatton Collection FH 275-80 Lord Nottingham's letterbooks as Secretary of State, 1702-04 FH 3738 Notes 21 August 1702 Meeting of the Lords of the Committee

University of Pennsylvania Library, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

Ms. Fr. 120-22 L'abbé François Gaultier diplomatic correspondence, February 1712-14

Public Record Office, London

Admiralty:

ADM.	1/2	In letters, Admirals, Baltic, Mediterranean and Downs, 1711-18			
	1/376				
	1/709				
		In letters, Plymouth			
		In letters, Portsmouth			
		Prize Office			
		Solicitors Office			
	•	Relating to colonies			
1/4087-96 4278		From secretaries of state			
		Orders in Council			
	1/5262-64	Benbow and Munden courts martial			
ADM.	2/27-45	Instructions to officers			
	2/364-66	To secretaries of state			
	2/1048-51	To Admiralty and Vice Admiralty courts			
	2/1744	Out letters, instructions, warrants for			
		period October-November 1708			
ADM.	3/16-27	Minutes of the Prince's Council and			
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Public Record Office, London (continued)

ADM. 7/550 List of ships ADM. 7/169,175 Estimates ADM. 8/7-12 List books of ships in sea pay ADM. 49/173 Navy debt ADM. 181/1 Estimates Colonial Office: C.O. 77/16: East Indies C.O. 91/1,4-5: Gibraltar C.O. 174/1,15: Minorca C.O. 267/5: Sierra Leone (West Africa) C.O. 390/5-8,12:Trade Statistics Foreign Office: F.O. 90/13,37, King's letters, Miscl. 1710-13 38A,48B, 60B,72 F.O. 93/7 Protocols of treaties, Algiers F.O. 95/523-26 Treaties 1639-1719 French papers relating to the mission F.O. 95/559 to Holland, 1701 High Court of Admiralty: H.C.A. 25/14-25 Bonds, Warrants for letters of Marque, 1702-12 H.C.A. 30/774 Lists of Prizes H.C.A. 49/106 Vice Admiralty Court proceedings H.C.A. 50/7-8 Muniments, letters patent Indices: IND. 9017-9021: Calendar of prize cases before the High Court of Admiralty, 1701-12 Report on the Political and Diplomatic IND. 6908C: History of Great Britain during the reign of William III and Queen Mary, 1689-1702, pp. 643-843; . . . Queen Anne, 1702-1714, pp. 847-1101; with appendices describing the major treaties and documents [by John Bruce, 1801] Privy Council Office: P.C. 2/78-84 Registers P.C. 4/1 Draft minutes P.C. 5/2-4 Plantation books Miscellaneous, March-July 1702 P.C. 6/15 Public Record Office Gifts, Deposits and Transcripts: PRO. 30/24/20-22 Shaftesbury Papers PRO. 31/3/187-201 Baschet's Transcripts, Paris archives PRO. 31/14/46 Venetian Transcripts, England 1702-09 State Paper Office: Pamphlets S.P. 9/248-9 Domestic, Anne S.P. 34/1-3 Domestic, military S.P. 41/3-4,34

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Viner, Jacob, 'Power versus Plenty as objectives of foreign policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth century', <u>World Politics</u>, i (1948), pp. 1-29. SHORT ABSTRACT of a thesis entitled 'ENGLAND IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: THE ENGLISH VIEW AND CONDUCT OF GRAND STRATEGY, 1701-1713', and submitted to the faculty of Modern History in the University of Oxford for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy during Hilary Term, 1979, by John B. Hattendorf, Pembroke College.

This thesis presents a reassessment of English policy in the War of the Spanish Succession. Based on a study of the process by which decisions were reached in military, naval and foreign affairs, the author shows that the nation's conduct in these areas was not governed exclusively by one or two individuals, but through a bureaucratic process. From the papers of the ministers, generals, admirals, diplomats and other officials involved in the decisionmaking process, the author has drawn an outline of English war aims and the grand strategy through which the nation attempted to reach them. This outline is complemented by a broad analysis of the numerous treaties which England entered into in order to reach her objectives as well as an overview of war expenditure and the employment of the army and the navy in carrying out her strategy and in defending herself, her trade, and her colonies. The thesis proceeds with a discussion of some of the problems which England faced in maintaining her concept of an effective alliance. It shows examples of some of the different methods by which her influence and resources were used to encourage the allies to carry out the war as England wished. The study concludes with a description of England's use of her military force

in relation to the peace negotiations. Here the author shows that the ministry attempted to use the army and the navy as a means to facilitate the negotiations and to ensure the peace settlement. Despite changes in the Government, the nation's basic war aims were not altered, although changes in European politics forced England to change her strategy. Throughout the thesis, the ministry's view and understanding is presented, and in many ways this is a different perspective from that attributed to it by the allies and from the position it presented in national politics. ABSTRACT of a thesis entitled 'ENGLAND IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: THE ENGLISH VIEW AND CONDUCT OF GRAND STRATEGY, 1701-1713', and submitted to the faculty of Modern History in the University of Oxford for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy during Hilary Term, 1979, by John B. Hattendorf, Pembroke College.

In general, historians have associated England's conduct in the War of the Spanish Succession with the duke of Marlborough. They have interpreted his campaigns in Flanders as the primary contribution to a strategy that was based on continental military campaigns and a European alliance. At the same time, Marlborough has been seen as the director of the war. The campaigns at sea and in Spain, Italy and Germany have generally been considered less important to Marlborough and to England. Marlborough's fall from power and the change of ministry in 1710 have been interpreted as signalling a new war strategy that was based on a 'blue water' naval strategy and which rejected the alliance and the military campaigns on the continent.

