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
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POLITICAL AND MILITARY EPISODES.



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JOHN BURGoyNE
(ROMe, 1750).

From a painting by Ramsey, in possession of Miss Burgoyne, at Hampton Court Palace

POLITICAL AND MILITARY EPISODES

IN THE

Latter Half of the Eighteenth Century.

DERIVED FROM THE

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF

THE RIGHT HON. JOHN BURGoyNE,

GENERAL, STATESMAN, DRAMATIST.

BY

EDWARD BARRINGTON DE FONBLANQUE,

AUTHOR OF "THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY,"
"NIPPON AND PECHILI," "THE LIFE AND LABOURS OF ALBANY FONBLANQUE," ETC., ETC.

WITH PORTRAIT, ILLUSTRATIONS, AND MAPS.

London :

MACMILLAN AND CO.

1876.

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PREFACE.

THE daughters of the late Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne entrusted me with the duty of preparing a biography of their grandfather from such letters and documents, many of them of a very fragmentary nature, as had been preserved in the family.

The other sources of information of which I have availed myself have been conscientiously acknowledged by a reference to their authorship.

Something more, however, than a general expression of obligation is due to an accomplished descendant of the subject of my memoir, as well as to her husband, Colonel the Honourable George Wrottesley, to whose judicious advice and kindly assistance I have been deeply indebted throughout the performance of my task.

E. B. de F.

LONDON, *December*, 1875.

153207

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CORRIGENDA.

- Page 5. In foot-note 2, the name of *Mr. Prescott*, the eminent American historian has been inadvertently substituted for that of *Mr. Bancroft*.
- „ 14. Sixth line from bottom of page, *for* Scotch rebellion of “44,” *read* “45.”
- „ 16. Third line from top, *for* “15th,” *read* “16th” Regiment. Seventeenth line from top transfer inverted commas to beginning of eighteenth line.
- „ 31. Eighteenth line from top, *for* “tactician,” *read* “tacticians.”
- „ 136. In foot-note 1 omit “*See Appendix.*”
- „ 247. Fifteenth line from top, *for* “Earl Hervey,” *read* “General Hervey.”
- „ 263. The purport of foot-note of p. 217 is here repeated. Omit.
- „ 286. Fifth line from top, *for* “*orduis*,” *read* “*arduis*.”
- „ 310. Eighth line from top, *for* “1,160,” *read* “1,366.”
- „ „ „ „ *for* “seventy-three,” *read* “ninety-nine.”

POLITICAL AND MILITARY EPISODES

IN THE

FIRST HALF OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III.

CHAPTER I.

BURGOYNE'S EARLY CAREER.

1729—1761.

IT is not only "the evil that men do" that lives after them, while "the good is oft interred with their bones," but too frequently a solitary misfortune is so severely visited upon the memory of a public man as to outweigh and bury in oblivion the fruitful services of a lifetime.

General Burgoyne had undoubtedly earned some claim to public recognition, as a writer and a politician as well as a soldier, in each of which capacities he had attained, if not an eminent, certainly a more than average position among his contemporaries.¹

¹ Lord Macaulay describes Burgoyne as "a man of wit, fashion, and honour, an agreeable dramatic writer, and an officer whose courage was never questioned, and whose skill was, at that time (1773), highly esteemed." (*Essay on Lord Clive, Edinburgh Review*, January 1840.) Lord Mahon says:—"In war his bravery was never questioned, and in civil life he was gifted with many high accomplishments; a fluent speaker in Parliament and an agreeable writer of plays."—(*History of England*, vol. vi.) Horace

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But while his military, political, and literary services are forgotten, his name has gone down to posterity, and will, in time to come, continue linked with the national calamity in which he bore a prominent, though no blame-worthy part: the surrender of the army under his command to an American general.

General Burgoyne has fared ill at the hands of contemporary writers. Those who supported the war against America denounced him as the cause of their failure; those who opposed it condemned him as an instrument of tyranny; while among the masses it soothed the national pride to cast the odium of a great public disaster upon the incompetence of an individual rather than to attribute it to the injustice and folly of Government and people, or to the inherent vices of a bad cause.

As a man who has been unjustly convicted of a crime receives, when his innocence is established, the royal pardon for an offence which he did not commit, but no compensation for the sufferings he has undergone, so General Burgoyne, though ultimately he fully vindicated his professional reputation, could not remove the prejudice and injury which a long and powerful persecution had produced against him. All men had listened when he was accused; only his friends cared to hear him exonerated.

Burgoyne, the hero of Valencia d'Alcantara; Burgoyne,

Walpole, no friendly critic, for he disliked Burgoyne, declares *The Hairs* to be "the most genteel comedy in our language." American writers, with rare exceptions, bear generous testimony to the merits of the general whom they defeated. Neillson says: "Burgoyne appears to have been a humane and honourable man; a scholar and a gentleman; a brave soldier and an able commander. Some of his sentiments have a higher moral tone than those in common with men of his profession, and have probably procured him more respect than all his battles."

the trusted friend and colleague of Fox and Burke ; Burgoyne, the popular poet and dramatist ; Burgoyne, the honest and eloquent champion of oppressed India, is forgotten ;—but where is the Englishman or American who does not remember Burgoyne of Saratoga ?¹

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There are few pages in modern history which Englishmen of a past generation would so gladly have blotted out of their national records as those which chronicle our long and fruitless efforts to subdue the American colonists by force of arms, when an arbitrary and unjust policy had goaded them into rebellion. It is owing probably to this reluctance to dwell upon events so little creditable to our political or military reputation, that historical justice has failed to remove from the name of a gallant soldier the slur cast upon it by an unscrupulous Ministry, in the hope to divert from themselves the responsibility for the disgrace and disaster incurred through their own recklessness and folly.

The lapse of a century has blunted the susceptibility of Englishmen in all that relates to that unhappy struggle, the incidents of which we can now recall, if not without regret, at least without bitterness or resentment. We have survived alike the humiliation of defeat, and the sense of injury over our loss ; for we recognize that victory in such a cause—had it been

¹ It is noteworthy that nearly 100 years after the convention of Saratoga, the name of Burgoyne became again connected with an event which, although of no political importance, may yet be classed among national calamities : the loss of her Majesty's turret ship *Captain*, which foundered during her trial trip in the Bay of Biscay in 1870, burying in the waves her gallant commander, Hugh Burgoyne (the General's grandson, and only son of that great and good man, Field-marshal Sir John Burgoyne), with her crew of 500 English sailors. Captain Burgoyne, who had while serving as a midshipman during the Crimean War earned the Victoria Cross by an act of exceptional gallantry, was at the time of his death one of the most accomplished and popular officers in the Navy.

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possible—would have proved to us a curse rather than a blessing ; and that the nation, which the injustice of our forefathers called into existence, has within one century become prosperous and great, almost beyond example, without impairing the welfare or the power of the British Empire.

Modern historians, rising above the mist of party feeling and personal prejudice, have, in dealing with his share of the American War, treated Burgoyne more fairly ; but the motives, the circumstances, and the innumerable details which go to make up the sum of personal actions, are so minute as to elude the wide grasp of the historian, and it becomes the function of the less ambitious biographer, by supplying these links, not only to supplement history but to do justice to individuals.

It is always a grateful task to right an injured reputation, and I shall feel gratified if I should succeed in removing unmerited aspersions from the memory of a gallant soldier and loyal gentleman ; such, however, is not the main object of this work. The career of Burgoyne is one possessed of much public interest, and calculated, from the character and position of the men with whom he lived in intimate relations, and the events in which he took a more or less prominent part, to throw light upon the social and political history of his time.

JOHN BURGOYNE was born in the year 1722. His father was the second son of the third baronet of the name, and his mother the daughter and heiress of a wealthy London merchant named Burnestone. It is curious that a piece of idle gossip, originally traceable to no higher source than the loose tongue of a jealous

woman, should have given rise to the belief that General Burgoyne was of illegitimate birth. Horace Walpole, in one of his ill-natured letters, endorses the scandal,¹ and asserts as a fact that he was a natural son of Lord Bingley; and this statement, from its not having elicited any public contradiction, has come to be generally accepted. Several of the obituary notices, in recording his death in 1794, perpetuate the calumny; in a short sketch of his life, prefixed to a collection of his dramatic and poetical works, published in 1808, it is quoted as probably true; and in a critique on his writings which appeared in the *Morning Herald* of 25th September, 1823, it is stated that Burgoyne's birth was doubtful or obscure, with an allusion to the report connecting him with Lord Bingley. Later biographers and historians have without exception adopted this story;² and even a writer so habitually accurate and conscientious as Earl Stanhope has fallen into an error which a little inquiry would have avoided, for the fact of Burgoyne having been born in wedlock is beyond all dispute,³

¹ See *Last Journals and Letters to Dr. Mason*. Walpole adds that "Lord Bingley had put Burgoyne into the entail of the estate; but when young Lane came of age the entail was cut off." Lord Bingley died in 1730, leaving an only daughter, in favour of whose husband, Mr. Lane, the title was revived in 1762. It is now extinct.

² Mr. Bancroft, in his *History of the United States* (vol. v.), not only records the scandal in the coarsest terms, but goes so far as to attribute Burgoyne's readiness "to sacrifice life and political principle" (though on what occasions he showed the latter disposition is not stated) to his "darling object of effacing the shame of his birth by winning military glory with rank and fortune." It is a pity that so ingenious a theory should fall to the ground for want of the slightest foundation in the fact upon which it rests. Mr. Prescott throughout his work speaks of Burgoyne in terms of unjust disparagement; in this respect he stands almost alone among American writers, most of whom express themselves of the English general whom their army defeated in warm and generous terms.

³ A reference to the Baronetage will suffice to establish the fact, but this

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and if any scandal had attached to his mother, it must necessarily have been of that nature of which the law does not take cognizance, and which can under no circumstances sustain the public charge of illegitimate birth. It does not appear, however, that his parents ever lived upon other than affectionate terms, or that the slightest blot had at any time rested upon the reputation of his mother; and this is fully confirmed by the following extract from a letter written by Miss Warburton (whose mother, Lady Elizabeth Warburton, was a sister of Lady Charlotte Burgoyne).¹

“ September 25th, 1823.

“ MY DEAR CAROLINE,

“ I must take a folio sheet to vent my rage (not at

simple means of ascertaining Burgoyne's parentage does not appear to have been resorted to by any writers of the time.

Having consulted Sir Bernard Burke on this point, he has permitted me to quote him as an authority for the following statement :—“ General Burgoyne, of Saratoga mishap, was, despite of Horace Walpole's innuendo, the legitimate son of Sir John Burgoyne, third baronet, of Sutton, by Anna Maria his wife, daughter of Charles Burnestone. In Kimber's Baronetage, published in 1771, is this entry under the issue of the third baronet of Sutton :—‘ 2nd, John, who married the daughter of — Burnestone and had issue.’

“ The exact same statement occurs in Betham's Baronetage, 1805, and in Debrett's Baronetage, edited by Mr. Cotton, of the Heralds' College, edition 1840. The Burnestone marriage is given with the addition, ‘ and had issue the Right Honourable John Burgoyne, Commander in America.’ The legal legitimacy of the author of *The Heiress* is, I fancy, beyond controversy.”

I further find that Sir Roger Burgoyne, the sixth Baronet, named his cousin, General Burgoyne, in the entails of his estate, and that Sir John Burgoyne, the seventh Baronet, made him his executor. The question is not in itself one of much public importance, but the fact of the scandal having found universal acceptance on the strength of Walpole's gossip illustrates the mischief that may arise from a man of his position and authority lending the weight of a great name to a statement without authenticating its truth.

¹ Daughters of the eleventh Earl of Derby. The letter is addressed to Mrs. Parker, a sister of the late Field-marshal Sir John Burgoyne.

you, but) at the *Morning Herald* of to-day,¹ in which there is an article relating to your father that moves my ire, and which I think we might contrive to have contradicted in some parts, and cleared up in others. It speaks handsomely of him and his writings in the main, but expresses astonishment that nothing should be known of the origin and early life of a man of so much celebrity. You would suppose from what is said that his birth was obscure ; and it alludes to a report that he was a natural son of Lord Bingley, in which there was not one word of truth. I dare say you remember old Mrs. Carr, of this place, who knew him from his earliest years, and whose parents lived in great intimacy with Mr. and Mrs. Burgoyne, his parents. Your grandfather, I'm sorry to inform you, was one of those many fine gentlemen about town who contrive to run through their means, and finish their days in the King's Bench. He was at one time a captain in the army, and was the second son of Sir John Burgoyne (third baronet of the family) by Constance, daughter of Richard Lucy, Esq., of Charlecote, in Warwickshire. Your grandmother's name was Burneston. She was a co-heiress, and brought a good fortune, which, however, her husband dissipated. She was exceedingly beautiful, of which she had great remains when I knew her at more than seventy years of age. Her intimacy with the Carrs continued as long as Mrs. Carr, a highly respectable woman, lived. Lord Bingley also lived intimately in the same set, but not so

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¹ The passage referred to is this :—"It is curious that a man of such celebrity as a writer, a senator, and an officer as the late Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne, should be found among the number of those of whose youthful days no memorial has been preserved. Neither the time, place, nor circumstance of his birth are known. Even his parentage is doubtful. He is said, though upon what authority does not appear, to have been a natural son of Lord Bingley, who died at an advanced age in 1774."

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his lady, whose ungovernable temper and malignancy of disposition rendered her a dangerous as well as disagreeable associate. It happened that when your father was christened, Lord Bingley was one of the sponsors ; upon which Lady Bingley raised a story to poor Mrs. Burgoyne's disadvantage, which, at a later period, in some minds gained a footing, in consequence of Lord Bingley bequeathing your father a handsome legacy as his godson. But Mrs. Carr (my old friend) assured me there was not the slightest truth in the story ; and she added :—'My mother was so particularly nice in the choice of her acquaintance' (of which she gave a strong instance) 'that I'm very sure if she had seen the least impropriety in Mrs. Burgoyne's behaviour, she would not have continued in friendship with her.'

"So much for your father's birth and parentage. I wish Mr. Montagu Burgoyne would take the matter up, so far as to make known the relationship he bore to an old and honourable house, of which he was indeed a member ; and I think it not unlikely, if he sees the article in the *Herald*, that he will do so."

John Burgoyne was educated at Westminster, where he formed that intimacy with Lord Strange, the eldest son of the eleventh Earl of Derby,¹ which was destined to exercise so powerful an influence upon his life and fortunes. He entered the army at an early age, and succeeded to a troop in the 13th Dragoons in 1744. His intimacy in Lord Derby's family had led to a strong attachment being formed between him and Lady Charlotte Stanley, which ultimately, about the year 1743, while he was quartered with his regiment at Preston,

¹ Lord Strange never succeeded to the Earldom, having died during his father's lifetime in 1771 ; his son became twelfth Earl in 1776.

resulted in an elopement. The marriage was an imprudent and unequal one. The young soldier of fortune, who had inherited little from his father beyond his extravagant tastes, was no suitable match for the daughter of one of England's greatest peers; but in contravention of the rule in such cases, the union proved exceptionally happy for both, and the letters and private papers that have been preserved in the family afford touching proofs of Burgoyne's deep and unaltered affection for his wife after the lapse of many eventful years. Although the Derby family at first resented the marriage, they soon became reconciled with Burgoyne, whose friendship with Lord Strange ended only with their lives.

With all his natural gifts and social accomplishments, however, the young soldier was unequal to solving the problem of how to enable two persons to live upon means which had proved insufficient for one, and in 1747, the *res angustæ domi* obliged him to retire from the army and take up his abode on the Continent. There are unfortunately no records relating to his seven years' exile, the greater part of which he passed in France, having settled near Chanteloup, the magnificent residence of the Duc de Choiseul. "Here," Miss Warburton says, in the letter already quoted, "commenced the intimacy of your father and my aunt with the Duke and Duchess of Choiseul, which ceased only with their lives. They went together on a tour of pleasure into Italy; and at Rome Ramsey took the portrait of your father, which Mrs. Horton afterwards had. . . . I shall ever regret your father's memoir by his own hand not being forthcoming, as he would have been able, from his long intimacy with the ex-Minister of France,¹ to have thrown great light

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¹ There is some confusion here. At the time Burgoyne went to live abroad, Choiseul, or, as he was then, the Comte de Stainville, was only

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upon events very interesting both to England and to France."

It is not a little remarkable in how great a degree John Burgoyne possessed the faculty of inspiring attachment in all those with whom he came in contact, and how strong and lasting his friendships were through all the changes and vicissitudes of his long life. He appears to have been essentially a lovable man.

His knowledge of the French language, which was extolled by some of his military contemporaries (it being in those days by no means a common accomplishment), was probably acquired during these years; but his correspondence in that language, although it subsequently improved, does not at this time show him to have mastered its idiomatic difficulties, and his earlier French compositions had very much the character of what Mr. Kinglake¹ calls "continental English." It sufficed, however, to enable him to make his way in foreign society, as well as to study the military literature of France, and to instruct himself generally in the science of war. These pursuits may have contributed to his anxiety to be restored to a profession which he had left with regret, and which had always been congenial to his tastes. The reinstatement of an officer in the army after his having retired from it for many years, was, however, even in those days of irresponsible patronage, a rare, if not an unprecedented step, and there can be little doubt but that the exception made in his favour was due to the interest

twenty-eight years of age, he having been born in 1719; but he had already been employed on several important diplomatic missions. He did not become a Cabinet Minister until a later period, though, thanks to Madame de Pompadour, he enjoyed great Court favour. He died in 1785.

¹ *Eöthen*. The reader may remember the happy remark on this subject: "Where will you find more terse Saxon English than in the Duke of Wellington's French despatches?"

of the Derby family, who, in common with two or three other great Whig houses, exercised an all-powerful influence in the State under the two first Georges.

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Be this as it may, in 1756 John Burgoyne was gazetted junior Captain of the 11th Regiment of Dragoons, a position which, as appears from a letter written by him to his commanding officer, Major Warde, was conferred with a view to early professional advancement.

"I cannot help saying," he writes on 23rd November, 1757, "that the circumstance of serving *under* so many men whom I had commanded appeared so disagreeable to me, when my friends proposed my entering a second time into the army, that I should not have suffered any application to be made for me had I not had good assurances that I should not long continue a captain, and had I not flattered myself that my situation would have procured me in that rank in the regiment as many indulgences as could be made consistently with the good of the service. I have great reason to believe that I shall not be disappointed in the first of these expectations, and I return you a thousand thanks for the manner in which you deal with me in regard to the last."

At this time all Europe was mapped out into large military camps, and while the main body of the English forces engaged in the Seven Years' War was operating under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick in Germany, the British Government had organized several joint naval and military expeditions against the French coast.

In 1758, Captain Burgoyne served under the Duke of Marlborough in the attack upon Cherbourg, the basin and fortifications of which we destroyed.¹

¹ The absence of discipline among the English troops employed on this expedition was very conspicuous, and great outrages were committed upon

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He was also present at the unfortunate expedition in the same year against St. Malo, of which he has left a concise and graphic description in a private letter.

The force was under command of Lieutenant-General Bligh and Admiral Howe. The former, contrary, it appears, to the advice of his naval colleague, disembarked the army on an unfavourable point of the coast, without having informed himself of the strength or position of the enemy. "Two days after the landing," writes Burgoyne, "a deserter came in from the enemy who informed the Generals that the Duc d'Aiguillon, with an army double our number, was within six miles, and that he was pushing to get between Matignon, where the gross of our army lay, and the sea. Our situation now became critical, and an *aide-de-camp* was despatched to Lord Howe to countermand the provisions, and to make a disposition to embark the troops early next morning. Lord Howe, as soon as it was day, had brought the bomb-ketches and frigates as near the shore as possible in a circular bay,¹ about an English mile in extent; the right bounded by a steep hill, with a village on the top; the left by a range of high rocks, which stretched a considerable distance into the sea. On the top of the beach ran a breastwork, cannon-proof, that had been formerly thrown up to oppose a descent; beyond this was a plain of about a quarter of a mile, terminated by a range of hills on the side of which were two works and the village of St. Quest. By the time half the rear brigade of the army had gained the beach, the first column of the enemy appeared on the top of the hill. We began embarking as fast as possible, beginning with the

the inhabitants of Cherbourg, in spite of all the efforts of the Commanders-in-chief, who had guaranteed the lives and properties of non-combatants. See Mahon's *History of England*.

¹ The Bay of St. Quest.

Dragoons and youngest regiments. The Guards and Grenadiers of the Line, who were to cover the retreat, were drawn up close to the breastwork, and stretched from one end of the bay to the other. About nine o'clock our bombs began firing, and the first shells that were thrown took effect on the top of the hill with some success. When the enemy began to descend, which was about nine o'clock, all the frigates gave him their broadsides, and from this moment it was a continual fire till the whole affair was over. About ten the enemy opened a battery of cannon on the top of the hill, which did not hurt us much. Soon afterwards C. and myself, who were upon the right of all, perceived a very large body pushing with great expedition upon the hill on the right, in the intention to flank us. Of this we immediately informed the Generals, but received no order how to act, and were obliged to determine upon our own authority to wheel the divisions we commanded so as to front the enemy. A short time afterwards I received orders to lead 300 men up the hill, but this was countermanded before I had got forty yards, and the whole battalion was ordered to occupy the rocks upon the left, towards which another column of the enemy was advancing. About twelve the enemy poured down from the village of St. Quay and from the hill on the right, in the face of all the fire from the frigates and bomb-ketches. The fire of our Grenadiers did great execution while they were forming, but they advanced with resolution, and the ammunition of our men being wholly expended,¹ they were obliged to quit the breastwork. During the whole of these proceedings

¹ This is not the only proof of the utter want of military preparation and foresight, for in another part of this letter, Burgoyne mentions that only three waggons had been landed for all purposes of transport for a force of 10,000 men, while "the sick and wounded alone could not have been properly contained in a dozen."

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the embarkation had been going on with all expedition possible, but from the moment the breastwork was forced all was confusion. It was the lot of our regiment to get on board before the dismal part of the scene began. Those left behind were part of the 1st Regiment and all the Grenadiers of the army, on the whole amounting to between 1,700 and 1,800 men. Our people ran up to the neck in the sea; some pushed to the rocks on the left, but the French had now gained the opposite side of the breastwork, where they were safe from the fire of the ships, and able to fire upon our defenceless men."

In this unfortunate affair we lost 600 men in killed and wounded, and 400 prisoners.¹

On his return to England, Burgoyne was transferred as Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel to the 2nd Foot Guards, and when in 1759 George the Second determined to raise two regiments of light horse, he was selected for the formation, and promoted to the command of the 16th Dragoons.

Light cavalry, in its modern sense, may up to this time be said not to have existed in our service. The heavily equipped horse regiments had done admirable and decisive work on many a battle field; the Dragoons, who were in point of fact light infantry mounted for special occasions, did useful service; and during the Scotch Rebellion of '44, and again in the beginning of the Seven Years' War, corps of light horse were raised for skirmishing duty; but we had not then learnt the importance of those rapid movements by bodies of lightly equipped horsemen which have played so important a part in the modern art of war.

¹ General Bligh was, on his return to England, stripped of all his military appointments. The Duc d'Aiguillon was almost as severely blamed by his Government for not having taken greater advantage of his opportunity.

According to a French military writer,¹ it was the example of Frederick the Great which first led us, in common with themselves and other European powers, to introduce this arm : and the choice of Burgoyne for the organization and training of one of these regiments, though owing to his comparatively junior rank and standing it created some jealousy at the time, was fully justified by the result. By unremitting attention to the drill and discipline of this force, he soon succeeded in bringing it to the highest degree of efficiency, and in attaining a quickness of movement without the sacrifice of regularity, never before attempted in a mounted corps.

The King gave him repeated proofs of his approbation, and George the Third, after his accession, used to take a particular pleasure in reviewing "Burgoyne's Light Horse," as the corps was commonly called.

The following extracts from a Code of Instructions drawn up by Colonel Burgoyne for the guidance of his officers, shows, not only the minute care which he bestowed upon every duty connected with his command, but also the importance which he, in contradistinction to the ordinary military martinet of his time, attached to

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¹ Major Rocquancourt, author of *Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire* (Paris, 1841). But the Prussian king had himself learnt his new cavalry tactics from the example of the Austrians, whose Hungarian Hussars enjoyed a high reputation; and from Charles XII. of Sweden, whose *chevaux légers* had in the preceding century greatly contributed to his successes. It is related of these by Nolan in his *Cavalry Tactics* (London, 1854), that they had pursued the Saxons in their retreat into Silesia under Schulembourg, for nine successive days without unsaddling, a feat which to the colossal men and horses of the Prussian cavalry must have appeared incredible. The great Frederick took an exceptional interest in the practical development of this arm, and in writing of the value of Light Cavalry as a means of observation and intelligence, uses an expression which has since grown into a military proverb: "Ce sont vos oreilles et vos yeux." See *Œuvres Militaires de Frédéric II.* (Berlin, 1851).

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intellectual culture and moral influence as instruments of discipline :—

“ The officers of the 15th Regiment of Dragoons being as much particularized by their youth and inexperience as by their rank and fortune, some instructions which seem superfluous to older soldiers become necessary to many of them ; and any hints which may tend to promote the King’s service or the credit of the corps, will be acceptable to all of them. It is proposed, therefore, to throw together in the first place whatever may occur relative to the conduct of officers of a new dragoon corps in general ; and afterwards to endeavour to point out the particulars which regard each several station. It is not intended to offer anything in the following sheets as the orders of a commanding officer, but as the sentiments of a friend, partly borrowed and partly formed upon observation and practice.” . . .

Promotion from the ranks to commissions did not appear to Colonel Burgoyne within the bounds of possibility, and he lays it down as an understood proposition that “ the ranks of corporal and serjeant should be considered as the most signal honour and reward that a man from the ranks could attain,” as, indeed, in those days it was ; but, because of this being the case, he enjoins the nicest discrimination in the advancement of private soldiers to the non-commissioned ranks, and he proceeds in a semi-philosophical tone, curiously at variance with modern military instructions, to argue upon the best methods of training the soldier for the superior positions, recommending a medium course between the great Frederick’s brutal system of coercion and the laxity of French discipline.¹

¹ Thomas Campbell, in his history of Frederick the Great, states that after the Seven Years’ War, the French, attributing the military efficiency

“There are two systems which, generally speaking, divide the disciplinarians; the one is that of *training men like spaniels, by the stick*; the other, after the French, of *substituting the point of honour in the place of severity*. The followers of the first are for reducing the nature of man as low as it will bear. Sight, hearing, and feeling are the only senses necessary, and all qualities of reason become not only useless but troublesome. The admirers of the latter, who commonly argue more from speculation than practice, are for exalting rationality, and they are commonly deceived in their expectations. The German are the best; the French, by the avowal of their own officers, the worst disciplined troops in Europe. I apprehend a just medium between the two extremes to be the surest means to bring English soldiers to perfection. Without entering into philosophy, one reflection will suffice to show *why an Englishman will not bear beating so well as the foreigners in question*. In the one instance, reason is never called forth by education. A stranger to the rights of a fellow creature, inured from infancy to slavery, ignorance, and hardship, the recruit verges upon the state of mere animal instinct before he enters the service. In the other, before the indiscriminate use of the stick can be quietly submitted to, the man must be divested of all the favourite ideas of his country, implanted in childhood, and fostered by the laws of liberty, custom, ease, and plenty. It must be confessed, the German method, when the subjects to be operated upon are proper, is by much the most easy and short; and officers might be of great assistance in forming a

of Prussia to the severity of their criminal code, attempted to introduce it into their army, to the disgust of the officers, one of whom, having been obliged to condemn a soldier to twenty-five lashes, witnessed the execution of the sentence, and then plunged his sword into his own body.

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corps without many more ideas than the men they command. To succeed where *minds are to be wrought upon, requires both discernment and labour*; but for an encouragement to the effort, it may be depended upon that mechanical valour will always be surpassed by national spirit and personal attachment where discipline is equal. Admitting then that *English soldiers are to be treated as thinking beings*, the reason will immediately appear of getting insight into the character of each particular man, and proportioning accordingly the degrees of punishment and encouragement."

Swearing at the soldier is prohibited as "faulty, if for no other reason than that it is condemned by the articles of war," and, although the maintenance of a strict line of demarcation between officers and men is imperatively enjoined, "there are occasions, such as during stable or fatigue duty, when officers may slacken the reins so far as to talk with soldiers; nay, even a joke may be used, not only without harm but to good purpose, for condescensions well applied are an encouragement to the well disposed, and at the same time a tacit reproof to others."

On the other hand, while exacting the strictest subordination of officers on duty, Colonel Burgoyne insists upon their complete social equality in private intercourse. "Any restraint upon conversation (off parade), unless when an offence against religion, morals, or good breeding is in question, is grating, and, though I may differ from some gentlemen whose abilities as officers I venerate, I will venture to affirm that it ought to be the characteristic of every gentleman neither to impose nor to submit to any distinction, but such as propriety of conduct or superiority of talent naturally create."

Those who in the present day cavil at recent legisla-

tion in the direction of improved education among military officers, will be surprised to find that Colonel Burgoyne, a century and a quarter ago, was disposed to exact quite as much general knowledge from regimental officers as the most ardent of modern reformers.

“The two last wars have filled the army with excellent officers from the year 1743. The military science, which in the course of the long peace had degenerated into the tricks of parade and the froth of discipline, has been attentively considered both in theory and practice; and to the honour of the cloth be it said there are few sets of officers now to be met with where an ignorant man could converse upon his profession without exposing himself. A short space of time given to reading each day, if the books are well chosen and the subject properly digested, will furnish a great deal of instruction. To those who do not understand French, I would recommend a serious and assiduous application till they attain it. The best modern books upon our profession are written in that language, and in foreign service gentlemen will find themselves at the greatest loss if they do not both write and speak it readily. I should be sorry, nevertheless, to engage them so far in that pursuit as to neglect the study of our native tongue. An officer ought to write English with swiftness and accuracy. He ought also to be well versed in figures; from contempt of the latter, numberless inconveniences arise. I mention, as one of the most trivial, a false return which officers will continually sign if they trust the figure part to a sergeant.

“The study of mathematics is so well known to be of utility in a military life, and the recommendation of it to youth so universal, that it is needless to enforce it. I shall only say that so much of engineering, as regards

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the construction of a breastwork or the attack of a redoubt, may be necessary for light dragoons ; but, exclusive of these and much higher purposes, one great advantage which attends an application to this science is that it strongly exercises the mind, and common reading becomes a relaxation after it. If a man has a taste for drawing, it will add a very pleasing and useful qualification ; and I would recommend him to practise taking views from an eminence, and to measure distances with his eye. This would be a talent, peculiarly adapted to the light dragoon service."

It was recently related of the commanding officer of a cavalry regiment that on the inspecting general expressing disapproval of the condition of the troop horses, he replied that he was not a veterinary surgeon. Colonel Burgoyne would have dealt very summarily with such a man, for he laid it down as a rule that an officer could never properly enforce a duty on the part of his subordinates which he was unable to perform himself in case of need ; and seems to have been of the opinion of one of the best cavalry officers of our days, that no man was fit to hold a commission in a mounted corps who could not shoe a horse.¹

"I come now to a point of the utmost importance in the dragoon service, though, in general, much neglected : —the study of horsemanship. This term is in the common acceptation of it confined to the grace and art of riding ; but to take it in the large sense, comprehends the knowledge of every article that concerns the horse or the rider ; a knowledge as necessary to a dragoon officer as is that of the construction of a vessel to a seaman. The defects, common to be observed, proceed

¹ The late Colonel Jacob of the Bombay army, who was killed during the Indian mutiny in the assault on Delhi.

from want of attention to the first elements upon which the science depends. I will venture to affirm, for example, though it may seem a paradox, that there is many a gentleman able to carry a dressed horse through every lesson of the *manège*, with grace and even exactness of hand, who are totally ignorant of the principles upon which a common bit and curb act upon the mouth. The reason is, they have been used to have everything adjusted by their groom, and their riding-master has taught them how to give their aids without ever informing them why the horse obeys them."

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To bring this matter home to our purpose, how frequently may we see, even in old and celebrated regiments (at least in parties which have not been looked over by a field-officer or a riding-master), bits ill fitted, accoutrements slovenly put on, twisted stirrups, saddles out of their places, &c., while an officer at their head, exactly equipped and a good rider, is wholly unconscious of anything amiss.

There is but one way to prevent the reflections which such oversights bring upon an officer and the corps, and that is not a very difficult one. Let every officer make himself thoroughly acquainted with every minute part of the accoutrements, consider the purposes they severally serve, and look critically over every man at the troop parade. Thus they will not only soon find their eye become offended with anything out of its place, but the men, by being so constantly set right, will acquire a nicety and a pride about their equipment which they will never lose, and which will add greatly to their appearance as well as to more essential advantages. There is an opening at present among the dragoons for a regiment to gain credit by an attention of this sort.

I hope I shall not appear finical, if I recommend to

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officers sometimes to accoutre and bridle a horse themselves till they are thoroughly acquainted with the use of each strap and buckle. I submit to the consideration of those who may possibly think such an employment a degradation, whether a reproof from a field officer, or, what is perhaps worse, a criticism from a judicious spectator, would not give them more pain. I cannot dismiss this point without advising every officer who is master of the French language to read 'Les Institutions Militaires de la Potière.' The other points necessary to constitute a horseman, in my sense of the word, and not at all below the attention of a gentleman, are a competent knowledge of farriery, and, what might be reckoned a branch of it, in feeding horses for health and business. The small allowance given by the Government for corn sometimes makes the latter a matter of great moment, and the opportunities which will frequently arise of rescuing a noble animal from the hands of an ignorant and cruel blacksmith, will make an application of the former very agreeable."

Burgoyne appears always to have been fond of writing, a predilection not uncommon among soldiers of our days, but rare in his time; and he was fastidious and ornate in his style. The drafts of many of his letters are almost illegible from alterations and corrections, and in his correspondence on the most trivial matters, he seems to have aimed at an ambitious literary standard. There is a letter of his extant, addressed to a captain in his regiment, and endorsed "To Sir William Williams on the only dispute that was ever between us," the concluding paragraph of which runs thus:—

"Having now fully explained myself upon your letter, I assure you, dear Sir William, from the bottom of my heart, I have no wish more sincere than that you may

apprehend and believe that I mean to profess myself zealous for the honour of the corps in general, and earnest in my inclination to cultivate your acquaintance in particular. I esteem your ardour for the service; I love your ingenuousness; I am sensible of your talent; I condemn your impetuosity."

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There is something ludicrous in the employment of this highflown language in the discussion of the qualifications of a corporal, and the necessity of an additional drum in the regimental band, but a stilted and inflated style was the prevailing literary vice of those days; and although Horace Walpole, who never lost a chance of having a fling at Burgoyne, dubbed him "Pomposo," his writings do not suffer in comparison with those of most of his contemporaries, or with the speeches of men of far higher pretensions to purity of style.¹

In 1760, the 16th Light Dragoons were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for embarkation to join the allied forces under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, in Germany, but these orders were countermanded. In the following year two troops were ordered to embark for the expedition against Belle Isle, when Burgoyne, whose rank disqualified him for the command of a detachment of his corps, joined the expedition as a volunteer, greatly,

¹ Colonel Wrottesley in his admirable *Life of Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne*, says with much truth in reference to the style of General Burgoyne:—"The warmth of imagination which occasionally led him into bombast in his public documents, is toned down in his private letters to a natural depth of feeling and simplicity of manner which reveal the charm that captivated his contemporaries."

The most exaggerated of Burgoyne's effusions, such as the American proclamation of 1777, is not after all more florid than some of the writings of Burke, or the speeches of Chatham, the effect of which does not appear to have been marred by what Horace Walpole, whose style was singularly free from such blemish, calls the "redundancy of images."

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as it appears, against the wish of his wife, whose anxieties he attempted (with what success does not appear) to soothe by the following lines :—

“ Still does my obstinate repine,
And reason's voice reprove ;
Still think him cold who would combine
Philosophy with love.
Try then from yet a nobler source
To draw thy wished relief ;
Faith adds to reason double force,
And mocks the assaults of grief.
By her, fair hope's enlivening ray,
Patience, and peace are given ;
Attend her calls ; resign, obey,
And leave the rest to Heaven !
The power that formed my Charlotte's heart
Thus tender, thus sincere,
Shall bless each wish that love can start,
Or absence foster there.
Safe in the shadow of that Power,
I'll tread the hostile ground ;
Though fiery deaths in tempest shower,
And thousands fall around.
And when the happy hour shall come,
(Oh ! speedy may it be !)
That brings thy faithful soldier home
To love, content, and thee ;
Pure may our gratitude ascend
To Him who guides our days,
And whilst He gives with bounteous hand,
Accepts our bliss for praise ! ”

The force employed against Belle Isle consisted of ten ships of the line, under Admiral Keppel, and about 6,000 men of all arms,¹ under General Hodgson, who,

¹ It is not easy to understand why cavalry were employed upon these raids, and more particularly in the siege of a fortified place on a small island. The use of this arm appears, however, to have been general in every description of warfare, quite irrespective of its character, and one of our best cavalry regiments was almost annihilated while engaged in the attempt to put down an insurrection among the runaway Spanish slaves, in the jungles and inaccessible mountain passes of Jamaica, during what was called the Maroon War.

writing to the Secretary of War, from on board his Transport, off St. Helens, on 29th March,¹ speaks disparagingly enough of the condition of his troops, and urges, among other complaints, the paucity of officers as "intolerable." "In one regiment alone," he writes, "no less than fifteen officers are absent, and among others the major and five captains."

The first attack on Belle Isle, on 7th April, failed, the English troops being repulsed with a loss of 500 men; but they subsequently effected a landing on a part of the coast considered inaccessible, and, therefore, weakly guarded, and invested the citadel of Le Palais, the garrison of which, after a gallant defence, capitulated on the 7th June, and marched out through the breaches with the honours of war.

Burgoyne happily escaped the "fiery deaths" invoked in his verses; not so, however, his friend, the Sir William Williams, before mentioned, who commanded one of the troops of the light horse employed on this service. He was shot by an advance sentry of the enemy, having, it is supposed, lost his way while reconnoitring.

In his report of this officer's death, to the War Office, General Hodgson mentions:—

"He had some papers and two of Drummond's notes of £100 each in his pocket, which the Chevalier de St. Croix, commandant of the citadel, sent me yesterday by a drum."

The "Annual Register" records of Sir William Williams that he was "the third gentleman of fashion whom in this war the love of enterprise had brought to an honourable death in these expeditions to the coast of France."

¹ This report, with many other official documents referred to in the course of this work, is to be found in the archives of the War Office.

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After the fall of Le Palais, an English force remained in occupation of Belle Isle until it was restored to France under the terms of the peace of Paris in 1763.

Out of a military force of something less than 6,000 men, we lost above 1,800 in killed and wounded in this expedition.¹

¹ At this time men dying in hospitals, whether of wounds or sickness, appear to have been included among "killed," although then, and down to a much later period, the number of soldiers lost by the hand of the enemy bore but a very small proportion to those who fell victims to privations of various kinds, and to defective hospital arrangements. See foot-note in chapter III., page 53.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL.

1762-63.

BURGOYNE returned home towards the end of 1761, when he was elected member of Parliament for the borough of Midhurst ; but before he could take his seat England had declared war with Spain (January, 1762), and his regiment receiving orders to hold itself in readiness for foreign service, he eagerly seized the opportunity of taking part in active operations on a larger scale than any of which he had yet had experience.

During the preceding year the Duc de Choiseul had succeeded in forming the Bourbon confederacy, known as "the family compact," and he now did his utmost by threats and cajolery to detach Portugal from a neutrality which was supposed to afford exceptional advantages to England.

In March 1762, the French and Spanish Ministers, at Lisbon, presented a joint memorandum to the Portuguese Government, urging the King to enter into an alliance which their Sovereigns had felt it necessary to form in order "to curb the pride of the British nation which aspires to become despotic over the sea." To this document, which was couched in a tone of studied

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menace, and which concluded with a hint that a powerful army was already concentrated on the Portuguese frontiers, a categorical answer was demanded within four days.

The King of Portugal replied in moderate but firm language, refusing to take up arms against England, and expressing his determination to repel force by force should his territory be invaded, and the English Government, in fulfilment of its obligations to a loyal ally, engaged to furnish a subsidy in money and a contingent of seven or eight thousand British troops¹ in aid of the defence and independence of Portugal.

Mr. Pitt graphically described the nature of our co-operation, in reply to some objections raised in Parliament to our undertaking the cause of Portugal, when he said, "I do not mean that we should carry the King of Portugal on our shoulders, but only that we should set him on his legs, and put a sword into his hand."

Indeed, in anticipation of the threatened action of France and Spain, the Conde de Oeyras, better known by his later title of Marquis de Pombal, the enlightened Prime Minister of Joseph the First, had been for some time engaged in organizing a national army, for which purpose he had obtained the assistance of English officers. The veteran general, Lord Tyrawley, directed this service in his joint capacity of ambassador and commander-in-chief; but he would appear to have wanted both the genius and the inclination for the successful performance of such a task. Shortly after his arrival in Lisbon he wrote to Mr. Pitt that the Portuguese forces were a mere rabble, and the Spanish army little better; adding, "Ten thousand disciplined troops upon the

¹ The force actually embarked was, according to official returns at the War Office, 7,164 officers and men of all arms.

frontier might take their choice whether they would march upon Lisbon or Madrid." To create a force capable of defending this country against the allied armies of France and Spain, out of a disorganized mass of half armed peasants, required a master mind, and such was found in the general whom Oeyras succeeded in enlisting in his country's cause, the reigning Count of Schaumburg Lippe, then a field-marshal and master-general of Artillery, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick in Germany.¹

A younger son of the reigning count of a small principality in North-western Germany,² Wilhelm La Lippe had from childhood upwards shown a marked predilection for a military life, together, with what is far less common, an extraordinary aptitude for military science. His father was a kinsman³ and a frequent guest of George the Second, at whose court the boy was born in 1724, and where he received his early education. He was subsequently sent to study at Geneva, and in 1742 obtained a commission in the foot guards from the King of England, under whom he fought at Dettingen, distinguishing himself by his intrepidity and his coolness under fire.⁴ During the twenty years of the almost

¹ Carlyle says in his *History of Frederick the Great*, that on the appointment of Count La Lippe to the command of the Portuguese army, "Tyrwley resigned in a huff," but there is reason to believe that he himself suggested the choice of one with whom he had served, and whose merits he appreciated, to supersede him in the performance of an uncongenial duty.

² Schaumburg Lippe, in contradistinction to the adjoining territory of Lippe Detmold, bordered by Hanover and Westphalia, has an area of about 210 square miles, and a population of less than 30,000.

³ He was a son of George I., by the Duchess of Kendal.

⁴ Count Schulembourg, under whom La Lippe subsequently served in Italy, punished what he described as rashness, by sending him on detached duty on the eve of a general action, as a hint that an officer had no business to be shot uselessly. *Militär Conversations Lexicon*, Leipsig.

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uninterrupted warfare which followed, William la Lippe sought service wherever military experience or honour could be gained, nor did he allow his unexpected succession to his little sovereignty to interfere with his chosen career. On the conclusion of the Seven Years War, however, the prospect of a lasting peace relegated him to his civil duties, and he retired to his dominions, where, following the ruling passion of his mind, he established a high school of military science,¹ in which he himself presided over the mathematical class. He also devoted himself to the working out, upon the small scale of which his principality admitted, a theory which has since been developed with the most important results upon the history of Europe. Starting with the proposition that man was by nature a fighting animal; deducing from this that wars were inevitable, and that in war national defence was the first duty owed by the citizen to the state, he endeavoured practically to solve the problem of exacting military service without unnecessary detriment to national industry, or, in other words, how to create the largest possible army at the smallest possible cost.²

General Gneisenau, who was, in the sturdy Blucher's campaigns, what Moltke was in Prussia's latest war, thus speaks of the results of La Lippe's labours in a letter addressed by him to Varnhagen von Ense:—

"You have praised the Count La Lippe highly,³ yet not as befits his merit. He was far greater than you re-

¹ The Wilhelmstein Academy for the training of Artillery and Engineer officers.

² Count La Lippe expresses these views in his *Mémoires sur la Guerre défensive*, of which a few copies were printed at Bückebourg, and one section of which is entitled "The art of protecting a small State against a greater Power."

³ With reference to Von Ense's *Denkmaale* published in Berlin in 1824.

present him. I formerly stayed some time in his capital of Bückebourg, and have read his manuscripts in the archives there. All our systems of national armament with its Landwehr and Landsturm, the whole modern method of making war, this man thus thoroughly worked out ; in its greatest principles and smallest details he had learned and practically taught it. Just think what kind of man he must have been whose genius could thus forecast the most vast requirements of war, so that their realisation in latter days actually shattered the whole power of Napoleon himself.”¹

Two generations later, the yet more complete development of La Lippe’s theory again broke the power of a Napoleon, and established Prussia in the rank of the first military power in the world.

La Lippe’s private character was in no wise inferior to his military genius. General Scharnhorst, one of Prussia’s bravest soldiers, and best tactician, had been his favourite pupil at Wilhelmstein, and he thus speaks of his patron and benefactor shortly after his death in 1776 :—

“Seldom have there been united such entire goodness of heart with so many fine qualities of mind. He never left the distressed without relief, nor the widow and orphan without care for their condition. Every expense of his small court was reduced, in order that he might enjoy the happiness of making others happy. Towards those about him, he was very agreeable and courteous. In his school he was at once organizer, inspector, benefactor, and friend. He made many a young man happy, and his lessons are already bearing fruit.”

Such was the man who now left the scene of glorious

¹ *Das Leben des Generals von Scharnhorst.* Von G. H. Klippel : Leipsig, 1870. For an admirable critique on this work see the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1874.

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achievements under the great Frederick to infuse military spirit and discipline into the disorganized and discouraged ranks of the Portuguese army, and to enable them to offer a front to the overwhelming force threatening to invade their territory. It was a formidable task, but La Lippe was not a man to be deterred by difficulty.

"The best artillery officer in the world¹—a man of excellent knowledge and faculty in various departments; strict as steel with regard to discipline, to practise, and conduct of all kinds; a most punctilious, silently supercilious gentleman of polite but privately irrefragable turn of mind." This politeness must have been not a little outraged, when, seated at a banquet given to him by the Portuguese Generals, La Lippe found that the valets waiting at the table were the captains and lieutenants under his command.² The Portuguese army had at this time fallen into a state of complete disorganization; and though Pombal's energy³ had enabled him to initiate considerable administrative reforms, and to have brought a force of 60,000 men under arms, the condition of these troops must have appeared lamentable enough to La Lippe, whose service had been passed among the best disciplined and most highly organized army then existing. His estimate of the artillery may be gathered from the fact that he offered a prize to such gunners as should strike the flag attached to the pole of his tent,

¹ Carlyle's *Frederick the Great*, Vol. 6.

² Varnhagen von Ense in his "Denkmaale" says that the officers of the Portuguese army at this time frequently followed mechanical trades in order to maintain themselves; that Captains were tailors, and their wives washerwomen; that General officers gave their servants commissions in the army in lieu of wages; and that the guards on duty at the King's palace in Lisbon would, with outstretched hand, and on bended knees, beg alms from passers by.

³ The English Minister at Lisbon reported in 1760, that Pombal combined with his functions of Prime Minister those of Commander-in-Chief.

and this practice was carried on during the return dinner which he gave to the Portuguese Generals, and at which he presided much in the manner of Diogenes, when he seated himself in front of their target to escape the shafts of inexperienced archers.¹

Even the English contingent, though they must have appeared to immense advantage in comparison with their allies, were a somewhat heterogeneous mass, for, by the side of picked corps such as Burgoyne's Horse and the Grenadiers, there were a number of hastily raised and undrilled levies, officered by volunteers of little experience; while the jealousy of the inhabitants of the peninsula to anything approaching to foreign influence or pretension contributed a powerful element of discord to the difficulties of La Lippe's command.

Colonel Mauvillon, a German engineer officer, serving on the staff of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, in his interesting history of that General's campaigns², dwells upon the difficulties attending the command of an army composed of various nationalities, and in the course of his strictures, he gives the following unflattering description of the English contingent serving in Germany during the Seven Years' War:³

"Braver troops there cannot indeed be found in the world when in the battle field and under arms before the enemy; but here ends their military merit. In the first

¹ Varnhagen von Ense says that La Lippe, who had made strong efforts to abolish duelling in the Prussian army, found the spirit of the Portuguese officers so abject and cowardly that he not only encouraged the practice among them, but threatened to dismiss any officer who should submit to insult without demanding redress by sword or pistol.

² *Geschichte Ferdinands, Herzogs von Braunschweig Lüneburg*, Leipzig, 1794.

³ Prince Ferdinand himself entertained and expressed a far higher opinion of the value of his British troops, to whom he was indeed deeply indebted for his successes.

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place, their infantry is composed of so indiscriminate a conglomeration of men, that it is difficult to maintain even a shadow of discipline among them. Their cavalry is indeed differently constituted, but a foolish love for their horses makes them astonishingly rapacious after forage;¹ so that in this respect they will exhaust a district far sooner than the Germans with whom a limit may be fixed.

"Officers' commissions among them are all had by purchase, and the consequence is, that their officers do not trouble their heads about the service, and with few exceptions, understand absolutely nothing whatever about it; and this goes on from the ensign to the general. Their home customs incline them to the indulgences of life, and nearly without exception, they all expect to have comfortable means of sleep. This disposes them to acts of neglect of duty which would sound incredible if related. To all this is added a quiet, natural arrogance which tempts them to despise the enemy as well as the danger. It is well known how much these people despise all foreigners: this of itself renders their co-operation with troops of other nations very difficult."

That Lord Loudon's² soldiers despised their Portuguese allies is more than probable; nor, to do them justice, do the latter appear to have grudged their British comrades the honour of the foremost place whenever fighting was to be done. Count La Lippe, however, recognised in them—what our own experience

¹ Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne in his *Military Opinions* (page 433) expresses a very much less favourable view on this point; and is disposed to attribute the habitual falling off in the condition of our troop horses on active service to the fact that "the characteristic disposition of our countrymen is peculiarly unfavourable for the care of horses," and that "the Englishman has been declared proverbially to be the worst horse-master in the world."

² Lord Loudon was in immediate command of the British contingent.

confirmed when half a century later the English and Portuguese fought side by side—that their defects as soldiers lay more in the want of efficient leaders than in an absence of individual courage, or of a capacity for discipline; and when he placed at their head English officers, in whose conduct and skill they had confidence; when moreover he put arms into their hands, and gave them food and clothing, and even money at times, something like a military spirit began to display itself.¹

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To Burgoyne, who had embarked for the Tagus with his light horse, early in May, and who now held the local rank of Brigadier-General, the organization of his brigade of 3,000 men, of whom nearly two-thirds were Portuguese, must, in spite of his love of soldiering, have been an irksome task, and his general orders indicate the formidable difficulties with which he had to contend, not only in bringing the native levies into military subordination, and maintaining good relations between them and their allies, but in restraining the predilection of the English troops for wine and plunder.

Discipline was necessarily severe in such an army, but Burgoyne, while he repressed crime with a stern hand, and by a scale of punishment graduated downwards from "summary execution" to "working for three days under the engineer without pay," showed a solicitude for the soldiers' comfort in marked contrast with the indifference on this point of which there were too many examples among the military commanders of his time. The penal code in the army was in those days barbarous enough, though hardly more so than in

¹ In a manuscript on this campaign in the British Museum, the following passage occurs relating to the cheerful endurance of the Portuguese infantry:

"La plupart usant bientôt leurs souliers, ne laissoient pas de marcher gayement dans ces chemins de rochers aigus, laissant partout des traces de leurs pieds ensanglantés."

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civil life; indeed, considering the difficulty and the importance of maintaining strict subordination in an armed force composed in a great measure of a class disposed to lawlessness and violence, the comparison may be said to have been in favour of military law. Still it is startling to read in general orders, how frequent were the cases of capital punishment, or of what amounted to the same thing under more horrible conditions, of flogging beyond the power of human endurance.¹

Although this war was undertaken entirely in the national interests, nay, in defence of the very existence of Portugal, it was viewed with disfavour by an influential if not a large portion of the population. The expulsion of the Jesuits by Pombal, and the barbarous and indiscriminate retaliation inflicted for the attempt which they had instigated upon the king's life, had aroused a powerful and unscrupulous opposition to his measures however salutary; and he was by far too conscientious a reformer, and too ruthless an enemy of corruption not to have incurred the bitter hatred of the classes most interested in the maintenance of abuses: the aristocracy and the priesthood—both of which brought all their influence to bear upon the dependence and superstition of the peasantry.

Colonel Anderson, belonging to the British Contingent, and serving on the staff of the Count de San Jago, writes to Burgoyne:—

¹ Thus we find that "Lord Loudon has been pleased to approve of the court-martial on four English soldiers tried, the three first for desertion, and the last for mutiny; two of whom are sentenced to death, and two to receive each *one thousand lashes*. The order proceeds thus without a full stop:

"The sentence of the two latter to be put in execution to-morrow morning, in front of the Great Redoubt, the piquets of all the corps to attend; the men condemned to death to suffer on Saturday, the Infantry to apply to the Assentists for straw."

"You may depend upon receiving the best of intelligence of the enemy's motions; but hitherto the Conde de San Jago has found it very difficult to get good intelligence. It's odd, you'll say, when every peasant might reasonably be supposed to be a spy for him. These do not look on the Spaniards as their enemy; they think their cause the cause of the Jesuits and the cause of God. The people of condition, the excellencies and the Hidalgos have so insuperable a hatred to the minister, as to sacrifice their king, their country, and even their honour, to feed it. I have, however, the happiness here to be under as honest a man as ever lived, with as good a heart as it is possible to imagine."

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Burgoyne's brigade had been at this time pushed in advance with a view to watching the enemy, who was already in overwhelming force, and in possession of strong positions within Portuguese territory. The united Spanish and French¹ forces amounted to about 42,000 men, with ninety-three pieces of cannon, under the Marquis de Saria, who early in the spring had advanced upon the frontier in three divisions. A portion of the northern division under Brigadier-General O'Reilly had, before the declaration of war, crossed without opposition into the province of Tras os Montes, and on the 9th of May captured Miranda the capital, and shortly afterwards Braganza and other towns, with the design of marching upon Oporto. The second army corps had entered Portugal by the province of Beira, and after a short siege taken Almeida, an important fortified town

¹ The French Government had promised a large contingent, only a portion of which was provided, and though a considerable number of French officers served in the campaign, the main body of the invading army was composed of Spanish troops. These, however, greatly outnumbered the joint Portuguese and English forces.

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in a commanding position about twenty miles from Ciudad Rodrigo; while the third, composed of 14,000 men, and comprising a powerful force of cavalry and artillery, under the Conde d'Aranda, was concentrated on the southern frontier, threatening the approaches to Lisbon by the Tagus.

The strong position gained by the invading army in the north was so alarming, and the means of checking their further progress appeared so precarious and insufficient, that the English factories prepared to remove their property from Oporto, and our Government hastily despatched a squadron to the coast. A small English force however, acting in conjunction with guerilla bands and occupying the intervening mountain passes, succeeded in repelling the Spaniards with considerable loss, and induced them eventually to abandon their design of crossing the Douro. This check, important as it was, left the division available for co-operation with the two army corps in the south.

It was not until the month of July that the allied forces under La Lippe, who lay with his head-quarters at Abrantes on the Tagus, about midway between Lisbon and the Spanish frontier, were in a condition to take the field: but even then the army was but imperfectly organized, greatly inferior to that of the invaders in numbers, and yet more inferior in cavalry and artillery. Were the enemy allowed to advance in force into the open country of Alentejo, a pitched battle under circumstances in every respect disadvantageous to the defenders, must ensue; and this was a risk which La Lippe was resolved to avert at all hazards. To prevent the junction of the three army corps was his principal object; to this end he determined upon attacking the enemy on his own ground in Estremadura, and to

Burgoyne he entrusted the execution of his bold design.

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The advanced lines of the third corps of the enemy lay within the circuit of a few leagues around Valentia d'Alcantara, a walled frontier town, which from its favourable position had been selected as the base of offensive operations in the south. It was also the principal supply depôt, and contained a park of artillery and considerable magazines. La Lippe's plan was to detach a force to destroy the magazines at Valentia : then to advance upon the Spanish supports at Selvorino and St. Vincent ; and finally, by pushing on to Ponte San Pierro and the passages of the Xevora, to cut off communication with Badajoz.

Burgoyne's dispositions were admirably made. By a forced march he struck across the mountains of Castel da Vida, without allowing the enemy to gain intelligence of his movements ; but delayed by the slowness, if not something worse, of his Portuguese Infantry, and the non-arrival of the force ordered to co-operate with him in the advance beyond Valentia, he found it impossible to carry out the plan as laid down. While its execution had appeared feasible he had displayed the foresight of a prudent General ; now that it was hopeless he trusted to the dash of the *sabreur* to strike an effective blow, and charging at the head of his Light Horse, he carried the enemy's position. The story of this brilliant exploit is best told in his own modest despatch :—

“ According to my intelligence, I was to find the town situated in a plain : the principal entrance there, one on the Pitteranha road (which was that I marched), to the east ; one on the great road to Alcantara, on the west ; and one towards the mountains, on the south ; on the north, only some small inlets.

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"I was informed that the patrols were not regular, nor at a distance ; that there were no advanced piquets, no barricadoes, and that the only guard was in the great square.

"The disposition that I made was as follows :—

"I ordered the troops to march in two columns to the heights of Pitteranha, which are the boundaries of Portugal, and about half way between Castel da Vida and Valentia : from thence, there being but one narrow road to the plain above mentioned, I ordered Major Luttrell, to whom I had given the command of the Portuguese Grenadiers, to proceed to the plain, from whence he was to get, with all possible diligence, round the town to Alcantara road. His division was headed by a party of the country cavalry, supported by an officer and twenty-four English light dragoons ; to cut to pieces, or make prisoners any patrols they might meet : the flanks were covered by armed peasants and the irregular infantry.

"Lord Pulteney with the British grenadiers was ordered to form the attack on the Pitteranha road.

"The Portuguese irregulars were to take post opposite the entrance on the side of the mountains, and endeavour to make themselves masters of some houses at the entrance of the town on that side.

"The English light dragoons were, upon their arrival in the plain, to form on the north side, from whence Colonel Somerville had orders to detach a captain's command on the road to Alcantara, and another on the road to St. Vincent's, which were the only passages by which the enemy could retreat, or from which he could receive succour. He was to remain with the rest of the corps ready to support wherever necessary.

"My idea was to attack on the three sides at once ;

and I had given the Alcantara side to the Portuguese, though the longest march, to reserve the English for a rush into the town, in case I should find we were discovered, while the different divisions were taking up their posts.

"About four miles short of the town I found a convent which was a very strong post, and I left in it a hundred men.

"About the same time I perceived with much dissatisfaction that my guides had greatly deceived me with regard to the distance; they assured me at Pitteranha, I had an hour of dark more than I wanted, and pressed me to stay longer, to avoid falling in with the patrols, which they said retired a little before day. Contrary to my expectation, I found the day coming on fast, and that the sun would be risen before the foot could possibly reach the town: I thought it therefore expedient to lay aside entirely my first disposition, and carry forward the light dragoons, who by a brisk gallop might possibly still effect a surprise, or at worst stop up the avenues. I accordingly went on with that corps at three-quarters speed without molestation, and the advanced guard, consisting of forty men, led by Lieutenant Lewis, finding the entrance clear, pushed into the town sword in hand.

"The guards in the square were all killed or made prisoners, before they could use their arms, and the ends of the streets were possessed with very little resistance.

"By the time the body of the regiment was formed in the square, a few desperate parties attempted an attack, but all perished or were taken. The only firing that remained was in single shots from windows, which did not continue long after the grenadiers came up. I was obliged to treat the people who persisted in it

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without quarter, and at last got some priests, whom I forced through the town, to declare that the town should be set fire to at the four corners, unless all doors and windows were instantly thrown open. Before they had proceeded down one street, the people had seen their error, and all was quiet.

"I detached the dragoons into the country to pick up all who had escaped ; they brought in a good many horses ; a detached serjeant and six men only fell in with a subaltern and twenty-five dragoons, unbroken, and prepared to receive them ; they killed six and brought in the rest of the men prisoners, and every horse of the party : believe me, my Lord, this is no exaggeration of the Colonel, but real fact. I brought off prisoners, Major-General Don Michael de Irunibeni and Kalanca, and his aide-de-camp, one colonel and his adjutant, two captains, seventeen subalterns, and fifty-nine privates. There were taken and brought off besides three colours, and a large quantity of arms, and a great many more, together with ammunition, destroyed.

"I also brought away hostages for the good attendance and safe delivery of my wounded, and for the payment of a year's king's revenue for sparing the convents and town.

"The light in which Count La Lippe has taken this affair gives me the highest pleasure and confusion ; his approbation gratifies my ambition, but at the same time I am conscious that the chief merit of the success was due to the admirable, though not uncommon valour and activity of the troops I had the honour to command. I am persuaded I shall give your Lordship satisfaction, when I inform you that Colonel Somerville¹ distin-

¹ The officer in acting command of the 16th Light Dragoons, in consequence of Colonel Burgoyne holding the rank of Brigadier.

guished himself in this affair in the manner his best friends could wish ; he had an opportunity of displaying his judgment, his spirit, and humanity ; and I do not know for which of those qualities he deserves most commendation."

The effects upon the campaign of the surprise of Valentia must not be measured by the comparatively small importance of this affair as a military operation. The capture of a garrison, and the destruction of a battalion, could not seriously affect the fortunes of the invading army ; but it had nevertheless an important moral result in giving heart to the Portuguese nation, who were at this time sinking into a state of hopeless despondency, and in raising the military reputation of the English in the eyes of their allies. In a struggle for national independence against overwhelming odds, isolated acts of conspicuous gallantry are perhaps better calculated to inspire hope and confidence than more important but less obvious successes, and this may account for the extraordinary elation of the Portuguese over Burgoyne's feat. The Colonel of Dragoons charging with a squadron the head-quarters of an army, the young Lieutenant galloping into a strong hostile garrison sword in hand, at the head of forty men ; and the sergeant and six men making prisoners of a Spanish officer and twenty-five dragoons, recall some of the exploits which made the name of a Prussian Uhlan so formidable in the late war with France.

The effect of Burgoyne's success is shown in the compliments showered upon him.

"Extrait des Ordres de Jour, 29 août, 1762 :—

"Monseigneur le Maréchal croit de son devoir de donner part à l'armée de la glorieuse conduite de M. le Brigadier Burgoyne, qui après avoir marché 15 lieues

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sans relâche, a emporté Valencia d'Alcantara, l'épée à la main ; fait prisonnier le général qui devoit envahir l'Alentejo ; détruit le régiment Espagnol de Seville, prit trois drapeaux, un colonel, plusieurs officiers de distinction, et beaucoup de soldats. Monseigneur le Maréchal ne doute point que tous ceux qui composent l'armée, ne prennent part à cet événement, et que chacun, à proportion de son emploi, ne s'efforce d'imiter un aussi bel exemple."

The Prime Minister of Portugal writes to La Lippe on the 2nd September :—

"Le Roy en sçait à V. E. le plus grand gré, espérant qu'elle fasse parvenir à la connoissance de M. le Brigadier Burgoyne combien Sa Majesté a été édifiée de la sagesse et de la bravoure avec lesquelles il a conduit la même affaire, et lorsque les drapeaux seront présentés à Sa dite Majesté, elle rendra à M. de Bourgoyne et aux dignes officiers anglois, qui les ont pris, la justice de les juger à eux appartenants, pour les envoyer là où bon leur semblera."

Three days later, "Monsieur de Bourgoyne" receives from King Joseph a diamond ring under cover of the following letter :—

"A BELLEM, le 6^{me} Septembre.

"MONSIEUR,

"Le Roy ayant ouï avec un sensible plaisir par les relations de Son Excellence Monsieur le Conte Rég-nant de Schaumbourg Lippe, la prudence, la bravoure, et la rapidité, avec lesquelles vous avez conduit, et con-clû, l'assaut de Valence d'Alcantara, m'ordonne de vous témoigner par cette lettre, combien Sa Majesté a été édifiée de votre conduite dans cette affaire, et le gré qu'Elle en sçait à vos sages dispositions.

"Pour vous donner une preuve plus réelle de la satis-

action que Sa dite Majesté a de votre personne, Elle n'ordonne aussi de vous marquer, que les trois drapeaux, qui luy ont été présentés, sont déposés à la Secrétaire d'État de la Guerre, comme à vous appartenants. Et à fin que vous puissiez avoir le plaisir de les envoyer en Angleterre (si cela peut vous être agréable) ils seront remis a celui, qui se légitimera avec un pouvoir signé de votre main pour les recevoir.

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“Le Roy m'a ordonné encore de vous remettre la bague qui accompagnera cette lettre, en vous signifiant de sa part, que Sa Majesté vous l'a destinée comme un petit souvenir de l'action de Valence, que vous avez si bravement conduite; et comme une marque de son affection Royale à votre égard.

“Dans mon particulier, j'espère, que vous croirez de moy la grande part que je prends à tout qui peut contribuer à votre gloire.

“Et j'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la considération la plus parfaite,

“Monsieur,

“Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

“LE CONTE D'OEVRAS.

“MONSIEUR DE BOURGOYNE,
Brigadier des Armées de S. M. B.”

Count La Lippe, in his despatch to Lord Bute, after detailing the character of his plans, says:—

“General Burgoyne in consequence continued his march, and attacked Valentia the 27th in the morning, with all possible valour and conduct; and carried the place first with his own regiment sword in hand.

“It is an unspeakable mortification to me, that the intended plan could not take place, but the admirable behaviour of the few British troops upon this expedition,

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and the remarkable valour, conduct, and presence of mind of Brigadier Burgoyne, could not but give me infinite satisfaction, and it is my duty to mention this officer to your Lordship as a most excellent one, and extremely worthy of his Majesty's remembrance."

Carlyle always, in spite of his honest denunciation of shams, prone to measure merit by success, writes in allusion to this affair:—

"The Burgoyne who begins in this pretty way at Valencia d'Alcantara, is the same who ended so dismally at Saratoga within twenty years. Perhaps with other war offices, and training himself in something suitabler than parliamentary eloquence, he might have become a kind of General, and ended far otherwise than he did."¹

Shortly before his embarkation for Portugal, Burgoyne (who certainly never fell into the error of under-rating his claims) had made application for the rank of full colonel in the army, upon which Lord Bute wrote to him on the 12th April, 1762, handsomely expressing his great regret that he had failed in obtaining that rank for him, in consequence of the number of Lieutenant-Colonels senior to him.

We who live in days when it is not the practice (in official correspondence) to base claims for professional advancement upon anything short of personal merit, and when political interest is never allowed (in public documents) to direct the bestowal of government patronage, must be startled to find how openly and candidly an officer could, a century ago, in addressing a superior authority, found his demand for promotion upon private or parliamentary influence. Writing to Mr. Townshend,²

¹ *Frederick the Great*, vol. 6.

² The Honourable Charles Townshend, Secretary at War.

on the 10th August 1762, Burgoyne expresses his dissatisfaction at not having been included in a recent promotion, and proceeds in a tone of reproach and indignation:—

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“ My friend Brudenell, Mr. Clinton, and Mr. Fitzroy, are the only persons ever mentioned to stand between me and that preferment upon the pretensions of *family support*. *Upon any other ground, I should blush to ask it, and I doubt not that the gentlemen who have succeeded likewise waived the claim of service.* Had military merit been in question, some of the gentlemen preferred must together with me have waited for the provision of older and more experienced officers above them; *but when the Government thinks proper to allow family weight and protection to take place,* I will be bold to offer my claim, from the honour of Lord Strange’s application, upon the same list as Mr. Clinton and Mr. Fitzroy, and my want of success will give me more pain as a slight to my patron, than as a disappointment to myself.”

Mr. Townshend replies to this in an apologetic tone, which, if somewhat unusual in a communication from a minister of the crown to a subordinate, certainly indicates the personal regard in which Burgoyne was held:—

“ WAR OFFICE, 19th September, 1762.

“ SIR,

“ I have the honour of your letter dated the 10th of August, and I own the manner of it surprises me extremely; I will answer every part of it with truth and exactness. You complain of your disappointment to find yourself left out of the promotions, at the time that Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzroy, Lieutenant-Colonel Boyd, and Lieutenant-Colonel Brudenell, were made Colonels; and you hope your appointment of Brigadier in

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Portugal is not the plea urged to explain your not having the rank. When you lately did me the honour of applying to me, I told you I would represent your wishes to the king, and should be happy to assist you on your own account, and to oblige your friend Lord Strange. I then instantly obeyed your commands, and I told you the answer His Majesty gave me. Since that, Lord Strange has himself applied to His Majesty ; and if Lord Strange will instruct me to represent to the Crown, that the promotion of the gentlemen named by you, is contrary to the answer he received from His Majesty, I will again obey his commands, and again assist you, to the utmost of my little power. This is the footing upon which Lord Strange's personal solicitation has left it. I have very lately seen Lord Strange, and if he had, in any degree, suggested to me, that he saw the promotion, and His Majesty's answer to him, in the light you do, I should not have suffered one day to have passed, without acting upon his remonstrance.

" You have used many expressions, in your manner of writing to me, which I confess hurt me ; they hurt me, not only as I have merited very contrary returns from you, but as I have ever had a personal regard for you as a man as well as an officer. I am now obliged to say, and flatter myself you will here convince Lord Strange, I am not cold in any interest or to any person he recommends and loves ; my life and conduct will be a full answer to that charge. You will certainly act prudently in employing the interest of those whom you believe most able, and think most willing to support your claims. My breast tells me, that when you have made that choice, however you find many more able, you will not find one more willing than myself. You will forgive me if I write in the style of a man much hurt, for I

really am extremely, as you are the last person in the army from whom I should have expected to receive expressions of reproach and distrust.

"I am, with great respect,

"Sir,

"Your most obedient and most humble servant,

"C. TOWNSHEND.

"BRIGADIER BURGOYNE, at Lisbon."

Burgoyne's success at Valencia, however, enabled him to add to his previous claim that of good service done in the field, and Lord Bute, on the 2nd November, announces to him his promotion in these gratifying terms:—

"SIR,

"I hope you will excuse my not answering your letter sooner. I thought the most agreeable manner of doing it was by procuring you the rank you wished, which His Majesty very readily consented to, out of regard to Lord Strange, and your own merit; permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the very brilliant manner in which you have conducted yourself ever since your arrival in Portugal; and on the success that has attended it. Count La Lippe has indeed done you ample justice; and his Excellency's letter was of no small use in procuring what I so much wished. I am happy to observe, sir, how your own gallant behaviour has in the eyes of the army justified the mark of favour His Majesty has conferred.

"I am, Sir, with great regard,

"Your obedient humble servant,

"BUTE.

"LONDON, Nov. 2nd, 1762."

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After the capture of Valencia, Burgoyne's Brigade was employed in watching the enemy's manœuvres on the frontier, and of preventing the threatened passage of the Douro by the force which was gradually closing in upon La Lippe's army.

In September, La Lippe slowly retreated before D'Aranda's division, which took Castello Branco, a strong place commanding the passage of the Tagus; and shortly after, though Burgoyne continued obstinately to dispute the ground, Villa Velha fell, thus laying open the defiles of St. Simon, and the main approaches to the capital. In the meantime a Portuguese brigade under the Conde San Jago, which had formed the garrison of Castello Branco, was in full retreat, covered by an English force under Lord Loudoun. In order to harass the rear of the latter, the enemy detached a large body from Villa Velha: Burgoyne, who, in accordance with La Lippe's policy of gaining time, in the hope that the approaching rainy season would check the advance of the invaders, continued to watch the camp of Villa Velha, had noticed that the enemy, elated by his recent successes, showed carelessness in guarding his position. This circumstance, together with the weakened state of the garrison in consequence of the withdrawal of the troops sent in pursuit of Lord Loudoun, seemed to him to offer a tempting opportunity for striking a severe blow by a surprise, which he planned with much skill, and executed with his usual vigour. On the night of the 5th of October, Colonel Lee,¹ in obedience to instructions from Burgoyne, crossed the

¹ This is the Colonel Lee who subsequently, as Washington's second in command, fought against the British army in America, and was taken prisoner by a detachment of the identical Light Horse which he now led into Villa Velha. See Chapter IV.

Tagus with a force of two hundred and fifty British Grenadiers and fifty Light Dragoons, reached the camp unperceived, and after inflicting great slaughter, spiking six guns, destroying magazines, and carrying off a large number of pack-animals, regained his position with only a few trifling casualties.

The loss inflicted upon the enemy at Villa Velha was so severe as to compel him to remain inactive while awaiting reinforcements ; but towards the middle of October an advance in force against Abrantes was decided upon, and La Lippe's despatches show the importance which he attached to the vigilance of Burgoyne in frustrating this design.

