

HENRY BOUQUET: A STUDY OF THREE MILITARY
CAMPAIGNS IN NORTH AMERICA, 1758-1764

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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ABSTRACT

HENRY BOUQUET: A STUDY OF THREE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN
NORTH AMERICA, 1758-1764 by Major Patrick H.
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Henry Bouquet, a professional Swiss officer, served in the British Army from 1756-1765 in the 60th or Royal American Regiment. Bouquet's service to the Crown involved his participation in three major campaigns in North America. During 1758 Bouquet served as the second-in-command to Brigadier General John Forbes in an expedition to secure from the French Fort Duquesne, later renamed Fort Pitt.

In 1763, Bouquet returned to Fort Pitt, personally organizing and leading the relief column which broke the Indian siege of that critical frontier installation during Pontiac's rebellion. This action resulted in the Battle of Bushy Run. In 1764, Bouquet conducted an expedition against the Delaware and Shawnee Indians in the Muskingum River Valley of Ohio. In this campaign he succeeded in ending Indian resistance in the region without having to fight in a single battle or engagement. Bouquet is generally evaluated by historians as a successful Indian fighter. An analysis of his campaigns reveals the fact that his success resulted from his performance as a competent and professional military leader.

This study evaluates Bouquet's three campaigns. It relates Bouquet's performance to leadership, warfighting and campaigning concepts outlined in modern military doctrine.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

On 5 and 6 August 1763 Colonel Henry Bouquet fought his only major tactical engagement on the North American continent, known today as the Battle of Bushy Run. Although a relatively minor encounter in the military history of the world, it was an important event in the opening of the interior of North America to settlement by British and later Americans. The action at Bushy Run occurred during the second of Bouquet's three major North American campaigns. Bouquet played a major role in three operationally significant campaigns or expeditions between 1758 and 1764, all of which achieved their operational objectives, due in large part to his professional leadership and decisive actions.¹

This study will evaluate Bouquet's three major North American campaigns, concentrating on an analysis of his performance as it relates to the modern concepts of leadership, warfigting and campaigning. During 1758 Bouquet served as the forward commander and second-in-command to Brigadier (General) John Forbes during the Forbes Expedition. In 1763, during Pontiac's rebellion, Bouquet led an expedition resulting in the Battle of Bushy Run and relief of Fort Pitt. In 1764 Bouquet led an expedition against the Ohio Indians and without a battle or engagement achieved his operational objective.

Henry Bouquet's career as a professional British officer spans a nine-year period between 1756 and 1765. During this entire period he served in North America. His efforts influenced the course of history, assisting in the defeat of French and Indian forces and opening the continent for future English expansion. In reviewing his successful record of military achievements it is evident that Bouquet made a significant contribution to warfare in North America. The reasons for Bouquet's accomplishments are less obvious. His success is based around his adherence to many of the basic concepts and principles today outlined in modern military doctrine.

Henry Bouquet's background and European military experiences as well as the events leading to his arrival in North America are important in understanding Bouquet's role and successful performance in colonial American warfare. Henry Bouquet was born in Rolle, Switzerland, during 1719, the son of a French Huguenot family. Bouquet's family was wealthy, well educated and contained a number of military officers.²

Henry Bouquet's military career began on 24 April 1736 when he became a cadet in a Swiss regiment. His commissioned service began 1 June 1739 as a second lieutenant in a Swiss Regiment in the service of the King of Sardinia where he served between 1739 and 1748. The rugged Sardinian theater included operations in the mountains of northern Italy and provided an excellent

training ground for Bouquet's future operations in North America. Bouquet's three major campaigns in North America involved the crossing of and operations in the rugged Appalachian Mountains of Pennsylvania.³

Little is known of Henry Bouquet's life between 1748 and 1756. As peaceful relations developed on the European continent during this period Bouquet continued his education as his services as a combat officer were not required. During this time he traveled, as a chaperone, in France and Italy with Lord Middleton (George Brodrick) from whom he acquired his knowledge of the English language.⁴ Bouquet also obtained valuable military knowledge relative to battlefields and fortifications on the European continent during this period. The young Lord Middleton may have also influenced the social sphere which had access to the Duke of Cumberland.⁵ Cumberland, the King's son, served as the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army and was instrumental in the decision to appoint foreign officers to the Royal American Regiment, Bouquet's future command. Therefore, any contacts in this social circle worked to Bouquet's benefit in gaining a commission from the Crown.⁵

In 1755 Bouquet was serving as a lieutenant colonel in the Regiment of Swiss Guards at the Hague. This regiment was in the service of William the IV, Prince of Orange, leader of the Dutch Republic.⁶ A

series of events unfolded on the North American continent between 1748 and 1755 which provided a challenge to British military dominance. While England and France were technically at peace, a state of limited if not total war developed on the North American continent between the French and English and their respective Indian allies.

Both France and England laid claim to the vast interior of North America, the region west of the Allegheny Mountains. The general strategy developed by the British government prior to 1756 authorized the use of offensive action in North America to secure those areas occupied by the French, but claimed by both the French and the English.⁷ The general attitude in the English business community was to eliminate France as a commercial competitor not only in North America, but worldwide. Land speculators and land companies in both Virginia and Pennsylvania had their eye on the rich lands in the Ohio Valley. The French colonial government in Canada, or New France as it was called, perceived the threat posed by the combined British commercial and provincial interests to French claims in North America.⁸ Both England and France initiated actions to strengthen their military and political positions in the colonies. This series of events set the stage for Henry Bouquet's arrival in North America.

The French viewed their military activity in the Canadian theater as an economy of force measure. Their intent was to tie-up as many regular British Army and Navy forces as possible, preventing their use in European, West Indian or East Indian theater of operations.⁹ After negotiations with the Iroquois Indians, the Governor of Canada, the Marquis de la Galissonniere, moved quickly to establish French authority over the Ohio country. He dispatched an expedition under Pierre-Joseph de Celoron de Blainville to the Ohio River Valley during the summer of 1749 to show the flag, drive out the English traders and reclaim the region for France. Celoron found the Indian population in the Ohio Valley fully supportive of the English for numerous reasons, primarily because the English could offer merchandise at about one-fourth the cost of the French.¹⁰

The major blow to English trade in the Ohio Valley came not from the French military but from a band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians led by a Frenchman, Charles Langlade. In June of 1752, Langlade's band attacked and destroyed the English trading post and Indian village at Pickawillany, on the Miami River. The Miami Indians who lived at Pickawillany were loyal supporters of the English and viewed by the French as a significant threat to their interests.¹¹

The French attack on Pickawillany had been preceded by a conference in May of 1751 at Logstown. Located about eighteen miles downstream from present day Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Logstown was an important trading village. In 1754, however, military activities shifted away from Logstown to the forks of the Ohio. The confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, form the Ohio River, at this strategic geographic location. The forks of the Ohio became the focus for military activities in the Ohio Valley until well after the American Revolution while Logstown faded into insignificance. (See Figure 1.)

Represented at Logstown were the French, the English and the major Indian tribes; Iroquois, Delaware, Shawnee, Huron and Miami. George Croghan, an experienced Pennsylvania trader and Thomas Joncaire, a Canadian half-breed, represented the English and French interests respectively. The conference at Logstown reaffirmed the English loyalty of the Indians, specifically the Iroquois, who exercised control over much of the Ohio River Valley. The Iroquois actually authorized English construction of fortified trading posts in the upper Ohio Valley. The pacifistic government of Pennsylvania, however, failed to respond to requests for military posts in the Ohio Valley allowing Virginia to expand her interests in this region.¹²

The French government in Canada initiated a military campaign in February of 1753 with the purpose of establishing a series of forts in the Ohio Valley, regaining support of the Indians and blocking the English westward advancement.¹³ By the fall of 1753 the French succeeded in establishing three forts, one at Presqu'Isle, on the south side of Lake Erie, near present Erie, Pennsylvania, a second at Le Boeuf, present Waterford, Pennsylvania, and a third at Venango, Pennsylvania. (See Figure 2.)

Governor Dinwiddie in Williamsburg, Virginia monitored these developments with great concern. The initial response to these French efforts was a diplomatic gesture. A twenty-one year old major in the Virginia militia, George Washington, delivered a warning to the French from the Governor of Virginia to terminate their efforts in the Ohio Valley. The French rejected this diplomatic effort and Washington believed that the next move by the French would be to the forks of the Ohio. This strategic location would remain a piece of key terrain, and because of its military significance, the primary geographical focus in each of Henry Bouquet's major campaigns in North America.¹⁴

In the spring of 1754 the English, actually a detachment of Virginia militia, began construction of a fort at the forks of the Ohio. A French force of about 500 men under the command of Captain Claude-Pierre

Pecaudy de Contrecoeur arrived and forced the English to abandon the site. This French army began construction of Fort Duquesne and dispatched a reconnaissance party to locate the English troops advancing from the southeast.¹⁵

George Washington, now a Lieutenant Colonel, advanced toward Fort Duquesne from Winchester, Virginia with a 350-man force. His mission was to eject the French from the region. Washington located and attacked a French reconnaissance party. Upon learning of this attack, the French countered, with a 650-man army, forcing Washington to establish "Fort Necessity" and await reinforcements. On 3 July 1754 the French attacked in force and Washington surrendered his army under rather lenient terms.¹⁶

The events of the summer of 1754 were clear in one respect, the English failed to gain a base of operations on the west side of the Appalachian Mountains and the French were present in strength at the forks of the Ohio. It would not be until 1758 that General John Forbes, with his able and trusted forward commander and second-in-command, Henry Bouquet, would gain control of the upper Ohio Valley for the English.

The political implications of these events in the wilderness were significant. France and England were not at war. The French had seized a partially completed British fortification by the use of military force. As

a result, Washington, based on guidance from the Virginia government, believed he had the authority to use military force to eject the French and exercised this privilege.

The English response to the events near the forks of the Ohio was to resort to the use of more military force. The Duke of Cumberland, an experienced professional soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the British army, emerged from this series of political and diplomatic events as the chief policy maker in the British government concerning use of military force on the North American continent.¹⁷ This fact is critical in understanding later events in the raising of the Royal American Regiment for service in North America.

After hearing of Washington's disaster at Fort Necessity, in September of 1754, the British cabinet quickly responded in October directing General Edward Braddock and an expeditionary force of 2,000 men to North America. This was one aspect of a four part plan initiated by Cumberland. The plan, which was offensive in nature, involved the securing of Fort Beausejour, Nova Scotia, Crown Point in the Hudson River Valley, and Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario as well as Braddock's drive on Fort Duquesne. The British also initiated a naval blockade at the entrance to the St. Lawrence River to prevent any French reinforcements from reaching New France. Upon learning of Braddock's mission the French ordered a counter expedition of 3,000 men which departed

France in May of 1755. Cumberland's plan achieved success only in Nova Scotia where New England troops occupied Fort Beausejour and settlements on the St. John's River.¹⁸

Braddock began his expedition with extreme indifference displayed by the colonies toward the crisis on the frontier. This provincial attitude resulted in a lack of personnel, logistical and monetary support for Braddock's efforts. A critical aspect was the failure of the colonial governors to secure the assistance of loyal Indians to support Braddock. Forbes and Bouquet experienced similar problems in 1758 but were successful in dealing with all of these issues. Additionally, Braddock began his expedition from Williamsburg, Virginia unlike Forbes and Bouquet who launched their expedition from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.¹⁹

The defeat of General Braddock's force, along the banks of the Monongahela River by the French and Indians was one of the most decisive defeats suffered by any army on the North American continent. In a classic meeting engagement the smaller French force totally destroyed Braddock's army. More detrimental than the route was the loss of British plans in Braddock's baggage. This allowed the French to effectively counter British attacks on Fort Niagara and Crown Point.²⁰

The French followed up the victory over Braddock with a series of violent and bloody raids against

frontier settlements. The English had no force available to counter this threat. These attacks, always made at dawn, were sudden, short and brutal. The result was a 300 mile front of terror and a war of attrition. The French did not perceive these activities as decisive. They were simply a distraction designed to break the will of the English colonists.²¹

Events in the colonies helped to bring about the "diplomatic revolution" in Europe in 1756. France, Austria and Russia alligned themselves against Britain and Prussia. Prior to Britain's declaration of war against France on 17 May 1756 preparations were well underway for war.²² One of these acts involved the formation of a new unit for service in North America, the "Royal American Regiment." The Royal Americans consisted of four battalions of ten companies each with a total authorized strength of 4400 noncommissioned officers and men. Recruiting took place in both Europe and North America. Although the actual order to raise the regiment was not formally issued until 4 March 1756, actions to build the regiment began in late 1755. Christmas Day 1755 is the date of Lord Loudon's commission as colonel-in-chief of the regiment. Loudon arrived in New York as Commander-in-Chief of His Majesties Forces in North America on 20 July 1756.²³

The issue of providing capable competent officers for service in this new regiment was critical.

Recruiting German and Swiss Protestants from the European continent balanced by an equal number of native British officers solved this problem. On 3 January 1756 Henry Bouquet was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the Royal Americans. Bouquet was the senior lieutenant colonel commissioned in the regiment.²⁴

One of Henry Bouquet's first missions, after receiving his commission as the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Americans, was to recruit additional officers for the regiment.²⁵ This effort, in conjunction with James Prevost, resulted in the contracting of forty-six Swiss and other European officers. These officers made up slightly less than half of the officers in the regiment. Although many of these European officers recruited along with Bouquet had engineering or artillery experience, they served as infantry officers.²⁶ These technical skills would, however, prove valuable in campaigning in North America. On 17 August 1756 Henry Bouquet arrived in New York Harbor.²⁷ During Bouquet's transatlantic voyage both England and France had formally declared war.

Bouquet and his battalion initially served in New York at both Albany and Saratoga. The battalion arrived in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on 10 December 1756 and went into winter quarters. During December, Bouquet's battalion contained less than fifty percent of its authorized strength but new recruits, primarily from

Pennsylvania, continued to arrive daily, increasing his combat capabilities.²⁸

During February and March Bouquet developed detailed plans for offensive action against Fort Duquesne. In March 1757 Bouquet's orientation shifted to the south. A meeting between Loudoun and the southern governors resulted in the assignment of Bouquet to command a planned combined regular and provincial force of 2,000 men, based in Charleston, South Carolina. Bouquet departed Philadelphia on 16 May with five companies of his Royal Americans. This was Bouquet's first independent command in North America.²⁹

Colonel John Stanwix, colonel-in-chief of the 1st Battalion of Royal Americans and Bouquet's superior remained in Carlisle, Pennsylvania providing security on the Pennsylvania frontier and recruiting to fill the remaining vacancies in the battalion. Stanwix's position, as colonel commandant of the battalion, was primarily an administrative and ceremonial title. Bouquet, as the senior field officer, managed and fought the unit. Bouquet met with numerous frustrations during his independent command in South Carolina. Lack of billeting and the unhealthy climate reduced his effective regular strength. He received only 170 of the 1,300 provincial troops promised by the southern governors, reducing his offensive capabilities. He encountered professional differences with William Littleton, Governor

of South Carolina and also experienced serious problems recruiting in the region.³⁰

Despite these problems Bouquet surveyed and strengthened coastal defenses on the Georgia and South Carolina coasts. He also improved English strength at the outposts on the western frontier of Georgia, North and South Carolina. In September, the newly formed 77th Highland Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Montgomery arrived in Charleston from Ireland to reinforce Bouquet. Bouquet also received the very pleasant news of his promotion to colonel.³¹

The lack of a significant threat to the southern provinces and the development of the 1758 campaign plan necessitated the redeployment of Bouquet's forces to the north. Bouquet departed Charleston with his Royal Americans during March, arriving in New York on 19 April 1758. Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery remained in Charleston until adequate shipping became available to move his Highland Regiment north, to join Bouquet. Upon arrival in New York, Bouquet learned of his assignment to the Forbes Expedition, the first of his three major north American campaigns.³²

ENDNOTES

¹ Dale Van Every, Forth to the Wilderness (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1961), 181-4; and Niles Anderson, The Battle of Bushy Run (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1975), 14-15.

² The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. I, ed., S.K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, Autumn L. Leonard (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1972), xvi-xxviii; and Louis M. Waddell, The American Career of Colonel Henry Bouquet, 1755-1765, An Address Delivered to the Swiss American Historical Society, Philadelphia, PA, October 1980. Rolle, Switzerland is located on the north bank of Lake Geneva in the Canton of Berne. Bouquet's French Huguenot family had resided in the area for at least fifty years prior to his birth. Bouquet's uncle, Louis Bouquet was known to have served in the Swiss Guards and attained the rank of lieutenant general in the service of Holland in 1772. Bouquet's father was active in local government and his mother's family was wealthy.

³ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, xx-xxii and 78; Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. II, ed., Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 917; and R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), 636.

Bouquet was seventeen years old in 1736 when he joined the company of Captain Crousaz in the Swiss Regiment of Constant. He served as a cadet for three years continuing his general education and gaining his first exposure to military science. Education remained important to Bouquet throughout his life. He particularly enjoyed the study of mathematics.

Bouquet's service in the Sardinian theater between 1739 and 1748 involved experience in at least two Swiss regiments. His initial combat experience occurred in this relatively minor theater in the War of Austrian Succession. Bouquet's regiments fought for King Charles Emmanuel III, of Sardinia. Sardinia occupied much of what is today northern Italy. The King allied himself with the Austrians while opposing the Spanish and later the French and other Italian states.