I was attracted to a study of the War of the Spanish Succession because of this opposition between two quite different strategies and because of the political debate which accompanied it. I began my research at Blenheim Palace with the idea that I would find there the richest source of the strategic ideas behind Marlborough's direction of the war. I was disappointed. The Marlborough papers made it clear that Marlborough had been directed from London on the highest matters of war policy. At first, I thought that the out-letters of the secretaries of state would provide all the information I needed. However, it soon became clear that decisions in the cabinet were being made on the basis of the opinions, reactions and understanding of a wide variety of officials, both at home and abroad. In order to get at my subject, I needed to sift through all the incoming and outgoing correspondence of cabinet officials which related to the war. This material was mainly located in the Public Record Office and the British Museum, but very important segments were also found in numerous record offices and libraries in the United Kingdom and in America.

After reviewing these manuscripts I was able to construct an outline of the English viewpoint and objectives in the war. In the process of doing this, I discovered that continental scholars had more interest than English historians in the diplomatic and military affairs of this period and had written more about them. These works, written in French, German, Dutch, and Swedish gave me a quite different perspective on the problems which I was considering and provided useful information. Through them, I realized that the reports of foreign envoys in London and the letters of men who met and negotiated war problems with responsible Englishmen could, on occasion, provide useful summaries and insights into the English viewpoint. In addition to published histories based on this material, I have used some original material from archives in The Hague, Karlsruhe, Hannover, and Stockholm. While this material was valuable, I did not undertake a

systematic search for it as I did for English documents. Careful use of it would require a reading knowledge of at least eight foreign languages and several years of work in archives throughout Europe. Since the major objective of my work is to understand the English viewpoint and the general problems which England faced, I have complemented original English documents with transcripts available in England, published foreign documents and the works of continental historians.

The change of source material from Marlborough's personal and official papers to a much wider bureaucratic process altered the scope as well as my understanding of England's purposes in the war. First, it became clear that the campaign in Flanders was designed to be complementary to equally important campaigns in Germany, Italy and Spain. All acting together, they were planned to create an effect which prevented France from concentrating her immense strength in any one area. In order to carry out this concept an elaborate network of treaties was developed, and England carefully used her finances, diplomacy, army, and navy in order to support it. It was a strategy which depended upon the allies in order to defeat France and to prevent her from expanding her influence over Spain. In English eyes, Spain was the key to establishing a balance of power in Europe, and it was a balance of power which would allow England to pursue her independent commercial and political goals. This strategy was pursued throughout the Godolphin ministry, and it was continued by the Harley ministry. However, the increasing

burden of the war on England and the reluctance of the allies to carry out the strategy in the manner which England thought best made the ministry anxious to conclude the best peace that circumstances would allow. While proceeding along these lines, the Government was forced to reconsider its strategy when the death of Emperor Joseph I and the accession of Charles VI threatened to upset English plans for a Spain which was free from the control of any great power. While continuing to use the old strategy as a means to exert pressure on France, England seized a diplomatic initiative and sought to create a balance of power on the basis of a different succession in Spain. Throughout the war, England used her army and navy carefully as a means to achieve her objectives. Both war-time ministries used the forces in a ways which they believed would complement diplomacy and contribute to achieving the nation's war aims. Although the situations which the two ministries faced were different, their ultimate goals were largely the same.

While this picture was unfolding, it became increasingly clear that the simple opposition between military and naval strategies which I had first intended to study was remote from the actual conduct of the war. The public, political debate in England included war strategy as an issue, but the essence of that discussion was the struggle between the parties over the broad nature of the government. In this, the two war ministries represented two broad political viewpoints, and there were basic differences in their views on foreign and military policy.

However, in the actual conduct of strategy during the war, there was a great similarity. English historians who have written about the war in the past have tended to view English war conduct through the lens of the debate and not through an understanding of the decision making process, diplomacy, treaty agreements, war expenditure, and the placement of forces in the light of national goals and objectives. For this reason, I have developed the central theme of the thesis on these basic elements of strategic analysis and included the public debate as an additional factor. By this process, I have tried to provide a balanced picture of the use of the army and navy within a broad grand strategy.

In dealing with these subjects, a number of difficult problems arose with statistics. There is a disparity in financial statistics when different compilations of figures are used and where different contemporary accounting methods were used. There are serious doubts on the validity of figures for effective troops in the field based on the inaccuracy of the original muster reports. The figures for privateers include some 'double counting' and the statistics on the location of captures are, in some cases, conjectural. Similarly, the available statistics for naval operations do not reflect the combat readiness of ships assigned to distant stations. The figures for the Dutch navy rest on a 19th century printed source, not modern research. I have used all this data with some scepticism, but also with the conviction that it helps to provide a generally accurate conception of English grand strategy.

In presenting the results of my study, I have chosen an analytical method in order to cover a wide area in a limited space. In two places, the study of problems in the implementation of the strategy and in the search for peace, I have used a broad narrative overview in order to stress the importance of developing situations in the formulation of policy. Much of what has been written on this period has dealt with the personalities of individuals acting within a span of time. Rather than repeat readily available information, I have chosen, for the moment, to stress the abstract, broad pattern which men created by their actions and understanding.