By the cautious defensive warfare adopted, the enemy was kept at bay until the early part of November, when the rains set in with unusual severity, rendering the roads, bad enough at any time, impassable for artillery. The invading army accordingly commenced to recross the frontier, and La Lippe's troops retired into winter quarters.¹

Thus ended the campaign in Portugal,² the renewal

¹ A short time afterwards a considerable body of Spanish troops recrossed the frontier and attempted to take Marvas, an important fortress garrisoned by a small English detachment under a Captain Brown, who was summoned to surrender, but replied by sending a cannon shot into the midst of the force surrounding him, and succeeded in holding out until relieved by reinforcements, when the enemy retired with loss. I regret being unable to trace the individuality of Captain Brown, who merits a more distinctive title.

² Among other sources of information relating to this half-forgotten campaign, it is right to mention Heinrich Schæfer's "History of Portugal" (Gotha, 1854), in which many details of this period are quoted from a MS. of Count La Lippe. From certain points of resemblance, I am led to believe that this is identical with an anonymous paper among the Royal MSS. in the British Museum (George III., No. 236), entitled "Mémoires de la Campagne de Portugal en 1762," in which Burgoyne is repeatedly referred to in terms of high commendation.

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of which was prevented by the conclusion of the Peace of Paris early in 1763. Towards the end of the year, Burgoyne embarked with his regiment for England, whither his reputation had preceded him as that of a dashing soldier and a prudent and skilful general.

CHAPTER III.

AN INTERVAL OF PEACE.

1763-1775.

THE Seven Years' War, the conclusion of which, now ratified by the Peace of Paris, enabled Europe once more to sheathe the sword, was but an episode in a series of wars which had occupied England, in common with the principal continental powers, during more than one half the period which had elapsed since the accession of Queen Anne in the beginning of the century.

In these wars England had not only put forth her full strength on land and at sea, but had lavished her wealth and credit in subsidizing foreign levies¹ to co-operate with her armies wherever these might be engaged.

The cost of these wars had been enormous,² and

¹ At the end of 1762, the number of foreign legionaries in British pay amounted to 57,762 men, while the total force of British Artillery did not exceed 3,000, and the corps of Royal Engineers numbered only sixty men.

² The National Debt, which on Queen Anne's accession, in 1702, amounted to fourteen millions, had in 1762 reached the sum of 130 millions; but this difference does not nearly represent the actual expenditure incurred; the cost of the Seven Years' War alone being computed at 112 millions, the greater part of which was raised by direct taxation. The loss of life was on a corresponding scale. The *Annual Register* (1763, page 50) quotes the loss of seamen and marines alone, during this war,

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although less exhausted by her sacrifices than the continental states, England lost no time, after the formal conclusion of peace, in disarming to an extent which their geographical position did not allow her late allies or adversaries to emulate. In the course of these sweeping reductions,¹ the disbandment, among other cavalry corps, of Burgoyne's Horse was contemplated, but the design was abandoned, it is said at the instance of the king; for George the Third continued to show a marked predilection for this corps, of which, early in this year, he appointed Burgoyne Colonel-Commandant.²

The newspapers of the time make frequent mention of His Majesty's inspections of the 15th and 16th Light Dragoons, brigaded together. It was on the occasion of one of these reviews at Wimbledon, in the course of this year, that he conferred upon them respectively, the title of "the King's" and "the Queen's" Light Dragoons.³ The favour which Burgoyne long enjoyed at court was doubtless in a great measure due to his having brought his regiment to so high a state of efficiency as to make it as much a pageant in peace as it had proved formidable in war.

Early in this year Burgoyne had taken his seat in the House of Commons, and was present when he and his corps received the thanks of Parliament for their conduct

at 184,893 men, and by a rough calculation, computes that these figures represent 32,805 widows, and 67,610 orphans.

¹ The standing army was in this year reduced to 40,000 men, for service in England, Ireland, and the Colonies.

² Burgoyne's commission as Colonel in the army was dated 8th October, 1762; that of Colonel-Commandant, 18th March, 1763.

³ The formation of the 15th Light Dragoons had been entrusted to Colonel Elliot, who served in command of this corps with great distinction under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick; and at a later period, earned high honour by his defence of Gibraltar. He was raised to the peerage as Viscount Heathfield and Baron Gibraltar, and died in 1790.

in Portugal; and during the interval of twelve years' peace which now ensued, he threw himself into political life with all the ardour which had hitherto characterized his military career. Although by nature gifted with great fluency of speech—which in later life not unfrequently rose to the dignity of eloquence—he did not as yet speak much; but among his papers of this period there are indications of his extreme diligence and application in the study of different political subjects, and more especially those connected with the affairs of the East India Company, in the discussion of which he afterwards took so conspicuous and honourable a part.

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Nor did parliamentary labours and professional study furnish sufficient occupation for Burgoyne's active mind. From early childhood he had "dallied with the Muse," though hitherto his literary efforts had not soared beyond *vers de société*, and other occasional pieces,¹ many of which were written at this time. The ruling passion of his mind, however, continued to be directed to arms, and in 1765 he proceeded to visit the scenes of the late wars on the Continent, with a view to the composition of a military work on the subject.

The following letters are among his correspondence of this period. They are curiously characteristic of the flowery and verbose style and of the exaggerated sentiments and expressions which were then in vogue. It could only be in days when Johnson wept over *Clarissa Harlowe*, and Edmund Burke sat up all night to finish the last volume of *Evelina*, that a request for a letter of introduction could be granted and acknowledged in such terms as these :—

¹ A consideration of Burgoyne's literary labours will form the subject of a separate chapter in this work.

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From the RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT *to* COLONEL
BURGOYNE.

"SIR,—It is with very particular pleasure that I obey your wishes in sending you inclosed a letter for Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick—a letter which General Burgoyne could little want to a Prince well informed of all actions of *éclat* throughout the whole theatre of the late extended war, and which is sure to be well received from the hand that is to deliver it.

"I will not attempt at present to give expression in any degree to the extent of what I feel from the friendly assurances of the sentiments with which you honour me ; little as I have merited such a favourable suffrage where you, sir, so kindly attribute deserving, I can only beg you to be persuaded that if to be proud and happy in the honour of a justly valued friendship can give a kind of pretension to it, I shall hope you will not find me without some title to the place you are so good to give me in yours.

"Accept, dear sir, many warm wishes for your health, pleasure, and satisfaction in the tour you are going to make ; wherein you will, agreeably to yourself, and usefully to your country, add to the rich stock of military treasures already your own, fresh matter of present contemplation and of future action.

"I have the honour to be,

"With the truest esteem and consideration,

"Dear Sir,

"Your most obedient and affectionate humble servant,

"WILLIAM PITT.

"BURTON PYNSENT,

"*July ye 1st, 1766.*"

*From COLONEL BURGOYNE to the EARL OF CHATHAM.*¹

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"MY LORD,—The letter I had the honour to receive from your Lordship at the time I left England, together with one inclosed for Prince Ferdinand, required a warmer acknowledgment than I could find terms to make, and that debt has been increased by the reception so distinguished a mark of your Lordship's countenance procured me at the Court of Brunswick. But howsoever flattering or advantageous have been the effects of your friendship, it is in the possession of it that I exult; and not to wrong my feelings, I must still trust to the conceptions of a great and benevolent mind, and not to my own feeble expression, to represent that respect, that gratitude, and that zeal with which I solicited, with which I embrace, and with which I study to cultivate, the sentiments your Lordship professes towards me.

"I beg you, my Lord, to accept my congratulations upon your peerage, and upon your engaging in the administration, as those of a man who takes the truest interest in everything that leads to your glory and satisfaction, and who looks up to your lights and counsels for the salvation of his country. I move not a step upon the Continent without seeing the impression your Lordship's name makes. It is a touchstone that no German hypocrisy can resist; and the conversation at every court upon the present arrangement of affairs in England betrays their disposition towards us. With those who partake in the satisfaction of the friends of Great Britain and your Lordship, there are not wanting those who are industrious to propagate the malevolence of our party writers, for the prejudices and the follies of our country are dispersed over the world with every wind

¹ William Pitt had been raised to the peerage in this year.

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that blows ; and what at home is made use of to embroil and disunite every class of the people, is retailed at second-hand abroad, and serves, as far as our enemies can make it do so, to depreciate and disfigure his Majesty's measures ; but these are but the vapours of an hour, and they will fly like those which have often attended, but never obscured your Lordship's conduct.

"Able and vigilant as is his Majesty's minister at Berlin, it would be very impertinent in me to mention my observations upon the present politics or occupations of that court. The circumstances that particularly have engaged my reflections as a soldier, I shall communicate to your Lordship, if I have the honour to be admitted to your conversation at my return to London.

"Since my arrival at Dresden, I have been confirmed in what I before had reason to believe relative to a meeting proposed between the Emperor and the King of Prussia. The one wished a personal interview to gratify his curiosity ; the other, to penetrate into the character of a young monarch, who, if what is reported of his talents, his application, and his ambition be true, will soon become a principal object of the attention of Europe. The Empress prevented the meeting.

"However distant and transient will be the view I can expect to have of this Prince, I cannot resist the desire I have to see him. I propose visiting the camp he is forming near the ground of the battle of Colin next week, and I shall go from thence to Vienna, which place I shall leave about the last week of September, and hope to reach England by way of the Rhine and French Flanders, in October.

"I take the liberty to mention my route in order to introduce my most humble offers of service in case I

can be made useful, in the course of my progress, to Government or to your Lordship.

"I have the honour to be,

"With the most profound respect, attachment,

"and sense of obligation,

"Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

"JOHN BURGOYNE.

"DRESDEN, 21st August, 1766."

From COLONEL BURGOYNE to COLONEL ELLYOTT.¹

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE BOHEMIAN ARMY AT TEUTCHBROD,
"9th September, 1766.

"DEAR SIR,—The situation in which I found your son at Brunswick was so satisfactory to the interest I take in your happiness, that I determined to give myself the pleasure of writing to you upon that subject; but I deferred my letter in hopes of being able to add some accounts that might be entertaining to you, relative to the objects of my journey.

"I had the good fortune to reach Brunswick just in time to deliver your paquets before Mr. Ellyott began his progress with his governor and some of his companions, during the recess of the academy, of which I dare say he has informed you. I saw enough of him in the few hours he could spare me, to make me heartily regret the loss of his company; and my opinion of him was confirmed by what I heard from the Duke of Brunswick, who is well informed of everything that passes at the academy, and from many others whose judgment in matters of education I thought good. I am able to assure you, sir, without deviating from the sincerity of real friendship, that your young Royal Dragoon is the distinguished example of the academy, both in diligence and in talents to make diligence of good effect. If he

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¹ The name is variously spelt throughout their correspondence.

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should fail your expectation in any article, the fault will be in the master and not in the pupil. There is one branch among the multiplicity of his applications wherein I could wish him better assisted ; I am afraid neither the mounting of the *manège* nor the master is equal to the rest of the establishment of the academy. The other masters are of the kind that you would wish them ; those in particular who teach French and mathematics are excellent. I shall lengthen this account no further than to add that even in the short conversation I had with Mr. Ellyott, his morals, his goodness of heart, and his filial duty and affection were discernible in a degree that charmed me, and that gave a very solid foundation to my friendship for him.

“Since I left Brunswick I have had the most agreeable progress imaginable. Every step I have taken has been to a soldier classic ground, and I have wandered over it with enthusiasm. I have had the good fortune to go over many of the great scenes with very intelligent officers who were present in the actions ; I have been assisted with the best plans, and have conversed with most of the principal actors on both sides. I stayed at Berlin long enough to see the best of the Prussian army, and made some stop at Dresden, from whence I made excursions to the many different camps of the King of Prussia, Prince Henry, and Marshal Daun, in that neighbourhood, and afterwards passed by Maxen and Pirna to Aussig ; I passed some days in those mountains, tracing with extreme amusement the positions and marches of both armies during different periods of the late war, till I came to the ground of Lowositz, from whence I went to Prague, and from thence to the ground of Colin. Upon coming to this neighbourhood, I found the Emperor’s prohibition of all foreign officers, and

even of those of his own generals who were not on duty, was put rigidly in execution. To ask leave that had been refused to men of the first rank was in vain; but by a little intrigue, a good deal of perseverance, and perhaps more assurance than I ought to boast of, I have succeeded to be present incognito at the practice of the principal manœuvres. The Bohemian army consists of thirty thousand men; the Moravian army which is at Iglau, a day's march from hence, consists of about twenty-five thousand. The Emperor divides his time between the two. Marshal Lacy commands under his I. M., but the manœuvres are planned by General Loudoun, whom the King of Prussia has done the honour to couple with his brother Prince Henry in estimation of military abilities, and declares them the only generals who never made a fault in the course of the last war. The manœuvres are calculated to show the Emperor all the great parts of war, and are executed with a precision hardly to be conceived. The infantry exceed everything I have seen in every branch of their business; the cavalry are very rapid, but I think them short of perfection in many articles; the general officers appear to me very knowing. My paper does not suffer me to enlarge, but I shall with great happiness have the honour to communicate to you all I can observe here at my return. In the meantime I will request you not to mention having heard from me, as I have not yet wrote to certain men at home who might possibly think I neglected them.

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"I have the honour to be, with great respect,

"Dear Sir,

"Your most obedient servant,

"J. BURGOYNE."

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The first results of Burgoyne's studies and researches on the Continent are summed up in the following paper, which, even after the lapse of a century, cannot fail to prove of interest to the student of military history :—

OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS UPON THE PRESENT
MILITARY STATE OF PRUSSIA, AUSTRIA, AND
FRANCE.

(Written in the Year 1766.)

PRUSSIA.

“To maintain a numerous army has long been the great object of policy in the house of Brandenburg. The establishment for peace in the late reign amounted to a hundred thousand men; and a foundation was then laid for the discipline which has since rendered the Prussian arms the most formidable in Europe.

“The acquisition of Silesia, and the powers of uncommon genius, furnished the present king with resources to double the numbers; and his early experience in war enabled him to strengthen and enlarge whatever was weak or insufficient in his father's institutions. He continues to superintend every branch of the service, and by his presence and unremitting attention invigorates and supports a system which can hardly be any longer improved.

“The Prussian exercise is more talked of than understood. The management of arms which is chiefly meant by the term *exercise* in common conversation, is now reduced (one short motion of compliment excepted) to loading and firing: a battalion fires with cartridge nine times in two minutes. The Prussian exercise in the larger and more proper signification, comprehending all evolutions that battalions or squadrons can perform,

is well worthy reflection. The Prussian method of manœuvring is founded upon a few general, plain principles. The art and beauty of it consist in making the utmost simplicity in the movement of small parts effect the finest and most complicated movements of great bodies. The highest conceptions of the King of Prussia's mind can be instantly executed by the most stupid part of mankind. The constant daily labour of the Prussian parade is applied only to acquire the management of the ramrod and the military step ; by the one quickness of loading is effected, and all movement depends upon the other. The cavalry does not make a figure equal to the infantry ; it is not highly mounted nor well appointed ; neither is it trained upon the excellent principle which makes the infantry so fine, of forming the small parts separately and perfectly, and joining them by degrees before the whole machine is put in motion. It is not that the defects in the composition and in the management of it are unknown, but the necessary economy interferes : this branch of the establishment could not be rendered perfect according to its present numbers without a great augmentation of expense, or incroaching upon the other services. Nevertheless the king, whose eye will not be satisfied with mediocrity in any part of his troops, requires extraordinary velocity in the movements of his cavalry, for which neither men nor horses being duly prepared, a day of exercise sometimes produces as much mischief as a slight action.

“The Prussian cavalry of the line seldom distinguished themselves in the late war, their spirit was often questioned, and whole corps were sometimes disgraced. The reason is plain ; they wanted the mechanical valour of the infantry resulting from order,

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regularity, and subordination. The hussars and light troops succeeded better, because the same want was in their enemies, joined to inferiority in composition and in numbers. These regiments continue to be better in their kind than the heavy-armed ; they are more easily mounted, are sustained at a less expense, and are more the object of the king's attention.

"The Prussian Artillery is formed upon a great scale, exercised with the utmost assiduity, and provided with every utensil and store necessary for immediate and active service. Horses sufficient for the whole train are marked and registered, and distributed among the peasants, who are allowed the use of them upon condition that they are well foraged and are always forthcoming. Inspections are made occasionally, and in case of a horse suffering by want of care, the peasant is obliged to make him good. By these means agriculture is assisted, and this numerous and expensive body maintained in the best order for draught work without trouble or cost to the state.

"In the dress and outward appearance of the Prussian troops there are many absurdities ; they may be pronounced such without arrogance, if they are considered as introduced not by error, but by design, to amuse and mislead the observations of strangers, a supposition the more probable because they do not prejudice nor interfere with the essentials of their system, and may be altered or laid aside at pleasure. It is not so with those who take the change. They adopt the fopperies as the essentials, and make everything give way to them. Thus while the Prussians keep within themselves the most judicious regulations of economy, and the finest discoveries and improvements in tactics, all the minutiae of their service are dispersed through the world, and a

thousand practices are introduced under the sanction of their parade, that are frivolous, whimsical, and inconvenient.

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"The excellence of the Prussian troops appears the more extraordinary when we consider the disadvantages attending them unknown to other states. The ranks are filled up, perhaps more than a third part, with strangers, deserters, prisoners and enemies, of various countries, languages, and religions. They cannot therefore be actuated by any of the great moving principles which usually cause extraordinary superiority in armies ; they have neither national spirit nor attachment to their prince, nor enthusiasm, nor hopes of fortune, nor even prospect of comfortable old age to inspire them.

"In an army thus composed it is wisdom and sound policy to sink and degrade all intellectual faculties, and to reduce the man as nearly as possible to mere machinery, and indeed as nature has formed the bulk of the King of Prussia's native subjects, that task is not very difficult. But it is impossible to close this observation without touching upon the mistake of those who prefer this plan, when the disposition of their country offers the best groundwork of national character or publick spirit. The King of Prussia deprived of such principles to work upon, turns his defects to advantage, and substitutes a species of discipline wherein the mind has no concern ; many of his disciples suppose his necessity to be his choice, and destroy a great, solid, natural foundation to build upon one merely artificial.

"The first principle of the Prussian system is subordination, and the first maxim 'not to reason, but to obey.' The effects of these are attention, alertness, precision, and every executive quality in the officers, which assisted by the constant exercise of the soldiers upon the soundest

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principles of tactics, enable the troops to practise with wonderful ease and exactness, manœuvres that others hardly admit in theory ; from these at the same time may in part be accounted for a striking observation, that the vigour of the army is in the subalterns and non-commissioned officers, who are undoubtedly the best in the world : it seems to decline as the ranks ascend, and as other qualifications than those of mere execution become requisite.

“Most of the generals who eminently possessed the great parts of their profession, perished in the war, or are worn out by the fatigue of it, or have sought occasions to retire ; the greatest part of the present set have recommended themselves by their assiduity upon the parade, and are men of very confined education. The severity with which command is carried ; a long attention to trivial duties ; the smallness of pay in the lower ranks ; the œconomy of the table imposed upon the higher ; the want of the French language, and many other causes which prevent the intercourse officers of other countries enjoy with superiors and strangers, concur to keep the mind contracted ; and Prussian officers, by length of time and experience, only become more expert artificers to prepare and sharpen a fine weapon, diligent and proud to put it into the hands of their master in the most perfect order, awkward and ignorant if compelled to employ it themselves.

“The history of the late war will justify the assertion, that the Prussian school, excellent as it is to form men for executive parts, does not succeed better than others to form men of conduct. Set aside princes and foreigners, who drew their instruction apart, generals of a high form will not appear to exceed the number of extraordinary natural geniuses, which in a certain space of time, and in

a certain portion of people, providence bestows on every country, and they break forth with a light that no disadvantages of situation or of education can overwhelm or darken.

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“ If this survey of the Prussian army be just, it will be found, after giving all possible credit to the discipline and the exercise, that its most formidable powers exist in the king, or in his brother Prince Henry. All the energy of action and of expedient is in them, and whenever they fail, and the direction of that stupendous machine falls to princes of the common cast, it must soon appear how intimately the principles of decline are blended and interwoven with its apparent strength. The greatest of these, and indeed the parent of all the rest, is present to the mind through every observation, viz : the stretch and overgrowth of the military establishment comparative to the resources of the State. The difficulties of recruiting alluded to above, are not to be described. Not only every species of decoy and cajolement, but sometimes violence is employed to draw men from other countries. Hence the evil of desertion, which in spite of every precaution the genius of man can devise, is supposed to amount in time of peace to nearly a fifth of the army every year. In war it is much more considerable. The army is more harassed with precautionary guards against their own soldiers, than against the enemy ; and after an unsuccessful action, the number missing usually trebles the number to be accounted for by death or capture.

“ The military chest is not more easily supplied from natural pecuniary strength than the corps from natural population ; yet the readiness of the troops, and all other stores would be useless without an ample provision there. The most grievous burthens are imposed upon the people,

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the most extraordinary efforts of financiers are tried for this purpose. Hence a languor of industry and manufacture, general murmur, dejection and depopulation. The army is recruited by stratagem, and paid by oppression.

“The designs of the king are not within the fathom of common conjecture, nor is his character to be attempted upon common observation. He is jealous of prying eyes in all his employments. If he means to manœuvre ten thousand men in private, he shuts up a country as effectually as his palace ; at Sans-Souci, his retirement is so strict, that sometimes for a month together he is seen only by his *valet de chambre*.

“There may possibly be more causes for these seclusions than mere love of solitude or application to business ; perhaps they sometimes cover secret excursions, and his majesty may be at some hundred leagues distance, when at Berlin they suppose him in his cabinet ; perhaps long-continued intense efforts of the brain, joined to a natural violence of temper, throw him into a state which he may wish to conceal.

“Those who would draw probable plans from his situation might consider his coffers filling with the most rapacious solicitude, which passes over all propriety, all principle of common policy, all suggestions of benevolence. They might observe magazines formed on the Elbe, the troops compleat in camp equipage, the artillery furnish'd, and every circumstance in readiness to take the field with an hundred and sixty thousand men without one day's note of preparation to his neighbours ; on the other hand, they might reflect that if the king's plan was merely to secure his defence, he could not more effectually awe his enemies than by a manifestation of his powers to attack : that conscious of the difficulties attending his pecuniary measures, diffident of his suc-

cessor's talents, or desirous from real good will or political prudence, to save a new monarch from odium, he may wish during the remainder of his life and of his abilities to collect and establish a strength of his own creation equal to a long series of exigencies.

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AUSTRIA.

"The emperor's army shows all the natural advantages the Prussians want ; the sources of men and money are great and natural ; the officers have liberality, the soldiers have national spirit ; there is sufficiency and excellence in every part of the basis ; it is the superstructure alone which has hitherto been defective ; the military strength of the court of Vienna has been kept depressed by deficiency of abilities in the department of finances, mismanaged pomp, a general spirit of profusion, and want of a warlike prince ; the troops have been ill paid, ill appointed, and ill disciplined ; the military plans have been unwisely concerted in the cabinet, and the commands injudiciously conferred in the field ; yet with all these disadvantages, such is the force of native zeal and good will, the Austrian troops in the course of the late war were sometimes victorious, always respectable.

"The present emperor appears to be of a disposition to change the scene, and of a capacity to draw out and employ all the latent vigour of the state. This young monarch¹ has so much reserve in his temper, that those who approach his person the nearest, may perhaps be at a loss to develop his character truly. That he has talents and application is manifest to the most distant observation ; and a speculatist would perhaps remark, that his talents are of the kind which usually spring from

¹ Joseph II., who succeeded to the throne in 1765.

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ambition, and are found chiefly to predominate, and to be cherished, in minds occupied in deep designs, and capable of the most determined perseverance.

"It is well known that the object upon which the Emperor is most intent as a ground-work for all his plans, is a reformation of economy in every branch of government. He began with the attendance upon his person; all the walking furniture of his court is dismissed, and the only splendour retained is military, viz. : the imperial guard, composed of gentlemen who have the rank of lieutenants, and the noble Hungarian guard, mounted and equipped as hussars for the escorts of the royal family. In the first of these corps, a scheme has taken place by which the greater part of the expense will be saved; the gentlemen are appointed lieutenants in regiments as vacancies happen, from whence they draw their pay, continuing the duty in the corps of guards. It is true those regiments become deficient of an officer for duty, but as they are to consist of four battalions, one of which will be always in garrison, that deficiency will not be felt. The Hungarian guard is also very magnificent but not the less martial, and there seems only to want the concurrence of the Empress Queen¹ to give to the court of Vienna as military an appearance as that of Berlin.

"The other reforms the emperor has made in every department intrusted to his absolute control, have been so minute and rigid, that some people have supposed them directed rather by avaricious passion than by policy; but the general tenor of his conduct will not justify such an imputation. He seems, indeed, intent upon establishing the greatest military power in Europe, and for that purpose to explore every source of revenue, and jeal-

¹ Maria Theresa.

ously to lead each separate product undiverted to one great channel ; but when collected, to let the current flow with strong and extensive operation to every branch of the establishment.

“ It might be curious for those who would trace the distinction between political frugality and real avarice in rearing and guiding military institutions, to compare the conduct of the emperor with that of the present minister of Portugal,¹ upon a supposition that they are actuated by those different motives.

“ The plans of both are to augment, to new model, and to perpetuate an army. Their ideas of publick savings to effect those purposes are also alike, extensive over the whole mass of government, and pervading its minutest parts ; but if these sentiments of their characters are just, the one to the most parsimonious œconomy in the parts that will bear it, will join a liberal appropriation of funds to the parts that want it, particularly the two most expensive, a great train of artillery, and a well-composed body of cavalry. The other, overcome by his ruling passion, will be found to counteract his own purposes ; and while he broods over the hoards of the state with the gratification of a private miser, the plans of one of the greatest military geniuses of the age will starve at the vitals.

“ There are no less than three hundred and thirty-eight general officers in the imperial army. It must be confessed this class is not without the failings we see in other services : some are superannuated ; others owe their preferment (and have no other pretensions to it) to family rank and court intrigue ; many have risen by gradual seniority without faults, and without merits, whom it would be unjust to put by, yet whom the state can

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¹ The Marquis de Pombal.

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never employ for great purposes. After all these deductions, many remain fit to form and to conduct great armies and great enterprises: men of solid knowledge and much experience, instructed by a vicissitude of recent events, by errors of their own, and the abilities of their enemies.

"Among these, Field-Marshal Lacy has distinguished himself, a man of detail and precision; ingenious, resolute, and indefatigable. He is charged at present, and seems to be chosen with great judgment for that employment, with the superintending of the whole reform in appointment, exercise and discipline. Sometimes men of this cast are not so excellent in the conduct of the field as in that of parade; should this be the case, the Austrians possess a treasure in General Loudon.

"No man's abilities can have a more honourable testimony than the king of Prussia gives him in classing him with Prince Henry, and declaring them the only two generals he has known who never made a fault.

"In taking a view of the rest of the general officers in the Austrian service many of the most distinguished characters will be found among men of Irish extraction; and in the lower ranks the army swarms with the offspring of the best Roman Catholic families of that kingdom—high-spirited, intrepid, nervous youth, retaining a hankering desire after their own country, feeling themselves worthy of it, and possessing a thousand qualities to make the policy regretted which drives them from it.

"It may not be improper to observe here that every Roman Catholic service in Europe abounds with this race, full of the same spirit and of the same passions; and should means be found in future times of exigency to open a door without danger to the state to receive

these emigrants into British pay, for any destination and upon any terms reconcileable to their religion and honour, those who have conversed most with them abroad will not hesitate to foretell that they will flock to your standard, and bring home a stock of military acquirements highly desirable to any power. They are like robust plants that are rather improved than impaired by an early change of situation ; under cautious management they might become an ornament and a strength to their native soil, and would leave a vacancy where they were removed, not easily to be filled up.

“The artillery and the infantry have employed the most time since the emperor's accession ; the former was put upon a very fine footing in respect to its œconomy some time before by Prince Lichtenstein who is at the head of it. He formed the scheme of taking into the hands of government the exclusive privilege of making and vending gunpowder ; and the extent of the dominions and the general passion for the chase make the consumption of that article so great that not only the current service of the artillery is supported, but founderies and stores are yearly supplied by it.

“The arsenal at Vienna is not shown to strangers without particular leave, and there is yet more jealousy in producing anything in it that is new. Of this nature are some pieces of a late construction which they call cannon for cavalry ; they are six-pounders, with a carriage extraordinarily long and the wheels low ; it is pretended that they will cross ditches, or pass the most uneven ground without overturning.

“The plan for the infantry is that each regiment shall consist of four battalions, each battalion shall consist of six companies of fuzileers, and one company of grenadiers, each company of an hundred and fourteen men,

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non-commissioned officers and drummers included. In time of service the fourth battalion of each regiment is to supply the garrisons, and at the same time to serve as a nursery of recruits and a deposit of convalescents. Officers who are infirm or who are uninstructed in their duty, are thrown into this battalion.

“Considerable changes are making in the clothing and appointment of the infantry. They have adopted a cap, in the place of a hat, something after the idea of Marshal Saxe. Its use is to let down and cover the ears and neck in inclement weather. It is under consideration to substitute a jacket instead of a coat with light cloak, which is to be carried when not worn rolled upon the top of the knapsack. They make use at present of the Prussian gaiter made of soft, black, woollen cloth, but it is proposed to try the Hungarian trowser and a half boot without a stocking: whatever contrivances may at last take place, the object of contemplation in every circumstance of the clothing is to unite as much as possible, lightness, warmth, and ease.

“In the exercise of arms and the military step, the Austrians differ but little from the Prussians; they are not yet arrived at the extraordinary steadiness of the latter under arms, but cannot fail of soon attaining it, with the advantage of seeing their ends compassed with good will and little severity. They are likewise short of their model in some circumstances of discipline, but are making expeditious progress to surpass it, inasmuch as zeal, emulation, and honour, with equal subordination, will out-go any diligence arising from dread of punishment or other slavish principle.

“Altho’ the cavalry has not been much worked upon in publick, no time has been lost in laying the ground plot for raising it upon a new model. Great studs are

established in Bohemia and Hungary, furnished with stallions and mares from all countries at the Emperor's expense in order to breed horses for the army. These studs are carefully superintended, the different breeds and crosses are tried, and those will be multiplied which appear best adapted to the climate and soil, and to the use they are intended for ; by these means there is reason to expect the emperor will not only in a few years preserve within his country large sums, which have hitherto gone out of it for the remount, but he will also possess the best cavalry upon the continent. He already is supplied from the kingdom of Hungary and the frontiers of Turkey with an excellent race for mounting hussars and light troops. It is intended that each regiment of horse shall consist of a thousand, divided into seven squadrons with one captain, one captain-lieutenant, two lieutenants, two second lieutenants, and one standard-bearer to each squadron. They will preserve in their equipment their present cuirass, backpiece and helmet, and will be armed with a carbine, pistols and long sword.

The regiments of dragoons and hussars will likewise consist of a thousand each, and be armed as at present, except that part of each squadron are to have the musqueton. These pieces are of a singular construction, they are one foot nine inches and-a-half in the barrel, the barrel enlarges gradually towards the mouth, which is flattened in order to scatter the balls horizontally. The piece weighs seven pounds, and carries as many pistol balls as a common blunderbuss.

"The emperor's army consists at present of fifty-eight regiments of infantry, of four battalions each ; eighteen regiments of cavalry of seven squadrons each ; thirteen regiments of dragoons, and twelve of hussars of the same numbers ; a very great train of artillery, and a consider-

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able corps of engineers. There is besides a great number of Sclavonians, Croats, and other irregulars always ready, but never paid or exercised except when employed.

“The views of the house of Austria may not perhaps be so difficult to penetrate as are those of the king of Prussia. The recovery of Silesia is at the heart of every individual in the Austrian dominions, and they will be ready at all times to sacrifice blood or fortune in that cause. Perhaps advancement in age, experience in misfortune, and growing habits of devotion may have overcome at present in the mind of the empress-queen the natural ambition of her house, and the ardour with which her sex usually pursue personal resentment; and as affairs are now circumstanced, she may wish to see the evening of a troubled life pass undisturbed. But should the death of the king of Prussia, or his incapacity to act, or any change in the politicks of Europe present a favourable occasion, it is not to be supposed a young emperor full of martial fire will leave the sword undrawn, or suffer the general fervency and wish of his subjects to subside; probably in such circumstances the empress would resume her wonted disposition, but should she not, war will be popular, and notwithstanding the power of the purse and of civil government, the emperor, supported by popularity, and at the head of perhaps two hundred thousand troops, can be restrained by nothing but filial piety and decorum, from forcing her concurrence. This prince, like Hannibal, imbibed enmity in his cradle. In the loss of Silesia he has been taught to consider the rights of his family violated, their honour injured, their revenues usurped, and he is urged to war by every motive that can influence an heroick or a selfish disposition. When we add the reflection how much more prone youth is to precipitancy than to sloth, it will seem more

probable that occasions will be anticipated than let slip, to try the new arms of the Austrian troops, and that it is impossible under any supposition that the peace between Austria and Prussia can be permanent.

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FRANCE.

"The military state of France is too well known to make a detail of it pertinent upon the present occasion, neither can any intelligence of the measures of that power, for the improvement of their military, be wanting to the ministers of Great Britain. Such few reflections, therefore, will be only mentioned as peculiarly strike a soldier's mind, relative to the motive, the progress, and the probable success of those measures.

"France has always looked with an eye of pride on her military powers, the apparent superiority derived from the population of the country, and the martial turn of the nobility has made her kings ambitious, and her councils troublesome and dangerous to Europe. Nevertheless, the greatest armies France has brought into the field have generally disappointed expectation ; they have mouldered away without action, they have been defeated in their purposes by intestine dissension and personal pique, and they have frequently lost a victory they had in their hands by mistaken, rash, or unpunctual execution of orders. The want of subordination and discipline has long been supposed the cause of all their misfortunes.

"The present minister,¹ now labouring to remedy these defects, is a man of lively talents and sanguine temper—vigilant, secret, ambitious, enterprising ; with activity often resembling precipitancy, and perseverance that may sometimes be termed obstinacy ; actuated by national

¹ The Duc de Choiseul.

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and by private pride, and feeling more sorely the loss of honour in the late war, than the expense of blood, of treasure, or of dominion.

“The projects of such a minister will more frequently owe their success to vigorous execution than to nice discernment ; and this idea may be applied to the present occasion. It might appear to minds of a speculative and cautious turn that the French character would bear the old principles of glory and duty to be wound up to a height that would answer the purposes of the strictest disciplinarians ; or that if an entire new system, whose characteristick is severity, was found absolutely necessary, the alteration should be effected by degrees and the design disguised and assisted by all the colour and appearance of the old rooted doctrine. It would occur to those reasoners, that to tear up a tree in order to raise one of another species in its place is inconvenient, tedious, and dangerous ; but that by a skilful introduction of new powers, nature might be led to an alteration without risk or violence—the antient stock loses its original properties in the product of the graft—it shoots imperceptibly into a change—

‘*Miraturque novas frondes et non sua poma.*’

The more violent measure is adopted in France, and the Prussian severity of command together with the free use of the stick, is without preparation established among men of impatient spirits habituated to all the prejudices of punctilious honor, and even in the lowest class, regarding a blow as an irreparable disgrace. The effects which might have been expected are come to pass. The allurements of novelty, the confidence of youthful minds, and the operation of reward and punishment from the court, have gained to this system some real and

many affected partizans ; especially among the young nobility at the head of regiments ; among the more experienced and advanced it has to combat not only the prejudices, but the judgment of age ; and among the common soldiers, it is received with repugnance that causes at present an incredible desertion.¹ Upon the whole, the progress of this system, driven by authority and checked by ill-will, presents to the mind the image of a ship in full sail with a beam across her head ; it carries all the show of speed with a concealed impediment to counteract it. Nevertheless it would be rash to pronounce that the zeal of a warm, industrious, determined, absolute minister will not overcome all obstacles, if life and a duration of power give him time ; but the attempt is so far bold and hazardous, that should it fail, the affairs of the army will probably be in worse condition than they were before it was made, as the relapse is usually more desperate than the original disease.

“ Besides the general reformation of discipline which regards the whole army, the ministry is particularly intent upon the improvement of the cavalry, a branch of the military now rising into general estimation upon the experience of the late war from a state of dormancy into which it had been thrown by some modern generals who neither understood to prepare nor to use it.

“ The prospect of success in this endeavour is neither speculative nor hypothetical ; it is demonstrably clear that the French are not only at more expense and pains, but are also more advanced than any power in Europe in training their cavalry. The superior schools are under direction of very able men, and are attended with uncommon assiduity. Detachments from every regiment are perfected there, and inferior schools are established

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¹ See *ante*, page 16, *et seq.*

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in every regimental quarter; thus the whole body working upon the same principles, when a number of regiments assemble they are not only uniform in their exercise and manœuvre, but any backwardness in the progress of their improvement is immediately discernible; whereas when latitude is allowed in the execution of any circumstance, idleness and inability are often covered, and the inferiority of one corps to another passes only as a difference of practice.

“In contemplating this extraordinary application to the cavalry, it strikes a soldier that there is something more in the minister's mind upon that subject than the mere idea of general military improvement.

“This species of arms is especially important for some kinds of invasive war, where success depends upon rapid progress; where sustenance is to be acquired by keeping all small parties of the enemy aloof, and by embracing and keeping in awe a large circuit of country; where intelligence is difficult to be obtained, and where a formidable opposition is to be expected from arms of the same nature.

“Cavalry, it is true, may also be peculiarly useful where so great an extent of coast as that from Bayonne to Dunkirk is exposed to a superior naval power, and where opportunities might happen for a small debarkation to submit the space of many leagues to contribution or devastation before a body of infantry could arrive to check it; but the known former intention of invading these kingdoms, the contrivances absolutely brought to perfection for the conveyance of cavalry, and the enterprising disposition of the minister are all circumstances rather to confirm the persuasion, that however necessary he may find it at present to preserve the peace at any rate, however distant may be the period

requisite to ripen his projects, yet that he has that period in expectation, to open an offensive war in Great Britain or Ireland.

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“In the meantime it is for the contemplation of the experienced and the able in the last-mentioned branch of arms, how far science and labour will operate upon bad materials. It is with exultation a Briton observes, that our breed of horses is not only superior to any the French have, but to any they can have, unless they draw them from our stock. It is with the same sentiment he reflects that the king possesses in his service very many distinguished cavalry officers, and there only wants that some inconveniences be removed which constrain and keep back the service, and perhaps some regulations made to keep the price of horses within the compass of regimental funds, to enable the cavalry of Great Britain not only to retain its present superiority, but to rise far beyond any strength it has yet shewn.

“Perhaps it may not be too digressive to observe here that tho’ the dragoons and light troops of most of the States upon the Continent find a remount at home, or draw it at a moderate expense from Poland, it cannot properly be said that there are more than three species of cavalry of the line, or what is usually termed heavy armed cavalry, in Europe, viz. : the English, the Spanish, and the Portuguese, for they are from the same stock ; and the Holstein or North German, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and a few other neighbouring States, which have sufficiency for their own remount within themselves, need no distinction, because their climate, their soil, and their intercourse have rendered their breed precisely the same. France, Austria, Prussia, and even Russia, if I am rightly informed, draw their large horses at a vast expense from Holstein and the adjacent countries, and

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consequently between those powers, numbers alone make the superiority in the field. Circumstances will be changed if the emperor succeeds by his studs to form a superior breed, and if France profits as expected by her labours to establish an artificial superiority in the science of horsemanship. Circumstances will be more changed if England permits the exportation of stallions and mares.

"All that remains is to collect these scattered observations into one general view; it will thereby appear that the Continent is in arms, or at least intently occupied either in precautionary or hostile preparations.

"May the wisdom, the vigilance, and the spirit of his majesty's councils continue unshaken, that while the ambitious or restless States of Europe become partially formidable, England may be found universally respectable."

Accompanying this document there is a copy in Burgoyne's handwriting of a correspondence between Frederick the Great and his General, La Motte Fouquet, endorsed, "Of great curiosity and value—the more so if they have never been published, of which circumstance I am ignorant."

The essay by the king, which forms the subject of this correspondence, had not then, but has since been, published, and will be found included in "*Les Œuvres Militaires de Frederic II.*," published in Berlin in 1861, and possibly in earlier editions of his works. The accompanying letters, however, do not appear in print; and as the essay is little known, and the whole subject is treated in a very interesting manner, the papers as preserved by Burgoyne are given in the appendix.¹

¹ Appendix A.

The following is Lord Chatham's acknowledgment of Burgoyne's "Reflections and Observations." Considering the relative position of the two men, the terms in which his letter is couched are more than flattering, and indicate the high estimation in which Burgoyne was already held.

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From the EARL OF CHATHAM *to* COLONEL
BURGOYNE.

"MONDAY, *December 14th*, 1766.

"DEAR SIR,—I will not attempt to tell you how much pleasure and how much instruction I have received from the perusal of the Observations, &c., which you was so good to send me. It would not be less difficult for me to describe the sensations which the honour of the letter accompanying the Observations have filled me with. Allow me to offer, in one hasty line, more real acknowledgments than the longest letter could contain; and to assure you that I count the minutes while indispensable business deprives me of the pleasure of seeing you. If Wednesday morning next at eleven should suit your convenience, I shall be extremely happy in the honour of seeing you at that time.

"I am, with the truest esteem and most distinguished consideration,

"Dear Sir,

"Your most faithful,

"And most obedient, humble servant,

"CHATHAM."

The following letter affords an honourable proof of that high sense of military duty which Burgoyne dis-

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played throughout his life, and shows how firm he could be in resisting powerful political and social influence when exerted against what he believed to be the interests of the public service. The officer, whose application for the appointment of aide-de-camp to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland he so justly opposes, was a nephew of Horace Walpole, whose frequent and spiteful disparagement of Burgoyne in after life may possibly be due to this cause :

*From COLONEL BURGoyNE to LORD TOWNSHEND.*¹

"MY LORD,—An intimation of a desire from your lordship is to me a command. Inclination and respect would give it that force were your lordship's rank and power unconcerned, and I must return your lordship my most sincere acknowledgments for the attention you have honoured me with in making me a party to the favour you design Major Walpole. But while I am sensible of the motives of generosity and of kindness upon which your lordship acts towards him, I cannot help complaining aloud of the impropriety of his solicitation. The major has already thrown a year's duty upon Lieut.-Colonel Somerville, a diligent and meritorious officer, who acquiesced in his application to the king for that absence upon his promise of attendance for an equal space of time at his return ; and though he may reconcile it to his own mind to make a sinecure of the post which ought to be the most active in the army, I am sure, with the sentiments your lordship possesses towards the service, you would think me unworthy the situation I hold were I to submit without remonstrance to a slight upon my regiment, or an injustice to my other field-officer.

¹ Then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

" Could I look upon the major's military interest as concerned in this event, this opposition to his wishes, though a duty, would be painful to me ; but he must have an opinion very different from mine, both of your lordship's friendship and of the credit of a soldier, to suppose any preferment he may have in expectation would not meet him with as much readiness from your lordship and as much grace to himself, at the head of his corps, as in the function of an additional aide-de-camp.

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" If after this representation, Major Walpole thinks proper to persevere in his application, I have only to hope that he may speedily find from your lordship's patronage a rank more worthy of his attention, and that an opening may be made in my regiment for a major whose views of future preferment will rest upon a diligent discharge of a present trust.

" If I have presumed, my lord, to express myself warmly and freely upon this subject, I hope you will admit my love of sincerity as an apology ; and that you will believe me actuated by the same principle when I assure your lordship of the attachment and high respect with which

" I have the honour to be,

" Your lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

" JOHN BURGOYNE."

In 1768 the king conferred another mark of favour on Burgoyne, by appointing him to the government of Fort William, North Britain, an honourable and lucrative post then rarely held by an officer under the rank of general, and which, together with the emoluments of his other military appointments and the fortune to which

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his wife had about this time succeeded, afforded him the means of indulging his refined tastes and his love of society, not only of the fashionable and the gay by whom he was fêted, but of all who were eminent in literature and art, and among whom he was equally welcomed.

With a handsome person, a manner the charm of which neither man nor woman could, it was said, easily resist, a genial, kindly nature which drew all hearts towards him, a ready wit, a cultivated mind, and the prestige derived from his reputation as a soldier, a speaker, and a poet—many a man more highly favoured by fortune, might have envied Burgoyne his position.

He was a favourite at court. The Derby family, who had at one time resented his alliance with a member of their house, had learnt to love him, and vied in showing him kindness and in advancing his interests; high military authorities consulted him; eminent politicians courted his support, and literary men were pleased to call him one of themselves.¹

Burgoyne's youth had not been free from cares and anxiety; his later years were darkened by a great sorrow; but at this period he basked in the full sunshine of life. Happy in his home, universally popular in society, successful in his profession, rising into prominence in Parliament, all surrounding circumstances justified him in indulging in the hope of eminence in public life and of gratified ambitions in time to come.

¹ Among his friends of this time was Sir Joshua Reynolds, who had painted his picture, in 1766, and of whom Mr. Tom Taylor says in his *Life of the great Painter* :—"Burgoyne he had not only painted, but must have been in the constant habit of meeting in the Green Room of Drury Lane, at the dinners of the Thursday Night Club, at the Star and Garter, at every place of amusement where the gay, the witty, and the well-bred of London were gathered together."

On the occasion of the General Election of 1768, the Earl of Derby and the Corporation of Preston,¹—a borough under the direct influence of the great Whig peer—held opposed political opinions; the latter body professing not only high Tory principles, but being suspected of Papistical and Jacobite sympathies. They accordingly put forward Sir Peter Leicester² and Sir Frank Standish to contest the seat with Lord Derby's nominees, Colonel Burgoyne and Sir Henry Hoghton.³ Although the two latter received a very large majority of votes, the returning officers declared the Corporation candidates to be duly elected on the ground that the votes of all others than "freemen" were null and void. On petition, however, a Committee of the House of Commons again confirmed their original decision, and pronounced in favour of Burgoyne and his colleague.

This election had created intense excitement not only because of the political questions at issue, but since it involved the important question as to "whether the Earl of Derby or the Corporation of Preston was to nominate members to represent the borough in Parliament."⁴

¹ Under ancient charters the Corporation and such "freemen" as they chose to admit into their guild, claimed to possess the exclusive right to the political franchise of the borough. During the seventeenth century, however, this monopoly was called in question, when a Committee of the House of Commons decided that the right of electing members of parliament was not limited to the mayor and burgesses but extended to "all the inhabitants." This vaguely-worded decision, which actually conferred upon Preston the privilege of universal suffrage, was upheld by the House on several subsequent occasions, and the right of "all the inhabitants" to vote remained in force until the Reform Bill of 1832 defined, and in this instance restricted, the classes entitled to the franchise.

² The son of Sir John Byrne by the sole daughter and heiress of Sir Francis Leicester, whose name he had assumed in 1744. His eldest son was created Lord de Tabley.

³ Of Hoghton Tower, Lancaster; now de Hoghton.

⁴ See *History of the Parliamentary Representatives of Preston*, by W. Dobson, Preston, 1868.

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The town was crowded with armed bands and great rioting with bloodshed and destruction of property took place. "An inhabitant," writing to the *Gentleman's Magazine* (March, 1768), says:

"The contest here is attended with imminent danger. I have just escaped with many friends. The country is now up in arms, and the town is abandoned by our men. The cry is, 'Leave not a single freeman alive.' God knows where this will end. I think to-night or to-morrow will be fatal to many. This is shocking work in a civilized country."

Burgoyne was, among others, indicted for having incited his supporters to acts of violence. The trial took place in the Court of King's Bench, before Mr. Justice Yates, in April, 1769. Burgoyne admitted having gone to the poll with a loaded pistol in each hand, but urged that this was in self-defence, "the Corporation mob" having been furnished with similar weapons by the Mayor from an arsenal established at the Town Hall. He was, however, found guilty, and sentenced to a fine of £1,000; narrowly escaping the additional penalty of imprisonment.

Among those who voted for Burgoyne on this occasion was Richard Arkwright, who had recently arrived at Preston, and was engaged in putting up his first spinning jenny in a room in the Free Grammar School, which the head master had lent him for that purpose. He was at this time in such destitute circumstances that a subscription was raised to provide him with a decent suit of clothes to appear in at the poll.¹

Burgoyne continued to represent Preston until his death. Local annals have preserved an anecdote con-

¹ The incident is related in the *History of Preston*, by Baynes, 1825.

nected with his election in 1784. A party of his political opponents assembled in the bar-room of an inn, proposed playing a joke upon him, or, as they called it, "trotting the General." A woollen manufacturer of the name of James Elton accordingly pulled out a valuable watch, and giving it to Burgoyne's servant requested him to take it to his master and request him to inform them if he could tell them the time of day. Burgoyne, unable, as we all probably are, to discover the point of the joke, but seeing that a liberty was being attempted to be taken with him, placed the watch and a pair of pistols upon a tray, and desired his servant to accompany him to the persons who had despatched him upon the message. Arrived at the tap-room, he asked each of the assembled party whether he was the owner of the watch. In view of the pistols no one was found to acknowledge the ownership, whereupon Burgoyne said: "Since the watch belongs to none of you gentlemen it remains my property," then turning to his servant he presented it to him saying, "Take this watch and fob it in remembrance of the Swan Inn at Bolton." The chronicler states that Elton, whose stupid joke had thus rebounded upon himself, bore the name of Jemmy Trotter to his dying day.¹

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In one of his violent attacks upon the Duke of Grafton, Junius fell foul of Burgoyne on the subject of the Election of 1768, accusing the duke of having sold a patent place, and given the proceeds, amounting to £3,500, to Burgoyne, "to reward him, I presume, for the decency of his deportment at Preston, or to reimburse him, perhaps, for the fine of one thousand pounds, which for that very deportment the Court of King's Bench thought

¹ The story is told in the *History of Bolton-le-Moors*, by P. A. Whittle, 1856.

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proper to set upon him. It is not often that the Chief Justice and the Prime Minister are so strangely at variance in their opinions of men and things."¹

Whether or not Junius had any grounds for this charge no excuse can be offered for the insinuations conveyed in the following paragraph :—

"Perhaps the noble Colonel himself will relieve you. No man is more tender of his reputation. If any man, for example, were to accuse him of taking his hand at a gaming table, and watching with the soberest attention for a fair opportunity of engaging a drunken young nobleman at piquet, he would undoubtedly consider it an infamous aspersion upon his character, and resent it like a man of honour. Acquitting him, therefore, of drawing a regular and splendid subsistence from any unworthy practices either in his own house or elsewhere, let me ask your grace for what military merits you have been pleased to reward him with a military government? He had a regiment of dragoons which one would have imagined was at least an equivalent for any services he had performed. Besides, he is but a young officer considering his preferment, and except in his activity at Preston, not very conspicuous in his profession. But it seems the sale of a civil employment was not sufficient, and military governments which were intended for the support of worn-out veterans, must be thrown into the scale to defray the extensive bribery of a contested election."

An ungenerous allusion to these remarks having been made in the House of Commons,² Burgoyne said that "If the wretch, Junius, is now lurking here in any corner

¹ Letter xxxiv, 12th December, 1767. To the Duke of Grafton.

² On the Clive Committee, when Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General, who took a very prominent part in Lord Clive's defence, bid Burgoyne

of the House, he would tell him to his face that he was an assassin, a liar, and a coward."¹

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Burgoyne was too completely a man of fashion not to fall in with the prevalent vices of his age, and he may have been addicted to high play; but the imputation conveyed in these passages was so scandalous and so palpably unjust as to elicit a defence and a remonstrance even from the pen of one so unfriendly to him as Horace Walpole.

That Burgoyne owed his seat in Preston to Court influence is extremely improbable; for in the first place, the borough was under the influence of the Derby family; and secondly, the position which he at this time maintained in the House of Commons was too completely independent to admit the belief of his being a nominee of the Government. Although the personal obligations under which he felt himself to the king induced him generally to support the measures of the Court, he seems to have had no political sympathy with Lord North. This, indeed, he declares in a letter which he wrote to his constituents in 1779, in which, after reviewing his past parliamentary services, which he describes as "A constitutional support of the Crown, a liberal reliance upon those who conducted the public measures, but an independent claim to free opinion and free conduct on every occasion," he adds: "I had thus found myself obliged sometimes to oppose the measures of the Court, and, though I bore respect to Lord North's character, no two persons not in direct enmity could live at a

(with a direct reference to the letters of Junius) reform his own conduct before he turned reformer.

¹ It may be inferred from this that the suspected author actually was a member of the House. Among those to whom the letters of Junius were at this time attributed was Lord George Sackville; but it could hardly have been him that Burgoyne had in his eye.

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greater distance when I was asked to take American service in 1775."

Much as he valued Court favour, and knowing how severely the king resented opposition to his measures on the part of his personal friends, Burgoyne did not hesitate to vote against the ministry when he disapproved of their proceedings. Of his political independence he gave a prominent instance on the occasion of Lord North asking the House to ratify his negotiation with Spain in the affair of the Falkland Islands. A Spanish admiral had in the summer of 1770, made a descent upon Fort Egmont, forcibly expelled the small English garrison, and to prevent communication with the fleet, taken the rudder off the only British vessel in the harbour.¹ Reckoning upon the support of France, the Spanish Government justified the action of their agent, and more than six months elapsed before England succeeded in extorting a tardy and inadequate reparation, clogged with pretensions which Lord North himself had at first declared to be inadmissible. Burgoyne denounced the treaty as derogatory to the national honour, and in the course of a spirited speech,² said :

"Spain gave fifteen minutes to an officer to evacuate a garrison ; Great Britain slept four months after the insult. It has been the fashion to maintain (I have seen it in print, and I have heard it in conversation) that military men were prejudiced judges in questions of this nature. Sir, I disdain the idea, and denounce it in the name of my profession. The man who would wantonly promote bloodshed, who upon private views of advantage

¹ Captain Walsingham, in the course of this debate in the House of Commons, said that if the Spanish Admiral had attempted to remove the rudder from a ship of line, he would have thought it his duty "to knock his head off."

² "Parliamentary Reports," 13th February, 1771.

or ambition would involve Europe in war, would be a promoter of ferocity—a disgrace to his profession, to his country, and to human nature. But there are motives for which a soldier may wish for war; these are a sense of satisfaction due for an injury inflicted; a desire to make a return to our country for the honours and rewards we receive at her hands: a zeal to be the forward instrument to battle for the honour of the Crown, and the rights of the people of Great Britain.”¹

The Government measure was, however, carried, and the king writes to Lord North:

“The great majority is very creditable for the administration. The seeing Colonel Burgoyne's name on the side of the minority appears so extraordinary that I almost imagine it was a mistake.”²

When in the following year the Royal Marriage Bill was introduced, Burgoyne voted in its favour, and the king thanks Lord North for having called his attention to this fact, adding that “had he (Burgoyne) failed to do so, I should have felt myself obliged to name a new Governor for Fort William,”³ so that His Majesty thought it consistent with his duty to withdraw from an officer a reward conferred for distinguished military service, in the event of such officer presuming in his place in Parliament to oppose any political measure introduced by the ministry.

¹ In the course of the debates on this subject in the House of Lords, Lord Chatham, in moving for the production of papers, laid it down as a rule that in matters of such import, the House should never accept the word of the responsible minister.

² Donne's *North Correspondence*.

³ This was the established practice of the king, which had led to a discussion in 1765 with regard to the dismissal of General Conway and other military officers who were deprived of their employments as a penalty for having voted against the ministry in their places in Parliament. Lord Rockingham endeavoured to obtain the support of Mr. Pitt in making such

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At this time Burgoyne appears to have gained the ear of the House ; his speeches were fully reported and discussed by contemporary politicians ; and when the malpractices of the East India Company and their servants challenged the notice of Parliament, the management of this great question seems to have been spontaneously conceded to him, as a member whose knowledge of the subject, and whose capacity and influence would enable him to deal with it successfully.

It has already been stated that at an early period of his parliamentary career, Burgoyne had given much attention to Indian affairs, and some of his papers on the subject of the East India Company at that time, possess much interest, if only from the contrast they present to the existing state of things in our Eastern Empire.

The following are his thoughts on the financial condition of the Company at a time when their capital was but a little over three millions, and the price of stock stood at 160 :

"There is no rational or honest method of redeeming the East India Company from its present distress for want of money, but by getting some indulgence in point of time from their present creditors by pointing out the means of doing justice to them afterwards. This must be done by a diminution of their own expense, and by a plan of frugality in the management of their affairs both at home and abroad.

"The first step, and that which is the most immediately within the power of the proprietors, is to reduce

proceedings the subject of charges of a breach of privilege, but the great Whig statesman deprecated so extreme a course as "touching too near upon prerogative." See Albemarle's *Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham*.

For another instance of such arbitrary conduct, see the removal from his command of the Marquis of Lothian, in Chapter X.

their own dividend to six per cent. per annum, if not lower. This reduction will at the same time free them from the annual sum of £400,000 to Government, which with what they thus save of their own dividends amounts to a saving of £600,000 annually. If the cause of the evil were removed, which is a very extensive consideration, this alone would in two years free them from their present incumbrances—but every other method which has been or can be suggested, will be found upon examination fallacious and destructive for the following very plain and simple reasons :

“ 1st. It is impossible to produce anything out of nothing. The Company have no money, and therefore it is impossible they should pay any to their creditors.

“ 2nd. They have no credit, and therefore they can borrow none. This, however, is a circumstance very much in their favor, as it puts it out of their power to increase their present misfortune, which is that of being already too much in debt.

“ But of all the methods that have ever been suggested for furnishing them with ready money for present relief, that of extending their capital is the most thriftless and ill-considered. Their capital is now £3,200,000; we shall suppose that they extend it to £4,000,000. The money given in by the new subscribers for that purpose is not to be employed in any way that is profitable in trade, but is to be immediately doled out to the proprietors themselves, or to the British Treasury, or to defray expenses already villainously incurred. But these new subscribers, although they bring no new addition to the annual profits of the trade, must receive their share of them in common with the other proprietors, and that annual sum of money which being divided among the holders of £3,200,000 stock gave each of them a

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dividend of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. when divided among the holders of £4,000,000 must afford them a proportionably smaller dividend, and this not a temporary diminution, but such a one as must continue during the existence of the Company.

“But who is there in the present scarcity of money who will voluntarily engage his property in so grossly a mismanaged and bankrupt Company, and which as I have just now shown, must become more unprofitable by their entering into it? The price of stock is now about 166 per cent., and yet people who have money to lay out in stock do not choose to purchase it at that price, although they know that the whole profits of the trade and revenues are to come to them as shares of a stock of no more than £3,200,000. Were this stock increased to £4,000,000, I believe it would be difficult to find purchasers for it at the low price of 100 per cent. What a noble harvest would such a scheme produce for the Bulls and the Bears, and what a crop of ruin for those who were not perfectly in the secret! A minister who would be concerned in a business of this sort would deserve to be hanged, and I am confident that if Lord North thinks of it at all, it is from his not being at all acquainted with the ways of 'Change Alley.

“I therefore return to the proposition with which I set out, that the most profitable plan for the proprietors is to lessen their own dividends, which they may do without consulting Lord North or any projector whatsoever. That, indeed, and all other methods will be ineffectual if the rapacity of the servants abroad and the knavery of the Directors at home is not checked, instead of becoming by impunity more and more enormous.”

In another paper which he endorses as “A short account of the political conduct of the East India Com-

pany's servants," he points directly to the necessity of a constitutional check upon the action of the Company.

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"In examining the charters granted by King William III. and his successors to the company of merchants trading to the East Indies, we find amongst other privileges, those of building forts, of training soldiers, and of providing themselves with all the necessary implements for carrying on war by land and by sea. But we find, at the same time, that all those warlike powers are, with regard to their use and intention, put under the strictest limitation.

"Those charters accordingly prohibit the trading company from employing their arms, or performing any acts of hostility without *just cause*, which they fully explain to be the *repelling of invasion, reprisal of goods forcibly taken from them*, and other motives merely of defence and retaliation. No sanction is given by any of those charters to wars carried on for the acquisition of booty or territory, but on the contrary, they are carefully prohibited, and in a variety of clear and distinct terms, as if it were meant that every acquisition of that sort should be considered as an infringement of the charter and a breach of the covenant then virtually entered into between the Crown and the Company.

"But in the sealing of those charters it was not sufficiently considered that they were in themselves only pieces of dead parchment, without eyes to see transgressions, or hands to punish them; and that when certain stipulations were made with the Company, there ought to have been at the same time a constant inspection and control provided for their observance. Without such provision, all conditions in a contract are nugatory and virtually null and void."

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An outline of the machinery necessary for the exercise of an efficient State supervision is then given, and the highest testimony that can be borne to the justice and soundness of Burgoyne's views is to be found in the fact that not only the principles which he enunciates but the practical details for carrying them out were for the greater part adopted by William Pitt when, in 1784, he brought in the bill which led to the creation of the Board of Control.

It is not a little to Burgoyne's honour that he was among the very first to raise his voice against the rapacity and unscrupulous proceedings of the founders of our Indian Empire, and that it should have devolved upon him to bring under the notice of Parliament the corruption and breach of faith which cast so dark a slur upon the brilliant career of Lord Clive.

On the 13th of April, 1772, he accordingly moved for a Select Committee to enquire into the affairs of the East India Company ; his speech on the occasion was as follows :—

“MR. SPEAKER,—I rise in consequence of the notice I gave the House, to make motion of as serious importance as I believe ever came under your consideration, to the interest and the honour of the nation ; to its interest, inasmuch as the influx of wealth from India makes a vital part of our existence ; to its honour, inasmuch as the most atrocious abuses that ever stained the name of civil Government, call for redress.

“For the substance of this motion I shall make no apology. I believe it to be reasonable, I know it to be parliamentary. If any excuse be necessary for bringing it so late in the session, it is due from others, to whose situations, had they thought it expedient, it more naturally fell to take the lead. For my insufficiency to treat

it as it deserves, to state this great subject with that arrangement of matter, and that propriety of argument and inference which could best justify the undertaking, I require more apology than words can express for the patience of the House under these inabilities, I shall want more than their candour; I shall want their favour, their indulgence, I might almost say their prejudice.

“As the first step, and to remove at least any unfavourable impressions that may be conceived of me, I shall beg leave to state to the House the motives and principles upon which I act.

“At the opening of the session, I heard with satisfaction and with gratitude the attention of Parliament directed from the throne to this great object. As the session advanced, I came every day to the house with expectation of seeing some data established, some premises laid for framing a great extensive political arrangement for India, coinciding and harmonizing, as far as might be, with the principles and spirit of this constitution, dispensing the blessings of well-regulated government in those remote regions, and wealth and prosperity in Great Britain. I never conceived it possible that Parliament could be called upon by any men whatever, to apply a remedy without any information of the disease—to pass an Act upon divination—to give upon trust a vote of justice and regulation to the India directors as we give a vote of credit to the Crown, leaving them the judges of the exigency and the application.

“It would be disorderly now to enter into a discussion, or to give a prejudgment upon the Bill which is to be presented in the course of this day; but I will say that any Bill calculated upon the present narrow and rotten system of Indian Government must be probably a

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destructive measure, and at best a mere temporary expedient—a poor, paltry, wretched palliative.

' It will but skim and film the ulcerous part,
While foul corruption, mining all beneath,
Infects unseen.'

" Therefore, sir, when I heard notice given of bringing in this Bill, and nothing else proposed, I considered the proceeding with astonishment, I listened to the comments that were made upon it in public, and applied to all quarters of the House, with indignation. Sir, I do not believe those comments were founded—but I am ready to confess that I think a dread of labour, a passive submission to difficulties, a spiritless acquiescence under evils that we all know and that we all feel, are too much the characteristics and the reproach of the times. Supineness upon this occasion will confirm those disgraceful sentiments in the opinion of all Europe. We shall not only be degraded as politicians, but as men. I do not assume more feeling than others, but in considering the numberless circumstances, too apparent, I fear, to the House, that disqualify me for stepping forward, I feel one qualification to encourage me. I stand separate and clear from every concern and interest in person and property that could be supposed to warp the mind from pursuit of the great object. I think it incumbent upon me in this stage of the business to explain myself to the House upon this point, in the clearest and most strenuous terms; and I pledge my veracity, my duty to the House, my fidelity to my country, every claim of honest fame, every sentiment that in every man's mind can constitute his idea of the term honour, that I act in this motion unconnected with any man whatever, unconcerned in every interest, unintentioned of every purpose that might arise from it, other than a fair,

a free, a direct, an impartial, a temperate, but an effectual enquiry ; to present to Parliament a comprehensive view of the existence and extent of the evils under India Government ; and thereby to enable them in their deliberate wisdom, to apply an effectual remedy. I have dwelt upon this subject not only for my own sake, but for the success of the motion ; for if I can give to my conduct the fair mark and stamp of sincerity, I shall remove at least that coldness and backwardness towards the motion that might arise from suspicion of the mover.

“ Having cleared my ground thus far, I can proceed with more confidence to explain my purposes. I mean to move an enquiry into the nature, state, and condition of the India Company, and of the British affairs in India. By the first part of the motion, I mean to give powers to a committee to enquire into the constitution of the Company, into the purposes for which it was framed, and the powers with which it was invested ; I would then proceed to the management of those purposes and powers ; see where have been deviations, where there have been abuses ; where the evils have unavoidably arisen from the latent errors in the constitution, where they have flowed from the casual misconduct of servants ; and the enquiry will be thus naturally brought by the last part of the motion to a view of the present disorders, civil, military, moral, and political ; that chaos where every element and principle of government, and charters, and firmans, and the rights of conquest, and the rights of subjects, and the different functions and interests of merchants, and statesmen, and lawyers, and kings, are huddled together in one promiscuous tumult and confusion, natural to the jarring operations of powers the most discordant and incompatible. To sift and examine these several materials, many of them excellent in themselves,

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and dangerous only by being confounded, will be the only means to enable the controlling and creative power of legislature to new model and arrange them, and to give them for the future permanent regulation and direction to their proper ends.

“It would be needless and unfair to enter into a further display of the apparent state of the Company at present. Clouds and darkness rest upon some parts of it—upon others there is too much light.

“Gentlemen will be ready to ask, do I mean hostility to the Company? I disclaim all idea of hostility; I mean by an investigation of facts to discover the common danger and the common interest of the Company and the nation; to hold up the mirror of truth to the Company, wherein they may see themselves and their affairs as they are, and judge in concert also with the nation, what measures of reformation will best enable them to fulfil the trust reposed in them; for I hold every trading company, and that of India in particular, to be trustees for the State, acting upon terms beneficial to themselves.

“As to the servants, I scorn the thought of proceeding upon a vindictive principle towards any of them. I believe many of them to be men of integrity; others to have been led astray by such sorts of temptation as human nature cannot resist. The greater part of the evils will be found to be deeply rooted in the constitution which is framed to excite and give play to the vicious passions of men. I would not, at the same time, check my enquiry for fear of stumbling upon a criminal; should such crimes appear as would make it a duty in Parliament to take notice of them, chastisement will be justice not hostility. I only mean that chastisement is not the object or end of my intention. When means

can be found to make the offence impracticable for the future, example of the offender is unnecessary; therefore, Sir, let errors, or let crimes (if such there be) sleep where they can do so without infringement to our duty; with my consent, let them sleep for ever, buried beyond the search of human eye, and over-shadowed with the trophies of public services or of private virtues.

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“But, Sir, I shall perhaps be told that the object and end of my enquiry is to throw the whole affairs of the Company into the hands of the Crown, from which the death blow to the constitution is most to be apprehended. I have no such purpose. If legislature has not powers and wisdom so to model and regulate the sovereignty of the State in India, or so to delegate its powers as to prevent influence of the Crown in England, let it never be attempted. I will join issue with the gentleman who upon a former occasion asserted that India and Great Britain had better be swallowed up in the sea than liberty endangered by any exercise of undue weight given to the Crown that might make it preponderate over the other branches of the State. Though a servant of the Crown, I am not less a servant of the public: it is my confidence and my happiness that I serve a sovereign to whom I shall most effectually recommend myself by services to the public; but had it been otherwise, I trust I should have been found to bear a heart devoted to this constitution, and capable of making any sacrifice to support it. I scorn therefore the idea of acting a part upon any undue principle. Let resolutions grow out of facts,—let remedy spring from resolutions,—I only contend that if by some means sovereignty and law are not separated from trade, the words of the honourable gentleman to whom I alluded before will be a prophecy,

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and India and Great Britain will be sunk and overwhelmed never to rise again. But charters, Sir, I shall be told are sacred things,—they are so; and to touch them with the hands of the Crown, or any other single branch of the legislature would be sacrilege. Charters are sacred,—so are crowns,—so is yet more sacred the religion of the country; but when by a long series of abuses, the one is degenerated from her first beauty and simplicity to the grossest bigotry and superstition; when the other by a course of corruption, is perverted from the only principle upon which free government can exist for the good of the people,—has any wise legislature, has this legislature hesitated to apply a remedy? We sit here at this hour in the full enjoyment of our civil and religious liberties, happy examples of the powers and of the rectitude of our ancestors, in reformation and revolution. Upon this principle, therefore, and upon this alone, that an unprecedented concurrence of circumstances has produced an unprecedented exigency, would I apply the doctrine of the reformation and the revolution to the India Company's charters; and I would blend that doctrine with every consideration of equity and compensation, to satisfy the interest of the parties concerned, while it applied to the common interest and common sálvation of India and Great Britain.

“Need I urge any further excitements? The fate of a great portion of the globe, the fate of great States in which your own is involved, the distresses of fifteen millions of people, the rights of humanity are involved in this question. Good God! what a call! The native of Hindostan, born a slave,—his neck bent from the very cradle to the yoke,—by birth, by education, by climate, by religion, a patient, submissive, willing subject to Eastern despotism, first begins to feel, first shakes his

chains, for the first time complains under the pre-eminence of British tyranny!"

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He then proceeded formally to move for a Select Committee of thirty-one members, and although the Government was opposed to the enquiry, the Committee was ultimately granted without a division, and sat through the summer. The report was brought up on the 3rd May, 1773,¹ and Burgoyne in the course of a rather remarkable speech, said that "it contained the recital of crimes which it shocked human nature even to conceive," and wound up with a formal impeachment of Lord Clive for having abused his power, and betrayed the trust reposed in him in India, in having "illegally acquired the sum of £234,000, to the dishonour and detriment of the State."

The influence of the East India Company was at that time already very considerable in the House of Commons, and although the directors had now no personal feeling in favour of their agent, they were deeply interested in resisting enquiry into the conduct of their affairs. The King had too high an appreciation of the great services rendered by Lord Clive, not to view with displeasure the public exposure of his delinquencies. Clive had moreover warm and influential friends in the Cabinet, and in the House of Commons party feeling was sacrificed to the prevailing sentiments of personal sympathy or indignation.

Strong efforts were accordingly made to defeat Burgoyne's intentions, and although he succeeded in carrying

¹ In a letter to Mr. Holroyd, Gibbon, the historian, writes on the 19th May, 1773 :—"The House sat late last night; Burgoyne made several spirited motions, that the territorial acquisitions of India belonged to the State; that grants to the servants of the Company were illegal; and that there could be no true repentance without restitution."—*Gibbon's Correspondence.*

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his resolution, its effect was neutralized by a second resolution moved by Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General, and agreed to by the House, that Lord Clive had "at the same time rendered great and meritorious services to this country."

Lord Macaulay says :—"The Commons voted the major and minor of Burgoyne's syllogisms, but they shrank from drawing the logical conclusion."¹

It was perhaps, under the very peculiar circumstances of the case, a judicious compromise, and Burgoyne, to whose nature vindictiveness was unknown, was probably not displeased to find that while he had been instrumental in vindicating the national honour and good faith, he had done so without the personal sacrifice of one to whose genius and valour England was deeply indebted. He had stated that he was actuated by a sense of justice and not of hostility; that it was not so much to punish crimes as to render their perpetration impracticable in the future that he was striving; and that if crimes were discovered, he was willing that they should "sleep for ever beyond the reach of human eye, and overshadowed with the trophies of public services."

Such had indeed been the result of the enquiry, which in spite of the unpopularity which attended it, he had conducted with courage, temper, and impartiality, and with a degree of judgment and eloquence which greatly raised his reputation in the House of Commons.

¹ "Lord Clive," *Edinburgh Review*, January 1840 :—"In this well-known Essay, the great historian graphically describes the effect produced by Lord Clive's aggressive defence; and tells us how, after enumerating the temptations to which he had been exposed, and the opportunities of enriching himself which he had had, he exclaimed: "Good God! Mr. Chairman, at this moment I stand abashed at my own moderation."

CHAPTER IV.

AMERICA.

1775.

WE are now about to enter upon the most important period of Burgoyne's public life; but before proceeding to review his career in America, it will not be out of place to glance cursorily at the relations existing between England and the colonies in the beginning of this year.

The discontent created by the Acts of 1765 and 1767, under which the Imperial Parliament asserted their right to impose taxation upon our North American possessions without the assent of the people taxed, and the persistent refusal of the Government to entertain the remonstrance of the colonists, had by this time developed into a spirit of widespread and undisguised opposition to the pretensions of the mother-country.