⁴ Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. II, ed., Allen Johnson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 480; Dictionary of American Military Biography, Vol. I, ed., Roger J. Spiller (Westport, CT: Greenwood

Press, 1984), 102; Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. II, 917; and Waddell Address. During the 1748 to 1756 period, Bouquet also accompanied a group of officers who received evacuated forts in the Low Countries from the French.

⁵ Waddell Address.

⁶ Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. II, 917; Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. II, 480; and Dictionary of American Military Biography, Vol. I, 102. While at the Hague Bouquet studied under Professors Hemslerhuis, Konig and Allemand. Bouquet would later write a letter of introduction for Benjamin Franklin to Professor Konig, a noted mathematician. Dictionary of American Military Biography, Vol. I, 102; and Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 78.

⁷ Sir Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, Vol. I (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1918), 23-27.

⁸ W. J. Eccles, France in America (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), 178-9.

⁹ Ibid., 179.

¹⁰ Donald H. Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1981), 5 and 9; and Eccles, 180.

¹¹ Walter O'Mera, Guns at the Forks (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 15-16.

¹² Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1973), 322-3 and 325-326; and O'Mera, 12-13. Virginia's interest in the Ohio Valley was primarily economic. Formed in 1747 by London and Virginia land speculators, the Ohio Company was an economic venture. The British crown authorized the company 500,000 acres if the company promised to seat a hundred families in the upper Ohio Valley within seven years. The first tract selected for colonization was between the Monongahela and Kanawha Rivers. The Royal Governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie, supported the Ohio Company's efforts for both personal and political reasons. Dinwiddie was a stockholder in the Ohio Company and served to benefit from these actions.

¹³ Kent, 19. The Appalachian Mountains represented a significant barrier to the English colonization of North America. Once across the Appalachians the extensive river and lake system provided waterborn mobility as far west as the Rocky Mountains. A

successful effort by the French could insure integrity of their colonial empire in the interior of North America or at a minimum require the use of tremendous military resources by the English to gain control of the Ohio Valley.

¹⁴ Leach, 327-30; and Eccles, 181. George Washington began his 900 mile seventy-five day journey on 31 October 1753. Washington traveled as far as Fort Le Boeuf where he surveyed the military resources available to the French and received a negative reply from the polite but firm French commander.

¹⁵ O'Mera, 27-28, 40-41, 82 and 87-89; Leach, 318-19 and 332; and Eccles, 381. The race to the forks of the Ohio seemed to be won by the English when during February 1754 William Trent an experienced frontiersman, commissioned as a captain in the Virginia militia, began construction of a fort at the forks of the Ohio. The project received the support of Half King or Tanaghrisson appointed as a viceroy by the League of the Iroquois over the vassal tribes who occupied the Ohio Valley. The Iroquois confederation, consisting of six separate tribes, viewed the Delaware as a subordinate political entity. The Delaware did not share this view but exercised diplomacy in dealing with the powerful Iroquois. Half King had openly supported the British efforts in the Ohio Valley since 1748.

A French force of about 500 men under the command of Captain Claude-Pierre Pecaudy de Contrecoeur arrived at the forks of the Ohio on 17 April, and without firing a shot easily required the British forces, under the command of Ensign Ward, to abandon the site. Upon learning of the events at the forks George Washington, now a lieutenant colonel, began a movement toward the forks of the Ohio with the intention of establishing a forward base and to wait for a 800 reinforcements under Colonel Fry. Between the terrain, weather and the threat of mutiny within his army, Washington's progress averaged only two miles per day, allowing the French an opportunity to strengthen and reinforce their position.

The French, now constructing Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio, dispatched Ensign Joseph Coulon de Jumonville and a party of about thirty-five men on an armed reconnaissance mission. Washington's Indian scouts advised him of the approach of this French party and after discussion with Half King, Washington decided to gain the initiative. Early on the morning of 28 May 1754 Washington and his party attacked the French soldiers. In an engagement which lasted about fifteen minutes the Great War for Empire began with this seemingly insignificant fire fight. Jumonville, the French

commander and nine of his men were killed. Washington took twenty-one prisoners and suffered only one killed and several wounded. Unfortunately for Washington, one French soldier, escaped to Fort Duquesne and provided a detailed account of the events to the commander there.

¹⁶ Eccles, 183; O'Mera, 92 and 103; and Leach, 335. French reaction was prompt and effective. Washington's small army of less than 350 men hastily built "Fort Necessity," and awaited reinforcements. The French response came in the form of 650 French and Indians under the command of Captain Coulon de Villiers, Jomonville's brother. After a short engagement on July 3, 1754 Washington surrendered his army under rather lenient terms and the next morning began the march back to Virginia.

Washington built Fort Necessity in the middle of Great Meadows, which turned out to be a swamp when it rained, a poor location for a fort. Washington's major mistake in negotiating with the French was to sign the articles of capitulation which referred to "the assassination of Jumonville." The French distributed copies of the article of capitulation signed by Washington to the governments of Europe trying to gain diplomatic support for their position over the incident and discredit the British.

¹⁷ Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988, 119 and 122. King George had an aversion to sending troops to North America. The Duke of Newcastle, First Lord of the Treasury and Head of the Ministry strongly supported military action against France in North America. Newcastle appealed to the Duke of Cumberland, the King's son, for his assistance in gaining the King's support.

¹⁸ Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1940, 287-89. Cumberland's plan was bold and aggressive. He intended with one offensive campaign to eliminate the French in North America. The four offensive ground expeditions were to strike at the French strength. The naval blockade supported the ground action by preventing reinforcements from reaching New France through the St. Lawrence River. The naval blockade was successful in stopping only two ships.

¹⁹ Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire, 1754-1757, Vol. 6 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 65-70, 71-72 and 74-75.

²⁰ Leach, 365-367; O'Mera, 143-148; and Eccles, 184-185. The French commander at Fort Duquesene responded to Braddock's 3,000 man army, with an offensive gamble. The French plan called for their nearly 900 man force, 250 French regulars and militia and 600 Indians to ambush the English force as it crossed the Monongahela River. As with most plans, the enemy failed to cooperate. The end result was a meeting engagement between the two forces. The French routed Braddock's army inflicting nearly two-thirds casualties. French casualties were light, twenty-three killed and twenty wounded.

The third English volley took the life of the French commander, Captain Beaujeu, dead with a round through his forehead. Captain Dumas took command, held the road with his militia and regulars while the Indians poured enfilading fire into the flanks of the column. Confusion reigned in Braddock's army, his troops broke and ran, leaving guns and equipment on the battlefield. Braddock himself had five horses shot from under him, before being hit, while attempting to rally his troops. The route was complete, out of 1460 men engaged, 913 were killed or wounded. Of the eighty-six officers involved sixty-three were casualties.

Many interesting accounts of what took place during this meeting engagement are available. In many respects the French regulars and militia functioned in conventional tactical formations.

²¹ O'Mera, 157-8.

²² Leach, 380.

²³ Lewis Butler, The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, Vol. I, London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1913, 18 and 24. Originally numbered the 62d, but upon disbandment, in America of two regiments captured by the French at Oswego, resulted in designating the Royal Americans as the 60th.

²⁴ Waddell Address; Butler, 345; and Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XI, 1120. The British Ambassador to the Hague, Sir Joseph York, engaged the service of an adventurous Swiss enterpriser Jacques (or James) Prevost in recruiting qualified officers for the Royal Americans. Henry Bouquet and his good friend Frederick Haldimand were several of the first officers recruited for the Royal Americans. Recruiting, carried out by British representatives on the European continent, was under the direction of the British government. Those directions appear to have come from two men in London, Lord Ligonier and the Duke of Cumberland. Ligonier was a

proven battlefield commander, a trusted military advisor to King George II and like Henry Bouquet, a member of a Huguenot family originally from the south of France. At the time of the formation of the Royal American Regiment, Ligonier was serving as Lieutenant General of the Ordnance. The Duke of Cumberland was serving as commander-in-chief.

²⁵ Butler, xxi; and Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, xxvii.

²⁶ Waddell Address.

²⁷ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 3 and 7.

²⁸ Ibid., 7, 10, 25-39, 40, and 42-47. Here Bouquet experienced considerable resistance and lack of provincial cooperation in obtaining adequate winter quarters for his troops. After petitioning the local authorities, governor and the Pennsylvania Assembly, all parties concerned met and resolved the issue.

²⁹ Ibid., 49-62, 67-75, 91-96, 101-102 and 171. Bouquet's planned troop list included the following:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Troop Strength</u>
1st Bn Royal Americans (5 companies)	500
3 Independent Companies	200
Provincial Troops (South Carolina)	500
(North Carolina)	200
(Virginia)	400
(Pennsylvania)	<u>200</u>
TOTAL	2,000

Of these planned units Bouquet received only 170 Virginians to augment his Royal Americans. The effective strength of the independent companies was seventy men. Because of sickness Bouquet's Royal Americans averaged an effective strength of only 300 men. Bouquet's strength did not exceed 1,000 until the arrival of the 77th Highland Regiment in September.

Lord Loudoun thought rather highly of Bouquet, as did the Duke of Cumberland. This was the main reason Loudoun selected Bouquet to command in South Carolina over several colonels and more senior lieutenant colonels. Stanley Pargellis ed., Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765, Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle, (New York, London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1936), 235, 254, 223 and 345.

³⁰ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 119-120, 121-122, 124-126, 157-162, 170-176, 201, 212-220, 232, 248-250, 254-260, 266-269 and 271; and Pargellis, 345.

³¹ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 115, 147-148, 163-169, 182 and 274. Bouquet's promotion to colonel, effective in America only, was dated 16 January 1758. Montgomery also received news of his promotion to colonel. His date of rank was junior to Bouquet's. This was important because they both served under General Forbes during 1758. Bouquet, however, served as Forbes' forward commander, because of his experience and his seniority.

³² *Ibid.*, 301-302, 331 and 333.

CHAPTER 2

THE FORBES EXPEDITION, 1758

During the Forbes Expedition, named for its commander, Brigadier (General) John Forbes, Colonel Henry Bouquet served as the second-in-command. The expedition, whose objective was the destruction of French military power in the Ohio River Valley, lasted nearly nine months. It began, when Forbes assumed responsibility for planning and organizing the effort, in March 1758, and ended with the fall of Fort Duquesne in late November. Henry Bouquet played a critical role in the conduct of the expedition. An analysis of his effort provides valuable insight into Bouquet's performance and abilities as a professional officer campaigning in North America.¹

The Forbes Expedition was one of three North American expeditions against French and Indian forces conducted during 1758. The theater campaign plan outlined by British Prime Minister William Pitt called for three geographically separated but strategically supporting offensive thrusts. Pitt directed an amphibious operation against the fortress of Louisburg located on Cape Breton Island. The second expedition, with the city of Montreal as its objective, was an effort north from New York City along the Hudson River and Lake Champlain. The third was Forbes' overland effort beginning at Philadelphia against Fort Duquesne. These

three campaigns focused on the destruction of French military power in North America. The French concentrated their military resources along the St. Lawrence River, but significant military forces also controlled the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys. The three 1758 expeditions were to commence simultaneously in the late spring to prevent the French from concentrating forces against any one effort. The Forbes Expedition was a supporting attack and therefore received the least amount of combat power.²

The amphibious assault against Louisburg, commanded by Major General Jeffery Amherst, succeeded in late July in securing this strategic fortress which controlled the entrance to the St. Lawrence River. Amherst was unable to follow-up on this success with a drive toward Quebec and Montreal because of the relative lateness of the season. He chose not to chance having his amphibious forces trapped by ice in the St. Lawrence River. He also learned of General Abercromby's defeat at Fort Ticonderoga eliminating the planned link-up of the two armies.³

Major General James Abercromby, who replaced Lord Loudoun as Commander-in-Chief in North America during March 1758, assumed command of the expedition whose objective was Montreal.⁴ Unlike the amphibious expedition against Louisburg, Abercromby's force consisted primarily of provincial troops. After repeated

and costly frontal assaults against fortified defensive positions at Fort Ticonderoga during July, Abercromby broke contact and retreated south, down the Hudson River Valley. His efforts were a complete failure costing 1,500 casualties.⁵

Despite the defeat at Ticonderoga, the Forbes Expedition received positive support from Abercromby's army. After marching his army back to Albany, New York, Abercromby held a council of war. In an effort to salvage some success from his failed effort, he authorized Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet to conduct an offensive effort against Fort Frontenac. Located on the northeast shore of Lake Ontario near the entrance to the St. Lawrence River, Fort Frontenac represented a key communications link with the French posts to the west and south (see Figure 2). After a short artillery duel the French commander surrendered the post.⁶ The fall of Fort Frontenac during late August 1758 cut the supply lifeline between Montreal and Fort Duquesne, contributing to the success of Forbes and Bouquet later that year.⁷

The North American theater campaign plans provided General Forbes relatively vague guidance concerning his objective. In an effort to eliminate French military power in the Ohio Valley and interdict the line of communications between Montreal and the Mississippi River Valley, Forbes focused his efforts on the capture of Fort Duquesne (see Figures 1 and 2). The capture of this post

would provide a secure base west of the Allegheny Mountains, and serve as a secure forward post to reassert English influences over the western Indians and reestablish English claims to the disputed Ohio Valley.⁸

Henry Bouquet's assignment to the Forbes Expedition resulted from a series of decisions made in both London and North America. Forbes needed an aggressive, rational and experienced officer who was senior to the provincial colonels. As a result, Abercromby assigned Bouquet and four of his ten companies of the 1st Battalion, 60th Royal American Regiment, to the Forbes Expedition. Abercromby formalized Bouquet's authority as second-in-command by the issuance, on 6 May 1758, of two important warrants with legal authority. These warrants authorized Bouquet general courts martial authority and authority to grant warrants for subsistence. These two documents delegated Bouquet the authority to sign not only for Forbes but for Abercromby as well. This action formalized Bouquet's assignment as second-in-command and provided Forbes with a positive, professional leader.⁹

Bouquet's first personal contact with his new superior, Brigadier General John Forbes, took place during mid-May 1758 in Philadelphia. The general ordered Bouquet west, to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the assembly area for the majority of the army. There, Bouquet began

the difficult process of organizing, training and equipping the provincial troops.¹⁰

The first regular troops to arrive at Carlisle were Bouquet's four companies of Royal Americans during late May. Montgomery's 77th Highland Regiment did not reach that location, from South Carolina, until June. The Pennsylvania provincial troops formed at Carlisle during May and June while the Virginians formed at Winchester, during the same period.¹¹ (Appendix A provides additional information concerning planned and actual troop strength and unit commanders during the expedition.)

Bouquet faced many challenges at Carlisle during May and June. As well as forming the provincial units, Bouquet found it necessary to equip them. The provincial troops required tents, blankets, tomahawks, kettles, canteens as well as weapons. Forbes obtained equipment from local sources and pushed it forward for Bouquet to distribute because the supply ships did not arrive from England until late June. Equipment arrived at Carlisle so rapidly many wagons had no inventory lists or instructions as to who was to receive them.¹²

Bouquet outlined his frustration with the state of provincial troops in a letter to Forbes, "The new recruits will make you a thousand troubles; they need blankets, clothing, and so on - endlessly. Their officers haven't an idea of the service, and one cannot

depend on them to carry out an order." Bouquet's company officers found it difficult to control the provincial recruits because these units lacked experience non-commissioned officers. Bouquet did however find some provincial officers in whom he had confidence and assigned them responsibilities commensurate with their abilities.¹³

Bouquet established a positive relationship with his superior, John Forbes, early in the expedition. As a result Forbes entrusted Henry Bouquet with the responsibilities of forward command. Bouquet located himself with the lead elements of the army and assumed responsibility for all forward operational and logistical matters. Forbes was extremely ill during the campaign and was not physically capable of moving with the forward elements of the expeditionary army. The general was so weak and incapacitated he often travelled in a litter between two horses, because he could not ride. This resulted in Bouquet assuming responsibility for the forward movement of the army for nearly the entire expedition. In reviewing the correspondence between Forbes and Bouquet their professional relationship becomes evident. General Forbes was obviously in overall command of the army but he clearly relied heavily on Bouquet's judgement as the forward commander.¹⁴

One of the major issues which faced Forbes and Bouquet was the route the army was to take to reach Fort

Duquesne. Two potential axis of advance existed in 1758 (see Figure 1). Both routes proved marginal for moving an army with wagons and artillery. The two routes began at Carlisle, Pennsylvania and Winchester, Virginia respectively. These two communities represented the western limit of settlement in the spring of 1758 on these two axis. West of these two communities were only a few small stockaded forts to protect the frontier from the French sponsored Indian raids. The most important of these posts were Forts Loudoun, Lyttleton and Cumberland.