Lord North had now been for five years at the head of the Government, and George the Third had hitherto found in his first minister a zealous and capable instrument for the exercise of his exaggerated ideas of prerogative and arbitrary rule.

Trained by his mother, and tutored by Lord Bute to hold the maintenance of his personal authority as his first and highest duty, the King had learnt to place

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implicit faith in the infallibility of his judgment upon public affairs, and to resent as disloyalty any opposition to his will on the part of his subjects.¹

Had he been as clear-sighted as he was tenacious of his dignity, he would probably have discovered that by assuming a different attitude towards America he might have strengthened rather than impaired the royal power, for the opposition of the colonists was directed, not against the King, but against the pretensions of the Imperial Parliament to supreme legislative authority over the foreign possessions of the Crown.²

This view was clearly expressed in the earlier remonstrances of the colonists, and notably in the resolutions passed in the Provincial Congress of Philadelphia in September, 1765, where, after claiming it as "the

¹ There was something ludicrous in the expression of the king's political bigotry at times, as when, in the tone of Falstaff lamenting over the degeneracy of the age, he writes to Lord North complaining of the opposition in Parliament on American affairs: "It is melancholy to find so little virtue remaining in the country."—*The North Correspondence*, by Donne.

² In speaking of the attitude of the colonists, Junius says in his celebrated letter to the King, of December 1769:—"They were ready enough to distinguish between you and your ministers. They complained of an Act of the Legislature, but traced the origin of it no higher than to the servants of the Crown. They pleased themselves with the hope that their sovereign, if not favourable to their cause, was at least impartial. The decisive personal part you took against them has effectually banished that first distinction from their minds."

But though Junius denounced the action of the Government, he in his letter lxiv of the 2nd November 1773, acknowledges that he shares in the principle on which that action was founded: the right of the British Legislature to impose taxation upon the colonies, although he deprecates the exercise of that right; and he distinctly asserts that "the general reasonings which went against that power, went directly against the whole legislative right, and that one part of it could not be yielded without a surrender of all the rest." Admitting these premisses, the action of the English Government could not, on constitutional grounds, be impugned.

inherent birthright and indubitable privilege of every British subject to be taxed only by his own consent, or that of his legal representatives, in conjunction with His Majesty or his substitute," they proceed to state that whenever a claim shall be made upon them in conformity with such rights, that is, by a demand from the King or his local representative, to the provincial congress, "it will be their indispensable duty most cheerfully and liberally to grant to His Majesty their proportion of men and money."

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In his contemptuous disregard of the just and moderate demands of his American subjects, George the Third unconsciously made himself the champion, not of the royal power and prerogative, but of the privileges of Parliament, which in other matters he would gladly have curtailed. Having once, however, assumed such an attitude, he maintained it with characteristic obstinacy and courage. Every remonstrance, every complaint, on the part of the colonies, tended to embitter his feelings towards them, while the expression of sympathy with their cause on the part of Englishmen produced in him a corresponding accession of severity and resentment.¹

While the most certain road to the King's favour was by encouraging and fostering this temper, as was done by Lord North, and at a later period by Lord George Germaine;² those who, without espousing the cause of

¹ When the municipality of London presented their "humble address" in 1775, deprecating the employment of violent measures towards the colonists, the king openly denounced their action as "encouragement to his rebellious subjects."

² The Duke of Grafton, before resigning his seals in November 1775, earnestly warned the King against the danger of coercive measures towards the colonists. His resignation led to a reconstruction of the Cabinet, and to the acceptance of office by Lord George Germaine, who was appointed American Secretary vice Lord Dartmouth, and who inverting the due

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America, opposed the policy of his Cabinet and Parliament were at once classed among his declared enemies ; and at the very time that Lord Chatham wrote : " I trust that the minds of men are more than beginning to change on this great subject so little understood, and that it will be impossible for free men in England to wish to see three millions of slaves in America,"¹ the King wrote to Lord North, " Every means of distressing America must meet with my concurrence."²

By disposition kind-hearted and humane, George the Third upon this subject seems to have allowed his entire nature to become warped and hardened ; and when we read that at one of his levées he laughingly remarked that he would " as lief fight the Bostonians as the French,"³ we are in charity impelled to ask whether we may not here find an early symptom of that taint which darkened his after-life ?

In order to justify their policy before the country, the best and most unscrupulous writers of the day were subsidized by Government to advocate their cause.⁴ Foremost among these was Samuel Johnson, who in his two pamphlets, *The Patriot* and *Taxation no*

order of things, proved as bloodthirsty in council as he had when a soldier shown himself pacific in the field.

¹ *Chatham's Correspondence*, 1774, vol. iv.

² *North Correspondence*, 1774, Donne.

³ Horace Walpole relates this in his *Last Journals*. He was not always accurate in his statements, and as doubt has been thrown upon the fact of Nero having fiddled while Rome was burning, let us hope that this story of a good-natured English king may likewise be relegated to the category of Mr. Hayward's *Mock Pearls of History*.

⁴ In the *King's Correspondence* with Lord North, edited by Mr. Donne, some curious revelations are to be found relating to the disposal of secret service money. Among other incidents mentioned is the payment of the sum of £3,250 to a notorious scurrilous writer named Bate, a clergyman, whose attacks in the *Evening Post* upon the members of the Opposition culminated in a foul libel upon the Duke of Richmond, for which he was prosecuted and imprisoned.

Tyranny, treated even the most moderate pretensions of the colonists in a tone of contemptuous superiority admirably calculated to goad a high-spirited people into rebellion. Convicts, rascals, robbers, pirates, are among the epithets he applies to those who among his American fellow-subjects dared to raise their voices against British legislation. He denies them the right of remonstrance, because "he that accepts protection stipulates obedience. We have always protected the Americans; we may therefore subject them to government." In reply to the complaint that the obnoxious taxation was an innovation to which they had not before been subjected, Johnson brutally replies: "The longer they have been spared, the better they can pay;" while their claim to share the liberty enjoyed by their fellow-subjects in Great Britain is disposed of in the following sentence:—"Liberty is to the lowest rank of every nation little more than the choice of working or starving."¹

These compositions are painfully unworthy of their author, and derogatory to his just fame. The only excuse to be offered for him is that, unlike the tribe of hirelings then engaged by government to vilify America and those who advocated its cause, he wrote according to his convictions, and out of the fulness of that deep-rooted bigotry and prejudice which too often warped his judgment.²

Warning voices against the fatal policy pursued had

¹ By way of antidote, Dr. Franklin wrote several satirical pamphlets, one of which was called *Rules how to reduce a Great Empire to a Small One*. Another purported to be an *Edict from the King of Prussia imposing Taxes upon the Inhabitants of Great Britain, as the Descendants of Emigrants from his Dominions*.

² In one of these very pamphlets, Johnson—the man who stated to Boswell as an indisputable fact that "all foreigners are fools"—remarks that "to be prejudiced is always to be weak," so blind may even a great mind be to its own defects.

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again and again been raised in Parliament, and statesmen of the character and influence of Chatham and Burke had eloquently urged the justice as well as the expediency of measures of conciliation in place of an unreasoning persistence in the maintenance of obnoxious laws. But all these efforts were defeated by an overwhelming majority in both Houses of Parliament, and were at this period but feebly supported by the country at large.

Both parties were, however, agreed upon one point and actuated, in pursuing antagonistic courses, by one motive. The King and his adherents, as well as the adherents of Chatham¹ and Burke, believed that the establishment of American independence would involve the ruin of the British Empire, to avert which the former were determined to exert the fullest military force at their disposal,² and the latter the greatest extent of concession compatible with the maintenance of imperial supremacy. As the success of the war became more hopeless, the possibility of American in-

¹ Chatham, while warmly and eloquently supporting the American cause, repeatedly expressed his strong opposition to any demand on the part of the colonists tending to independence. In a letter to Governor Carleton, dated in May 1775, he distinctly claims the subordination of the colonies to the supreme legislative authority and superintending power of the Parliament of Great Britain, and repudiates the imputation of countenancing "a wild independence in the Colonies."—See *The Chatham Correspondence*.

² Among those who justified the employment of armed force to subdue the colonists, was the humane and gentle Cowper, who in his poems so eloquently denounces the horrors of war as the greatest curse that can befall mankind. Writing in the beginning of 1782, by which time the king's fatal policy had nearly accomplished the independence of America and the humiliation of England, he says: "It appears to me that the king is bound, both by the duty he owes to himself and his people, to consider himself with respect to every part of his territories as a trustee, deriving his interest in them from God, and invested with them by divine authority for the benefit of his subjects," and therefore to subdue the rebels by the sword.

dependence came to be viewed with greater equanimity by the liberal party ; but during the earlier years of the struggle the idea of a peaceful separation as the solution of the difficulty never seems to have presented itself. Fox was perhaps in this respect the only exception among our prominent statesmen, for in December 1777, he urged that "sooner than continue this wretched war he would treat with the Americans as allies. He did not fear the consequences of their independence."

In the same year Chatham admitted that it was too late to avert the greatest evil that could befall England—the loss of her colonies,—and that the independence of America was virtually accomplished. This thought embittered his dying hour.

Although the extreme views held by the King and his ministers, and supported by their adherents of all classes, were not shared by the greater part of the intelligence of the nation, it must be admitted that at this time, and even after the outbreak of actual hostilities, many Englishmen who would have strenuously resisted and resented the least infringement of their own liberties, had but little active sympathy with the grievances of their fellow-subjects across the Atlantic.¹ America was too remote, and its population too insignificant, to enlist the sympathy of the masses in their cause; while the ruling classes, without distinction of party, looked upon our colonial possessions as a subject territory, destined to minister to the power and to contribute to the wealth of the mother-country. That England, who had forced her

¹ Lord Albemarle in his *Memoirs* of the Marquis of Rockingham takes the most favourable view of the motives of English champions of America when he says : "It was not merely their sympathy with an oppressed people that prompted the adhesion of this party to the American cause, but a deep and well-grounded conviction that if despotism were once established in America, arbitrary government would at least be attempted in the mother-country."

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will upon the most powerful States of Europe, who had lately defied France and humbled Spain, should be successfully opposed by the scattered inhabitants of a penal colony, had not then probably entered the mind of the most enlightened and far-seeing of her statesmen ; who, in urging a policy of conciliation, were actuated rather by a love of fair play and a generous leaning to the side of the weak and defenceless than by considerations of constitutional rights or by a sense of abstract justice.

Such, at least, is the impression conveyed by most of the speeches of even the most advanced anti-ministerialists of this period. "Our North American possessions," so they appear to argue, "are after all very valuable to us, and we should therefore treat the colonists with indulgence and generosity, and not exasperate them by obnoxious measures. The Imperial Parliament is no doubt supreme, and therefore justified in imposing taxation ; but rather than give offence and stop trade, why not repeal unpopular Acts, and restore the poor people to good humour ?"¹

"No," said in reply the King and his ministers ; "let us first compel them to admit our right to tax them as much as we please ; and then, if they show proper contrition for their past opposition to our will, we may perhaps, as an act of bounty, relieve them of the payment for the present."²

¹ When in February 1775, Lord Chatham moved the abrogation of the Declaratory Act, he claimed the full supremacy of the Imperial Parliament in all matters *except taxation*, a compromise which two years earlier would have been readily accepted by the colonies. Lord Shelburne entertained similar views and said that he "acknowledged the power of Parliament to be supreme, but refuted the expediency of the Act to be considered in a commercial view, regard being had to the ability of the Americans to pay this tax and likewise to the consequences likely to proceed in any event from the late violences."—*Life of Lord Shelburne*, by Lord Edward Fitzmaurice, vol. i. p. 361.

² Mr. Dunning during the debate on the Massachusetts Bill in the House

The colonists were, however, too deeply imbued with that love of liberty, for the sake of which their English forefathers had abandoned house and home, to purchase immunity from a money-payment at the cost of a principle lying at the very root of political freedom; while the contemptuous indifference shown to their feelings by the English Government, and what Horace Walpole calls "the bullying, provoking, and temporizing policy" of Lord North, tended day by day to make negotiation more difficult.¹ Up to this time their opposition had, with the exception of a few isolated acts of violence, such as the burning of a British gunboat at Providence in 1772, the destruction of tea-chests at Boston and New York, and the more harmless demonstration of burning unpopular officials in effigy, been kept so much within constitutional limits as to lead to no apprehension of overt rebellion; but the formal convocation of delegates from the States to assemble at Philadelphia in September, 1774, appeared to be a step so full of menace as to induce the home Government to strengthen their army in America, which then consisted of something over 8,000 men under General Gage.²

This step, though in itself it amounted to nothing more than a measure of ordinary precaution, was violently opposed in parliament as tending to lessen the chances of an amicable arrangement of the difficulty.

of Commons in May 1774, said that the extreme concession of the Government towards the colonies amounted to this: "Resist, and we will cut your throats—acquiesce, and we will tax you."

¹ The petition presented to Parliament by the American merchants resident in London, praying that conciliatory measures instead of armed force should be employed, was allowed "to lie upon the table."—See *Walpole's Journal*.

² Coincident with the spread of political agitation, desertion from the army had become alarmingly prevalent. In the month of August 1774, over 500 men had deserted from the garrison of Boston.

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Charles Fox said that "he could not consent to the bloody consequences of so silly a contest, about so silly an object, conducted in the silliest manner that history or observation had ever furnished an instance of, and from which we were likely to derive nothing but poverty, disgrace, defeat, and ruin."

These and other similar warnings were, however, fruitless. The King, who could not be brought to believe in the possibility of successful resistance to his will, determined to force it upon his American subjects. Military reinforcements were accordingly despatched early in 1775, which, with Major-Generals Sir William Howe,¹ Clinton,² and Burgoyne,³ reached Boston in the spring of that year, and placed themselves under the command of General Gage.⁴

During the recriminations which ensued on the failure of the Northern Campaign in 1777, the Ministry was blamed for having entrusted important commands to untried generals, from motives of personal favour or political influence; but it is certain that in the case

¹ The Honourable William Howe, M.P. for Nottingham, Brother of Admiral Howe, fourth Viscount, whom he succeeded in the title.

² Henry Clinton, a cadet of the Lincoln family, M.P. for Boroughbridge.

³ Burgoyne had been promoted to the rank of Major-General in May 1772, retaining the command of the 16th Light Dragoons.

⁴ The Honourable Thomas Gage, second son of Viscount Gage, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in America in 1764, and Governor of Massachusetts in 1774. He was relieved of his command in the autumn of 1775, and recalled to England, under pretence of being there required for purposes of consultation. He was an amiable well-meaning man of no military or administrative capacity, and of a weak character. Among other complaints made against him was that of being so completely under the influence of his wife (the daughter of a colonist, Mr. Peter Kemble, President of the Council of New Jersey) as habitually to confide to her his local projects and correspondence with the ministry, which she, it was alleged, as habitually confided to his enemies.

of Burgoyne, no such charge can be sustained, since we have the clearest evidence that he not only did not solicit the command, but that when tendered, he accepted it with regret and reluctance, and only under a sense of public duty.

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This reluctance on his part to take service in America was not due, as in the instance of other military men of his time, to political sympathy with the cause of the colonists ; indeed, it is remarkable, more especially when we consider the prominent part which he was afterwards destined to play in American affairs, how little interest he, up to this period, appears to have taken in the question which, during the greater part of his early parliamentary career, had occupied the mind of England. His leanings, such as they were, were clearly in favour of the Court policy, and of the unquestionable right of the Imperial Parliament to impose taxation upon the colonies. These views he expressed with great clearness in the House of Commons on the 19th of April, 1774, when he voted against the repeal of the duty on tea :

“I look upon America as our child, which we have already spoilt by too much indulgence. It is said that if you remove this duty, you will relieve all grievances in America : but I apprehend that *it is the right of taxation which they dispute, and not the tax*. It is the independence of that country upon the legislation of this for which they contend.”

At the same time, he expressed a hope of seeing America “convinced by persuasion, and not by the sword ;” and from first to last his feelings were in harmony with this hope, although unhappily his duty compelled him to fight instead of to negotiate.

Had his views been in an opposite direction, he would probably have declined the service when offered to him,

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even though he might not, under the strong sense of military duty which always inspired him, have felt himself justified in resigning his commission in the army rather than draw the sword in a cause of which he disapproved, as many naval and military officers of high rank actually did.¹

Burgoyne's scruples were partly due to purely personal considerations, for as the junior of the three Major-Generals, he saw no prospect of his holding a prominent or useful position ; but mainly to the nature of the service on which the army was to be employed. He was too humane a man not to shrink from the idea of active participation in a civil war, and too thorough a soldier to consider the maintenance of order among a refractory population a congenial employment. With a soldier's arrogance too, he probably shared in the contemptuous estimate in which at that time the fighting power of the Americans was held in England,² and thought an armed citizen a foe unworthy of his steel : for even after his arrival at Boston, he ridiculed the

¹ Admiral Keppell, on being offered a command in America, stated that "although professional employment is the dearest object of my life, I cannot draw the sword in such a cause." The Earl of Effingham, when his regiment was ordered to America, threw up his commission ; and Lord Chatham went so far as to withdraw his son, Lord Pitt (then serving as aide-de-camp under Sir Guy Carleton in Canada) from the army rather than allow him to be engaged in an unjust war. (See *Memoirs of Rockingham—Lord Mahon and Chatham Correspondence*.)

Lord Cornwallis acted less consistently, for although he had warmly espoused the Colonial cause in Parliament, and opposed the ministerial policy, he not only accepted, but solicited a command in America, when that policy had driven the colonists into rebellion.

² The notorious Mr. Rigby had, in April 1775, stated in the House of Commons, that it was "romantic to think that the Americans would fight ; it was an idea thrown out to frighten women and children. There was more military prowess in a militia drummer." Those words were uttered two months before the battle of Bunker's Hill !

enrolment of provincial troops as "a preposterous parade of military arrangement."

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Shortly before his embarkation for America (24th February, 1775), Burgoyne made a lengthy speech in the House of Commons, which sounds like an apology for his acceptance of a post which he distinctly states was sought neither by himself, nor by his colleagues, but which their duty to the King compelled them to accept. He makes allowances for the attitude assumed by the colonists, and goes so far as to admit that "there is a charm in the very wanderings and dreams of liberty that disarms an Englishman;" but urges that "while we remember that we are contending against brothers and fellow subjects, we must also remember that we are contending in this crisis for the fate of the British Empire."

The selection of Burgoyne, as of his colleagues, was thus owing neither to private influence exerted on his behalf, nor, as has been alleged,¹ to a desire on the part of Government to rid themselves of a political opponent in Parliament, but to the high professional character which he justly enjoyed, and as he himself expresses it, to the determination of the Ministry to make up "a triumvirate of reputation."²

¹ See *Stedman's American War*, where Burgoyne's selection for a command is attributed to "the miserable expedient of the ministry of appointing men from the Opposition"—a motive never discovered until after the failure of the campaign, and which is disposed of by the fact of Burgoyne having supported the American policy of the Government.

² This is the opinion of Adolphus, who describes the three Generals as "men of undoubted bravery, in the prime of life, who had served in different parts of the world; eminent military characters, in whose appointment neither parliamentary nor other influence had been used. Howe's family was unfriendly to the Administration, and Burgoyne voted with the Opposition."—*History of England*.

A story was told at the time, however, of Lord North having remarked

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The following private memorandum from Burgoyne's own hand, not only bears out this view, but throws some light upon the political aspect of American affairs at this period. There are here and there pleasant flashes of humour, and an unconscious tone of vanity and self-assertion, which make the paper pleasant reading, for however much the moralist may condemn egotism, it is a quality to which the historian and the biographer are greatly indebted.

"The first suspicion in my mind that I was thought of for the American service arose from a few words of Mr. Jenkinson,¹ as we were coming in the crowd together out of the House of Commons, after a debate on the affairs of America in the latter end of January. He 'wished I was in that country,' with a look and emphasis that conveyed more than accidental conversation. It struck me that he meant to sound my inclinations. I answered that 'every soldier must go where he was ordered; but that I believed in the present state of things, *that* service would not be desirable to any man.' Some days after I found my name was mentioned in whispers; but I had no information to depend upon till the 2nd of February, when I was sent for by Lord Barrington, who informed me of the King's commands.

"The manner of breaking the business appeared to me at the time rather singular. As soon as I was seated, his lordship began upon the American debate the preceding day in the House. 'We sat late; it was very tiresome,' and a few other common chit-chat observations of that sort; till at once, with a sort of these three Generals, "I don't know what the Americans will think of them, but I know that they make me tremble." As he was, however, mainly responsible for the choice, and as all three were generally esteemed able officers, this story seems to be, to say the least, improbable.

¹ Afterwards Lord Liverpool.

abruptness something like what Horace recommends to an epic poet, launching instantly *in medias res*, he 'hoped and did not doubt, that everything in America would mend, when I and the two other Generals for whom he was to make out letters of service, should arrive there.' The perfect indifference of his countenance, the tone of voice, and whole manner of opening to me one of the most important, of the most unexpected, and as might naturally be supposed, *the most disagreeable events of my life*, suited the idea I had ever entertained of his lordship's feelings.

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"I desired to know whether he was directed by the King to deliver to me finally his commands; that if this service were in any degree optional, I had some professional reasons to decline it, but many more arising from such private feelings as most affect the human heart;—critical family situations probably ensuing, in which my presence might be of great concern to my fortune; habits of life; unambitious pleasures; friendships and affections; in all which absence and distance would make a breach that no emolument in the power of Government to bestow (and I had no claim to any above the regular stipend of my station), would compensate. That if, on the contrary, his Majesty had done me the honour to think of me, the last and humblest of his list of Generals, as particularly necessary to his service upon this occasion, and had sent me his orders as such, I should act in conformity to the principle which I had ever held to be indispensable with a soldier when called forth upon a duty of service, to forego every consideration of private interest or happiness, in obedience to that call.

"His lordship did not spare compliments; it is a language in which he is always ready; and, in

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conclusion, he told me that 'no person, as he believed, had suggested to the King this nomination; that in all military distinction he was persuaded his Majesty considered the list of his Generals with no other view than scrupulously to appoint to each particular service the person in his judgment best adapted to it; that his Majesty had expressed himself decisively in regard to Generals Howe, Clinton, and myself, and he was persuaded the whole kingdom would applaud his decision; that he had seen these gentlemen separately a few hours ago, and had the satisfaction to find, to the honour of us all, that we exactly agreed in principles of our duty, and almost in the expression of them.' I professed to his lordship the honour I felt in being classed with such colleagues, and I requested him to assure his Majesty, together with that sentiment, of my ready obedience to his commands.

"Thus engaged, I resolved to devote myself to the duties of my situation; and in contemplating the important national objects to which it might open, I alone found assistance to overcome the sensations equally frequent and painful, that attended my preparation. To separate for a length of time, perhaps for ever, from the tenderest, the faithfullest, the most amiable companion and friend that ever man was blessed with—a wife, in whom during four and twenty years I never could find a momentary act of blame! The narrow circumstances, perhaps the distressed state in which she might find herself at my death, added severely to my anxieties. To supply the requisites of her rank, to reward the virtues of her character, I could only bequeath her a legacy of my imprudences. Men of the world in general are too callously composed to conceive what I endured. My intimates, even those of most sensibility,

acquainted with the levities, the inattentions, and dissipations of my common course of life, might have wanted faith in my sincerity ; I therefore concealed my heart from all ; and I even suffered my dearest Charlotte herself—not, I hope, to doubt that I felt—but rather to be ignorant *how much* I felt, than expatiate on a subject that would be so afflicting to her in the tender and delicate state of her mind and health.

“The first measure I took, and, indeed, it appeared preparatory and necessary for all others for making myself useful to Government in the degree I wished, was to conciliate the opinion of Lord North. I had thought myself some years ago, treated by him with very undeserved slight, and had occasionally expressed my resentment. Civil messages had sometimes passed between us through friends ; but no indication of attention towards me, that showed like cordiality, had ever had place on his part. During this coldness that subsisted between us, I had sometimes most conscientiously opposed his measures in Parliament, particularly in the debate upon the affair of Falkland’s Island, upon that of the Caribbs, and upon the perpetuity of Mr. Grenville’s Bill. In the motion I made for the Committee of enquiry into the state of the East India Company, and through the whole progress of that long business, I had acted without his participation ; and in the feeble support he gave me when I moved the resolutions against Lord Clive, he knew my opinion was that he acted with duplicity. Nothing short of professed enmity could place me further than I found myself from the confidence of this minister ; but I satisfied my mind upon public motives, to court a union for which I should have scorned to make an overture upon any other.

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“ I began by explaining myself to Mr. Cowper, and requested him to prepare Lord North for an explanation from me in person. He did so, with much civility and seeming good will to the office. In my conversation with his lordship, I frankly mentioned the circumstances which I supposed had kept us so long at a distance ; and I lamented that misfortune from a principle of respect which I professed to his personal character. With regard to my parliamentary conduct, I disavowed having ever suffered my resentment of what I had thought personal slights, to warp my inclinations and my duty in supporting the King's measures. My principles of acting in public lay in a small compass. To assist government in my general line of conduct ; but that in great national points, and where the vote of a House of Parliament might lead him to important consequences, detrimental or disgraceful in my conviction to the interest or honour of the State, I would ever hold myself at liberty to maintain my own opinion. Upon these motives, and upon these only, I had occasionally opposed his measures ; I had done the same in particular points by every other administration since I had sat in the House, and had often voted even against the sentiments of the late Lord Strange, the man of whose integrity and political judgment I had the highest veneration, and who was besides my benefactor, my patron, and my friend. *He* ever approved the sincerity of that conduct ; I hoped no others ever were offended at it ; if they were, they reasoned unjustly. I expressed how much my mind went with the system of measures opened by his lordship in Parliament in regard to America, and in the warmest terms I could find, offered my services to carry them into effect.

“ He listened to me attentively, and answered me with politeness ; assured me of the high opinion he entertained of my abilities, and the satisfaction he should have in the fullest communication of our mutual sentiments upon the important subject of America. I immediately embraced this opening to confidential discourse, and expressed my surprise and concern that in the present crisis there was no person proper to manage the affairs of government at New York. The governor (Tryon) was in England ; the lieutenant-governor, if one considered his great age alone, (I knew no exceptions to his character) must be supposed disqualified for any great exertions. It was well known the whole people of the province were classed in two opposite parties under the families of Delancey and Livingstone ; that Tryon had been supposed a favourer of the latter, which was now on the popular and seditious side ; that he had likewise been officially concerned in deciding some disputed grants of land which had made, perhaps, very unjustly, many discontented people. When to these accidental causes of jealousy were added the prejudices that prevailed in America against every governor, perhaps a military man, clothed with that character only, going in his station at the head of three or four regiments, might with equal talents or with less talents than Mr. Tryon possessed, find more facility in negotiation. That I sought not to interfere in military command with my colleagues, but that I offered my service in the other line with some confidence of success ; and wished his lordship to lay me at his Majesty's feet for that or any other department where my zeal might be of more use and extent than in the bare superintendence of a small brigade. His lordship acquiesced entirely in my reasoning, but was very cautious of committing himself

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in any engagement further than to lay all I had said before the King.

"In the course of a few days after this conference, I visited Mr. Jenkinson, Lord George Germaine, and Sir Gilbert Ellyott, upon the same subject, all of whom I knew were much consulted. The former was very open in his conversation, and I thought his sentiments just and firm. He assured me very warmly of his esteem. I discovered that he had been the man to suggest my nomination ; and I had reason afterwards to believe from private intelligence, that his original idea was to have left out Generals Howe and Clinton, to have withdrawn Gage, and to have made me commander-in-chief.

"I found Lord George communicative and friendly, a sort of behaviour he had shown towards me upon all occasions. He had more information upon the subject, more enlarged sentiments, and more spirit than any of the ministers with whom I had conversed. He acknowledged that he was in all consultations upon American measures ; that indeed his warmth had led him almost to offer himself to Lord North ; but that those measures apart, he assured me upon his honour, no word had passed between them tending to an overture, or intimating even a wish on either side, for a ministerial connection. He then told me he had for a long time together goaded every part of the administration upon the neglect of New York ; that he knew not where they could find a more proper person than myself to send there ; that the proper place for General Howe was with the main body of the army, where his name as well as his abilities would be instrumental to restore discipline and confidence.

"Sir Gilbert Ellyott who had for some time past shown me great attention on account of the friendship he knew

I bore to his sons, and some services I had been able to render to the younger of them,¹ expressed himself with a warmth towards me that exceeded the usual moderation of his professions, and carried at the same time every mark of generosity and sincerity. Upon a suggestion that General Howe might possibly wish to command at New York, he gave high and just encomiums to his military character, but thought he would not be well chosen for a political manager, and lamented the precipitation with which the nomination to the staff was made, intimating, as it seemed to me, that he had warned the minister against inconveniences that might arise from competitions when military rank, which is always of tender touch, interfered with political distinction. I parted with him, convinced he would to the utmost of his power, support my views of obtaining a principal or, at least an active part in America.

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"The next person I saw was Mr. Pownall the secretary. I had but a slight acquaintance with him, though we are distant cousins. I only expressed in general terms my desire to be known to Lord Dartmouth, as a man who having had the lot to be appointed to the American staff, was anxious to render government every service in his power. He presently entered into a long, formal, and sometimes unintelligible discussion of American affairs. He talked to me as I imagined he might be accustomed to do with men really inferior to him in information, or whom he supposed to be so. Gentlemen in trade and other situations in life, which set them at a distance from great men in office, or even from the subalterns and apes of official greatness, diffident of their own judgement, and believing men in power to be better informed because they ought to be so, are generally

¹ See *ante*, page 59.

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patient hearers, and hence a secretary is very apt to contract an air of supercilious or ministerial importance. He was guarded—mysterious—obscure—I acquired by the conversation (as I thought) some lights into his character, but none into American affairs.

“I was introduced a few days after by Mr. Pownall to Lord Dartmouth, and found what I had expected from his general character, *much* politeness and benevolence of mind, *too* much attention to his secretary whose parts appeared to me inferior to his own, and a good deal of caution in committing an opinion upon nice subjects, though not more of it than was excusable in a minister conversing with a perfect stranger.

“I had no right, nor did I expect to be admitted into the confidence of that house, and resolved to pay due attentions of civility, but to work my own measures through other engines.

“I soon discerned how well my original opinion was founded, that the desirable situation for doing the public service, and acquiring personal credit, was New York. I found General Haldimand was to be withdrawn from America, in order to make Howe second in command. I thought the opportunity fair to renew my application for that distinction, and found every minister with whom I conversed, Lord Dartmouth excepted, who always supposed that the governor was the proper person for negotiation, strong in my support. I looked upon Lord Dartmouth's answer as a mere ministerial put-off; knowing, that according to the secret intention then, Tryon was not, at least not speedily, to return.

“I thought it a point of honour to mention this subject to General Howe, that I wished myself employed in some more active station than the mere inspection of a brigade; that I should not think of interfering with him

in any military competition, but that New York opened another line of business; that possibly I was thought of for that distinction during the absence of Mr. Tryon, though I would not accept the government with any stipend that could be allotted to it. He answered me in a very friendly manner, but not explicitly, said that 'he owned he wished to avoid going to Boston if possible.' I knew the reason given publicly by all his friends for that wish was the obligation his family owed to the Bostonians, who had raised a monument to the late Lord Howe, and particularly complimented the general. However I very soon discovered that the secret and real reason was the low opinion he held of the commander-in-chief as a soldier. I believe he did justice with all the world to his personal and private character, but dreaded acting immediately under the orders of an officer whose talents were far inferior to his command.

"Some time passed without any overture of consultation between the ministers and the major-generals. I knew there was an equal reserve to us all, and I began to feel regret at being selected merely to make up a *triumvirate* of reputation, and to foresee the irksome situation of being placed at the head of a small brigade without confidence, without detached command, or a mixture of civil negotiation, which it had been hinted in the House of Commons, and was become the general expectation of the world, was designed for some of us.

"Resolved if possible to get insight into the intentions of the ministers, I made use of Sir John Blaquiere, who I knew had an inclination to serve me, and power to do so; a head excellently turned for ministerial intrigue, an established intimacy with Lord North, and an uncommon confidence with—. He embraced my first opening of the business most cordially, and on the same day brought

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me from — an invitation of friendship. I had long known this lord. He received me in a manner that charmed me, and from that hour the most confidential intercourse was established between us. I had many proofs before I left England of the sincerity of his proceedings, and was intrusted with secrets of the most important and most private nature.

“I learned from his lordship that the King, to whom he had imparted my desire of being employed at New York, was very graciously disposed towards me. Lord Suffolk and Lord Dartmouth, he supposed, espoused Howe ; Lord North and all the rest of the Cabinet were strenuous in my preference, wherever negotiation was in question. Mr. Jenkinson and other counsel of ministers, I had good reason to suppose were the same. General Howe’s friends were, nevertheless, indefatigably at work.

“During these operations, I took occasion to make a speech in Parliament in support of the ministers’ American measures. I spoke from my heart, and to that cause I impute its success. It was uncommonly well received by the House. Lord North professed at every table, that it had done more essential service to Government than any speech of the year. Copies were much desired. Lord Gower read one to the King, who ratified the general strain of encomium by the most obliging expressions to me upon the subject at his levée, and in his closet, where I introduced myself for the declared purpose of asking the royal consent to my nephew going a volunteer to America ; but not without a view to express my sentiments upon affairs of that country, were a favourable opening given to me. I had the most gracious reception,—a very long conference,—but no opening that I could avail myself of with propriety.

“Lord George Germaine, whom I saw often, expressed

his wonder to me that the major-generals were not called before the Cabinet, or by some other method consulted upon a plan of measures before General Gage's instructions were drawn. He concluded it must be meant to have full communication with us, and hoped the ministers had adopted his advice to lay aside the formality of a council, and rather to invite us to cabinet dinners. He had often observed that the surest means of collecting matter from professional men, especially if they were modest men, were to employ convivial hours for that purpose.

"In effect, the Cabinet invitations began to take place. The first was at Lord Dartmouth's. There were present all the Cabinet, and moreover Lords Sandwich and Barrington, and General Hervey, Governor Hutchinson, and Mr. Secretary Pownall; and to the whole was added (I could never guess for what purpose) the Earl of Hardwicke. I did not conceive much expectation of business upon the sight of so numerous and motley a company, and except a short conversation between Lord Suffolk, General Howe, and myself, who sat near each other at table, and which Lord Suffolk expressed a desire to extend upon some other occasion, we talked of every subject but America.

"It was at this dinner that Lord Dartmouth, in the name of the whole Cabinet, and he added that of His Majesty, desired that I would permit my speech to be printed, in order to its being dispersed in America.

"Such repeated professions of obligation from all parts of the ministry, I thought entitled me to press my claims of separate employment more pointedly than I had done before. I represented in repeated conversations with Lord North, how different I found the state of things as

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my embarkation approached, from what I had expected at my appointment ; that at that time I had not conceived, nor I believe had any other person, that I was taken from the last of the roll merely for the inspection of a brigade,—to see that the soldiers boiled their kettles regularly ; that nothing bore the appearance of any further intention towards me, nor indeed towards my colleagues ; that we were totally in the dark upon all the plans of Government for the campaign ; that willing and zealous to forego all private interests if placed in a state of confidence or of action, I felt the hardship of being called upon to make such sacrifices only to attain the character of a cypher ; that the general voice was in my favour for New York, and as it was not a military but a political competition, I hoped his lordship would allow me to urge my pretensions: that I looked upon their success or disappointment as a test of the real opinion the King's servants had of me.

“ He agreed in opinion upon the propriety of my appointment to New York, but said he believed it was thought proper to leave the choice of persons for the several departments under him entirely to General Gage ; I shook my head at that insinuation, and requested his Lordship to do me at least the honour to treat me like a man not totally ignorant of the world ; that I knew General Howe was using every engine of interest for the preference, and it was preposterous to suppose a private hint would not be given to General Gage where to give it. He confessed frankly at last that it was so. He believed some promise had been made him early and unadvisedly in this business, which embarrassed the King, but that he would do his utmost to reconcile all difficulties and forward my wishes.”

On the eve of his embarkation for America, Burgoyne wrote the following letter to the King, which, though disfigured by a laboured and stilted style, displays the kindly and affectionate nature of the man, and a certain simplicity of thought glaringly at variance with the phraseology employed.

The paper is endorsed :

"Copy of a letter to the king written the morning of my embarkation for America 1775, and lodged in a friend's hands, with directions for delivering it in case of my death.

"Though this letter was rendered useless by the death of Lady Charlotte,¹ I preserved the copy (as I have done many other papers), to show my thoughts of that excellent woman at different periods of my life."

"PORTSMOUTH, *April 18th*, 1775.

"SIRE,

"Whenever this letter shall be delivered to your Majesty, the writer of it will be no more. It may therefore be esteemed an address from beyond the grave, and under that idea I am persuaded your Majesty will consider with indulgence both the matter and the expression.

"My purpose, sire, is to recommend to your royal protection Lady Charlotte Burgoyne, who at my death will have to combat the severest calamities of life,—a weak frame of body, very narrow circumstances, and a heart replete with those agonies which follow the loss of an object it has long held most dear. What will be her consolation? Wretched state, when poverty is disregarded, only because it is the least poignant of our

¹ Lady Charlotte Burgoyne died at Kensington in the autumn of 1776.

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sensations, and the pains of distemper are alleviated by the hopes that they tend to our dissolution.

"The first comfort upon which my mind rests in regard to that dear woman, in a crisis so trying, is a knowledge of her piety ; the next, a confidence in your Majesty's compassion and generosity. I sincerely trust that in the eyes of God, she is marked for those rewards hereafter, which in His mercy He prepares for the most blameless of His creatures ; and a character so deserving will be a sure title with your Majesty for such bounty as, when her sorrows settle, may smooth her passage through the remains of life.

"Your Majesty, acquainted with the value of female excellence, will hear without impatience a husband's praises. I protest, with the sincerity of a man who meditates death while he writes, and calls God to witness to his testimony, that in the great duties of life, I do not know that Lady Charlotte ever committed a fault, except that, if a fault it can be called, of love and generosity which directed her choice to me without consulting her family—even that is now cancelled in their eyes, upon a review of our happiness during a course of twenty-four years, no moment of which has been embittered, except by sickness or separation.

"My heart tells me, Sire, that I am not presumptuous in this application. *I received your Majesty's commands for America with regret, the first sensation of that nature I ever experienced in a call for service*, but I have not a less sense of duty ; I have scorned to propose terms to my obedience, or to take advantage of the crisis of receiving your royal orders to prefer a petition for the provision for my family.

"I rely on your Majesty's heart to accept with indulgence this humble mark of my respect, and I take

confidence to assure your Majesty that, whatever may be my fate in my ensuing trials, I shall be found to my last moment,

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"Your Majesty's
"Zealous soldier
"And most faithful subject,
"J. BURGoyNE."

The despatch of military reinforcements was at that juncture, a measure too significant of the intentions of the Home Government not to add fuel to the excited feelings of the colonists, who, now in the full ferment of their passions, were far more likely to be appeased by pacific overtures, than deterred by a somewhat feeble display of military force.¹

General Howe and his two lieutenants reached Boston in the *Cerberus*² frigate in the middle of May, to learn that blood had been shed in a conflict between the colonists and the English troops at Lexington, and that the States had solemnly formed themselves into a defensive union.³

¹ Four additional regiments were at this time despatched to Boston Harbour. The Duke of Richmond had on the 6th of March, moved a resolution in the House of Lords, for the countermanding of reinforcements with a view to a vote of confidence, but the motion was lost by a large majority.

² The name of this frigate with the three generals on board, afforded an irresistible theme for the smaller Bostonian wits. One of the several pasquinades on the subject ran thus :

"Behold the Cerberus the Atlantic plough,
Her precious cargo, Burgoyne, Clinton, Howe.

Bow, wow, wow !"—

See *Orderly Book of General Burgoyne*, by E. B. O Callaghan, M.D. Albany, 1860.

³ "More than a century and a half had elapsed since Englishmen had met Englishmen in a war embrace. In both places, at Edgehill as at Lexington, the aggressions of prerogative were the original cause of feud. In both cases a great experiment was put to the issue, whether individual or

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The arrival of the three generals in Boston was greeted with derisive congratulations, and night after night the walls of their residences were placarded with mock proclamations of threatened vengeance on the part of King George.

On the 12th June, General Gage met these foolish demonstrations by issuing an equally foolish proclamation, a document of which Burgoyne acknowledges the authorship.¹ It is couched in his most inflated style, and was as little calculated to intimidate the disaffected, as to win over the wavering, or to reassure the loyal.

Burgoyne's apprehensions as to the uncongenial nature of military service in the colony, appear to have been fully confirmed by his first local impressions, for we find him, contrary to his natural tastes, expressing a wish to negotiate rather than to fight,—“to seek such places as should be the theatre not of arms but of counsels,” and “to assist the great work of reconciliation” in preference to “entering upon a campaign.”

GENERAL BURGUYNE TO LORD NORTH.²

“BOSTON, *June 14th*, 1775.

“MY LORD,

“What I foresaw of my situation, and I am afraid troubled your Lordship too often to hear, is precisely

national will should prevail. In both a controversy, which a few months earlier reason and moderation would have adjusted, was determined by the fierce tribunal of war; and in both cases, jealousy and memory of wrong done, cut the ties, and marred the features of natural brotherhood.”

—LORD ALBEMARLE in his *Life of Lord Rockingham*

¹ See Appendix.—The copy of this document among the Burgoyne papers is headed in his own handwriting, “Drawn up by me at the request of General Gage.” See *Letter to Mr. Thurlow*, apud.

² This, and other of his original letters quoted, are taken from Burgoyne's *Letter Books*, most of the entries of which are in his own handwriting.

verified. I am in too humble a situation to promise myself any hope of contributing essentially to His Majesty's service in the military line in America. My portion of command, in point of numbers, is much inferior to what has formerly fallen to my share as lieutenant-colonel; and when I look around me I have not much expectation that it will be mended in point of enterprise.

"Believe me, my Lord, I do not mention these circumstances peevishly: I mean them but as reasons to forward my desire, and since I have received His Majesty's approbation, I may call it a claim, to return to England during the ensuing winter. The private exigencies that demand my presence there are great; but I should scorn to urge them at such a crisis, were I not convinced I might do so, not only without prejudice, but also with assistance to the great cause in which, though yet an insignificant one, I am made an actor. I beg leave to assure your Lordship, at the same time, I have no thoughts of relinquishing this service, should my presence be thought necessary for a second campaign. It is not indulgence that will ever induce me to resign employment.

"It would ill become me, my Lord, and it is equally unnecessary, to expatiate upon the present untoward state of affairs in this country; and it is but tautology to renew my assurances of exerting every thought, and word, and act, that can contribute to retrieve them. My colleagues, Generals Howe and Clinton, join in my zeal, and it is equal honour and pleasure to me to reflect that we have not differed in a single sentiment relative to the conduct that ought now to be pursued. But it is not within the most sanguine expectation that any stretch of our efforts, nor the co-operation of His Majesty's

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councils at home, nor even any success that may attend both, short of the interposition of a miracle, can close the business this year.

“My plan, therefore, to make my services useful in preparing for the next is as follows:—

“That the Commander-in-chief be wrote to in the despatches from His Majesty’s confidential servants, to dismiss me from the army as early in the autumn as the propriety of any service in which I may be then engaged will permit. That the Admiral be at the same time instructed to facilitate my passage to New York, Philadelphia, or any other province where in my judgment His Majesty’s service may call me, and afterwards to convey me to England.

“The friends of Government are everywhere suppressed, it is true, but, notwithstanding appearances, I am far from believing their sentiments are changed by the late events. The alarms which are spreading, and the real evils of the contest which will daily be felt more and more in every part of the continent, will necessarily incline many to peace who perhaps, strictly speaking, may not come under the denomination of friends to Government. I have, therefore, no doubt, but without risk to my person, which I mean nevertheless not to spare when the King’s service demands it, I could find means to be received in those provinces where the war shall not actively have extended. In such places as should be the theatre not of arms but of counsels, it might possibly be expedient openly to profess that, ‘being upon my return to England, I was desirous to inform myself of the general sentiments of the Americans—not charged with any commission or authority to treat; but as an individual member of Parliament, a friend to human nature, and a well-wisher to the united

interests of the two countries, to obtain such lights as might enable me to assist the great work of conciliation.'

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"If by language of this nature, in which Government would not be at all committed, I could procure admission to all parties, it would then be the great effort of my undertaking, to prepare for your Lordship such a delineation of the prevailing dispositions, expectations, proceedings, and powers of men, as might enable you to come to Parliament with a more positive plan than could be suggested in the present uncertainty of things. I have not a doubt of your Lordship's consistency to assert the dignity and real interest of the nation in this great business as heretofore, and you shall find me a steady, a zealous, and an active supporter.

"My wish is to sail from Boston early in October, and to arrive in England about Christmas;—always understood that the whole and every part of this plan is to be subservient to any military arrangement in which the King's service immediately, or my professional honour particularly, may be concerned.

"I have only further to submit to your Lordship the means of carrying my proposal into execution. If it should be judged proper to put it upon the footing of private affairs, I request your Lordship to give due effect to the official letter to the Secretary at War, which I take the liberty to inclose herewith. Should it be considered as a measure of State, I beg the favour of your Lordship to put it in proper train. Being ignorant whether His Majesty's Secretary for the American Department was acquainted with what has already passed between your Lordship and me, I have not wrote to him, but I should be sorry to be thought wanting in my respect to him, and rely upon your

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Lordship's goodness to remove from his mind any such suspicion."

Substance of a letter from General Burgoyne to General Hervey,¹ of the same date as the preceding one:—

"I wish to converse freely with you as an officer, an Englishman, and a friend; but a safe conveyance is rare.

"At my arrival I found army and town unrecovered from the consternation into which they had been thrown by the ill success of April 19th, and from the general revolt which had followed. I lament the manner in which the plan of that day was conceived and executed and the general state of our military management; great part of our defeats owing to want of capacity in the departments of the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General; the difficulties attending Gage's situation; no reflection to say he is unequal to his present station, for few characters in the world would be fit for it. It requires a genius of the very first class, together with uncommon resolution, and a firm reliance upon support at home.

"The necessity of exertions in England to put us in a condition to act, particularly in the great articles of magazines, of which we are totally deficient, as well as of bread-waggons, bât-horses, artillery-horses, and many other articles necessary for an army to move to a distance—but chiefly money, with which the military chest is unprovided. While cash could be got for bills (now it cannot) officers were obliged to pay 10 per cent. for their personal pay. The General had expected forty

¹ General Hervey held the office of Military Secretary at the Horse Guards.

housand pounds by the *Cerberus*. He was informed of fifty thousand having been issued, ten of which only he had received by another conveyance. Where does this money lie, and who receives the interest? In regard to our own affairs, you know Lord North informed us of His Majesty's orders for five hundred pounds apiece, equipage-money. You know Pownall told you he *had* taken care the order was transmitted to General Gage for that payment. I see the surprise of your countenance when I inform you not a word has been wrote to General Gage on the subject. He cannot even supply us with personal pay; but when a pound of fresh mutton can only be bought *au poids d'or*, coolly advises us to write home to our agents for money to be remitted in specie,—which (provided we have credit there) will arrive about October next. I acquit North and Dartmouth of the dirtiness of office; but is it not fit that at a proper time and in a proper place the subalterns of office should hear of this treatment? In the meantime you will do Howe, Clinton, and myself the justice to believe our zeal for the King's service will not be impeded by our personal resentment against any persons whatever."

Five days after its appearance the Bostonians replied to General Gage's proclamation by erecting batteries and entrenching themselves on Charlestown heights, the attempt to dislodge them from which by British troops led to the Battle of Bunker's Hill on the 17th June.

Burgoyne was not actively engaged in this action, which he, however, witnessed throughout from a line of batteries in Boston Harbour, the fire of which it was his duty to direct. His letters on the subject are full of interest.

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"TO LORD ROCHFORD,¹

"MY LORD,

"I take the first opportunity of a safe conveyance to enter upon the confidential correspondence which your Lordship permitted me to hold with you. And while I lament the untoward state of things which, in consistency with such an intercourse, I may often be bound to impart, it is truly satisfactory to me to reflect that my communications and opinions will be safe and sacred under the guard of your honour and friendship: the one will secure me from being discovered by those who might consider my intelligence with jealousy or prejudice; to the other I trust for a candid and generous interpretation of the freedoms my pen may take. The end I aim at is to convey truth to the King. My heart disavows a single sentiment of asperity or ill-will towards any servant of the Crown in America; and in regard to that servant in particular to whom, in stating facts, I must necessarily and principally allude, I desire to be considered as one who bears high respect to his private virtues; and who, in commenting upon the circumstances of his public conduct, finds reason to justify him in some, to excuse him in others, and to pity him in all.

"I arrived at Boston, together with Generals Howe and Clinton, on the 25th May. It would be unnecessary were it possible, to describe our surprise or other feelings, upon the appearances which at once and on every side, were offered to our observation. The town, on the land side, invested by a rabble in arms, who flushed with success and insolence, had advanced their

¹ Secretary of State for the Colonies.

sentries to pistol shot of our out-guards; the ships in the harbour exposed to, and expecting a cannonade or bombardment;—in all companies, whether of officers or inhabitants, men still lost in a sort of stupefaction which the events of the 19th of April had occasioned, and venting expressions of censure, anger, or despondency.

“The principle of seizing arms, and thereby bringing the designs of the malcontents to a test and a decision was certainly just. We can only wonder that it was not sooner adopted. Had General Gage held himself authorised by his instructions, sufficient in force, and unimpeded by other difficulties, to have acted upon this principle early in the preparations of hostility, and at the same time to have seized the persons of Adams, Hancock, and other leaders who were then within his reach, it would probably have tended to the best effects; but even then means should have been found, such as at a later time he made use of, to obtain secret intelligence of the enemy’s counsels; military precautions should have been used to prepare the troops for the sort of combat they were to expect, and so prevent a possibility of insult to the troops, or at least of advantage over them. Posts should have been occupied for keeping open the adjacent country for the supply of the town; and above all, plentiful stores should have been provided of every article that, in failure of common supplies, every exigency might require. Perhaps the town and harbour of Boston are more advantageously situated for the establishment of magazines, supposing the command of the sea, than any spot that could be found upon the map of the world.

“It is not therefore from the principle of the measure of the 19th of April, but from the plan of the exe-

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cution, and the want of preparation for the consequences, that I think may be derived great part of the perplexity and disgrace which have followed.

“The news of this mis-marriage, aggravated with misrepresentations and inflammatory suggestions, were dispersed, it is incredible how swiftly, from one end of the continent to the other. A total suppression of those who were acting in favour of Government followed everywhere; and from the neighbouring provinces reinforcements flocked to the victorious insurgents by thousands a day. The cattle upon the neighbouring islands in the harbour, (a poor stock it must be confessed) were taken off with triumph; the houses of those who had dared to supply provisions to the garrison, were burnt; an armed vessel of the fleet was burnt, and her guns taken away in the view of an admiral and lieutenant-general; and in the unfortunate situation to which things were then reduced, I do not know that they could have prevented these insults. At last, the enemy advanced works upon the height which commands the town and harbour; and there seemed to want only the opening of batteries to produce a more singular and shameful event than can be found in the history of the world—a paltry skirmish (for the affair of the 19th of April was no more) inducing circumstances as rapid and as decisive as the battle of Pharsalia; and the colours of a fleet and army of Great Britain, not wrested from us, but without a conflict, kicked out of America.

✕ “The sentiments of Howe, Clinton, and myself have been unanimous from the beginning. We have alike endeavoured to palliate past omissions; to conceal present irremediable wants; to press vigorous undertakings. At the same time, we have been obliged in

justice to acknowledge that the reasons for waiting to the last moment for the expected reinforcements which it was known were near, were justly founded.

"At the time when the exigencies above stated had nearly reached their consummation, the troops of the first embarkation happily arrived. The effect on the spirits of the army was visible. Nevertheless, the proceedings of the enemy did not manifest any intimidation on their part. They pushed on their work on the heights on both sides of the town with double diligence. We lost no time in preparation, and on the 17th instant, General Howe was detached with a considerable corps, to attack on the heights of Charlestown.

"It would be waste of your Lordship's time to enter into the detail of an action that will of course be conveyed at large to the King's servants by General Gage's letters; and my friend Howe's conduct will not want my testimony to do it justice. Clinton had the good fortune in the course of the action to be actively employed, and acquitted himself, as I am persuaded he will ever do, much to his honour. For my part, the inferiority of my station as youngest Major-General upon the staff, left me almost a useless spectator, for my whole business lay in presiding during part of the action over a cannonade to assist the left.

"This situation, you well know, my Lord, I foresaw, and felt, before I left England. In the general regular course of business in this army, Major-Generals are absolute cyphers. The small number of brigades and large number of Brigadiers perhaps makes them necessarily so. We have not even the little employment of inspection; and for commands of detachments of consequence like the last, should they go in rotation, I am afraid the sphere of our campaign must be too bounded

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to furnish one to each of the triumvirate. My lot in justice and propriety must come last, and in the meantime my rank only serves to place me in a motionless, drowsy, irksome medium, or rather vacuum, too low for the honour of command, too high for that of execution. This correspondence is the single gratification my mind receives in its activity and zeal ; but while I declare it single, I acknowledge it sufficient, provided it can furnish any useful lights in so great a cause ; and in that hope I will stifle the regret of being otherwise unemployed.

“ I have supposed the King’s servants to be apprised by General Gage’s letters of the general circumstances of the success of the 17th ; and I now congratulate you, my dear Lord, upon an event that effaces the stain of the 19th of April, and will, I hope, stand a testimony and a record in America of the superiority of regular troops over those of any other description. It is certain our detachment had to struggle with more than treble numbers, assisted with all that nature and art could do to strengthen a post ; intoxicated with zeal ; and instigated, during the action, by the presence of one of their most favourite and able demagogues (Warren), who at last sealed his fanaticism with his blood before their eyes.

✓ “ In this point of view the action is honourable in itself ; and whatever measures his Majesty’s councils may now pursue, it must be of important assistance by the impression it will make, not only in America, but universally, upon public opinion. It may be wise policy to support this impression to the utmost, both in writing and discourse ; but when I withdraw the curtain, your Lordship will find much cause for present reflection, much for the exercise of your judgment, upon the future conduct of the scene.

“ Turn you eyes first, my Lord, to the behaviour of the enemy. The defence was well conceived and obstinately maintained; the retreat was no flight: it was even covered with bravery and military skill, and proceeded no farther than to the next hill, where a new post was taken, new intrenchments instantly begun, and their numbers affording constant reliefs of workmen, they have been continued day and night ever since.

“ View now, my Lord, the side of victory; and first the list of killed and wounded. If fairly given, it amounts to no less than ninety-two officers, many of them an irreparable loss—a melancholy disproportion to the numbers of the private soldiers—and there is a melancholy reason for it. Though my letter passes in security, I tremble while I write it; and let it not pass even in a whisper from your Lordship to more than *one* person: the zeal and intrepidity of the officers, which was without exception exemplary, was ill seconded by the private men. Discipline, not to say courage, was wanting. In the critical moment of carrying the redoubt, the officers of some corps were almost alone; and what was the worst part of the confusion of these corps—all the wounds of the officers were not received from the enemy. I do not mean to convey any suspicion of backwardness in the cause of Government among the soldiery, which ignorant people in England are apt to imagine; and as little would I be understood to imply any dislike or ill will to their officers. I believe the men attached to their regiments, and exasperated against the enemy—that there has not been a single desertion since the 19th of April is a proof of it—I only mean to represent that the men in the *defective* corps being ill grounded in the great points of discipline, and the men in *all* the corps having twice felt their enemy to

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be more formidable than they expected, it will require some training under such generals as Howe and Clinton before they can prudently be intrusted in many exploits against such odds as the conduct and spirit of the leaders enabled them in this instance to overcome.

“But suppose that point of confidence in the troops attained. Look, my Lord, upon the country near Boston—it is all fortification. Driven from one hill, you will see the enemy continually retrenched upon the next; and every step we move must be the slow step of a siege. Could we at last penetrate ten miles, perhaps we should not obtain a single sheep or an ounce of flour by our laborious progress, for they remove every article of provisions as they go. Does any man extend his expectations to a further scope of country in this province? Count our numbers, my Lord; any officer will tell you that in such a country, and against such an enemy, who in composition and system are all light troops, they are not more than requisite to secure our convoys and communications between the army and the great deposit of magazines; or if that difficulty were got over by great and active genius, look into our state once more, and you will find us totally unprovided with bread waggons, hospital carriages, bat-horses, sufficient artillery horses, and many other articles of *attirail* indispensably necessary for an army to proceed by land to a distance.

“I am apprehensive lest this representation taken upon the gross, should seem to carry more of imputation than I professed at setting out. But I do not mean it, and would explain myself upon that subject once for all.

“I think General Gage possessed of every quality to

maintain quiet government with honour to himself and happiness to those he governs ; his temper and his talents, of which he has many, are calculated to dispense the offices of justice and humanity. In the military, I believe him capable of figuring upon ordinary and given lines of conduct ; but his mind has not resources for great, and sudden, and hardy exertions, which spring self-suggested in extraordinary characters, and generally overbear all opposition, In short, I think him a contrast to that cast of men, somewhere described—

“ Fit to disturb the peace of all the world,
And rule it when 'tis wildest.”

Unfortunately for us, that cast of character, at least the latter part of it, is precisely what we want here ; and I hope I shall not be thought to disparage my general and my friend in pronouncing him unequal to his situation, when I add that I think it one in which Cæsar might have failed.

“ The lamentable point with which I shall close the state of our affairs (one, indeed, in which Cæsar would not have erred) is the parsimonious extreme to which our system of caution has extended in point of money. Your Lordship is better placed than I am to discover whether any part of that blame lies at home ; some may possibly be due to those at the head of subordinate departments here. The general may have excuses for the rest, but the miserable result of the whole is that the interest of the treasury has been managed, or mismanaged, till we are destitute, not only of cattle and magazines of forage, but of the most important of all circumstances in war or negotiation—*intelligence*. We are ignorant not only of what passes in congresses, but want spies for the hill half a mile off. And what renders the reflection

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truly provoking is that there was hardly a leading man among the rebels, in council, or in the field, but at a proper time, and by proper management, might have been bought.¹

“It is now time to consider, my Lord—and the question will naturally be asked in the King’s councils at home,—can nothing then be done this campaign? I think something may, and my colleagues and General Gage I believe, will agree in my opinion. When the four battalions of the second embarkation arrive (and they are expected daily, one vessel being come in), and such of the wounded men as we may expect speedily to recover have joined their regiments, our army will consist of about five thousand two hundred effective men, exclusive of officers. If you, in England, reckon upon more, you are mistaken. With this force, and perhaps before it all arrives, we cannot fail possessing the whole peninsula on the south of Boston, called Dorchester Neck. It is proposed afterwards to fortify it with redoubts. To occupy this ground when so fortified, on one side, the heights of Charlestown on the other, and the lines and other works of Boston in the centre, will take, in the opinion of our best officers, upwards of three thousand men. I will suppose, therefore, about two thousand left to be employed upon expeditions. I would embark this force, and unite to it all the ships of war that can be safely spared from the protection of Boston.

“I should think one probable and immediate effect would be the separation of a great part of the Massa-

¹ It is hardly necessary that I should disclaim participation in Burgoyne’s sentiments upon this and similar points. Impartial judgment of public men in America was not then possible for one in his position; and when he wrote he was necessarily in ignorance of the true state of feeling in that country, and still more so of the true character of her leading men.

chusetts army, which is composed of the forces of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Hampshire. The Bostonians alone would remain before Boston. This possibly might give an opening to those affected by their inclinations (for such I still believe there are), and to a much larger number affected by their interest, to move in our favour. And if they did not open a direct communication with the town, in the starving condition it is in at present, even smuggling a quantity of fresh provisions would be of great consequence to the health and spirits both of army and inhabitants; the former live entirely upon salt meat, and I hardly guess how some of the latter live at all.

“The expedition at sea, the whole coast of America, equally ignorant of its destination, would be equally in alarm. The real points for acting with effect must depend upon circumstances. My idea would be to try the temper and strength of places, by degrees, to the southward. Rhode Island ought to feel chastisement; Connecticut river, if practicable, would afford ample contribution; Long Island will, I hope, be found deserving of encouragement, and can hardly fail under protection of force, to become an excellent market for supplies. As for New York, do not let me be thought positive or chimerical if I still retain the sentiments I so much pressed in London. That province is lost for want of management, and a proper force to second it. I continue to lament that I was not thought worthy of undertaking that business. I might have failed, but with the temper which prevailed in the Assembly, and the different uses which might have been made of the military power, to encourage and to terrify, I would have been content to forfeit all pretensions to discretionary trust hereafter, if I had. Even now, notwithstanding the use that has been made of the 19th of April, I do

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not despair of great effects from an expedition there, if wise measures are taken to work upon men's minds.

"As one previous step to that purpose, my advice to General Gage has been to treat the prisoners taken in the late action, most of whom are wounded, with all possible kindness, and to dismiss them without terms. 'You have been deluded; return to your homes in peace; it is your duty to God and your country to undeceive your neighbours.'

"I have had opportunities to sound the minds of these people. Most of them are men of good understandings, but of much prejudice, and still more credulity; they are yet ignorant of their fate, and some of them expect when they recover, to be hanged. Such an act of mercy as I have proposed may make an impression, and it may spread. Should it fail, it will at least serve to justify acts of a different nature hereafter; and you are no further the dupes of it in the meantime than by adding about thirty men now in your power to a stock of as many thousands who are out of it.

"Another and more material prelude to an expedition will be a manifesto; and I heartily wish a proper one, framed in England by the King's ablest counsellors, could arrive in time.

"Large contributions of cattle, forage, and other requisite stores for winter magazines, must I think be obtained. Should some towns be burned, and others be deserted, it will be warning and alarm to the yet more southern provinces; and should the enthusiasm of the time, and the control of the seditious leaders be indeed general, Government will at least have clear lights to proceed by.

"If the continent is to be subdued by arms, his Majesty's councils will find, I am persuaded, the proper

expedients; but I speak confidently as a soldier, because I speak the sentiments of those who know America best, that you can have no probable prospect of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion with any force that Great Britain and Ireland can supply. A large army of such foreign troops as might be hired, to begin their operations up the Hudson river; another army composed partly of old disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from Canada; a large levy of Indians, and a supply of arms for the blacks, to awe the southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of regulars; and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast, might possibly do the business in one campaign.

“Should it be thought more expedient to the nation, and reconcilable to its honour, to relinquish the claims in question, I doubt not the wisdom of those councils of which your Lordship is so distinguished a part, will propose such relinquishment as will be at once effectual. But I am fully persuaded that any intermediate measure between these disagreeable extremes (except that of withdrawing your army, and leaving the restraints of trade enforced by a fleet to operate, which would be a work of long protraction), I repeat my full persuasion—that any other intermediate measure, supposing the confederation to be general, will be productive of much fruitless expense, great loss of blood, and a series of disappointments.

“I have delivered this sentiment firmly, but I rely upon your Lordship’s candour to receive it as intelligence collected by personal observation of men and things which those at home have not opportunity to make; and not as a presumption of my private judgment acting in competition with those to whom the King has entrusted the great direction of the state.”

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The death of Major Pitcairn,¹ of the Royal Marines, who was shot in the action at Bunker's Hill, is thus feelingly announced in the course of a letter to Lord Palmerston:—

“Major Pitcairn was a brave and good man. His son, an officer in the same corps, and near him when he fell, carried his expiring father upon his back to the boats, about a quarter of a mile, kissed him, and instantly returned to his duty. This circumstance in the hands of a good painter or historian, would equal most that can be found in antiquity.

“I inclose a letter found among the papers of Major Pitcairn, addressed to Lord Sandwich, but unfinished. The Major's friends wish it to be transmitted to his lordship, not only as it contains business relative to the corps, but as his attention to assist the worthy and the unfortunate under his command—and it happened to be the last act of his life—leave upon the mind an affecting impression of his character. The family he has left is numerous, and may be in need of patronage; the son in particular, who has given so fine an example of bravery and filial piety, is directly within the line of Lord Sandwich's protection. I cannot put these circumstances into better hands than yours, my dear friend, not because your intimacy with that lord will give you opportunity, but because your heart will give you sensibility to represent them forcibly.”

The following extracts from a letter to Lord Stanley,²

¹ This officer had commanded the advanced guard in the attack upon Concord on the 18th of April, and was the first to give the order to fire upon the insurgent Americans.

² In Lord Malton's history (vol. vi.) similar extracts are quoted as having been written by Burgoyne to Lord Stanley; the two letters are, however, far from being identical, which may be owing to Burgoyne's habit of making entries in his letter books from memory, instead of tran-

give a detailed and graphic description of the action :—

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“MY DEAR LORD STANLEY,

“If you should perceive a want of coherence in the ensuing letter, or a failure in that tender, and I will call it parental expression, to which my heart always prompts me when conversing with you, I cannot make a better excuse than in the words which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of your ancestor to the Duke of Richmond :—

“The leisure, and the fearful time
Cuts off the ceremonious vows of love,
And ample interchange of sweet discourse,
Which so long sundered friends should dwell upon.”

“I am too much lost in the variety of American matter, and the reasoning that it all occasions, to be distinct or methodical. I refer you to Lady Charlotte, through whose hands I send all my letters unsealed, and who will take extracts, to collect my sentiments upon the several parts of the great scene in which I am engaged.

“As to the action of the 17th (Bunker’s Hill), you will see the general detail of it in public print. To consider it as a statesman, it is truly important, because it establishes the ascendancy of the King’s troops, though opposed by more than treble numbers, assisted by every circumstance that nature and art could supply to make a situation strong. Were an accommodation, by any strange turn of events, to take place without any other action, this would remain a most useful testimony and record in America.

scribing literally. This letter indeed is headed, “*Substance of a letter to Lord Stanley,*” and was probably entered after the despatch of the original to which Lord Mahon had access.

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"To consider this action as a soldier, it comprised though in a small compass, almost every branch of military duty and curiosity. Troops landed in the face of an enemy; a fine disposition; a march sustained by a powerful cannonade from moving field artillery, fixed batteries, floating batteries, and broadsides of ships at anchor, all operating separately and well disposed; a deployment from the march to form for the attack of the entrenchments and redoubt; a vigorous defence; a storm with bayonets; a large and fine town set on fire by shells. Whole streets of houses, ships upon the stocks, a number of churches, all sending up volumes of smoke and flame, or falling together in ruin, were capital objects. A prospect of the neighbouring hills, the steeples of Boston, and the masts of such ships as were unemployed in the harbour, all crowded with spectators, friends and foes, alike in anxious suspense, made a back-ground to the piece; and the whole together composed a representation of war that I think the imagination of Le Brun never reached. It was great, it was high spirited, and while the animated impression remains, let us quit it. I will not engage your sensibility and my own in contemplations of humanity upon the subject; but will close *en militaire*, by lamenting that your brother Thomas was not arrived, because in a long life of service he may not, perhaps, have an opportunity of seeing any professional tragedy like it.

"I am exceedingly intent upon returning to England in the dead part of the winter, meaning to return again to America in the spring, should my services be thought necessary. I am persuaded you will approve the reasons of this resolution, for which I refer you again to Lady Charlotte's letters."

In a letter written to a private friend immediately after the action the following passage occurs:—

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“Except two cannonballs that went one hundred yards over our heads, we were not in any part of the direction of the enemy's fire. A moment of the day was critical. Howe's left was staggered ; two battalions had been sent to reinforce him, but we perceived them on the beach seeming in embarrassment which way to march. Clinton, then next for business, took his part without waiting for orders. . . . Colonel Abercrombie, commanding the grenadiers, died yesterday of his wounds. Captain Addison,¹ my poor old friend, who arrived only the day before, and was to have dined with me the day of the action, was also killed. Lord Percy's regiment has suffered the most and behaved the best ; his lordship himself was not in the action. Lord Rawdon behaved to a charm ; his name was established for life.”

Two characteristic passages are entered in the letter book at this time, and they are quoted in further evidence of Burgoyne's affectionate nature and kindly and considerate feelings:—

“I wrote also by this despatch to Colonel Phillipson,² stating my most private thoughts upon some circumstances, and referring him to Lady Charlotte's letters for others. The chief purport of this letter was to recommend that dear woman to all the attention of his friendship in all circumstances which this campaign might produce ; to prevent alarms ; to reason her out of the belief in improbable reports ; sometimes to give new colours to truths, if in themselves they bore too gloomy

¹ The letter from which these extracts are made was kindly communicated to me by the wife of Lieutenant-General Grofton, *née* Addison, a descendant of the officer here named.

² Colonel of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, an intimate friend of Burgoyne's.

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an aspect. I relied upon his care and his cheerfulness, next to the piety with which I knew her mind to be endued, for the support of her spirits."

This was written by the man of whom Walpole says, on the death of Lady Charlotte in the following year : "Burgoyne pretends to be in grief for the loss of his wife, at which everybody laughs."¹

The second entry is as follows :—"I wrote also a very long letter to Lady Charlotte herself—and some few hours after the despatch of my packet, had occasion to write her another short one, to recommend to her care Mrs. Dutton, widow of Lieutenant Dutton, killed on the 17th, and who I found was taking her passage on board the *Cerberus*, in every distress of mind and of fortune."

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the details of the action at Bunker's Hill. The Americans have claimed it as a victory, which in a military sense, it certainly was not ; but they had nevertheless good grounds for being proud of the long and formidable resistance shown by their raw levies against our troops. It is curious that whereas Washington severely censures the colonial officers for having shown want of conduct and courage on this occasion, Burgoyne attributes the same to our soldiers,² ascribing the heavy losses of officers on our side to their having sacrificed themselves in their attempts to rally their wavering columns.³

It must indeed have required all their habitual gal-

¹ *Last Journals.*

² When this charge was repeated in the House of Commons (February 20, 1776), Burgoyne admitted that they had wavered for a time, but had quickly rallied ; and denied that their want of spirit was in any way due to political sympathy with the insurgents.

³ The official returns place our losses at 19 officers and 207 rank and file killed, and 70 officers and 758 rank and file wounded. The American losses were quoted at 500 killed and wounded ; the proportion of officers being very small.

lantry and devotion, to lead unwilling and ill-trained troops, unnecessarily encumbered with heavy knapsacks and three days' provisions,¹ to the charge of strong redoubts on the summit of a steep hill ; badly supported too by their own artillery, since the ammunition failed at an important crisis, in consequence of the cartridges served out proving too large for the guns.

Burgoyne's letters, though he tries to make the best of the situation, show that he was not insensible to the moral effects of this action in giving confidence to the insurgents, and the concluding paragraphs of his despatch to Lord Rochford are full of good sense. He deprecates any course between immediate and overpowering military action and the fullest possible concessions, with an evident leaning to the latter, as the more wise and more humane alternative. What the ultimate result of such a course might have been it were now useless to conjecture ; but it is safe to venture upon the assertion that the best and most successful military operations would only have produced what Lord Mahon describes as "the protraction of an inevitable issue."

The English Government, however, adopted neither course ; their political conduct tended to alienate the bulk of the American people, while their military preparations were not on a scale to subdue or discourage rebellion.

A day or two after the battle of Bunker's Hill, Washington had been formally invested by Congress with the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Provincial Forces ; Colonel Lee, of whom we last heard as doing gallant service under Burgoyne in Portugal, being at the same time appointed Major-General in the insurgent army.

¹ Mr. Ross, in his *Life of Lord Cornwallis*, states that every man carried a weight of 125 lbs. on going into action.

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Charles Lee had entered the British service as ensign in the 44th Regiment in 1747, and had been favorably mentioned for his conduct in the American campaigns against the French, in which so many officers (Washington among the number) who met as foes during the revolutionary struggle, had fought side by side. He was a Major in the 103rd Regiment when the campaign in Portugal was undertaken, and held the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on that service. At the conclusion of peace in 1763, his regiment was disbanded. Ever anxious for active military employment, he took service in Poland and Turkey. In 1772, after having been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he emigrated to America, where he soon became conspicuous for his opposition to the obnoxious measures of the Imperial Parliament, and for a bitter hatred to the rule of his native country, the cause of which was generally attributed to a personal grievance he considered himself to have sustained at the hands of the English Government. He had lived on intimate terms with Sir Joshua Reynolds in England, under cover to whom he, in 1774, sent a remarkable letter addressed to Burke, upon the unanimity of the Colonists in their determination to resist the British pretensions, and the hopelessness of any attempt to subdue them by force.¹

Lee was undoubtedly a man of considerable ability and great accomplishments ; versed in law, and fluent, not only in most of the Continental languages, but in several Indian dialects. He was a brave soldier,² and a

¹ See Tom Taylor's *Life of Reynolds*, Vol. ii. p. 97.

² Lee commanded the provincial forces at Charlestown, South Carolina, when attacked by a British squadron under Sir Peter Parker in 1776, and noticing, while the shot was flying around him, that one of his aides-de-camp shrunk every now and then, he cried, "Death ! Sir, what do you mean ? Do you dodge ? Do you know that the King of Prussia lost above

skilful strategist ; but of a perverse and ungovernable temper, and a spirit as little disposed to bow to the authority of an American Congress as to that of an English sovereign. He was taken prisoner in December, 1776, in Morris County, where he was surprised in his quarters, and carried off by a detachment of Burgoyne's Horse, under Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt, but was subsequently exchanged.¹ In 1778, he was brought to a court martial by Washington, for insubordination and disobedience of orders at the battle of Monmouth, and sentenced to one year's suspension. He died in Virginia, in 1782.

On Burgoyne's arrival in Boston, General Lee, presuming upon his friendship with his former commander, wrote him the following letter ;—

“ PHILADELPHIA, *June 7th*, 1775.

“ MY DEAR SIR,

“ We have had twenty different accounts of your arrival at Boston, which have been regularly contradicted the next morning ; but as I now find it certain that you are arrived, I shall not delay a single instant addressing myself to you. It is a duty I owe to the friendship I

one hundred aides-de-camp in one campaign ?” “ So I understand, Sir,” replied the officer ; “ but I did not know that you could spare so many.” — LAMB's *American War*, Dublin, 1809.

¹ So great a value did the American Congress at this time attach to the services of General Lee, that they offered to give six English field officers, prisoners of war in their hands, in exchange for him. General Howe refused to entertain this proposal, on the ground that Lee was a deserter from the king's army ; a pretension which would have applied with equal force to Washington himself, and which Howe was shortly afterwards compelled, under a threat of reprisals, to withdraw. It should be stated that Lee had formally resigned his half-pay in the British army before taking service under Washington.

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have long and sincerely professed for you ; a friendship to which you have the strongest claims from the first moments of our acquaintance. There is no man from whom I have received so many testimonies of esteem and affection ; there is no man whose esteem and affection could, in my opinion have done me greater honour. I entreat and conjure you therefore, my dear Sir, to impute these lines not to a petulant itch of scribbling, but to the most unfeigned solicitude for the future tranquillity of your mind, and for your reputation. I sincerely lament the infatuation of the times, when men of such a stamp as Mr. Burgoyne and Mr. Howe can be seduced into so impious and nefarious a service, by the artifice of a wicked and insidious court and cabinet. You, Sir, must be sensible that these epithets are not unjustly severe. You have yourself experienced the wickedness and treachery of this court and cabinet. You cannot but recollect their manœuvres in your own select committee, and the treatment yourself as president received from these abandoned men. You cannot but recollect the black business of St. Vincents, by an opposition to which you acquired the highest and most deserved honour. I shall not trouble you with my opinion of the right of taxing America without her own consent, as I am afraid from what I have seen of your speeches, that you have already formed your creed upon this article ; but I will boldly affirm, had this right been established by a thousand statutes, had America admitted it from time immemorial, it would be the duty of every good Englishman to exert his utmost to divest Parliament of this right, as it must inevitably work the subversion of the liberties of the whole empire. The malady under which the State labours is indisputably derived from the inadequate representation of the subject, and the vast pecuniary in-

fluence of the crown. To add to this pecuniary influence and incompetency of representation is to insure and precipitate our destruction. To wish any addition, can scarcely enter the heart of a citizen who has the least spark of public virtue, and who is at the same time capable of seeing consequences the most immediate. I appeal, Sir, to your own conscience, to your experience and knowledge of our court and Parliament; and I request you to lay your hand upon your heart, and then answer with your usual integrity and frankness, whether, on the supposition . . . all be abject enough to submit to the terms imposed, you think a single guinea raised upon her would be applied to the purpose (as it is ostentatiously held out to deceive the people at home) of easing the mother country? Or whether you are not convinced that the whole they could extract would be applied solely to heap up still further the enormous fund for corruption which the crown already possesses, and of which a most diabolical use is made? On these principles I say, Sir, every good Englishman, abstracted of all regard for America, must oppose her being taxed by the British Parliament; for my own part I am convinced that no argument (not totally abhorrent to the spirit of liberty and the British constitution) can be produced in support of this right. But it would be impertinent to trouble you upon a subject which has been so amply, and in my opinion, so fully discussed. I find by a speech given as yours in the public papers, that it was by the King's positive command you embarked in this service. I am somewhat pleased that it is not an office of your own seeking, tho', at the same time, I must confess that it is very alarming to every virtuous citizen, when he sees men of sense and integrity (because of a certain profession) lay it down as a rule implicitly to

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obey the mandates of a court be they ever so flagitious. It furnishes, in my opinion, the best arguments for the total reduction of the army. But I am running into a tedious essay, whereas I ought to confine myself to the main design and purpose of this letter, which is to guard you and your colleagues from those prejudices which the same miscreants, who have infatuated General Gage, and still surround him, will labour to instil into you against a brave, loyal, and most deserving people. The avenues of truth will be shut up to you. I assert, Sir, that even General Gage will deceive you as he has deceived himself : I do not say he will do so designedly ; of that I do not think him capable ; but his mind is so totally poisoned, and his understanding so totally blinded by the society of fools and knaves, that he no longer is capable of discerning facts as manifest as the noon-day sun. I assert, Sir, that he is ignorant, that he has from the beginning been consummately ignorant of the principles, temper, disposition, and force of the colonies. I assert, Sir, that his letters to the ministry, at least such as the public have seen, are one continued tissue of misrepresentation, injustice, and tortured inferences from mis-stated facts. I affirm, Sir, that he has taken no pains to inform himself of the truth ; that he has never conversed with a man who has had the courage or honesty to tell him the truth.

“I am apprehensive that you and your colleagues may fall into the same trap, and it is the apprehension that you may be inconsiderately hurried by the vigour and activity you possess, into measures which may be fatal to many innocent individuals, may hereafter wound your own feelings, and which cannot possibly serve the cause of those who sent you, that has prompted me to address these lines to you. I most devoutly wish, that

your industry, valour, and military talents may be reserved for a more honourable and virtuous service against the natural enemies of your country (to whom our court are so basely complacent), and not be wasted in ineffectual attempts to reduce to the wretchedest state of servitude, the most meritorious part of your fellow subjects. I say, Sir, that any attempts to accomplish this purpose must be ineffectual. You cannot possibly succeed. No man is better acquainted with the state of this continent than myself. I have run through almost the whole colonies, from the north to the south, and from the south to the north. I have conversed with all orders of men, from the first estated gentlemen to the lowest planters and farmers, and can assure you that the same spirit animates the whole. Not less than a hundred and fifty thousand gentlemen, yeomen, and farmers, are now in arms, determined to preserve their liberties or perish. As to the idea that the Americans are deficient in courage, it is too ridiculous and glaringly false to deserve a serious refutation. I never could conceive upon what this notion was founded. I served several campaigns in America last war, and cannot recollect a single instance of ill behaviour in the provincials, where the regulars acquitted themselves well. Indeed we well remember some instances of the reverse, particularly where the great Colonel Grant (he who lately pledged himself for the general cowardice of America), ran away with a large body of his own regiment, and was saved from destruction by the valour of a few Virginians. Such preposterous arguments are only proper for the Rigby's and Sandwich's from whose mouths truth never issued, and to whose breasts truth and decency are utter strangers.

“ You will much oblige me in communicating this

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letter to General Howe, to whom I could wish it should be in some measure addressed, as well as to yourself. Mr. Howe is a man for whom I have ever had the highest love and reverence. I have honoured him for his own connections, but above all for his admirable talents and good qualities. I have courted his acquaintance and friendship, not only as a pleasure, but as an ornament—I flattered myself that I had obtained it. Gracious God! is it possible that Mr. Howe should be prevailed upon to accept of such an office! The brother of him, to whose memory the much injured people of Boston erected a monument, employed as one of the instruments of their destruction! But the fashion of the times it seems, is such as renders it impossible that he should avoid it. The commands of our most gracious Sovereign are to cancel all moral obligations, to sanctify every action, even those that the Satrap of an Eastern despot would start at. I shall now beg leave to say a few words with respect to myself and the part I act. I was bred up from my infancy in the highest veneration for the liberties of mankind in general. What I have seen of courts and Princes convinces me, that power cannot be lodged in worse hands than in theirs; and of all courts I am persuaded that ours is the most corrupt and hostile to the rights of humanity. I am convinced that a regular plan has been laid (indeed every act since the present accession evinces it) to abolish even the shadow of liberty from amongst us. It was not the demolition of the tea, it was not any other particular act of the Bostonians, or of the other provinces which constituted their crimes. But it is the noble spirit of liberty manifestly pervading the whole continent, which has rendered them the objects of ministerial and royal vengeance. Had they been notoriously of another

disposition, had they been *homines ad servitudinem paratos*, they might have made as free with the property of the East India Company as the felonious North himself did with impunity. But the Lords of St. James's, and their mercenaries of St. Stephen's well know, that as long as the free spirit of this great continent remains unsubdued, the progress they can make in their scheme of universal despotism will be but trifling. Hence it is that they wage inexpiable war against America. In short, this is the last asylum of persecuted liberty. Here, should the machinations and fury of her enemies prevail, that bright goddess must fly off from the face of the earth, and leave not a trace behind. These, Sir, are my principles; this is my persuasion, and consequentially I am determined to act. I have now, Sir, only to entreat that whatever measures you pursue, whether those which your real friends (myself amongst them) would wish or unfortunately those which our accursed misrulers shall dictate, you will still believe me to be personally, with the greatest sincerity and affection,

"Yours, &c.,

"C. LEE."

Between the despatch of this letter and its receipt by Burgoyne a full month had elapsed, during which the battle of Bunker's Hill had been fought, and the chances of reconciliation thus considerably lessened. With the concurrence of General Gage and his friends generally, Burgoyne (though it is an unusual proceeding for two opposed generals in subordinate posts, while engaged in war, to carry on a political correspondence) not only answered Lee, but proposed a meeting for the purpose of personal discussion :

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" BOSTON, *July 8th*, 1775.

" DEAR SIR,

" When we were last together in service, I should not have thought it within the vicissitude of human affairs that we should meet at any time, or in any sense, as foes. The letter you have honoured me with and my own feelings, combine to prove we are still far from being personally such.

" I claim no merit from the attentions you so kindly remember in the early periods of our acquaintance, but as they manifest how much it was my pride to be known for your friend ; nor have I departed from the duties of that character, when, I will not scruple to say, it has been almost general offence to maintain it : I mean since the violent part you have taken in the commotions of the Colonies.

" It would exceed the limits and the propriety of our present correspondence to argue at full the great cause in which we are engaged. But anxious to preserve a consistent and ingenuous character, and jealous I confess of having the part I sustain imputed to such motives as you intimate, I will state to you as concisely as I can the principles upon which, not voluntarily, but most conscientiously I undertook it.

" I have, like you, entertained from infancy a veneration for public liberty. I have likewise regarded the British constitution as the best safeguard of that blessing to be found in the history of mankind.

" The vital principle of the constitution, in which it moves and has its being, is the supremacy of the King in Parliament—a compound, indefinite, indefeasible power, coeval with the origin of the empire, and coextensive over all its parts.

" I am no stranger to the doctrines of Mr. Locke, and

others of the best advocates for the rights of mankind, upon the compacts always implied between the governing and governed, and the right of resistance in the latter when the compact shall be so violated as to leave no other means of redress. I look with reverence almost amounting to idolatry upon those immortal Whigs who adopted and applied such doctrine during part of the reign of Charles the First, and in that of James the Second.

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"Should corruption pervade the three estates of the realm so as to pervert the great ends for which they were instituted, and make the power vested in them for the good of the whole people operate, like an abuse of the prerogative of the Crown, to general oppression, I am ready to acknowledge that the same doctrine of resistance applies as forcibly against the abuses of the collective body of power, as against those of the Crown or either of the other component branches separately. Still always understood that no other means of redress can be obtained : a case I contend much more difficult to suppose when it relates to the whole than when it relates to parts.

"But in all cases that have existed or can be conceived, I hold that resistance, to be justifiable, must be directed against the usurpation of undue exercise of power ; and that it is most criminal when directed against any power itself inherent in the constitution.

"And here you will immediately discern why I drew a line in the allusion I made above to the reign of Charles the First. Towards the close of it the true principle of resistance was changed and a new system of government projected accordingly. The patriots previous to the Long Parliament and during great part of it, as well as the glorious revolutionists of 1688, resisted to vindicate and restore the constitution ; the republicans resisted to subvert it.

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"Now Sir, lay your hand upon your heart, as you have enjoined me to do on mine, and tell me to which of these purposes do the proceedings of America tend ?

"Is it the weight of taxes imposed, and the impossibility of relief after a due representation of her burthen, that has induced her to take arms ? Or is it a denial of the right of British legislation to impose them, and consequently a struggle for total independency ? For the idea of power that can tax externally, and not internally, and all the sophistry that attends it, tho' it may catch the weakness and the prejudice of the multitude in a speech or pamphlet, it is too preposterous to weigh seriously with a man of your understanding ; and I am confident you will admit the case to be fairly put. Is it then for a relief from taxes, or from the control of Parliament 'in all cases whatever' we are in war ? If for the former, the quarrel is at an end—there is not a man of sense and information in America who does not know it is in the power of the Colonies to put an end to the exercise of taxation immediately, and for ever. I boldly assert it because sense and information will also suggest to every man, that it can never be the interest of Britain after her late experience to make another trial.

"But if the other ground is taken, and it is intended to wrest from Great Britain a link of that substantial, and I hope perpetual chain by which the empire holds—think it not a ministerial mandate ; think it not a mere professional ardour ; think it not a prejudice against a part of our fellow subjects, that induces men of integrity, and among such you have done me the honour to class me, to act with vigour ; but be assured it is a conviction that the whole of our political system depends upon the preservation of its great and essential parts distinctly, and no part is so great and essential as suppre-

macy of legislation. It is a conviction, that as a King of England never appears in so glorious a light as when he employs the executive powers of the State to maintain the laws, so in the present exertions of that power, his Majesty is particularly entitled to our zeal and grateful obedience not only as soldiers but as citizens.

“These principles, depend upon it, actuate the army and fleet throughout. And let me at the same time add, there are few, if any, gentlemen among us who would have drawn their swords in the cause of slavery.

“But why do I bind myself to the navy and army? The sentiments I have touched are those of the great bulk of the nation. I appeal to the landed men who have so long borne burthens for America; I appeal to those trading towns who are sufferers by the dispute and the city of London at the head of them, notwithstanding the petitions and remonstrances which the arts of party and faction have extorted from some individuals; and last, because least in your favour, I appeal to the majorities in the houses of Parliament upon American questions this session. The most licentious news-writers want assurance to call these majorities ministerial; much less, will you give them that name when you impartially examine the characters that compose them—men of the most independent principles and fortunes, and many of them professedly in opposition to the court in the general line of their conduct.

“Among other supporters of British rights against American claims, I will not speak positively, but I firmly believe, I may name the man of whose integrity you have the highest opinion, and whose friendship is nearest your heart—I mean Lord Thanet, from whom my aide-de-camp has a letter for you, and also one from Sir Charles Danvers; I do not inclose them, because the

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writers, little imagining how difficult your conduct would render our intercourse, desired they might be delivered to your own hands.

“For this purpose as well as to renew ‘the rights of fellowship,’ I wish to see you ; and above all, I should find an interview happy if it should induce such explanations as might tend in their consequence to peace. I feel, in common with all around me, for the unhappy bulk of this country ; they foresee not the distress that is impending over them. I know Great Britain is ready to open her arms upon the first reasonable overture of accommodation : I know she is equally resolute to maintain her original rights ; and if the war proceeds, your one hundred and fifty thousand men will not be a match for her power.

“I put my honour to these assertions as you have done to others, and I claim the credit I am willing to give.

“The place I would propose for our meeting is the house upon Boston neck, just within our advanced sentries, called Brown’s house. I will obtain authority to give my parole of honour for your safe return. I shall expect the same on your part that no insult be offered me. If this plan is agreeable to you, name your day and hour. At all events, accept a sincere return of the assurances with which you honour me, and believe me in all personal considerations, affectionately yours.

“P.S.—I obeyed your commands to Generals Howe and Clinton. I also communicated your letter and my answer to Lord Percy. They all join me in compliments, and authorise me to assure you they do the same in principles.”

General Lee appears to have submitted this letter to Congress, who forbade the proposed meeting, and accordingly the following pithy note concludes this remarkable correspondence :—

"CAMBRIDGE, HEAD QUARTERS, *July 11th.*

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"General Lee's compliments to General Burgoyne. Would be extremely happy in the interview he so kindly proposed. But as he perceives that General Burgoyne has already made up his mind on this great subject; and as it is impossible that he [General Lee] should ever alter his opinion, he is apprehensive that the interview might create those jealousies and suspicions so natural to a people struggling in the dearest of all causes, that of their liberty, property, wives, children, and their future generation. He must, therefore, defer the happiness of embracing a man whom he most sincerely loves, until the subversion of the present tyrannical ministry and system, which he is persuaded must be in a few months, as he knows Great Britain cannot stand the contest. He begs General Burgoyne will send the letters which his Aide-de-Camp has for him. If Gardner is his Aide-de-Camp he desires his love to him."

With every desire to do justice to Burgoyne's motives, in which zeal for the public service undoubtedly predominated, it is difficult to reconcile his adoption of a friendly and familiar tone with the opinion he, at the time, expresses of his former companion in arms, and the vile use to which he had hoped to turn him, had he succeeded in obtaining the proposed interview. If an American General could have been found base enough¹ to purchase his restoration to the favour of his late Sovereign by gross treachery to his adopted country, an English General should surely not have thought it worthy of his character and position to bribe him to such an act.

¹ The treason of Arnold was not perpetrated till several years later.

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The applicability of these remarks must be sought in the following letter, addressed by Burgoyne to Lord North:—

“MY LORD,

“I had the honour to write to your lordship last month, in consequence of your very kind and confidential engagement with me before I left London, relative to my return home during the winter. . . .

“My present intrusion upon your lordship’s time is upon a different subject, but I persuade myself you will think it equally pardonable. I am unwilling the inclosed correspondence between me and an enemy, and which has unavoidably been printed, should fall into your hands without some explanation on my part. To preserve your good opinion, my Lord, is one reason why I think it necessary, and I confess I am also anxious to extend that explanation, through your lordship’s goodness, to the King.

“I dare say your lordship is well acquainted with the character of Mr. Lee, late half-pay major, and incendiary in the King’s service; at present, by a very strange progression for a man of his temper, Major-General and demagogue in the rebel army which forms the blockade of Boston. He served under me in Portugal,¹ and owed me obligations which in the very overflow of his misanthropy, he has since constantly acknowledged, and we have usually conversed upon a certain style of friendship.

“Soon after this gentleman’s arrival in the enemy’s camp, I received the first of the inclosed letters from him. It was my intention to have sent your lordship only extracts, leaving out those virulent apostrophes

¹ See *ante*, page 50.

which stand like oaths at Billingsgate, for expletives when reason fails ; but finding it was printed in the *New York Gazetteer* even before I received it, that it has been reprinted in all the American papers, and probably, by the same pains to circulate it, will find its way into the English ones, I send the letter entire, persuaded that the terms applied to your lordship will make about the same impression upon you in point of pain, that I found when he warns me of your offences towards me in point of resentment. . . .

“The great object I proposed to myself in my answer to Lee was to obtain an interview ; and had I succeeded I would have cut him short in that paltry jargon of invective alluded to above, and with which the infatuation of the vulgar is supported, and, laying Ministers aside, would have pressed upon him, to conviction if possible, the sentiments of the nation at large in support of Government ; the powers incident to such a support ; the probable operation of those powers, and the natural consequence to America ; the fallacy of the assertion that the ruin of Britain must necessarily be involved in that of America ; the phrenzy of British Colonies offering themselves to France or Spain, and the ignominy that would attend the mention of that circumstance in history, should it at the same time appear that their cause and character were thought too preposterous and profligate for our most inveterate enemies to accept them.

“All these points I think I could have maintained. I would next have represented the impossibility that any administration, even that of Lord Chatham, the supposed Messiah of America, could cede the supremacy of the British legislature as asserted in the Act of the 5th of the King, and in the Act from which it is

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copied, binding Ireland ; that nevertheless Great Britain, inclined as she is to peace, perhaps might not insist on a formal admission in words of the definitions of those Acts ; that to accede to the propositions of Parliament, or even to effectuate the purpose of them in another mode ; and to petition dutifully and in common form for a repeal of the laws that were grievous to them, leaving untouched those declaratory Acts, would be thought sufficient on one side ; and that the zealots on the other might still comfort themselves with the reflection that the question remained as much dormant as it was immediately after the repeal of the Stamp Act ; that the man who could make himself instrumental to these purposes would deserve the united thanks of the whole Empire ; and America herself, when her senses returned, would raise statues to his memory.

“ I would then have endeavoured to touch his pride, his interest, and his ambition. I know the ruling passion of Lee’s mind to be avarice—the foundation of his apostasy I believe to be resentment. I would have stated to him how naturally his disappointments in preferment arose from the indiscretion of his discourse and writings, which had not been bounded to Ministers, but had been daringly and unjustly levelled at the King himself ;—that, persuaded of the magnanimity of his Majesty’s mind, I should not yet think it impossible for him to cancel that and every other crime, even the high treason in which he was now engaged. The means were obvious—a return to the cause of his native country. I would not call it a conversion of sentiments, because no man would believe him sincere in those he professed on the other side—fools might be sincere in this rebellion ; knaves and men of desperate fortunes might be so—but in maintaining that public

virtue and the genuine flame of ancient liberty were really the springs of action in his associates sense and sincerity were incompatible.

“This would have been the general plan of my conversation, and I think it probable that a man of the character I have described, though he would have started at a direct bribe, might have caught at an overture of changing his party to gratify his interest, provided any salvo were suggested for his integrity—a point in which many a man fancies he possesses more than he really does. It is not impossible that the example of General Monk might have presented itself to his imagination, and though not with the same powers, he might have flattered himself with acting upon the same intentions: to restore the State. Had he discovered a tendency towards my purpose, it would have been for his Majesty to decide how far to proceed in encouragement, and during the suspense his inactivity at least would have been secured. Were he secretly bought over, the services he might do are great; and very great, I confess, they ought to be to atone for his offences.

“I trust, my Lord, after this explanation—and you will pardon its prolixity when so essential a point was in question—I shall stand acquitted to the King for the mild and, as they may appear, friendly terms in which I have corresponded with a man who has treated his person and Government with disrespect, and whose life stands forfeited to his country by an act of rebellion. The hopes of doing ultimately more service to his Majesty’s measures by the style I assumed, than by that of indignation, to which I was inclined, and those hopes alone, directed my pen.

“I hope I have also justified myself to your Lordship

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for my moderation; but a third purpose of troubling you so much at large with my abortive conference, is to learn your sentiments upon my ideas in general: that in case an opportunity should offer of holding discourse with the enemy after I have the honour of your answer, I may conduct myself with Lee, or with any other person, *mutatis mutandis*, upon the corrections and suggestions of your better judgment. I do not think such a meeting impossible hereafter, for I learn from pretty good intelligence (—though leave to meet me was refused to Lee after deliberation in Provincial Congress and upon the reason of jealousy which he frankly assigns in his second letter; yet that there were many partizans in the camp in favour of my sentiments, and who thought if they were avowed at home they were favourable to peace—) that the letter had been sent by a special messenger to Philadelphia, and was now before the Continental Congress.

“I have now, my Lord, to communicate to you another letter of Lee’s, and perhaps of much more importance.¹ It came under cover with the former, and was dated the day I received it. Your Lordship will find inclosed a manuscript copy of all the material part; and it appears to me that a much better use may be made of it than the immediate publication.

✱ ✱ “One striking circumstance upon the first view of it is that the rebels are more alarmed at the report of engaging the Indians than at any other measure. And I humbly think this letter alone shows the expediency of diligently preparing and employing that engine.

“Another most material circumstance is the writer’s assurance upon his positive knowledge—and he solemnly

¹ This letter is not forthcoming.

pledges his honour to the fact—that France and Spain are ready to accept the Colonies.

“I conceive it probable that your Lordship yourself, or by a Secretary of State, may communicate this last assertion to the Ministers of those Courts; and I take for granted, though it should be true, they will flatly deny it. I will not presume to say what different uses might be made of such an explanation; but one obvious one would be to publish it, in America at least, and thereby oblige Lee (who speaks and writes the language of Congress) to sit down under the imputation of having put his honour to a falsehood, or to exasperate him to further proof.

“It may happen, my Lord, that the jealousy professed of Lee may extend to many other men among our adversaries with whom I may wish to converse. I am aware (notwithstanding the intelligence I mentioned above of my letter being transmitted to Philadelphia, &c.—) that the leaders of the revolt may refuse for other reasons to admit me, or any well affected man, amongst them. It is more than probable they will be as much averse to trust their cause to fair discussion as to the fair field. Distant skirmish, ambush, entrenchment, concealment, are what they depend upon in debate as in arms; and, above all, they may dread an intercourse that, while it conduces in any degree to remove the delusion by which the multitude is led, may also discover to Government such exceptions to the seeming general infatuation as they know are still to be found, but who are kept, by the inquisitorial powers by which they are surrounded, from manifesting their sentiments. . . .

“I have the honour to be,” &c.

On the general aspect of affairs, Burgoyne writes under the same date to Lord Rochford:—

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“ Your Lordship will be apprised of the general state of things by General Gage's despatches. In regard to my opinion of them, nothing has happened since my last to increase my confidence. On the contrary, every day's observation robs me of some expectation, and I begin now to despair of the expedition of which I expressed promising hopes in my last. Enterprise is not ours. Inertness, or what is equal to it, attention to small objects, counteracts or procrastinates undertakings when no visible objection lies to them. But I take with great pleasure this opportunity to do justice to Mr. Gage; and the Admiral must take to himself, and account for, a great share of our inactivity, our disgrace, and our distress.

“ I will not undertake a task so useless at present, and so repugnant to my disposition, as to particularise instances of these misfortunes, but the glaring facts are not to be concealed: that many vessels have been taken, officers killed, men made prisoners; that large numbers of swift boats, called whale boats, have been supplied to the enemy at well known towns on the coast, in which boats they have insulted and plundered islands immediately under the protection of our ships, and at noonday landed in force and set fire to the lighthouse, almost under the guns of two or three men-of-war. I am not seaman enough to say that a vigilant and daring enemy, excellent boatmen, and knowing perfectly how to time winds, tides, and currents, might not possibly effect these exploits, in spite of any diligence on the other side; but I know not where an excuse will be found for not enforcing instant restitution and reparation where boats have been furnished, privateers fitted out, prizes carried in, or provisions refused. And this omission is the more extraordinary, because before the

proclamation of martial law, the Admiral breathed nothing but impatience and flame ; and since that I know General Gage has urged him in vain to put his former schemes in execution.

“It would be invidious to proceed. I have said enough, when compared with the observations I had the honour to transmit by the *Cerberus*, to prevent your Lordship forming any very sanguine expectations of this campaign. I am afraid it will require a good deal more activity than we have yet shown to prevent famine in the town, if not in the army, when winter approaches.

“General Gage appears to be not disinclined to an idea of evacuating Boston, if he can make himself master of New York, and of taking up his winter quarters there ; and there is much solid reasoning in favour of it. The post, in a military view, is much more important, and more proper to begin the operations of next campaign. In political consideration, yet more might be said for it, and in regard to general supply the neighbourhood of Long Island, and other adjacent islands, would afford some assistance that we want here. But on the other hand, to quit hold entirely of Massachusetts, at least before solid footing was obtained elsewhere, requires very mature reflection ; I would not be understood to give my opinion. The execution of the measure also would demand great foresight, secrecy, and other management. The inhabitants, friends of Government, must not be left behind ; they would require a vast quantity of shipping. The merchandise in the town, great part of which belongs to absentees, and ought to be confiscated, amounts, I am told, to the value of three hundred thousand pounds. That deposit ought surely to be detained ; to preserve it to the proprietors, if innocent ;

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to the public, where these should be guilty ; and from the use of the enemy in both cases. I think it possible General Gage may not have mentioned this circumstance to Government ; and I submit it to your Lordship as one of great importance, and upon which, I hope, orders will be sent from home ; for I foresee a man of the General's scrupulous integrity (a part of his character that entitles him to the greatest honour) may be induced rather to relinquish or burn warehouses upon an exigency, than subject his reputation to the breath of slander by laying his finger upon private property.

“ To revert for a moment to the point from which I have digressed. Though I profess myself unprepared for an opinion upon the expediency of evacuating Boston and its harbour entirely, in favour of New York, I have no scruple in declaring myself warmly for a spirited trial to possess both. I hope such reinforcements may be already destined for America (for it will be too late after the arrival of these despatches) as may make the trial desirable to the most cautious. If not, I think it will not want my proposal with the force we have, unless some unforeseen impediments intervene ; and I should be happy to be employed in the execution. But whether the scheme of leaving Boston takes place in the whole, in part, or not at all, be assured, my Lord, the army will be in danger of perishing with hunger and cold the ensuing winter, if the proper departments here do not fully represent, and the departments at home fully believe, the impossibility of any solid supply of any article whatsoever except from Britain or Ireland. At present the sick and wounded are without broth for want of fresh provisions, and the poor ensign cannot draw for his pay at less than 15 per cent. discount.

“ In zeal for the success and glory of the King's mea-

tures, I give you, my Lord, this confidential representation of things. The same motive will make me careful to conceal or discountenance any complaint or despondency here. Indeed I should be unjust to the prevailing disposition of the army if I assumed much credit to my colleagues or myself upon this account ; for men cannot be more attached to the cause of their country than they are, or bear wounds and hardship with a better grace."

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Burgoyne's letters of this period to Lord Dartmouth and other public men were much to the same effect as the foregoing ; but in most of them he expresses his anxious wish to return to England in the winter, as well as dissatisfaction with the state of military affairs in America. In a private letter to Mr. Ross, the sentiments of which he desires to be communicated to Lord Mansfield and Lord George Germain, the following passage occurs :—

"Many of the facts I have to relate, I disapprove and lament ; but I desire not to be understood to convey blame to any particular quarter. I am too little acquainted with instructions and springs of action to investigate errors or point out the authors. You must take, I believe, a full share to yourselves at home ; some, it must be confessed, have been committed here."

Burgoyne's enemies accused him of having at this time endeavoured to curry favour with the Ministry at the sacrifice of the political principles he professed, but on the American question he had from the first, as his speeches in Parliament and his letters testify, differed from his party, nor had he ever hesitated openly to avow his opinions on the subject. In a private letter to his friend Charles Fox of 27th July, he says :

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"Nothing that has happened ought to alter my original opinions of our cause and our enemy ; I look for consistent measures from Government, and shall act with zeal to support them."

Throughout this conflict, his military instincts had swayed his political bent of mind, but he expressed his views, such as they were, with all candour and loyalty.

Complaints as to the treatment of prisoners, not altogether without good grounds, had reached the American Commander-in-chief, who addressed the following remonstrance to General Gage:—

"CAMBRIDGE, *August 11th*, 1775.

"SIR,

"I understand that the officers engaged in the cause of liberty and their country, who by the fortune of war, have fallen into your hands, have been indiscriminately thrown into a common gaol appropriated for felons. That no consideration has been had for those of the most respectable rank, when languishing with wounds and sickness. That some have been even amputated in this unworthy situation.

"Let *your* opinion, Sir, of the principle which actuates them be what it may, *they* suppose they act from the noblest of all principles, a love of freedom and their country. But political opinions, I conceive, are foreign to this point ; the obligations arising from the rights of humanity and claims of rank, are universally binding and extensive, except in case of retaliation. These I should have hoped would have dictated a more tender treatment of those individuals whom chance or war has put in your power. Nor can I forbear suggesting its

fatal tendency to widen that unhappy breach, which you and those Ministers under whom you act, have repeatedly declared you wished to see for ever closed.

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"My duty now makes it necessary to apprise you that for the future I shall regulate my conduct towards those gentlemen who are or may be in our possession, exactly by the rule which you shall observe towards those of ours who may be in your custody. If severity and hardship mark the line of your conduct (painful as it may be to me) your prisoners will feel its effects: but if kindness and humanity are shown to ours, I shall with pleasure consider those in our hands only as unfortunate, and they shall receive the treatment to which the unfortunate are ever entitled.

"I beg to be favoured with an answer as soon as possible.

"And I am, Sir,

"Your most obedient and very humble servant,

"G. WASHINGTON."

The copy of this letter is endorsed by Burgoyne—"From Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the rebel army, to General Gage"—and the answer as entered in the letter book is headed—"As wrote by me; one sentence which does not appear here was added by the General."

"SIR,

"To the glory of civilized nations, humanity and war have been made compatible, and compassion to the subdued is become almost a general system.

"Britons, ever pre-eminent in mercy, have outgone common examples, and overlooked the criminal in the captive.

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"Upon these principles your prisoners, whose lives by the law of the land are destined to the cord, have hitherto been treated with care and kindness—indiscriminately, it is true, for I acknowledge no rank that is not derived from the King.

"My intelligence from your army would justify severe recrimination. I understand there are some of the King's faithful subjects, taken some time since by the rebels, now labouring like negro slaves to gain their daily subsistence ; while others are reduced to the wretched alternative to perish by famine or take arms against their King and country. Those who have made the treatment of the prisoners in my hands, or of your other friends in Boston, a pretence for such measures, found barbarity upon falsehood.

"I would sincerely hope, Sir, that the sentiments of liberality which I have always believed you to possess, will be exerted to correct these misdoings. Be temperate in political disquisition ; give free operation to truth ; and punish those who deceive and misrepresent ; and not only the effects but the causes of this unhappy conflict will be removed.

"Should those under whose usurped authority you act, control such a disposition, and dare to call severity retaliation—to God who knows all hearts be the appeal for the dreadful consequences. I trust that British soldiers asserting the rights of the State, the law of the land, the being of the Constitution, will meet all events with becoming fortitude. They will court victory with the spirit their cause inspires, and from the same motive will find the patience of martyrs in misfortune.

"I am, Sir, &c., &c.

"THOMAS GAGE,

"Lieut.-General."

Read by the light of subsequent history, there is something irresistibly ludicrous in a man of the calibre of General Gage thus solemnly lecturing George Washington upon his political and social duties ; but let it be remembered that, at the time, it was the King's armed representative addressing a rebellious subject ; one to whom, in the following year, General Howe, then acting as one of the British Commissioners, refused his military title, until the positive orders of Congress that no communication addressed to George Washington, Esq., should be received by their Commander-in-Chief, compelled him to waive the point, and to concede the appellations of General and Excellency.¹

It must always be a matter of some difficulty to determine the precise boundary line between war and rebellion, and to decide when it is justifiable for the agents of an empire engaged in upholding its authority against intestine resistance, to acknowledge rebellious subjects as belligerents, and therefore as equals. General Gage's declaration that he could acknowledge "no rank but that conferred by the King," and that all prisoners taken in arms by him were "by the law of the land destined to the cord," was denounced by the Americans as ridiculous bravado, or sheer barbarism ; yet language almost identical was used by American statesmen and generals towards their fellow-citizens in the Southern

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¹ Colonel Patterson, the English Adjutant-General, in a personal interview with Washington, weakly attempted to explain that no disrespect was intended by this mode of address, and that "&c., &c., &c.," was meant to include his military titles. Washington replied that though he would "never sacrifice essentials to punctilio, his duty to Congress, who had conferred his rank upon him, compelled him to insist upon its being recognized by the British Commissioners ; and that though '&c., &c., &c.' might imply *everything*, it might also imply *anything*." See Marshall's *Life of Washington*.

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States during the late civil war, and throughout that protracted struggle the Confederates were described in official documents as "rebels."

During this troubled period, and in the midst of his more serious duties, Burgoyne found time to contribute to the social resources of Boston, and to encourage all amusements calculated to dispel that despondency so commonly affecting an army in a state of enforced inactivity before an enemy.

Among other entertainments given by the garrison was a series of private theatricals, and on the occasion of the performance of *Zarah*, in September, he wrote the prologue and epilogue, the former of which was spoken by Lord Rawdon, and the latter by "a young lady ten years old." In these compositions, he good-humouredly ridicules the prudery and Puritan severity of the Bostonians, but urges the English troops to

" Unite the warrior's with the patriot's care,
And whilst you burn to conquer, wish to spare ; "

while the young lady's concluding moral points to the naughtiness of rebellion, and lays it down that :

" Duty in female breasts should give the law,
And make e'en love obedient to Papa ; "

By the middle of August, the position of the British army in Boston had become a very precarious one. Hemmed in on the land side by an insurgent force, numerically very superior, strongly entrenched, and operating from a base which afforded every facility of supply and reinforcement ; deriving little or no advantage from the command of the sea by our fleet, devoid of magazines, short of provisions, and deficient in every

material essential of military efficiency, their enforced inactivity under many privations, which operations in the field would have rendered endurable, seriously threatened to impair the *morale*, and to destroy the discipline of the troops.

Horace Walpole describes the situation in his most ironical tone in a letter to the Rev. W. Mason, on the 7th of August, 1775 :

"Mrs. Britannia orders her Senate to proclaim America a continent of cowards, and vote it should be starved, unless it would drink tea with her. She sends her only army to be besieged in one of her towns, and half her fleet to besiege the *terra firma* ; but orders her army to do nothing, in hopes that the American Senate in Philadelphia *will be so frightened at the British army being besieged in Boston that it will sue for peace.*"

With a vacillating policy at home (for at this time the ministerial pendulum vibrated between the extremes of alarm and resentment) and an incompetent General and apathetic Admiral¹ to carry out instructions abroad, every day's delay gave encouragement and strength to the insurgents, and spread despondency among the supporters of the imperial rule.

Burgoyne, in common with Howe and Clinton, fully appreciated the danger of the position, and strongly urged decisive action. His own project is set forth in a memorandum which he submitted to General Gage on

¹ See Burgoyne's remarks on the fleet in his letter of 20th August to Lord George Germain. The king writes to Lord North, 28th July, 1775, "I do think the Admiral's (Graves) removal as necessary, if what is reported is founded, as the mild General's" (Gage). He was accordingly recalled and replaced by Lord Howe. *Aquila non capit muscas*, the motto chosen by Admiral Graves on his elevation to the peerage, may be meant to explain that it was a contempt for rebels which led to their not being interfered with.

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the 17th of August. In this he shows that the blockade by the enemy could not be removed until the army was able to advance into the country in force, and for this purpose it would require large means of transport, with which it was quite unprovided, and which it could not obtain from the fleet. He therefore recommends the evacuation of Boston, and the concentration of the army at New York. In the latter place he shows that it would be less harassed by the enemy, that the situation was more favourable for supply from the sea, and that it would afford a better base for operations in the spring.

If the General commanding should not be disposed to take a step of so much consequence as the evacuation of Boston, without the sanction of his Majesty, which could hardly be expected before the middle of October, he proposes a previous expedition of 2,000 men to secure Rhode Island,—leaving 4,000 for the defence of Boston and Charlestown heights. He calculates that the first probable effect of this expedition from Boston would be a partial dismemberment of the rebel army of Massachusetts, owing to the natural impatience among the members of a body so composed to defend their own homes, which they would consider to be exposed ; in this case, the expeditionary force could be reinforced. At any rate, it would be giving the law to the enemy instead of receiving it, as they were doing at present, and they could take advantage of their superiority at sea to threaten several points at once.

Should it be decided that the main army must winter at Boston, he points out that part of the expedition might be drawn back, leaving about 1,200 men, who, with a proper proportion of artillery, and assisted with armed vessels, would hold Rhode Island.

The original memorandum enters into many minute

details for the execution of this scheme, which it is unnecessary to insert here. It will be seen that Burgoyne, in his letters to the Ministers at home, alluded more than once to his project of an attack upon Rhode Island ; but this appears to be the first time that he drew out the plan in detail, and submitted it to the Commander-in-Chief in America.

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There can scarcely be a question as to this plan of operations being, from every point of view, preferable to that ultimately adopted by General Howe, who allowed month after month to pass till finally,¹ what at an earlier period would have produced a certain moral effect, if no great military result, as an offensive operation, took the form of a hurried and ignominious retreat.

Burgoyne's spirit, it is clear, chafed under a state of things so little creditable to the King's cause, and there is no reason to believe that, in giving vent to his feelings in the following letter to Lord George Germain, he had in any way exaggerated the actual condition of the army and navy :—

“ BOSTON, 20th August, 1775.

“ MY LORD,

“ I have never lost the remembrance of the honour you did me in permitting me to write to you, and I rely upon your Lordship's candour not to consider my silence hitherto as inconsistent with that profession. The occasions of writing confidentially have been few, and those generally so sudden as barely to leave time to despatch letters of business and family concern. . . .

“ The notoriety of the event of the 19th of April ; the

¹ On his evacuation of Boston and the embarkation of the army for Halifax.

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general revolt which ensued ; the blockade of Boston ; the action of the 17th of June upon Charlestown heights, and many other occurrences previous to the return of the *Cerberus*, necessarily stated in all public letters, and commented upon in all private ones, will much abridge my undertaking at present.

"Your Lordship's insight into men and things will make my reflections equally superfluous upon the parts of our present dilemma imputable at home. Whatever party in America may father this rebellion, *all* parties in England have contributed to nurse it into strength. Inconsistencies and contradictions, by a strange fatality of the times, have lost their usual nature. Ministry and Opposition, faction and meekness of spirit, principles the most incongruous, have in effect operated to the same end ;—till after a fatal procrastination, not only of vigorous measures, but of preparation for such, we took a step as decisive as the passage of the Rubicon, and found ourselves plunged at once in a most serious war, without a single requisite, gunpowder excepted, for carrying it on.

"Such was the beginning of the campaign ; and the almost only circumstance upon which the mind can rest with a moment's satisfaction since, is the victory obtained at Charlestown by the spirit and conduct of Mr. Howe, and the exemplary, I might almost say unexampled, bravery of the officers under him.

"It would depreciate this victory to estimate only its immediate effects. Great as they are, they do not more than compensate the heavy loss by which it was bought. But in one consideration it may be esteemed most important ; it re-establishes the ascendancy of the King's troops in public opinion, and enables us to rest upon our arms, or even to close the war, should the enemy so

incline, with an impression, not only beneficial to the present circumstances of England, but to the general repose of mankind. I believe in most states of the world, as well as our own, the respect and control and subordination of Government at this day, in great measure depends upon the idea that trained troops are invincible against any number or any position of undisciplined rabble ; and this idea was a little in suspense since the 19th of April.

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“ I have one remaining subject of congratulation for your Lordship and other friends of Government, and with that I am afraid I must close all the agreeable part of my intelligence. It is, however, highly satisfactory. The army is firmly attached in principle to the cause of Britain ; the private men, a very few rascally drafts and recruits from Irish jails excepted, have not deserted. On the contrary, they appear in general exasperated against their enemy ; and as to the officers, no men ever fought or endured hardship with more alacrity and distinguished fortitude.

“ Occasion will doubtless be taken in England, as well as in America, to extol the defence of the rebels at Charlestown, and the report of our loss will assist prejudices. But nothing happened there, or in any of the little affairs since, that raises them in my opinion one jot above the level of all men expert in the use of firearms ; Corsicans, Miquelets, Croats, Tartars, mountaineers and borderers, in almost all countries, have in their turns done much more hardy things than defend one of the strongest posts that nature and art combined could make, and then run away. In short, it is as preposterous to recur to Sparta and Athens for comparisons to their courage, as it is to suppose their spring of action in this revolt analogous to the genuine spirit

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of liberty that guided those states. But the multitude are zealous, and the leaders, though often the most profligate hypocrites, have among them very able men. I believe Adams to be as great a conspirator as ever subverted a state. I cannot help quoting a passage of a letter from him to his wife, intercepted the other day, and which I conclude is transmitted with some others to Lord Dartmouth:—

“‘The business’ (says he) ‘I have had upon my mind has been as great and important as can be entrusted to man, and the difficulty and intricacy of it is prodigious—a constitution to form for a great empire—a country of fifteen hundred miles in extent to fortify—millions to train and arm—a naval power to begin—an extensive commerce to regulate—a standing army of twenty-seven thousand men to raise, pay, and victual, and officer, &c.’

“In another confidential letter to a friend, intercepted at the same time, after expressing great dissatisfaction against one of his tools (I conclude he means Handcock,¹ president of the Continental Congress, whom he calls a piddling genius), he goes on thus:—‘We ought to have had in our hands a month ago the whole legislative executive and judicial of the whole continent, and have completely modelled a constitution; to have raised a naval power, and opened all our ports wide; to have arrested every friend of Government on the Continent, and held them as hostages for the poor victims in Boston. Shall I hail you Speaker of the House’ (meaning a Provincial Congress), ‘or councillor, or what? What sort of magistrates do you intend to make? Will your new legislative and executive feel bold or irresolute? Will your judicial hang, and whip, and fine, and imprison without scruple?’ &c. &c.

¹ There are no apparent grounds for this conclusion of Burgoyne’s.

"The bare effort of investigating such objects argues an aspiring and vigorous mind: but when it is considered that with a profligate character, a very unpopular origin in party, neither supported by pecuniary nor political interest, nor ascending to factious eminence by the footsteps of any leader or patron; that merely by the exercise of his parts, availing himself of the temper and prejudices of the times, he has cajoled the opulent, drawn in the wary, deluded the vulgar, till all parties in America, and some in Great Britain, are puppets in his string; when the contrivance, and extent, and execution of his present plans as far as they appear or are conceived, are examined, I am persuaded your Lordship will, with me, lose sight of Catiline or Cromwell in passing judgment upon his character.

"Be assured, my Lord, this man soars too high to be allured by any offer Great Britain can make to himself or to his country. America, if his counsels continue in force, must be subdued or relinquished. She will not be reconciled.

"I will not presume to suggest measures for proceeding in either of the extremes with honour to Britain. Your Lordship's acute discernment will best point them out. Nor would I willingly lead your attention from objects of that magnitude to the very inferior ones of this campaign. I shall therefore say very little upon it.

"The blockade of Boston cannot be effectually relieved. Not that I think it impossible, even with our disparity of numbers, to dislodge the enemy from their present posts; but that neither having bread-waggons, bāt horses, sufficient artillery horses, nor other articles of *attirail* necessary for an army to move at a distance; nor numbers to keep up posts of communication and convoys (had we even magazines to be convoyed), it

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would be impossible after success to open the country so as to force supplies.

"Conceiving therefore that an attack upon the adjacent entrenchments might be attended with considerable loss and no possible advantage, my colleagues and I have been unanimous (as indeed we have been upon every other matter) to advise operations at a distance.

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"My own favourite plan is a descent at Rhode Island, where I would entrench; and I think it might be effected with two thousand men and some frigates. I have set forth in a memorandum to General Gage the advantages that I think possessing that post would afford, not only as a diversion that might probably disperse the army before Boston, but likewise as it is of importance to cover and facilitate greater designs.

"I confess a despair of seeing this or any other enterprise take place—our efforts at best have but the disappointed vigour of a dream :

" ' Nequicquam extendere cursus
Velle videmur, et in mediis conatibus ægri
Succidimus.'

"The representation I have touched may seem to carry imputation to General Gage. I check my pen whenever that thought comes across me, for I have a most sincere value for his character, which is replete with virtues and with talents. That it is not of a cast proper for his present situation, I allow; and hence many, though far from all, of our misfortunes. To have prevented, or to have redeemed the circumstances of this war, required a man of the greatest resources of mind—of a spirit not to be overborne by difficulties; but above all of a resolution to act upon the occasion; in events which the King's servants at home could not

have foreseen, to substitute reason and principle for orders—to state his motives—and whatever were the fortune of his undertakings, to submit his honour and his head to the judgment of his country.

“If this character in the present age be not quite ideal, it is at least so rare as to admit us to mention where it fails without disparagement or offence to a respectable officer and friend.

“It may be asked in England, ‘What is the Admiral doing?’

“I wish I were able to answer that question satisfactorily; but I can only say what he is *not* doing.

“That he is *not* supplying us with sheep and oxen, the dinners of the best of us bear meagre testimony; the state of our hospitals bears a more melancholy one.

“He is *not* defending his own flocks and herds, for the enemy have repeatedly plundered his own islands.

“He is *not* defending the other islands in the harbour, for the enemy in force landed from a great number of boats, and burned the lighthouse at noonday (having first killed and taken the party of marines which was posted there) almost under the guns of two or three men-of-war.

“He is *not* employing his ships to keep up communication and intelligence with the King’s servants and friends at the different parts of the continent, for I do not believe General Gage has received a letter from any correspondent out of Boston these six weeks.

“He is intent upon greater objects, you will think,—supporting in the great points the dignity of the British flag,—and where a number of boats have been built for the enemy; privateers fitted out; prizes carried in; the

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King's armed vessels sunk ; the crews made prisoners, the officers killed,—he is doubtless enforcing instant restitution and reparation by the voice of his cannon and laying the towns in ashes that refuse his terms ? Alas ! he is not. British thunder is diverted or controlled by pitiful attentions and mere Quaker-like scruples ; and under such influences, insult and impunity, like righteousness and peace, have kissed each other.

“ I should have hesitated in giving an account that may appear invidious, had not the facts been too notorious to expose me to that censure, and my feelings in this great cause too sensible to observe them without some impatience. Upon the whole, when the supineness of this department is added to the diffidence of the other ; and the defects of Quartermaster-Generals, Adjutant-Generals, Secretaries, and Commissaries, are superadded to both, they will make altogether a mass of inefficiencies that I am afraid would counteract and disappoint the ablest counsels in the world.

“ You will now, my Lord, indulge me with a moment's patience if I say one word of myself. I have experienced, in fact, all I foresaw of an irksome situation before I left England, and much more. It is hard to conceive so absolute a cypher in a military light as the youngest Major-General in this army. I have been brought from the most interesting concerns, pleasures, duties of life, to partake of every inconvenience that can be supposed to exist in a town invested on one side, asleep on the other ; and from both those and some other causes, destitute of fresh provision, money, and all those common comforts which habit makes almost necessities, and with scarcely any other employment than to contemplate errors that I cannot redress.

"I do not complain of this rough lot of service. I only lament the little use that is made of me. Every sentiment I feel in this great cause tells me (and I trust I am free from vanity in those sensations) I deserve a more active station. My private motives, therefore, are not more prevalent than public ones when I solicit leave to return to England. A proposal for making myself serviceable was transmitted to Lord North some time ago, and I conclude it has been communicated to your Lordship. I mean to be a faithful intelligencer to Government, and, if I can, a useful one to Parliament; and shall be ready to cross the Atlantic back again in the spring, should the war continue, and be extended enough to make my presence useful.

"I have delivered my opinion of our circumstances with freedom, my Lord, but I hope without acrimony. I bear sincere friendship to some, and enmity to none of the persons to whom I have alluded. I have not withheld important truths, because I am persuaded that the knowledge of them under your Lordship's management may be beneficial to this great national crisis; and confiding in your Lordship's discretion, and I venture to add friendship, not to commit the author, I have only to finish this long intrusion upon your time with sincere profession of the very profound respect with which

"I have the honour to be

"Your Lordship's," &c. &c.

"P.S.—Since writing the above, a provision of cattle is come in, and I hope it will have speedy effect upon the health of the camp; but we owe it to the transports armed and sent out by General Gage, and not to any assistance from the fleet."

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In a letter of the same date to Mr. Thurlow,¹ introducing Mr. Sewell, the Attorney-General of Massachusetts, as one "whom the distressed state of America induces to take refuge with his family in England, where he is an entire stranger," he says :—

"If we turn our reflections from the military to the political system, as little real will be found to change our judgment upon the cause or leaders of the revolt. The former has always appeared to me founded upon false principle, and supported only by sophistry and frenzy; the latter I have ever believed to be profligate hypocrites, but I am now convinced that with their hypocrisy they have great ability. Adams,² who has certainly taken Cromwell for his model, and who perhaps guides secret counsels with more address, soars too high in personal ambition to incline to accommodation. Depend upon it, Franklin, and greater than Franklin, the instruments and movers of American faction here and in England, are equally this man's dupes."

In conclusion, he again harps upon the unsatisfactory nature of his own employment; and speaks with a mock humility which cannot fail to provoke a smile—and which probably provoked a more forcible expression of feeling in Thurlow—of those literary performances which, for want of military employment, he had undertaken, and of which he was evidently not a little vain.

"In regard to myself (forgive me for detaining you a moment with the mention of such a cypher) I am placed

¹ Then His Majesty's Attorney-General, afterwards Lord Chancellor.

² John Adams, the first representative of the United States at the Court of St. James's, and who succeeded Washington as President. Burgoyne's remarks on his character are ludicrously unjust; he was as upright and honourable as he was able, and a man of whom his country has every reason to feel proud.

in a situation that leaves me little more than contemplation for employment, except when I am sometimes called upon to draw a pen instead of a sword. If the proclamation for the exercise of martial law, the correspondence with Lee, or the answer to Washington upon the subject of rebel prisoners, fall into your hands, I request you to consider these productions with all the allowances your candour can suggest—not as voluntary undertakings, but proceeding from a principle to refuse no task assigned to me, and to deal out vigour where I could in this great cause, though by the exercise of a weapon for which I was most unfit.

“My spirits do not droop; but I confess they are unquiet under the insignificancy of the part I am brought from all the nearest and dearest interest of life to sustain. Useless here, I have claimed on truly zealous motives, stations of activity and use elsewhere.”

By the same opportunity he writes to Lord Rochford, inclosing some intercepted letters from Adams, who, he says, “appears to me to write with the conciseness of Tacitus. He opens matter for a volume in half a sentence. I hope his general and political judgment be not, like the same author’s, as acute as his expression.”

The home Government was by this time fully sensible of the precarious condition of our army in Boston, and Lord Dartmouth accordingly, early in August, sounds General Gage as to the propriety of at once removing his forces to Canada and Nova Scotia (“if Boston should not be tenable in the winter, as many here think”), leaving considerations of the next year’s campaign dependent upon the turn which events might take in the interval, but conveying the determination of the Ministry to push the war with vigour in the spring, to which end the King’s army should be in-

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creased to 20,000 men, exclusive of Canadians and Indians.¹

There was indeed but little encouragement to be derived by England from a retrospect of the military operations which by the beginning of September had come to a complete standstill for want of the first essentials of successful warfare—a general to direct, a staff to carry out orders, a commissariat to provide the material of war, and money to subsist the troops.

Burgoyne's gloomy picture, as sent to a private friend² in the month of September, vividly recalls similar representations made during the first year of our Crimean Campaign, and it may afford some consolation to that large class of military officers who have at the present time a grievance, to find that the same disposition to shabby economies, of which such loud complaints are now made against the War Office, was charged against that department a century ago in much the same terms; and that then, as now, it was the custom to attribute these acts to subordinate officials rather than to the responsible chiefs.

"Our present situation is a consummation of inertness and disgrace. You will be told we are on the point of

¹ Lord Dartmouth writes—"The steps which you say the rebels have taken for calling in the assistance of the Indians, leave no room to hesitate upon the propriety of our pursuing the same measure. For this purpose I inclose to you a letter to Colonel Johnstone, containing His Majesty's commands for engaging a body of Indians." There is no question but that the colonists, although they condemned the employment of Indians as barbarous when directed against themselves, had early in the struggle made arrangements for enlisting them as allies. They had been employed, without remonstrance from any quarter, in the Canadian war against the French; and in spite of all the sentimentalism wasted upon this subject in England and America, the strongest argument against the services of these men was their entire uselessness and their want of discipline.

² The letter bears no address, but would from internal evidence appear to have been written to Sir Gilbert Elliot.

removing the blockade : I believe we are ; and I doubt not the troops will recover their reputation. I am confident of their future ascendancy, but we have not a magazine of any sort, nor any provision or preparation whatever that can enable an army to advance twenty miles, nor do I see a possibility of remedying these defects *now*, except by great and sudden exertions in England. I seek to blame nobody. General Gage is entitled to my respect and esteem upon every principle that can commend a private character. He is amiable for his virtues, but he is not equal to his situation.

“ The things that call most immediately for remedy are, first, exertion in the department of the Quarter-master-General ; the present one means well, and is always busy ; but I am afraid his *ideas* only go to supply the army from hand to mouth, and I wish his abilities may go so far ; in regard to the other parts of his office, knowledge of ground, propriety of position, arrangement and conduct of convoys, &c., I am afraid he will be found still more deficient. The department of Adjutant-General is also all peace, parade, and St. James's Park. I wish these gentlemen properly provided for, for they have no demerits that I know of but unfitness for their employment in the present exigency.

“ A still greater deficiency remains behind—money. General Gage told me, within this week, he had not more in his treasurer's hands than would supply the next month's subsistence ; none can possibly be got for bills, not even at 10 per cent. discount, which has been the rate at which the officers of the army have been compelled to draw for their private pay for some time past. He expected £40,000 by the *Cerberus*, being the balance of £50,000 which he was officially informed *was* issued, and of which he received ten. Not a guinea more is

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come. In what contractor or clerk's hands is the interest of that sum? Together with money, for God's sake urge the Minister to encourage the General in the use of it for secret service. I am bold to say he has not proper intelligence of what passes within half a mile of us,—perhaps his best is such as can be obtained by a spying glass, or from common report often calculated to deceive him. I am bold to say, also, money well bestowed would bring intelligence, and more than intelligence, not only from the camp, but from the councils which direct the camp."

He then proceeds to narrate at length, in almost the same words which he had previously used in his letter to General Harvey, the treatment he and his colleagues had experienced in pecuniary matters; no intimation having been received by General Gage of the £500 gratuity which they had been given to understand he was instructed to pay them; the General's inability to give them their personal pay, or even their forage money; and when an ounce of fresh provision could only be obtained by a high price of ready money, his "calm advice to them as a friend" to write to their agents in England, to send them cash from thence. He concludes by saying:—

"No man who knows Howe, Clinton, or myself, will think that our resentment of the dirtiness of office will influence our zeal in the King's service. Our thoughts, language, and actions, have been invariably employed, and will continue to be so, to conceal errors, to make the best of appearances, to flatter expectations, to advance measures of vigour; and it is with pride I add we have agreed to a tittle in our sentiments, both when we have been called upon for advice, and when we have given it unasked. But whenever the duty to the service is over,

occasions may be found in proper places and at proper times, to hold a comment that shall make the ears ring of those underlings who have played these tricks, for I entirely in my mind acquit the superiors in office.

“You will perhaps hear that I have applied for leave to return home upon my private affairs in the course of the winter, provided my presence can then be dispensed with, and the King’s service not suffer. I trust that you will credit me that I shall readily forego making use of that indulgence if any operation in the field should offer wherein professional duty or personal honour is concerned. I will add that I should be scrupulous in this application, if I had not hopes that a scheme which I have proposed to combine with my return may be of assistance to the great general cause. The present occasion does not permit me to open myself farther upon that head.”

Before embarking for America, the King had desired Lord North to signify to Burgoyne that he “very much approved of his request of coming home during the time the troops cannot be employed the next winter, as it will be of importance to his private affairs, and he will besides be able to bring a very full account of the minds and dispositions of the people of that part of the globe;” adding: “I desire you will not mention this to any one, and I shall keep as exact a silence on this subject.”¹

So well did Lord North observe the secrecy enjoined, that he did not mention the subject even to the person most interested, Burgoyne himself, who, not knowing that his request had been granted by the King, made repeated applications for leave of absence, which he

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¹ Donne, *North Correspondence*.

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finally obtained from Lord Dartmouth in November, when he returned to England.

General Gage had been recalled in the previous month, nominally, as the King wrote to Lord North, "that he may explain the various wants for carrying on the next campaign;" but the supersession of the "mild General" by Sir William Howe had then been determined on.

CHAPTER V.

CANADA.

1776—1777.

TOWARDS the end of 1775 the star of the colonists was everywhere in the ascendant. From Virginia to Canada the imperial authority was defied, and the British arms were successfully resisted. Lord Dunmore had been driven out of his stronghold in Norfolk, and obliged to take refuge with the fleet; the King's troops had been expelled from Charlestown; General Howe's army lay besieged in Boston; Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the key to the Canadian provinces, had been captured, and Quebec was closely invested by land and water. Some months must yet pass before reinforcements could arrive from England; and every day's inactivity gave strength and confidence to the insurgents. No more was now heard of claims for the redress of grievances or the repeal of obnoxious laws; Congress was established on the basis of independence, and the Commander-in-Chief whom it had appointed was vigorously organizing new armies throughout the thirteen provinces for the complete overthrow of the imperial rule.

In the meantime the English Cabinet was almost

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exclusively engaged in concerting means for the re-establishment of the royal authority in America, and Burgoyne was called into their councils and invited to submit his views as to the military operations to be undertaken in the ensuing year. These he set forth at length in a paper entitled "Reflections upon the War in America;" and though this was written under the impression that Quebec had fallen,¹ his favourite project was already that of an expedition from Canada into the heart of the disaffected districts.

He insists upon the vital importance of a more effective blockade of the coast with a view to cutting off supplies, and to this end suggests the employment of "a number of smaller armed vessels, from the sloop or schooner of eighty or ninety tons to the row-boat. Each of the great ships, frigates and sloops of war, would thus resemble a primary planet with its satellites oscillating round it; the lesser cruisers or satellites being from their size adapted for peeping into every hole and inlet, and for navigating every passage or sound, would be to the fleet what the light infantry are to the troops." He next points to the necessity of our land forces being equipped in a manner better suited to the peculiar features of the country and mode of warfare. His experience in Boston has somewhat qualified his contempt for the military capacity of the colonists, but he still greatly underestimates the fighting power of his future enemy.

"It is not to be expected that the rebel Americans will risk a general combat or a pitched battle, or even stand at all, except behind entrenchments as at Boston. Accustomed to felling of timber and to grubbing up

¹ "Quebec being in the hands of the rebels will prove no impediment to our armies passing above it; the experience of the year 1759, when our fleet and navy pushed past it, leaves all doubt upon that matter fully decided."

trees, they are very ready at earthworks and palisading, and will cover and entrench themselves wherever they are for a short time left unmolested with surprising alacrity. Many officers of rank and reputation in the British army, who have served in America, have given opinions of the American militia, which were, it seems, formed from their observation, to which the writer hereof cannot subscribe that of his own. It is indeed true that the troops sent by some of the northern colonies to join the general cause of the late war were in many respects unfit to be reckoned upon at all as soldiers, but it ought to be remembered that such as answered the description alluded to were not the yeomanry of the countries from which they were sent, but only the substitutes. Those, however, who have been well led, did upon many occasions behave well.

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“Composed as the American army is, together with the strength of the country, full of woods, swamps, stone walls, and other enclosures and hiding places, it may be said of it that every private man will in action be his own general, who will turn every tree and bush into a kind of temporary fortress, from whence, when he hath fired his shot with all the deliberation, coolness, and certainty which hidden safety inspires, he will skip as it were, to the next, and so on for a long time till dislodged either by cannon or by a resolute attack of light infantry. In this view of the American militia, rebels as they are, they will be found to be respectable even in flight. Light infantry, therefore, in greater numbers than one company per regiment, ought to be an essential part of the general system of our army.”

In reviewing the different lines upon which military operations could be undertaken, Burgoyne dwells upon the formidable objections to an advance from New York

CHAP. V. 1776-1777. owing to the difficulties of transport and the scarcity of local means of supply, while he points out the advantages of a joint expedition by two co-operating armies advancing to a central point of junction from north and south, such as ultimately became the foundation of the plan of the campaign in the following year.

It is worthy of note that in this document Burgoyne expresses opinions in advance of his age in favour of the then despised earthworks, which he contends may be made "extremely formidable," and he likewise condemns the prevailing tendency to fortifying towns with a view to holding a country, supporting his opinion by the authority of Marshal Saxe on the campaign in Poland.

The plan ultimately decided upon by the Cabinet was the employment of the fleet and the army under Lord Howe and his brother Sir William Howe,¹ for the reduction of New York ; the restoration of the Royal authority in the Southern States by a subsidiary force under Sir Peter Parker and General Clinton ; and the expulsion of the Americans from the Canadian provinces by Sir Guy Carleton with Burgoyne as second in command.

The opening of the new year had been brightened by a gleam of success on the part of the English ; Lieutenant-General Carleton² succeeded, in spite of the disaffection of the Canadians and the weakness of the force at his disposal, in raising the siege of Quebec and driving the routed besiegers before him to a con-

¹ Lord Howe and his brother were at the same time invested with the office of Civil Commissioners, nominally for the purpose of entering upon negotiations of peace, but their powers in this respect were greatly limited, and in reality amounted to little more than the right of granting pardon to those who chose to return to their allegiance.

² Governor of Canada, afterwards raised to the peerage as Baron Dorchester. For the defence of Quebec the king sent him the red ribbon early in '76.

siderable distance. More it was impossible to do pending the arrival of reinforcements, but it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this success, since the fall of Quebec would have kindled the flames of rebellion throughout the provinces, and necessitated the re-conquest of Canada as a preliminary to further operations.

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General Howe's position in Boston, however, had grown more and more precarious; the enemy was daily closing in greater strength around him; the troops were suffering for want of provisions; while the deepest despondency prevailed among such portions of the population as still remained attached to the British cause. In the meanwhile Washington was busily strengthening his position and erecting battery after battery to command the town. In the beginning of March he opened a bombardment, which the garrison endured for fifteen days, when Howe, seeing the hopelessness of protracting the struggle, determined to evacuate the city.¹ He accordingly embarked his army without molestation on the 17th March, and set sail for Halifax, leaving the capital of Massachusetts, with its powerful works and admirable harbour, in the hands of the insurgents.²

Burgoyne had sailed from England with a division of the Brunswick troops in March. He had failed in obtaining either a separate command or, what he would have preferred, the office of a negotiator. In accepting his present post he was probably in a great measure

¹ For his account of these proceedings see appendix B.

² The shipping at his disposal was barely sufficient to embark the garrison, and the property of the loyal Bostonians was left to be confiscated. After Howe's departure several English store ships, one of which was laden with 1,500 barrels of gunpowder, and a transport with 700 troops, sailed into Boston Harbour in ignorance of the evacuation, and were seized by the Americans, who had hoisted British colours on the forts and batteries.

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actuated by a wish to acquire personal knowledge of Canada, with a view to his darling project of a future campaign from that direction. Certainly, the service on which he was proceeding in a subordinate position offered few temptations, and his absence from England was embittered by the precarious state of his wife's health. He parted from her with gloomy forebodings too well justified by the event; she died before his return.

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

"PALL MALL, *March 1st, 1776.*

"DEAR SIR,

"I have proposed to the King that you should embark at Spithead with the first division of the Brunswick troops; that the artillery should sail at the same time; and that the regiment at Plymouth, instead of going to Cork, should join you as you pass through the channel. Lord Sandwich says Captain Pennel commands the *Blonde* and is one of the convoy, and he says he is persuaded he will, upon your applying to him, receive you with pleasure on board his ship. It seems he is rich and you need not fear putting him to expense. I likewise mentioned again the affair of your rank: the King wishes to antedate as far back as you desire; it is now with Lord Barrington, and I have sent him word that the King inclines that his lieutenant-generals should command Knyphausen,¹ and that his Lordship will contrive to do it with as little impropriety as possible, so that this point will be settled to your satisfaction. The King enquired anxiously about Lady Charlotte

¹ Lieut.-General Knyphausen, a Hessian officer employed in command of the German Legion under General Howe in '76-'77.

and you, and I trust I did not inform him wrong when I said I had heard she was something better.

"I am, dear Sir,

"Most sincerely yours,

"GEO. GERMAIN."

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On Burgoyne's arrival at Quebec towards the end of June, Sir Guy Carleton found himself at the head of a fine army of twelve thousand men, about one-third of which was composed of Hessian and Brunswick troops, subsidized by Great Britain for service during this war.¹

The employment of "mercenary troops," as these foreign levies were invidiously called (as though all regular troops served their country from purely patriotic motives and without pay), was severely condemned by the opposition in England and as much made the subject of reproach by the Americans,² as that of Indian warriors, in the enlisting of whose services our Government had

¹ Towards the end of '75 George III. had been induced to enter into negotiations with the Empress Catherine of Russia for twenty thousand of her troops to be employed with the English forces in America. So desirous was he of bringing this force into the field that he left it to Her Majesty to fix her own terms. Catherine, however, indignantly resented the proposal, as one which would place her on a level with the petty German princes who traded in the lives of their subjects; and her refusal was evidently couched in terms more emphatic than polite, for on 3rd November the King writes to Lord North:

"The letter of the empress is a clear refusal, and not in so genteel a manner as I should have thought might have been expected of her. She has not had the civility to answer me in her own hand, and has thrown out some expressions that may be civil to a Russian ear but certainly not to more civilized ones." (Donne.)

Horace Walpole makes great fun out of the poor King's correspondence with "Sister Kitty."

² Will any American seriously contend that the large number of the Germans employed in the Federal army during the War of Secession were anything but "foreign mercenaries?" Foreigners recruited by American agents in German ports for service in their army can surely not claim to be American citizens or national soldiers in any true sense of the terms.

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only competed with the American Congress. But now we heard the rifle of the Brunswick soldier as loudly denounced as the tomahawk of the North American savage. Lord Chatham, in one of his finest perorations, said :

“ Pile up and accumulate every assistance you can buy or borrow. Traffic and barter with every pitiful German Prince that sells his subjects to foreign shambles. Your efforts are for ever vain and impotent ; doubly so from this mercenary aid upon which you rely, for it irritates to incurable resentment the mind of your enemies. To overrun them with the mercenary sons of rapine and plunder, devoting them and their possessions to the rapacity of hireling cruelty ! If I were an American as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country I never would lay down my arms,—never,—never,—never ! ”

And again:—“ Forty thousand German boors can never conquer ten times the number of British freemen. They may ravage, they cannot conquer.”¹

Yet while English statesmen were thus denouncing as a barbarism the employment of German soldiers to aid us in the suppression of the rebellion, the Americans had been making overtures to France and to Spain for armed support against the mother country ; their accredited agents were intriguing at foreign courts to provoke war against England, and the progress of these negotiations was openly discussed in Congress.

The wisdom and the justice of our attempt to subdue

¹ Lord John Russell, in his *Life of Charles James Fox*, in like manner condemns the employment of this class of soldiers. “ The attempt to establish despotism *by the hands of foreign mercenaries* was an act which would justify the severance of all ties between the colonies and the mother country.” Would not such an attempt by other means equally justify the severance ?

the American colonists by force of arms was then, and may possibly even now be, a fair subject for discussion; but once the sword was drawn on both sides it is not easy to understand by what train of reasoning the employment of this particular class of troops came to be considered unjustifiable, or why German soldiers (trained as the population of these small principalities then were, in strict habits of military discipline) should have been thought more cruel or rapacious than Frenchmen, Spaniards, or even (considering the difficulty of filling our ranks, and the consequent necessity of recruiting among the lowest classes) than our own soldiers.¹

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It is on very different grounds that the practice of raising these foreign levies should at that time have been condemned. It was not the Americans who were aggrieved by it, but the poor German soldiers themselves, since there can be no doubt but that they were frequently enlisted and transported across the Atlantic much against their will. The extravagant sums paid by the English Government in the shape of levy money and bounty was a powerful incentive to the avarice of the despotic petty princes,² whose unscrupulous barter of their subjects created indignation throughout Germany. The King of Prussia denounced the practice, and actually

¹ Convicts under sentence were at this time liberated on condition of serving in the army in America. Congress, on the other hand, while it denounced the German legionaries as barbarians, was quite willing to accept them as citizens, for they issued an address in German, and circulated it in the wrappers in which tobacco was sold, offering a tract of land to any foreign soldier who would desert his colours.

² The principal dealers in German blood ("Mencheschacher" and "Seelenverkauferei," were the terms applied to this traffic in Germany) were the Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick. The former furnished 12,000 and the latter 5,000 soldiers out of their small populations, receiving thirty crowns a head levy money, and an annual subsidy computed at the rate of one hundred crowns for each man sent into the field.

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made the legionaries, whenever, on their way to embarkation, they had to pass through his dominions, pay toll as "cattle exported for foreign shambles."

The great Frederick can hardly be suspected of the weakness of having been actuated by motives of humanity, for he had himself never scrupled to indulge in such traffic for his own purposes. He was probably indignant at seeing the price of German soldiers so greatly raised in the market by English competition;¹ for during the Seven Years' War he had been able to purchase an entire regiment of dragoons from the Elector of Saxony for "forty large blue and white metal jars."²

Certain German writers, and among others Max von Eelking, in his *Life of General Reidesel*,³ defend the practice and ridicule the objections to it as the sentimentality of poets and dreamers;⁴ but there is too much reason to believe that these so-called volunteers had but little choice in the matter, and were often forcibly seized and sold to swell the revenues of their sovereigns.⁵

¹ In 1777 we had 23,762 Germans borne on the strength of the Army estimates. The property tax was at that time four shillings in the pound.

² Hollis' *Memoirs*.

³ Published at Leipsig in 1856.

⁴ Schiller refers to this practice in his *Kabale und Liebe*, when he makes the Prince's messenger deliver a casket of jewels to Lady Milford, and on her expressing amazement at the costliness of the gift, the man exclaims, "They have not cost the Prince one farthing. Twenty thousand of our countrymen sailed for America this morning; they pay for all." "But not under compulsion?" asks my lady. "Oh, no," replies the old man, bitterly, "they are all volunteers of course. It is true a few noisy fellows did step out of the ranks and ask their commander at how much a yoke the Prince sold his subjects. But they were soon silenced. Our gracious sovereign paraded the troops and had the chattering fools shot then and there. We heard the crack of the muskets; we saw their brains sprinkled against the wall, and then the rest shouted 'Hurrah for America!'"