Supplying the army during its advance across the Appalachian Mountains became the first priority of the expedition commander. The distance between Carlisle and Fort Duquesne was 200 miles. Nearly all the territory west of Carlisle was under enemy control.¹⁵ During May, Brigadier Forbes developed a supply support plan for the advance for the army. His logistics concept, based on the work of a French author, called for the construction of a series of stockaded camps with block houses, every forty miles. He understood this would slow his advance but ultimately reduce his vulnerability while securing a line of communications and retreat, if necessary. Bouquet began construction of his first new supply depot and stockade at Raystown during June, on the northern route. At the same time he began an effort to link Fort Cumberland and Raystown by improving the

partially completed trail between these two posts (see Figure 1).¹⁶

These operational and logistical decisions by Forbes and actions by Bouquet offered several options for further advance of the army. The Virginians assembling at Winchester and Fort Cumberland could advance using Braddock's old road or link-up with the regular troops and Pennsylvanians, and proceed using the northern route. This course of action was practical only if a suitable wagon road over Laurel Hill could be located. Should no acceptable route over Laurel Hill be found, the entire army could advance from Raystown to Fort Cumberland then to the objective, Fort Duquesne (see Figure 1). The southern route was about twenty miles longer and included several river crossings, but the trail was already cleared within eight miles of Fort Duquesne. For this reason the southern route offered a more rapid axis of advance.¹⁷

Henry Bouquet spent the month of July supervising and personally conducting the route reconnaissance of the northern route. He forwarded his findings and recommendations to the expedition commander during late July. Forbes chose to advance along the new all weather northern route. This axis avoided crossing the Monongahela River making it more trafficable during periods of high water. He continued to maintain a strong provincial force under the command of Colonel George

Washington operating out of Fort Cumberland on the southern route, in an attempt to deceive the French as to his intention. This decision created a great deal of controversy within the army.¹⁸

George Washington served not only as the senior Virginian in Forbes' army but acted as a representative of Virginia's political interests. Washington and the government of Virginia had no desire to see a new northern route cut across Laurel Hill. The Virginians viewed this action as a threat to their political control and economic interests in the Ohio Valley. Washington confronted Bouquet over the issue but failed to persuade him with his argument for the use of Braddock's road. Washington wrote to both Brigadier General Forbes and his aide, Major Halkett, on the issue. However, he accomplished little except irritating both Bouquet and the expedition commander. The decision was final, the army would advance over what soon came to be known as Forbes' Road (see Figure 1).¹⁹

The management of logistical aspects of the expedition provided Bouquet, as the forward commander, with many challenges. Supporting an army of 6,000 men over mountainous terrain required hundreds of wagons and thousands of pack horses.²⁰

The farmers and merchants on the Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia frontiers were somewhat reluctant to support the army with wagons and horses, for good

reason. Many of the teamsters hired to support the Braddock expedition had never been paid. These men received no compensation for their dead horses or lost or destroyed wagons. The farmer who owned only one wagon and a good team of horses was not interested in loaning them to the army, despite the promise of compensation.²¹

On two occasions in May and again in October the lack of transport threatened to halt the forward movement of the army. In May a "Press Warrant" issued by Governor Denny of Pennsylvania relieved the immediate transportation problems experienced by the army. At this point in the expedition Forbes required adequate transport to stock the Raystown depot with three months supplies for 6,000 men. In October, with the majority of the army staged at Loyalhanna (Fort Ligonier), only fifty miles from Fort Duquesne, movement of supplies forward from Raystown became critical to the army's existence (see Figure 1).

To resolve this issue Bouquet recommended to General Forbes that he appeal directly to the Pennsylvania Assembly for assistance. The general followed Bouquet's recommendation and sent his Quartermaster, Sir John St. Clair, to meet with members of the Pennsylvania Assembly in Philadelphia. St. Clair reached a favorable agreement concerning transportation issues with the Pennsylvania authorities. This allowed

both Forbes and Bouquet to concentrate on the operational issues confronting them, although logistics remained a significant limiting factor throughout the campaign.²²

A major issue in the expedition was the integration of regular and provincial troops, with Indian support, into a formidable army. As the forward commander much of the responsibility for accomplishing this task fell on Henry Bouquet. It was the intent of the British government for the colonies to provide the majority of the troops for the North American campaigns. Provincial troops made up more than two thirds of Forbes' small army turning the Duke of Newcastle's philosophy, "Let Americans fight Americans," into reality. Additionally, the colonies were responsible for raising, clothing and paying their troops. The Crown assumed responsibility for furnishing arms, ammunition, tents and provisions.²³

Bouquet utilized the provincial troops to perform the majority of the manual labor associated with building a road through the mountains and forests. He quickly gained an appreciation for the many differences between military operations conducted in Europe and those conducted deep in the North American wilderness.²⁴ In June 1758 he wrote:

It will never be my opinion that the soldier in America should be paid for his work on campaign, that can be done in Europe where they have no provisions and there is little work to be done, but here where not a step can be taken except by work, if things were put on that basis, this army

would cost the government more than three armies in Europe.²⁵

Bouquet also gained an appreciation for the type of equipment needed for campaigning in the forests. Nearly half of the provincial recruits arrived with their own firearms, rifled muskets. Bouquet, familiar with these weapons in Europe, requested lead bars to mold bullets and fine powder which functioned more efficiently in a rifle. The use of rifled weapons had little impact on the supply system despite the added requirements. The fact that many provincial troops carried personally owned rifles had little overall effect on the army. Bouquet, however, adopted functional provincial practices to improve combat performance in the mountains and forests.²⁶

Bouquet appreciated the need for equipment suited for use in the wilderness. He found the bayonet a useless weapon in the woods and preferred the tomahawk. Because numerous provincials carried personal weapons, many were unable to fix bayonets even if they had been supplied. Early in the expedition Bouquet did obtain sixteen rifles capable of mounting bayonets, unique until the mid-Nineteenth Century, and unique as well in Forbes' army. Bouquet also noted that provincial troops were not very good at making cartridges, they took too much time and their cartridge boxes held only nine to twelve charges. He recommended the use of powder horns and

pouches for carrying bullets. Bouquet felt this was a better method in case of a sudden or night attack. Washington was using this system with his Virginians with good results.²⁷

Washington also dressed his Virginians in a rather nontraditional military style. Washington believed it was necessary to "...cause the men to adopt the Indian dress but officers also, and set the example myself:...." Washington recommended this dress, primarily buckskin, to reduce baggage and for convenience. After viewing this style of dress on the arrival of two companies of Virginians at Raystown, Bouquet concurred and recommended its use. The regulars and provincials differed greatly not only in their equipment but in their dress as well. The Pennsylvania provincial troops dressed in buckskin breeches and short green jackets while the Highlanders wore plaid kilts and hose with scarlet coats and the Royal Americans, buckskin leggings with scarlet coats.²⁸

Intelligence gathering in the forest was an element of the campaign which consumed a great deal of Bouquet's effort. Throughout the planning and execution of the expedition the importance of the Indian in this role was evident. Indians, because of their way of life, were able to move quickly over long distances with minimal supply support and therefore made excellent scouts. Bouquet understood the need to maintain loyal

Indians as part of the army and worked diligently to employ, support and retain them.

In fact the issue of Indian allegiance, not necessarily active offensive support, became a critical factor in the success of the campaign. In the spring of 1758 a series of diplomatic efforts gained the allegiance of over 700 Cherokee supported by Catawba warriors from the southern frontier. For a variety of reasons the majority of these warriors left the army after only a few weeks service. Despite a significant effort by both Forbes and Bouquet and numerous provincial officers to encourage Indian loyalty to the army, the majority of those who remained were not considered extremely reliable.²⁹

Bouquet employed the friendly Indians that remained with the army in small patrols accompanied by a trustworthy regular or provincial officer or non-commissioned officer. He followed this procedure to insure an accurate report upon return of the party and to keep the Indians offensively oriented while in the field. Despite a small but aggressive patrolling effort, throughout the campaign, Bouquet failed to obtain a clear view of enemy strength.³⁰

General Forbes, concerned over the lack of intelligence and friendly Indian support, sought to reduce French influence over the Ohio Valley tribes. French military strength in the Ohio Valley relied

heavily on Indian warriors to augment their small but capable regular and militia detachments. If several tribes supporting the French could be convinced to bury the hatchet, Forbes felt he could easily crush the French force at Fort Duquesne. Part of the general's stated mission was to reassert English influence over the Ohio Valley Indians.³¹

Bouquet understood the need to manage the Indian issues to the benefit of the army. Bouquet understood the need to encourage neutrality among the western tribes, specifically the Delaware, Shawnee and Seneca.³² Management of Indian affairs with these tribes was the responsibility of Sir William Johnson. However, Johnson and the Mohawk tribe with whom he had direct contact, were not on good diplomatic terms with these western tribes. As a result of this relationship, the western tribes were actually looking for a diplomatic avenue to approach the English but to avoid Johnson.³³

Forbes, disappointed in Johnson's performance, obtained the assistance of Israel Pemberton and the Pennsylvania Quakers. The Quakers seeking peace with the Delaware, arranged for a conference at Easton, Pennsylvania. Attending were the governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, George Croghan in the capacity of Johnson's deputy, Israel Pemberton, and about 500 Indians from fifteen tribes.³⁴

The conference which lasted nearly the entire month of October 1758 not only opened communications with the Ohio Indians but resulted in diplomatic developments favorable to British imperial interests. Although all issues were not fully resolved, the majority of the Delaware and Shawnee warriors deserted their former French allies in an effort to establish a peaceful relationship with the English on the frontier.³⁵

The events at Easton combined with the return of many western Indians to their homes, for the winter, improved the English ratio of combat power in the vicinity of Fort Duquesne. News of the events at Easton reached the frontier just as Forbes consolidated his army for a final push for Fort Duquesne.³⁶

This consolidated effort by Forbes was not the first offensive thrust oriented at Fort Duquesne during the expedition. Major James Grant, second-in-command to Colonel Archibald Montgomery of the 77th Highland Regiment, made an unsuccessful effort during September. During August, this extremely aggressive officer moved forward to reinforce Bouquet at Loyalhanna with a detachment of the 77th Regiment. Loyalhanna (Ligonier) was the last major stockade and supply depot on the route to Fort Duquesne.³⁷ (See Figure 1.)

Upon arrival at that post Bouquet authorized Grant to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force and if practical conduct a limited objective attack. Grant's target was

the Indian camp and bivouac area just outside the walls of Fort Duquesne. Bouquet and Grant secretly planned the operation to insure operational security. This action was undertaken in response to several Indian attacks on small parties of troops in the vicinity of Loyalhanna.³⁸

Bouquet placed under Grant's command a combined regular and provincial force of nearly 800 men. A combination of poor reconnaissance and a slow night movement to the objective caused Grant to lose the element of surprise. On 14 September 1758, his force became separated and disoriented and was defeated in detail by the French and Indians. Grant himself was captured and he lost nearly 300 men killed or captured. Bouquet's decision to authorize this attack caused the only strain in relations between Bouquet and Forbes experienced during the expedition.³⁹

Bouquet fully expected the French to follow-up Grant's defeat with an attack on his line of communications. He therefore moved his reserves forward in anticipation of this action. The intelligence picture at Fort Duquesne remained extremely unclear. Estimates of combined French and Indian strength ranged from 1,200 to 3,000 even after Grant's defeat. Fortunately for Forbes and Bouquet, the French did not pursue or follow-up on their victory, allowing Bouquet to strengthen his position at Loyalhanna. Interestingly

enough, despite Grant's defeat, Bouquet maintained a favorable impression of the provincial troops and their ability to fight.⁴⁰

During mid-October, Bouquet placed Colonel James Burd, of the 2d Pennsylvania Battalion, in command at Loyalhanna. He moved to the east to supervise needed improvements to the marginal road traversing Laurel Hill. During his absence a French and Indian force assaulted the garrison at Loyalhanna, inflicting only minor casualties but driving off numerous packhorses. Bouquet was extremely upset when he learned that Colonel Burd, one of his trusted provincial officers, failed to pursue the enemy after repulsing their assault.⁴¹

Despite this minor setback Forbes consolidated the army at Loyalhanna for the final assault on Fort Duquesne. Washington arrived with his provincial troops on 23 October while Forbes himself, accompanied by Colonel Montgomery arrived on 2 November.⁴²

Shortly after his arrival Forbes solicited from his colonels plans for future offensive action against Fort Duquesne, and then held a council of war on 11 November. The council, attended by all regular and provincial colonels, decided against continuing the attack. The primary reasons for this decision were the lack of accurate intelligence and the shortage of clothing and provisions needed to support a cold weather campaign.⁴³

The following day the enemy made their second attack on Loyalhanna. This attack by 200 French and Indians was one of the most important engagements to occur during 1758. Its objective was simply to harass the garrison and drive off their livestock. The Virginians, in the process of breaking up the attack, captured three prisoners, two Indians and a white man. The white man was a British subject who had defected to the French. Threatened with death, the man talked and revealed the weakness of the French garrison at Fort Duquesne. Armed with this new information, the best intelligence to date, Forbes reconsidered his decision and chose to advance.⁴⁴

Forbes established a strong garrison at Loyalhanna then task organized an assault force into three brigades. The assault element consisted of 2,500 hand picked men, both regular and provincial, with only a light train of artillery.⁴⁵ His regular colonels, Bouquet and Montgomery, commanded two of the brigades while Washington commanded the third.⁴⁶ The army began its advance on 15 November with detachments of Bouquet's and Montgomery's brigades in the lead followed by Washington's men cutting the road. The army assembled on 21 November along a ridge known as "Bouquet's Camp," which was the final attack position for the assault of Fort Duquesne. Scouting parties moved toward the objective in anticipation of the final attack.⁴⁷

The scouts, some loyal Indians who remained with the army, reported on the evening of 24 November that the French had burned and abandoned the fort. The army advanced and found the fort completely destroyed. The commander of Fort Duquesne, De Lignery, was under orders to burn the post should the enemy show up in force in the vicinity. Part of the French garrison of about four hundred men went south down the Ohio River while another detachment under De Lignery traveled overland north to the French forts of Venango and Presque 'Isle.⁴⁸

The victory had come none too quickly. Provincial troops' term of enlistment expired on 1 December and the supplies and equipment carried by the army were totally inadequate to sustain it during the winter. Forbes established a 250 man garrison of provincials to maintain an English presence at the forks of the Ohio during the winter.⁴⁹

Forbes, prior to marching his army back across the mountains renamed Fort Duquesne, Fort Pitt, in honor of the Prime Minister, William Pitt. He renamed Loyalhanna, Fort Ligonier in honor of the new commander-in-chief of the British Army, Lord Ligonier, and Raystown, Fort Bedford in honor of an important political leader. Forbes departed Fort Pitt on 3 December, enroute to Philadelphia. Bouquet remained behind to manage the retrograde of the army back across the mountains.⁵⁰

Bouquet took no credit for the successful results of the campaign. His correspondence and orders reflect loyal professional conduct throughout the expedition. Under the guidance of John Forbes, Henry Bouquet experienced his first campaign deep in the American wilderness. He gained valuable experience in a number of important areas and displayed a solid understanding of his surroundings.

A number of observations concerning Bouquet's abilities as a professional officer are evident in reviewing his performance during the Forbes Expedition. These observations fall into two major categories. Bouquet used insight and tact in dealing with the provincial governments and officers. He also displayed a willingness to adopt new ideas if they enhanced the performance of his organization.

Bouquet's assignment as the forward expedition commander placed him in constant contact with the provincial officers in the army. Bouquet effectively integrated the inexperienced provincial units into the army, maintaining high standards of performance, while supporting the provincial officers and maintaining harmony. Throughout the expedition many leadership and management issues concerning provincial support of the expedition frustrated him yet he never lost his mission focus. He maintained his offensive attitude while effectively addressing the political realities of colonial life.⁵¹

Support of the British military effort to defeat the French in North America was never extremely popular in the colonies, specifically in Pennsylvania.⁵² Maintaining a minimum level of support from the Quaker controlled Pennsylvania government was necessary to the success of the campaign. Both Forbes and Bouquet were able to influence the decision making process at just the right time producing the minimum support necessary to defeat the French.

Bouquet's letter to his friend, William Allen, a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly, written the day Fort Duquesne fell, outlines the responsibilities facing the government,

...but I know the disposition of people in general always indolent and ready to fall asleep on the smallest glance of ease and quiet. You must rouse them, and make them sensible that this business is but half done. We have acted our part, let you do yours; It is now in your power to enjoy in peace and quietude your Lands and possessions, if you will only lay out in some time and money, which may save you ten times more, and the lives of thousands of your poor Inhabitants.⁵³

Bouquet understood the importance of the military achievement in which he played such a critical role. He did not want to see his efforts and accomplishments and those of the army wasted because of the lack of provincial political support.

Bouquet's willingness to adopt new ideas to enhance his combat capabilities is clearly evident. Bouquet adopted aspects of colonial dress, equipment and tactics.

He exercised a great deal of judgement and discernion in tailoring and employing his forces for combat in the rugged mountains and forests while ensuring compliance with basic military principles. He emphasized security and reconnaissance while employing combined regular, provincial and Indian organizations in offensive combat operations. Offensively oriented, Bouquet displayed an understanding of the tactical defense. He addressed progressive concepts such as marksmanship training and entrenching, reflecting a superior knowledge of contemporary military art and science.⁵⁴ The main supply depots at Forts Bedford and Ligonier contained fortified earthworks similarly in design to those outlined by the great military engineer Vauban.

While the Forbes Expedition was Bouquet's first major expedition or campaign in North America, his performance reflected the training of a capable combat officer. Bouquet's frontier knowledge and experience would continue to grow prior to his next major campaign. By 1763, Henry Bouquet developed into one of the leading senior military experts on North American colonial frontier.

ENDNOTES

¹ S. K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and Autumn N. Leonard, eds., The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951), iii.

² Alfred Procter James, ed., The Writings of General John Forbes, (Menasha, WI: The Collegiate Press, 1938), 54; and Sir Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, Vol. I (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1918), 305-7.

³ Corbett, Vol. I, 317-330. The loss of Louisburg by the French had more economic impact than military. Louisburg represented a valuable commercial possession. It provided a port from which to exploit the valuable cod fisheries on the grand banks off New Foundland. While the fur trade in the interior of Canada was essential to maintaining political alliances and support of the Indians to the French, the fishing industry was far more valuable to the economy of France. Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988), 306.

⁴ James, 54.

⁵ Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire, 1758-60, Vol. 7, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 230-231; and Jennings, 363-364. Abercromby's planned strength was 15,000 troops making it the largest effort of the 1758 campaign. Unlike the Louisburg effort, the majority of Abercromby's force consisted of provincial troops. Eight regular battalions made up the corps of the army. Six companies of Bouquet's 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment under the command of Brigadier General John Stanwix, Colonel-Commandant of the Battalion, and Major John Tulleken fought at Ticonderoga. These men were part of a series of unsupported attacks ordered by Abercromby. Bouquet considered Tulleken a fine officer. All but two of the 1st Battalion officers who fought at Ticonderoga suffered death or a wound, including Tulleken who was wounded but survived. Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 308-309.

⁶ Gipson, Vol. 7, 236-246.

⁷ Jennings, 367 and Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire, (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1973), 436-437.

⁸ James, 35. The 1758 campaign plans approved by Prime Minister William Pitt during late December 1757 did not arrive in North America until 4 March 1758.

Loudoun's plan for "Operations on the Ohio" dated 1 February 1758 states, "Seneca Indians" would assist in destruction of the French. Based on Loudoun's commissioning of Col. James Byrd, III of Virginia to gain support of the Cherokee nation, during February 1758, it seems possible this was an error and should have read "Cherokee Indians." Loudoun's plans, while not identical to those outlined by William Pitt, were similar. Both called for Forbes to command the southern expedition to "annoy the enemy." Troop lists were however different. This is the reason the regular troops, specifically nine companies of Bouquet's 1st Battalion of Royal Americans, literally passed each other on the road between New York and Philadelphia in April of 1758. James, 35, 54 and 91.

⁹ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 337-339. There is no indication that Bouquet and Forbes met prior to Bouquet's assignment as his second-in-command. Forbes arrived in North America in 1757 as a colonel in the 17th Regiment. He served as Loudoun's adjutant general until his assignment to command the 1758 expedition. During this same period Bouquet served in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, Forbes was in New York.

During his independent command in South Carolina Bouquet corresponded extensively with Forbes in his capacity as adjutant general for Loudoun. Although no reference is available, Forbes no doubt approved Bouquet's assignment to serve as his second-in-command. Also see Chapter 2, Note 10. Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 247 and Allen Johnson, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. VI (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 505.

¹⁰ Ibid., Vol. II, 47. When Forbes and Bouquet met in Philadelphia during May 1758 they obviously discussed the many details of the campaign. Bouquet previously outlined plans for a campaign against Fort Duquesne, March 1757. Bouquet's 1757 plan, reviewed by Lord Loudoun is similar in many ways to the plan followed by Forbes. While it is unfair to Forbes to credit Bouquet with the entire campaign plan, much of the plan must be attributed to him. Forbes served as Loudoun's adjutant general until his assignment to command the expedition against Fort Duquesne. He no doubt had access to Bouquet's plan and time to study and improve its content after discussing it with Loudoun. Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 49-62 and 247.

¹¹ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 351, Vol. II, 39-40, and 60.

¹² Niles Anderson, "The General Chooses a Road," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 42, No. 2 (June 1959): 115; and Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 16-17.

¹³ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 23 and 35. Among the capable provincial officers Bouquet mentions were: Colonel James Burd, Captain John Hambright, Captain Robert Callender and Lieutenant Thomas Hutchings. Colonel Burd commanded the 2d Pennsylvania Battalion of which Captain Hambright was a member. Bouquet transferred Hambright to command a troop of light horse. Bouquet wrote of Hambright, "He is the most suitable man in America for that commission." Bouquet was in fact impressed with Colonel Burd's entire battalion. Of Burd's troops he wrote, "They are almost all soldiers who have served in Europe or are woodsmen who are useful on this expedition."

Captain Callender was a prominent Indian trader who was serving in the 1st Pennsylvania Battalion. Bouquet appointed Callender as wagon master general because of his energy and knowledge of the country. Lieutenant Hutchins of the 3d Pennsylvania Battalion he appointed as quartermaster in charge of provisions. Hutchins later became a trusted regular officer in the Royal Americans, a superior surveyor and engineer, and later served as the first geographer of the United States of America. Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 6, 48, 51-52, 122 and 124 and Allen Johnson, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 9 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 436.

¹⁴ James, 37, 102, 166, and 172; Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 135, 167, 264, and 380; and Gipson, Vol. 7, 259. Forbes was extremely ill during the expedition, for weeks he could not even write a letter.

¹⁵ James, 118 and 140-141. For more detail on these routes see Archer Butler Hulbert, Historic Highways of America, Vol. 5, The Old Glade Road (Cleveland, OH: 1902-5, reprinted, New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1971), 16-24; Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 300; and Archer Butler Hulbert, Historic Highways of America, Vol. 2, Indian Thoroughfares, (Cleveland, OH: 1902-5, reprinted, New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1971), 71 and 89-91. These routes, former Indian trading paths, permitted only single file traffic, totally inadequate for wagons and artillery. The "Old Trading Path" became Forbes' Road while "Nemacolin's Path" became known as Braddock's Road.

¹⁶ Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 347-348 and 366-368; James, 117-118 and 239-240; and Anderson, 120-122.

¹⁷ Hulbert, Vol. 5, 16-24 and Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 300.

¹⁸ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 142, 234-246, 255, 265, 294 and 336.

¹⁹ Ibid., 291, 298-303 and 344; and Anderson, 242.

²⁰ Ibid., 254.

²¹ Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. I, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889, 184; John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington Himself, (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1933), 83; Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 105; and James, 89 and 247.

²² Bouquet Papers, Vol. I, 405 and Vol. II, 471-474.

²³ Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire, 1754-1757, Vol. 6 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 10; and Anderson, 113-115.

²⁴ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 53, 75, 143, 149 and 253.

²⁵ Ibid., 152.

²⁶ Ibid., 17, 23 and 50.

²⁷ Ibid., Vol. I, 339 and Vol. II, 22 and 88-89.

²⁸ Ibid., Vol. II; 7, 136, 159 and 183; and Anderson, 390.

²⁹ Stanley Pargellis, Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765, Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1936), 431; James, 38, 75, 91, 102 and 141; Gipson, Vol. 7, 257; and Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 15, 39-40, 65, 68, 98-102, 137 and 146. During June and July 1758 Bouquet and Washington made reference to over 200 warriors from several Indian tribes supporting the army. These included Cherokee, Windots, Catawba, Nottoway and Tuscarora.

³⁰ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 180, 205-206 and 221-222.

³¹ James, 286 and 289.

³² Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 380-381.

³³ James, 85. Sir William Johnson managed Indian affairs from Pennsylvania north and Edmund Atkin from Virginia south. Johnson received his commission in 1755 and Atkin in 1756. The appointment of these men to manage Indian affairs in the colonies was the only action

to result from the Albany Congress of 1754. The northern and southern Indian districts did not match the geographic boundaries of the military districts created during the French and Indian war of 1756 to 1763. Specifically, the province of Pennsylvania was in the northern Indian district and the southern military district. This contributed to coordination problems during the Forbes Expedition. John Richard Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier (New York: Gordian Press Inc., 1966), 75-79; James Alan Rogers, "Northern Colonial Opposition to the French and Indian War," (Docotral Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1968), 24-51.

³⁴ Leach, 442; James, 85; and Jennings, 384.

³⁵ Gipson, Vol. 7, 275-278. Christian Fredrick Post, a Moravian missionary made two trips to the Ohio Valley from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The purpose of these trips was to encourage attendance by the Delaware at the Easton conference and carry news of the results. During both trips, made during July and November respectively, Post risked his life. Leach, 441-444.

³⁶ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 461-462 and 494.

³⁷ Ibid., 457.

³⁸ Ibid., 493.

³⁹ Ibid., 499-505, 512, 518 and 513-521. Grant's action took place on what is now Grant's Hill near downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Grant along with other prisoners returned to friendly lines via Canada in a prisoner exchange. Grant saw no more action in the Forbes campaign but commanded the successful expedition against the Cherokee Indians in 1761. He also campaigned against the Americans during the Revolution.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 513-521. Although Bouquet frequently addressed organization and management problems experienced by the provincials, he never questioned the fighting abilities of these men, only their inexperience.

⁴¹ Ibid., 555-556 and 560. Bouquet could hear the battle at Loyalhanna from his location on the east side of Laurel Hill. Bouquet, supervising the movement of an artillery train, believed his presence at Loyalhanna during this engagement would have proved decisive. Burd counterattacked but did not aggressively pursue the enemy.

⁴² Ibid., 547 and 555-556.

⁴³ Ibid., 593-599.

⁴⁴ James, 255 and 392.

⁴⁵ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 610.

⁴⁶ Anderson, 393. The brigades were structured as follows:

1st Bde	Col Bouquet	Pennsylvania Regt Royal Americans
2nd Bde	Col Montgomery	Highlanders 2d Virginia Regt
3rd Bde	Col Washington	1st Virginia Regt North Carolina Troops Maryland Troops Lower County Troops (Delaware)

⁴⁷ James, 259-260; and Anderson, 394.

⁴⁸ Gipson, Vol. 7, 285.

⁴⁹ James, 263; and Anderson, 295.

⁵⁰ Forbes Writings, 269. It is interesting that, while many frontier forts simply rotted away, construction of these three forts was adequate and their location strategic enough to permit their use for a number of years. All three survived and are today museums open to the public. Forbes and Bouquet have living monuments to the success of their campaign.

⁵¹ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 185, 224, 397 and 436.

⁵² Rogers, vii-viii.

⁵³ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 611.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 396-397 and 642.

CHAPTER 3

THE RELIEF OF FORT PITT, 1763

The political and military conditions which led to Pontiac's rebellion in 1763 evolved from a series of English military victories in North America. Henry Bouquet was an active participant in these events. Bouquet's involvement in the Forbes campaign of 1758 followed by three and one-half years of service on the frontier directly exposed him to the military and diplomatic conditions leading to the rise of Pontiac and his Indian coalition.¹ From the fall of Fort Duquesne in late November 1758 through the summer of 1763, English military dominance over the French in North America was complete. English control of the western Indian tribes, however, was lacking.

The fall of Fort Niagara in July 1759 ended any serious French threat to Fort Pitt and its line of communications to the east.² Major General James Wolfe's well known victory at Quebec in September 1759 followed by the fall of Montreal in September 1760 terminated organized French military action in North America. However, the Anglo-French war continued in Europe, the West Indies, the Far East and at sea.³ The defeat of the regular French forces at Quebec and Montreal did not completely end their military and diplomatic interest in North America. The western Indians remained loyal to the French who continued to

support their efforts to oppose the English. The Indians proved a formidable opponent for Henry Bouquet as well as for Major General Jeffery Amherst, who assumed duties as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in America in late 1758. Despite Amherst's victories over regular French forces he was inexperienced in dealing with the Indians and was never able to establish policies acceptable to the western tribes.

The failure of the English government to effectively deal with the Indians on the western border resulted in Henry Bouquet's expeditions of 1763 and 1764. English authorities displayed no strategic plan to deal effectively with Indian affairs after the defeat of the French in 1760. Bouquet's operational goal was to end the Indian threat on the frontier. His actions during 1763, encompassing the relief of Fort Pitt and the Battle of Bushy Run, were essentially tactical in nature, because of the lack of a strategic policy. Achieving his ultimate operational goal, however, required adequate forces and logistics support to march deep into enemy territory and force peace on the Indians.

Despite the lack of an effective strategic policy, Bouquet intended to pursue the Indians in 1763 and terminate their abuses on the frontier. Lack of resources and time prevented offensive action in 1763 and nearly prevented it in 1764. Bouquet, however, achieved two important military objectives in 1763. He relieved

the garrison at Fort Pitt, the symbol of English military power in the Ohio Valley, and more importantly, he defeated an Indian force in the field at the Battle of Bushy Run. With this victory, Bouquet enhanced his creditability among the Indians and established his reputation as a warrior. This enhanced view of Bouquet's abilities by the Indians contributed significantly to his operational success in 1764.⁴

Henry Bouquet's performance on the frontier between 1759 and 1763 placed him in a critical military leadership position in 1763. After the death of John Forbes in March 1759 Major General Amherst awarded command of the Southern Department to Brigadier (General) John Stanwix.⁵ Stanwix served as Bouquet's immediate superior until April 1760 when the former was replaced by Brigadier (General) Robert Monckton. Bouquet became the senior officer in the Southern Department in October 1761, when Monckton assumed command of operations in the West Indies. Bouquet's formal appointment to command in the Southern Department dates from 1763.⁶ The primary mission for the commander of the Southern Department, throughout this period, was to build, garrison and maintain a series of frontier forts west of the Allegheny Mountains.

The physical occupation of the frontier by a military force was necessary to establish English authority over the Indians and reaffirm claims to the

Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys. The most formidable of these posts was Fort Pitt. Other key fortifications included Forts Detroit and Niagara. Designed and built as the main English fortification or outpost in the Ohio Valley, Fort Pitt served in that capacity until after the American Revolution when the frontier shifted to the west.⁷ Forts Niagara and Detroit were French forts which the English occupied. English troops established rebuilt and garrisoned numerous smaller stockaded forts at strategic locations. These forts covered an extensive area from the northern Great Lakes to the Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys. (See Figure 2.)

Although the regular French army in North America suffered a defeat at Montreal in 1760, the Treaty of Paris, formally ending the Seven Years War or Great War for Empire, was not signed until February 1763.⁸ News of this treaty did not reach many French posts deep in North America until the fall of 1763. As a result, a very volatile situation existed on the frontier during this period between English and the Indians, who were often urged on by the French.

Those familiar in dealing with western Indians, believed that it was necessary to conduct large-scale offensive military action to force western tribes to comply with English authority on the frontier.⁹ The size of the British army in North America, however, decreased after the defeat of the French at Montreal.

The force reduction involved reassignment of some units to other theaters or complete elimination of others from the force structure.¹⁰ Amherst consented in these troop reductions in America which were driven primarily by economics, because he perceived no serious threat from the Indians.¹¹ Despite numerous indicators from the officers commanding at the western posts from 1759 to 1763, he failed to believe the western tribes capable of large-scale offensive action. Amherst seriously underestimated the ability of these tribes to unite and form a creditable military force.

English Indian policy between 1759 and 1763 alienated the western tribes. General Amherst terminated the gifts of weapons, gun powder, lead and steel implements upon which the Indians had grown dependent. George Croghan, Deputy Indian Agent to Sir William Johnson, seriously constrained in his efforts to deal with the western tribes because of a shrinking budget, struggled to maintain Indian loyalty to the Crown.¹² Unscrupulous traders raised the price of trade goods offered to the Indians and illegally sold them alcohol. Settlers pushed over the mountains and in violation of treaties and occupied Indian lands. Contact between Indians and whites increased and so did the casualties. It was only a matter of time until the frontier would explode from a combination of these pressures like it had in the south several years earlier with the Cherokee.¹³

The Cherokee were a numerous and powerful Indian tribe. Residing on the South Carolina frontier, they maintained positive relations with the British until 1758. A series of incidents resulted in two expeditions in 1761 to punish the Cherokee for their acts of terror on the frontier. The second of these was highly successful in achieving its objective.¹⁴ The situation existing on the northern frontier, not unlike the southern frontier in 1761, provided a military challenge to the English in 1763.

Pontiac, an Ottawa Chief, organized an Indian Confederation which nearly succeeded in driving the English east of the Appalachian Mountains. Pontiac's Ottawa tribe lived in the vicinity of Fort Detroit, but he organized a confederation of Indian nations from across a wide region spanning the Great Lakes and Ohio and Mississippi River Valleys. Included were Ottawa, Chippewa, Pottawatomie, Huron, Miami, Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, Wyandots and Seneca.

Pontiac's rebellion began in early May 1763 when Pontiac and a group of warriors attempted to enter Fort Detroit, with concealed weapons. Major Gladwin, commanding at Fort Detroit, learned of the plan and refused to admit Pontiac and his men.¹⁵ Pontiac settled into a seige of Fort Detroit. His confederation quickly eliminated all English forts west of the Allegheny Mountains with the exception of Fort Pitt. The

post experienced a siege similar to that experienced at Fort Detroit.¹⁶ In the process of capturing the frontier forts, Pontiac's Confederation acquired large amounts of powder and trade goods which they desperately needed to sustain their war efforts.¹⁷

Pontiac's initial success was tremendous. Only garrisons of 120 and 338 men respectively held out at Forts Detroit and Pitt.¹⁸ Fort Detroit, located on a navigable river, had a reasonably secure line of communication with Fort Niagara, across Lake Erie. Fort Pitt, although formidable, suffered the weakness of an overland line of communications, across the Allegheny Mountains. All reinforcements and supplies destined for Fort Pitt had to travel over this easily interdicted route. Henry Bouquet and Captain Simon Ecuyer, commanding at Fort Pitt, faced a serious challenge.