⁵ Lord Mohun relates that a Hessian Colonel, Count Donop, when dying of his wounds after the attack on Rosbach in '77, said, "My career ends early; I die the victim to my own ambition and the avarice of my sovereign." *History of England*, vol. vi.

The Canadian campaign of '76, in which Burgoyne was now actively engaged, although in the main successful, was attended with no important results. Advancing from Three Rivers (an Indian settlement on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec), the English army drove the Americans under Arnold¹ out of their camp at Sorel, when Burgoyne, in command of three columns, was sent in their pursuit. Abandoning post after post they finally crossed Lake Champlain to gain Crown Point, and there our operations ceased for want of boats, of which, strange to say, no provision had been made. To create a flotilla was necessarily the work of time, and though Carleton made extraordinary exertions,² it was not until the end of September that our troops were enabled to continue the pursuit.³ They then took to the water, and in a remark-

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¹ Benedict Arnold, who as a private soldier had in early life twice deserted from the British army, received the rank of Colonel in the insurgent forces early in the revolutionary struggle. He soon showed considerable military skill and unrivalled courage. One among the many difficulties of Washington's position was the universal spirit of jealousy and bickering between the American commanders; and Arnold, whose brilliant conduct in the field only served to bring into more marked relief his utter want of principle and the habitual offences of his private life, was greatly disliked and finally publicly reprimanded in conformity with the sentence of a court-martial. This affront is said to have rankled in his mind and to have led to the idea of his treachery in surrendering his post at West Point to the English; but in this he was probably actuated at least as much by interested as by vindictive motives. Poor André, taken and—not unjustly—hanged as a spy, fell a victim to this disgraceful scheme, whilst Arnold made his escape and lived to receive the honour of a Major-General's command from the King of England. He died in 1801.

² In his *Life of Washington* Chief Justice Marshall, who unquestionably writes in a more philosophical and impartial spirit than any other American historian of this period, gives high credit to Carleton for his vigour in improvising a fleet. "As if by magic Arnold saw on Lake Champlain early in October a fleet consisting of nearly thirty vessels, the largest of which, the *Inflexible*, carried eighteen 12-pounders."

³ Lord George Germain sought in this delay an excuse for venting his rancour against General Carleton, but the King, in spite of the powerful

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able naval action, fought mainly by soldiers, in which Arnold greatly distinguished himself by his skill and intrepidity, succeeded in dispersing or destroying the American boats and in gaining possession of Crown Point. The insurgents then fell back upon Ticonderoga, which, since it had come into their possession during the previous June, had been greatly strengthened under the directions of Kosciuszko, the Polish patriot,¹ and which General Gates now held with a strong garrison; and Carleton, considering the season too advanced for further operations, retired into winter quarters.

It is alleged by American writers that Burgoyne urged the assault of Ticonderoga, and Marshall states that in pursuance of this advice Carleton reconnoitred the fort, but not liking the appearance of the works decided not to attack. The following letter from Major-General Phillips to Burgoyne tends to show that the army generally were of opinion that their commander might have shown more energy:—

"CAMP AT CROWN POINT, *October 23, 1776.*

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I have passed a very unpleasant time since here and lament your absence most sincerely. I stand alone unable to bear up against the sloth and changes of this atmosphere. You will scarcely suppose that there is neither reconnoitring post nor scout sent forward, but as the whim of a drunken Indian prevails. I have endeavoured in vain to form a small detachment to feel the

influence which the minister exercised over his mind, defended his officer, for on 17th November he writes to Lord North, "Sir Guy Carleton gives sufficient reasons for his not earlier attempting to pass the lakes." (Donne.)

¹ He acted as an engineer officer under General Schuyler, and afterwards under General Gates during the campaign of '77, and was present at Saratoga.

pulse of the enemy ; the answer is that it is wrong to teach these rebels *war*. There are deserters who are daily giving accounts of the panic of these people. Two men came in from Albany who report that there are ships of war and other vessels, amounting to thirteen, in the Hudson River beyond the highlands on the way to Albany ; that the Royalists are all waiting with eager impatience for assistance. I do really believe that Howe's army will take the post of Crown Point¹ when we leave it, which is this day determined after bringing away all the artificers from Isle aux Noix and St. John. I will, before you leave this country, send you the report of the engineers concerning this place. I must be of opinion that, notwithstanding the success upon the lake, we terminate the campaign ill. It was upon the positive declaration that a post was to be established *here*, at all events, that I proposed sending the troops back into winter quarters for the power of more easily supplying the corps here, and to be left for the winter with provisions ; for I do protest that otherwise I think the army should have moved forward and a trial made at Ticonderoga. Had we failed in a strong feint we could but have retired, and I must think there were good chances of success from the very strong panic which has taken the rebels. But it is the humour here to suppose that it is no disgrace to retire if it is not done in the face of the enemy. I have been uniform in my ideas of the manner this army was to have proceeded upon the lake. One brigade to attend the fleet, the

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¹ It is not shown upon what grounds General Phillips anticipated such a movement on the part of Howe's army, which the latter general certainly never for a moment contemplated. The abandonment of Crown Point appears to have been a great error on the part of Carleton ; its possession as a starting point at the opening of the next campaign would have been an incalculable advantage to the northern army.

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rest to move at the moment of success. Had it been so, the army might have been at Crown Point on the 15th, and the fleet and armed vessels going up the lake towards Ticonderoga with a show of attacking with the army and strong parties towards Lake George and Renesborough, we should have destroyed their communications if we had not frightened them out of Ticonderoga. I never was of opinion to attack the entrenchments seriously, but I am and shall ever be of opinion that every art of war should be practised upon these people, whose ignorance renders stratagem and surprise so easy to succeed. I am tardy in saying all this as it has been our joint opinion, and it is a flattering, most flattering, most satisfactory reflection to me that we have agreed, I think, almost in every proposal and plan for this campaign. I shall be very happy, as a citizen, that Howe succeeds, even to Crown Point, but, as an officer, I wish this army might have been allowed the share in the war which it should, in my opinion, have had. I write my mind freely to you and repose my griefs in the bosom of a friend; such I believe you; such I respect and regard you for at my heart. I do not talk to the folks here thus: my pride of soldier-ship forbids it. The army seems distressed and hurt at the languor which governs every movement. I still fear a dreadful winter; but still I shall be myself, nor let chagrin prey upon me, nor will I grow languid in the public service. I promise you to do my utmost to preserve the army for an early opening of the campaign, and I do most sincerely hope you will come out to us. The next year must divide this army, and we will go together if it be possible. Take care of our cause in England; I rely on your goodness and regard for me to represent me favourably to the King if you think

I deserve it, and keep me third in this army unless a second lieutenant-general is sent. I will leave you some of my letters open ; read them, as it is possible they may contain something worthy your remembrance concerning the detail. Seal them with a common impression, when I take the liberty of consigning them to your care. . . .

“Yours sincerely,

“W. PHILLIPS.”

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Certain it is that the English ministry were displeased with the unfruitful termination of the campaign, but Sir Guy Carleton's exclusion from the command of the expedition in the following year cannot be attributed to this cause, since as early as in August '76, Lord George Germain had signified to him that his command should be limited to the Canadian provinces.¹

American writers have asserted that Carleton's disfavour was owing to the clemency with which he had treated the American prisoners who had fallen into his hands, and it is certain that, if the campaign had not enabled him to gain much military distinction, his conduct to the enemy had been marked by rare humanity and generosity. Not only to those taken in arms as rebels against the King's authority which he represented, but to the fugitives of the defeated army, who, in their flight were overtaken by sickness and famine, and who must have died in the forests in which they had taken refuge, he extended care and protection, seeking them

¹ This despatch, dated 22nd August, 1776, would, had it reached General Carleton, have obliged him to return to Quebec in the midst of his operations, and to resign his command on the lakes to Burgoyne. The prevalence of contrary winds, however, prevented the bearer from reaching Quebec by the St. Lawrence.

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out, tending, feeding, and clothing them, and finally affording them the means of returning to their homes.

"My lads," said he, to his American prisoners, as he addressed them when brought before him in batches, "why did you come to disturb an honest man in his government that never did you any harm in his life? I never invaded your property, nor sent a single soldier to distress you. Come, my boys! you are in a very painful situation, and not able to go home with any comfort. I must provide you with shoes, stockings, and good warm waistcoats. I must give you some good victuals to carry you home. Take care, my lads, that you don't come here again, lest I should not treat you so kindly."

At the same time he issued the following proclamation, and in reading it the reflection forces itself upon the mind, how strangely different the history of England and America during the last century would have been written had King George the Third and his Cabinet been inspired by the kindly and conciliatory sentiments of his Lieutenant in Canada.

"Whereas I am informed that many of His Majesty's deluded subjects of the neighbouring provinces laboring under wounds and divers disorders are dispersed in the adjacent woods and parishes, and in great danger of perishing for want of proper assistance. All captains and other officers of militia are hereby commanded to make diligent search for all such distressed persons, and afford them all necessary relief, and convey them to the General Hospital; all reasonable expenses which may be incurred in complying with this order shall be paid by the Receiver-General.

"And lest a consciousness of past offences should deter such miserable wretches from receiving that assist-

ance which their distressed situation may require, I hereby make known to them that as soon as their health is restored they shall have free liberty to return to their respective provinces." CHAP. V.
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The Southern campaign had been attended with some successes the moral effect of which upon the colonists might have been serious but for Washington's consummate generalship in retrieving his losses towards the close of the year. The surrender of 900 Hessians at Trenton was a heavy blow to our cause, and Howe's conduct of the operations which led to this result was severely criticised. Donne says :

"Sir William Howe's imprudence can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war. He extends his line at the very time he was sending for more men from England over a space of eighty miles. He leaves the centre of that line, Trenton, Burlington, and White Horse weakly defended to provide against surprise; neither redoubts nor intrenchments. The posts least exposed he strengthens in proportion to their distance from the enemy, while he entrusts to foreigners ignorant of the British language, and therefore the less capable of obtaining intelligence of any hostile movement, the worst guarded portions of his line."

Our naval operations had not upon the whole been successful, and the only important results of the campaigns of 1776 were that our army was left in undisputed possession of New York, then the stronghold and centre of the adherents of the Royal cause, and that British authority in the Canadian provinces was fully restored.

Writing to Lord George Germain towards the end of the year, General Howe proposes to open the campaigns of the Southern army in 1777 with three corps d'armée amounting to 35,000 men—one to act offen-

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sively on the side of Rhode Island with a view to reducing Boston, the second to cover Jersey, and the third to move up the North River to Albany with a view to effecting a junction with the army from Canada.

By these means he hoped effectually to oppose the 50,000 men voted by Congress. Referring to the projected expedition from the North, he says :—

“By the best information from the northward I have, the army from Canada was obliged by the severity of the weather to repass the lake from Crown Point on the 5th instant, from which event and a consideration of the difficulties that army must meet with *before it reaches Albany in the course of next campaign*, it is reasonable to conclude that this will not be effected earlier than the month of September.

“The enemy, though much depressed at the success of His Majesty’s arms, are encouraged by the strongest assurances from their leaders of procuring assistance from foreign Powers, for which end it is understood that Dr. Franklin has gone to France to solicit aid from that Court.

“I do not presume to point out any way of counteracting him, but were that effected (the proposed plan of operations), and the force I have mentioned sent out, it would strike such terror through the country that little resistance would be made to the progress of His Majesty’s arms in the Provinces of New England, New York, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania *after the junction of the Northern and Southern armies.*”

Burgoyne returned to England towards the end of the year, the bearer of the news of Sir Guy Carleton having found it inexpedient to attack Ticonderoga, and of his having abandoned Crown Point and recrossed the Lakes. This unfruitful issue of a campaign, from which great

results had been anticipated in England, created much disappointment, and Burgoyne, as a participator in what Lord George Germain stigmatized as "operations conducted without sense or vigour," shared in the disfavour which the King and Cabinet showed towards Carleton.¹

When after the failure of the campaign of '77 Lord George Germain and his adherents attempted to retrieve the minister's reputation by blackening the character of Burgoyne, they accused him of having at this time intrigued to supplant his chief in the command of the projected expedition from the north. It may be as well here to dispose of this imputation. It has already been shown that as early as August, '76, Lord George Germain had informed Sir Guy Carleton that his command was not to extend beyond the Canadian frontier. On the 13th December, '76, when Burgoyne had first arrived in England and before he had been received at court, the King, whose impulses, when not checked by prejudice, were generally just, wrote to Lord North :—

"That there is great prejudice, perhaps not unaccompanied with rancour, in a certain breast ² against Governor Carleton is so manifest to whoever has heard the subject mentioned, that it would be idle to say any more than that it is a fact. Perhaps Carleton may be too cold (query, old) and not so active as might be wished, which may make it advisable to have the part of the Canadian army which must attempt to join General Howe led by a more enterprising commander ; but since the proposal be to recall Carleton from his government, that would be cruel, and the exigency cannot authorize it. Burgoyne

¹ "Burgoyne was not in favour at this moment ; the King scarcely spoke to him, and he was obliged to crave for an audience." *Donne's North Correspondence.*

² In allusion to Lord George Germain.

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may command the corps to be sent from Canada to Albany." ¹

It is quite clear, therefore, that Carleton's supersession had been determined upon before Burgoyne *could* have intrigued for the command, and although the conduct imputed to him is of a character so entirely at variance with his candid and loyal nature as hardly to require formal refutation, it is only an act of justice to place the facts on record, more especially since (as in the case of his birth) later writers have not hesitated to adopt and propagate a calumny resting on no better authority than the malevolence or ignorance of his contemporaries.

Lord George Germain, ever unscrupulous in the gratification of his personal resentment, had not forgiven Carleton for having refused to place an incompetent *protégé* of his in an important position on the staff, and would doubtless have been glad of an opportunity of adding to the limitation of his power, the affront of supersession in an important military command by a junior officer; but Burgoyne, ambitious as he was of high place, was not the man to take advantage of such hostile feelings against his former chief, whose conduct in the past campaign he now justified and defended, and with whom he ever afterwards maintained relations of unreserved friendship. ²

¹ Donne.

² In further proof of Burgoyne's regard and respect for Sir Guy Carleton see *apud*, the generous testimony which he bore to the character of his former chief in his speech in Parliament in 1786. Sir Guy Carleton never disguised his contempt for the character of the American minister. A contemporary statesman said of Lord George Germain, "he endured every species of indignity, from Sir Guy Carleton in particular, and other officers with whom he was obliged to correspond. There was a general diffidence as to his honour and a general disrespect for his person." *Life of Lord Shelburne*, by Lord E. Fitzmaurice.

Of his desire for an independent command he made no secret. When towards the end of 1776 he succeeded in obtaining an audience of the King, he had, as, in the servile phraseology of the time, he expresses it, "laid himself at His Majesty's feet for such active service as he might think him worthy of;" and fully aware, as he became, that the Cabinet had determined upon restricting the authority of Sir Guy Carleton to the Canadian provinces, there would have been no impropriety in his soliciting the command of the expedition to the South.

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In his prefatory speech before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1779, Burgoyne thus disposes of the unworthy charge which the malice of his persecutors had attempted to fix upon him.

"The next tendency was to impress the public with an opinion that I was endeavouring to supplant Sir Guy Carleton in the command of the Northern army, an action abhorrent to the honour of an officer and the liberality of a gentleman, and of which, thank God, I can prove the falsehood by irrefragable evidence upon your table and within a very small compass. I need only refer to the despatches of Sir Guy Carleton by his aide-de-camp, dated 22nd of August, 1776, four months before I came home, to show that it was at that time determined that he should remain in Canada, and that determination was made, as I have been informed, not only upon the political reasoning which appears in the despatch, but also upon great law opinions, that he could not under the commission he then held under the Great Seal pass the frontiers of his province. This confutation was urged by me last year, and were collateral proof necessary to my justification upon this subject I would bring to your bar a tribe of gentlemen who had

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would bring to your bar a tribe of gentlemen who had imbibed impressions not very favourable to the military proceedings of Sir Guy Carleton in the campaign of 1776. I could show that I seized numberless, indeed I seized every possible occasion, to vindicate the judgment, the assiduity, the activity of that highly respectable officer, careless how ill I paid my court, earnest to meet every attack against his fame."

It is quite clear that Burgoyne on his return to England shared in the disfavour of Sir Guy Carleton, which would not have been the case had he attempted to disassociate himself, as indeed he might without injustice have done, from the responsibility for that officer's want of vigorous action. He had advocated an attempt upon Ticonderoga, and had opposed the abandonment of Crown Point: but his loyal nature would not allow him to claim credit for his views to the prejudice of the reputation of his chief.

So little, indeed, does Burgoyne appear to have urged his claim to the command of the expedition that although the King had at first named him, the question continued an open one. On the 20th February the King writes to Lord North:—

"Lord George Germain will to-morrow propose Clinton for Canada and Burgoyne to join Howe. He (Lord G. G.) wants Carleton to be recalled, but I have thrown cold water upon that."¹

Burgoyne had retired to Bath for the benefit of his health early in the year, but before leaving town had submitted to the Cabinet his "Thoughts for conducting the war from the side of Canada," a document upon which, though with some important and unfortunate

¹ Donne.

alterations, the official plan of the campaign was ultimately founded.¹

At a Cabinet council in March it was finally determined that Burgoyne should be selected for the command of the expedition; a decision which Lord Germain conveyed to Sir Guy Carleton in these terms:—

“My letter of the 22d August, 1776, was intrusted to the care of Captain Le Maitre, one of your aide-de-camps; after having been three times in the Gulf of St. Lawrence he had the mortification to find it impossible to make his passage to Quebec, and therefore returned to England with my dispatch; which, though it was prevented by that accident from reaching your hands in due time, I nevertheless think proper to transmit to you by this earliest opportunity.

“You will be informed, by the contents thereof, that as soon as you should have driven the rebel forces from the frontiers of Canada, it was His Majesty’s pleasure that you should return to Quebec, and take with you such part of your army as in your judgment and discretion appeared sufficient for the defence of the province; that you should detach Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, or such other officer as you should think most proper, with the remainder of the troops, and direct the officer so detached to proceed with all possible expedition to join General Howe, and to put himself under his command.

“With a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become highly necessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected;

¹ This document, together with the King’s comment upon it which afford a remarkable illustration of the capacity for mastering detail which George III. showed in his conduct of all public business, civil or military, will be found in the appendix C.

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and therefore, as the security and good government of Canada absolutely require your presence there, it is the King's determination to leave about 3,000 men under your command, for the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder of your army upon two expeditions, the one under the command of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diversion on the Mohawk River.

"As this plan cannot be advantageously executed without the assistance of Canadians and Indians, His Majesty strongly recommends it to your care, to furnish both expeditions with good and sufficient bodies of those men; and I am happy in knowing that your influence among them is so great, that there can be no room to apprehend you will find it difficult to fulfil His Majesty's expectations.

"In order that no time may be lost in entering upon these important undertakings, General Burgoyne has received orders to sail forthwith for Quebec; and that the intended operations may be maturely considered, and afterwards carried on in such a manner as is most likely to be followed by success, he is directed to consult with you upon the subject, and to form and adjust the plan as you both shall think most conducive to His Majesty's service."

Upon receipt of this communication Sir Guy Carleton tendered the resignation of his governorship, but he was too high-minded a man and too loyal a soldier to show the slightest resentment towards the junior in whose favour he had been superseded, or to relax in the least degree in his efforts to prepare for the expedition. To this Burgoyne bears full testimony in his state-

ments before the Committee of the House of Commons, when he says:—

“Had that officer been acting for himself or for his brother he could not have shown more indefatigable zeal than he did to comply with and expedite my requisitions and desires.”

Sir Guy Carleton, however, could but make the most of local resources; the main supply of the material of war had to be despatched from England,¹ and Burgoyne, on his arrival at Quebec on 6th May, expresses some uneasiness at the non-arrival of troopships and victualers. In a despatch to Lord George Germain of the 14th May he says:—

“The army will fall short of the strength computed in England, and the want of camp equipage, clothing, and many other necessary articles will cause inconvenience. . . .”

Again he writes:—

“I am in hopes of finding a sufficiency of provisions to enable me to cross the Lake Champlain at least without the arrival of the Cork fleet. I hope also to find artillery stores enough to feel the enemy's pulse at Ticonderoga, but should their situation and resolution be such as to make great artillery preparations requisite, I shall certainly be under the necessity of waiting at Crown Point the arrival of the ordnance ships from England.”

He at the same time gives but a poor account of the military assistance upon which he had reckoned from the Canadians, whom he describes as “ignorant of the

¹ Lucrative army contracts were at this time among the most valuable pieces of Government patronage, and so jealous were ministers of any encroachment upon this privilege that even timber for shipbuilding—of which an unlimited supply existed on the spot—was contracted for in England and, it is said, actually despatched from thence across the Atlantic.

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use of arms, awkward, disinclined to the service, and spiritless."

4 The principal alteration in the plan of campaign, as originally proposed by Burgoyne, was in the withdrawal of all discretionary power in the commander to deviate from the letter of his instructions in the event of circumstances arising to render their execution precarious or hazardous. The principle of the project was an advance, from opposite points of the compass, of two armies operating by separate lines upon a common centre; the weak link consisting in the difficulty of the two commanders being able to obtain information of one another's movements, since the bases from which they had to act were separated by an almost impenetrable tract of country in possession of a generally hostile population. Under such circumstances every precaution should have been taken to ensure concerted action by imperative orders to the generals of both armies; but, while Burgoyne's instructions were positive and unconditional, 4 Howe was left at such complete liberty as to justify him in marching to the south at the very moment that the force with which he was intended to effect a junction was advancing to meet him from the north! Indeed, the only orders which Howe appears to have received upon this point are comprised in this casual sentence contained in Lord George Germain's despatch of 18th May, '77, with reference to the threatened operations of the insurgent army in the south: "I trust, however, that whatever you may meditate will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army to proceed from Canada."

A subsequent despatch containing full and explicit instructions to Sir William Howe as to his co-operation with Burgoyne was written, but by one of those shame-

(cf
James
Clark
Howe's How.

ful acts of official neglect, of which our history unfortunately affords but too many examples, this document was suffered to be pigeon-holed in London, where it was found, after the convention of Saratoga, carefully docketed, and only wanting the signature of the minister.¹

Immediately after his arrival in Canada, Burgoyne wrote to Sir William Howe in New York informing him of his orders to force a junction with him, and in this despatch he says:—

“I wish that a latitude had been left me for a diversion towards Connecticut, but such an idea being out of the question *by my orders being precise to force the junction*, it is only mentioned to introduce the idea still resting upon my mind, viz., to give the change to the enemy if I could, and by every feint in my power to establish a suspicion that I still pointed towards Connecticut.

“But under the present precision of my orders I shall really have no view but that of joining you, nor think

¹ Since this was written a strong light has been thrown upon the transaction by Lord E. Fitzmaurice, who, in his *Life of Lord Shelburne*, quotes a memorandum from the hand of that statesman, on the subject of this disastrous blunder. He says, “The inconsistent orders given to Generals Howe and Burgoyne could not be accounted for except in a way which it must be difficult for any person who is not conversant with the negligence of office to comprehend. It might appear incredible, if his own secretary and the most respectable persons in office had not assured me of the fact, and what corroborates it is that it can be accounted for in no other way. It requires as much experience in business to comprehend the very trifling causes which have produced the greatest events as it does strength of reason to develop the very deepest designs.” The memorandum proceeds to state that Lord George, “having among other peculiarities a particular aversion to be put out of his way on any occasion, had arranged to call at his office on his way to the country in order to sign the despatches; but as those addressed to Howe had not been ‘fair copied’ and he was not disposed to be balked of his projected visit into Kent, they were not signed then and were forgotten on his return to town.” Our late expedition to Abyssinia, which cost the nation nine millions sterling, is said to have been due to a similar piece of official forgetfulness.

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myself justified by any temptation to delay the most expeditious means I can find to effect that purpose."

It is important that the reader should bear in mind that, from the outset of the expedition, Burgoyne had regretted the withdrawal of that discretionary power to act as circumstances might dictate, for the non-exercise of which it was afterwards attempted to throw upon him the responsibility of failure.]

Upon one point it is impossible to acquit either Sir Guy Carleton or Burgoyne of want of foresight. The former had received instructions to make provision for all the requirements of the coming campaign, but in his arrangements one essential want appears to have been strangely overlooked. There was no transport for either stores or artillery. Still more strange does it appear that Burgoyne had been a month in Canada before he began to make preparations for procuring carts, horses, and drivers. It was not until the 7th June, by which time he might, as far as can be judged, have been well started upon his march, that he makes a formal demand upon Sir Guy Carleton for "contracts for an expeditious supply of 400 horses for the artillery and 500 carts with two horses each for the other purposes."

He admits that these numbers are inadequate to the service required, but that with a view to economy he means to "trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest"—a reliance which, as he himself foretold that the Americans would use every effort to sweep the country of supplies as he advanced, was surely hazardous. The only explanation of the neglect, on the part of the two Generals, to provide for so important an element in military operations as transport, is to be found in their belief, that by means of *corvées*¹ the

¹ Relays of Canadians employed as carriers.

whole army *matériel* might have been conveyed across the ~~carrying places wherever a break~~ in the communication occurred between the lakes and rivers. The *corvées*, however, failed, and the delay caused by the attempt to organize horse transport at the eleventh hour added to the many difficulties of the campaign, while an attempt to supply the deficiency, by an attack upon the enemy, led to the first of the series of disasters which culminated in the convention of Saratoga.

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CHAPTER VI.

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BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN OPENS.

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IT has been said that under a despotic government the history of nations is written in the biography of their kings. In like manner the history of armies may be said to be written in the lives of their commanders. In recording the career of General Burgoyne during the campaign of 1777 I may thus hope to tell the story of one of the most remarkable chapters in the American War of Independence, a story which, although it involves the defeat and captivity of an English army, Englishmen may read without shame ; for the General who surrendered his sword retained his honour, and even the breath of slander has failed to tarnish the good name of the soldiers who laid down their arms at the bidding of a victorious enemy.

The year, destined to terminate so fatally for the prospects of the British cause in America, had opened under exceptionally favourable auspices. At no time during the seven years' struggle had the feeling of the country been more completely in harmony with the wishes of the King and the policy of his Cabinet ; at no time had the successful termination of the war appeared

so hopeful.¹ Lord North, it is true, had begun to show symptoms of wavering, but George the Third found more than compensation for the defection of his old minister in the apparent vigour and boldness, in the prosecution of coercive measures, of Lord George Germain.²

In Parliament ministers had an overwhelming majority, against which the opposition could barely make its voice heard. Country gentlemen and the clergy,³ with all those who were dependent upon them, were loud in their professions of loyalty and patriotism; while the manufacturing and trading classes,⁴ dreading the supposed effect of American independence upon British commerce, were prepared to make the heaviest sacrifices to avert the threatened evil.⁵ Money and men were voted without stint, and all interest in domestic politics

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¹ In a despatch to Sir William Howe, dated 18th May, 1777, Lord George Germain speaks confidently of "the intelligence which we daily receive of the rebels finding the utmost difficulty in raising an army to face His Majesty's troops." And again, "The information which I receive of the disposition of the people, and the high opinion which I entertain of your ability, inspire me with no small degree of hope that this campaign will put an end to the unhappy contest."

² "Lord North lost a whole year in bullying, provoking, and temporizing; while Lord George Germain was always for decisive action."—Horace Walpole's *Last Journals*.

³ The pulpits of the Established Church at this time resounded with exhortations to the people to smite the rebels; and in the House of Lords the Bench of Bishops were so warm in their support of the war as to provoke Lord Chatham into an indignant rebuke addressed to Archbishop Markham. The display of a bloodthirsty spirit then commended itself to the King as a priest's best claim to preferment.

⁴ Burke said that "the merchants began to snuff the cadaverous *haute* *goût* of lucrative war."

⁵ The town of Manchester at this time raised at its own expense two regiments to serve in America, which led Lord Abingdon to move in the House of Lords for the opinion of the twelve Judges to be taken as to the legality of troops being raised without the consent of Parliament.

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was merged in the one great object of subduing the revolted colonies.

Although the loyalists and waverers in America were still a numerically considerable and influential class, the attitude of Congress, which had led, rather than represented, national feeling, and of its armies, was unmistakable in its resolution and firmness.¹ The quarrel had passed the stage at which mutual concessions could furnish an alternative between submission and separation. On both sides of the Atlantic the great majority of the nation was resolved that the sword, and the sword alone, should be the arbiter, and each had put forth its full strength confident of the issue, the one to restore the royal authority, the other to achieve national independence.²

Burgoyne, as has been before stated, was called into consultation by the King's Government, and the project ultimately adopted was based upon the idea which at the beginning of the war he had conceived, which he had then urged upon the attention of General Gage, and which his subsequent experience, and more especially the campaign of '76, had enabled him to mature.

The political object of this plan of operations was the disseverance of the New England States from the other insurgent colonies by the introduction of two strong

¹ Congress compelled all men to declare which side they took, and required those who would not take the oath of allegiance to the United States to go over to the enemy, or to live under surveillance in places indicated as their residence. Among the Burgoyne papers there is an interesting letter from an American of distinction to the Committee of the State of New York, on the subject of his banishment to Boston, in consequence of his "maintaining an equivocal neutrality."

² At this time propositions had been urged upon the Cabinet in favour of the war being carried on exclusively by naval operations. It is possible that a strict blockade of the coast might have proved more effectual in bringing the insurgent colonists to terms than military campaigns.

military bodies converging upon their centre, and the establishment of a chain of posts extending from the Canadian frontier to New York. The force for which Burgoyne had stipulated for the execution of his part of the scheme was 8,000 regular troops exclusive of artillery, 2,000 Canadians to act as escorts and working parties for clearing roads, constructing bridges, and similar services, and 1,000 Indians; besides a large number of provincials (*corvées*) for transport duties.

With such a force he contemplated being able to make his way from the Canadian frontier to Albany, and, while garrisoning such posts on the line of march as were necessary for maintaining communications, to meet and overcome any hostile body that should attempt to bar his progress.

The distance to be traversed was about two hundred miles as the crow flies; but the country at that time presented extraordinary physical difficulties to the march of an army. It consisted, for the greater part, of a dense forest, intersected by the narrow paths of the Indian, and only broken at long intervals by scattered settlements. The roads, where roads existed at all, were of the rudest description, and the reliance which had been placed upon the co-operation and intelligence of the loyal portion of the inhabitants failed almost entirely from the sparseness of the population dotted over a large tract of country, devoid of means of inter-communication, and who had far more to dread from the resentment of the American levies by whom they were surrounded, than they could hope for from the protection of the army on the line of march.

There was, it is true, the great advantage of water communication from the frontier by means of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain to the head of

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Lake George; but the two lakes do not directly communicate, and the nearest navigable point of the Hudson River is twelve miles distant from the most southerly point of Lake George, so that much land transport was necessary for the conveyance, not only of artillery and stores across the *portages* but, of the boats themselves.

In view of the difficulty of raising the large levies requisite for the conquest of the insurgent colonies, Burgoyne had reduced his original estimate of the expeditionary force from ten to eight thousand regular troops; but on his arrival in Canada he found that even these decreased numbers could not be furnished, and the army with which he actually took the field amounted only to 6,740 infantry (of which over 3,000 were Germans), while the 3,000 Canadians and Indians dwindled down to 650.¹

The transport establishment also fell far below the modest estimate that had been originally formed; the contractors for carts and horses having proved unable to fulfil their agreements, and a large number of the drivers provided having deserted. Sir Guy Carleton, writing from Quebec on 29th of May, tells Burgoyne: "It is no more than what I expected; if Government laid any great stress upon assistance from the Canadians for carrying out the war it was surely not upon information proceeding from me."

Small as it was, however, Burgoyne's army was composed of thoroughly disciplined troops under trustworthy and able officers. Major-General Phillips was not only distinguished as an artillery officer, but had given proof of exceptional strategical skill; Major-General Reidesel had been specially selected for his military experience,

¹ For the detailed return of troops employed on the expedition see appendix D.

acquired during a long service, and more especially in the Seven Years War, where he had enjoyed the entire confidence of Prince Ferdinand. Brigadiers Fraser and Hamilton had been appointed to commands solely on the ground of their professional merits. The former¹ had attained a high reputation for judgment and cool daring, and was considered one of the most rising officers in the army. Colonel Kingston, the Adjutant-General, had served with distinction in Burgoyne's horse in Portugal, and Majors Lord Balcarres and Ackland, commanding respectively the light infantry and grenadiers, were, each in his own way, considered officers of high professional attainments and brilliant courage.

Lieutenant Aubury, an infantry officer attached to the expedition, whose letters written to a friend during the campaign were afterwards published, says at this time :—

“As to our army, all I can say is that if good discipline, joined to health and spirit among the men at being led on by General Burgoyne, who is universally esteemed and respected, can ensure success, it may certainly be expected. But as I observed before, we have more dangerous enemies at home than any we have to encounter abroad ; for all transactions that are

¹ Simon Fraser, a younger son of Alexander Fraser of Balnain and Glendo, of the Farraline branch of the Lovat family by a daughter of Angus Mackintosh of Killachy, from whom the celebrated James Mackintosh was directly descended. The Fraser Tytlers and James Buillie Fraser, the traveller, belong to a younger branch of the same family, which is, indeed, remarkable for the number of men of intellectual mark it has produced. Simon Fraser was born in 1729, had entered the army at an early age, and attained the command of the 24th Regiment of Foot before the war with America broke out. Burgoyne, who knew his worth, had solicited his employment as a brigadier under his command, and held him in the highest personal regard.

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to take place are fully known before they are given out in orders, and I make no doubt you will be as much surprised as the General was when I tell you that the whole operations of the ensuing campaign were canvassed for several days before he arrived, while he supposed that he was communicating an entire secret.”¹

This statement is fully borne out by Burgoyne, who, in a letter to General Hervey dated 19th of May, says :—

“ I had the surprise and mortification to find a paper handed about at Montreal publishing the whole design of the campaign almost as accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State’s letter. My own caution has been such that not a man in my own family has been let into the secret. Sir Guy Carleton has, I am confident, been equally discreet.”²

Lord George Germain, who, among his many other unstatesmanlike qualities, was utterly unable to keep his own counsel, was probably at the bottom of the mischief.

Burgoyne took the field early in June, and on the 17th encamped on the Western Border of Lake Champlain, whence the army was transported in bateaux to Crown Point, the extreme southern point of the lake.

Here he was joined by about 400 Indians, whom he addressed in a speech designedly couched in their own flowery style, and intended to inculcate those humane principles of civilized warfare which to them must have

¹ *Travels in America*, by an Officer. London, 1791.

² This with other letters appears in the “State of the Expedition from Canada” which Burgoyne published, together with the proceedings of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry into his conduct, in 1779 ; a work to be found in most military libraries, and to which the reader is referred for many interesting details of this campaign.

been incomprehensible.¹ An old chief of the Iroquois, however, replied on behalf of the tribes, that having thrown in their lot with the English, notwithstanding the inducements which the Americans had offered them to secure them as allies, "they had sharpened their affections upon their hatchets," and were prepared to obey the commands of their "great father."

The employment of the Red Man, for which Burgoyne was severely attacked in Parliament² and by English and American writers, was an act of the British Government, adopted in conformity with the precedents of previous wars³ in America. Nor was this act unnecessary; for early in the struggle Congress had taken steps to secure the alliance of the Indians, and the virtuous indignation which the colonists affected at the idea of the use of the tomahawk as a weapon of war found no voice in their own councils. The tales of

¹ See Appendix E.

² Chatham's indignation, during his speech upon this subject, carried him so far as to enable him to discern frowns upon the faces of the tapestry figures looking down upon him in the House of Lords; and Burke, after having exhausted his "redundancy of imagery," in passionate and pathetic denunciation of the employment of Indians, convulsed the house by his ludicrous illustration of Burgoyne's appeal to the Red Men's humanity: "Suppose there was a riot on Tower Hill. What would the keeper of His Majesty's lions do? Would he not fling open the dens of the wild beasts, and then address them thus? 'My gentle lions,—my humane bears,—my tender-hearted hyenas, go forth! but I exhort you as you are Christians, and members of civilized society, to take care not to hurt any man, woman, or child!'"

Horace Walpole in his *Last Journals* describes the effect of this sally, and tells us how tears of laughter rolled down the fat cheeks of Lord North at hearing an absent man thus ludicrously denounced for measures for which he himself was mainly and directly responsible.

³ Both Montcalm and Wolfe had employed Indians in the war of 1758-59 an alliance immortalized by an American artist in his celebrated picture of the death of the English General on the Plains of Abraham.

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horror with which American writers¹ entertained the public were for the greater part the creations of vivid imaginations, and the main argument against the employment of Indians in our armies really rested upon their uselessness, and the difficulty of subjecting them to military discipline.

Much as Burgoyne, at this time, underrated the enemy he could scarcely have believed that the American troops would be frightened by the war-whoop of the red man ; and although their name caused terror to the wives and children of the scattered inhabitants of the backwoods, he might have apprehended that the employment of Indians as skirmishers and scouts at the head of the army would be more likely to have the effect of driving neutrals and waverers into the arms of the enemy for protection, than to tempt them into the British lines.

Burgoyne, in his defence, said with truth that in threatening to let loose his Indians "he spoke daggers but used none ;" and that he had always looked upon the employment of such allies as "at best a necessary

¹ Not only American writers ; for in *Saunders's News Letter* of 14th August, '77, there appeared a harrowing description of the atrocities committed by Burgoyne's Indians on the banks of Lake Champlain during the advance of the army on Ticonderoga, when, scouring the country conjointly with the English Light Infantry, they scalped 700 men, women and children. What makes this achievement the more remarkable is that, at that time, the country around Lake Champlain was a complete wilderness, and that up to that period of the march no enemy had shown himself. An American writer, whose information was derived from a journal kept by his father, an officer in the Revolutionary army, so far does justice to Burgoyne as to allow that : "While, on the one hand, he attempted to mitigate the natural ferocity of the Indians, he endeavoured, on the other hand, to render them an object of terror to those who persisted in resistance." See *Burgoyne's Campaign*, by J. Neillson. Albany, 1844. Washington Irving, with his habitual sense of justice and generosity, exculpates Burgoyne from all blame in the matter. See his *Life of Washington*, vol. iii. p. 191.

evil." Indeed he had not been a fortnight on the march before he complained of having found these men "little more than a name," while the necessity of keeping a constant restraint upon their bloodthirsty and plundering propensities gave more trouble than their best services to the army were worth.

On 30th June Burgoyne prepared to attack Ticonderoga. The importance of this fort may be estimated from its commanding position on the narrow passage intervening between Lakes Champlain and George; it is thus the main point of communication between the Canadian provinces and the State of New York. The fort was originally built by the French in 1756, from whom it was taken by General Amherst three years later. Early in '75 Colonel Arnold made an assault upon it at the head of 250 Americans, and expelled the feeble English garrison which had been left to guard it, since when the works had been so greatly strengthened that it was believed to be impregnable. It was now held by General St. Clair, with a garrison of between three and four thousand men.¹

Before advancing Burgoyne promulgated a general order to the troops, of which the following is an extract:

"The army embarks to-morrow to approach the enemy; the services required of this particular expedition are critical and conspicuous. During our progress occasions may occur in which nor difficulty, nor labour, nor life are to be regarded; this army must not retreat."

On the following morning the whole army made a forward movement, and took up a position in two lines

¹ The garrison of Ticonderoga at this time is variously estimated by different writers. Creasy puts it as low as 3,000 men; certain it is that the force was inadequate in numbers to the efficient defence of such extensive and scattered works.

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within a distance of three miles from Ticonderoga. The gun-boats were anchored on the east and west sides of the lake, just without reach of the batteries. The enemy was very strongly posted behind several lines of entrenchment, sustained by block-houses at their different angles. Upon their right a powerful battery ran close to the water's edge. Upon the high ground, to the east, called Mount Independence they had erected a star fort, heavily armed, and the foot of the hill on the side which projected into the lake was entrenched and protected by a strong abbatiss running down to the water. This entrenchment was lined with heavy artillery, flanking the water battery on the right. The south side of the hill which it was impossible to reconnoitre was believed to be inaccessible.

The reduction of this strong position was indispensable to Burgoyne's progress, not only as ensuring his line of communications, but because of the danger of his leaving so considerable a force in his rear. His operations were delayed for some days by the difficulty of bringing up the heavy ordnance, and forming a supply dépôt and a hospital.¹

On the 5th July, Sugar Hill, a position to the south of Ticonderoga and equidistant between that fort and Mount Independence, the works of which it commanded, was taken possession of by General Fraser's light infantry, but before our batteries could be completed

¹ The want of organized Transport, and of the Army Works Corps upon which Burgoyne had reckoned, was already making itself felt. In a despatch to Sir Guy Carleton of 5th July Burgoyne writes: "The work of removing the tents and provisions without the assistance of horses, and to open communications and roads, with many bridges to repair, has been extremely laborious in this sultry weather. . . . Heavy work of the same sort will grow upon me every hour, and the assistance of labourers, particularly axemen, were they but 500, would be of extraordinary service."

the American General, apprehending that his lines at Ticonderoga would be enfiladed, and that Mount Independence would be inverted, convened a Council of War, with whose concurrence he precipitately abandoned the position during the night. The garrison retreated by a bridge which had been constructed over the neck of Lake George, where such stores as there was time to remove were embarked in bateaux and despatched across the lake under cover of five gun-boats; while the main body of the troops fell back in a south-easterly direction by the Skenesborough road upon Vermont. By day-break of the 6th the English colours waved over Ticonderoga.¹

The neglect to fortify Sugar Hill was a fatal error on the part of the Americans. In a letter to Earl Hervey, dated 15th July, Burgoyne says:—

“The manner of taking up the ground at Ticonderoga convinces me that they have no men of military science. Without possessing Sugar Hill, from which I was proceeding to attack them, Ticonderoga is only what I once heard Montcalm had expressed it to be—‘*une porte pour un honnête homme de se déshonorer* ;’ they seem to have expended great treasure and the unwearied labour of more than a year to fortify, upon the supposition that we should only attack them upon the point where they were best prepared to resist.”

He proceeds:—

“I flatter myself the King will be satisfied with the diligence used in taking the field, as well as with the subsequent operations; if not, my disappointment can only proceed from my own deficiency in taking the

¹ Forty pieces of artillery with a large supply of ammunition and provisions and 200 boats fell into our hands.

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embarrassments I found, notwithstanding previous preparations and cordial assistances. Remote situations of the troops, currents, winds, rocks, want of materials for caulking the vessels, inactivity and desertion of the Canadian *corvées* were all against me. I am indispensably obliged to wait some time in this position to clear roads and make bridges, which is a great labour in this country, to bring up a stock of provisions, and also to give time to the gun-boats, bateaux, and provision vessels, to be put into Lake George to scour the lake, and secure the future route of the magazines. I propose to possess Fort Edward at the same time that the force is ready to move down the lake, by which means, if the enemy do not evacuate Fort George, the garrison must inevitably be caught. At present they are collecting at Fort Edward, but I cannot believe, though I hope and wish it, that they mean to wait for me either here or at Saratoga."

The news of the fall of Ticonderoga was received in England with exultation. The King rushed into the Queen's apartment, crying "I have beat them, I have beat all the Americans;"¹ and Lord George Germain announced the event in Parliament as if it had been decisive of the campaign and of the fate of the colonies. At the same time he writes to Lord Derby to signify the King's intention of conferring the vacant Red Ribbon upon Burgoyne.

"KEW LANE, *August 29th*, 1777.

"MY LORD,

"I beg leave to congratulate your Lordship upon General Burgoyne's success. His conduct is so meritorious, and the approbation his services meet with

¹ Horace Walpole's *Last Journals*.

is so general, that I am certain your Lordship must feel happy in hearing your friend so justly applauded.

“The King speaks of him as of an officer of distinguished merit, and immediately declared he would honour him with the vacant Red Ribbon; I trust he will hereafter receive more substantial marks of favor.

“I hope you will forgive my troubling you upon this occasion, but I could not defer expressing the satisfaction I feel upon so happy an event till I had the honor of paying my personal respects to your Lordship.”

Before this letter had reached Lord Derby, he had himself written as follows to Lord George :—

“MY LORD,

“The friendship and affection which I feel for General Burgoyne induces me to trouble your Lordship upon a subject in which he is very much concerned, and I trust that those feelings will plead my excuse with your Lordship for taking up a few moments of your time.

“Hearing from several quarters that a Red Ribbon is intended to be sent out to that General as a mark of distinction and a reward for the service he has just performed, and knowing something of his sentiments upon this subject, I should think myself highly wanting in friendship and attention to his wish did I not endeavour to represent them to your Lordship. From whim, caprice, or some other motive, he has, I know, a strong objection to the honor above mentioned, and though, if offered, his respect and gratitude to His Majesty would prevent his refusal of it, I am well convinced he would be infinitely obliged to your Lordship (should such a thing have been thought of) to let it drop

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in such a manner as your Lordship might think most proper.

"These were, I know, his sentiments before he left England and I have every reason to believe he still retains them. I therefore hope your Lordship will attribute this appeal to my zeal to promote his wishes, and if I might presume to make a further request, it shall be that if I have taken an irregular or wrong method of attaining the object I wish, you would be so good as to excuse it and direct me in what manner I may do it with more propriety."

From the EARL OF DERBY *to* GENERAL BURGOYNE.

"KNOWSLEY, *September, 17th, 1777.*

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I have deferred writing a few days in hopes of being able to give you some account of the business you entrusted to my care and of a letter which I wrote to Lord George Germain upon the subject. His answer is not yet arrived, and as Gardner leaves this place to-morrow I must give you the state of the case as it now stands, and if I hear soon from his Lordship will send the letter to Gardner to London.

"On the receipt of yours, I thought I could do nothing better than write at once to Lord G. on the subject of it. I accordingly sent to him the letter of which the enclosed is a copy. Before it could have reached him he wrote me the one which I likewise enclose. This gave me, I thought, a fair opportunity to write again. The copy of this letter I meant to send you, but have somehow mislaid. The purport of it, however, was to thank him for his congratulations with regard to the ribbon. I told him he would know

my sentiments by a letter I wrote before I received his, and that I could not help wishing still that a way could be found out for you to be without the intended honour provided it could be done without the smallest appearance of disrespect to the King. I was convinced nothing was further from your thoughts, that you would be all gratitude for the intention, but, from ideas of your own, from whim or caprice, you had, I knew, so strong an objection to the ribbon you would be more obliged by the relinquishment than the prosecution of such intention of His Majesty to honor you with it. To this letter I had no answer, so that I still entertain some faint hopes that, you may yet escape. At any rate you will, I hope believe I have done my utmost to obtain what you so strongly recommended to me. If I knew any more likely method of doing it, I would not hesitate to make the trial. The Duchess of Argyle was in Scotland when your letter arrived, so that any application through her would have been too late. I have, however, mentioned the thing to her, and she will take the opportunity as soon as she sees the great personage of saying something upon the subject.

“Let me now congratulate you upon the well-earned glory your commencement of the campaign has gained. I wish not to travel fast, but cannot help flattering myself you have by this time completed the plan by a junction with the Southern army. Very little of their motions is known here. One day they are reported gone to Philadelphia, the next to Providence. Tom remains some time longer, there not being horse transports enough for the two regiments. He speaks with the greatest pleasure of the hopes of joining your family soon. We seldom have much news in the country ; at present there is none at all. The Parliament will not

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meet, I hear, until the latter end of November—this will keep me a good while in the country ; indeed, I am not sure I shall go up to the meeting unless something very particular is likely to come on early in the Session ; the voting on the address I shall hardly rank in that class.

“I had like to have forgot that Lucy has produced another son about three weeks since. She and the children are perfectly well. My sisters go back to Preston on Monday, and return hither when Lucy is able to come. All here join in every sentiment of love and affection to you with my dear Burgoyne’s most devoted and sincere friend

“DERBY.”

In a postscript dated three days later Lord Derby mentions having heard from Lord George Germain :—

“The satisfaction I feel at having succeeded in putting by this ribbon is not to be expressed. I am now only apprehensive that you may think I have pressed the thing too warmly. You are, however, delivered of the *Tria juncta in uno*, and I trust you will attribute it (if I have gone too far) to my zeal to do what I was confident you wished done.”

Lord George Germain’s letter states that “the King, in the desire of showing the strongest approbation of General Burgoyne’s conduct, intended giving him the red ribbon as a mark of the honour which he thought would be most acceptable to him. As your Lordship knows the General’s sentiments upon that subject, His Majesty will not put him under the disagreeable necessity of accepting from duty what he had rather decline ; at the same time His Majesty is sorry that he cannot give him any immediate mark of his favour, as it is difficult to reward the services of a general officer

who is employed upon the staff, who has a regiment of dragoons, and a government."

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The reasons which induced Burgoyne to decline the proffered honour—and in those days the order of the Bath was a distinction more rarely conferred and therefore more coveted than at present—are not known. Horace Walpole says that "he now refused the Red Ribbon because the King had declined to bestow it upon him at an earlier period, and before he had done anything to deserve it"—which period could only have been that of the campaign in Portugal, when his rank disqualified him from claiming the honour.

Commensurate with the elation which the fall of Ticonderoga had produced in England was the despondency which the event created in America. General St. Clair was at once brought to a court-martial for having shamefully surrendered his post,¹ and Washington, little disposed as he was to give expression to despondent views, thus wrote to General Schuyler:—"The stroke is indeed severe and has distressed me much, but, notwithstanding that things at present wear a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope that a spirited opposition to check the progress of Burgoyne's arms and the confidence derived from success, may hurry him into measures which will in their consequences be favourable to us."²

Burgoyne lost no time in pursuing the retreating enemy. The flotilla moved forward, and, forcing a passage through the formidable barriers which it had taken the Americans six months to construct, gave chase,

¹ His defence proved perfectly satisfactory and he was honourably acquitted. There is little doubt but that the only effect of a prolonged resistance would have been the loss of his army as well as that of the fortress. As he himself expressed it, "I have lost a post but saved a province."

² Marshall's *Life of Washington*.

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captured the armed vessels, and compelled the escort to destroy their stores, abandon their bateaux, and retreat by land.

The left of our army under General Fraser was in the meanwhile in pursuit of the main body of the Americans, whose rear guard, under Colonel Francis, was overtaken near Huberton. On the 7th they made a gallant resistance, and their experience in bushfighting stood them in good stead; they were, however, overpowered and dispersed, leaving their commander and many other officers, with above 200 men, dead upon the field. A very great number of wounded are said to have perished in the woods, and over 200 prisoners fell into our hands.

To prevent the enemy reaching Fort Anne, at the head of Lake George, Burgoyne detached the 9th Regiment,¹ under Colonel Hill, who, marching through the dense and pathless forest, reached the Fort, to find it in possession of the enemy, reinforced by large detachments from the south. Vigorously attacked and suffering severely from their inferiority in bushfighting, this gallant little band held their own against overpowering numbers² for several hours, when Burgoyne, fearing for their safety, came in person to the rescue at the head of a column of 1,000 men. The enemy then set fire to Fort Anne, and fell back upon Fort Edward on the Hudson, whither Washington had already despatched General Putnam with a considerable body of fresh troops to support them.

¹ He stated that this was all he could spare, the rest of the troops being employed night and day in dragging bateaux over the carrying place.

² General Burgoyne states that Colonel Hill, whose regiment reached Fort Anne exhausted by their long and difficult march, was attacked by more than six times his number of fresh troops. American writers have also borne testimony to the gallant conduct of the 9th Regiment on this occasion.

On the 10th, Burgoyne's army occupied a line of posts extending eastward about fifteen miles from the mid-way border of Lake George, the right resting, in a commanding position, on Skenesborough heights; the extreme left at Pulteney, with Fraser's division in the centre. Hitherto our losses had been very small considering the magnitude of the operations during five successive days; but there was already a want of supplies, for Burgoyne, in his despatch to Lord George Germain of 11th July, reports that a great part of the troops had wanted provisions for two days and that the whole of them had been without tents or baggage, and this although they were operating near the borders of the Lake where ample stores of every description only awaited disembarkation, but for the carriage of which, inland, no efficient means existed.

Burgoyne concludes his despatch with:—

"Roads are opening for the army to march upon Fort Anne, and the Wood Creek is being cleared of fallen trees, sunken stones, and other obstacles to give passage for the bateaux for carrying stores, artillery, provisions, and camp equipage; these are laborious works, but the spirit and zeal of the troops are sufficient to surmount them. Some little time must also be allowed for the supplies of provisions to overtake us. In the meantime all possible diligence is using at Ticonderoga to get the gun-boats, provision vessels, and a proper quantity of bateaux into Lake George. A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate by that route, which will afterwards be the route for the magazines, and a junction of the whole is intended at Fort Edward."

In a private letter of the same date Burgoyne informs the minister that about 100 armed provincials had joined his colours, and that he expected their numbers to be

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considerably increased, and would encourage their employment for the moral effect which it was likely to produce in the country, though he attached little value to these men as soldiers.

He speaks in terms of strong disparagement of the Indians, who, he says, would, if left to themselves, commit "enormities too horrid to think of," and again dwells upon his regret of not being allowed a greater discretionary power.

"Your Lordship will pardon me if I a little lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose in my original project of the campaign, to make a real effort instead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my left instead of my right, I should have little doubt of subduing, before winter, the Provinces where the rebellion originated. If my late letters reach General Howe I still hope this plan may be adopted from Albany; in the meanwhile my utmost exertions, according to my instructions, shall continue to force a junction."

He also refers to the proclamation which he issued at Ticonderoga,¹ a composition couched in his most inflated style, but which he states to have produced "great effects where the country is not in the power of the rebels; where it is, the committees turn all their efforts to counteract it." Among these efforts they did not neglect the weapons of ridicule, and among other counter proclamations they issued the following parody on Burgoyne's manifesto in allusion to his threat to "give stretch to the Indian forces, and they amount to thousands, to

¹ For the text of this document see Appendix F. Horace Walpole says that "Burgoyne's proclamation would expose him to derision if he failed, and would diminish the lustre of his success if he obtained any."

overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain and America :"—

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" I will let loose the dogs of hell,
Ten thousand Indians who shall yell,
And foam, and tear, and grin, and roar,
And drench their mocassins in gore ;
To them I'll give full scope and play
From Ticonderog' to Florida.

If, after all these loving warnings,
My wishes and my bowels' yearnings,
You should remain as deaf as adder,
Or grow, with hostile rage, the madder ;
I swear, by St. George and St. Paul,
I will exterminate you all ;
Subscribed with my manual sign,
To test these presents, John Burgoyne."¹

Burgoyne's Indians, by this time indeed, seem to have given more trouble to him than to the enemy. A body of them was sent, under Captain Money, the Quarter-master-General, to the relief of the 9th Regiment at Fort Anne, but refused to advance within rifle shot; and about the same time a circumstance occurred which raised a storm of indignation against them in the British camp. A young officer of one of the provincial corps attached to Burgoyne's army, fearing for the safety of his intended wife, a Miss McCrea, the daughter of a clergyman living in an adjoining settlement, despatched two of the

¹ Burgoyne's campaign throughout and long after the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, formed a popular theme for the American verse-makers of the day. Three or four sets of burlesque rhymes will be found on the subject in Griswold's *Curiosities of American Literature*, published in New York. See also Wright's *History of the House of Hanover*, where the following lines are quoted with reference to the actions at Saratoga :—

" Burgoyne unmindful of impending fates,
Could cut his way through woods but not through *Gates*."

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Indians with the offer of a considerable reward if they would escort her in safety into the English lines. They undertook the service and had actually accompanied her to within a short distance of the camp, when a dispute arose between them as to which should claim the reward, and being unable to agree upon this point, one of them solved the difficulty by despatching the unfortunate girl with a tomahawk. Burgoyne insisted upon the tribes delivering up the murderer to justice, and summary execution would have ensued but for the remonstrances of M. St. Luc, a French-Canadian, acting as superintendent of the Indians, who represented that the men were already chafing under the restraint in which they were held, and that if one of their number were now put to death they would retire in a body massacring whatever defenceless people lay in their path, and carrying terror and destruction among the peaceful inhabitants of the Canadian frontier.

Burgoyne replied that he would "rather lose every Indian in his army than connive at their enormities;" but being convinced of the justice of M. St. Luc's apprehensions, he felt compelled to forego his purpose and the punishment of the man was left to the tribe to which he belonged; in other words, he escaped from justice. It may be imagined that the Americans made the most of this atrocity, which was published with the addition of very exaggerated details throughout the land; and even in England Burgoyne was savagely assailed and not only held responsible for the employment of such allies, but charged with encouraging them in their worst practices in the hope of inspiring terror in the enemy.

Mr. Belsham, in his *History of George the Third*, applies to Burgoyne's proclamation and to his threat of

inflicting vengeance by letting loose his Indians these lines from *Timon of Athens* :—

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“ Let not thy sword skip one ;
Pity not honoured age for his white beard ;
Strike me the matrons ; let not the virgin's tear
Make soft thy trenchant sword ; spare not the babe
Whose dimpled smiles from fools exhaust their mercy :
Mince it without remorse ! ”

In his own army Burgoyne was very differently judged. Among his papers is a letter written in 1782, by Captain McCrea, a brother of the lady so barbarously murdered, who had served under him in the campaign, and who now wrote in the warmest and most affectionate terms to thank his former chief for a service he had rendered him. The letter is thus endorsed in Burgoyne's handwriting :—

“ From Captain McCrea (1782), brother to Miss McCrea, who was murdered by the Indians in the campaign of '77. I had been accused by the malicious of having encouraged the Indians to acts of barbarity. It was a great pleasure to me to be thought of so differently by that lady's brother, as five years afterwards, when he had other and more able supporters, to be singled out as the person whom he wished to act as his patron. From a man of Captain McCrea's character, this selection was not only a pleasing evidence of my innocence, it was one on his mind of my abhorrence of that act. It was a still greater pleasure to me to succeed in my application and to obtain him a company, though I was then out of power.”

A non-commissioned officer, named Lamb, who served throughout the campaign, became a prisoner of war after Saratoga, succeeded in making his escape and joining Howe's army in the south, fought throughout the

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remainder of the war, and was again taken prisoner on the surrender of Lord Cornwallis's army, published a very interesting and well written journal,¹ in the course of which he says on the subject of Burgoyne's treatment of the Indians :—

“Indeed it was very remarkable how he restrained their ferocity during the short time they were with our army, and in order to do this the more effectually he took to his aid a favourite priest of theirs who had more control over the passions of the Indians than all their chiefs put together.”

The same writer, who was evidently a man of education and intelligence, and who, during the campaign, appears to have been employed in hospital duties,² thus describes the position of the army towards the middle of July :—

¹ *Journal of Occurrences during the late American War, to the Year 1783*, by R. Lamb, Sergeant in the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Dublin, 1809.

² He gives a graphic account of the action at Fort Anne where he was present with his regiment, and says :—

“It was a distressing sight to see the wounded men bleeding on the ground, and what made it worse the rain came pouring down upon us like a deluge, and still to add to the distress of the sufferers there was nothing to dress their wounds, as the small medicine box which was filled with salve was left behind with Surgeon Kelley and Captain Montgomery at the time of our movement up the hill. The poor fellows earnestly entreated me to tie up their wounds ; so I took off my shirt, tore it up, and with the help of a soldier's wife—the only woman who was with us, and who kept close by her husband's side during the engagement—made some bandages, stopped the bleeding of their wounds, and conveyed them in blankets to a small hut about two miles in our rear. . . . Our regiment now marched back to Skenesborough, leaving me behind to attend to the wounded, with a small guard for our protection. I was directed that, in case I was either surrounded or overpowered by the Americans, to deliver a letter, which General Burgoyne gave me, to their commanding officer. There I remained seven days with the wounded men, expecting every moment to be taken prisoners ; but although we heard the enemy cutting down trees every night during our stay, in order to block up the passages of the road and the river, we were never molested.”

"The British were now obliged to suspend all operations for some time and to wait at Skenesborough for the arrival of provisions and tents, but they employed this interval in clearing a passage for the troops to proceed against the enemy. This was attended with incredible toil ; the Americans (now under the direction of General Schuyler) were constantly employed in cutting down large trees on both sides of every road which was on the line of march. The face of the country was, moreover, so broken with creeks and marshes that there were no less than forty bridges to construct, one of which was over a morass two miles in extent."

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On the 11th July Burgoyne applied to Sir Guy Carleton to furnish a garrison for Ticonderoga in order to render the troops which he had left there after its capture available for service in his campaign. On this point he says:—

"My communications will widen so much as I proceed, the drain upon the army for posts will be so considerable, not to speak of detachments and safeguards to protect and to awe the country, that if that first diminution is not replaced, my effective strength may become inadequate to the service intended."

He proceeds in urgent terms to beg Carleton to attach a wide and liberal interpretation to his instructions (which limited his command to the Canadian frontier), and thus to afford the reinforcement of which he stood in such pressing need.

Unfortunately Governor Carleton did not feel himself justified in complying with this request, conceiving that it would involve a direct breach of orders, and Burgoyne, with a sad heart, admits the justice of the grounds of his decision in a despatch of 29th July:—

"The construction which your Excellency puts upon

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the orders of the Secretary of State is too full and decisive for me to presume to trouble you further upon the subject of a garrison for Ticonderoga from Canada ; I must do as well as I can, but I am sure your Excellency, as a soldier, will think my situation a little difficult. A breach into my communication must either ruin my army entirely or oblige me to return in force, to restore, which might be the loss of the campaign. To prevent a breach Ticonderoga and Fort George must be in very respectable strength, and I must besides have posts at Fort Edward and other carrying places. These drains, added to common accidents and losses of service, will necessarily render me very inferior in point of numbers to the enemy, whom I must expect always to find strongly posted ; but I ask pardon for dwelling so much on the subject."

These and similar representations afford a sufficient answer to the charge of rashness and precipitation which was afterwards brought against Burgoyne. What would have been said of him if, instead of redoubling his efforts to overcome his thickening difficulties, he had fallen back upon Canada on the grounds (for which he had but too much justification) that the authorities had broken faith with him and left him with a force and means of transport insufficient to carry out the objects of the campaign ?

Meanwhile the army was from want of supplies¹ unable to follow up its successes and to take advantage of

¹ In a private letter to Lord George Germain, dated from Fort Edward on 30th July, Burgoyne says :—"The perseverance of the enemy in driving both people and cattle before them as they retreat seems to me an act of desperation or folly. The only purpose it can answer is to retard me for a time, which it certainly does ; it cannot finally injure me ; on the other hand, the tyranny of it is deeply felt and the end must be famine. Those who escape bring their cattle to my camp and swear allegiance to the King. . . .

the dispersion of the American forces. Had Burgoyne been in a position to do so and to have advanced in force after the actions of Huberton and Fort Anne, it is difficult to believe that even the genius and vigour of Washington could possibly have organized an army of sufficient strength to bar the progress to Albany. As it was, the troops were incessantly employed in doing the work of labourers and pack animals instead of advancing upon the enemy, and that which, with efficient arrangement, would have been the work of days became the incessant toil of weeks and months.

Meanwhile the Americans were in possession of Fort George and Fort Edward, both strong positions: the ~~one~~ at the head of Lake George; the other, sixteen miles farther south, near the angle of the Hudson River at the point where it first becomes navigable. In the rear of these garrisons Generals Schuyler and Arnold¹ were collecting an army at Saratoga. (It was Burgoyne's purpose to cut off communication between Fort George and the south, and thus to prevent that garrison from being succoured or from retreating.) To this end he employed his gunboats to scour Lake George, while the main army advanced from Fort Anne upon Fort Edward by a short cut across country, an operation involving a tedious march of about sixteen miles through an unbroken forest intersected by creeks and marshes. The difficulties of such an undertaking for an army worn out

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Among such as sue for protection are many families totally destitute of corn, and it is very embarrassing how to grant their requests upon this article without great inconvenience, or to refuse it without equal inhumanity."

¹ The brave and skillful officer, whose subsequent treachery and desertion of the colours under which he was serving led to the ignominious death of poor Major André as a spy. George III. paid his own army the bad compliment of appointing this man a Major-General; and at his death exceptionally large pensions were granted to his widow and children.

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with hard work, and ill supplied with transport, were very great, and Burgoyne has been much blamed for attempting it while it was possible for him, by falling back upon Ticonderoga, to have carried his army by water to Fort George; but his defence of the course which he adopted is unanswerable:—

“I considered not only the general impressions which a retrograde movement is apt to make upon the minds both of enemies and friends, but also that the natural conduct of the enemy in that case would be to remain at Fort George, as their retreat could not then be cut off, in order to oblige me to open trenches, and consequently to delay me, while they would have destroyed the road from Fort George to Fort Edward.

“On the other hand, by persisting to penetrate by the short cut from Fort Anne, of which I was then master, to Fort Edward, though it was attended with great labour and many alert situations, the troops were improved in many essential points of wood service. I effectually dislodged the enemy from Fort George without a blow, and seeing me master of one situation, they did not think it worth while to destroy the other.”¹

Another motive which must have actuated him was that by employing a large number of boats for transporting the army across Lake George he would have absorbed his principal means of transport for ordnance stores and other requirements of the troops; while the withdrawal of the entire army from the eastern border of the lake would have given advantage and encouragement to the disaffected population of the “Hampshire Grants” (the large district lying between the lakes and the Connecticut River), who were now kept in check by

¹ Burgoyne's narrative in his *Account of the Expedition from Canada*.

the Germans under General Reidesel on the extreme left of the line. ✓

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It must also be borne in mind that the means of communication by water ceased at Fort George, from whence the *impedimenta* of the army must have been carried, over bad roads, a distance of sixteen miles.

The difficulties of transport and the necessity for making the most of all that he possessed seems never to have been absent from Burgoyne's mind, and is a frequent subject of his general orders, among which the following is one:—

“Regiments are in general encumbered with much more baggage than they can possibly be supplied with means of conveying. Such gentlemen as served in America the last war may remember that the officers took up with soldiers' tents, and often confined their baggage to a knapsack for a month together.”

Upon this hint all superfluous baggage and everything not indispensable for military requirements was sent back to Ticonderoga. ✓

The German troops, between whom and their allies feelings of jealousy had existed from the opening of the campaign, appear to have been less amenable with regard to the employment of excessive transport, and on the 18th July Burgoyne writes to General Reidesel:—

“Je vous supplie de faire en sorte que l'esprit de l'ordre par rapport à la renvoye des bagages des officiers à Ticonderoga aye lieu. Les bagages des officiers britanniques sont déjà renvoyés, et il n'en reste à plusieurs qu'une petite tente et une valise. C'est réellement pour l'intérêt de l'officier à la fin que je suis si porté à cet article.”

The Legionaries seem to have possessed a peculiar

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aptitude for seizing cattle and horses, but were not easily to be persuaded that such prize became the joint property of the army. On this subject again Burgoyne writes to the German commander :—

“ Vous ne me faites que justice, Monsieur, en croyant que je n'ajoute point de foi aux rapports que j'entends aux préjudices de vos troupes ; mais vous conviendrez que de garder le bétail à la place de la rendre au Commissaire, excepté dans les cas où les provisions manquent, est contrevenir l'ordre général du 11 de ce mois ; et voilà la cause d'une peu de jalousie qui se lève parmi les troupes britanniques qui sont obligés de rendre tous leurs bœufs, et de manger la viande salée pendant qu'ils voyaient des troupeaux entre les mains des troupes allemandes.”¹

This “ peu de jalousie ” appears to have culminated in open conflict between English and German soldiers, for shortly after the date of the foregoing letter the following general order appears :—

“ Any conduct for the future, whether of British or Germans, that shall tend to obstruct the harmony which has hitherto so happily reigned between the two nations, and which must continue to subsist among brave troops serving in the same cause unless violated by intoxication or misapprehension, will be punished as a crime the most fatal to the success and honour of the campaign.”²

¹ It is significant of how rare an accomplishment an idiomatic knowledge of the French language was among Englishmen a century ago, that the writer of this and similar compositions should in his day have been quoted as a proficient and finished French scholar.

² It is probable that many of the misunderstandings which arose between the English and German troops were due to their ignorance of one another's language. The same inconvenience was experienced in the American army after the general employment of French officers. Lafayette never spoke

The reduction of Forts George and Edward was not effected until the end of July, and once more Burgoyne had to halt, while awaiting the arrival of supplies, to enable him to prosecute his march.

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The following letter to Sir Guy Carleton shows how deliberately he had planned those peculiar features of the campaign for the rash neglect of which he was afterwards blamed. The reasons which in his defence before Parliament he assigned for the march upon Fort Edward are precisely and literally those which before the event he explains in the fullest detail.

"The same day that I took possession of this great communication (Fort Edward) the first disembarkation arrived from Ticonderoga at Fort George. I now, therefore, mean to abandon entirely the communication by Skenesborough, and perhaps I should not have made use of it at all had not the pursuit from Ticonderoga necessarily thrown me so forward. Being once at Skenesborough I considered that to return to Ticonderoga in order to take what appeared the more convenient route by Lake George would not only be attended with the impressions which a retrograde movement often occasions in the minds of foes and friends, but also that the natural conduct of the enemy would be to remain at Fort George, as their retreat could not be then cut off, in order to oblige me to prepare to open trenches and consequently to delay me, and they would afterwards have destroyed the road to Fort Edward. By persisting in penetrating by the short cut from Skenesborough, though it was attended with great labour, I effectually dislodged the enemy from Fort George, and seeing me master of one communication they did

but broken English, and a story is told of a French colonel applying for an interpreter to swear at his recruits in their own tongue.

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not think it worth while to destroy the other, so that I look upon myself as *much more forward in point of time* than I should have been by the other measure, and by sending a large corps to my left while I was employed in making roads from Skenesborough, I gave great jealousy to Connecticut and New England, and thereby prevented the junction of militia from that quarter. I have troubled your Excellency with this explanation, unnecessary with regard to business, but essential to myself as having a sincere ambition to possess your good opinion.

"I have only to add in regard to my future progress that I shall be obliged to wait some days for the arrival of provisions and bateaux, by which time I think it probable the enemy will be fallen back to Saratoga, where I mean to attack them if they stand. At present they are in Schuyler's island, Schuyler being gone to the Congress. *I have no news of Sir William Howe.*"

On 30th July Burgoyne writes to the same effect to Lord George Germain :—

"Although the continued retreat of the enemy from one post to another has prevented any material action, I think the bare date of a letter from Hudson River matter of intelligence not to be deferred, and I take this occasion to give your Lordship the further satisfaction of knowing that the march hither, though scarce a day passed without firing, was effected without any loss to the regulars. The toil of the march was great, but supported with the utmost alacrity. The country being a wilderness, in almost every part of the passage the enemy took the means of cutting large timber trees on both sides the roads so as to fall across and lengthways with the branches interwoven. The troops had not only layers of them to remove in places where it was im-

possible to take any other direction, but also they had above forty bridges to construct and others to repair, one of which was of logwood over a morass two miles in extent.

"I was not unapprized that great part of these difficulties might have been avoided by falling back from Skenesborough to Ticonderoga by water, in order to take the more commodious route by Lake George. But besides wishing to prevent the effect which a retrograde movement often has to abate the panic of an enemy, I considered that the natural consequence would be resistance, or delay at least, at Fort George; where, as the retreat was open, the enemy would await leisurely the preparation of batteries, or at any rate a landing in force for the purpose of investment.

"The issue has justified my perseverance. The garrison of Fort George, in manifest danger of being cut off by the direct movement from Skenesborough to Hudson River, took the measure I expected of abandoning the fort and burning the vessels, thereby leaving the lake entirely free. A detachment of the King's troops from Ticonderoga which I had ordered to be ready for that event, with a great embarkation of provisions, passed the lake on the same day that I took possession of the communication by land; and I have the happiness, upon the whole, to find that the necessities for continuing the progress of the army are more forward in point of time than they could have been by any other means. ✓

"The enemy is at present in force at Saratoga, where they profess an intention of standing a battle, and they have drawn a supply of artillery from New England for that purpose. The King's troops are employed in bringing forward from Fort George provisions, bateaux,

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artillery, and other materials necessary for proceeding."¹

In an accompanying private letter to the minister Burgoyne states :—

X "I have spared no pains to open a correspondence with Sir William Howe. I have employed the most enterprizing characters and offered very promising rewards, but of ten messengers sent at different times and by different routes not one is returned to me, and *I am in total ignorance of the situation or intentions of that General.*"

✓ He at the same time tells Lord George Germain that Sir Guy Carleton had informed him of his having tendered his resignation of the governorship of Canada, and that in the event of the King designing him to succeed to that office, he would request the interposition of his Lordship's friendship to decline that appointment, feeling conscious that neither his "talent nor his constitution were adapted to do due justice in the province of Canada," but praying for permission to return to England on the conclusion of the campaign.