The seige of Fort Pitt began in early June. Prior to this Ecuyer sent several letters to Bouquet in Philadelphia.¹⁹ Based on Ecuyer's assessment of the limited intelligence available, he feared a general Indian uprising was taking place. Ecuyer, anticipating an Indian assault, prepared Fort Pitt for a seige. He fortified his defenses, burned all structures near the fort to prevent their use by the Indians and set beaver traps along the ramparts. His military preparations were thorough and reflected the performance of a professional officer.

Although Captain Ecuyer was confident of his ability to hold out at Fort Pitt, the line of communications to the east presented a more serious challenge. The number of regulars garrisoning these posts was small. Fort Bedford, commanded by Captain Louis Ourray, contained only three corporals and nine privates. Ourray was augmented after the crisis began by 155 provincial militia manning his garrison adequately for its mission. The garrison at Fort Ligionier, commanded by Lieutenant Archibald Blane was also small and more difficult to reinforce. The situation along this line of communication although not desperate, caused Henry Bouquet a great deal of concern.²⁰ Although Bouquet exhibited a sense of urgency, neither he in Philadelphia nor Amherst in New York had any idea of the seriousness of the situation on the frontier. On 12 June, Amherst, more irritated than alarmed by these early reports of Indian unrest reluctantly alerted two companies from the 42nd and 77th Regiments to march from New York to Philadelphia and then to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which would soon serve as the assembly area for Bouquet's relief expedition of Fort Pitt.²¹ Appendix B provides a more detailed accounting of troops in North America and those under Bouquet's control.

As additional reports reached Bouquet he began to comprehend the seriousness of the threat on the frontier. Bouquet intimately more familiar with the military threat

posed by a general Indian uprising than Amherst, quickly moved these limited reinforcements forward. Amherst, at Bouquet's insistence released an additional light infantry company and a detachment of artillery to Bouquet. The first reinforcements arrived at Carlisle on 26 June. Bouquet immediately sent thirty men to reinforce Fort Ligonier and strengthened Forts Bedford and Loudoun. These actions secured Bouquet's line of communications but the fate of Fort Pitt remained precarious.²²

At Carlisle, Bouquet assembled all available troops and logistics support necessary to relieve Fort Pitt. Bouquet's relief column departed from there on 10 July and arrived at Fort Bedford on 25 July. While assembling his army at Carlisle, Bouquet received information from Captain Ecuyer, commanding at Fort Pitt, concerning the loss of Forts Presque' Isle, Le Boeuf and Venango. Bouquet's earlier request to abandon Forts Le Boeuf and Venango in order to concentrate his forces had been disapproved by Amherst.²³

Bouquet's efforts in organizing the relief expedition amid apathy on the part of the Pennsylvania Assembly and general population was a tremendous accomplishment. Carlisle was also the assembly area for hundreds of refugees from the frontier. Recruiting of drivers and packhorsemen was difficult because of the fear and panic spread by these refugees. Despite these

circumstances, Bouquet assembled transportation and supplies consisting of: thirty-two wagons, 300 pack horses, and additional livestock, 60,000 pounds of flour, powder, packhorsemen and wagon drivers necessary to support his relief effort.²⁴

At the insistance of Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Assembly approved the raising of 700 militia to defend the frontier. This action in early July, was of little immediate assistance to Bouquet. The Pennsylvania authorities authorized these men to proceed no farther west than Fort Bedford. Their primary mission was the defense of the frontier from the east side of the mountains. What Bouquet needed was support for the relief expedition to Fort Pitt, far to the west. Bouquet welcomed the action of the assembly and it significantly enhanced the small standing garrison of only thirty men stationed at Fort Augusta, Pennsylvania.²⁵ In relieving Fort Pitt, Bouquet received no provincial manpower.

Upon arrival at Fort Bedford it was clear to Bouquet that his relief column was ill-prepared for forest warfare against the Indians. Bouquet needed the stealth of provincial militia to protect his flanks and scout to his front. The Highlanders got lost in the woods when Bouquet attempted to use them as flank guards.

In order to rectify this deficiency Bouquet recruited fourteen backwoodsmen under the command of

Captain Lemuel Barrett. These men arrived at Fort Bedford from Fort Cumberland and gave Bouquet the eyes and ears he needed to press forward to the west while protecting his column.²⁶

In New York, Amherst learned of the seige of Fort Detroit and committed his strategic reserve. He dispatched his own aide, Captain James Dalyell, to Albany, New York to collect reinforcements and move to the relief of the western post. Dalyell departed Fort Niagara on 6 July with 220 men. After suffering light casualties on the voyage, Dalyell arrived at Fort Detroit on 28 July. He planned to strike directly at Pontiac's strength and end the seige. Unfortunately, Dalyell's lack of knowledge of Indian warfare lead his poorly conceived offensive thrust into an ambush on 31 July. This action resulted in his death and that of twenty-one of his men in the Battle of Bloody Run. His relief expedition had strengthened the garrison at Detroit but failed to break the seige. By the end of July 1763 Fort Detroit had received much needed reinforcements, but Fort Pitt remained exposed with no outside communications.²⁷

Amherst hated the Indians and considered them less than human. He instructed both Bouquet and Major Gladwin to take no prisoners. Amherst also instructed Bouquet to use all means available to reduce the enemy including what is today considered biological warfare. Although crude in his delivery, Bouquet spread small pox

infected blankets among the Indians to induce an epidemic. Amherst's goal, shared by many on the North American continent, was nothing short of extermination of the Indian race, a concept that dominated American Indian policy for years after this campaign.²⁸

Henry Bouquet arrived at Fort Ligonier on 2 August and reorganized his relief column. He left all his wagons and many of his provisions at that post. With 400 pack horses and 450 soldiers he planned a rapid movement to Fort Pitt, departing Fort Ligonier on 4 August. The next day he faced the Indians in one of the most decisive engagements between the Indians and white men to take place on the North American continent.²⁹

On 5 August Bouquet planned to rest his column along Bushy Run, a way station halfway between Fort Ligonier and Fort Pitt. He then planned a night move through the Turtle Creek Valley to minimize the possibility of an ambush. A mile east of Bushy Run, at about one o'clock in the afternoon the Indians struck in a surprise attack.

Two light infantry companies of the 42d Regiment cleared the enemy from the front of the column. The Indians quickly encircled Bouquet's force. Attempts to clear the Indians from the flanks proved ineffective, forcing Bouquet's men to consolidate to protect the large supply train.

Bouquet described the situation on the battlefield that evening as "truly deplorable." He suffered sixty casualties. Ten of his sixteen Royal Americans were killed or wounded. He praised the performance of his officers and men for

...their cool and steady Behavior, having not fired a Shot without Orders, & drove the Enemy from their Post with fixed Bayonets.³⁰

While Bouquet praised the tenacity and loyalty displayed by his men, he understood the strength of the tactical defense and selected a hill on which to organize his defense. (See Figure 3.) He also knew the Indians would never assault a fortified defensive position. He improvised by building a make-shift fort by using the flour bags carried by the pack horses to protect the wounded and strengthen his defenses. Bouquet's men also suffered from a lack of water. His column had halted a mile short of Bushy Run where he had planned to refresh his men and horses.

On the morning of 6 August, the Indians renewed their attack. Casualties continued to mount and conditions on the hill deteriorated. His men repulsed several assaults by the Indians but it was clear to Henry Bouquet that some limited offensive action was necessary. A rapid breakout of the encirclement was impossible because his force had already sustained a number of casualties and the loss of numerous horses reduced his mobility. Bouquet settled on a simple plan

to force the enemy to mass in a killing zone, then destroy them before they could retreat.

Bouquet ordered two companies to withdraw from the line filling the gap with units from their left and right and reducing the perimeter. As desired, the Indians viewed this as a withdrawal and assaulted directly into the line of thinned troops, expecting a breakthrough. Just when the Indians penetrated the line, two companies under the command of Major Campbell, and positioned behind a small hill and out of direct observation, struck the right flank of the advancing Indians. This action forced the retreating Indians across the front of two stationary companies, exposing them to more flanking fire. The four companies then pursued the Indians nearly two miles until they were dispersed.³¹ (See Figure 3.)

This brilliantly designed and aggressively executed plan broke the siege and inflicted significant casualties on the enemy, but more importantly, Bouquet broke the enemy's will. Henry Bouquet's initiative and offensive attitude combined with the loyalty and tenacity of his troops resulted in an important but costly victory.³²

Bouquet had no opportunity to rest his men after two days of battle, the relief of Fort Pitt remained his operational goal. They made litters for the wounded, destroyed supplies they could not carry and began a slow almost torturous march to Fort Pitt. His army covered

the twenty miles to Fort Pitt in four days, arriving on 10 August. Tactical security remained critical because the Indians still controlled the area between Bushy Run and Fort Pitt, slowing his rate of advance.³³

The Battle of Bushy Run opened communications with Fort Pitt and allowed for the evacuation on non-combatants. From mid-August through late September Bouquet moved supplies forward, each convoy requiring a large contingent of regular troops to insure its safety. Guarding supply convoys was more demanding than it may initially appear. Bouquet estimated his troops marched 900 miles in the five months between June and October, the majority of these miles in supporting convoys.³⁴

Bouquet conducted this build-up of supplies in anticipation of an offensive thrust into the Ohio Valley against the Delaware towns along the upper Muskingum River (near present Coshocton, Ohio), that fall. He was seriously hampered in his efforts to organize an offensive drive by the reduction of the 77th Regiment and reorganization of the 42d. Bouquet was far short of the estimated 1,000 men he needed to march 130 miles into enemy held territory. This distance represents a deep attack even by modern standards. Bouquet sought volunteers and militia from both Virginia and Pennsylvania for this purpose. He persisted in his desire for an offensive action through the end of October 1763, when it was finally clear he would receive no

provincial militia or volunteer support. Bouquet was aware he gained an important victory at Bushy Run and desired to exploit this success. Retaining his offensive momentum and initiative was his primary operational focus.

Environmental factors also influenced his ability to strike deep. High water and bad roads from melting snow and spring rains prevented rapid movement during the spring. The fall was relatively dry and the primarily deciduous forests provided little cover for the Indians.³⁵

Henry Bouquet was dependent on the provincials for men, specifically men acquainted with the woods and forest. Bouquet's seven years in North America taught him many lessons. One of the most important was the value of the buckskin clad frontiersmen in scouting and flank security. Bouquet wrote

...I cannot think of employing Regular Troops alone, who are totally unacquainted with the Woods, and unable to Flank and reconnoiter without the assistance of Woodsmen to procure intelligence....³⁶

The lack of provincial support delayed Bouquet's offensive strike for one year.

Despite Bouquet's frustration that fall, 1763 gained him not only tactical but limited operational success as well. Bouquet enhanced his reputation among the Indians with his victory at Bushy Run, thereby increasing his chances for success in later campaigns.

The Indians respected successful battlefield commanders and were not about to engage someone who recently defeated them. At Bushy Run, Bouquet met the Indians, regained tactical and operational initiative and broke their will. The decisive battlefield victory he gained against the Indians was an event not frequently experienced in North America.³⁷

Bushy Run was a unique engagement between the white men and the Indians. Indian military power was not yet seriously overmatched. The relief of Fort Pitt, resulting from the Battle of Bushy Run was one of eleven major decision-seeking expeditions launched against the Indians between 1754 and 1794. English officers commanded seven expeditions, four achieved both tactical and operational success. Bouquet commanded two of these: the relief of Fort Pitt in 1763 and the 1764 expedition against the Ohio Indians. While actions at Bushy Run exemplify a major tactical or battlefield victory, Bouquet's expedition against the Ohio Indians is a study in operational success.³⁸

ENDNOTES

¹ In the summer of 1763 Henry Bouquet had seven continuous years of military experience in North America. There were only a few officers with more time in America than Bouquet. Bouquet, however, was unique. His experience was on the frontier. Management of an army in the forest, against Indians, became his specialty. While the majority of Henry Bouquet's correspondence and activities during the period 1759 to 1763 dealt primarily with the day-to-day administrative, operational and logistics management on the frontier, Bouquet maintained a warfighting focus.

Bouquet dealt extensively with the Indians and formulated concepts on how to campaign in the forests of America. He built on his experiences in the Forbes expedition. During this time period Bouquet authorized the payment of bounties to the best provincial marksmen in the Pennsylvania battalions. In July 1763 he received correspondence from a Mr. John Hughes recommending the use of dogs to pursue Indians in the forest. Marksmanship was a rather progressive military concept in the 1760's. The concept of the use of dogs to pursue Indians in the forest appears in the contemporary account of Bouquet's Indian campaigns, William Smith, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, (Philadelphia, 1765), 49. It also appears in correspondence with Amherst. The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet, Series 21649, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent and Leo J. Roland (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1940), Part 1, 214-215 and Series 21653, 321.

² Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire, 1758-1760, Vol. 7 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 343-356. At the insistence of Sir William Johnson, an expedition began during May 1759, to gain control of Fort Niagara. A combined regular, provincial and Six Nation Indian force secured Fort Niagara. The northern flank of the Niagara expedition received protection by the occupation of Oswego, on the south bank of Lake Ontario by a force commanded by Colonel Frederick Haldimand, a Royal American and good friend of Henry Bouquet.

In the spring of 1759 French and Indian forces operating from Presque Isle and Venango posed a serious threat to the small garrisons at Forts Pitt and Ligonier and the line of communications supporting these posts. French and Indian forces attacked Ligonier on 6 July 1759 but were repulsed. They were planning a stronger assault

on Ligonier from their advance base at Venango when word of the seige of Fort Niagara reached them. At this point the French commander, De Legneris, had a force of 700 French regulars and militia and nearly 2,000 western Indians. When he turned north to relieve Fort Niagara half the Indians went home. Upon arrival at Niagara, faced by Iroquois warriors, the remaining Indians deserted the French.

De Legneris lost nearly 600 men at Niagara, within sight of the Fort. De Legneris commanded what may be called the French army of the Ohio Valley. The destruction of De Legneris' army effectively ended any French threat to Fort Pitt or the Ohio Valley. Aware of the threat to Fort Pitt, Bouquet was ordered west on 31 May 1759 to reinforce the line of communications with Fort Pitt. Four companies of Bouquet's 1st Battalion of Royal Americans arrived at Fort Ligonier on 12 July 1759. It is interesting to speculate what may have transpired had De Legneris attacked either Forts Pitt or Ligonier prior to attempting to relieve Fort Niagara. Bouquet Papers, Vol. III, 349, 385, 389-400, 405-408; Guns at the Forks, 216-218.

³ Gipson, Vol. 7, 467. The strategy and operational overview for the campaigns against Quebec and Montreal are addressed in Sir Julian Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1918), Vol. I, 404-405 and Vol. II, 106-118.

⁴ Bouquet Papers, Series 21653, 237.

⁵ The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. III, ed. Donald H. Kent, Louis M. Waddell and Autumn L. Leonard (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1976), 154. Amherst first assigned Brigadier General Monckton, then at Halifax, to assume command of the Southern Department upon the death of John Forbes. Upon receipt of contradictory guidance from London, only several days later, Stanwix was assigned. Monckton accompanied Wolf in the Quebec expedition. Stanwix reluctantly took command in the Southern Department but as any professional would do aggressively went to work on the frontier. Bouquet Papers, Vol. III, 196-197, 199-202, 212.

⁶ The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vols. IV, ed. Louis M. Waddell, John L. Tottenham and Donald H. Kent (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1978), 2 and Vol. V (1984), 6, 810-811. General Monckton assumed command of the expedition to Martinique during October 1761, leaving Bouquet the senior officer in the Southern Department. There is no indication he was placed in command in the Southern

Department until 1763. See Note 1, Chapter 5. The Southern Department included all of the present eastern United States south of New York and west to the Mississippi River.

⁷ Walter O'Mera, Guns at the Forks (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 218-223. The construction of Fort Pitt took place between 1759 and 1761. Fort Pitt was the second largest fort built by the British in North America exceeded in size only by Oswego. It contained extensive outworks, ditches, stone and brick walls and occupied eighteen acres. The majority of the ramparts in the fort were 20 feet high and 60 feet wide. The earthen ramparts were covered with sod to prevent erosion. Because of its location, spring floods were a constant problem at the fort. The fort was however an impressive symbol of English power in the Ohio Valley.

⁸ Corbett, Vol. II, 377-390. A copy of the Peace of Paris is contained in the above document. Article VII, the Mississippi Line, addresses the issue of British sovereignty of all territory east of the Mississippi River.

⁹ Bouquet Papers, Vol. III, 25-26. As early as January 1759 Colonel Hugh Mercer of Pennsylvania wrote to Brigadier General John Forbes on this subject. Mercer felt it was necessary to force the Delaware and Shawnee Indians, residing in the Ohio Valley, to make peace. His recommendation was the use of a large military force for this purpose. This is exactly what Henry Bouquet accomplished in 1764.

¹⁰ Bouquet Papers, Vol. V, 357-358. Secretary of War, Lord Barrington ordered Amherst to reduce all battalions to a strength of 700 privates, thirty sergeants, thirty corporals and seven drummers. This reduction in force structure was effective 25 December 1760. Bouquet received these instructions from Amherst on 17 April 1761. The accession of George III to the throne also produced changes in political leadership in London. This ultimately influenced the military policy in North America. Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire 1760-1763, Vol. 8 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 197-204.

In June 1763 Amherst assigned a detachment of the 77th Regiment to accompany Bouquet in the relief of Fort Pitt. In September 1763, only a month after the Battle of Bushy Run the 77th was ordered to England for reduction. Vacancies in the 42d Regiment were, however,

filled prior to embarkation of the regiment at New York. Bouquet Papers, Series 21653, 225.

¹¹ O'Mera, 232-233; The Bouquet Papers, Series 21649, Part I, 157-158.

¹² Bouquet Papers, Series 21648, Part II, 1-2, 74-75, 167-168. The Bouquet papers contain numerous references to the problems existing on the frontier. In reviewing these documents it is obvious that Indian unrest was very serious. Reports of war belts being passed between western tribes, murders of settlers and Indians, complaints about settlers on Indian lands and lack of control of Indian traders are some of the issues addressed. Bouquet Papers, Series 21641-21653, 21655.

Bouquet issued an important proclamation of 30 October 1761 prohibiting hunting or settlement west of the Allegheny Mountains. The basis for this action was the Treaty of Easton, 1758, which reserved that land for the Indians. As there was no civil law west of the Allegheny Mountains, punishment of violators was by military court martial. This proclamation initiated a series of letters between Governor Francis Fauquier of Virginia, Bouquet and Amherst. The London government formalized Bouquet's action in October 1763 with the famous Proclamation of 1763. Douglas Brymner, Report on Canadian Archives, 1889 (Ottawa: Brown Chamberlin, 1890), 72-79.

¹³ Bouquet Papers, Series 21648, Part II, 1-2, 74-75, 167-168.

¹⁴ Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1973), 487-492. Lieutenant Colonel James Grant of the 77th Regiment commanded the second successful expedition. Grant served under Bouquet during the Forbes expedition.

¹⁵ Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 125. It is generally accepted that Angelique Cuillerier daughter of Antoine Cuillerier, a friend of Pontiac's informed Major Gladwin of Pontiac's intentions to enter and capture the fort. Her actions prevented the loss of Fort Detroit.

¹⁶ Ibid., 154-169. Below is a list of western forts which were captured by Pontiac and his warriors. Included is the name of the fort, date captured, the approximate size of the garrison, the commander and the fate of the soldiers:

<u>Fort</u>	<u>Date Captured</u>	<u>Approx. Garrison</u>	<u>Fate of Troops/ Commander</u>
Sandusky	16 May	15	ENS Christopher Pauli All Killed Pauli-Prisoner
St. Joseph	15 May	15	ENS Francis Schlosser Killed/Prisoner Schlosser-Prisoner
Miamis	27 May	15	ENS Robert Holmes Killed/Prisoner Holmes-Killed
Quatenon	1 Jun	20	LT Edward Jenkins Prisoners Jenkins-Prisoner
Michilimackinac	2 Jun	35	CPT George Etherington 20 Killed Etherington-Prisoner
Edward Augustus	21 Jun	Unk	LT James Gorrell All Escaped
Venango	16 Jun	16	LT Francis Gordon All Killed (Note)
Le Boeuf	18 Jun	15	ENS George Price Killed/Escaped Price-Escaped
Presque' Isle	20 Jun	29	ENS John Christie Killed/Prisoner Christie-Prisoner

Note: Lieutenant Gordon was slowly roasted to death over a fire after writing an account of Indian grievances.

During this period traders across the frontier were killed and their goods plundered. Settlements as far east as Bedford, Pennsylvania and Winchester, Virginia came under Indian attack.

Although the seige of Fort Pitt began in early June 1763, the fort was not completely cut off and surrounded until early July, allowing limited communications with posts to the east and ultimately with Bouquet.

¹⁷ Ibid., 163.

¹⁸ Ibid., 127 and 170. The number of warriors in Pontiac's Confederation is difficult to assess. Groups of 200-500 warriors were the largest force assembled in one location. A force exceeding 2,000 warriors is not an unreasonable estimate. Bouquet Papers, Series 21655, 88; Series 21653, 228; Peckham, 182. In early June Captain Ecuyer's garrison at Fort Pitt consisted of 250 men, half regulars and the other half provincial militia. By late June the garrison consisted of 338 men, 104 women and 106 children a total of 548 people. These additional people were refugees. Bouquet Papers, Series 21649, Part I, 125, 176.

¹⁹ Bouquet Papers, Series 21649, Part I, 114-117, 125-127. Ecuyer's letters are dated 29 and 30 May. A third letter dated 2 June provides even more detailed intelligence.

²⁰ Ibid., 118, 129, 149, 159.

²¹ Clarence J. Webster, Ed., The Journal of Jeffery Amherst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 306, 311-312. Amherst expected instruction concerning redeployment of the regiments serving in North America and the West Indies. He was somewhat reluctant to dispatch these troops to the frontier only to have to recall them. The instructions arrived from London on 17 July. The 77th Regiment was recalled to England to be disbanded. Word of the recall did not reach the men of the 77th with Bouquet until after the Battle of Bushy Run.

²² Bouquet Papers, Series 21634, 190, 197-199; Series 21653, 183-184.

²³ Bouquet Papers, Series 21634, 207-208, 222-224; Series 21649, Part I, 176.

²⁴ Bouquet Papers, Series 21653, 184-190.

²⁵ Niles Anderson, The Battle of Bushy Run (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1975), 5-6; Peckham, 176, 217-218. Virginia responded more quickly to the Indian uprising than did the Pennsylvania Quakers. Virginia authorized 1,000 militia. Organized into thirty-man companies, these men protected the Virginia frontier.

²⁶ Anderson, 7.

²⁷ Peckham, 201-209. Dalyell's relief of Fort Detroit consisted of troops from the 40th, 55th and 60th Regiments. Dalyell made it clear to Major Gladwin, commanding at Detroit, that he, Dalyell, was under orders

from General Amherst to attack the Indians. Gladwin consented but saw little chance for any success.

Major Robert Rogers also accompanied Dalyell in the relief of Fort Detroit and the Battle of Bloody Run. Rogers, the famous ranger, although senior to Dalyell was not in command until Dalyell's death. He, along with other officers, successfully extracted the remnants of Dalyell's force from the ambush at Bloody Run. Dalyell clearly failed to accomplish his mission.

²⁸ Ibid., 226-227.

²⁹ Don Daudelin, "Numbers and Tactics at Bushy Run," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 68, No. 2, (April 1985), 153-179. The above author provides a thorough analysis of the numbers of men and companies employed by Bouquet at Bushy Run. The majority of the troops were from the 42d Regiment. The 77th Regiment was also well represented. The remaining troops were from Bouquet's 1st Battalion, 60th and scouts or rangers recruited at Fort Bedford. Numerous packhorsemen and others support personnel were also with Bouquet. Reverend Cyrus Court, Col. Henry Bouquet and His Indian Campaigns of 1763 and 1764 (Lancaster, PA: Steinaman and Henser, Printers, 1883), 42, insists his great great grandfather, Jacob Byerly, an early settler, businessman and civilian was present at Bushy Run. While it is difficult to dispute Court's story it is doubtful that more than a handful of refugees from Fort Ligonier like Byerly, joined Bouquet. Bushy Run was a battle fought by regular British troops, mostly Highlanders, inexperienced in the forest, against Indians.

³⁰ Bouquet Papers, Series 21653, 207-208.

³¹ Ibid., 209-211.

³² Bouquet Papers, Series 21649, Part II, 28. Bouquet suffered 50 killed and 60 wounded for a total of 110 casualties. Included in these totals are seven officers. This amounts to twenty-five percent of Bouquet's force. Using modern standards he was decisively engaged and rendered combat ineffective, but continued his mission.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Bouquet Papers, Series 21653, 241.

³⁵ Ibid., 232, 237, 239-241.

³⁶ Ibid., 237-238.

³⁷ Bouquet's victory at Bushy Run and relief of Fort Pitt did not end the Indian depredations on the frontier. The seige of Fort Detroit continued into November 1763. An ambush of regular troops near Fort Niagara, primarily by Seneca Indians, resulted in seventy-three deaths. The largest loss in a single engagement in 1763.

During the fall of 1763, many frontier settlers did, however, return to their farms and salvaged their crops. The situation on the frontier was far from secure during the fall of 1763. Bouquet's 1764 campaign finally secured peace on the frontier and allowed settlers to return to their homes in large numbers. Bouquet estimated 600 frontier inhabitants were killed and hundreds captured in 1763. Anderson, 12-13; Peckham, 225.

³⁸ Dale Van Every, Forth to the Wilderness (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1961), 86-87. Van Every considers Braddock's expedition as one of the eleven. There were French militia and regulars present, all under the command of a regular French officer. Even with this flaw Van Every's conclusions are valid, the Indians fought very well in the forest. Population and technology not their social system or leadership brought their downfall.

Bouquet was the only officer over a 40-year period to meet success twice. Other successful Indian campaigns were James Grant's 1761 Cherokee expedition and General Anthony Wayne's action at Fallen Timbers in 1794.

CHAPTER 4

THE OHIO VALLEY EXPEDITION, 1764

Henry Bouquet's expedition against the Ohio Indians in 1764 achieved what all military and political leaders desire, military victory without a battle. After Pontiac's highly successful offensive campaign of 1763, diplomatic efforts to deal with the western Indians were impractical as they continued their attacks on the frontier settlements in 1764. A military expedition, risking high casualties and complete destruction of the force deep in enemy territory was the preferred option to punish the Indians. Delaware and Shawnee villages, located over 100 miles west of Fort Pitt represented the base of support for the highly mobile Indian force. They drew their limited sustainment and political backing from these villages. This was the focus of Bouquet's effort. The risk was great but the benefit, peaceful Indian relations and more access to the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, outweighed any potential cost. Henry Bouquet outlined his military objectives to Colonel Adam Stephen of Virginia as early as September 1763;

...burn and destroy all Indian Towns & Settlements between this Post, the Lake and the Wabash, [sic] & drive the Brutes beyond the Mississippi [sic] or the Lakes...¹

The military and official government reaction to Pontiac's rebellion outlined by the North American commander-in-chief was punitive in nature. The military

plan developed by General Amherst, in the fall of 1763, but implemented the following year by General Thomas Gage, the new commander-in-chief in North America, reflected this approach. Gage, however, aware of the importance of the Illinois country, initiated additional diplomatic activities not planned by Amherst with the objective of consolidating English authority even farther west.² As part of Gage's overall plan, Bouquet's immediate objective focused on the Delaware and Shawnee in the Muskingum River Valley.

Amherst's plan for military operations against the Indians was relatively simple: Colonel John Bradstreet was to lead an amphibious expedition west from Fort Niagara across Lake Erie to Fort Detroit. There, Bradstreet would pacify the Ottawa and neighboring tribes and reoccupy posts along the Great Lakes. Bradstreet was then to march from Lake Erie south toward the Muskingum and Scioto River Valleys.

Bouquet was to march directly west from Fort Pitt toward the Delaware and Shawnee settlements on those two rivers. Bouquet's mission was to decisively engage the Delaware and Shawnee and destroy them. Amherst hoped the destruction of the Delaware and Shawnee would set the example for other tribes and make them more passive. While this plan seemed simple on the surface, it had numerous flaws.

The Indians were still hostile and any force moving against them had to be large. Because regular troop strength in North America was not sufficient to support this plan Amherst asked the colonies to provide 3,500 troops. As usual the colonies were slow to react. The plan also made no provisions for Bradstreet's and Bouquet's expeditions to mutually support each other. They were simply too far apart. Nor was there any plan for Bradstreet and Bouquet to link-up or concentrate to destroy the enemy. Bouquet's approach was also much slower because he was moving overland, over undulating terrain without the benefit of any roads. Yet, Bradstreet's mobility over Lake Erie was far superior to Bouquet's.³

Despite these problems General Gage implemented Amherst's plan. Bradstreet's inability to execute orders and his own personal ambition rendered his efforts ineffective and actually counterproductive. This placed the burden of the campaign squarely on the shoulders of Henry Bouquet.

Bouquet was adamant on the need for offensive action against the Indians. During May and June 1764 reports of increased violence and murder on the frontier reached Bouquet, now in Philadelphia. Indian attacks occurred as far east as Winchester, Virginia and Bedford, Pennsylvania. (See Figure 1.) It was obvious to Bouquet that a strong defense would not adequately protect the

frontier. The Indians conducted a protracted guerrilla style war, rarely massing their forces. The deep attack to destroy their homes and families was the preferred solution, providing immediate results. Bouquet, however, still lacked the men he needed for an offensive thrust.⁴

Bouquet met with the Governor of Pennsylvania and his council on 4 June, in Philadelphia. They reached an agreement to provide Bouquet with 1,000 men complete with arms and clothing as well as a troop of light cavalry, consisting of fifty men. As during the Forbes Expedition, the Crown assumed responsibility for feeding and supplying ammunition to the Provincial troops.⁵

Although Bouquet now had a guarantee from Pennsylvania to provide troops, he was not impressed by what he saw assembling on the frontier. On 24 June he wrote to his friend, Captain Harry Gordon,

This province has [sic] voted one Thousand Men to join us, & is [sic] now picking up all the vagrants & Vagabonds in the street to go immediately upon Service without to give them any Shape; almost all brave Men of last Year are in the Forts and I cannot get at them, So I must venture myself with this Strange Mob, which will not be ready to move before the End of July; it will require another Miracle to succeed with such Tools, however I am Still confident we Shall do well, and once more rout the Villains who scalp actually as fast as ever.⁶

Throughout the spring and early summer Bouquet continued his logistics preparation to support the expedition. It was not until his agreement with the Pennsylvania authorities that he finalized his plans for

providing subsistence to the army. This is an indication that he was never confident that Pennsylvania would act quickly enough to assemble an army for the 1764 campaign season, despite the instructions from both Amherst and Gage.⁷

Despite Pennsylvania's actions to provide troops, Bouquet continued to ask for volunteers from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland. Neither Virginia nor Maryland formally provided militia to Bouquet. Bouquet was successful in obtaining 254 Virginia volunteers, who agreed to serve without pay. Bouquet was also joined by some Maryland volunteers during the expedition. Bouquet utilized the Virginians to replace members of the Pennsylvania units that deserted. The Pennsylvania Assembly later authorized funds for payment of these volunteers.⁸ (See Appendix C for more information on these troops.)

As Bouquet was struggling to assemble his army, Colonel Bradstreet was on the move. Bradstreet departed Fort Niagara in early August with a force of 2,000 men, half provincial and half regular. In violation of his instructions, Bradstreet did not attack the Indians but began to negotiate a peace treaty. At Detroit, on 7 September, Bradstreet signed a peace treaty with several western tribes. Unfortunately for Bradstreet, only Sir William Johnson had the authority to conclude formal peace treaties with the Indians. To add to Bradstreet's

problems, the same tribes with whom he negotiated an illegal peace, continued their attacks on the frontiers to the south. The Indians with whom Bradstreet dealt had no authority to negotiate for the tribes living primarily in the Ohio Valley. Bradstreet failed to comprehend this important issue. The Indians simply took advantage of Bradstreet's ignorance of western Indian affairs and his desire to conduct a rapid conclusion to hostilities.⁹

General Gage was dumbfounded by Bradstreet's actions. Bouquet reacted to the news of Bradstreet's treaty with disgust as did other influential political leaders.¹⁰ Bradstreet further compounded the problems on the frontier when he disobeyed Gage's orders to move south from Sandusky and link-up with Bouquet along the Muskingum River. Bradstreet departed Sandusky on 18 October, and after losing several boats in a storm, moved to the northeast finally reaching Fort Niagara in November.¹¹

Unlike the attitude displayed by the Indians toward Bradstreet, the Indians respected Henry Bouquet. They knew he would and could fight. The western Indians had suffered an unknown but significant number of casualties during Pontiac's rebellion. More importantly, in the fall of 1764, they lacked the resources to continue the war. Food was scarce because of their failure to maintain their crops, and ammunition and powder were in short supply. The Indians retained the will to resist, but lacked

resources. Bouquet's presence in their home region left the Indians two choices, sue for peace or fight for their homes.¹²

Bouquet staged his army at Fort Pitt during the month of September after moving from his assembly area at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.¹³ On 2 October 1764, a full year after he outlined his campaign objectives, he began his westward movement to destroy Delaware and Shawnee Indian power in the Ohio Valley.

Although not a stated objective, Bouquet was about to open the Ohio Valley to settlement by the English. His campaign was undertaken not to open the Ohio Valley to settlement but to prevent Indian interference with English settlement east of the Appalachian Mountains, as outlined by the London government in the Proclamation of 1763. Another important objective added by General Gage was to expand English control over the western Indians.

Bouquet had no road which was suitable for movement of his army. The route he followed was an Indian path called the "Great Trail." This route followed the north bank of the Ohio River from Fort Pitt to Big Beaver Creek (the Beaver River, present Beaver, Pennsylvania.) Then it proceeded cross country almost due west to the Tuscarawas River (present Bolivar, Ohio). Here Bouquet proceeded southwest to the forks of the Muskingum and Tuscarawas Rivers (present Coshocton, Ohio), the home of the Delaware.¹⁴ (See Figure 4.)