While Burgoyne had thus pushed forward to the left bank of the Hudson, and was anxiously sending out scouts in the hope of obtaining intelligence of the advance of Sir William Howe, that General, instead of marching to the north, was busy in his preparations for an attack upon Philadelphia, leaving Sir Henry Clinton, with an insufficient garrison, in New York. The situation thus became most critical. To cross the Hudson and advance was to give up his communications with the north, and, in the event of not meeting with the

¹ At the risk of repetitions, I have quoted Burgoyne's despatches very fully on a subject upon which his military reputation was at a later period assailed.

expected co-operation from New York, to risk the loss of his army; to fall back was to expose the southern army to the same danger should Howe, in supposed obedience to his orders, have approached Albany. There was no alternative between following out his instructions at the risk of sacrificing himself and of abandoning the objects of the campaign and probably causing the defeat of his brother General by a disobedience of orders based upon motives of personal prudence. To a chivalrous nature like Burgoyne's there could be no room for doubt as to the course to which his duty pointed: he determined to advance.

His resolution, however, could not be carried into effect without preparations on a large scale to secure the subsistence of the troops, and to this end Burgoyne planned an attack upon Bennington on the Connecticut River, where the enemy had formed a large depôt of transport and provisions.

In his "narrative" he states:—

"It was found, in the situations of the transport service at that time the army could barely be victualled from day to day, and that there was no prospect of establishing a magazine in due time for pursuing present advantages. The idea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon this plan.

"I knew that Bennington was the great deposit of corn, flour, and cattle, that it was guarded only by militia, and every day's account tended only to confirm the persuasion of the loyalty of one description of the inhabitants and the panic of the others. Those who knew the country best were the most sanguine in this persuasion.

"Had my intelligence been worse founded, I should not have hesitated to try this expedition with such

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troops and under such instructions as I gave to the commanding officer, for so great a purpose as that of a supply sufficient to enable the army to follow upon the heels of a broken and disconcerted enemy. The German troops were of the best I had of that nation. The number of British was small, but it was the select Light Corps of the army, and composed of chosen men from all regiments and commanded by Captain Fraser, one of the most distinguished officers in his line of service that ever I met with.¹ The instructions recommended the utmost caution respecting posts security and retreat, and attention against exposing the solid part of the detachment to affront, or committing it in any instance without a moral certainty of success."

The original instructions for this service, as drawn up for Lieutenant-Colonel Baume by General Reidesel, with the alterations and amendments made by Burgoyne, are published in the "State of the Expedition," and show the careful attention to the minutest detail which Burgoyne had paid to every particular connected with this undertaking, the failure of which was clearly owing to want of intelligence on the part of the officer in command, who paid for it with his life. Burgoyne, with his habitual generosity, passes lightly over these errors.

✓ "I touch with tenderness and with great reluctance points that relate to the dead. My defence only compels me to say that my cautions were not observed, nor the reinforcements advanced with the alacrity I had the right to expect. The men who commanded in both instances were brave and experienced officers. I have ever imputed their failure partly to delusion in respect to the enemy, and partly to surprise and consequent confusion to the troops."

¹ A nephew of Brigadier Simon Fraser.

In another place Burgoyne says :—

"Had my instructions been followed, or could Mr. Breyman (who had been sent with the Brunswick Chasseurs to support Colonel Baume) have *marched at the rate of two miles an hour* any given twelve hours out of the two and thirty,¹ success would probably have ensued—misfortune would certainly have been avoided."

Colonel Baume, whose force consisted of nearly 500 men, at first met with some small successes ; but he was misled by the false representations of professed loyalists who joined his standard, and were the first to fire upon him when they had led him into ambush. Ignorant of the country and of the position and numbers of the enemy, he, on the 16th August, found himself surrounded by overwhelming numbers.² For some hours he maintained his post with great obstinacy in the hope of being succoured by the force which he knew had been detached to his support ; finally he attempted to cut his way through the enemy. The attempt failed ; he fell sword in hand, and of the whole corps not a man escaped being killed or taken prisoner.

Colonel Breyman was met in force on his advance, and obliged to retreat with the loss of many men and two guns.³

¹ The slowness of the German troops becomes intelligible when we read in Irving's *Life of Washington* that the helmet and sword of one of Reidesel's dragoons weighed as much as the whole equipment of a British soldier.

² The Americans were commanded by General Starke, who thus addressed his force before the action :—"Come on, my lads ; we shall either beat the British or Molly Starke will be a widow this night."

³ These guns (brass pieces) have met with many vicissitudes of fortune. They were of French manufacture, and had been taken by Wolfe's army in Quebec in 1759, lost at Bennington in '77, retaken by the British at Detroit in 1812, and again lost at Niagara in the following year. They are now in possession of the Americans. See *Burgoyne's Campaign*, by Neillson.

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The Americans were greatly elated by this success. To Burgoyne the loss of 700 men was a serious blow, and the more so since the failure upon Bennington necessitated his awaiting supplies from the north, and prevented him from meeting the enemy before he could collect in force.

Although he did not lose heart, Burgoyne was fully sensible of the importance of the check he had met with, and in a private letter to Lord George Germain, of 20th August, seems, for the first time, to be oppressed with gloomy forebodings:—

“The consequences of this affair, my Lord, have little effect upon the strength or spirits of the army; but the prospect of the campaign in other respects is far less favourable than when I wrote last. In spite of St. Leger’s victory, Fort Stanwix holds out obstinately. I am afraid the expectations of Sir J. Johnson greatly fail in the rising of the country. On this side I find daily reason to doubt the sincerity of the resolution of the professing loyalists. I have about 400 (but not half of them armed) who may be depended upon; the rest are trimmers merely actuated by interest. The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress, in principle and in zeal; and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be equalled. Wherever the King’s forces point, militia, to the amount of three or four thousand, assemble in twenty-four hours; they bring with them their subsistence, &c., and, the alarm over, they return to their farms. The Hampshire Grants in particular, a country uncopied and almost unknown in the last war, now abounds in the most active and most rebellious race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering storm upon my left. In all parts the industry and management in

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driving cattle, and removing corn, are indefatigable and certain; and it becomes impracticable to move without portable magazines. Another most embarrassing circumstance is the want of communication with Sir William Howe; of the messengers I have sent I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant whether any of the rest arrived. The same fate has probably attended those dispatched by Sir William Howe; for only one letter is come to hand. . . .

"No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour; the highlands have not been threatened. The consequence is that Putnam has detached two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now strongly posted near the mouth of the Mohawk River, with an army superior to mine in troops of the Congress, and as many militia as he pleases. He is likewise far from being deficient in artillery, having received all the pieces that were landed from the French ships which got into Boston.

"Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think it my duty to wait in this position, or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George would be perfectly secure, till some event happened to assist my movement forward; *but my orders being positive to 'force a junction with Sir William Howe,'* (I apprehend I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer than shall be necessary to collect twenty-five days' provision, and to receive the reinforcement of the additional companies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Lake Champlain.) (The waiting the arrival of this reinforcement is of indispensable necessity, because from the hour I pass the Hudson River and proceed towards Albany, all safety of communication ceases.) I must expect a large body of the enemy from my left will take

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post behind me. I have put out of the question the waiting longer than the time necessary for the foregoing purposes, because the attempt, then critical, depending on adventure and the fortune that often accompanies it, and hardly justifiable but by orders from the state, would afterwards be consummately desperate. I mean, my Lord, that by moving soon, though I should meet with insurmountable difficulties to my progress, I shall at least have the chance of fighting my way back to Ticonderoga, but the season a little further advanced, the distance increased, and the march unavoidably tardy, because, surrounded by enemies, a retreat might be shut by impenetrable bars or the elements, and at the same time no possible means of existence remain in the country.

Handwritten: *When I wrote more confidently, I little foresaw that I was to be left to pursue my way through such a tract of country, and hosts of foes, without any co-operation from New York; nor did I then think the garrison of Ticonderoga would fall to my share alone; a dangerous experiment would it be to leave that post in weakness, and too heavy a drain it is upon the life-blood of my force to give it due strength.*

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“I yet do not despond. Should I succeed in forcing my way to Albany, and find that country in a state to subsist my army, I shall think no more of a retreat, but at the worst fortify there and await Sir W. Howe's operations.

“Whatever may be my fate, my Lord, I submit my actions to the breast of the King, and to the candid judgment of my profession, when all the motives become public; and I rest in the confidence, that whatever decision may be passed upon my conduct, my good intent will not be questioned.

"I cannot close so serious a letter without expressing my fullest satisfaction in the behaviour and countenance of the troops, and my complete confidence that in all trials they will do whatever can be expected from men devoted to their King and country.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"J. BURGoyNE."

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About this time Burgoyne received a second piece of discouraging intelligence. Before leaving Canada he had, in conformity with instructions from the Cabinet, detached Colonel St. Leger with a mixed force of 1,000 men (British light troops, Provincials, and Indians) to advance by a rapid march from Lake Ontario on Fort Stanwix, and, having reduced that post, to effect a junction with the main army between Saratoga and Albany by a flank movement on the Mohawk River.

(Like Colonel Baume, St. Leger was misled by the information of pretended friends of the Royal cause, and compelled after some time to raise the siege of Fort Stanwix, and, on being abandoned by the Indians, to fall back upon Canada; the project of the flank movement, which would probably have had an important effect on the operations of the enemy, was thus defeated and Burgoyne deprived of the services of this part of his small army.

Washington, writing to General Schuyler before the result of the operations against Fort Stanwix and Bennington had become known, said:—

"As I suggested before, the successes General Burgoyne has met with may precipitate his ruin. From your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which of all others is most favourable to us; I mean acting in detachments. This conduct will certainly give

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room for enterprise on our part, and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four or five or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people."

Undoubtedly true ; but, both in Colonel St. Leger's and in Colonel Baume's expeditions, the failure was due to exceptional causes, upon which the enemy had no right to reckon, while the success of either would have inflicted a heavy blow upon the American cause. The operations were in themselves perfectly legitimate.

At this time the American army seems to have been inspired with a graduated scale of animosity towards the King's troops employed against them, according to their nationality : the Royal army being considered a worthy foe, to be beaten if possible, but always to be respected ; the Germans hated as mercenaries hired to do the work of a tyrant ; and the Provincials despised as traitors to the cause of their native country.

In the unfortunate affair at Bennington the wounded and prisoners who fell into the hands of the Americans were either Provincials or Germans, and these they were accused of having treated with such barbarity that Burgoyne felt it his duty to remonstrate with General Gates :—

"It is with great concern I find myself obliged to add to this application a complaint of the bad treatment the provincial soldiers in the King's service have met with. I have reports upon oath that some of these men were refused quarter after having asked it ; I am willing to believe that this was against the order and inclinations of your officers, but it is my part to require an explanation, and to warn you of the horrors of retaliation if such a practice is not in the strongest terms discountenanced and reprehended."

To this remonstrance General Gates replied by re-criminating charges against Burgoyne for employing Indians:—

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"That the savages of America should in their warfare mangle and scalp the unhappy prisoners is neither new nor extraordinary; but that the famous Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, in whom the fine gentleman is united with the soldier and the scholar, should hire the savages of America to scalp Europeans and the descendants of Europeans, nay, more, that he should pay a price for each scalp so mercilessly taken, is more than will be believed in Europe."

Burgoyne, in his rejoinder, declines to allow the grounds of his remonstrance to be evaded by the imputation of ungrounded charges against himself, and declares with a sudden lapse into magniloquence:—

"I would not be conscious of the acts you pretend to impute to me for the whole continent of America, though the wealth of worlds were in its bowels and a paradise upon its surface."¹

(It was not until the middle of September that Burgoyne had collected sufficient supplies² to prosecute his march, and on the 14th of that month he crossed the Hudson by a bridge of boats and took up his position on the plains of Saratoga.

Sept 14

He had previously made arrangements for detaching a garrison, under Brigadier-General Powell, for the defence of Ticonderoga, whom he prepared to expect an attack, with a view to cutting off communication with Canada, and which was actually attempted a few

¹ "Burgoyne in a manly reply declared that he would have disdained to justify himself from such rhapsodies of fiction and calumny, but that his silence might be construed into an admission of their truth, and lead to acts of retaliation."—IRVING'S *Life of Washington*.

² He had now magazines calculated to subsist the troops for thirty days.

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1777. at this time for troops and transport—and having, to use

✓ his own words, “drained the life-blood of his force” in order to garrison Ticonderoga in due strength, Burgoyne now made extraordinary sacrifices in order to afford every comfort in the removal of the sick and wounded to Canada, and in his detailed instructions on these points the man’s kindly and considerate nature is fully displayed.

Shortly after his passage of the Hudson, Burgoyne received the following despatch from General Howe, the only one that reached him out of a number which had been sent ; most of the messengers having either found it impracticable to penetrate so far, or been taken and hanged by the Americans. This communication is written in very small characters upon narrow strips of paper and was conveyed in a quill.¹

“DEAR SIR,

✓ “I have received yours of the second instant on the 15th, have since heard from the rebel army of your being in possession of Ticonderoga, *which is a great event, carried without loss.* I have received your two letters, *viz.*, from Plymouth and Quebec, your last of the 14th May, and shall observe the contents. There is a report of a messenger of yours to me having been taken, and the letter discovered in a double wooden canteen ; you will know if it was of any consequence ; nothing of it has transpired to us. I will observe the *same rules* in writing to you as you propose in your letters to me. Washing-

¹ Two months after the date of this letter General Clinton, writing to General Hervey, says :—“I have not heard from Howe for six weeks, and have no orders to co-operate with Burgoyne.” And again, “No certain accounts of Burgoyne ; from all I hear he has not 6,000 men opposite to him.” See *Memoirs of Lord Rockingham*. At this time he was actually opposed by an army of 12,000 men strongly posted.

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ton is waiting our motions here, and has detached Sullivan with about 2,500 men, as I learn, to Albany. My intention is for Pennsylvania, where I expect to meet Washington, but if he goes to the northward contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve you.

"After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide yours; but my wishes are, that the enemy be drove out of this province before any operation takes place in Connecticut. Sir Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will act as occurrences may direct. Putnam is in the highlands with about 4,000 men. Success be ever with you.

"Yours, &c.,

"WILLIAM HOWE."

Whatever meaning was to be extracted from this intelligence it is perfectly clear that Howe expected Burgoyne to advance upon Albany, and it might reasonably be inferred from his reference to Sir Henry Clinton that he was instructed to co-operate with a view to a junction. (The Americans could not believe in the practicability of Burgoyne's undertaking, without co-operation from the south; and how much Washington feared it, and how relieved he was when he found that it was not to be carried out, is to be seen from two of his letters of this time. In the first, dated from the Delaware on 30th July, he says:—"Howe's in a manner abandoning Burgoyne is so unaccountable a matter, that till I am fully assured of it I cannot help casting my eyes continually behind me." On the 22nd August he says:—"The English Fleet has entered the Chesapeake, there is not the least danger now of Howe's going to New England."¹ And on the 29th

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¹ These letters are quoted by Belsham in his *Memoirs of George III.*

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September :—"I think we may now count on the total ruin of Burgoyne."

Of these circumstances Burgoyne was kept ignorant ; nor did he know, though the enemy was fully aware of it, that Sir Henry Clinton could not advance from New York until after the arrival of reinforcements from England. He had penetrated to the Hudson in obedience to orders, and he was well aware that from the moment that he had crossed the river the enemy could gather in his rear, intercept his supplies, and render retreat hazardous, if not impossible. The issue of the campaign now hung upon the co-operation he might hope for from the south, and the extent of resistance which the opposing army could present to his progress. His letters of this period show that he acted under a deep sense of the responsibility which he incurred ; they also show that his sense of duty left him no alternative : he had passed the Rubicon.

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SARATOGA.

THE failure of the expeditions against Bennington and on the Mohawk had the effect of restoring the confidence of the insurgents, so rudely shaken by the fall of Ticonderoga and the dispersion of its garrison; and Burgoyne's delay, while engaged in bringing up supplies from the north, afforded them ample time for the concentration of a new army. General Gates¹ had now been appointed to the command of the forces destined to bar the progress of the Royalists, and so eagerly did recruits flock to his standard that the New England States were said to have been completely denuded of their arm-bearing population.²

¹ Horatio Gates, an Englishman by birth, had been an officer in the British army, and served with distinction against the French in Canada. He subsequently purchased an estate in Virginia, and, on the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, was appointed Adjutant-General of the insurgent forces. He received the thanks of Congress for his victory at Saratoga, and was appointed to the chief command in the south, where he was signally defeated, at Camden, by Lord Cornwallis in 1781. He was related by marriage to the Earl of Thanet, and was a grandson (scandal attributed a nearer relationship) of Horace Walpole.

² In the then state of the colony this must be taken to mean the entire male population, with the exception of those incapacitated by the infirmities of old age or the immaturity of youth.

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As Burgoyne's army slowly made its way through the forest along the western bank of the Hudson, the Americans, who had encamped at Saratoga, fell back to a distance of eight miles upon Stillwater, where they had previously determined to make a stand, and which, naturally a strong position, had been entrenched and fortified under the direction of Kosciusko. Their army was at this time estimated at 10,000 men. The right, under Gates, occupied a ridge of hills running due east from a narrow defile on the banks of the Hudson, which two batteries commanded; the base of the ridge was defended by an abattis nearly a mile in extent; the left line, under Arnold, was posted on high ground, the approach to which was intersected by a deep ravine. The entire position was covered by a dense forest extending nearly a mile towards the north.

On the morning of the 19th September Burgoyne's army advanced upon this position in three columns, of which he led the centre, while Brigadier-General Fraser commanded the right and Major-Generals Phillips and Reidesel the left wing; the point upon which they converged being some open ground called Freeman's Farm, immediately touching the enemy's left, Burgoyne's reconnoissances having convinced him that the position on the right was impregnable.

The British signal guns gave the word of command to both armies, for simultaneously with our advance the American Left marched forward with a view of outflanking the Right of our line; but being met by General Fraser, who had made a circuit to the eastward to avoid the ravine, they turned upon the centre of the line, which a column under Arnold attacked with great fury. Although the entire distance which at daybreak

had separated Burgoyne's army from the encampment of the enemy was under four miles, the march through the wooded and over the broken ground was so tedious that it was not until two hours after noon that the action became general. It then continued without intermission till sunset, when the Americans fell back upon their entrenchments, while Burgoyne's army lay upon their arms that night, and early on the following morning took post within cannon-shot of the enemy, where they fortified the ground on the right, and extended their line to the meadows bordering the Hudson.

In this action our loss in killed and wounded exceeded 300 men, with a large proportion of officers;¹ that of the enemy was said to have been greater; but beyond the barren honour of remaining masters of the field little advantage had been gained. The formidable barrier, guarded by a resolute army, still lay before us, and the Americans, although driven back, were justly elated at the obstinacy with which they had for many hours maintained a hand-to-hand struggle with the veteran troops of England.

The honest soldier whose journal I have before quoted says:—

"General Burgoyne during this conflict behaved with great personal bravery. He shunned no danger; his presence and conduct animated the troops, for they

¹ Our loss was heavy in officers, in consequence of their having been made the mark of American riflemen, who, advancing singly under cover of the dense wood, and even taking up their post in trees, picked off individuals in conspicuous positions. The artillery suffered severely in this way. Captain Jones, the commander of a battery, was thus shot, and thirty-six out of his forty-eight gunners were killed or disabled by the enemy's marksmen. Of the 62nd Regiment, who had left Canada 500 strong, only sixty men, with four or five officers, now remained under arms. Of three officers of the 20th Regiment, who fell and were thrown into one grave, the eldest was only seventeen years of age.

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greatly loved the General. He delivered his orders with precision and coolness, and in the heat, danger, and fury of the fight, maintained the true characteristics of the soldier—serenity, fortitude, and undaunted intrepidity.”¹ This is truly the *mens æqua in orduis* becoming the commander of men.

The long and tedious marches, the casualties which had thinned their ranks, the absence of all opportunities for plundering, and the strict discipline in which they were now held, combined to make the Indians discontented with the service in which they were engaged, and numbers of them deserted at this juncture. The provincial volunteers too, who had joined the Royal forces in full confidence of a rapid and successful termination of the campaign, now that danger and privation beset the army melted away day by day, and retired to their homes; some of them, indeed, not only abandoned their colours, but transferred their weapons to the enemy.

On the day following the action at Stillwater Burgoyne received a ~~letter in~~ cypher from Sir Henry Clinton, who informed him of his intention of attacking Fort Montgomery and other strong places on the Hudson, calculated to annoy him in his advance upon Albany, which he contemplated commencing on the 22nd September.

Burgoyne sent back the messenger on the same night, with full information as to his position, and an urgent appeal to Clinton to hasten his advance, in order to compel Gates to detach a part of his army to meet the diversion. This communication was deposited in a hollow silver bullet, which the bearer was directed to deliver into the General's own hands. The man suc-

¹ Lamb's *Journal*.

ceeded in making his way to Fort Montgomery on the Hudson, where, in compliance with his enquiries for General Clinton, he was led into the presence, not of Sir Henry Clinton, but of a namesake, General Clinton of the American army, the late Governor of New York. On discovering the mistake, the unfortunate man swallowed the bullet ; but an emetic being administered, the despatch was discovered, and its bearer hanged as a spy. ✓

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Burgoyne had, however, taken the precaution of sending several messengers by different routes. One of these was Captain Scott of the 53rd Regiment, and his journal of this expedition furnishes a good illustration of the extraordinary difficulties of communication existing between the two armies operating to effect a junction, and then actually within a short distance of one another, though neither was conscious of the fact. ✓

CAPTAIN SCOTT'S JOURNAL.

" The 27th September in the evening I left General Burgoyne's camp at Freeman's Farm, with despatches for Sir Henry Clinton, at which time I passed the Hudson River to the east side, by a bridge that was upon the left by our camp ; but could not get further into the woods than a mile and a half, owing to the darkness of the night, and a swamp which we got into. Set out the 28th in the morning, keeping the woods until we got to the banks of the Husack Creek, which we found was guarded at all the fords by the enemy, to prevent the friends of Government from getting into General Burgoyne's camp, which obliged us to remain quiet all that day. Passed several of their guards that night, and by

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the assistance of a thick fog, passed the creek early in the morning of the 29th, and got four miles beyond Pits-town, at which place my guide from General Burgoyne's camp left me, and recommended me to a German, where I stayed part of the night. The 30th, got a guide who brought me through the woods to another friend of Government, where I got horses. It being night, I kept the road until I arrived at Kinderhook, where I stayed the remainder of the night. October 1st, passed the Hudson River in a canoe to the west side, and stopped for a few hours at Cusocky at a friend's house, who furnished me with horses that carried me eight miles, where I was obliged to stop that night. 2nd, prevailed on a German for a sum of money, to carry me down the Hudson River, concealed in a canoe, as far as the other side of Esopus Creek, which he did that night ; being landed half a mile below Esopus, I continued marching the remainder of the night, and some part of the next day, being the 3rd, but was obliged to stop, not being able to procure a guide. The 4th, proceeded to the back of New Windsor, where I stayed until the evening of the 5th, at a friend's house, at which time I set out, having prevailed on a guide to try to conduct me to New York, as I could get no intelligence at that time relative to Sir Henry Clinton. Coming up the North River, saw a good many parties of the rebel militia making towards New Windsor and the forts ; got the same evening as far as Smith Clove, at which place I had great reason to suppose my guide betrayed me, having brought me close to the rebel guard, who challenged us, and ordered us to come in, which the guide did ; upon seeing which I immediately fell back, was fired at by two sentinels at a distance of three or four yards from me. They took one man who came with me in order to get to the King's

army at New York. I made my escape into a wood about three hundred yards distant from the guard, along with a man who came with me from General Burgoyne's army, where we remained all the rest of the night ; heard one of the rebels at daybreak in the morning, being the 6th, in search of us, and was obliged to remain hid all that day. Set out in the night, and got past their guards. The 7th, we made for the Jerseys, steering by a compass having no guide. The 8th, met an inhabitant who informed us of Fort Montgomery being taken ; he seemed much dejected, and thought their cause at that time in a bad way. Altered our course for Fort Montgomery, lay that night in a house by itself in the Highlands, which was the only one we ventured into since the 5th, during which time our provision did not consist of more than a pound of bread and cheese ; still steering by a compass, got into Fort Montgomery by 10 o'clock that day, went immediately and waited upon Sir Henry Clinton aboard of Commodore Hotham, set out the next day, being the 10th, on my return to General Burgoyne, on board the fleet of armed vessels going up the Hudson River, under the command of Sir James Wallace. Sailed the 11th, but as the fleet at that time did not proceed higher up the river than twenty miles below Esopus, we were obliged to land in the night, when we lay hid in the woods until morning. The 12th, we marched all day and crossed Esopus Creek in the night. The 13th, marched all day, and was conducted in the night by a guide to a friend's house, where I got a wagon that carried me the same night to Cusocky, where I was obliged to remain hid until the 15th, not being able to procure a guide that would undertake to carry me through to General Burgoyne's army, declaring he was entirely surrounded and had capitulated, likewise

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finding those that were well inclined to Government would upon no account venture either for to harbour me or give me the least assistance. I was obliged to try for to make my way back to our fleet in the North River ; set out in the night and by the assistance of a canoe got twelve miles. The 16th, was obliged to lie hid all day up a small creek ; set out in the evening in the canoe, and got on board the fleet that night, opposite to Liviston's Manor, whereof I continued until they had arrived at New York.

" THOMAS SCOTT,
" Captain 53rd Regiment.

" May 16th, 1778."

In his despatches Burgoyne impressed upon his brother General the urgency of his co-operation, stating that while he was unsupported he could not attack the enemy's lines, which became stronger with every day's delay ; that by husbanding his supplies he hoped to be enabled to maintain his position until the 20th of October ; that he considered his communications with Canada as cut off ; and that, even if he could succeed in forcing the American lines, his advance upon Albany would be hazardous, unless he were assured that he should there be met by reinforcements and by supplies for the subsistence of his exhausted troops.

In the meanwhile he occupied himself in throwing up earthworks, and by all means which the ground afforded strengthening the position.¹ On the 3rd October it

¹ General Gates was urged by Arnold to attack Burgoyne in his lines and destroy the army before reinforcements from the south could reach him ; but the former, better informed probably as to Clinton's position, refused to take the offensive until his army was so much strengthened as to exceed that of the English by three or four to one. In consequence of a misunderstanding arising from this decision Arnold was suspended from duty and deprived of his command.

was found necessary to place the army upon reduced rations, a measure to which they submitted with "the greatest cheerfulness." Indeed, every incident of this campaign affords evidence of the high state of discipline and admirable conduct of the troops.

It has already been shown that Burgoyne crossed the Hudson, not, as his detractors have alleged, with reckless precipitation, but with a full sense of the responsibility incurred by such a step; and now that he found himself face to face with a powerful enemy strongly entrenched, he was conscious that his position was precarious in the extreme. By falling back he might yet have placed his army in security,¹ but while there was the slightest chance of cooperation from the south, he conceived that to abandon the advancing force to the whole strength of General Gates's army might be to decide the fate of the war, while his own defeat could but be a partial disaster. No unbiassed mind can contemplate his attitude at this juncture, in a position the most trying and responsible in which a General can be placed, without respect and admiration.

In his despatch to Lord George Germain, of the 20th October, he says:—

"The difficulty of a retreat upon Canada was clearly foreseen, as was the dilemma, should the retreat be effected, of leaving at liberty such an army as General Gates's to operate against Sir William Howe.

"This consideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as possible, and I reasoned thus: the expedition which I commanded was at first


¹ Among his own Generals, Reidesel was the only one who advised a retreat upon Fort Edward; possibly his knowledge of the disheartened condition of the German levies may have influenced him in such counsel.

CHAP. VII. evidently intended to be *hazarded*; circumstances might
1777. require it should be *devoted*."

Days passed over wearily, while the English army lay inactive, awaiting tidings of that co-operation which never came, and Burgoyne at length determined to make a movement upon the enemy's left, to ascertain the chances of forcing a passage; at the worst to cover a foraging party sent out in the hope of supplying his exhausted magazines. Much depended upon the result of the operation, for although he was ignorant of the successes of Clinton,¹ on the Hudson, his breach of the enemy's line, and further advance towards the south, must soon have given the two Generals tidings of each other's movements, and a junction would have been assured, for the advanced guard of the southern expedition was now actually within forty miles of Albany.

On the morning of the 7th October Burgoyne placed himself at the head of a column of 1,500 regular troops with ten guns, and deployed in line within three-quarters of a mile of the American left, while a body of provincials and Indians was sent through the woods to gain the rear of their position. The attack was, however, anticipated by the enemy, who advanced rapidly in great force upon our left, where Major Ackland, at the head of the British Grenadiers, received and checked them. In a few minutes the action extended along the whole line, while a large corps of American riflemen attempted to march round the flank of the extreme right. The light infantry under Lord Balcarres, and a part of

¹ Sir Henry Clinton had captured two forts on the Hudson, and entirely destroyed the American war vessels on the river. He had also, in anticipation of Burgoyne's urgent requirements, collected provisions calculated to maintain the army for six months, which lay in boats to await their arrival within a few miles of Albany.



the 24th Regiment, were quickly formed into a second line, to cover the retreat into the English camp, but had hardly taken ground in this position when an attack by overwhelming numbers upon the left line compelled them to advance to save it from being broken. The attack was repelled, and the English line once more advanced with a loud cheer.

It was at this moment that Arnold appeared upon the scene.¹ He had remained in the camp after being deprived of his command and stripped of all authority : and when the Americans prepared for battle he asked permission to serve as a volunteer in the ranks. Gates refused his request, and now his restless spirit chafed as he saw others advancing upon the enemy at the head of those troops which he had formed and led. Eagerly gazing to the front, he listened to the din of battle, until, unable to curb his instincts longer, he sprang upon his charger and rushed into the field. In vain did Gates despatch messengers to recall him. The Adjutant-General,² who attempted in person to check his progress, was warned aside by a derisive wave of his sword, and, calling upon the soldiers by whom he was known and trusted, to follow him, he threw himself full upon the advancing line of the British, with the reckless fury of a man maddened with a thirst for blood and

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¹ Arnold's conduct on this occasion has been the theme of much fine writing on the part of Americans ; but, making allowance for some exaggerations, his was a very conspicuous and picturesque figure in this battle piece, and although we were then already greatly outnumbered by the enemy, his desperate and reckless courage undoubtedly contributed in a great degree to the American victory.

² Colonel Wilkinson, who accused Arnold of having on this occasion been "mad with drink." There was, however, a strong personal animosity between the two men, which invalidates his testimony. Arnold's animal courage was of a kind which required no artificial stimulant to quicken it. As Washington Irving says, "Arnold needed but his own irritated pride and the smell of gunpowder to rouse him to acts of madness."

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carnage. General Fraser's quick eye saw the danger. Conspicuous wherever the fight was thickest, his commanding figure had already become the mark of the American riflemen, and as he rode forward to sustain the staggering column, Colonel Morgan, their commander, called one of his best marksmen, and, pointing to the English General, said, "That is a gallant officer; but he must die. Take post in that clump of bushes, and do your duty." The order was but too well obeyed; ~~Fraser fell mortally~~ wounded.

Meanwhile the American forces were pouring in ever increasing masses upon the British line, and the contest became a hand-to-hand struggle; bayonets were crossed again and again; guns were taken and retaken; but our men were falling fast under the withering fire of the riflemen, and there were no reserves to fill the big gaps in their ranks. A desperate struggle ensued in the attempt to recover one of our guns—finally it was turned against us. Again Arnold, at the head of a column of fresh troops, charged upon the centre, carrying all before him. Thrown into irretrievable disorder, Burgoyne's broken columns regained their camp, leaving ten guns and hundreds of their dead and wounded on the field.

But the warlike rage of Arnold was not yet appeased, and before the English had completely regained their lines he was again upon them. Repelled in the centre by a desperate fire of grape shot, he flung himself upon the German reserves on the right with irresistible fury, and crashing through their entrenchments, although himself severely wounded, gained an opening upon the rear of the English camp. Colonel Breyman gallantly resisted the charge, but fell shot through the heart; when the Germans, who had hitherto borne themselves well, broke and fled, or surrendered.

The abrupt darkness of an American autumn evening now fell upon the blood-stained field, and mercifully interposed its shadows between the combatants.

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The advantage gained by the enemy rendered Burgoyne's position untenable, and during the night he effected a complete and skilful change of position, occupying some high ground in rear of the extreme left of his original encampment. This movement necessitated a corresponding change of front on the part of the American army, from which a large column was at once detached and posted on the Hudson within 1,200 yards of the British lines.

Gloomy indeed must have been the reflections which now forced themselves upon "Burgoyne's anxious and accomplished mind,"¹ embittered, as they were, by grief for the loss of the many friends who had fallen in the struggle. Fraser, his old companion in arms and trusted adviser, lay dying in a hut; his favourite aide-de-camp² had been struck down by his side mortally wounded; Major Ackland, the gallant commander of the light infantry, shot through both legs, was a prisoner in the American lines; the silence of the night was broken by the groans of the wounded who crowded the hospital tents, while the effective troops lay hungry and shivering under the chill rain of an inclement sky. Burgoyne himself had been exposed to a heavy fire, a shot had passed through his hat, another through his waistcoat. Did he, during his meditations among the dead and dying on that dismal night, feel grateful at having escaped a soldier's death?

"The British officers have bled profusely and honourably. Those who remain unwounded have been equally forward, and the general officers, from the mode of

¹ Lord Mahon.² Sir James Clerke.

CHAP. VII. fighting, have been more exposed than in other services.
 1777. I too have had my escapes; it depends upon the sentence His Majesty shall pass upon my conduct, upon the judgment of my profession, and of the impartial and respectable part of my country, whether I come to esteem these blessings or misfortunes."¹

On the morning of the 8th the enemy renewed the attack, but not in force, confining his operations to throwing forward skirmishing parties, at the same time detaching a body of troops to the opposite bank of the Hudson, to cut off retreat in that quarter. Towards evening, in compliance with his last request, General Fraser was buried in the great redoubt in front of the abandoned English camp. The Americans, on observing a gathering towards their batteries, opened fire upon the group collected around the old soldier's grave, foremost in which stood Burgoyne, who thus describes the scene:—

"The incessant cannonade during the solemnity; the steady attitude and unaltered voice with which the chaplain² officiated, though frequently covered with dust which the shots threw up on all sides of him; the mute but expressive mixture of sensibility and indignation upon every countenance; these objects will remain to the last of life upon the mind of every man who was present."

Darkness was closing in while the mourners still stood around the open grave, when the Americans, become aware of the nature of the ceremony, silenced their hostile batteries, and fired minute-guns in honour of the dead soldier.

¹ Despatch to Lord George Germain of 20th October, 1777.

² Mr. Brudenell, chaplain to the artillery.





Painted by Fraser.

Printed by the Alhambra Press.

BURIAL OF BRIGADIER GENERAL FRASER.

Painted by Fraser.	9th October 1777.	Mr. Wm. Jackson
General Burgoyne	Captain Green A.D.C.	Earl Boscawen
Major General Phillips	Revd. Mr. Boulton	Major General Fiddes
	Major Fraser	Russian Officer A.D.C.

Another episode in the history of this ill-fated day is thus recorded in Burgoyne's own words :—

“ Lady Harriet Ackland had accompanied her husband to Canada in the beginning of the year 1776. In the course of that campaign she had traversed a vast space of country, in different extremities of season, and with difficulties that an European traveller will not easily conceive, to attend, in a poor hut at Chamblée, upon his sick bed.

“ In the opening of the campaign of 1777 she was restrained from offering herself to a share of the fatigue and hazard expected before Ticonderoga, by the positive injunctions of her husband. The day after the conquest of that place, he was badly wounded, and she crossed the Lake Champlain to join him.

“ As soon as he recovered, Lady Harriet continued her progress, a partaker of the fatigues of the advanced corps. On the march of the 19th, the grenadiers being liable to action at every step, she had been directed by the major to follow the route of the artillery and baggage, which was not exposed. At the time the action began she found herself near a small uninhabited hut, where she alighted. When it was found the action was becoming general and bloody, the surgeons of the hospital took possession of the same place, as the most convenient for the first care of the wounded. Thus was this lady in hearing of one continued fire of cannon and musketry, for four hours together, with the presumption, from the post of her husband at the head of the grenadiers, that he was in the most exposed part of the action. She had three female companions, the Baroness of Reidesel and the wives of two British officers, Major Harnage and Lieutenant Reynell; but in the event their presence served but little for comfort. Major Harnage was soon

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brought to the surgeons, very badly wounded; and a little time after came intelligence that Lieutenant Reynell was shot dead. Imagination will want no help to figure the state of the whole group.

"From the date of that action to the 7th of October, Lady Harriet, with her usual serenity, stood prepared for new trials; and it was her lot that their severity increased with their numbers. She was again exposed to the hearing of the whole action, and at last received the shock of her individual misfortune, mixed with the intelligence of the general calamity: the troops were defeated, and Major Ackland, desperately wounded, was a prisoner.

"The day of the 8th was passed by Lady Harriet and her companions in common anxiety; not a tent nor a shed being standing, except what belonged to the hospital, their refuge was among the wounded and the dying.

"When the army was upon the point of moving, I received a message from Lady Harriet, submitting to my decision a proposal (and expressing an earnest solicitude to execute it, if not interfering with my designs) of passing to the camp of the enemy, and requesting General Gates's permission to attend her husband.

"The assistance I was enabled to give was small indeed; I had not even a cup of wine to offer her; but I was told she had found, from some kind and fortunate hand, a little rum and dirty water. All I could furnish to her was an open boat and a few lines, written upon dirty and wet paper, to General Gates, recommending her to his protection.

"Mr. Brudenell, the chaplain to the artillery (the same gentleman who had officiated so signally at General Fraser's funeral) readily undertook to accompany her,

and with one female servant, and the major's valet-de-chambre (who had a ball which he had received in the late action then in his shoulder) she rowed down the river to meet the enemy. But her distresses were not yet to end. The night was advanced before the boat reached the enemy's out-posts, and the sentinel would not let it pass, nor even come on shore. In vain Mr. Brudenell offered the flag of truce, and represented the state of the extraordinary passenger. The guard apprehensive of treachery, and punctilious to their orders, threatened to fire into the boat if it stirred before daylight. Her anxiety and suffering were thus protracted through seven or eight dark and cold hours,¹ and her reflections upon that first reception could not give her very encouraging ideas of the treatment she was afterwards to expect. But it is due to justice at the close of this adventure to say, that she was received and accommodated by General Gates with all the humanity and respect that her rank, her merits, and her fortunes deserved.

"Let such as are affected by these circumstances of alarm, hardship, and danger, recollect that the subject of them was a woman; of the most tender and delicate frame; of the gentlest manners; habituated to all the soft elegancies, and refined enjoyments, that attend high birth and fortune; and far advanced in a state in which the tender cares, always due to the sex, become indispensably necessary. Her mind alone was formed for such trials."

The following is a copy of the letter of General Gates

¹ American writers deny this, and assert that there was no delay in Lady Harriet's landing, and I am disposed to believe them, since want of consideration for a woman under any circumstances is the last charge which can be brought against Americans.

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in reply to one addressed to him by Burgoyne, recommending Lady Harriet to his kind offices :—

“SARATOGA, *October 12th, 1777.*

“SIR,

“I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter by Lady Ackland. The respect due to her Ladyship's rank, the tenderness due to her person and sex, were alone sufficient recommendations to entitle her to my protection ; considering my preceding conduct with respect to those of your army whom the fortune of war has placed in my hands, I am surprised your Excellency should think that I could consider the greatest attention to Lady Ackland in the light of an obligation.

“The cruelties which mark the retreat of your army, in burning the gentlemen's and farmers' houses as they pass along, is almost, amongst civilized nations, without a precedent ; they should not endeavour to ruin those they could not conquer ; this conduct betrays more of the vindictive malice of a monk than the generosity of a soldier.¹

“Your friend, Sir James Clerke, by the information of Dr. Potts, the director-general of my hospital languishes under a very dangerous wound ; every sort of tenderness and attention is paid to him, as well as to all the wounded who have fallen into my hands,

¹ The charge of cruelty in burning houses was without foundation. The principal buildings referred to were the property of General Schuyler, one of which took fire accidentally, while occupied as a hospital by English troops, who were with difficulty removed from the flames ; the others were some saw-mills which Burgoyne deliberately fired, as they formed a complete cover to the advance of the enemy. So far from attributing the act to wanton love of destruction, General Schuyler, after the Convention, assured Burgoyne that he admitted the necessity as a means of self-defence, and that he would, under similar circumstances, have done the same.

and the hospital which you was necessitated to leave to my mercy.

"At the solicitation of Major Williams I am prevailed upon to offer him and Major Meiborn in exchange for Colonel Ethan Allen. Your Excellency's objections to my last proposals for the exchange of Colonel Ethan Allen I must consider as trifling, as I cannot but suppose that the Generals of the Royal armies act in equal concert with those of the Generals of the armies of the United States.

"The bearer delivers a number of letters from the officers of your army, taken prisoners in the action of the 7th inst.

"I am, SIR,

"Your Excellency's most humble servant,

"HORATIO GATES.

"Lt.-General Burgoyne."

The following remarks on Lady Harriet Ackland are extracted from a letter written by Miss Warburton (Burgoyne's niece) to her nephew, the late Sir John Burgoyne, while a boy at school :—

"You will be curious, I do not doubt, to know the sequel of this incomparable woman's history, and as far as I am able I will give it you. She had the happiness to see her husband perfectly recover from his wounds, shortly after which he was unfortunately involved in an affair of honour in consequence of some disagreement¹ with a brother officer in America during the preceding campaign. They fought with swords, and Major Ackland, in making a pass at his adversary, slipped and fell forward with great violence. It happened that a small

¹ The disagreement was, curiously enough, on the subject of the courage of American troops, which Major Ackland upheld against his comrade.

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pebble lay within reach of his fall, and he struck **his** temple upon it with such force that instant death **ensued**. Imagine to yourself the wretchedness of Lady Harriet on this unhappy event. Attached to him as she **was**, having suffered so much for his sake, and having, **as she** hoped, brought him home to safety and a life of **future** happiness, to have all this cheering prospect dashed **at** once in so miserable a manner, was, one would **have** thought, more than human nature could support or **sus**-tain. But she had a mind superior to every trial, and **even** this, her severest infliction, she bore up under with **resig**-nation and fortitude. I saw her again many years **after**-wards, when her sorrows had been somewhat **tempered** by time. She was still handsome, but her bloom **and** vivacity were gone. I placed myself where I **could** unobserved contemplate the change she had **undergone** since I had first seen her. Her countenance was **mild** and placid, but there was a look of tender melancholy mingled with resignation that made her the **most** interesting object I had ever beheld. . . . Whilst we render this tribute to the virtue of Lady Harriet, let us not overlook the heroic conduct of Mr. Brudenell. I cannot conceive courage and fortitude exceeding that which he displayed at the funeral of General Fraser. There was on that occasion everything to appal the strongest mind; that under such circumstances he should not only go through the solemn service with deliberation, but that his voice should preserve its firmness, is, I think, an instance of the most determined resolution that ever was exhibited."¹

On the evening of the 8th Burgoyne observed the

There is a sequel to this romantic story which Miss Warburton forgot to mention: Lady Harriet Ackland ultimately became the wife of Mr. Brudenell.

took at SARATOGA

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disposition of the enemy to turn his right by the advance of a strong column, and he at once determined to defeat the manœuvre by falling back upon Saratoga. The march, though the distance was little over eight miles, occupied the army twenty-four hours, such were the difficulties of the ground and the labour of transporting material. Even so, it had been found impossible to remove the hospital, and our sick and wounded were left in the camp with a touching recommendation to the humanity of General Gates.

On reaching Saratoga the heights were found to be in possession of the enemy, who, however, fell back on our approach, and joined a large detachment posted on the opposite bank of the river. The entire ground was indeed already invested by the enemy, whose continually increasing numbers now amounted to upwards of fourteen thousand men, and whose position, extending around the English lines for three out of the four parts of the circle, and on the fourth unassailable from the nature of the ground, left Burgoyne no hope of extrication except by succour from without.

"The possible means of further retreat was now considered the only one that seemed at all practicable was by a night march to gain Fort Edward, with the troops carrying their provisions on their backs; the impossibility of repairing bridges, putting a conveyance of artillery and carriages out of the question. It was proposed to force the ford at Fort Edward or above it. Before this attempt could be made, scouts returned with intelligence that the enemy were entrenched opposite those fords, and possessed a camp in force on the high ground between Fort Edward and Fort George with cannon. They had also parties down the whole shore to watch our motions, and posts so near to

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✓

us on our own side of the water, as must prevent the army from moving a single mile undiscovered. In this situation the army took the best position possible, and fortified, waiting till the 13th at night in the anxious hope of succours from our friends, or the next desirable expectation, an attack from our enemy. During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part; even rifle and grape-shot came into every part of the line."¹

To add to the desperate state of the army, the magazines were exhausted, the weather was unusually severe and the men worn out by toil and privation, by hard fighting and incessant watching, were without shelter and short of food. The store batteaux in the river were commanded by the enemy's batteries, and provisions had to be carried up hill on the shoulders of the troops under a galling fire.

"Very great indeed were the distresses which we had to encounter at this time, yet they were borne with fortitude. The greatest subordination was manifested throughout the British lines. The men were willing and ready to face any danger, when led on by officers whom they loved and respected, and who shared with them in every toil and hardship."²

out 12

On the 12th Burgoyne called a Council of War, to whom he presented the actual position of the army, and the choice of one of the following courses:—

- ✓ "1.—To wait in the present position an attack from
- ✓ the enemy, or the chance of favourable events.
- "2.—To attack the enemy.
- ✓ "3.—To retreat, repairing the bridges as the army

¹ Burgoyne's despatch to Lord George Germain of 20th October.

² Lamb's *Journal*.

moves, for the artillery, in order to force the passage of the ford.

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"4.—To retreat by night, leaving the artillery and the baggage; and should it be found impracticable to force the passage with musketry, to attempt the upper ford or the passage round Lake George.

"5.—In case the enemy, by extending to their left, leave their rear open, to march rapidly upon Albany."

The want of provisions rendered the first proposition inadmissible; to break through the superior numbers of an enemy strongly posted and entrenched in every point was desperate and hopeless; and a majority finally reported in favour of a retreat under cover of night.

The information brought in by scouts; however, made it apparent that (not a movement could be made without immediate discovery by the enemy,) and (after another weary and anxious night on those bleak heights, Burgoyne submitted for the consideration of his army, the only alternative: surrender. The unanimous decision of the council was that "the present situation justifies a capitulation upon honourable terms."

Lieutenant-Colonel Kingston¹ accordingly became the bearer of the proposed articles of a convention, and of the following message from Burgoyne to General Gates:—

"After having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited some days in his present position, determined to try a third conflict against any force that you can bring to attack him.

"He is apprized of the superiority of your numbers, and the disposition of your troops to impede his supplies, and render his retreat a scene of carnage on both sides. In this situation he is compelled by humanity, and thinks himself justified by established principles and

¹ Adjutant-General and Military Secretary.

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precedents of state and of war, to spare the lives of brave men upon honourable terms.

“Should Major-General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea, General Burgoyne would propose a cessation of arms during the time necessary to communicate the preliminary terms by which, in any extremity, he and his army mean to abide.”

General Gates, upon receipt of this communication, authorized a cessation of arms until sunset, and forwarded an amended series of proposals, and although this document has become historical, it may not be out of place to quote it here, together with the honourable comments of the English General.

PROPOSITION.

I.—General Burgoyne’s army being reduced by repeated defeats, by desertion, sickness, &c., their provisions exhausted, their military horses, tents and baggage taken or destroyed, their retreat cut off, and their camp invested, they can only be allowed to surrender as prisoners of war.

II.—The officers and soldiers may keep the baggage belonging to them. The Generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged.

III.—The troops, under his Excellency General Burgoyne, will be conducted by the most convenient route to New England marching by easy marches,

ANSWER.

Lieut.-General Burgoyne’s army, however reduced, will never admit that their retreat is cut off while they have arms in their hands.

Noted.

Agreed.

ufficiently provided for by
ay.

—The officers will be ad-
d on parole, and will be
d with the liberality cus-
y in such cases, so long as
by proper behaviour, con-
to deserve it, but those
are apprehended having
their parole, as some
h officers have done, must
t to be close confined.

—All public stores, artillery,
ammunition, carriages,
s, &c., &c., must be de-
d to commissaries ap-
d to receive them.

—These terms being agreed
d signed, the troops under
excellency's, General Bur-
e's command, may be drawn
their encampments, where
will be ordered to ground
arms, and may thereupon
rched to the river side on
way to Bennington.

There being no
officer in this army
under, or capable of
being under, the de-
scription of breaking
parole, this article
needs no answer.

All public stores
may be delivered,
arms excepted.

This article is in-
admissible in any ex-
tremity. Sooner than
this army will consent
to ground their arms
in their encampments,
they will rush on the
enemy determined to
take no quarter.

Colonel Kingston on the same afternoon returned to
American camp with Burgoyne's replies to the pro-
s, and a reiterated assurance that,

"General Gates does not mean to recede from the
article, the treaty ends at once ; the army will to a
proceed to any act of desperation sooner than sub-
to that Article."

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Article

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General Gates in the first instance appeared disposed to insist upon the objectionable clause, but after some negotiation, and probably having in the meanwhile received tidings of the approach of Clinton, he substituted the following Article, which was accepted :—

“The troops under General Burgoyne to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the entrenchments, to the verge of the river, where their arms and their artillery must be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

“A free passage to be granted to the army under General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest ; and the port of Boston to be assigned for entry of transports to receive the troops whenever General Howe shall so order.”

Among the many sad incidents of actual war, there is perhaps none that so strongly appeals to sympathy as the contemplation of a brave army advancing in cold blood to lay down their arms in the face of a victorious enemy.

As Burgoyne approached the American Headquarters on Bemis' Heights, General Gates met him with extended hand, saying, “I am glad to see you,”—“I am not glad to see you,” was the reply ; “it is my fortune, Sir, but not my fault that I am here.”¹

¹ A story has been told, though it is impossible to trace it to any authority, that Burgoyne having spoken contemptuously of General Gates as “*une vieille accoucheuse*,” the latter on the occasion of their meeting after the Convention, remarked, “Well, you see the old midwife has delivered you of 6000 English soldiers”—a speech so utterly at variance with the courtesy and consideration shown by Gates to his adversary that it may safely be pronounced an invention. In Michaud's *Biographie Universelle* (Paris, 1854) this story is repeated and amplified. Among other incidents in the life of Burgoyne not generally known, this biographer relates that he had been made a Privy Councillor and Member of Parliament for his services in Portugal ; that

They entered the marquee, and after a short time came out together.

"The American commander faced front, and Burgoyne did the same, standing on his left. Not a word was spoken, and for some minutes they stood silently gazing on the scene before them ; the one, no doubt, in all the pride of honest success ; the other, the victim of regret and sensibility. Burgoyne was a large and stoutly-formed man ; his countenance was rough and harsh, but he had a handsome figure and a noble air. Gates was a smaller man, with much less of manner, and none of the air which distinguished Burgoyne. Presently, as by a previous understanding, General Burgoyne stepped back, drew his sword, and in the face of the two armies, as it were, presented it to General Gates, who received it, and instantly returned it in the most courteous manner."¹

Upon this the remnant of Burgoyne's army was marched to the river's bank, where, out of view of the American lines (a gracious and generous arrangement spontaneously accorded by Gates), they piled their arms at the word of command of their own officers. Many a voice, that had rung in tones of authority and encouragement above the din of battle, now faltered ; many an eye that had unflinchingly met the hostile ranks, now filled with tears. Young soldiers who had borne privation and suffering without a murmur, stood abashed and overcome with sorrow and shame ; bearded veterans for

he was deprived of his military rank for his conduct at Saratoga, and that he then married a daughter of Lord Derby ; who, at this time, had been dead two years, after having been his wife for twenty-five.

¹ Neillson. It is curious that this writer, whose information was obtained from his father, an eye-witness of the scene, should describe Burgoyne as of harsh features. He was, even at this time, when he was fifty-three years of age, strikingly handsome.

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no!
was born in
1722 -
now father
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whom danger and death had no terrors, sobbed like children, as for the last time they grasped the weapons they had borne with honour on many a battlefield.

Death, wounds, and sickness, had made sad havoc in the ranks of Burgoyne's brave army, since full of hope and confidence they had marched from the Canadian frontier. Their losses during the campaign had amounted to 1,160 in killed and wounded, of whom seventy-three were officers; and the numbers who now laid down their arms before more than 17,000 American soldiers¹ did not exceed 3,500 officers and men, of whom 1,600 were Germans.

Deeply as the English troops felt the humiliation of their position, and all the more bitterly from the contempt in which they had hitherto held their foe, there was in no breast the shadow of resentment against the General who had led them. Here is the testimony (published after the lapse of many years and when the principal actor in the scene was no more), of two men, the one an officer, the other in the ranks, both of whom had fought throughout the campaign, both of whom were now prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

"General Burgoyne has done everything in this convention for the good of the troops consistent with the service of his King and country; all that wisdom, valour, and a strict sense of honour can suggest. He will be liable to public censure, but justice must raise him in the mind of every liberal man who shall judge him."²

"General Burgoyne possesses the confidence and

¹ See Appendix G. These numbers are taken from General Gates' official return, and include 3,875 men quoted as "on command," but who actually formed part of the army, they having been detached to the flanks and rear of the British forces.

² Lieut. Aubury. *Letters from Cambridge.* (United States.)

affection of his army in so extraordinary a degree that no loss or misfortune could shake the one, no distress or affliction weaken the other. This established an instance perhaps unequalled in military history, that notwithstanding so long and continual a scene of unceasing fatigue, hardship and danger, finally ending in general ruin and captivity, not a single voice was heard through the army to upbraid, to censure, or to blame their General; and that at length, when all their courage and efforts were found ineffectual, and every hope was totally cut off, they were still willing to perish along with him."¹

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The day following the formal exchange of the Articles of Convention, the captive army was ordered to Boston, a distance of 200 miles. During this march the troops suffered much privation from the inclemency of the weather, want of shelter, insufficient clothing,² and even from a scarcity of food. The population along the route displayed a violent animosity against the unfortunate prisoners, but more especially towards the Germans, whom they lost no opportunity of reviling and insulting. Madame de Reidesel, who had accompanied her husband throughout the campaign, and now followed him into captivity, published an interesting record of her

¹ Lamb's *Journal*.

² Madame de Reidesel, who has no love for the Americans, relates that during the march an English officer, whose feet were almost on the ground, offered an "American General," who was riding past, a guinea for his boots, whereupon the "General" immediately dismounted, exchanged *chaussure* with the Briton, pocketed his money, and rode on. She describes the inhabitants of Boston as being dressed in blue *roquelaures* with wide sleeves, a leather strap round the waist, and a driving whip in their hands, and that being of very low stature, and their costume being uniform, it was difficult to distinguish one from another. She adds that nine out of ten of the Bostonians were unable to read or write. She also relates that an English officer having broken parole, the authorities revenged themselves by tarring and feathering his wife and daughters, all of which she doubtless believed.

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adventures and sufferings,¹ in the course of which she blames Burgoyne for the ill-feeling exhibited by the Americans towards her countrymen. General Reidesel himself, in his *Mémoires des Feldzugs*, 1777, accuses the English General of unfairly disparaging the German troops, because in one of his despatches he spoke of his army being reduced to 3,500 fighting men, "not 2,000 of which are British;" and again that "had the force been all British, the perseverance had perhaps been longer." Max von Eelking,² in his *Life of General Reidesel* (published in Leipsic in 1856), also speaks with some bitterness of the attitude assumed by their English Commander towards the German troops, whose disasters the writer attributes to his carelessness ("leichtfertiges Benehmen") and he quotes Madame de Reidesel's complaints that during the campaign Burgoyne had on several occasions shocked her sense of duty and propriety; that on the advance upon Saratoga he used to drink champagne and to flirt with the wife of a Commissary, and that even after the Convention he continued to show himself inexcusably merry and cheerful ("munter und guter Dinge").

Probably, if this brave and excellent lady could have looked below the surface, she would have been less ready to accuse Burgoyne of undue cheerfulness; the following

¹ *Dienst-reise in Amerika*, 1801.

² This writer speaks of Burgoyne's insinuating nature ("das einschmeichelndes Wesen") and says that he was a "Schöngest," witty and brave, combining an attractive appearance with the polished manners of a courtier; but he cannot pardon him the cheerfulness with which he bore up under his misfortune. By way of variety, he attributes his paternity to Lord Lingley, and hints that he would have shared the fate of Admiral Byng, but for his having become the favourite of Queen Charlotte! This is probably the one solitary instance of scandal attaching to the name of that irreproachably respectable Queen.

private letters written a week after the Convention of Saratoga, certainly present him in a very different light.

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GENERAL BURGoyNE TO COLONEL PHILLIPSON.

"ALBANY, *October 20th*, 1777.

"MY DEAR PHILLIPSON,

"If my letter of the beginning of September reached you, the events which succeeded will not appear to you extraordinary, though unfortunate. I foresaw, and I believe expressed to you, that passing the Hudson's River was putting the fate of the army upon a chance, but that precision of my orders, the season of the year, and the other circumstances of the time, made the step unavoidable.

"I enclose to Lord Derby a copy of my public despatch to Lord George, in order that it may be published by him in case that the Ministry should curtail or mangle any part of it in their Gazette. I desire him also to communicate it to you in the first instance, and I refer you to that public account, (—trusting indeed that the fairness of Ministers will make the manuscript unnecessary,—) for the detail of as difficult, as dangerous, and as bloody a progress, as the same space of time in any campaign has produced.

"I shall subjoin hereto extracts of paragraphs in my private letters to Lord George and Lord North. I do it to furnish you with means of defending your friend against the attacks that necessarily follow unsuccessful events. I expect Ministerial ingratitude will be displayed, as in all countries and at all times is usual, to remove the blame from the orders to the execution; and the first trumpeters of my accusation will be the Cunninghams, the Smiths, and the Keenes. Should such a

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return be made for the zeal with which I have pursued their purposes, it will be the part of my friends to place the foundation of my defence upon the principle and letter of my orders. It was the will of the State to risk a corps of troops to assist the great and general arrangement of the campaign. If the State thought it necessary to *devote* a corps of troops for general purposes, it was no more within the General's duty to decline proceeding upon motives of prudence, and upon speculation of consequences, than it would be justifiable in a serjeant who heads a forlorn hope at the storm of a breach to recede because his destruction was probable—mine was a forlorn hope, with this difference, that it was not supported. This army has been diminished by scandalous desertions in the collateral parts, by the heavy drain of the garrison of Ticonderoga, and by great loss of blood. It has been totally unsupported by Sir William Howe. When my conduct, in advancing so far as to leave my communication with Canada, is arraigned, face the accusation with the wording of my instructions, and ask the accusers what they would have said had I remained supine in a camp at Fort Edward. Is there a man who would have held me defensible had I left exertions untried in the circumstances I then was? At Ticonderoga, at Huberton, at Skenesborough, at Fort Anne, the ascendancy of the British troops had been apparent against superior numbers; the junction of large corps of Loyalists was engaged for as the army should advance; Schuyler, who then commanded the enemy's army, was retreating; no possibility was suggested by friends or foes of the collection of a quarter of the force which has since appeared. The contempt of my own army, the condemnation of Government and the world, would have been the inevitable and the

deserved consequences of inaction ; my head would have been answerable for it ; and I should have left to my friends, had any such remained, the painful task of defending a *disobedience* of orders upon cowardly principles, instead of what I thank God will be now their only trouble, of vindicating a spirited *execution* of orders. The utmost that malevolence can say will be that I have been too bold.

“ Upon the whole, my friend, if I do not deceive myself, my friends may maintain the following ground :— A principle of duty induced me to accept a command of which I foresaw the difficulties and the dangers respecting the ~~public~~ service and personal reputation. Orders, in the construction of which there was neither latitude nor alternative, compelled me to leave out of consideration the general maxims of military reasoning upon securing a retreat. I twice fought, and once conquered, double my numbers. I afterwards withstood an attack from more than quadruple my numbers with which I was invested ; and at last, with only three days’ provision for the men upon short allowance, and not a particle of forage ; the troops galled with a cannonade into all parts of their position, and exhausted with watchfulness of many days and nights under arms ; the Germans dispirited and ready to club their arms at the first fire ; under all these circumstances of distress, among all these causes of despair, I dictated terms of convention which save the army to the State for the next campaign.

“ The consolation I have received from a public view of the army of Gates is, I confess, extreme. I have now the stubborn fact witnessed by every officer and soldier in my army that I was not much deceived by intelligence, and that I have understated his numbers

4

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good faith

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in calling them 16,000; and sorry am I to add that a better armed, a better bodied, a more alert, or better prepared army in all essential points of military institution, I am afraid is not to be found on our side the question.

"When all these facts are notorious, I am in hopes I shall receive honour and not disgrace from the public. I am impatient, you may imagine, to be at home to undertake my own cause, but think it indispensable to be directed entirely by Sir William Howe, when I shall know his measures for the return of the troops to Britain or their exchange. I certainly shall wish to precede the embarkation, if he approves it, and do you let the public be prepared to expect it.

"As to myself, I am exhausted in mind and body. . . ."

GENERAL BURGOYNE TO HIS NIECES.

"ALBANY, *October 20th*, 1777.

"MY DEAREST NIECES,

"There are few situations in a military life exposed to more personal hazard than I have lately undergone; there never was one attended with more perplexity, distress, and trial of every faculty and feeling of the mind. My public despatches, and my letters to Lord Derby and Phillipson, will let you into the detail of events. I have been surrounded with enemies, ill-treated by pretended friends, abandoned by a considerable part of my own army, totally unassisted by Sir William Howe. I have been obliged to deliberate upon the most nice negotiations, and political arrangements that required the most undisturbed reflection, under perpetual fire, and exhausted with laborious days, and sixteen

almost sleepless nights, without change of clothes, or other covering than the sky. I have been with my army within the jaws of famine ; shot through my hat and waistcoat ; my nearest friends killed round me ; and after these combined misfortunes and escapes, I imagine I am reserved to stand a war with ministers who will always lay the blame upon the employed who miscarries.

"In all these complicated anxieties, believe me, my dear girls, my heart has a large space filled with you ; and I will bring it home, when God shall so permit, as replete with affection as when I left you. The time is uncertain ; I should hope Howe will see the necessity of my return to state, and defend if necessary, my own cause, and that he will immediately send a frigate ; if so, I may see you in January.

"I beg you to apply to Lord Derby and to Phillipson to have all the detail of events sent to Hornby, and to Mr. Stanley of Winwick. I intended writing to both, but am exhausted to that degree with business that I can really scarce hold my pen. Conscious that I have done all that man could do for the public, and that I shall stand the object of approbation of the public when truth is known, I am easy as to reputation. I am only impatient that my friends should be out of suspense.

"Adieu, my dear girls. I have heard no word from any of you, nor shall I now till I see you. Heaven bless you as you deserve.

"Everything that is affectionate in particular to Hornby.

"Your most affectionate uncle,

"J. BURGOYNE."

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The following extract from a letter, dated Quebec, the 12th November, 1777, from Sir Guy Carleton, who had from the first been in possession of Lord G. Germain's despatches, is important as showing that he considered Burgoyne's orders to force his way at all hazards, imperative and unconditional :—

“ I received your letter of 20th October, with your public despatches, by Captain Craig on 5th instant, and heartily condole with you on the very disagreeable accounts they contain, all which I sincerely lament both on the public account and your own.

“ This unfortunate event, it is to be hoped, will in future prevent ministers from pretending to direct operations of war in a country at 3,000 miles distance, of which they have so little knowledge as not to be able to distinguish between good, bad, or interested advices, or to give positive orders in matters which from their nature are ever upon the change : so that the expedience or propriety of a measure at one moment may be totally inexpedient or improper in the next.”

On the arrival of Burgoyne's army in the neighbourhood of Boston there were already symptoms of a disinclination on the part of Congress to ratify the Convention of Saratoga, and, as weeks and months passed, fresh excuses were found to delay the embarkation of the troops ; fresh pretences devised to evade the responsibility of a covenant solemnly concluded in the name of the American nation.

Burgoyne's remonstrances to General Gates, and subsequently to Congress, remained unnoticed and undressed ; and although Washington earnestly urged a fulfilment of the pledge in which the honour of Congress and of the army was involved, the more unworthy counsels prevailed, and it soon became evident that

there was no intention of giving effect to the articles of capitulation.

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When the embarkation of the troops was proposed to take place at Rhode Island, as the most convenient point at that advanced season, an intention was imputed to General Howe of breaking faith by causing Burgoyne's army to join him in New York. When the transports were despatched to Boston, the port agreed upon, orders were given that the embarkation should be delayed till all accounts for the subsistence of the captive army had been settled; and on a settlement being offered, it was refused unless payment were made in gold, which, at the time, it was notoriously impossible to procure. Such were the petty and frivolous pretexts resorted to, till finally, in the beginning of January 1778, Congress passed a resolution indefinitely suspending the embarkation. Contemporary American writers have feebly attempted to defend this breach of faith; in more modern histories it has either been condemned or passed over in silence.

It is no excuse to plead that the terms granted by General Gates were less severe than Burgoyne, considering the desperate position of his army, had a right to expect. His firmness did actually procure him very favourable conditions, the terms of the Convention being the same as those which in 1809 Junot obtained at Cintra, when "policy regained what arms had lost,"¹ and when Sir Hew Dalrymple's concessions were vehemently assailed in England by Parliament and the Press. In striking contrast to the action of Congress, however, our Government, though far from approving

¹ See the stanza in the first canto of *Childe Harold* commencing with—
'Convention was the dwarfish demon styled
That foiled the knights in Marialva's dome.'

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the leniency shown to the enemy, were proof against the public clamour, and, to the honour of the nation, maintained inviolate the engagements guaranteed by their General.

The repudiation of the Convention of Saratoga must ever remain a blot upon the character of the American Government. It cannot even be palliated on the low ground of expediency, since to a people struggling for political life the moral support derivable from the maintenance of honour and good faith was worth a dozen material victories. Well may Lord Mahon ask to which country a man would rather belong, "to that, whose soldiers, repulsed and overthrown, were compelled to lay down their arms; or to that other country whose statesmen deliberately and wilfully, and with their eyes open to the consequences, broke the plighted faith on which, and which alone, that surrender was made."¹

Not only were the troops retained in captivity, but the treatment they received was of the harshest and most harassing kind. The sick and wounded who had been unable to march on the conclusion of the Convention had been sent to Albany, and if credit is to be attached to one who had ample means of observa-

¹ When towards the end of 1778, Sir Henry Clinton appealed to Congress on behalf of Burgoyne's captive army, and in his honest indignation, reproached them with their breach of good faith, that Assembly thought it not unbecoming its dignity to reply in the following terms: "Your letter of the 19th September was laid before Congress, and I am directed to inform you that the Congress make no answer to insolent letters." The terms of the Convention were never carried into effect by the United States Government; the men who had surrendered under a positive promise of being permitted to return to their native country were detained till the conclusion of peace, unless exchanged with ordinary prisoners of war. Burgoyne's formal exchange was not effected until the 9th January, 1782. The bad faith of the Americans was only equalled by the supineness of the English Cabinet, who showed a shameful want of consideration for the fate of the unfortunate army which their incapacity had sacrificed.

tion, and no reason to misrepresent facts, the Americans showed a want of humanity to helpless prisoners such as is not easily matched in the history of modern warfare. Dr. Hayes,¹ a surgeon in Burgoyne's army, writes as follows :—

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“ SIR,

“ In compliance with my instructions from your Excellency, I used every exertion in my power to have those brave sufferers under my care removed to New York ; and though my applications were early in the spring, I could not obtain my wish till the 2nd of June. On the 7th of June I arrived here with 117 men partly disabled, being the remainder of the hospital at Albany, and all the British and Germans about the neighbourhood. The Commander-in-Chief not being here on my arrival occasioned some difficulty in the exchange, which his presence removed, and immediate orders were given for their, my mates' and my own exchange, which liberated me from the engagement I was obliged to enter into for their release, and made the men completely happy. The difficulties I have latterly experienced in the execution of my attendance on the wounded are not to be conceived ; and the treatment the men and officers were likely to receive, had my frequent applications for our removal not taken place, would have been of such wanton cruelty as could not be equalled by the greatest barbarians ; an instance of which I shall beg leave to recite to your Excellency. On the 31st of May an order was, by direction of the commanding officer (a General Starke² of noted infamy), stuck

¹ Afterwards Sir John McNamara Hayes, Bart., Physician to the Forces.

² The officer who had commanded at Bennington, see *ante*, page 273.

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on the door of the Dutch church at Albany, in these words : ' All British officers and soldiers, prisoners, who are seen *ten rods* from their quarters shall be taken up and whipped *two hundred lashes on their naked backs* without the benefit of a court-martial.' This order was never read to the officers or soldiers ; and when I applied to the General for his reasons why so extraordinary an order was issued, his answer was that he had no charge of any sort against us, but would not allow a person to stir from his quarters, and declared he would *flog*, for such was his expression, the officers as well as the men. On the 2nd of June I received an answer to my request, and in two hours after, I embarked the whole hospital for New York, the sooner to be removed from this flogging hero, who, I dare say, has been well educated in that most military system.

"The exorbitant demands of the Commissariat department at Albany, after I had the honour of seeing your Excellency, in the payment of the rations, were such as I could not submit to ; and therefore I evaded the payment by a receipt, which must be a considerable saving to Government.

"I have, with unremitting attention, executed the important offices which from circumstances I was necessitated to engage in, and have the satisfaction to find that my endeavours, as well as services, have met with success. The officers and men will bear testimony to my strenuous endeavours for their comfort, to procure which I moved every engine.

"I was in hopes of getting to England by this conveyance, but while there is a probability of my services being wanted in this army, I shall lay aside every prospect, of which I have some, for the good of the service.

"I shall ever consider it my greatest happiness to be remembered by your Excellency, and that the execution of my duty meets with your approbation.

"I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

"JOHN MCNAMARA HAYES.

"NEW YORK, *September 4th*, 1778."

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If such was the treatment of the sick, it need not be matter for surprise that the main body fared even worse; not only were they ill-used and insufficiently fed,¹ but officers and men were subjected to the most galling insults and annoyances, which finally reached such a point that Burgoyne preferred formal charges against Colonel Healy, the officer in command at Cambridge, for habitually maltreating and insulting the prisoners. This man was accordingly brought to a court martial, Burgoyne conducting the prosecution with untiring energy and all his ability. In spite of an overwhelming weight of evidence, however, the offender was not only acquitted, but retained in a position which enabled him to revenge himself for the attempt to bring him to justice.²

¹ "It was not unfrequent for thirty or forty persons, men, women, and children, to be indiscriminately crowded together in one small open hut, their provisions and firewood on short allowance; a scanty portion of straw their bed; their own blankets their only covering. In the night time those that could lie down, and the many who sat up from the cold, were obliged frequently to rise and shake from them the snow which the wind drifted in at the openings. General Burgoyne, ever attentive to the welfare of his army, remonstrated in a letter to General Gates, and after making use of some strong expostulations, he added, "the public faith is broken."—LAMB'S *Journal*.

² At a later period, among other outrages, an English officer was shot dead by a sentry at Boston while seated in a carriage by the side of his wife, on the plea that he had not stopped when ordered. General Phillips' angry remonstrance led to his being placed under close arrest, and the whole of the prisoners being confined to their quarters. Foremost among

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FROM SIR HENRY CLINTON TO GENERAL BURGOTNE.

"New York, December 16th, 1777.

"I reflect with the sincerest concern, my dear Burgoyne, that this letter will find you in a situation so contrary to my hopes and wishes. I feared indeed, and I was not silent on the subject, that when our force was removed out of the power of co-operating with you, such numbers would press upon you from the four contiguous provinces as might overwhelm you. I had still, however, a hope that the Commander-in-Chief might get possession of Philadelphia, and send me reinforcements from thence early enough to enable me to try something in your favour; that I should have succeeded, had he sent me those reinforcements, I will (now that I have seen the country) by no means assert. Perhaps while the enemy were in sufficient force to have occupied all the points of defence, nothing less than his whole army, assisted by every effort of the navy, was equal to the attempt. I should at least have had the satisfaction of having endeavoured to assist you, though, in truth, report at that time did not represent you as in need of any succours. As it was, I cannot but flatter myself that the stroke which the late and scanty reinforcement of recruits enabled me to make was of service to you in your Convention, which I agree with you was most favourable. Upon this account I am doubly obliged to fortune, for to fortune I must chiefly attribute my success, as I sincerely believe that had the attack been made six days sooner or six hours later, we should not

the persecutors of the unfortunate captives was the Town Major of Cambridge, once a soldier in the English army, from which he had deserted.

have carried our point ; we caught them at the instant when through contempt of our weakness they were unguarded. You say that from your knowledge of my zeal and activity you are convinced the fault of your not being assisted was not mine ; surely, my good friend, you should not have a doubt in this case. Could there be a stronger proof of my inability than the complaint I made of my weakness in my letter to you of the 10th of September, and when in that letter I promise, if you will let me know your wishes, I will try something with 2,000 men, a number you must feel greatly inadequate to the service ? I likewise say, ' But if the enemy shall make a movement upon either of my flanks, I must return to save the important post.' Could you with reason, my dear friend, expect that I should form the most distant idea of penetrating to Albany ? Had I thought that with the small number I could spare from hence I should have been equal to forcing the highlands, I should not have conceived myself justified in detaching part of my garrison further, without extraordinary motives ; such were the accounts I received (for the first time) from Captains Campbell and Scott, relative to your situation, a situation very different from that in which universal report placed you, and I therefore pushed Vaughan forward, if possible to favour your operations. As for your having applied to me for orders, I never could be expected to give you any, ignorant as I was of your plans and those of the Commander-in-Chief, except his wishes that you should approach Albany ; but I feel for you as a friend, and will not look amiss upon anything that passed at a time when you had so much to perplex and distress you. . . . I heartily wish you a good voyage to Europe, health,

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and a happy meeting with your friends, and am faithfully

“Your obedient humble servant,
“H. CLINTON.”

Burgoyne meanwhile was exerting himself to induce the American Government to fulfil the terms of their engagement, but his health and spirits were breaking down under these efforts and the load of anxiety that weighed upon him. From the first, his knowledge of the character of Lord George Germain convinced him that he had no generosity to expect at the hands of that minister, who would not scruple to vindicate himself at the cost of his subordinate ; and, little given as he was to despond, his letters of this period are gloomy in the extreme. Writing to Major-General Pigot from Cambridge on 26th January, he says :—

“As for myself, the value of life has been for some time over with me, and whether I resign it to my country, to climate, or by arms, I am indifferent. To the last of it I shall retain due value for distinguished and amiable character, and among such I know not where to direct my view better than to yourself.”

When Burgoyne found that Congress were determined not to recede from their resolution to suspend the embarkation of the troops, he applied for permission to return to Europe on parole.

GENERAL BURGoyNE TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

“SIR,

“Should the first letter which my aide-de-camp will have the honour to deliver to you fail in the intended

effect of restoring the Convention of Saratoga to its original force, and the Congress adhere to their resolves of the 8th of January, I become subject to the dilemma of sacrificing probably my life, and certainly much nearer interests, or to accept a passport for England, should the Congress think proper to grant it as matter of indulgence.

"Principle and duty require me to avow that did I conceive the cause of my king and country to be involved, or the great question upon the point of public faith to be committed by my concession, these personal sacrifices should be made. But conscious that a request founded upon individual and private concerns cannot be prejudicial to the political interests or intentions of Great Britain, and persuaded that a compliance with them can as little affect the same considerations in America, I address myself to you, Sir, as the channel which I conceive to be the most proper to lay before the Congress the following representations and application for relief.

"My health, to which the climate of America was always averse, has lately declined by more than ordinary degrees.

"The symptoms of a complaint I have been subject to before, and for which the Bath waters have been found the only remedy, are daily increasing; and it is the opinion of my physician, as well as my own, that my life, under God, depends in great measure upon that resource.

"Accounts with the Treasury of Great Britain, to great extent and of a very complicated nature, lie open by reason of my absence; and my death before they are settled might occasion much embarrassment and great injury to my relations and friends.

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"These circumstances apply to the general principles of justice and humanity; another yet remains for generous consideration.

"By my detention in this country I am deprived of every possible means to give an account of my actions, and my character stands exposed, after an intricate and unsuccessful campaign, to all the aspersions and erroneous interpretations that the malevolent, the prejudiced, or the misinformed may choose to cast upon it.

"Such hardships of situation, whether considered severally or collectively, will, I trust, carry a weight that no ardour of hostility, or other circumstance of these unhappy times can oppose.

"On this confidence, and conscious of the favour I have repeatedly shown to officers of the continental troops, upon far less urgent exigencies, I ask of the Congress leave for myself, the officers of my family, whose names and ranks are transmitted herewith, and my servants, to return to England by Rhode Island, New York, or any other expeditious route the Congress shall appoint. I am ready to renew my obligations, if thought necessary, to all the stipulations of the Convention of Saratoga, and scorning to withdraw myself upon less reasons than life and honour from any possible lot of my profession, I am willing to give a parole that should the suspension of embarkation be by any means prolonged beyond the time apprehended, I will return to America upon demand of the Congress and due notice given, redeliver up my person into their power, and abide the common fate of my brethren in this army.

"I am, &c. &c.

"J. BURGOYNE."

Head Q^r. Pennsylvania Marth 11
1778.

Sir,

I was only two days since honored with your very obliging letter of the 11th of February. -

Your indulgent opinion of my character, and the politeness in which you are pleased to express it, are peculiarly flattering; and I take pleasure in the opportunity you have afforded me of assuring you, that far from suffering the views of national opposition to be embittered and debased by personal animosity, I am ever ready to do justice to the merit of the Gent^l & soldier - and to esteem, where esteem is due, however the idea of a public enemy may interpose - You will not think it the language of ~~an~~ unmeaning ceremony

it

if I add, that sentiments of personal respect, in the present instance are reciprocal.

Viewing you in the light of an officer contending against what I conceive to be the rights of my Country, the reverses of fortune you experienced in the field, cannot be unacceptable to me; but, abstracted from considerations of national advantage, I can sincerely sympathize with your feelings as a Soldier.

The unavoidable difficulties of whose situation forbid his success, and as a man whose lot combined the calamity of ill health, the anxiety of captivity, and the painful sensibility for a reputation exposed where he most values it, to the assaults of malice & detraction.

As your aid de Camp went directly on to Congress - the business of your letter to me has been decided before it came to me.

I am happy, that their cheerful acquiescence with your request

prevented

prevented the necessity of my inter-
vention; and wishing you a safe
and agreeable passage with a per-
fect restoration of your health;

I have the honor to be
very respectfully
Sir

Y^r Most Obed^t Serv^t

G. Waplington



At the same time he wrote in similar terms to Washington, from whom he received a reply worthy of its writer.¹

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GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

"HEAD QUARTERS, PENNSYLVANIA, *March 11th*, 1778.

"SIR,

"I was only two days since honoured with your very obliging letter of the 11th February.

"Your indulgent opinion of my character, and the polite terms in which you are pleased to express it, are peculiarly flattering; and I take pleasure in the opportunity you have afforded me of assuring you that, far from suffering the views of national opposition to be embittered and debased by personal animosity, I am ever ready to do justice to the gentleman and the soldier, and to esteem where esteem is due, however the idea of a public enemy may interpose. You will not think it the language of unmeaning ceremony if I add that sentiments of personal respect, in the present instance, are reciprocal.

"Viewing you in the light of an officer contending against what I conceive to be the rights of my country, the reverses of fortune you experienced in the field cannot be unacceptable to me; but abstracted from considerations of national advantage, I can sincerely sympathize with your feelings as a soldier—the unavoidable difficulties of whose situation forbid his success; and as a man, whose lot combines the calamity of ill-health, the anxieties of captivity, and the painful sensibility for a reputation exposed where

¹ The descendants of General Burgoyne have carefully preserved the original of this letter, of which a lithograph is published in this volume.

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he most values it to the assaults of malice and detraction.

"As your aide-de-camp went directly on to Congress, the business of your letter to me had been decided before it came to hand. I am happy that their cheerful acquiescence with your request prevented the necessity of my intervention; and wishing you a safe and agreeable passage, with a perfect restoration of your health,

"I have the honour to be very respectfully,

"SIR,

"Your most obedient servant,

"GEORGE WASHINGTON."

GENERAL GATES TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

"YORK, *March 5th*, 1778.

"SIR,

"I am exceedingly mortified that you did not accept of my offer at Albany, to go to England in a vessel that the State of Massachusetts Bay would at my request have provided. General Glover, with whom you were acquainted, was in that case to have attended you in his own ship; and I am persuaded you would have avoided many *désagréments*, had it pleased you to have accepted my offer. Your case I sensibly feel, as I ever shall that of the unfortunate brave. If courage, perseverance, and a faithful attachment to your Prince, could have prevailed, I might have been your prisoner. The chance of war has determined otherwise. The Congress now send the passports you desire, and I am happy to acquaint you that the Major and Lady Harriet Ackland are now in New York, and may possibly be

in England as soon, or very soon after you. With great respect,

“ I am, SIR,

“ Your most obedient humble servant,

“ HORATIO GATES.

“ His Excellency Lieut.-General Burgoyne.”

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Before embarking for England, Burgoyne, in a letter to the Duke of Brunswick, bears generous testimony to the services of General Reidesel, of whom he says :—

“ Je voudrais offrir à votre Altesse Sérénissime un témoignage de la conduite exemplaire de Monsieur le Général Reidesel durant une campagne marquée par des difficultés, des fatigues, par le sang et l'infortune. Je serais ingrat comme injuste si je cachais les obligations dues dans toutes ces circonstances à Monsieur de Reidesel pour les lumières que je tirais souvent de ses idées, et pour l'exactitude dont il a toujours exécuté les miennes. Avec une grande habilité pour dresser les troupes par manœuvre et discipline, ce digne officier possède toutes les qualités pour en tirer les plus brillants effets, et son cœur est en tout temps partagé entre l'honneur de son Prince et les services de ses alliés.”

At a later period General Reidesel made common cause with some of his countrymen in attributing to Burgoyne's rashness the failure of the expedition. At this time, however, the German Commander, if we may judge him by his own words, entertained no such opinion ; for in a letter addressed by him to Burgoyne on 2nd April, 1778, he writes :—

“ Mon cœur est trop sensible au départ de votre Excellence : il me serait impossible de lui exprimer de bouche ma reconnaissance pour la gracieuse lettre qu'elle vient d'écrire à mon sujet et ceux des troupes à

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S. A. S. Monseigneur le Duc de Bronswic, mon maître. Elle dit trop, plus que je mérite, excepté mon zèle pour Sa Majesté la Roi, et le vrai attachement pour vous, qui ne s'effacera jamais qu'avec ma vie. Ma défiance sur mon propre savoir, la différence de la langue des troupes des deux nations, m'ont fort souvent fait craindre de lui déplaire, et de manquer à mon devoir et dans le service ; ce doute m'était d'autant plus sensible dans le haut degré de mon attachement, estime, et profond respect, que j'avais pour votre Excellence.

" Cette lettre si gracieuse de votre Excellence, me rassure entièrement sur ce point ; elle me met dans la plus grande obligation, et elle me couvre entièrement dans les sentiments de mon Sérénissime Maître. . . .

" J'ose prier votre Excellence d'accepter par ces lignes les remerciements de moi et de tous les officiers des troupes de Bronswic, pour les grâces et les bontés que vous nous avez témoignées pendant le temps que nous étions si heureux d'être sous vos ordres. Si le bonheur n'a pas couronné vos travaux, nous savons bien que ce n'était pas votre faute, et que cette armée était la victime des revers de la guerre."

General Phillips, in a letter to General Hervey, dated from Cambridge in April, 1778, says :—

" Our friend, General Burgoyne, will inform you of all matters relating to the army. I am very glad he has at last obtained leave to go to England. He has been, and I think is, very ill ; the distressed situation of his mind, joined to a constitution rather hurt, would have destroyed him here. He may be restored by care and attention in Europe.

" You will hear that I am left here in a nominal command, not very pleasantly situated, but I am to bear it patiently. The impossibility of hearing from or cor-

responding with my friends, renders this exile more painful ; but I will hope a very few months may alter our situation."

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Burgoyne embarked at Rhode Island in the *Junó* frigate, Captain Hew Dalrymple, in the middle of April, having previously deposited with Congress the following parole :—

"I do pledge my faith and sacred honour that I will go from hence to Rhode Island, where I am to embark for Great Britain ; that I will not during my continuance at Rhode Island, or in any other part of America, directly or indirectly hold any communication with, or give intelligence to, any person or persons, that may be injurious to the interest of the United States of America, or either of them. And I do further pledge my faith and sacred honour that should the embarkation of the troops of the Convention of Saratoga be by any means prolonged beyond the time apprehended, I will return to America, upon demand and due notice given by Congress, and will re-deliver myself into the power of the Congress of the United States of America unless regularly exchanged."

Thus ended Burgoyne's part in the great drama of the American War. It remains to consider the causes which led to so disastrous a failure, and these are clearly traceable to three radical errors : the inherent strategical vices of the project, the alternate interference and negligence of the Cabinet in its executive details, and the want of administrative arrangement and preparedness in the essentials of Army supply.

Since military theories were first reduced to a science based upon fixed principles, there is no vice in the art of war which has been more universally condemned than the practice of acting upon double lines of opera-

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tions, without a mathematical certainty of effecting combined action. In the campaign under review the patent objections to such a policy operated with exceptional force ; for the bases of the two armies, upon the united and simultaneous action of which the whole scheme depended, were separated by several hundred miles of country rendered peculiarly unfavourable to the progress of regular troops by natural impediments (such as dense forests, numberless creeks and ravines, and an almost entire absence of roads and of local supplies), and defended by a hostile population of high-spirited men, accustomed to the use of arms and to desultory warfare.

The experience of the Seven Years' War, then still fresh in the minds of statesmen and soldiers, should have warned them of the danger of the plan they had adopted ; for the successes of Frederick the Great were mainly due to the persistence of his enemies in a similar policy. By maintaining a central position, whilst the army opposed to him acted on a wide circumference and separate lines of communication, he had won victories against enormous odds, to an extent incomprehensible to his contemporaries, until military science furnished a clue to their true causes.

While the English Cabinet, however, had decided upon separate expeditions under independent commanders, the absence of military reserves and the difficulty of raising recruits precluded their providing the force necessary for the effectual execution of their projects, and they accordingly attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims of the several generals by so combining their operations that, while each retained an independent command, they were required to furnish, and

supposed to be capable of affording, mutual support to one another.

The effect of this policy was to afford the insurgents more favourable conditions than they could have hoped to attain by any efforts of their own, and to enable them to husband their resources while we wasted ours. Washington's army, like that of Frederick the Great, was thus enabled to operate from the centre, while the English forces, disseminated around a circle of hundreds of miles, were expected to combine their movements, to penetrate through large tracts of a difficult country, and without power of intercommunication to act in concert against an enemy who, in numbers, local knowledge, and superiority in the peculiar warfare necessarily adopted, had decidedly the advantage. From the nature of the scene of war, the influence, elsewhere so powerful, of a more complete organization and higher discipline, and of the capacity of moving and manœuvring in masses, was here of little avail.

Next, it was a fatal error for the minister to assume the responsibility which should have been delegated to the General, and to conceive that, at a distance of 3,000 miles from the scene of action, he could provide by a cut-and-dried plan and a strict code of arbitrary instructions against the many and ever-varying contingencies of actual war—a war, too, in which the united action of two distinct bodies was essential to success. It should have sufficed for him to have indicated the political objects of the campaign and the general character of the operations calculated to effect this, leaving the rest to the executive officers, who, if fit to be employed, should have been thought worthy of being trusted.

The obvious facilities lent to an expedition from the Canadian frontier by the extended chain of lakes and

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rivers running in a southerly direction towards the point of junction had induced Burgoyne to place great confidence in the practicability of his share of the operations; but between the extreme point of direct water communication on Lake George and his objective point, Albany, the natural obstacles became so great, and the capacity for resistance so much more formidable, that a simultaneous diversion from the south had from the first been considered a necessary and indispensable feature in the plan : yet for this essential condition the responsible minister had as we have seen neglected to provide. Again, while Burgoyne had been tied down to the most literal and undeviating adherence to his instructions, the means which had been promised him for their execution had not been furnished, and in consequence the all-important duty of leaving detachments to maintain his communications could not be fulfilled. Had the force originally demanded and agreed to, been placed at his disposal he might still, possibly, in the absence of co-operation from the south, have forced his way to Albany ; but at the worst he would certainly have secured to himself the alternative of retreat, and thus have saved his army from the humiliation of surrender.

Not the least fatal of the errors was it to attempt an important and hazardous operation without adequate machinery for maintaining the troops in a state of efficiency and mobility. In this respect the campaign of 1777 cannot, unhappily, be cited as an exceptional instance. We may confidently boast that no English army was ever ruined by the misconduct of our soldiers ; that some of our military failures have been due to the weakness, the rashness, or the incompetence of Generals is not to be denied ; but by far the greater number of the disasters that have befallen the British arms may be

traced to the neglect of those administrative arrangements without which neither the genius of the commander nor the discipline and courage of the soldier can avail. Had Burgoyne been provided with the transport necessary for securing the supply and facilitating the progress of his troops, a rapid march would have carried him to Albany before the enemy, disheartened by his late defeats and dispersion, could possibly have collected a force capable of barring his advance. As it was, weeks and months were wasted in futile efforts to remedy these wants, while the Americans were enabled to bring together, and to entrench in a favourable position, their whole available strength.

That fatal confidence in the capacity to improvise, as the emergency arises, the complicated machinery of army administration was so severely shaken by the bitter experience of a modern English war as to have given way to healthier theories. Let us hope that the time may not be far distant when those theories shall be reduced to practice, and that statesmen will learn, not only to recognize, but to act upon the wise axiom¹ that while it is "war that tries the military framework," it is "during the leisure of peace that that framework must be constructed," if it is effectually to resist the shock of actual conflict.

A review of the causes which led to the failure of the campaign would be incomplete without taking into consideration how far the action of the General entrusted with the execution of the plan may have contributed to the result.

The main fault which must be ascribed to Burgoyne himself is one against which warning voices have been

¹ Sir William Napier. Vegetius expresses the same meaning in different terms when he says that "War should be a study, and peace an exercise."

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raised since armies first existed : contempt for his enemy ; a sentiment which in this instance was justified neither by experience of the past nor by the circumstances of the hour. He had himself seen at the outset of the struggle how ill-armed and untrained citizens had entrenched themselves in the face of an English army, and made a brave and protracted resistance to their assaults. The lapse of two years had converted that raw militia into a disciplined army, animated by an indomitable spirit and resolution, directed by a General of acknowledged genius, and aided in their struggle by the physical features of the country and the unequivocal sympathy of the population. Such circumstances should have more than outweighed in Burgoyne's mind the consciousness of a superior organization, and the confidence inspired by his facile victory at Ticonderoga. A more just estimate of the merits and resistant power of the insurgent armies would probably have induced Burgoyne to display a greater degree of caution and have prevented him from placing himself in a position to be outnumbered and surrounded without a hope of extrication. Beyond this justice will not admit of the blame of failure being laid at his door. It was one of the radical faults of the plan of operations that, in the absence of means of intercommunication between the two co-operating forces, each General was subject to the apprehension that if he fell back he would expose his colleague to bear the whole weight of the enemy. It was this apprehension which led Burgoyne to cross the Hudson and to break off communication with his base ; it was the fear of leaving Clinton or Howe to meet the combined strength of the American armies which urged him against every principle of military prudence to advance without the possibility of

securing his line of retreat. His enterprise failed, and he paid the penalty in the immediate ruin of his professional reputation. Had he succeeded, and the chances of success were not very remote, his chivalrous disregard of every interested or personal consideration would have added lustre to his triumph, and caused his name to be upheld, not only as that of a bold and skilful General, but as an example of loyal devotion to duty at the risk of self-sacrifice.

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CHAPTER VIII.

PERSECUTION.

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SIR EDWARD CREASY includes Saratoga among the decisive battles of the world, and takes for the text of this chapter of his justly popular work a sentence of Lord Mahon's, who speaks of "the surrender of 3,500 fighting men under Burgoyne" as having been "more fruitful of results than those conflicts in which hundreds of thousands of men have been engaged, and tens of thousands have fallen."

The historian, who uses this expression, in the same section of his work characterizes the occasional successes of the English army in the American colonies as tending only to the "protraction of an inevitable issue," and he cannot, therefore, have intended to attach supreme political or military importance to the effects of a battle which, occurring in the third year of a war, was followed by four years of continuous warfare in the same cause before producing a decisive result.

The surrender of Stanhope at Brihuega,¹ of Corn-

¹ Lord Mahon, in his *Wars of the Spanish Succession*, thus compares the capitulation of Stanhope at Brihuega in 1710, with that of Saratoga sixty-seven years later :—

"In both it must, I think, be felt and owned that strong reasons were assigned by the capitulating Generals why, hard pressed and surrounded as

wallis at Yorktown, of Mack at Ulm, and of Bazaine at Metz, virtually involved the conclusion of peace, and had Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga been followed by the abandonment of the war on the part of England, or even by a temporary cessation of hostilities with a view to negotiation, it might fairly be classed among the decisive battles ; but what was its actual result ? On the part of the Americans immense elation and encouragement ; on the part of France and Spain a quickening of the foregone intention to strike a blow at a hated rival by espousing the cause of her rebellious subjects ; on the part of England by only a stronger determination to crush the rebellion.

they were, no remedy besides the extreme course remained. In both the bravery and spirit were not denied of the troops or of the commanders. In both their military skill was at least allowed. In both the objections to their conduct which at first sight may appear will be found in a great measure to resolve themselves into the inevitable difficulties attending the want of supplies in a desolate district, and the want of intelligence among an unfriendly population." The analogy holds good in other respects, for in both cases the Government representing the victorious army shamefully violated the terms of the capitulation, and in both cases the English Government displayed an ignominious apathy and indifference in failing to insist upon the fulfilment of obligations solemnly entered into in the interests of their army. The comparison can be carried yet further, for with a few verbal alterations, and a little less bluntness of style, General Stanhope's despatch to Lord Dartmouth, dated on 9th October, 1710, might pass for the composition of Burgoyne, after Saratoga. General Stanhope writes :—

"I must do that justice to all the officers and men, that everything was done by them which could be done ; the horse and dragoons having taken their share of the business on foot," (this was the case in Burgoyne's Campaign, the Brunswick chasseurs never having been mounted). "Should I ever after this misfortune be entrusted with troops, I never should wish for better men than all have shown themselves to be, and whatever other things I may have failed in through ignorance, I am truly conscious to myself that in the condition we were reduced to I could not do a better service to the Queen than endeavour to preserve them by the only way that was left. When things were reduced to the last extremity I thought myself obliged in conscience to save so many brave men who had done good service to the Queen, and will, I hope, live to do so again."

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It was the nature rather than the extent of Burgoyne's disaster which lent the event an exaggerated importance. The mere loss of 3,500 bayonets could neither paralyze the power of England nor give a material preponderance to that of the insurgents. To us the Convention of Saratoga was a humiliation rather than a defeat ; to them less a victory than a triumph. The decisive battle began when the English House of Commons refused justice to her fellow-subjects across the Atlantic ; the foundation of American independence was laid in the English Cabinet when the King and his ministers resolved to resort to arms, and the first shot fired at Lexington sounded the death-knell of British dominion over the noblest of her colonies.

The moral which the Convention of Saratoga might, and should, have pointed was that which our most enlightened statesmen had for years past been vainly dinning into the ears of Court and Cabinet ; namely, that the just demands of free Englishmen could not in the long run be successfully resisted by force of arms. More than ten years before Burgoyne had begun his march from Canada, Mr. Pitt had, from his place in Parliament, warned his countrymen of the danger and wickedness of their policy towards the colonies, proclaiming, in never to be forgotten words, that it was hopeless to attempt to reduce America to slavery, but that if by force of arms we did succeed in binding her, "she would fall like a strong man : she would embrace the pillars of the State and pull down the Constitution along with her."¹

Eleven years later, but before intelligence or even a suspicion of Burgoyne's disaster had reached England, the same statesman said :—

¹ Debate on the Stamp Act, 1766.

"No man thinks more highly than I do of the virtue and valour of English troops. I know they can achieve everything but impossibility, and the conquest of English America is an impossibility. *We do not know the worst*, but we do know that in these campaigns we have done nothing and suffered much."¹

It is evident that Howe's expedition to Philadelphia had created uneasiness with regard to the fate of the northern force,² since the failure of the projected junction made its position extremely critical.

As early as August, '77, Walpole (*Last Journals*) says :—

"Lord George Germain owned to Lord Hertford that General Howe has defeated all his views by going to Maryland instead of waiting to join Burgoyne, and that Clinton had not force enough at New York to send him any relief."

And again :—"The ministers were so confounded by Howe's expedition, when they wished he should have gone to the north and endeavour to get Washington between him and Burgoyne, that they sent orders to Burgoyne not to advance beyond Albany till he could hear from and concert with Howe."

On 2nd November the Duke of Richmond writes to Lord Rockingham with reference to Burgoyne :³—

"I believe it is also true that a very great man said within these few days that he expected accounts of a general defeat very soon."

Sir George Saville, writing to the same statesman a few days later, says :—

¹ Debate in the House of Lords, 18th November, 1777.

² As it had created confidence in America ; see Washington's letters, ante, page 281.

³ Rockingham Correspondence.

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"I have little doubt of Howe's leaving Philadelphia, and of Burgoyne being obliged to retire."

Colonel Allen Maclean,¹ writing from Montreal on 19th October, says :—

"I think it more than probable that the rebellion is as unlikely to finish now as it has been at any time since the commencement. The unsuccessful event of Colonel St. Leger's expedition, and, I am afraid, more unsuccessful one of General Burgoyne's, will soon put the matter out of doubt."

Lord Chatham, two weeks before the tidings of the disaster reached England, spoke of "the sufferings, perhaps the total loss, of the northern army;" and all these forebodings of evil rested upon the fact of Sir William Howe having failed to keep his appointment with Burgoyne; so essential to success was his co-operation considered by all who were capable of forming an opinion upon the nature of the campaign.²

The news of the surrender reached England, via Quebec, on the 2nd December, and produced universal consternation. At the meeting of the House that evening, Colonel Barré questioned Lord George Germain, who denied being in possession of official information on the subject, and who then struck the keynote of the unworthy defence which he had determined to adopt, by remarking that in the absence of authentic intelligence

¹ This was a Scotch gentleman sent to America by Lord George Germain to raise a provincial corps among the Highland emigrants. The terms which he proposed were submitted to the King, who tells Lord North that they were exorbitant, adding that "this person has the over cunning for which his countrymen are celebrated" (Donne). He did raise a regiment of Highlanders, but the experiment did not upon the whole prove successful.

² On the 3rd November Horace Walpole writes :—"The papers to-day are full of a resurrection and victory of Burgoyne, which even the dates show to be manifest lies. It is doubted whether he will not have been forced to lay down his arms."—*Letters to Lady Ossery*.

he was unwilling to throw the blame of failure upon the General—an announcement received by the House with indignation and derision. The production of the instructions to Sir William Howe and General Burgoyne was then moved for, but refused by the ministers.¹

A few days more removed all doubt. Burgoyne's own despatch arrived, announcing that he and the remnant of his army were prisoners of war. Walpole treats this document with his accustomed ill-nature, ridicules its bombast—from which, by the way, it is singularly free—and laughs at Burgoyne's boast of having "dictated the terms of his surrender." There was no such boast, but that he did dictate the most important of those terms is undeniable. Lord Mahon's irony is tempered by his more generous spirit:—

"So far as Burgoyne's own conduct is concerned, his vindication could be placed in no hands more able than his own. When his despatch from Albany was first sent forth in print, the public did not fail to admire the grace, the good feeling, and the dignity with which in that able composition he tells his mournful fate. According to a popular writer of that age the style charmed every reader, but he had better have beaten the enemy and mis-spelt every word of his despatch; for so probably the great Duke of Marlborough would have done both by the one and the other."²

It at once became evident that Lord George Germain was not disposed to assume, in the smallest degree, the responsibility for the failure of the expedition, and that

¹ When the true state of the case began to transpire, Horace Walpole does Burgoyne justice so far as to say of him that:—"He did not want spirit or knowledge nor zeal for serving his masters, who seem to have sacrificed him because he did not execute a bad and impossible plan drawn by them."—*Last Journals*.

² *History of England*. Vol. vi.

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the sacrifice of his agent commended itself to his mind as the simplest and most natural solution of the difficulty. Accordingly, as by a preconcerted signal, the sluices of the ministerial press were opened upon the unfortunate General, and everything that malevolence could invent or vituperation express was resorted to to defame his military reputation and to blacken his private character.¹ The American minister generally maintained a silence more significant than direct impeachment, but his subordinate followers in Parliament poured forth their reprobation in unmeasured terms, and directly accused Burgoyne of having, by rashness, folly, and disobedience of orders, brought disaster upon the country and disgrace to the British arms.

Not only Burgoyne's friends, however, and the opposition, but independent members, actuated only by their love of fairplay and justice, came to the defence of the absent General.

On the 11th December, the Earl of Shelburne, in the House of Lords, directly charged Lord George Germain with having brought about the disaster :—

“The operation was intended to be carried out by two Generals in concert with one another, and the ministers sent *positive* orders to one General and *discretionary*

¹ Even the pen of foreign hirelings was not disdained, for in the *Annales politiques* by M. Linguet, we find under the heading of “La Défaite du Général Burgoyne en Amérique” the following passage, the venom of which is evidently not of French growth :—“Le Général B. après l'avantage peu pénible de Ticonderoga n'a cru avoir besoin que de marcher devant lui ; et, parceque l'ennemi ne résistait pas, il a imaginé qu'il fuyait. Emporté par cette idée, n'ayant pris aucune mesure pour les subsistances ; ayant négligé d'assurer ses communications, il s'est trouvé tout-à-coup enveloppé par ces mêmes hommes qu'il croyait ne pouvoir joindre assez promptement. Après un jeûne de plusieurs jours, il a voulu essayer de l'ouvrir au moins un passage par la force ; n'ayant pu réussir, il a fallu accepter une capitulation dont l'humanité des Américains adoucit la rigueur, mais non pas la honte.”

orders to the other. Mr. Burgoyne is directed to march to New York, or effect a junction with Mr. Howe. Mr. Howe goes aboard his ships and gets to the other side of Philadelphia. In the meantime Mr. Burgoyne is surrounded by the Provincials, and applies for succour to Mr. Clinton. Mr. Clinton is in the very act of complying with his request when he receives an order from Mr. Howe for a reinforcement of 4,000 men to defend himself on the redoubts near Philadelphia. What is the effect of this want of concert? Burgoyne is surrounded and taken prisoner with his whole army, and Clinton so weakened as to be in danger of sharing the same fate, while New York and Rhode Island are left in imminent peril."

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Lord Chatham spoke in a similar strain—defended Burgoyne, taxed the Ministry with wilfully deluding and misleading the King, and paid a compliment to the humanity of the American General:—

"While on the one hand we must lament the unhappy fate of that spirited officer, General Burgoyne, and the gallant troops under his command, who were sacrificed to the wanton temerity and ignorance of ministers, we are as strongly impelled on the other side to applaud the generous magnanimous conduct, the noble friendship and brotherly affection and humanity of the victors."

It is to be regretted that the subsequent conduct of Congress should have excluded the American Government from participation in the honourable testimony borne to their army by one whose good opinion they so highly valued.

In the House of Commons the opposition mustered in their fullest numbers, and were loud in their denunciation of Lord George Germain's attempts to shield himself by the sacrifice of an absent member.

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Fox said :—

“ A gallant officer sent like a victim to be slaughtered where his own stock of personal bravery would have earned him laurels if he had not been under the direction of blunderers, was too shocking a sight for humanity to bear unmoved. General Burgoyne and the House have been deceived. General Burgoyne's orders were to make his way to Albany, there to await Sir William Howe, but General Howe knew nothing of the matter.”

Colonel Barré, Colonel Luttrell, Mr. Vyner, and others, employed the same arguments, which, however convincing in themselves, made but little impression upon the impenetrable phalanx of the ministerial forces. All attempts to extort the production of correspondence were fruitless, and Lord George Germain, by insinuation, and his less responsible adherents by bolder assertion, threw the entire blame of the failure of the campaign upon the incompetence of the General.

Not only did the Ministry refuse to lay before the House any information tending to throw light upon the discussion, but the demand that the conduct of the northern expedition should become the subject of inquiry by an independent Board of General Officers was firmly resisted. Here we are afforded another instance of the King's natural sense of justice rebelling against the evil influence of his counsellors :—

“ I cannot help expressing some surprise,” he writes to Lord North on 28th December, 1777, “ that so many of the Cabinet have doubted of the propriety of bringing the unhappy fate of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's expedition to an inquiry, though I thought there might be differences of opinion as to the extent and mode of such inquiry.”

And again next day :—

"I confess I am still of the opinion that I threw out yesterday, that if on consideration it should be thought right to inquire, through the medium of a Board of General Officers, into the defence laid by General Burgoyne, that his orders were positive (*which I much incline to*), the reference ought to extend to the failure of the expedition."¹

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Lord George Germain, however, could have had but little difficulty in bringing the weight of his stronger mind to bear upon such scruples, and a hint that publicity would be injurious to the successful prosecution of the war must have sufficed at any moment to overcome the more generous impulses of the King. It has been shown that from the outset Burgoyne foresaw that it would become the policy of the minister to offer him up as a victim to public indignation. Before he could have communicated his suspicions on this head, his friends in England had arrived at the same conclusion, and in the English army in America Burgoyne's sacrifice was assumed as a matter of course, so little faith did there exist in the justice or magnanimity of the English Cabinet.²

Sir John Wrottesley, then serving in Howe's army, writes from Philadelphia, on 20th November, 1777, on the subject of the Convention of Saratoga :

"Various are the conjectures here relative to the effect that the news will have on your side of the water. In my opinion it will operate in the extremes. Either the people will be more exasperated against these fellows

¹ Donne.

² On the 16th March, '78, Fox moved a vote of censure upon the American secretary for his conduct of the war, which was rejected by a large majority. The opposition at this time, though formidable from its talents and influence, was numerically too weak to carry any important measure against the Government.

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than ever, and vote any men or any money for another trial, in which case Burgoyne will fall a sacrifice ; or they will overthrow the ministers and recall the army.¹

General Howe's success at Brandywine naturally enough had the effect of condoning his offence in having withheld succour from Burgoyne : had he failed in this enterprise, the blame for the miscarriage of the northern expedition would doubtless have fallen upon him. Even as it was, however, it was not possible for him to clear himself from the suspicion of want of discretion in abandoning Burgoyne to his fate, and it was no part of Lord George Germain's policy to check the unfavourable opinion which set in against a second of his Generals,²

¹ In another passage of this letter Sir John Wrottesley illustrates the precarious nature of our position in America at this time, even in places where our arms were victorious :—" We have made strong works here, but as our lines are near the town and the picquets of our army every day insulted, the opposite shores of both our rivers in possession of the rebels, you may easily imagine we are not fertile in provisions. Washington has published a manifesto in which he threatens to hang all persons bringing any species of provisions to this town. *We* can live upon salt pork, but what the 23,000 inhabitants of this place will do God only knows. Beef we have now and then, but they are the old cows that people sell for want of forage. That sells at 5s. per lb.; veal at 7s.; mutton none at all. Fowls at 8s. or 10s. a couple. Flour is totally out of the question. This is only November and the frost not yet set in. We had an expedition into the Jerseys two days ago, and brought over 400 head of cattle and as many sheep ; that helps a little, but alas ! if the inhabitants can't partake with us, how can they look on us in any other light than as the destroyers instead of the protectors of their country ? If Washington can enable them to live, and we cannot, which side will be the strongest ?"

² That Howe had been censured is evident from this passage in his despatch to Lord G. Germain, of 5th March, '78 :—" It gives me pain to learn by the honour of your Lordship's despatch No. 23, that my application to return home had given His Majesty one moment's concern. I meant not to throw any difficulty in the way of the King's service, which I have ever been and ever shall be most zealous to promote as far as my person and abilities can carry me. But in the present instance, conceiving the confidence of His Majesty's minister to be withdrawn, which I had the presumption to believe I once possessed, I considered it a duty which I owed the King, the minister, the public, and to myself, humbly to request my dismission."

and *pro tanto* diverted it from himself. Both Sir William and his brother, the Admiral, accordingly resigned their commands, and ultimately succeeded in obtaining a Committee of Inquiry into their conduct of the war.¹

Burgoyne reached England in the middle of May,² and at once sought an audience of the King; this was, at the instance of Lord George Germain, peremptorily refused; he demanded a court-martial, and it was ruled that as a prisoner of war this could not be accorded to him; he then adopted the only remaining course, an appeal for justice to the country from his place in Parliament. To defeat this end it was determined to silence him, on the plea of his being incapacitated, as a prisoner on parole, from taking his seat in the House of Commons.³

The attempt failed; he made his appearance in the House on the 21st May, and expressed his willingness

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¹ The Committee had not drawn up their report when further proceedings were stayed by the dissolution of parliament.

² There was a current report which has been repeated by some of his biographers that the opposition were so anxious to secure Burgoyne as a partizan that Charles Fox intercepted him at Hounslow, and after a long interview persuaded him formally to join his party. Whether or not Fox so met him, it has been shown that before his departure from America Burgoyne had anticipated the course which Lord G. Germain adopted, and had determined not to allow himself to be made the victim of ministerial blunders. He continued, however, for some time after his return to avoid joining the opposition.

³ The objection to his taking his seat was raised by Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General, but was disposed of by a large majority of the House, mainly upon a precedent found in the case of Lord Frederick Cavendish, who having been taken prisoner in the unsuccessful attempt on St. Malo, sat and voted while on parole in England. Before his enlargement he had inquired of the French Government whether there would be any objection on their part to his resuming his place in Parliament as he would certainly vote in favour of measures against them, and the reply was that they might as well prohibit him from having a child lest it should live and grow up to fight against them some day.

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to answer any questions;¹ the 28th was named for him to state his case, and Horace Walpole has described the scene in the House of Commons on that day. The crowd was so great, that ministers made it a pretext for the exclusion of strangers, although Burgoyne urgently prayed that they might remain and hear his defence, which could not be too public. His speech was moderate in the extreme, and rested entirely upon his having been left no discretionary power, his instructions having been "positive, peremptory, and indispensable;" and the saving clause which he had included in his plan to meet unforeseen exigencies having been struck out:

"The plan as originally drawn I have no reason to be ashamed of, because it underwent the inspection and had the sanction of some of the first and ablest officers of this country; but the plan as it stood when my orders were framed can with no more propriety be called

¹ Burgoyne refers to this intention in the following letter addressed to the Speaker:—

"HERTFORD STREET, 5 o'clock,
"Friday, May 22nd, '78.

"SIR,

"Lest any mistake should arise from the short and interrupted conversation I just now had with you, I put pen to paper to explain that my intention was, and is, to answer directly any questions that may be put to me without referring to the House any part of my situation, unless called upon to do so, because I could not be supposed to entertain a doubt that any part of my situation precluded me from a right to exercise at full, every privilege of a member of parliament.

"If I understand you right, Sir, the persons with whom you communicated only expressed an approbation of my conduct upon the supposition that I meant spontaneously to refer myself to the House, and made no declaration upon what was their opinion upon my situation, and whether they meant to combat my right as above stated, which is the point I wish them in fairness to be explicit upon. I therefore, Sir, ask your leave to see Sir Grey Cowper during your absence and renew that question to him that I may have the more time to be prepared. After the kind part you have taken, and the interest you have done me the honour to express for my situation I did not think it proper to take that or any other steps in your absence without your participation."

mine than any other formed by the Cabinet for the distant parts of America.

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"If there has been disobedience ; if unauthorized by circumstances or uncompelled by orders (for I will never shrink from that plea) a general has rashly advanced upon the enemy and engaged against insurmountable odds, the discipline of the state should strike though it were a favourite son.

"I, Lictor deliga ad palum!'"

In conclusion he threw himself upon the House for the means of vindicating his character:—

"Give me inquiry ; I put the interests that hang most emphatically upon the heart-strings of men, my fortune, my honour, my head, I had almost said my salvation, upon the test."

But while he thus sought the only means left him for the protection of his character, he avoided everything like personal recrimination ; bore generous testimony to the co-operation of Carleton and the efforts of Clinton, abstained from blaming Howe, and spoke in terms of praise of the American army.

It is evident that his military instincts and his personal affection for the King at this time to some extent tied his tongue, nor indeed was it until he had exhausted all other means, and convinced himself that the King shared in the determination of the ministry to refuse him justice, or even the opportunity of pleading his own cause, that he threw himself openly into the arms of the opposition.¹

Mr. Vyner now moved for a committee to inquire into Burgoyne's conduct, which he himself seconded, but which ministers strenuously resisted.

¹ Horace Walpole says in his *Last Journals* that at this time the Ministry regretted not having at once ordered Burgoyne back to America.

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Mr. Temple Luttrell taunted Lord George Germain with his dread of an investigation into his conduct, and said :—

“General Burgoyne was a gallant officer, whose only crime had been that he was too zealous, too brave, too enterprising, too anxious for the good of the country; had strictly obeyed his orders and done all that British valour could effect in executing the minister’s plans. Had he on the contrary *receded from his colours, disobeyed the commands of his superiors, and hid himself from danger*, such conduct would have given him pretensions to the patronage of the First Lord of the Treasury, and the honours and emoluments of the American Secretaryship.¹

It was indeed by a capricious turn in the wheel of fortune that the all-powerful Minister and the unsuccessful General now found themselves in their relative positions.

In 1759 Lord George Sackville (he had not then assumed the name of Germain²) returned to England from Germany to meet the gravest charge that can be preferred against a soldier. He was summarily dismissed the service by the King, and when subsequently, at his own request, his conduct was investigated by a court-martial, he was formally cashiered.

Sixteen years later he was one of the first ministers of the Crown, entrusted with the supreme conduct of

¹ Stung by these taunts Lord George rose and challenged Luttrell to meet him in mortal combat; a proceeding which, as he might have anticipated, only led to both disputants being placed in custody of the serjeant-at-arms until they passed their word to abandon the bloodthirsty design.

² Lady Betty Germain had been on terms of intimacy with the Duke of Dorset, and (to quote the words of a contemporary, Lord Shelburne) “proved her attachment to him by leaving, away from her own relations, to his third son a very considerable property upon condition of his taking the surname Germain.”

a momentous war, and the trusted adviser of a King,
 whose commission in the army he had been declared
 unworthy of, and incapacitated from, holding.¹

In 1762 Burgoyne had returned from Portugal to
 England laden with honours from the Sovereign under
 whom he had fought, to receive from the hands of his
 own King the highest favours he could bestow upon
 an officer of his rank, and by the voice of Parliament
 the thanks of the nation for his services.

Sixteen years later he stood before the country a
 prisoner; debarred from the presence of the Sovereign
 who had delighted to honour him, repudiated by the
 minister who had employed him, assailed by the
 Government he had served only too faithfully; and the
 man who had, after a desperate struggle, yielded to
 overwhelming numbers at Saratoga found himself
 arraigned, judged, and condemned by him, who had
 refused to charge the enemy at Minden!²

Truly, the race is not always to the swift, nor the
 battle to the strong.

Burgoyne's personal popularity, and the prevalent
 conviction that he was being sacrificed, swelled the
 numbers of the opposition, but not sufficiently to defeat

¹ It would be difficult to find in the annals of our history a prominent public character more consistently contemptible than that of Lord George Germain. Lord Shelburne, who had ample means of judging him, and who was not himself an ill-natured man, accuses him of "intolerable meanness and love of corruption," declaring that "he wanted judgment on all great affairs, and he wanted heart on every occasion." If we can rely upon Lord Shelburne's estimate of Lord George's statesmanship, we must conclude that he was as deficient in moral as in physical courage. The character he left in his office was that of a man "violent, sanguine, and overbearing in his first conception and setting out of plans, but easily checked, and liable to sink into an excess of despondency upon the least reverse without any sort of resource." See *Life of Shelburne*, by Lord Edward Fitzmaurice.

² For the court-martial on, and other particulars relating to, Lord George Germain, see Appendix H.

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the ministerial forces ; the motion was negatived by fifty-eight votes.

The effect produced by the defeat of Burgoyne's army had operated upon the public mind of England in two diametrically opposed directions. Those who had hitherto deprecated the war were confirmed in their conviction of its hopelessness, and urged more strenuously than ever the abandonment of the attempt to subdue the colonists.¹ The Court and Cabinet, and the majority, not only in Parliament, but, at this time, of the English nation, were, on the contrary, more than ever determined to enforce their authority ; they had now an insult to avenge as well as an offence to punish, and they resolved to redouble their efforts and to increase their sacrifices, in order to restore the royal authority.

In the House of Lords the Duke of Richmond on 2nd February moved that no further reinforcements should be sent to America and, on the 23rd March, that the British army should be withdrawn from the colonies, "to avert disgrace and bloodshed in the prosecution of an unjust and hopeless war." Both motions were rejected by large majorities.

On the 28th May Mr. Hartley moved in the Commons that the House be not prorogued, but remain sitting to forward measures for the restoration of peace ; Burgoyne supported the resolution in a powerful speech, denounced the incapacity of ministers,² and openly charged Lord George Germain with attempting to evade the responsibility of his acts by the sacrifice of his agent :

¹ Lord George Gordon, in the debate on the war on 26th May, '78, said that it was clear "that the most accomplished General at the head of the completest army was impotent when employed by arbitrary power to reduce mankind to unconditional submission."

² Fox said that "the Ministry was as incapable of making peace as of carrying on war."

"That I think myself a persecuted man I avow ; that I am a marked victim to bear the sins that do not belong to me I apprehend ; but this is not the first time that I have dared the frowns of power for parliamentary conduct, and whatever further vengeance may be in store for me I hope I shall endure it as becomes me. I am aware that in far better times officers have been stripped of their preferment for resisting the possessors of that bench. They cannot take from me a humble competence ; they cannot deprive me of a qualification to sit here ; they cannot, I trust they cannot, strip me of the confidence of my constituents who placed me here ; they cannot, I am sure they cannot, strip me of principle and spirit to do my duty here."

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The persistent refusal of the ministry to afford Burgoyne the means of vindication in any form, had the effect of enlisting in his cause the sympathies of many supporters of the Government whose sense of justice was stronger than party allegiance, and alarmed at these symptoms Lord George Germain determined to rid himself of a dangerous enemy before the ensuing session. The attempt to exclude him from Parliament as a prisoner of war on parole had failed—but why should he be on parole ?

Burgoyne accordingly received through the Secretary at War the King's command to rejoin the captive army in America. Against this order he thus remonstrates :—

GENERAL BURGOYNE TO LORD BARRINGTON.

KNOWSLEY, *June 22nd, 1778.*

"MY LORD,

"I have considered the letter I had the honour to receive from your Lordship on the 5th instant with the

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attention and respect due to an intimation of the King's pleasure. I have now to request your Lordship to lay before His Majesty a few particulars of my situation, and to offer to his royal consideration with all humility on my part, such of my complaints as admit of representation.

"My letter to Sir William Howe, referred to in your Lordship's letter, was writ in the fulness of zeal to renew my service in arms during the ensuing campaign.¹ Deprived of so animating a support and visited by new and unexpected anxieties, I have now recourse only, as far as the mind is concerned, to a clear conscience, perhaps a more tardy, but I trust as efficacious an assistance. The present season of the year, always favourable to me, gives me the appearance, and indeed in some degree the sensation, of health; but much care is still wanting to restore me to my former state. The remedies prescribed are repose, regimen, and repeated visits to Bath. My intention was to remain some time in the country, to repair to Bath for a short time next month, and to return thither for a much longer space in the proper season, the autumn. But whatever may be the benefit of all or any part of this plan, I am persuaded that to expose my constitution to the next American winter is in all probability to doom me to the grave.

"That I should not hesitate in such an alternative in circumstances of exigency I am confident that the King will admit, when in his grace he shall recollect how often at His Majesty's call in this war, I have relinquished

¹ War had been declared with France in February of this year, and Burgoyne had expressed himself anxious "to bear arms against the House of Bourbon," whenever he should be free to do so, either by the ratification of the Convention of Saratoga, or by his exchange.

private duties and affections more imperative upon the heart than any we owe to existence.

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"The purposes intimated as reasons for my present attendance in America would, I fear, be very different from services. The army I commanded, credulous in my favour and attached to me by the series of conflicts and misfortunes we have in common sustained, would not derive material consolation from my return in disgrace, and their disappointment could not but be enhanced by such indication that Government either thought it inexpedient to ratify the Convention of Saratoga or despaired of the ratification effectuating the redemption of that army; for they would not conceive it possible, had the return of the troops been in view, that any person would have advised the King of so harsh an act as sending an infirm, calumniated, unheard complainant across the Atlantic merely to inspect the embarkation.

"Your Lordship will perceive the parts of this letter which apply to that Council of the Throne, from whence I am to suppose the order originated, and in pure justice and generosity you will guard me, my Lord, from any supposable presumption of expostulating with the King in person. But I apply to the same qualities in your Lordship's mind for pointing out to His Majesty, independently of his Council, other letters among those transmitted to the Secretary of State alleging other reasons, and those more prevalent than the attention to health, for my return to England; and permit me, my Lord, to add that every one of them receives tenfold weight from what has happened lately, by my continuance in England.

"The special reason upon which I chiefly rest at present, my Lord, is the vindication of my honour.

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Until that, by full and proper trial, is cleared to my Sovereign and to my country, I confess I should feel a removal from hence, though enforced by the term duty, the severest sentence of exile ever imposed, and when the time and circumstances of such removal are further considered, that Britain is threatened with invasion, and that after an enemy has set my arm at liberty, I am forbid a share in her defence, can I, my Lord, be deemed offensive if I venture to declare that so marked a combination of displeasure and hard treatment would be more than I should be able, or perhaps ought, to bear?

"My cause, my Lord, being thus committed to your office and character, I have only to add that I feel assured you will do it justice.

"I have the honour, &c.

"JOHN BURGOYNE."

The King, partly, perhaps, from personal consideration for his former favourite (for George the Third was as obstinate in his likings as in his antipathies), but mainly, probably, because he had from the first felt the justice of the demand for inquiry, and was unwilling to make himself the instrument of his minister's rancour, consented to suspend the order for Burgoyne's return to America, and he profited by the respite in using every effort, and exerting all the influence he could command, to bring about a ratification of the Convention with a view to liberating the captive army, and to obtain the means of openly representing his own conduct before an impartial tribunal. This object he avows in an address to his constituents; at the same time he printed and circulated his two speeches in Parliament on the subject of his conduct of the campaign. These documents

afforded the public (who had not hitherto been in possession of any authentic information on the subject) the means of forming their own opinion, and letters of sympathy and condolence poured in upon him. Among them was the following characteristic communication :

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LORD DACRE TO GENERAL BURGoyNE.

BELHOUSE, *June 30 17th*, 1778.

" DEAR SIR,

" I could not receive anything more acceptable to me than the transcript of your late speeches in Parliament, which are so full a justification of your conduct in every point, and breathe a spirit of conscious innocence and generosity ; a spirit indeed worthy of the best times either in this country or in ancient Rome. I thought it was impossible for me to detest and despise the ministry's proceedings abroad and at home more than I did, but since your coming to England I find I was mistaken, and that it was still possible to despise and detest them more. As to yourself you have all the reason in the world to be consoled, for you have risen superior to them, and covered them with the load with which they had intended to oppress you.

" As to me, I count myself singularly happy that you do me the honour of counting me amongst your sincere friends, in continuing to do which be assured you will never find yourself mistaken. I know not how you intend to dispose of your time this summer ; if between this and August, when we go from hence, you have any to spare, you will make Lady Dacre and myself very happy in favouring us with your company here, the longer the better. Hoping therefore for this pleasure, I will add no more now than that I

CHAP. VIII. have the honour to be, dear Sir, with the most sincere
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“Your affectionate and faithful humble servant,
“DACRE.”

While exerting himself to the utmost, however, to protect the interests of his captive troops, and to vindicate his own aspersed character, Burgoyne was as yet evidently unwilling to declare himself a thoroughgoing member of the opposition. With the political principles of Lord North's cabinet he had no sympathy, but it should be remembered that in those days it was difficult to disassociate the Sovereign from his Ministry; and Burgoyne who, while in the full enjoyment of Court favour, had not hesitated to risk the Royal displeasure by voting according to his conscience, would not now allow persecution and injustice to goad him into a hostile attitude towards the King whose commission he bore and whose approbation and rewards he had been proud to receive.¹ The Whigs were bidding

¹ In the concluding portion of his address to Parliament he remonstrates against the King's name being dragged into the question; the passage (which will be found in the “State of the Expedition,” page 137) is a remarkable one, and worthy of quotation:—

“It is uncommon military doctrine, I may be told, to reason upon the King's orders—I confess it is so. Since the reign of James the Second, in the British service it never has been necessary. We have been used in this age, to see the King's name give wings and inspiration to duty. Discipline, in this country, has been raised upon personal honour—a firmer basis than fear or servility ever furnished: and the minister who first shakes that happy confidence; who turns military command to political craft; who dares to use his gracious Sovereign's name as an engine of state, to glut his own anger, or to remove his own fears, he is amongst the worst enemies to that Sovereign. But should his purposes go further (a consideration of far greater magnitude to the public) and should it be seen that the royal name was brought forth for the *discipline* of Parliament, the Minister so using it would be not only an enemy to his Sovereign, but a traitor to the constitution of the state.

eagerly for recruits, and in Burgoyne would have received a valuable ally, but his loyal nature revolted against his making personal grievances a pretext for political animosity towards the King's Government, and the following sensible letter from a private friend shows the almost morbid delicacy with which at this period he avoided anything that could be construed into an appearance of making advances to the leading men in opposition :—

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JOHN LEE,¹ ESQUIRE, TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

STAINDROP, 18th September, 1778.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"In consequence of your letter of the 14th I shall not wait for you at Wakefield longer than the evening of the 24th, which indeed will be no waiting at all, for my business there will occupy me the whole of the day. I shall proceed next morning to Wentworth, which is almost directly in my way to London, as is yours to

"I will close the defence of my principles respecting military subordination by reference to an anecdote well authenticated and not very remote.

"An officer in a neighbouring nation, for some error he had committed in a day of battle, received a blow from his prince who commanded in person. The officer drew a pistol, and his first movement was to point it at his master ; but the next (and it was instantaneous) was to turn the muzzle, and discharge the ball into his own heart. Though my case differs both in the provocation and the consequence, in many circumstances my conduct may justly be supported upon the same principle. I receive an affront that a liberal spirit cannot endure ; and in a name, against which no personal resentment can be pursued, nor indeed entertained : but a suicide of my professional existence (if I may be allowed the phrase) is preferable to the state in which the affront placed me. In one instance only I renounce the parallel—God forbid I should be thought, even in a burst of passion, to have pointed at my Sovereign ! It was not from his hand I received the blow."

¹ An eminent lawyer, appointed Solicitor-General under Lord Rockingham's second administration.

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Bath, merely to pay a visit to Lord Rockingham, of whom I think just as you do. I expect to meet him at home that evening and not before, for looking into the newspapers I observe that Doncaster Races (which he usually attends) end on Thursday, from whence he will naturally return home after an absence of some days.

"I suppose I am the worst man in the world to whom you could have referred for an opinion concerning the propriety of your calling at Wentworth at this time; I suppose it may be fit now and then to consider what the world at large will think or say of a particular measure; but I never do consider that; on the contrary, I satisfy my own mind as well as I can, and if I am so fortunate as to obtain my own approbation I never trouble myself about the perverseness or ignorance of others. Yet, perhaps, though this does well enough for my obscure station, it may be liable to objection in a situation exposed to public view, as yours is and will be. I commend therefore your abstinence from all appearance of evil; yet I cannot help observing that there is something in Lord Rockingham's turn of character that among such as know anything of him would effectually remove every suspicion of a sinister purpose in him or in you. As to yourself, you need be under no apprehensions that Lord Rockingham will misinterpret your visit into a tender of political connection. No man is so cautious, I think, on that head. He is even afraid of making proselytes to his sect for fear they should be destroyed for their heresy, and as I know that he wishes you well, and believe that he thinks you unkindly treated, he wants no other motives, nor even those, to dispose him to do justice to your cause.

"I am not, therefore, of opinion that any observations

to be made on a visit to Lord Rockingham, are worth your regard, especially as you intimate that you have been formerly at Wentworth on visits there. Had you never been there before, suspicion might have formed twenty conjectures about your present motives, but surely no delicacy can be supposed to require that circumstanced as you are, you should pass by the house of a gentleman whom you knew before, and would have called on had your situation been different. Lord Rockingham will, I dare say, be glad to see you, and Captain Gardiner's relation to you and to the publick, is a sufficient introduction anywhere.

"I am, dear Sir,

"Ever yours,

"JOHN LEE."

The political atmosphere of England was, at this time charged with unhealthy and dangerous elements. Our fatal policy towards America had now involved us in war with France and Spain; Ireland, smarting under the insults no less than the injustice of proscriptive laws, was openly disaffected; while every effort on the part of a few honest and enlightened statesmen to reform the crying abuses of the time was baffled by an arbitrary and narrow-minded King, an unscrupulous ministry, a venal Parliament,¹ a bigoted and corrupt

¹ How venal, we may read in the words of the King and his Prime Minister. On 18th April, 1782, the King writes to Lord North complaining of the heavy expenditure incurred by Government towards the election of their supporters, not because such sums had been disbursed from national funds for purposes of corruption, but because in consequence of the fall of the Ministry, the outlay had been unproductive of results, and therefore "a strange waste of public money." In reply to these reproaches "Lord North with a heart full of the deepest affliction at having incurred His Majesty's displeasure, throws himself at His Majesty's feet, and implores his attention to a few words he presumes to offer in explanation;" (could an oriental Vizier or a Chinese Mandarin go much beyond this in servile

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Church, and a servile middle class, all more or less interested in maintaining the existing order of things. The bulk of the people devoid of political power, ignorant, credulous and impetuous, were incapable of bringing a healthy influence to bear upon their rulers, but, blindly following the instincts of their undisciplined and unintelligent natures, one day cheered the King with shouts of "Bloody war to the Yankees," and the next threw up their caps for "Wilkes and liberty," or prepared to lay London in ashes at the bidding of Lord George Gordon, to the cry of "No Popery." The gaol, the whipping-post, and the pillory were then the national schools provided by Government for the education of the masses; the gallows was their principal agent for the inculcation of morality, and their character was the fruit of this training.

Charles Fox, who was not prone to indulge in gloomy reflections, gives vent to his feelings in these remarkable terms :—

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Lord Derby not finding me here, sent your letter by a servant down to me in Norfolk, where I then was, so that it did not come by the post any part of the way. I took it for granted Lord D. would let you know

phraseology?) and he proceeds to state that "had he known that the expense attending the elections would have amounted to £72,000, he certainly would not have advised His Majesty to have embarked in it;" that he was unwillingly drawn into supporting the contest for Westminster and the City of London which cost £16,000, because of "the necessity of strengthening the Government and weakening the opposition," and he reminds the King that a previous election had cost the Government near £50,000, besides a pension of £1,000 a year to Lord Montacute, and £500 a year to the Selwyns for their interest at Medhurst and Luggers-hill. See Donne's *North Correspondence*.

what he had done with it, and, therefore, did not think it worth while to write unless I could find some conveyance more to be trusted than the post. As I knew no other method of sending this, you will think it prudent in me to waive entering particularly upon the contents of your letter at present. It is impossible for anyone to be less sanguine than I am. I hardly know a possible event that would give me unmixed pleasure; for every little success has its evil consequences, though the greatest misfortunes have happened without producing any good. Although the most serious calamities have not taught us wisdom, we are as liable as ever to grow foolish upon the most trifling advantages. To have any serious hope of anything good, alterations must happen in the turn of mind and character of many, many people, nay, perhaps of whole sets of people, which is surely more than anyone who knows mankind can expect. Many private projects must be given up, and whole systems torn from the minds of some where they have taken deepest root. Add to this the extreme state of darkness in which we are with respect to some persons and things the most important to be known. Ever since I have received your letter some things have passed which throw more obscurity than ever upon matters which must be thoroughly known to anyone who can hope to build any solid system for the safety of the country. Under all these circumstances how can any but madmen be sanguine? All that I can bring myself to determine upon the subject is, that it is too great a work ever to be done by anything but such a continued course of wisdom and patriotism as is scarcely to be expected from man. Occasions may come when such severity may be right: are we all prepared to stand the risk as well as the odium belonging to violence?

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The contrary may possibly happen, and much yielding may be necessary : are we all ready to bear the reproach of temporizing ?

“There is one part of your letter upon which I could write whole pages of complaint, if a disposition to complain without attempting a remedy were not one of the very worst disorders of the present times. I am sorry to give you nothing but this melancholy picture of my mind upon this occasion ; I do not often use such despondent language, but the great openness with which your love treats me made me think it necessary to show you at once my genuine sentiments, however unpleasant they may be, and unfit as they certainly are for general conversation. Despondency is never right. At whist, as you very well know, it is often right in a desperate case to play upon a supposition of your partner’s having a good hand, though there might be the strongest symptoms of the contrary ; because if he has not the game is lost. Just so I think of the present state of affairs. It is the duty of those who mean to act upon public motives to suppose many things which they cannot believe, and to act, if possible, with the same cheerfulness and vigour as if they were sure of being backed by the thorough confidence of a spirited people, intent upon public affairs, observant of the conduct of public men, and ready to support those of whom they think well or ill. Let us then suppose all this, and there will still remain difficulty enough, because the people in this country are not everything. What a train of difficulties would this other part of the view open, if this were a proper opportunity for discussing them ; but difficulties in a great attempt there always have been and always must be. *Il n’y a que les petits génies* (says Cardinal Retz) *qui ne savent pas distinguer le difficile avec l’im-*

possible. We must hope the thing not impossible ; nay, and if it were impossible I should still think it our duty to attempt it. I have always thought it a miserable accusation against Cato and Brutus that they attempted to save the republic when it was too late. If it is not now too late, and I will not allow myself to think it is, I feel as sure as I can be of anything that there is but one possible road to safety, and one I think there is. If those who really have feelings for the country would thoroughly unite and learn to feel that sort of confidence which union gives, all might yet be well. Whoever is to undertake a work that requires all possible exertions must have some solid foundation to stand upon. The confidence of the people is the best and the most natural foundation. The confidence of the Prince is some sort of foundation too, though neither so solid nor so honourable as the other ; but if, from unfortunate circumstances, neither of these natural foundations can be had, surely it is not impossible to get a third of fictitious foundation, consisting of the union of a set of people connected by innumerable different ties, but all by this one tie as the very vital principle of their union : a real love for a free constitution, and a thorough determination to preserve ours so at all hazards. If this be impossible, which I allow to be difficult, what other hopes remain I know not, but should be glad to hear. With this I still am sanguine, *δός που στῶ, καὶ τὴν γῆν κινησῶ*, but while men have no certainty of support from any quarter, but are forced to employ all their skill and strength to keep upon their legs, how can it be expected that they should go on successfully in a work which requires all the nicety of a watchmaker and all the strength of a coalheaver ? Put Broughton upon a slippery piece of ice, and I will

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engage a Macheróni, who has firm ground to stand upon, shall beat him to a mummy. You will easily perceive that I have gone a great deal farther than I intended upon this subject, but it is impossible to think at all of public matters and not to kindle at the present state of the country. Whether those who never think of them consult their duty or not is one question, but that they consult their happiness, as things now go, is very certain. So much, and a great deal too much, for general politics.

"With respect to your questions I can answer you shortly and truly that I know nothing of the matter. I have not been in town since the 31st of August, nor have I seen anybody from whom I could hear anything. Fond as I am of the country at this time of year, I hope you will do me the justice to believe that I should certainly go to town if I thought any good was to be done by my being there, but I know this county and some of my best friends well enough to feel sure that to collect together an army sufficient to repulse a French invasion would be an easier task than to get any six people together to talk about public business a week before the meeting of Parliament. I asked Lord Derby whether he knew anything about the requisition made to Congress with respect to your army ; he knew nothing of the matter, but means to enquire as soon as he goes to town.¹ I have no doubt but Spain has notified the necessity she is under of assisting France, but I do not know anything certain about it. Adieu. I have written you a pamphlet instead of a letter, but as everything I have said is very general, I think I may safely let it go

¹ Here follows a sentence relating to purely private affairs.

by the post.¹ When I see you I will enter more into particulars.

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"I do not at present intend to be in town before the 22nd, on which day I have promised to dine at Lord Derby's; I shall probably meet you there, and by that time we must, I think, know all that is to be known of the state of affairs both in America and in Europe. I own I think it very fortunate Parliament meets so late, as it is much better to know the state of the facts completely than be talking upon matters in suspense. If you have any commands for me before we meet I wish you would direct to me at Hunstanton, near Docking, Norfolk. Indeed I should be glad to have a line to let me know that you have received this. I have not seen Richard (Sheridan) since I left London, nor have I heard from him very lately, which makes me guess he is not in town, for I think I should have heard from him what is supposed to be Lord G.'s own conversation. As it is I have heard from nobody, and literally know nothing but what I fish up from newspapers.

"I am, MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Yours very affectionately and sincerely,

"C. T. FOX.

"NEWMARKET, *November 2nd, 1778.*"

On the meeting of Parliament in the autumn of '78, the Earl of Shelburne, in the debate on the address, eloquently defended Burgoyne's conduct of his campaign:—

"He has been accused of carrying measures into execution which were wild, romantic, and impracticable; but he had neither the force promised to him nor the

¹ From this and the opening paragraph it would appear that a hundred years ago the English Post Office was not considered a safe mode of transmission for confidential communications of a political nature. See also the postscript to the Duke of Portland's letter, page 417.

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co-operation expected for their completion ; the consequence was that he and his gallant army were made prisoners. On his return to England he was simple enough to be jealous of his honour ; he retained some of those exploded sentiments and old-fashioned feelings which ministers wished to be forgot. What was their language ? 'Be silent ; we do not accuse you, and no doubt you have done your country justice. Perhaps you are uneasy about your army : Why should that give you any concern ? We did not find fault ; let the army desert or starve ; what is past cannot be retrieved. Stirring up that affair might be productive of public clamour, and can answer no end but that of embarrassing administration. Do you make no noise or disturbance ; the affair will die out of itself, and you cannot fail to find your account in being under protection of Government.'"

In the Commons Burgoyne on the same day urged consideration for his captive army, and bitterly reproached both Governments with having taken no steps to carry out the terms of the Convention : "But whatever motives the Congress may have had, the tameness and silence with which the British Ministers have borne this outrage is astonishing. That men so constant and so prodigal in their anger against the Congress as never before to have failed in expressing it even in cases when it bordered upon being ridiculous, should on a sudden become cold, and mute, and dead to feeling in cases when resentment was justly founded, can hardly be accounted for except upon the principle that it was better to suppress the justest censures upon a power they detested than that even a particle of unmerited odium should be wanting to load the men whom they were resolved to destroy

Meanwhile their brave soldiers were suffered to undergo what was worse than death—they seemed to be totally neglected and forgotten.”¹

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On the 14th December, during the debate on the army estimates, he again reverted to this subject, and pleaded that the soldiers kept prisoners in America “deserved the most grateful treatment from their country, for however criminal their General might have been, *they* had done everything that could be performed by men.”

On the 22nd April, '79, Burgoyne charged ministers with attempting “to cover their own defects by the relinquishment or crimination of those whom they employ; not only leaving officers unprotected but laying snares to effect their ruin; of stating that an officer had had all that he required when they knew that a third part had been withheld from him, and making him responsible for all blame because he drew his own plans and instructions, when the minister so stating knew both facts to be false. Finally, when an officer's conduct is called into question, his own reasons and motives are suppressed, though the minister has them in his pocket.”

Lord George Germain, who, while he had persistently hounded on his creatures to persecute and calumniate Burgoyne, had never dared to attack him in Parliament but under cover of insinuation, protested against these charges, and went so far as to deny ever having imputed to him the blame for the failure of the campaign. The sincerity of this declaration was illustrated, when a few days later one of the minister's most abject and unscrupulous followers, Mr. Rigby, made

¹ *Burgoyne's Speech on the Review of the Evidence before Mr. Montagu's Committee in the House of Commons.*

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a violent attack upon Burgoyne, accusing him of "having by his rashness sacrificed an army, and compelled English soldiers to pile their arms in the face of a despicable enemy, an undisciplined militia, and had left them to their fate, while he himself was enjoying the luxuries of London."¹

Burgoyne's reply, which is stated to have made a powerful impression upon the House, concluded thus:—

"He was there to vindicate their conduct (the captive troops) and his own honour, which had been scandalously aspersed. To see himself disgraced without a hearing, to hear the most abominable falsehoods circulated against him, to be denied a share in the defence of his country;² these were the luxuries he enjoyed, and if there was a man who thought them enviable, who thought they did not give thorns to the pillow and bitterness to the cup, he had more philosophy or less sentiment than himself."

By this time that love of fair play and impatience of

¹ Burgoyne was judged differently by his own army. General Phillips writing to him from his prison in Cambridge on 29th September, '79, says:—"I will not plague you about our situation, as you will know it by my assuring you it is almost exactly as you left us, so no more about it. The troops here depend upon you, their chief, in whatever may relate to them; their interest, their honour. It is not doubted that you will exert yourself that the officers may gain preferment in America with other parts of the army; that you will have the goodness to exert yourself in behalf of their situation in respect to the very great expense of living, and endeavour to procure the allowance of forage money; in short, that you will use all your powers, and persuasion, and interest for those troops which have served under you with zeal and with honour, and endeavour by serving *their* situation and *their* honour, to alleviate misfortunes which nor fortitude nor valour could prevent, and which they suffer, however, with resignation and patience. I am most perfectly convinced of your affectionate, I will say your grateful regard for us all, and I leave myself and the troops to your friendly care, to your humanity, to your honour."

² Burgoyne had again applied for active employment against the French in any capacity, even as a volunteer, but was refused on the grounds of his being a prisoner of war.

injustice which, in spite of the most adverse influences, are never, for long, absent from an assembly of English gentlemen, began to assert themselves more powerfully, and ministers found that they could not rely upon a majority to support them in their refusal to afford Burgoyne the means of vindication. When, accordingly, on the 10th May Colonel Barré made his motion for an inquiry into the conduct of the campaign by a committee of the House, it was voted without a division, though not without an angry remonstrance on the part of Lord North and the American secretary.

The committee met in May, when Burgoyne delivered a narrative of the events of the campaign, supported by the ministers' despatches and other documentary evidence. He next called in evidence Sir Guy Carleton and all the principal officers who had served under his command;¹ and finally delivered an address, in which he reviewed the entire evidence, and concluded by submitting that tied down as he was by positive and unconditional instructions, he should have failed in his duty had he hesitated to advance even with the conviction that by doing so he doomed himself and his army to inevitable destruction.

The effect produced by these revelations was as favourable to Burgoyne as it was damaging to Lord George Germain, who did not himself appear or call a

¹ Of his three Generals none unfortunately were available; one having been killed, and the two others—Phillips and Reidesel—being detained as prisoners of war in America; but the officers examined included his Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Lord Harrington, and the commanding officers of corps, or such of their representatives as were at liberty. All bore testimony to their entire confidence in their General from first to last—to his indefatigable energy—and, as far as their positions enabled them to form and justified them in expressing an opinion—his skill and judgment. More was not wanted, for even his persecutors had not ventured to impeach his courage or his honour.

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single witness to substantiate the charges which he had instigated. Parliament however was suddenly prorogued, and the committee were thus precluded from furnishing their report and of placing the exoneration of the accused General on public record. So far justice was still defeated, but enough had transpired to vindicate Burgoyne's reputation as a soldier, and to silence, if not to condemn, his most prominent accusers.

Parliamentary proceedings had, however, in those days but a very restricted publicity, and Burgoyne, by the advice of his friends, determined to make the truth generally known by printing and circulating the whole of the proceedings.

On this subject Edmund Burke writes to him :—

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I do not know whether I ought to be most obliged to you for your kind intention of a visit hither or for your hastening a publication in which I take a very sincere interest. I am persuaded that since your vindication could not come out when the matter of the enquiry was warm nothing has been lost by the delay. The minds of the people have been diverted another way by the operation of the same council which first brought on your misfortune and then your persecution. Perhaps the nearness of an enemy may make us return to some consideration of that part of the national force which consists in military skill and ability. Hitherto we have thought of nothing but numbers and expense. When we once come to think it of some moment how that expense shall be employed and how those numbers shall be conducted, the body of the English nation (if there yet be an English nation) will join me in my share of satisfaction in your triumph over Court adulation

and Court persecution, and they will wish posterity to know that even in the citadel of ministerial influences there was a force in truth and merit that power was not able to overcome. This makes me imagine that your publication may not be unseasonable about this time. God knows in what a state we are. As to myself I pass some unpleasant moments, but really on the whole I bear up with greater firmness than I expected against the worst part of the many public calamities that threaten and oppress us—I mean the unaccountable temper of the people.

"I shall be glad to receive your papers whenever you please, and am glad I am to promise myself the satisfaction of your own company on Monday next.

"I am, with the most sincere regard and esteem, ever

"My dear Sir,

"Most faithfully yours,

"EDMUND BURKE.

"BECONSFIELD, Sept. 1, 1779."