While Bouquet's advance into Indian country was an operational success, logistically it was just as impressive. Bouquet assigned his second-in-command, Lieutenant Colonel John Reid, of the 42d Regiment, command of all supply and ordnance trains.¹⁵ The trains consisted of 1,152 packhorses, broken down into sixteen brigades of 72 horses each, 400 sheep and 400 cattle. Bouquet integrated the movement and coordination of these extensive resources into the operational movement and tactical security of the army. At the beginning of the expedition there were actually more animals in the army than men. This large number of animals, combined with the requirement to cut a road, considerably retarded the progress of the army.¹⁶

Each packhorse carried 160 pounds of supplies. Wagons were not used during the march and carried supplies only as far west as Fort Ligonier. Packhorses did the work from Ligonier west. The army travelled an average of five to six miles each day, arriving at its destination 130 miles from Fort Pitt, 25 October 1764, after twenty-three days on the march.¹⁷

Each evening when the army encamped the loads carried by the pack animals formed redoubts to strengthen tactical security. These defensive fortifications included flour bags, bundles of provisions and pack saddles. Each unit in the army assumed responsibility for a sector in the defensive perimeter which provided for all

around security as well as a reserve. An advance guard, posted outside the perimeter, increased security. When encamped the army covered about fifty-acres of ground.¹⁸

Not only did Bouquet plan for security of the army while encamped, he always tried to locate the camp on a defensible piece of terrain, a small hill. He successfully sited nine of the sixteen camps utilized by the army on its march from Fort Pitt on this type of terrain.¹⁹ Bouquet commissioned four guides to assist in locating proper terrain to establish a suitable camp. These four men, all Indian traders with extensive knowledge of the route, served Bouquet well during the expedition.²⁰

Bouquet's tactical formations demonstrated the principles of security and integration of logistical support with elements of tactical combat power. He outlined a detailed order of march which included instructions for actions on enemy contact and procedures for crossing a danger area. The procedures were critical to the army because his column on the march stretched for nearly one mile.²¹

Bouquet used his volunteer infantry as scouts. His axmen, clearing three parallel trails, proceeded the regular infantry. The regulars marched forward on all three cleared trails flanked by a Pennsylvania battalion and detachment of light horse. Grenadiers and light infantry formed the reserve. Pennsylvania militia and

another detachment of light horse provided the rear guard. This formation placed the provisions, packhorses and livestock in the center of the column. It provided maximum firepower to the front and flanks well forward, a strong reserve and mobility to the flanks and rear of the formation. The strength of this formation was never tested by the Indians during the march. The concepts around which it is based are, however, similar in many respects to modern tactical doctrine.²² (See Figure 5.)

Bouquet also called for the use of riflemen. These men received their orders separately from the other units during the expedition. There is no indication that either the 42d or 60th Regiments provided riflemen. These men, like the light horse, were Pennsylvania militia.²³

Bouquet carefully formed and moved his army forward. Prior to departing Fort Pitt, an Indian delegation approached Bouquet seeking peace. Bouquet, unlike Bradstreet was not taken in by this delaying tactic. Bouquet knew the campaigning season was short. His objectives were clear. He marched into the homeland of the Delaware and established a base camp.

As Bouquet drew near to their villages, the Indians dispatched emissaries to Bouquet to discuss terms of peace. Bouquet cautioned his troops not only to avoid any direct personal contact with the Indians, but also to avoid any unnecessary bloodshed and any insults. Through these instructions Bouquet demonstrated the willingness to

avoid unnecessary conflict should diplomatic efforts prove effective. Bouquet was willing to negotiate with the Indians but on their territory and on his terms.²⁴

Bouquet began negotiations with the Indians even prior to reaching his most advanced camp. The Indians immediately began the release of prisoners as a sign of their good faith.²⁵ Indians often took prisoners then adopted these individuals into their families to replace family members who had died. Contrary to popular belief the life of an Indian was a rather harsh existence. With the war and disease brought by English and other settlers, populations declined rapidly. Prisoners once adopted were not hostages but functioning members of their family and social unit. This was a concept difficult for the English to accept. They viewed anyone taken from the frontier as a hostage and demanded their return. This is a critical issue in understanding Bouquet's demands and the seriousness of this demand on the Indians.

After several days of negotiations the Delaware conceded to all Bouquet's demands. The Shawnee were somewhat more defiant because Bouquet's army was still some distance from their main villages. The Shawnee were, however, soon convinced to comply with Bouquet's terms and they too began to release their prisoners.²⁶

Bouquet demanded and the Ohio Indians agreed to three major articles in his negotiations. First, an immediate stop to all hostilities. Next, the delivery of

all prisoners, deserters, Frenchmen, Negros or any other captives to Bouquet's army. Finally, having fully complied with the above conditions, deputies were authorized to go to Sir William Johnson and conclude peace treaties. By modern standards these appear as logical and practical terms. To the Indians they were humiliating and indicated weakness. Bouquet accomplished his mission without firing a shot.²⁷

The agreement to release prisoners brought additional challenges to Bouquet's army. The army had to feed, shelter, identify, transport and protect over 200 people. On the surface this appears rather simple. In reality it was a complex operation.

Many of the individuals released by the Indians had lived with Indian families for a number of years. They had no desire to return to white civilization and some had strong attachments to the Indians. Bouquet utilized guards to keep some former hostages from returning to the Indians. His troops found it necessary to physically restrain some individuals to prevent their returning to their Indian families with whom they had developed strong emotional ties.²⁸

Satisfied with the efforts of the Indians to comply with the terms imposed, Bouquet conducted a retrograde of his small army from the Muskingum River Valley returning to Fort Pitt on 28 November 1764. In the course of this expedition Bouquet suffered one casualty. Bouquet

accomplished his goal, a foundation for peace on the frontier now existed.²⁹

Bouquet's performance on this expedition to the Ohio Valley did not go unnoticed in the colonies or in London. The provincial governments of Pennsylvania and Virginia passed votes of thanks. In London the government promoted him to the rank of brigadier general.³⁰ Bouquet also left a detailed written account of procedures utilized by his army during this campaign. Over the years his correspondence and orderly books have received the attention of professional and amateur historians alike. Analysis of these documents reflect Henry Bouquet's competent professional and successful military performance. The reasons for Bouquet's success are based around his knowledge and implementation of sound leadership, tactical and operational doctrine.

ENDNOTES

¹ Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet, Series 21653 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1940), 237.

² John Richard Alden, General Gage in America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 93-103.

Amherst personally coordinated the 1764 plan, to punish principally the Delaware and Shawnee, with Colonel Bradstreet and Sir William Johnson in late October 1763. Amherst departed for England during mid-November and was replaced as commander-in-chief in North America by General Thomas Gage. Gage was a North American veteran. He served with General Braddock and had a better background for understanding Indians than Amherst. Clarence J. Webster, ed., The Journal of Jeffery Amherst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931, 324-326.

There is evidence to indicate that one of the reasons for Amherst's recall to London was his failed Indian policy, resulting in Pontiac's rebellion. John Shy, Toward Lexington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 122-123.

³ Ibid. Gage not only implemented Amherst's plan, but fully supported it. Gage, like most white men considered the Indian something less than human. Additionally, he supported plans to assassinate key Indian leaders.

Because of the mobility of the Indian forces and their ability to concentrate combat power Sir William Johnson recommended that Bouquet advance with no less than 1,000 men. Bouquet had addressed the requirement for 1,000 men well prior to the receipt of Johnson's recommendation. Bouquet Papers, Series 21650, Part I, 182.

⁴ Bouquet Papers, Series 21650, Part I, 165, 167, 176. Two separate reports dated 5 June 1764 reflect thirty settlers killed or wounded and nineteen taken prisoner.

Bouquet thought it impossible to defend the frontier without an offensive thrust into enemy territory. He believed any purely defensive plan would prove ineffective in halting Indian aggression.

⁵ Ibid., Series 21653, 294-296.

⁶ Ibid., Series 21653, 305-306. In this letter Bouquet also expressed disgust on his part and that of his officers toward the work of Indian fighting.

Captain Harry Gordon, an engineer, accompanied the Braddock and Forbes' expeditions and later designed and built Forts Bedford, Ligonier and Pitt. He also participated in campaigns in the West Indies.

⁷ Ibid., 302-303. On 20 June Bouquet ordered rations for 2,000 men for six months from the government contractors in Philadelphia. Bouquet, had, under his direct control, fourteen companies of regulars from the 42d Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 60th. At full strength these units consisted of 70 men per company plus corporals, sergeants, drummers, and officers or about 1,000 total. See Appendix C for numbers and units participating in the expedition.

Based on a review of casualty returns for this period it is doubtful that any units were at full strength. Recruiting in both England and North America did continue to replace casualties. Bouquet Papers, Series 21650, Part I, 206-207; Series 21650, Part II, 13-14, 58; and Series 21653, 300.

⁸ Ibid., Series 21650, Part I, 186-203; Series 21650, Part II, 32, 67, 153; and Series 21653, 306, 310, 314.

⁹ Alden, 96-98.

¹⁰ Bouquet Papers, Series 21650, Part II, 158. Benjamin Franklin in a letter to Henry Bouquet on 30 September 1764, expressed his views on Bradstreet's peace treaty to Bouquet.

Franklin, in the same letter, asked Bouquet to mention Franklin's support of the Crown in his next letter to the Secretary of State. Franklin was a true politician.

¹¹ Alden, 99. Bradstreet's aide on this expedition was Thomas Mante. Mante returned to England and wrote a history of the war in America. Thomas Mante, The History of the Late War in North America and the Islands of the West Indies (London, 1772). In this book Mante defends Bradstreet's actions and downplays Bouquet's accomplishments. It is unique because it is one of the few contemporary histories of the period. Unfortunately it suffers from the author's bias.

¹² Bouquet Papers, Series 21650, Part I, 100-103. Intelligence reports reaching Bouquet in the spring of 1764 indicate a weakening of Indian strength, specifically Delaware. The small pox blankets distributed to the Indians the previous summer were accomplishing their goal. Thirty to forty Delaware and Mingo died that winter of small pox, along with an unknown number of Shawnee. The Ohio Valley tribes also feared attacks from the Six Nations Indians. The Iroquois minus the Seneca had remained loyal to the English throughout the French and Indian War. With English support the Iroquois could easily dominate the Delaware who they already considered subordinate to their authority.

Food for the Indian families was in short supply because of their failure to plant and maintain their crops during Pontiac's rebellion. The strength of Delaware warriors was estimated at 200 as opposed to 600 only five years earlier. Bouquet Papers, Series 21655, 88.

¹³ Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Orderly Book of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764 (Carlisle to Fort Pitt)," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 56, Nos. 3-4 and 57, No. 1, (1973), 3 parts.

The original orderly books are in possession of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The edited versions above provide tremendous detail into specifics of Bouquet's army.

¹⁴ Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Orderly Book of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 42, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (1959), 3 parts.

Like the Carlisle to Fort Pitt orderly book addressed above, this edited version contains great detail. It begins on 2 October and ends 9 November 1764. Unfortunately the third original orderly book, covering the remainder of the expedition, has never been located. For even more detail on the move from Fort Pitt to Bouquet's destination, near Coshocton, Ohio, see Edward G. Williams, ed., "A Survey of Bouquet's Road, 1764: Samuel Finley's Field Notes," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 66, Nos. 2-4 and 67, Nos. 1-2 (April 1983-April 1984), 5 parts.

¹⁵ "Orderly Book," 42, No. 2, 194 and 56, No. 4, 406.

¹⁶ "Orderly Book," 42, No. 1, 30 and 56, No. 4, 406.

17 "Orderly Book," 42, No. 3, 285, 296 and 56, No. 3, 314.

18 "Orderly Book," 42, No. 1, 22-23, 30 and 56, No. 3, 305.

19 "Orderly Book," 42, Nos. 1-3.

20 "Orderly Book," 42, No. 1, 15-16, 28.
Bouquet's army contained two superior surveyors Captain Samuel Finley, an infantry company commander in the 2d Pennsylvania Battalion and Ensign Thomas Hutchins, a Royal American. These men surveyed Bouquet's route of March with a degree of accuracy equal to modern maps. Fortunately much of their original work survived for modern historians to evaluate. "A Survey of Bouquet's Road," 66, No. 2, 130-144.

21 "Orderly Book," 56, No. 3, 307-310.

22 "Orderly Book," 42, No. 1, 18-22. Also see William Smith, Expedition Against the Ohio Indians (Philadelphia, PA: William Bradford, 1765), reprint ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966). This publication contains information which is very similar to Bouquet's orderly books. Originally published in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania the author was anonymous. The title page stated it was "By a Lover of His Country." William Smith, Prevost of the College of Philadelphia, by his own admission, was aided by the papers of an officer of long experience.

Louis M. Waddell, ed., "New Light on Bouquet's Ohio Expedition: Nine Days of Thomas Hutchins' Journal, October 3-October 11, 1764," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 66, No. 3 (July 1983), 271-279. Provides new insight on the work credited to Smith. Waddell concludes Smith's book is based on Ensign Thomas Hutchins' journal (see Note 20 this chapter). Reference to the inclusion of a map of the Bushy Run battlefield prepared by Hutchins and reference to profits from the sale of the plan appear in a letter from then Lieutenant Hutchins to Bouquet. Bouquet Papers, Series 21651, 191. Based on these items of evidence, this author concludes that most of the detail in the book is based on Bouquet's concepts and practices, the facts are from Hutchins' journal.

23 "Orderly Book," 42, No. 1, 21, 29 and 56, No. 3, 310.

24 "Orderly Book," 42, No. 2, 184.

25 Ibid., 189.

²⁶ Bouquet Papers, Series 21655, 235 and 246; and Smith, 20-21.

²⁷ Ibid., 251.

²⁸ Smith, 28-29; Bouquet Papers, Series 21651; and "Orderly Book," 42, No. 3, 298-299. Some former prisoners were simply confused because they knew no one with the army and some children did not know their English names, others could speak little or no English. Some were identified on official list as; a male with a sore mouth or a girl with a sore knee or Betty with black eyes and hair. Bouquet Papers, Series 21655, 248; "Orderly Book," 42, No. 3, 298; and Smith, 20.

By 9 November the army received 206 former captives. Based on information received from reliable individuals recently released, Bouquet's confidence in the Indian's intention to release even more prisoners was high. Lists exist containing 363 names or identification of former captives that are presumed to have been surrendered by the western tribes. For an exact accounting of names see William S. Ewing, "Indian Captives Released by Colonel Bouquet," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 39, (1956), 187-203.

²⁹ Smith, 29 and "Orderly Book," 42, No. 3, 292.

³⁰ Bouquet Papers, Series 21637, 105 and Lieut. General Sir Edward Hutton, Colonel Henry Bouquet (Winchester, England: Warren and Son, Ltd., 1911), 34. In reviewing and evaluating the tremendous amount of material concerning Bouquet's performance as a professional soldier, there is little to criticize. This is particularly true during the 1764 expedition.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

Henry Bouquet made numerous contributions to warfare on the North American continent. The success he achieved during his three major campaigns helped to change the course of history by assisting in the destruction of French and Indian military power. An analysis of his efforts, however, provides insight into why he was successful and what lessons the modern officer may draw from these events.

Bouquet's Ohio Valley Expedition of 1764 was his last offensive action. He died from yellow fever on 2 September 1765 at Pensacola, Florida. Fortunately, many of the documents relating to Bouquet's successful military career in North America have been preserved. Of particular significance are those documents relating to his three major campaigns which provide the basis for a contemporary analysis of his actions.¹

Bouquet's ability to adapt his military training and knowledge to his environment was his greatest quality. Throughout his career he emphasized basic leadership, as well as tactical and operational principles of warfare. He demanded discipline, always remained positive despite the challenge, out thought his enemy, developed logical, supportable plans and then executed them with intensity and professionalism.

The evolution of Henry Bouquet's military doctrine for forest warfare is evident in reviewing his three major campaigns. More important, however, are the principles around which his decisions and actions revolved. An evaluation of Bouquet's performance on the basis of twentieth century military doctrine is plausible if conducted carefully. Such an evaluation provides a method to compare modern doctrinal concepts with Bouquet's practices. British Major General J.F.C. Fuller outlined the principles of war in 1921 as a guide for the British Army. These principles, generally accepted by military professionals today, are evident in reviewing Bouquet's three successful campaigns or expeditions.² His accomplishments also display many of the leadership, warfighting and campaigning concepts outlined in modern military doctrine. These categories provide a methodology to evaluate Bouquet's performance during his major North American efforts.³

In the area of leadership Henry Bouquet displayed many of the qualities outlined in the current senior level leadership doctrine practiced in the United States Army, contained in FM 22-103. Bouquet must be evaluated in the context of his background and the realities of an eighteenth century army. Bouquet was an aristocratic but professionally educated officer. His social contacts and friendships existed at the top end of the social ladder. He had few relationships with those below him. He was

not interested in equality, upon his death he owned three slaves who functioned as his personal servants.⁴

In other respects Bouquet was like a modern officer. His continued service and promotion in the British Army depended on his performance of duties. Bouquet like other non-British officers lacked relatives in high social or political positions to insure his continued service, a concept which is traditionally associated with many senior eighteenth century officers. As a foreign born officer British law prevented him from serving in any regiment but the 60th. He constantly advised his best native British officers to seek commissions in units serving in Europe. Bouquet expected his regiment would remain in North America, because it was specifically raised for service there. Life, even for officers, was very harsh in the 60th Regiment. During 1758 Bouquet's 1st Battalion suffered nearly 100 percent casualties in company grade officers.⁵ These circumstances resulted in Bouquet displaying some of the elements of leadership outlined in modern doctrine, concepts today associated with leadership in democratic armies.

Henry Bouquet always displayed the confidence needed in a leader. He motivated his officers and men to endure hardship and make the ultimate sacrifice. From the battlefield at Bushy Run he praised the performance of his men. This was not done in an after action report written

with the safety of his army assured. He displayed this confidence when the continued existence of his army remained uncertain, in a letter written on the battlefield to his superior, General Amherst.

Again, while building his army for the 1764 expedition into the Ohio Valley, he expressed confidence despite adversity. The Pennsylvania battalions contained many marginal, poorly trained soldiers, not accustomed to military discipline. Despite this significant and serious deficiency, Bouquet maintained a positive attitude towards his ability to accomplish his mission.

Bouquet's most impressive leadership characteristic was his ability to adapt.⁶ He took good ideas, often received from others, adjusted and implemented them. During his three campaigns he adapted his European military equipment, doctrine and procedures to the forests of North America. He employed provincial militia and Indians to strengthen and complement his regular soldiers, integrating them into a cohesive combat force, not unlike a modern combined arms team.

During both the Forbes Expedition and the 1764 Ohio Valley expedition, Bouquet built effectively integrated, hastily assembled provincial units into his army. Using a team building approach, he quickly assessed his subordinate commanders then assigned them responsibilities commensurate with their abilities. He focused on his objectives and exercised a great deal of personal

involvement. He delegated tasks to his subordinate commanders and held them fully accountable for their actions.⁷

Bouquet exhibited the ability to manage the resources, both human and material, assigned to him.⁸ He planned, organized and budgeted to make maximum use of those resources. Because of the lack of a formal military staff system in the Eighteenth Century, many of the management responsibilities today delegated to a commander's staff fell personally on Bouquet. He personally planned, organized and managed the many resources needed to sustain war. Bouquet effectively integrated his leadership and management into what is today called warfighting and campaigning.

Bouquet's three expeditions span the broad spectrum of war from military diplomacy to intense combat. Bouquet functioned at both the tactical and operational levels of war during his campaigns.⁹ As the forward commander during the Forbes Expedition his responsibilities were primarily tactical. Again, at the Battle of Bushy Run, Bouquet engaged in a classic tactical battle as part of his larger operational objective, the relief of Fort Pitt. During the 1764 expedition to the Ohio Valley Bouquet's actions were in pursuit of both tactical and operational objectives.

The modern term "maneuver warfare" was unknown to Henry Bouquet. It is defined today as "a warfighting

philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."¹⁰ Bouquet effectively achieved a battlefield victory at Bushy Run by maneuvering against the enemy's flank and driving him from the field. In fact at Bushy Run Bouquet achieved not only battlefield victory through maneuver, his actions had strategic significance.

The Battle of Bushy Run involved only a few forces, about 1,000 in contact over a twenty-four hour period. The operational impact of the battle became evident initially with the relief of Fort Pitt. The following year, during the 1764 Ohio Valley expedition, the full strategic significance of Bushy Run was highlighted. The presence of a large army near the homes of the Delaware and Shawnee, combined with the previous year's victory at Bushy Run, broke the enemy's will to resist. The Delaware and Shawnee reached their limit of endurance in that battle. They had neither the will nor the resources to confront a large army poised to destroy their homes.¹¹

Bouquet's 1764 Ohio Valley expedition was a classic military operation. The objective in campaigning is to give battle only if necessary and on terms favorable to the friendly force. Through the combination of a tactical defense and a strategic offense Bouquet achieved a strategic victory without firing a shot. Bouquet's

ability to assemble and equip his army then move deep into enemy territory helped to create a situation where his enemy lost the initiative. This action demonstrates a case of operational mobility.¹²

During this campaign Bouquet effectively integrated his extensive logistical support requirements into his operational plan. He was forced to carry all sustainment needed with the army because of a long tenuous line of communications. He actually used his supplies to strengthen his tactical defense building temporary fortifications with this material. Bouquet's ability to feed, arm and move his army 130 miles into enemy territory, while building and surveying a road, is a remarkable operational logistics effort.¹³

Henry Bouquet provides the modern military historian with a wealth of detailed knowledge concerning warfare in colonial America. Most historians view Bouquet in the context of an innovator of forest warfare techniques. More accurately, Bouquet adapted the resources he had available to function effectively in the forest against Indians. He was sometimes resourceful in his thinking, other times traditional but always professional and successful.

The fact that Henry Bouquet was successful is directly related to his application of sound operational and tactical military doctrine. He had few doctrinal documents to assist him in campaigning, unlike

the modern officer who has numerous doctrinal publications from which to obtain guidance. It is evident, however, that he used good judgement in the application of accepted principles. The challenge to the modern officer is to use judgement in the application of current doctrine, as well as learn from those who proceeded us. Henry Bouquet provides a fine example.

ENDNOTES

¹ "The Pennsylvania Journal," 24 October 1765. This newspaper carried Bouquet's obituary.

Spain ceded all territory east of the Mississippi River in North America to England as a result of the Peace of Paris "Article XX-Florida." England gained all territory east of the Mississippi River formerly claimed by the French including the Port of Mobile. New Orleans, however remained French, "Article VII-The Mississippi Line" and "Article XXIV-Epochs." Sir Julian Corbett, England in the Seven Years War II (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), 380-381, 387.

Bouquet assumed command in the Southern Department well prior to his relocation to Florida. The exact date cannot be determined. Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Orderly Book of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764 (Carlisle to Fort Pitt)," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 56, No. 3, 304. Also see: Henry Bouquet, Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds. Series 21650, Part II (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1943), 1. Bouquet's movement to Pensacola, Florida was related more to the territorial gains resulting from the Peace of Paris than Bouquet's promotion to brigadier general. Most authors connect the promotion and the move to the south. Bouquet had command in the Southern Department since 1763. Bouquet's assignment to command the Southern Department from that geographic location was logical given the fact that the colonial empire expanded significantly to the south.

Bouquet's executor was Fredrick Haldimand, then serving in Canada. Bouquet's personal papers, upon which much of this work is based, were given by Haldimand's heirs to the British Museum, together with Haldimand's papers. These papers were subsequently published as outlined in the bibliography. The Papers of Henry Bouquet, I, S. K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and Autumn L. Leonard, eds. (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1972), x-xi.

² FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986), 173-177.

³ FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1987); FMFM 1, Warfighting (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1989); and FMFM 1-1, Campaigning (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1990). Elements of modern doctrinal

concepts outlined in these three publications were used in structuring the evaluation of Henry Bouquet's performance which follows.

⁴ Louis M. Waddell, "The American Career of Henry Bouquet, 1755-1765," Swiss American Historical Society Newsletter, No. 17 (1981), 37 and Douglas E. Branch, ed., "Henry Bouquet: His Relict Possessions," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 22, 1939.

⁵ John Shy, Toward Lexington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 240.

⁶ FM 22-103, 49.

⁷ Ibid., 60-61 and 65.

⁸ Ibid., 42-43.

⁹ FMFM 1, 3-4 and 21-24.

¹⁰ Ibid., 59.

¹¹ FMFM 1-1, 29 and FM 100-5, 181.

¹² FMFM 1-1, 3, 26, and 71. "A campaign is a series of related military actions undertaken over a period of time to achieve a specific objective within a given region."

¹³ Ibid., 78 and FM 100-5, 60-63.

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<u>Figure</u>	<u>Source</u>
1	Walter O'Mera, <u>Guns at the Forks</u> (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 255.
2	Ibid., 256.
3	Francis Parkman, <u>Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War After the Conquest of Canada</u> , 9th ed. revised with additions (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1889), II [insert numbered].
4	William Smith, <u>Expedition Against the Ohio Indians</u> (Philadelphia: William Bradford, 1765), reprint ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966), Plate III.
5	Ibid., Plate II.




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3





FIGURE 4

FIGURE 5

PLATE II



APPENDIX A

Primary Individuals/Units in Forbes' Expedition March-December 1758¹

William Pitt, British Prime Minister
 Major General James Abercromby, Commander-in-Chief of
 British Troops in North America
 Major General Jeffery Amherst replaced Abercromby as
 Commander-in-Chief in America on 9 November 1758.²
 Brigadier General John Forbes, Task Force Commander
 Colonel Henry Bouquet, Forward Commander and Second-in-
 Command to Forbes

Troop List³

Regulars:	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Strength</u> <u>Actual</u>
Highlanders (77th Regt)	1,400	1,300
Col Archibald Montgomery		
Maj James Grant		
Royal Americans (1st Bn 60th Regt)	400	350
Col Henry Bouquet		
Royal Artillery	40	40
Provincials:		
Pennsylvania Regiment	2,700	2,700
1st Bn-Col John Armstrong		
2d Bn-Col James Burd		
3d Bn-Col Hugh Mercer		
Virginia Regiments	2,000	1,600
1st-Col George Washington		
2d-Col William Byrd, III		
Maryland Troops	300	300
North Carolina Troops	300	200
Lower County Troops	300	300
(Delaware)		
TOTAL	7,440	6,790

Bouquet was senior to Colonel Archibald Montgomery and considerably more experienced. There is no evidence to indicate that Montgomery played a significant leadership role in the campaign beyond commanding his regiment and serving as a brigade commander during November. (See Chapter 2, Note 46.) Forbes and Bouquet rarely mention Montgomery in their correspondence. Montgomery's second-in-command, Major James Grant,

captured by the French during September, was much more active during the campaign.

Pennsylvania battalions and Virginia regiments were nearly equal in size. Virginia authorities considered the two Virginia regiments a brigade, making George Washington the senior provincial colonel and a brigade commander. As a result, Washington commanded a composite brigade along with Bouquet and Montgomery during November. (See Chapter 2, Note 46.)

Indians added to the troop total but proved to be very unreliable. Indians consisted primarily of Cherokee and Catawbans from the Virginia, North and South Carolina frontiers, although numerous other tribes served with the army. At one point during May, Forbes assembled over 600 Cherokee at Fort Cumberland. He succeeded in equipping over 400 warriors with weapons. Forbes anticipated as many as 1,000 warriors. The Indians took their weapons and except for a few loyal warriors, went home after a few weeks with the Army.⁴

The North Carolina assembly authorized three infantry companies. One never arrived, while the two companies that did arrive had almost no equipment. Many of these men deserted.⁵ These companies reported to Fort Loudoun for duty with Bouquet during late July under the command of Major Hugh Waddel.⁶

Various sources conflict concerning specific numbers of troops. A contemporary history lists 6,850 men, including "Waggoners, & C."⁷ This source fails to mention the Maryland or North Carolina or Lower County (Delaware) troops.

Forbes stated in late October that he had 500 men sick with numerous men on garrison and escort duty. Forbes failed to address the actual combat strength of his Army, only that he was left with "...a small body either to make conquests or maintain myself where I am,...."⁸ He hand picked a force of 2,500 men for the final assault on Fort Duquesne. It is doubtful that the army he assembled at Fort Ligonier in November exceeded 5,000 men.

The issue of the Maryland troops is an interesting story. The Maryland assembly failed to appropriate any money to pay their 300 troops. Forbes agreed to pay the troops to maintain garrisons at Forts Cumberland and Frederick, as he needed their numbers and wilderness fighting experience.⁹ Governor Sharp of Maryland arrived at Fort Cumberland during mid-July and attempted to outline the background of the situation to his troops and encourage his officers and men to stay on, adding,

the Crown would ensure they were paid as previously arranged with Lord Loudoun.¹⁰

Sources

¹ Niles Anderson, "The General Chooses a Road," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 1959): 113-114.

² Clarence J. Webster, ed., The Journal of Jeffery Amherst, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931, 98.

³ Anderson, 113-114.

⁴ Alfred Proctor James, ed., The Writings of General John Forbes, Menasha, WI: The Collegiate Press, 1938, 75.

⁵ James, 148 and 201; S. K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent and Autumn N. Leonard, eds., The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II, Harrisburg, PA: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951, 75; Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire, 1758-1760, Vol. 7, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949, 254.

⁶ Bouquet Papers, Vol. II, 256.

⁷ Thomas Mante, The History of the Late War in North America and the Islands of the West-Indies, London, 1772, reprinted, New York: Research Reprints, Inc., 1970, 155.

⁸ James, 244.

⁹ Ibid., 91, 103 and 117.

¹⁰ Ibid., 151-152.

APPENDIX B
TROOP STRENGTH 1763

Bouquet's 1st Battalion, 60th Royal American Regiment, along with other regiments, was garrisoning frontier forts across North America in the spring of 1763. Maximum authorized strength of this battalion was 700 privates. The largest concentration of troops were at Forts Pitt, Niagara and Detroit. See Chapter 3, Note 16 for the smaller outposts and strengths. Bouquet's troops also occupied Forts Bedford and Ligonier. While no exact accounting of Bouquet's troops is available he had only sixteen Royal Americans available to accompany him in the relief of Fort Pitt, confirming the dispersed nature of his battalion. Soldiers from his battalion garrisoned at least a dozen different posts.

As a result, General Amherst provided the only available reserves from the garrison at New York remnants of the 42d and 77th Regiments, recently returned from the West Indies. These regiments were greatly reduced by disease and illness, but were the only troops available to send to Bouquet. Amherst initially sent Bouquet 273 officers and men. An additional detachment followed.

At Bushy Run Bouquet's force consisted of the following combat soldiers:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
42d Regiment	280
1st Bn 60th Regiment	16
77th Regiment	142
Backwoodsmen	<u>14</u>
Total	452 ¹

Overall, regular British troop strength in North America in early 1763 was 8,000 men. An additional 4,000 men, mostly sick and many dying were in the West Indies. North American troops were geographically distributed as follows:

<u>Geographic Location</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>
Canada	3,650
Nova Scotia, Cape Breton Island, New Foundland	1,700
New York (upper)	1,250
Pennsylvania	400
Michigan	350
South Carolina, Georgia	450
New York City	<u>200</u> (Note)
Total	8,000 ²

Note: Units returning from the West Indies, like the 42d and 77th Regiments raised this total by June, allowing Amherst to provide Bouquet reinforcements.

Sources

¹ Don Daudelin, "Numbers and Tactics at Bushy Run," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 68, No. 2, (April 1985), 156-157 and Clarence J. Webster, ed., The Journal of Jeffery Amherst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 304-305.

² John Shy, Toward Lexington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 114-119 and Webster, 312.

APPENDIX C
HENRY BOUQUET'S EXPEDITIONARY ARMY, 1764¹

Commanding Officer Colonel Henry Bouquet
Second-in-Command Lieutenant Colonel John Reid (Primary
Logistics Coordinator)

<u>Commander</u>	<u>Unit</u>	5 November 1764 <u>Strength</u>
LTC Colonel John Reid (MAJ James Murray)	42 Regt	316
COL Henry Bouquet (MAJ Augustine Prevost)	1st Bn 60th Regt	113
LTC Turbut Francis	1st Penn Bn	223
LTC Asher Clayton	2d Penn Bn	218
LTC John McNeil	Virginia Volunteers	138
MAJ John Field	Virginia Volunteers	82
CPT William McClellan	Maryland Volunteers	
CPT John Wolgomatt	Maryland Volunteers	50 (Note)
	Penn Volunteers	14
	Indians (Friendly)	<u>20</u>
Total		1,174

Note: The Maryland Volunteers consisted of two companies. They did not join the army until 20 October along the route of march.²

Most sources state that Bouquet's army contained 1,500 men. The strength figures above reflect the totals available thirty days into the expedition. In reviewing Bouquet's orderly books it is evident that detachments of troops returned to Fort Pitt with liberated prisoners and unloaded packhorses. It is possible that the army numbered 1,500 soldiers early in the expedition.

Bouquet began the expedition with 1,152 packhorses. The numerous packhorsemen required to manage these animals are not included in any army totals.

The Pennsylvania battalions are often called regiments. Because of formation of only one regiment consisting of three battalions for the Forbes Expedition this battalion designation is used vice the term regiment. The 1st Battalion mustered into service 23 July 1764 at Lancaster, Pennsylvania with a strength of 324 men. The 2d Battalion mustered into service 30 July 1764 at Carlisle, Pennsylvania with a strength of 364 men.

The volunteers simply agreed to serve during the campaign without pay. Most were members of organized frontier militia units, released by the respective

province to serve. Bouquet advertised for volunteers and thought very highly of those from Virginia.³

The friendly Indians are believed to be a party of Mohawks sent by Sir William Johnson. Little is mentioned of their activities or contributions to the army.⁴

Reference is made in Bouquet's orderly book to Royal Artillery. No other accounting of this unit can be found.⁵ They may have served as infantry in the regular units.

Sources

¹ The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet, Series 21651 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1943), 34. The totals include all personnel in the units specified with the army on 5 November 1764. They were extracted from a "Return of Effectives in Col. Bouquet's Army," endorsed in Bouquet's handwriting: names of unit commanders obtained from various sources.

² Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Orderly Book of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 42, No. 2 (June 1959): 190 and 200.

³ Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Orderly Book of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764 (Carlisle to Fort Pitt)," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 56, No. 4 (June 1973): 389 and 394.

⁴ "Orderly Book," 42, No. 1, 28, and No. 3, 287 and 298.

⁵ "Orderly Book," 42, No. 2, 188.