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The *State of the Expedition from Canada* was published early in 1780. It is dedicated to Major-General Phillips and the army that took part in the campaign, whose services are gratefully and affectionately acknowledged. Apart from the personal interest of this work it is one that cannot fail to prove instructive to the student of military history, who is here able to trace step by step the combination of causes that brought about the disastrous result. It must be remembered that Lord George Germain had persistently, if indirectly, charged the unsuccessful General with having by rashness and incompetence brought about the failure of the campaign and the loss of his army. Burgoyne argued

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that he had but obeyed his positive orders, and that not he, but the minister who framed his instructions and prohibited him from deviating therefrom in letter or in spirit, was responsible for the consequences.

In his prefatory speech to the chairman of the committee, Burgoyne contrasts the conduct of Lord George Germain with the magnanimous treatment he had met with at the hands of Count La Lippe, who, when he ordered him upon a hazardous service in Portugal, said, "I participate in the feelings with which an officer would be struck for his reputation in suffering himself to be cut off, and reduced to sacrifice his camp, his baggage, and twenty pieces of cannon; but be at ease; I will take this measure entirely on myself; persevere as I have directed, and be confident of my defence and protection."

Certainly a more striking contrast to the course adopted by the English minister could not have been presented, for, from the first tidings of failure, Lord George Germain had repudiated his responsibility, and to the last he shrank from no subterfuge to shield himself by the sacrifice of his agent.

In the course of the "narrative" which follows, Burgoyne points out the extraordinary physical difficulties of his march, the failure of the *corvées*, the inadequate numbers of his army, and the utter groundlessness of that reliance upon the loyalty of a large portion of the American people which formed so important a feature in the spirit of the project. He admits having shared in that confidence, but too soon discovered that disaffection was almost universal throughout the districts bordering upon his line of march, and that in the instances where loyalty to the royal cause did exist, it was, as a rule, of that timid nature that could only be aroused to self-

assertion by victory and success. The failure of Colonel St. Leger's expedition and of the attack on Bennington were, as has been already shown, both in a great part due to this fatal reliance upon a sentiment which had little foundation in fact. His reasons for crossing the Hudson and of each of the succeeding operations are succinctly and clearly stated, and he concludes by appealing to the committee to consider his transactions not from a present stand-point, but as they must have appeared at the time ; for "where war is concerned few men in command would stand acquitted, if any after knowledge of facts and circumstances were brought in argument against decisions of the moment and apparent exigencies of the occasion."¹

It would be well if military writers and historians would lay to heart the truth and wisdom of that sentence.

It has been shown that the very essence of the plan of the campaign of '77 lay in the united action of two distinct bodies of troops advancing upon a common centre from opposite points. How it came that the necessary instructions were given to one, but withheld from the other, General, was then unknown to all but Lord George Germain himself ; and his greatest enemy would have hesitated to suspect him of having sacrificed an

¹ In 1869 I had occasion to ask the late Field-Marshal Burgoyne his opinion on a French military work, then recently published, and in his reply he uses expressions almost identical with those uttered by his father ninety years before :—"The book," he writes, "contains many facts of much interest, and many good reasonings mixed with others that are prejudicial and erroneous arising from that mistake so common among authors who give accounts of military campaigns, of grounding accusations against a General for gross errors in his manœuvres, upon circumstances which, though thoroughly known to the writer subsequently, the General at the time was necessarily in ignorance of, and without allowance for the numerous matters of detail that frequently prevented him imperatively from doing what he could wish."

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army to his social convenience.¹ Although ignorant of the cause, however, Burgoyne succeeded in establishing the fact :

"The Secretary of State makes no mention of the northern expedition in any of his despatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am persuaded will not be contested, that he did not mention any orders or recommendations relative to co-operation verbally to Sir William Howe's aide-de-camp, or any other confidential person who sailed about that time.

"The first mention made of the necessity of co-operation was in the Secretary of State's letter of the 18th of May, wherein his Lordship '*trusts that whatever he [Sir William Howe] may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada.*'

"The proposition clearly justified by these facts is, that if the Secretary of State had thought proper to signify the King's expectation of a co-operation to be made in my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in consistency he ought to have done, it would have arrived before Sir William Howe embarked his army, and in time for him to have made a new disposition : but instead of that, this very material injunction was not despatched till it was almost physically impossible it should have any effect. And so indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received it on the 16th of August at a distance from Hudson's River too great for any detachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been spared ; and the reinforcement from England, upon which Sir William Howe depended

¹ See foot-note, page 233.

to strengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later still—
too late (as it has been shown) to enable that General
with all his activity and zeal to give any effectual
support.

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“Indeed the conduct of the Secretary of State, in inserting this paragraph in his letter of the 18th of May, when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly it would have been timely, seems so preposterous, that it can only be explained by one fact. It transpired about that time that Sir William Howe’s army was destined for Pennsylvania, and people who had considered the force of the enemy to be collected from the northern provinces began to be alarmed for my army. It is well known (though I cannot ascertain the date) that an officer of very great ability, and a perfect knowledge in the country through which I was to pass, as soon as he heard no disposition was made for a support from New York, foretold to the Secretary of State, or his near friends, the fall of my army. Under this apprehension it might appear to the Secretary of State a proper caution, that an expectation of co-operation should exist under his hand.

“If plans so inconsistently formed, and managed by the Secretary of State with so much seeming confidence as to mislead his Generals, and so much real reserve as to destroy them, should be defended by that infatuated belief then entertained of the inability of the enemy to resist, I should beg leave to state, as one proposition more, that after the experience of their actions at Trenton and many other places, and the intelligence of their new levies received from Sir William Howe, such confidence was an additional fault, and perhaps a more pernicious one than any I have stated.”

As the main imputation upon Burgoyne rested upon

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a vague charge of his having exhibited a want of judgment in attempting to force his way to Albany without being assured of the necessary co-operation from the south ; so it was his principal aim to establish that the Secretary of State's orders left him no discretion upon that point, and that under the circumstances, in which his obedience to imperative orders placed him, he had acted with honour and discretion. This the inquiry established beyond all question. Whether the genius of a Marlborough might, as Lord Mahon hints, have devised means for extricating the army without risking a greater disaster than was involved in its defeat, may form a subject for ingenious military speculation ; but whatever verdict be passed upon Burgoyne's strategy, no one who reads his justification can deny him the credit of having been actuated throughout by a chivalrous sense of duty ; by an utter abnegation of self ; above all, by the consciousness that there was no choice between the risk of his own sacrifice and that of a companion in arms who, as he was then bound to believe, trusted to his meeting him.

Let the reader endeavour to place himself in Burgoyne's position—shackled as he was on the one hand by positive instructions, and on the other by want of information regarding his colleague—and he will allow full weight to these words :—

“I am still convinced that no proof that could have been brought from appearances, intelligence, or reasoning, could have justified me to my country, have saved me from the condemnation of my profession, or produced pardon within my own breast, had I not advanced and tried a battle with the enemy.”

Burgoyne's vindication, however gratifying to his friends, was not calculated to disarm the animosity of

ministers. On the prorogation of Parliament he again received orders to proceed to America as prisoner of war. In reply to Lord Barrington's communication he expressed his willingness to obey the King's command as soon as he should have been restored to a capacity for service by the sentence of a court-martial. In the event of this act of justice, which every soldier, however criminal, was entitled to claim, being still denied to him, he begged His Majesty to accept the resignation of every military appointment which he held¹ except his commission as a Lieutenant-General in the army, which was necessary to enable him to fulfil his obligations to the American Congress.

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He at the same time made an appeal to the personal honour of Lord George Germain, but this letter was evidently written, less with any hope of changing the determination of the ministry than for the purpose of giving vent to his own outraged feelings.

GENERAL BURGOYNE TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

October 9, 1779.

"MY LORD,

"Though your Lordship can be no stranger to the correspondence between Lord Barrington and myself respecting my return to America, I enclose copies that it may be under your revision and contemplation together with this letter.

"The severity of the treatment shown me is so incompatible with the natural benignity and justice of the King² that I should have been convinced, had other

¹ The value of these appointments was computed at £3,000 a year.

² It will not fail to strike the reader how frequently at this time the person and name of the Sovereign became identified with ministerial acts and was involved in official correspondence.

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information been wanting, either that it proceeded entirely from His Majesty's counsellors, who are pursuing my ruin as a political measure, or that the Royal ear had been atrociously prejudiced and abused.

"Under this conviction, propriety and sentiment induce me to address my further answer to your Lordship as more particularly regarding your station and, if I conceive aright, my Lord, your personal honour.

"The original order being conditional, and my first answer stating my belief founded upon very painful experience that my constitution could not sustain the ensuing winter in the northern parts of America, the repetition of the order must be understood to carry a doubt of my veracity, a sentence of sacrifice, or a contemptuous disregard of every other representation made by me, and to put my stay in England during the winter solely upon my own attention to health.

"My past indifference to this object, when in competition with my service, has so little succeeded to recommend me to the favour of Government that I should not be liable to reproach though I availed myself of no other pretensions for declining to return to America ; but I claim a right of absence upon principles of more extensive import—the fundamental principles of justice and generosity due from all Governments to those who serve them zealously, and by some Governments thought doubly due to those who in their service have been unfortunate.

"I shall not recapitulate my former allegations, upon which the King's Cabinet seem very concisely to have decided, but I think it incumbent upon me to press upon your Lordship's consideration a circumstance not mentioned before. I stood responsible to my country for

the making of the treaty of Saratoga, and for keeping the terms of it as far as it depended upon my own conduct.

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“Government has never declared its sense upon the original measure nor upon what has followed.

“No man can inform me by what mode, or by what persons, or to what degree of charge I may be called upon to answer; *every man and every circumstance agree to show how frail would be my reliance upon defence and protection in my absence.*

“The silence of Government to Parliament, to the public, and to myself, upon the ratification of the treaty required by the enemy is of a suspicious nature. My understanding and my honour must be dead if I did not apprehend and resist a design to pass to my account the loss of the army I commanded by the treaty or by subsequent conduct. My duty to my country and to those gallant suffering troops must be equally dead if I did not resolve, as far as in me lay, to vindicate those wrongs, and I scorn, my Lord, to conceal (how much soever my avowal may increase the enmity already subsisting against me) that I mean to call publicly upon the King’s ministers to account for what has been left undone for the redemption of that army. And here, my Lord, I allude to the sentiment I expressed above upon the concern of your personal honour. *There are many accounts to settle between your Lordship and me before the tribunal of the world; I give you this notice of one particularly intended; I am persuaded you will not willingly conspire to remove a man who thinks you have injured him; you will not willingly decline to face an inquiry into your duty to the State.*

“I therefore, my Lord, rely upon your sanguine interference should orders for my return to America, in spite

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of health, of honour, of justice, due to me, come again under the deliberation of the Cabinet.

“Should our joint endeavours fail, I think it a duty—that Government may be prepared otherwise to accomplish the purposes intended by my return—to inform your Lordship that upon the receipt of a peremptory order I should think myself compelled to lay at His Majesty’s feet the appointment to the American staff, the Queen’s Regiment of Light Dragoons, and the government of Fort William, the services of more than thirty years, and the reward with which I acknowledge them to have been overpaid by His Majesty and his Royal grandfather.

“The only commission I still humbly request His Majesty’s permission to reserve is that of Lieutenant-General in the army, for the purpose of being amenable to a court-martial, and of properly fulfilling my parole to the Congress.

“I am, My Lord, &c. &c.,

“JOHN BURGoyNE.”

The final decision of the Cabinet was conveyed to Burgoyne by Mr. Charles Jenkinson (afterwards Lord Liverpool) on 15th October, in the following terms:—

“Having laid your letter before the King, I am commanded to acquaint you that for the reasons submitted to His Majesty by the Board of General Officers, in their report dated 23rd May, 1778 (which reasons subsist in the same force now as they did at that time), His Majesty does not think proper that any part of your conduct should be brought before a military tribunal so long as you shall continue engaged to redeliver yourself into the hands of Congress upon their

demand and due notice given by them. Nor does His Majesty think proper, in consequence of your representation contained in the said letter, to restore you, circumstanced as you are, to a capacity of service.

"Neither of these requests can therefore be granted.

"I have it further in command from the King to acquaint you that His Majesty considers your letter to me as a proof of your determination to persevere in not obeying his orders, signified to you in the Secretary at War's letter of the 5th June, 1778, and for this reason His Majesty is pleased to accept your resignation of the command of the Queen's Regiment of Light Dragoons, of the government of Fort William, and of your appointment on the American staff, allowing you only to reserve the rank of Lieutenant-General in the army for the purposes you have stated."

In these proceedings Burgoyne appears to have acted entirely upon his own judgment, and it was not until he had taken the decisive step, and had in consequence been stripped of every post he held under the Crown, except his commission as a General Officer, that he communicated it to his friends, and among others thus to Lord Rockingham:—

"I take the liberty of troubling your Lordship with the inclosed letters between the Secretary at War and me, in the certainty that if the oppression exercised against me is not matter of public concern, it will at least be received by a mind like yours with sensibility.

"I may appear, to some, precipitate in the sacrifice I have made; I may appear weak to others in not having temporised from the first. I scorned that idea. I have followed the impulse of honour as it arose in my own breast, and I shall find no pain in submitting to a humble competence as a private gentleman, if in

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that I am thought worthy the esteem I court from great and virtuous men.

“In contemplating that character, your Lordship claimed in my mind a right to the earliest communication of my proceedings.”

CHAPTER IX.

DRAMATIC.

IT is time that we should consider Burgoyne's claim to a place among the dramatic authors of England. We have seen that in all periods of his life he was prone to write in numbers, and that on the eve of battle, during the tedium of a siege, and in the heat of political warfare, he found time to indulge this predilection. Of his many *vers de société*, only a few scattered fragments are found among his papers. The very best productions of this kind, however, can rarely bear the test of time, and Burgoyne's cannot be ranked among such. The highest praise that can be given to his "occasional pieces" is that they are always in good taste, and not unfrequently graceful and musical.

Here is his wedding gift to a friend:¹—

While, Palmerston, the public voice
Displays in comments on thy choice,
Praise, censure, and surprise,
Blames thy disinterested part,
Or interest finds in worth of heart
Where Fanny's treasure lies,

¹ On the occasion of Lord Palmerston's (the Second Viscount) marriage with Frances, daughter of Sir Francis Poole, Bart., of Poole Hall, Cheshire, in 1767.

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Fain would my muse, though rude, sincere,
 One humble, artless wreath prepare
 To deck her lovely brow.
 With thee would hail th' auspicious morn,
 Attend the bride she can't adorn,
 And bless the nuptial vow.

Let the dull claims of due esteem
 To lukewarm crowds be claim supreme,
 I found pretensions higher ;
 For, know, this heart now taught to beat
 With friendship's sacred, temp'rate heat,
 Had once been tried by fire.

'Twas mine to see each opening charm,
 New beauties rise—new graces charm ;
 'Twas mine to feel their power ;
 Nature and morals just and pure,
 For that has made the fruit mature
 Since I adored the flower.

After hard conflict passion cool'd ;
 Discretion, reason, honour ruled
 O'er the subsiding flame ;
 Till Charlotte to my vacant breast,
 With kindred charms and virtues blest,
 A sweet successor came.

Long years of love we've numbered o'er,
 And oh ! to many many more
 May Heaven the term extend ;
 To try with thee the pleasing strife
 Who boasts the most deserving wife,
 Who proves the truest friend !

In those days, prologues and epilogues were thought as indispensable adjuncts to a play as the chorus to a Greek tragedy, or the argument to a *Mystery* of the middle ages; and managers and wits, politicians and fine gentlemen, were fond of making these compositions the vehicle for their satire upon passing events, for compli-

menting individuals among the audience, or eulogizing the charms and merits of a popular actress.

Besides those published in Burgoyne's collected works several have been found in a more or less incomplete state among his papers, and references to many more such compositions in his correspondence. A prologue by the hand of a prominent man seems then to have been valued as a theatrical advertisement, and the newspapers and periodicals of the time make frequent mention of Burgoyne as having afforded this sponsorship to new plays on their first production on the London or provincial stage.

Private theatrical entertainments, however, afforded Burgoyne better scope for the exercise of his courtier-like pen than the public stage, and a considerable number of compositions of this kind were written by him on such occasions, as at Lord Derby's theatricals at the Oaks in 1774, or when in '86-'87 the Duke of Richmond fitted up a large theatre in his house in Privy Gardens, and gave a series of performances, admission to which, either on the boards or before the curtain, became the eager object of competition among men and women of fashion. On the occasion of the King and Queen attending one of these performances, Burgoyne wrote an epilogue to *The Way to Keep Him*, spoken by the Honourable Mrs. Damer, in which the following extravagant and not quite intelligible eulogy was addressed to the Royal pair:—

Need I here point to virtues more sublime,
Unchanged by fashion—unimpaired by time?
To higher duties of connubial ties,
To mutual blessings that from duties rise?
Your looks—your hearts the bright assemblage own,
Which heaven to emulative life has shown,
And placed, in double lustre, on a throne!

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On the performance of *The Liar* at Lord Sandwich's in which Lord Derby, Mr. H. Edgumbe, and Major Arabin,¹ were the principal performers, the latter delivered a prologue composed by Burgoyne, of which he writes thus :—

“ HINCHINGBROOK, *October 30th*, 1787.

“ DEAR SIR,

“ The prologue last night was received with the greatest and justest applause, and many solicitations for a copy of ‘the Major’s own prologue ;’ so you see, I shone in borrowed plumes. If I am permitted by you, I shall favour Mr. Topham with a copy for insertion in the *World*, which I know would oblige him, and that it is what he will expect from me upon hearing the encomiums that it met with. And if you still persist in not acknowledging yourself as the author, your name need not be mentioned. Thus Peter Pindar, or any other celebrated writer, may attain the praise your productions so justly merit. I hope you are convinced that *I speak truth*, though from my great success last night in *The Liar*, I have met with encouragement enough to alter my system and profit by the credulity of mankind, which can only be expected from a good liar, who has, nevertheless, the honour to be with great truth,

“ Dear Sir,

“ Your most obedient and most humble Servant,

“ WILL. ARABIN.”

Even the prologues and epilogues of Pope have, however, ceased to be amusing reading, and it is no disparagement to Burgoyne to admit that the perusal of

¹ Then major and guidon in the 2nd Life Guards ; he died in 1801, one of the senior Generals in the army.

such of these compositions as he has preserved leave no room to regret the loss or destruction of the greater number. He took a higher and more ambitious flight when he conceived the project of preparing an acting and operatic version of *As You Like It*, and of manipulating the text of Shakespeare's most graceful and delicate pastoral. Here is his own scheme:—

“Idea for performing *As You Like It* in three acts, interspersed with additional songs; some part of the dialogue to be left out, but none altered. The thoughts of the songs and phrase as much as possible to be collected from Shakespeare.”

A few of the songs, together with the text to which they refer, may here be quoted:—

ROSALIND. *Fortune reigns in the gifts of the world, not in the lineaments of feature.*

Song.

The face that enchants, too commonly wants
The merits that spring from the mind,
And if we are plain, those merits are vain,
Why nature so hard to our kind?

To be honest and fair is too much for our share,
Impartially nature replies,
Ere that Phoenix I make, let me see for his sake
A man that's deserving the prize!

CELIA. *I'll put myself in poor and mean attire;
The like do you so shall we pass along,
And never stir th' assailants.*

Duet.

ROSALIND. In manly vest when I'm arrayed
My air shall hide the timid maid,
With martial arm my spear I'll wield
And innocence shall form my shield.

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I'll plead our tender tale to charm
 The robber's heart, the ruffian's arm,
 And if in vain my prayer I spend
 We'll share the blow we can't defend.

ROSALIND. Thus paired like Juno's doves we'll rove
 Bound in one fate of life and love.

CELIA (*lively air*). If my friend were away 'twould be exile to stay,

BOTH. Together all dangers we'll meet.

ROSALIND. The fortune that strives to sever our lives,

BOTH. Is the hardest we have to defeat.

Here is a bold amplification of the original Hunting Song :¹—

Single voice.

Who was the man that struck the deer,
 The badge of triumph let him wear,
 Round the haunch of the noble prey,
 Hail him, hail him, lord of the day.

[*Repeated in chorus.*]

AMIENS (*affettuosos*).

Ah poor hero of the lawn,
 What a change since yester dawn !
 When his forked pride he reared,
 Sovereign of the mighty herd !

[*Hunting symphony, con molto spirito.*]

Hark ! the hunters' piercing cry,
 See the shafts unerring fly !
 Ah ! the dappled fool is stricken,
 See him tremble—see him sicken,
 All his worldly comrades flying,
 See him bleeding, panting, dying.
 From his eyelids wan and hollow,
 How the big tears follow—follow
 Down his face in piteous chace,
 How they follow, follow, follow,
 Without stop, drop by drop,
 How they follow drop by drop !

¹ " What shall he have that killed the deer?
 His leathern skin and horns to wear."

Set to music by Sir Henry Bishop, and well known as one of his most popular glees.

[*Tenor voices in chorus, to the first air but in slower time.*

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Round the haunch of the noble prey
Lend an ear to pity's lay,
Hear it, tyrant of the wood,
Hear it, hear it, man of blood !

Bass voice.

Vivace). He was destined to yield to the fate of the field,
And 'tis folly to grieve at his fall,
Are not we who pursue also followed in view,
By death the great sportsman of all ?

Chorus.

Who was the man that struck the deer,
The badge of triumph let him wear,
Round the haunch of the noble prey,
Hail him, hail him, lord of the day !

ROSALIND. *But you, are no such man ; you are rather point-
device in your accoutrements, as loving yourself than seeming
the lover of any other.*

Song.

Thou a lover—where's the sign ?
In all that tidy trim of thine,
I cannot one discover ;
Not a gesture, not a look
That bears a mark in Cupid's book
Of what should be a lover.

A wandering step, a vacant eye,
A pallid cheek, a broken sigh,
A tear he cannot cover,
A life made up of fond extremes,
Of fantasies and waking dreams,
Such, such should be a lover !

A tongue that's mute, a heart that speaks,
And, in quick throbbing, vows it breaks,
Unless its anguish move her.
In garb, in mien, in thought, in soul,
One wild, confused, devoted whole,
Such, such should be a lover !

While all the sorrows you rehearse,
Are only found in frippery verse,
She holds you but a rover.

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Bring but the proof before her eyes,
My faith upon 't, she'll sympathize
When you are such a lover !

PHEBE. *But now mine eyes
Which I have darted at thee, hurt thee not,
Nor, am I sure there is no force in eyes
That can do hurt.*

Song.

How often we're told there is death in our eyes,
But where shall we see the example ?
Behold how I frown on the wretch I despise,
Kind Sir, will you give us a sample ?
The fetters of passion in which you are bound,
Appear to be all a delusion.
So I leave to itself an invisible wound,
Without fear of a fatal conclusion.

To which poor Silviu replies in words, still following
close upon the text :—

Still let me gaze upon your charms,
And I'll my fate endure,
And bless thee in a rival's arms,
With passion mute and pure.
The poor with little are content,
That little, Phebe, give,
Nor check the smile, if kindly meant,
For on that smile I'll live.
While to his home the ripened grain
The happy owner bears,
Leave to the poor and humble swain,
To glean the broken ears !

Hopeless as Burgoyne must have found his attempt
to "gild refined gold," these songs are not without a
certain merit, and in venturing to follow in the great
master's track, he has even, here and there, caught some-
thing like a gleam of his spirit. It does not appear,
however, that this version of *As You Like It* was ever
put upon the stage or published.

The Maid of the Oaks was Burgoyne's first dramatic composition ; it was written in honour of Lord Stanley's marriage with a daughter of the Duke of Hamilton, and performed at the Oaks in the summer of 1774. In the beginning of the following year it was produced with great success at Drury Lane,¹ Mrs. Abingdon taking the principal part. The epilogue was written by Garrick.

There is some smart dialogue in this piece ; Lady Bab, the woman of fashion, is lively and amusing, and in marked antithesis to the Ingénue, to whom we are first introduced in the second act, when she is discovered "sitting under a great tree," and singing a song which became, and continued for many years after, one of the most popular of young ladies' ballads :—

Come sing round my favourite tree,
Ye songsters that visit the grove,
'Twas the haunt of my shepherd and me,
And the bark is the record of love.
Reclined on the turf by my side,
He tenderly pleaded his cause,
I only with blushes replied,
And the nightingale filled up the pause.

It is to be regretted that Maria did not always reply with blushes, and leave it to the Nightingale to furnish conversation, for a more wearisome young woman whenever she opens her lips it is impossible to meet with. She is as full of high sentiments as a copy-

¹ *The Rivals* had been brought out at Covent Garden about the same time, and was withdrawn as a failure, so capricious are theatrical judgments and tastes. It was afterwards reproduced with perfect success, but, according to Moore (*Diary*) Sheridan always pronounced it "one of the worst plays in the language," and said he would have given anything he had not written it.

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book, and it is not until on the wedding morning, when Sir Harry comes to lead her to the altar, that she so far descends from the stilts as to tell her ardent lover that: "Repugnance would be affectation; my heart is all your own, and I scorn the look and action that does not avow it."

The Maid of the Oaks, however, enjoyed a great popularity for many years, and continued even within the present century a stock piece of the London and provincial theatres.

The Lord of the Manor was Burgoyne's next dramatic work; the plot was avowedly taken from Marmontel's *Silvain*, and it was written in 1780, "to relax a mind which had been engaged in more intense application." In the preface the author states that it was composed with the object of familiarizing the comic opera (to which he is disposed to assign a high place in dramatic literature) on the English stage. In one respect this piece was decidedly an advance upon previous works of the same class. *The Beggar's Opera*, which had been produced nearly half a century before, contained no original music whatever, and though some of the music in Sheridan's *Duenna* had been composed by Linley, the greater number of his songs were simply written with a view to adaptation to popular, and sometimes very commonplace, airs. In *The Lord of the Manor*, all the music was original, and, what is more important, composed by no less true an artist than Jackson of Exeter. Most of these songs are now forgotten, and can only be discovered by a search through those dismal volumes to be found at old bookstalls or in the lumber-rooms of country houses, in which the popular drawing-room ballads of past generations lie buried; yet the music, and even the words, are deserv-

ing of more permanent fame. There are two songs which, according to a modern critic, "are still valued by those who love pure and expressive melody;"¹ one beginning with "When first this humble roof I knew;" the other said to be the writer's tribute to his lost wife, though a comic opera hardly seems a fit vehicle for such an effusion:—

" Encompassed in an angel's frame,
An angel's virtues lay,
Too soon did heaven assert its claim
To call its own away."

The Lord of the Manor was brought out anonymously, and attributed among others to Sheridan. It contains many political allusions which have now lost their point, but the most harmless of which were, in the acting version, suppressed by the Lord Chamberlain, probably as tending to bring His Majesty's military service into contempt. The army, however, is so conservative an institution that the ridicule thrown upon the recruiting system a century ago is equally applicable in the present day, and were Captain Trepan, Serjeant Crimp, and Corporal Snap, introduced upon our stage, they would not be considered gross caricatures:—

RENTAL. By your dress you should belong to the army; pray, sir, what is your real business?

TREPAN. I am a manufacturer of honour and glory—vulgarly called a recruiting dealer, or more vulgarly still, a skin merchant. I come to a country wake as to a good market—a little patience and you shall see my practice; come, my men, paste up more bills—where's the lion rampant with the grenadier's cap upon his head?

WORKMAN. Here, sir, here.

TREPAN. And the marine device?

WORKMAN. Here it is, done to the life. The prize boarded; the decks running with arrack punch, and dammed up with gold dust.

¹ *History of the Opera.*

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TREPAN. Right, lad, place that next to the lion. I don't see the London tailor with his foot upon the neck of the French king?

WORKMAN. Here he is in all his glory.

TREPAN. Right; paste him up on the other flank of the lion—what have you left for the corner?

WORKMAN. The East Indies, captain; a Nabob in triumph throwing rough diamonds to the young fifiers to play at marbles.

RENTAL. Well, captain, as you have called yours a trade, will you oblige me by so much as to explain how it is carried on?

TREPAN. With pleasure, sir. Suppose new regiments are to be raised, I am applied to, "Captain Trepan, how are skins now?" "How many may you want?" "Five hundred!" "Why, your honour," answers I, "those that are fit for all use, that bear fire and wear well in all climates, cannot be afforded for less than £10 a piece; but we have an inferior sort that we sell by the hundred." "I'll take half and half," says my employer. "Your place of delivery?" "Plymouth!" "Agreed," and they are on board in a month.

RENTAL. But, captain, sure this business is subject to frauds?

TREPAN. Yes, there are rogues in all trades, but my word is known. I never ran the same recruit through more than three regiments in my life, and that only when we have been hard pressed for a review.

RENTAL. Very conscientious upon my word!

TREPAN. There, look at that recruit; he's my decoy duck—mere show goods for the shop window; not an inch of wear and tear in the whole piece. The dog inherited desertion from his family. His brother was called Quicksilver Jack; he was hanged at last at Berlin, after having served six different princes in the same pair of shoes.

Another of Burgoyne's operatic productions was *Richard Cœur de Lion*, adapted from Grétry's opera of that name, which was first brought out in Paris in 1784. Sedaine's text had evidently been written to fit the music, and Burgoyne had only to put it into a native dress, within the same limit as to measure. The work accordingly possesses no more literary merit than any ordinary libretto of a modern Italian opera done into English.

It is nevertheless described by contemporary critics

as having been a great success upon the London stage,¹ and it has been reproduced at Drury Lane within the last fifty years.

The composition to which Burgoyne owed his true reputation as a dramatic writer was his comedy of *The Heiress*, written at Knowsley in 1785, and performed at Drury Lane in 1786, the principal parts being taken by Miss Farren, Miss Pope, Mrs. Crouch, King, Palmer, Parsons, and Bannister. Its popularity may be estimated by the fact that it was acted for thirty nights² during its first season, ran through ten editions in one year, was translated into four foreign languages, and acted upon the French and German stage.

So fastidious a critic as Horace Walpole says :³—

“I went through *The Heiress* twice in one day, and like it better than any comedy I have seen since the *Provoked Husband* ;” and again : “Burgoyne’s battles and speeches will be forgotten, but his delightful comedy of *The Heiress* still continues the delight of the stage and one of the most pleasing domestic compositions.” Horne Tooke, in his *Diversions*, describes the *Heiress* as being, “one little morsel of false moral excepted, the most perfect and meritorious comedy of any on our stage ;” the author of the *Pursuits of Literature* says that it is “the production of a man of fashion, delicacy, wit, and judgment ;” and the *Old Playgoer* declares Burgoyne’s *Lady Emily* to be the only approach to a fine lady on the modern stage.

¹ Owing in all probability to Mrs. Jordan who took the part of *Matilda*.

² At a time when there were but few theatres in London, and a constant change of performances was necessary.

³ *The Heiress* was translated into French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and acted in Paris and Stuttgart.

⁴ *Letters to Lady Ossory*.

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Miss Farren's personation of this character was considered the most finished of all her performances; and on her first appearance in it she so completely fascinated Lord Derby that he remained under the spell for eleven years, and married her a few weeks after his wife's death in '97.¹

Horace Walpole says, on the subject of the private theatricals at the Duke of Richmond's:²—

"Who should act genteel comedy perfectly but people of fashion that have sense? Actors and actresses can only guess at the tone of high life, and cannot be inspired with it. Why are there so few good genteel comedies but because most of such comedies are written by men not of that sphere? Etheridge, Vanbrugh, and Cibber wrote genteel comedy because they lived in the best company; and Mrs. Oldfield played it well because she not only followed, but often led, the fashion. General Burgoyne has written the best modern comedy for the same reason, and Miss Farren is as excellent as Mrs. Oldfield, because she has lived with the best style of men in England,³ whereas Mrs. Abingdon cannot go beyond Lady Teazle, which is a second-rate character, and that rank of women are always aping women of fashion without attaining at the style."

We here see that the complaints so commonly heard

¹ Lady Betty Hamilton, on the occasion of whose marriage, in 1774, *The Maid of the Oaks* was first performed. She died on the 14th March, '97, and Miss Farren became Countess of Derby on the 1st of May following. Thus Burgoyne with one of his dramatic compositions welcomed his nephew's first wife, while by means of another he provided him with a second.

² *Letters to Lady Ossory*. Vol. ii.

³ This sentence admits of an offensive interpretation which the writer could not have intended to imply; it is not, however, quite clear how an actress can acquire the manner and habits of refined women by living among men however good their "style."

in these days of the paucity of actors and actresses capable of representing high comedy characters were equally prevalent a century ago ; but it is difficult to accept Walpole's dictum, that "people of fashion that have sense" necessarily make the best high comedians. If there are few professional artists to be found on the modern stage capable of representing English society in its higher and more refined phases, can we not count upon our fingers the number of well-born and well-bred amateurs who, with equal ambition to succeed, and with the advantage of education, example, training, and habit are able to do better ?¹

Equally untenable is his proposition that "people of fashion" should write the best comedies ; and it is surprising that he should have ventured upon such an assertion in the face of facts necessarily within his experience. The author of *She Stoops to Conquer* had never lived "in the best company," in the sense in which Walpole uses the phrase, nor indeed had Sheridan begun to do so when he wrote his *School for Scandal*.² Walpole might also have remembered that Shakespeare and some of his contemporaries, although they had no preten-

¹ It was said of Tyrone Power that, unsurpassed as he was in personating low Irish humour, he always conveyed the impression of having been drinking claret instead of whisky. If it be so difficult for even a great actor to completely sink the refinement of his nature, should it be surprising that men of coarser mould rarely rise to the level of even outward polish, and find a difficulty in assuming that peculiar tone and manner which even in the highest social classes is the envied gift of a favoured few ?

² *She Stoops to Conquer* was first produced in 1772, and the *School for Scandal* in 1777. The following extract from Moore's Diary shows the estimation in which Sheridan was held in early life by "good society" :— "January 4, 1819. Called upon Lady Cork, who told me a great deal about Sheridan. First met him and Mrs. S. soon after their marriage at a Mr. Coote's. Sheridan then an ugly, awkward-looking man. The Duchess of Devonshire anxious to have Mrs. S. to sing at her house, but not liking to have him, 'a player,' as she called him."

CHAP. IX. sion to belong to "that sphere," did yet manage to produce a few high comedy characters which even a Lord Chamberlain "who has sense" could not have improved upon.

In the present day, when no prejudice would attach to people of fashion who should write plays, why is it that that entertaining and instructive kind of drama vulgarly called "genteel comedy" is not attempted? The late Mr. Robertson's popular pieces made some approach in this direction, but his characters always verge upon caricature, and he occasionally commits gross outrages upon the social habits and customs which he attempts to delineate, such as even the talent of the performers fails to condone.¹

It may indeed be questioned whether a perfectly faithful representation of modern "high life" could be made of sufficient interest to inspire actors or to attract audiences, for it is difficult to give pictorial effect to a thing which is chiefly characterised by the absence of colouring, or to render attractive upon the stage a phase of society which, however artificial, is marked by nothing so much as repose and simplicity of bearing, and an absence of expression and demonstrativeness.

In the last century strongly-defined distinctions of costume, pronounced and formal manners, and a more highly pitched, if not less trivial, tone of conversation, combined to furnish some salient features for an effective picture which are entirely wanting in modern drawing-rooms; and it is not surprising that the author who now

¹ Other modern English playwrights sin even more grievously than Mr. Robertson. How often on our stage do we hear a visitor announce himself as "the Honourable Mr. So-and-So"; and Mr. Charles Mathews, whose instincts and experience must revolt against such solecisms, in a well known part, supposed to be that of an English gentleman, is repeatedly required to address a lady as "Mrs. Lieutenant-Colonel So-and-So."

wishes to paint social life in its higher phases should take for his models, not its best, but its most exaggerated types, such as the warm-hearted "fast" young lady, with her free and easy manners and "horsey" slang, or the "swell" who hides a fund of good nature and generous feeling under a foppish manner and a languid drawl. Such elements will never, however, produce a true portrayal of life in its more refined social phases, or rise to the level of legitimate high comedy, with its delicate lights and shades, its wit and humour, and sparkling, yet perfectly natural dialogue.

Whether Burgoyne's composition fulfils all the conditions of high comedy in its strict sense may be questioned, but it is certain that *The Heiress* obtained an immediate and universal popularity at a time when critical taste in dramatic literature was more generally cultivated than at present, and when the production of a new play created nearly as much interest, excitement, and discussion, as a change of ministry or a declaration of war. Yet with all the merit which this comedy undoubtedly possesses, it has failed to maintain a permanent reputation, and would probably be now less well received upon the stage than many inferior works of the same period.

In his preface to *The Heiress* Burgoyne states that he had been indebted for some of its incidents to a novel, and he has been charged with disingenuousness for not having acknowledged what his critics allege to have been its true source, a play by Mrs. Lennox called *The Sisters*. This statement appeared in the *Morning Herald* as recently as on the 25th of September, 1823, upon which, Miss Warburton (in a letter which has been already quoted¹) says:—

¹ See ante, page 6.

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"I happen to *know* that your father took the idea of *The Heiress* from Mrs. Lennox's novel of *Henrietta*, which he reckoned one of the cleverest works of its class that had appeared ; and I think what he says in his preface about acknowledging obligations to novelists was aimed at Sheridan, who could never bear to be told (what was, however, perfectly true) that his Sir Oliver Surface and his two nephews were borrowed from his mother's beautiful novel of *Sidney Biddulph*."

In her attempt to vindicate her kinsman from the imputation of unacknowledged plagiarism, Miss Warburton brings a more serious charge against him ; a very unjust one too, for Burgoyne was too attached and loyal a friend of Sheridan's to make any conduct of his the subject of public reproof. In his preface to *Cœur de Lion* he says of him : "As an author he is above my encomium ; as a friend it is my pride to think that we are exactly upon a level."

Mr. Forster, whose critical judgment is rarely at fault, states, in his *Life of Oliver Goldsmith*, that "the fashionable general" had certainly taken three characters of *The Heiress* from a play by Mrs. Lennox called *The Sisters* ;¹ but as this lady wrote both the novel and the play, and as there is a general resemblance in the plot and the characters of the two works, Burgoyne, in drawing upon the one, naturally laid himself open to the charge of having borrowed from the other.

In the absence of such means as now exist in the daily press for the ventilation of public grievances, political pamphlets in prose and verse were during the

¹ Mr. Forster adds that in making this statement he has no intention of "detracting from the real merit of a very pleasant comedy by an agreeable man," though he will not assign to the play so high a place as contemporary critics claimed for it.

last century resorted to by Whigs and Tories ; and after the accession of the Pitt ministry, Burgoyne became, with Fox, Sheridan, and others of his party, a contributor to the *Criticisms on the Rolliad*, and the *Probationary Odes* ; some specimens of which are to be found among his collected works.¹ Time, however, has blunted whatever point these compositions may ever have possessed, and he was, moreover, too deeply imbued with tolerance and good nature, and too incapable of rancour, to wield the satirist's pen with effect in the bitter personalities of political warfare.

Burgoyne's claim to take rank among his contemporaries in literature must rest upon *The Heiress* ; and whether or not its merits were over estimated, it is impossible to deny some claim to distinction to an author who produced a comedy universally approved and admired in an epoch when Goldsmith and Sheridan were writing for the stage.

¹ Published in two volumes by Scatcherd and Letterman, London, 1808.

CHAPTER X.

DECLINING YEARS.

1780-92.

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1780-1792.

^Δ BURGOYNE'S resignation of his military appointments left him a greater degree of freedom in the pursuit of his parliamentary career than was at that time allowed to any one while holding military office under the Crown; but though he now openly ranged himself on the side of the opposition, he took little part in general politics, and continued as before to interest himself principally in matters connected with India and with the army. On the subject of the American War his opinions had changed; not that he ever brought himself to espouse the cause of the colonists, but he had become convinced that their subjection by force of arms was impossible, since personal experience had taught him how false the reliance had been upon those two elements, to which England, in a great measure, trusted for success: the military weakness and incapacity of the insurgents, and the unshaken loyalty of a large and influential portion of the colonial population. The genius of Washington, with the successes of his army, and the almost complete unanimity of Congress, were beginning

to dispel both illusions in the public mind, and there were already unmistakable symptoms of the change which was soon to pass over the temper of the English people. Still the King, encouraged and inspired by his ministers, continued to hug himself in the belief of a speedy and triumphant termination of the war: a belief which he only grudgingly relinquished when the preliminaries of peace were signed. Lord North, it is true, was wavering, and admitted that he now no longer prosecuted the war with a view to reducing America to obedience or to the re-establishment of imperial rule; in other words, that he was squandering national blood and treasure out of deference to the King's infatuation.¹ Lord George Germain was more consistent, for his determination to carry the struggle to the bitter end was founded upon the conviction, repeatedly expressed, and perhaps honestly entertained, that "the moment the independence of America should be owned, this country was no more."

Early in November, '81, Sir Harry Clinton's aide-de-camp reached London with the intelligence of Lord Cornwallis's army being in imminent danger, and that he (Sir Harry) was hastening to his assistance.² A fortnight later (25th November) the news of the surrender at Yorktown arrived, and the King's speech, prepared for the opening of Parliament on the 27th, and in which a speedy

¹ Even after the surrender of Lord Cornwallis's army was known in England, Lord North was induced to urge the House to a vigorous prosecution of the war, "for the maintenance of the integrity of the empire."

² There had been a serious misunderstanding between the two generals, and Clinton had intimated to Lord Cornwallis that he would use every effort to extricate him from his perilous position, after which he should demand personal satisfaction at his hand. The surrender—which took place on the 19th of October, 1781—a little more than four years after the convention of Saratoga, prevented the duel.

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termination of the war had, as usual, been announced as one of the events of the ensuing session, had to be altered to meet the actual condition of affairs.

Still neither the King nor his chief advisers would bend their stubborn wills to the logic of facts. On the 21st of January, '82, His Majesty writes to Lord North with something more than his customary bad grammar and involved phraseology:—

“On one material point I shall ever coincide with Lord George Germain, and that is, against a separation from America, and that I shall never lose an opportunity of declaring that no consideration shall ever make me in the smallest degree an instrument in a measure that I am confident would annihilate the rank in which the British empire stands among European states, and would render my situation in this country below continuing an object to me.”¹

In February, General Conway moved a resolution against continuing the war, which, such was the change that had now come over public opinion, was lost by only one vote; but on his bringing in a second motion to the same effect, though in a different form, on the 27th, it was carried.²

On the 8th of March, Lord John Cavendish moved a vote of censure on Government for their conduct of the war, which was lost by ten votes, and when a similar resolution was moved a few days later by Sir John Rouse (who had up to that time been a warm supporter of the Ministry), it was defeated by only nine votes.

In spite of the significant temper of the House the

¹ *Donne.*

² General Conway had been the first man in Parliament to propose the repeal of the obnoxious taxes the imposition of which had led to the war.

King remained obstinate. On the 13th March he writes to Lord North —

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"I am resolved not to throw myself into the hands of the opposition at all events, and shall certainly, if things go on as they seem to lead, know what my conscience, as well as honour, dictate as the only way left for me."

Undeterred by Royal threats, however, events continued their course ; the ministry fell ; negotiations for peace commenced ; the British empire did not collapse ; and the King of England did not abdicate.¹ Lord North retired with the wardenship of the Cinque Ports, a pension, and the Garter ;² and Lord George Germain had already beaten a dignified retreat and was enjoying the reward of his wise and virtuous services in the House of Lords, to which he had been translated under the title of Viscount Sackville.³

¹ But he lamented bitterly, and writes to Lord North on the 27th of March :—"At last the fatal day has come which the misfortunes of the times, and the sudden change of sentiments in the House of Commons, has drove me to of changing the Ministry." Ungrateful Commons, after all the money he had spent in purchasing their support ! When in the following April the new Ministry contemplated putting a stop to the distribution of public money for the corruption of voters, the poor King exclaims in the bitterness of his virtuous indignation : "I foretold the measures that would be expected, but Lord North, as well as the rest who advised my treating with the opposition, would not credit my assertions."—DONNE'S *North Correspondence*.

² In *The Public Advertiser* the announcement of the honour conferred by the King upon his favourite Minister was accompanied by this couplet :

"What stigmas ! Stars and ribbons, what a blot
When North a Garter has and Chatham not !"

Horace Walpole relates that on the Duchess of Gloucester informing M. de Castrée, the Commander of Metz, that the King had made his Prime Minister a Knight of the Garter, the Frenchman asked : "Pourquoi l'a-t-il lui ? Est-ce pour avoir perdu l'Amérique ?"—*Letters to Lady Ossory*.

³ On 18th February, '82, the Marquis of Carmarthen moved a resolution to the effect that the elevation of a cashiered officer to the peerage was derogatory to the dignity of their House. The motion was properly enough rejected by a large majority, since it was hardly consistent to

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England has mainly to thank these two men for the loss of thirteen colonies and two armies, and for an addition of 100 millions to the National Debt.¹

A few weeks after the formation of the Rockingham administration, which brought most of Burgoyne's political friends into office, he was offered the appointment of Commander of the Forces in Ireland, a post of dignity and considerable emolument, and, at the time, of exceptional importance, owing to the disaffected state of the country and the threat of foreign intervention in support of Irish claims. He was at the same time appointed a member of the Privy Council. The new Government was composed of powerful elements, and, in spite of its being viewed with suspicion by the Court, gave promise of stability. Great confidence existed in Lord Rockingham who was possessed of peculiar qualifications for the leadership of the Whig party at this juncture, and his sudden death in the following July created consternation in the ministerial ranks :—

FROM THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"The worst of news has arrived. Lord Rockingham is no more. We lost him on Monday, after the most excruciating sufferings. Do let me see you to-morrow morning, but don't call here to-night, for I wish to

suggest that a man who had for many years held the position of a principal Cabinet Minister and a Privy Counsellor, should, from his earlier antecedents, be considered unworthy of a seat in the House of Peers.

¹ The National Debt had risen from 136 millions in 1774. to 238 millions in 1785.

conceal the afflicting stroke from the Duchess until tomorrow. Farewell.

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"Ever yours,
"PORTLAND.

"Don't send me an answer to-night."

"THURSDAY NIGHT, *July 4th*, 1782."

Lord Shelburne's accession to office in July was soon succeeded by a general liberal defection led by Fox, and the following letters throw light upon the political state of affairs under this shortlived administration, which, however, may claim the credit of having brought to a conclusion the most unjust, disastrous, and ruinous war that has ever been waged by England.¹

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"Fitzpatrick having repeatedly promised to write to you within a week after the opening of the session, I mean to confine myself to the letter to Sir Guy Carleton which occasioned so much speculation, and to the subject of yours of the 28th November, which was delivered to me on Thursday last. Yet I cannot help taking notice of the very extraordinary appearance of the House of Commons on that day, on which there is but one opinion, that the ministerial party was the weakest of the three who composed it, and according to Charles² and George Byng, our friends were the most

¹ Ratifications of Peace were exchanged in Paris on 30th November, 1782, as far as related to America. Peace with France and Spain was not formally concluded until the following January.

² Fox and Sheridan were generally spoken of by their friends and colleagues under the familiar names of Charles and Richard.

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numerous, though the day was avowedly with Lord North, who seemed to feel the dignity and importance of his own situation much more than he ever did in administration. Nor can I pass over the difference of opinion in ministers respecting the independence of America; those in the House of Commons declaring that the independence was so totally conceded that whenever a treaty should be concluded with France, it would be acknowledged, of course, in consequence of the provisional articles, which they asserted were signed; whereas Lord Shelburne and the Duke of Richmond avoided giving any direct answer to the question when put to them in our House, but particularly Lord S. gave us pretty plainly to understand that independence would be as liable to discussion as ever, unless the negotiation now depending with France should be concluded in time to prevent the opening of another campaign. With respect to the letter, its originality is unquestionable, and Charles's satisfaction was very complete on the first perusal of it, but, on meeting with difficulties and very material obstructions to the proceedings which appeared requisite to be taken in consequence of it, and in which he could not doubt, after such a measure, of the concurrence of his colleagues in office; after having repeatedly found his just expectations baffled, and the point for which he had not only been contending, but which he thought, with reason, that he had carried, again controverted and undecided, he, as honourably as wisely, determined to resign his employment; and I really think it is not less unfortunate for the public than for his own character that he cannot be at liberty to state every circumstance which induced him to take that upright and manly decision. Had Providence spared Lord Rockingham, it is my belief that peace would have

been by this time concluded, or that preliminaries at least would have been signed, whereas I cannot divest myself yet of very strong doubts of the sincerity of the minister's, and his principals', disposition to peace. I am *almost certain* that it is in no degree of forwardness, and have strong suspicions of the ministry having, either designedly or ignorantly, been crossed by the French court. Charles is much more sanguine in respect to peace than I am, and much more inclined to believe the ministers; but as there is no doubt that the whole negotiation passes *primarily* through Lord S., and solely through his *medium*, to the other ministers; and, as the disinclination of the Closet to the independence of America has not suffered any change, I must own to a great repugnance in my mind to give credit to the reports, or to indulge myself in the expectation of peace. I heartily wish that I may be mistaken, but greatly fear that we shall *at least* be put to the expense of another campaign. It would make me extremely happy to find you disposed to do yourself the justice which your character has justly acquired from the public as well as from those friends you mention in your letter to me. Could I have seen your situation in the same light as that of many who have, and of more who ought to have, resigned, I should not have hesitated to encourage the inclination you so early and so anxiously expressed, for I feel no difficulty in preferring honour to interest, and in such a case passing over every consideration of circumstances—nay, even of distress. You may be assured, therefore, that, in respect to yourself, had there appeared a doubt, or even the possibility of a doubt, arising in any other person of the propriety of your continuing in the employment you now hold, I would have recommended you to have

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quitted it ; but as I look upon it to be purely military I could see no objection to your retaining it, and in carrying on the most violent opposition to the Court at the same time in a political line. I consequently cannot conceive any reason for your relinquishing your post. Let me also beg you to do your friends the justice to be persuaded that if your presence in the House should essentially contribute to the advancement of that cause for which you express such favourable sentiments, they would apprise you of it, and I give you my word that the esteem in which I hold your friendship is such that it will not suffer me to let you be misinformed of the propriety of your attendance whenever there may be a possibility of its really contributing to the advantage of the public, or that the want of it can, by even implication, be supposed to affect your honour. O'Beirne has acquainted me with the purport of a visit you received from General Cunningham, upon which I can give no other opinion than that the recollection of his not being an Irishman inclines me to say 'Timeo Danaos,' &c. I wish you joy of the Fencibles, though that great statesman, Lord Aldborough, has written Richard word that he (Lord A.) is bound to impeach the adviser of the measure. I hope the wisdom of Government or the goodness of Providence has prevented or removed the apprehension of famine, and that one or both those causes will operate in clearing the dissatisfaction which a late event in the King's Bench is likely to produce. I am half afraid that on your side the water reason must not expect attention unless it be accompanied by power.

"Farewell, my dear Sir, and believe me,

"Most sincerely yours,

"PORTLAND."

"I send this by Lord Erne, who will deliver it *safely*, and therefore I have ventured to speak without reserve. I have told Lees and Tommy Townshend that I had *now* no intention of objecting to Arnold's re-establishment, and I understand that he is to be restored ; so that notwithstanding all the affidavits, I shall not from henceforth trouble the post with anything which I should be desirous of conveying only to your private ear."¹

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FROM THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I have not hitherto answered your letter, but I have not been negligent concerning the object of it. I have more than once pressed it strongly upon those who could speak with more weight upon what you wish to be informed of than I possibly could do, and I understand that Fitzpatrick had at last given you the Duke of Portland's and Mr. Fox's opinions, with which (if that were of any importance to you) mine coincided perfectly. I had no kind of delicacy with regard to you. Your conduct has been so clear, and your mind so manly on this trying point, that I should think anything scrupulous and tender on my part an affront to such determined principle. But my ideas are perfectly clear in the line you are to take. We do not want you. No, not at all. When we do, you may be assured that we shall make no more hesitation in calling you out than in bringing others in ; so rest satisfied in the discretion of your friends, and in their care of your honour, of which they are as tender as you can be, or else they would not be worthy to be the friends of a man like you.

¹ See foot note, page 371.

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"The extraordinary scene of last Thursday has been undoubtedly explained to you. Perhaps, with the few forces we could collect, it would have been as well not to try the question at all ; but, having once proposed it, I was as clear as I ever was of anything in my life that it was proper to have a division. If it were in my Lord North's power to command our conduct whenever he thought proper to come down, and that we could not move but at his pleasure, we could never consider ourselves as an independent party, and we should have all the disadvantage of subservience without the return of support. In the confused chaos in which the House lay it was necessary to separate the elements before we could hope to create anything in shape and order, and it was better for us to appear a small power than no distinct power at all. Now, the *men* are known, the *principles* are known, and those who choose to join the body, or to ally with it, have a distinct object before them. Nothing could be so disgraceful to the gentlemen who act as ministers as the victory obtained for them by Lord North. They looked, I assure you, more like captives led before the conqueror than parties in the triumph. They were parts, indeed, of the procession, but not in the solemnity. I think though the situation of Lord North was certainly grander, it was not more honourable than theirs. If you wish to have a complete abstract of the grounds of his argument, enclosed as it was in every possible covering of irony, contempt, detestation, and scorn towards those whom he rather protected than supported, it was this :—'There are manifestly two contradictory languages amongst you. Neither of those who speak them are deserving of the smallest degree of credit. You in the House of Commons have said what is not only false, but what cannot possibly be true. The

minister in the House of Lords, though a Jesuit, a prevaricator, a notorious liar, yet telling a story more conformable to the state of things and more consistent in itself, he is more to be credited than you. On this ground, therefore, I refuse the article called for, because it is not conclusive as you represent it, but merely dependent on a treaty now pending conformably to his account.'

"By showing that neither of the parties ought to be trusted, he came to a practical conclusion that implied a confidence in both. I like a ludicrous *speech* well enough, but I do not like a ludicrous *vote*. The treasury bench received this kind of assistance with tame acquiescence. Pitt expressed a modest wish that the terms on which it was given were of another sort, but there was no resentment,—no indignation. I think some of them even shared joy in hopes of imposing their disgraceful safety upon the publick as a sort of victory. But nobody is imposed upon, though the newspapers, as usual, did not at all enter into the true spirit of the debate, nor understood one word of Lord North's speech. Fox was as distinguished that day for fairness as much as he is every day for ability. You will enquire into the state of our forces? Alas! Our Adjutant-General is much humbled by our muster. The state of the House on that day was: for the ministry, 70 or thereabouts; Lord North gives to himself 150, but I am convinced he misreckons. He must certainly compute in his numbers the whimsicals of our party. Where were *our* numbers? On paper we are the strongest of all, but we never can appear with true numbers. Our people act from principle, and, of course, very irregularly, and many of them very feebly. Some do not come to town at all; some will not appear

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early; and as the principle is formed with a firmer or weaker tone of understanding, their conduct is more or less systematical. However, among the disadvantages of our party which arise from their general integrity, and they are very, very many, we have this one advantage, equal indeed to almost all the others, that very few of the corps are disposed to betray us for their interest. On the contrary, Lord North's (if it may be called *his*) party is within a trifle as numerous as ours upon paper, but their weakness is that not one, literally not one, is attached either personally to him or to any principle whatsoever. The only bond of union they have is their hope of destroying this ministry first, and the Establishment Bill next; and so securing to themselves the return of the old scheme of emolument. The Bill is their grand enemy; but it is the true cause of the weakness of the present people, and of their strength, for if the old places and contracts had existed, the ministry had broken them to pieces long ago. At present, if Lord North arranges himself and a few friends, he loses the rest for ever, and they will infallibly come to us from mere resentment. So that it does not appear to me that any compromise can take place between the body, which for want of another name I call Lord North's, and the Earl of Shelburne. Nor indeed do I see, on pretty much the same grounds, how any coalition can take place between them and us. I believe we must all continue to fight this battle-royal in the present confusion for some time longer. We shall, I am persuaded, grow into a greater degree of internal discipline, but in that respect we shall never equal Lord North's people, who have been in regular training to follow boldly and implicitly any leader in any cause. They think, too, that the Court looks with more favor

on them than on us, or perhaps than on the present ministry. They are not, I think, mistaken. In fact, this ministry have nothing for it but a dissolution of Parliament, whilst the boroughs in which the influence of the Crown is nearly destroyed by the taking away the revenue votes, have no other substituted in its place, and are therefore more open to a reception of the former power in another shape. I believe they will do it, but whether immediately or not I cannot tell. The part of the Establishment Act which takes away their power of private application of the Civil List money does not take effect till January next, and the intermediate time is likely to be the most favorable to them for the choice of a Parliament.

"I need not tell you that what the newspapers make me say about Lord Beauchamp, as if I gave any countenance to him or his measure, cannot be true. I said the direct contrary of what they represent. But this is almost regularly the case. God bless you in this good season and in all seasons. My brother is gone to Bath, but Mrs. Burke and my son are much your friends and humble servants, and I am ever, with the most faithful regard and attachment,

"Yours,

"EDMUND BURKE.

December 24th, 1782.

"I am just going out of town. I leave this to K. I have not time to read it over, and there may be mistakes. I ought to have excepted out of the profligates of Lord North's corps five or six Tories who act on principle, such as it is."

It will be seen from the foregoing letter that although

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some of Burgoyne's friends continued in office, the Cabinet was divided against itself, and that the advances which Lord Shelburne was making to Lord North had created suspicions which the event but too well justified. Of Mr. Townshend's motives for refusing him leave of absence to attend his parliamentary duties Burgoyne entertained a strong mistrust, and he was evidently right in attributing this refusal to other grounds than those of military exigency, for the following letter intimates pretty plainly that although the requirements of the public service would not preclude the General from visiting Bath, the extension of his journey to Westminster was not considered desirable by His Majesty's advisers.

THE RIGHT HON. THOMAS TOWNSHEND TO GENERAL
BURGOYNE.

" WHITEHALL, *January 6th*, 1783.

" DEAR SIR,

" Mr. Grenville has communicated to me the contents of your letter of the 29th December.

" You really do me no more than justice in supposing that I shall always have the greatest pleasure in forwarding any wish of yours. In the present instance, I must say to you very sincerely that your remaining in Ireland till the new staff is arranged¹ is a thing very much desired here. You know well that the frequent

¹ Burgoyne had been instructed to furnish a report upon this subject, with especial reference to certain economical considerations, which he sent in on the 30th of December, '82. In this document he opposes the then existing practice of employing Lieutenant-Generals in the position, and upon the pay, of Major-Generals; as also the proposal to exclude General officers in command of regiments from staff appointments. He further suggests that Major-Generals should be employed in regular rotation upon the staff for two years, with a view to testing their fitness for superior positions in the army.

interference of the military to support the civil power requires the employment of a person of more attention and temper than may be found upon taking the chance of the rolster. I trust that you are not less convinced of my earnest wish to promote whatever may be advantageous or agreeable to you.

“Under all these circumstances my letter to the Lord Lieutenant was written in answer to one which inclosed your desire to come to England. It was in the negative, your health being by no means stated as the principal cause of your wishing to return. But if that is the real cause, I will again state the matter to the King, and I do not much doubt but that I shall receive his orders to transmit to you his compliance with your request; though it is certain that your absence from Ireland would have been very much opposed, if it could have been avoided, at present.

“Health, to be sure, is a consideration which must make itself attended to, but if I should obtain His Majesty’s permission for you to come to Bath, I take it for granted that your constant desire to promote the King’s service will incline you to make no longer stay *there* than is necessary for your re-establishment. You will, I am sure, excuse the manner in which I press you upon this subject, but it is really from a strong opinion that your presence in Dublin should be dispensed with for as short a time as possible.

“Assure yourself, my dear sir, that there is not a man in England more sensible of your merit to the public than myself, or more desirous to testify on all occasions his sincere respect and esteem for you. Allow me to subscribe myself with great truth,

“Yours, &c.

“T. TOWNSHEND.”

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Believng, however, that his continued absence from his place in Parliament was incompatible with his duty to his friends, Burgoyne again urged upon them the propriety of the step he had before contemplated, of relinquishing his command, and accordingly submitted for the consideration of the Duke of Portland and of Lord Derby the draft of a letter of resignation addressed to the Secretary at War. From this sacrifice he was, however, once more dissuaded.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

LONDON, TUESDAY MORNING,
January 9th, 1783.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"I had the pleasure of receiving yesterday your friendly letter of the 1st, together with the copies and draft of your intended letter to Mr. Townshend, and was extremely glad to find by Fox that Lord Derby and he concurred in opinion with me that there does not exist a shadow of a reason for your gratifying the spleen of those who directed Townshend's pen. It would be impossible for me, after the assurances and sentiments which my recollection leads me to believe I offered you in mine of the 8th December, to hesitate in advising you to take any step, however inconvenient or disagreeable, that appeared to me to be in any degree due to your publick or private character, but this moment presents no such occasion, nor can the business of Parliament or the state of our force be sufficiently ascertained at present to warrant so decisive and important a measure; for I cannot but suppose that the publick will, as in justice to you I think they ought to, consider your resignation as the act of the party; that such a step indicates

determined opposition and hostility, and that no measures are to be kept with any part of the present administration. Considering the temper of the House of Commons in particular, and that unaccountable and wonderful power of candor by which they are, or at least very lately have been, fascinated, much delicacy is required in the management of such a body, and the partiality which they entertain for some of the members of the administration who sit amongst them, render more caution necessary than you be aware of at the distance you are now placed, or than even you could conceive upon the spot, consistently with the contempt and execration with which you will very unjustly understand the character of Lord S. to be universally and unexceptionally treated. It therefore very much behoves us not to run counter to the prevailing humour of the House, and give those advantages to the enemy which, though a weakness of understanding can only avail itself of, we are not the more secure of their profiting by. As then your honour is not affected by the civil, though I agree with you in thinking it insidious, manner in which the compliance with your request is suspended, I cannot think you warranted, or even called upon, to make the application of which you have transmitted me the draft, and which, I must say, could not be expressed in terms more suitable to the purpose, more honourable to yourself, or more satisfactory to your friends. If I could see that your acquiescence in this ministerial disposition would be productive of a whisper of suspicion on your character, nay, even if I were not perfectly convinced that a contrary conduct would be likely to injure your friends and prejudice you in the public opinion, I would not freely recommend to you, I ought to say, concur with you in

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wishing that the letter to Townshend might be sent in time for you to be here by the 21st; but the friendship I feel for you, upon public more than private grounds in this instance, forbids my consenting to your making a sacrifice which I cannot feel to be due to either your regard for the public or your own honour, and which neither the virtue or good sense of this country can suffer me to hope can be offered with any probability of its meeting with the return to which it is entitled, and even without exposing you to the censure of the moderate and (commonly called) well-disposed part of the community.

“As Lord Derby proposed sending a special messenger with his answer, I have taken the advantage of giving you my sentiments, though hastily, most honestly. You have a right to them in that shape, and whenever I give them to you in any other, I desire to be punished with the loss of your friendship.

“We must not then meet as yet, but in all places and situations be assured that I shall be, with most perfect sincerity,

“Constantly yours,

“PORTLAND.”

A fencing match ensued, in which the General certainly got the better of the minister. In a private letter of the 27th of January, Mr. Townshend thus conveys the King's sanction for Burgoyne's return to England :—

“As you express to me in strong terms that the present state of your health required the use of Bath waters, he (the King) is very unwilling to deprive you of that benefit, trusting, from your zeal for his service, that you will not stay there longer than is necessary for your recovery. I am persuaded it is unnecessary for me to

assure you that I have stated the real cause of the King's reluctance to part with you from Dublin ; but though my letter is a thoroughly sincere and confidential one, I am always afraid that the date of Whitehall implies the character of an official man rather than that of an acquaintance and very sincere friend."

Burgoyne was determined not to allow the real question at issue to be evaded, while at the same time he would not let himself be outdone in professions of politeness :—

"I very frankly confess," he says in reply to Townshend, "that, according to your suggestion, when I see 'Whitehall' on the top a letter I am apt to read it with the caution due to office ; and assure you with equal sincerity that when I see your name at the bottom, no ideas can have place my mind that are repugnant to the fullest belief in your honour and generosity as a minister, and in your regard as a friend.

"When, therefore, I observed the ground upon which my conditional leave was granted, namely, that I had 'expressed to you in strong terms' that the present state of my health required the use of Bath waters (which, I acknowledge, from other pens I should have construed ministerially) coming from yours, I was at no loss to reconcile the expression with the real tenor of my first letter, wherein I stated my health as a secondary and collateral object, and as I conceive by your subsequent letter you understood me in the same sense. The solution of this seeming contradiction is very flattering to myself. I suppose you to have acted upon a dictate of sensibility and kindness from having heard from others that my case was more serious than I had represented it, and either directly to have moved the King with a plea which could not but have

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prevalence in the Royal mind, or at least for the sake of obviating other objections to have adopted it, as being in his opinion the only proper plea for my application to rest upon.

"In whatever way it was done, my warmest feelings follow the attention you have shown me, and if I do not leave the matter here (as you will perceive by the letter accompanying that I do not), impute it to a temper that often pursues the private suggestions of duty with more warmth than discretion. I am at a time of life and in habits of self-restraint, that make disappointments very supportable, while suspicion, however undeserved, of seeking favour by a concealment of principles, would be uneasy to me. I shall not, perhaps, pay court by my sincerity, but I would not offend. Believe it, in the most unreserved confidence, I would not be where I am were I not sensible of the compatibility of the most active zeal in His Majesty's military service and the most conscientious adherence to my principles in Parliament.

"In whatever our opinions may differ (I do not say that they will do so), I know we shall each think each other's honestly formed. Confident in that mutual justice, I have only to add my reliance on your friendship to guard me against misrepresentation."

The Government formed by the Duke of Portland on Lord Shelburne's resignation in April, '83, and which comprised such antagonistic elements as Lord North and Fox, did not afford promise of greater stability than the two previous administrations, and such of Burgoyne's friends as joined the Coalition Ministry were no sooner in their seats than they thought it prudent to obtain for him some provision independent

of political changes, and thus to compensate for the sacrifices he had made by resigning his military appointments in 1779. So precarious, indeed, did Charles Fox consider his tenure of office that he appears to have urged upon his colleagues the very unusual step of nominating Burgoyne to the command of a regiment before it was actually vacant.

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FROM THE RIGHT HON. CHARLES FOX TO GENERAL
BURGOYNE.

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I have received your letter of the 9th, and have hardly time to say a word but that Lord T. (Townshend) told you true in saying he had recommended you for the *supposed* vacant regiment. The King has named you, and Lord North will notify it to you, though I know that General Severn is still alive. However, I thought it best that all this should be so, because in case of our being out of power, the circumstance of your being actually named will give you an irresistible claim afterwards. I have seen your letter to Derby; your suspicions of the K.'s intending to resist your appointment are ill-founded.

"Yours affectionately,

"C. J. Fox.

"P.S.—Understanding that your house is unoccupied, and wanting one for the moment, I mean to go into it until I can get one to my own mind. If you come over (as I hope you will) you may live in mine."

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1780-1792.

FROM GENERAL BURGOYNE TO LORD NORTH.

ROYAL HOSPITAL, KILMAINHAM,
24th April, 1783.

"MY LORD,

"The Lord Lieutenant has communicated to me your Lordship's letter of 15th inst., notifying that the King had been graciously pleased to bestow upon me the Eighth Regiment of Dragoons, then supposed to be vacant.

"Information being received that Lieutenant-General Severn, Colonel of that regiment, is still alive, my succession cannot take effect; but the most valuable part of the notification remains to me, viz.: the honour of being in His Majesty's consideration, for which I feel the deepest sense of gratitude, and I request your Lordship to represent to His Majesty my opinion of it, together with every other sentiment of duty and of zeal, and my hope to deserve the continuance of his favour.

"I have, &c.

"JOHN BURGOYNE."

It soon became evident that the Coalition Ministry was entirely devoid of cohesive elements; though when Parliament met towards the end of the year, its immediate dissolution was not apprehended. Fox, writing on the 31st of October, urges Burgoyne to come to town: "I really think it material that we should be fully attended at the opening of the session," but the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was not disposed to dispense with the presence of his Commander-in-Chief.

FROM LORD NORTHINGTON TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

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1780-1792.*Half-past 5 o'Clock, Thursday.*

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,

“ As you promise me the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow, I shall have an opportunity of conversing fully on the subject of Fox's letter. I have heard from him upon the subject of the volunteers. The critical period with regard to them seems to be approaching every instant. The fears of mankind increase upon the late resolution of the meeting of the Catholics in the city. Any steps that Government now takes will meet with a more decided support than if it had stirred at an earlier period. I apprehend it must now soon interfere. If in consequence of that interference a struggle should ensue (only to preserve the quiet of the city), it will afford much comfort to the people at large, and a high consolation to me, to have your presence and advice. I think, therefore, that in the present unsettled state of circumstances in this country, you can only make a conditional engagement with Fox to attend him at the time he proposes. I hope everything may be, but much doubt it, settled so quietly as to leave your departure without a question.

“ I remain, MY DEAR GENERAL,

“ Very truly and sincerely yours,
“ NORTHINGTON.”

To this period also belong these letters :—

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FROM GENERAL ELLIOTT¹ TO GENERAL BURGOWNE.

GIBRALTAR, 1st September, 1783.

"DEAR GENERAL,

"Lieutenant Haddon brought me a very kind token of your remembrance in your letter, which he delivered on his arrival two days ago. I am not only extremely happy to hear from you, but particularly so on the present occasion, making me acquainted with an officer whose services by far exceed such as could be expected from his age. I like young men who must have learnt that powder and pomatum not a *sine quâ non*.

"It is happy for the State that you have the command in Ireland; your military constitution must be original, and, I should apprehend, so complicated that none but the men endowed with great ability, perseverance, and address, could assimilate such heterogenous bodies *pour en tirer parti*. I should esteem myself especially fortunate if any command of yours could put my ready obedience to the trial, and wishing you all happiness,

"I have the honour, &c.

"G. A. ELLIOTT."

The Coalition Ministry fell to pieces in December, when William Pitt, abandoning the neutral attitude he had hitherto maintained—standing aloof alike from

¹ General Elliott had at this time gained enduring fame by his defence of Gibraltar against the French and Spaniards, whose siege (commenced in July, 1779), had through his exertions been finally raised in February, 1783. He had studied under Vauban, and commenced his military career in the corps of Royal Engineers in which he served for fifteen years before joining the cavalry. His success in preserving our great fortress against overwhelming forces, was probably in a great measure owing to this early training.

Whig and Tory—formed the cabinet of which, through all its modifications, he remained the chief for nearly twenty years.

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LORD NORTHINGTON TO GENERAL BURGOYNE,

"In answer to your kind letter I have only time to say that, owing to winds, I did not receive the notification of Lord T.'s¹ appointment until this morning. I have sent my resignation to his Lordship. Their manner being full of slight, mine has answered it. I shall write more particulars by a messenger to-morrow to yourself, Fox, and others.

"Yours ever most truly,

"NORTHINGTON."

"December 27th, 1783."

Even while some of his friends were in office, Burgoyne had found it difficult to reconcile his tenure of a military command with the requirements of parliamentary duty ; now that he was once more fairly thrown into the opposition, the two situations became incompatible. There were, besides, as he could not fail to recognize, such intimate political relations between the Lord Lieutenant and the Commander-in-Chief that his retention of office under a minister whose policy he might feel obliged to oppose in Parliament became next to impossible. He had no choice, therefore, between resigning his place or his seat in Parliament, and he did not for a moment hesitate as to which course he should adopt.

¹ Lord Temple, who had joined Pitt's Cabinet, but held office only for a few days.

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FROM GENERAL BURGOYNE TO LORD SIDNEY.¹

"MY LORD,

"I take the first opportunity after receiving information of Lord Northington's resignation of the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland to address myself to your Lordship to lay before His Majesty my humble request for his Royal permission to resign the command of His Majesty's forces in that kingdom.

"The present position of affairs there and the prospect of their growing more critical every day, make the trust of Commander-in-Chief of more than usual importance, and require the most confidential connection with His Majesty's ministers on both sides the water, to enable him to fulfil his duties with advantage to the King's service, and with security to his own honour.

"A cordiality of this nature I have no right, I have no pretensions, to ask from His Majesty's present servants, how much soever I may personally respect them, after the part I have already taken in opposing the measures upon which they came into power, and the necessity I feel myself under of adhering to that opposition.

"But were this difficulty removed, and, upon a liberality of sentiment which I am far from supposing His Majesty's servants to want, were a faithful discharge of military duties considered and supposed by them compatible with a decided difference of political opinion, I still should not change my intentions; I still should feel myself called upon for an option of sacrifice between the services I owe the Crown as a soldier and that I owe to the Crown and Country as a member of Parliament, in

¹ Mr. Thomas Townshend, who had been raised to the peerage under this title and had succeeded Lord Temple.

a session distinguished above every other of this age by the importance of its discussions and the practicable consequences of its decisions.

“A much longer absence from my command might appear a neglect of the King’s service. It can suffer no injury by a change of commander; while, upon the other hand, an absentee from the House of Commons upon no better excuse than the preservation of personal emoluments would feel doubtful, at least, whether he was not betraying a solemn trust. In the present division and contention of sentiment in that assembly, a single vote may become material to the publick in point of numbers, or should it not, it may be material to himself in point of honour.

“At my age, and with a temper that finds no terror in the loss of income, there may be little merit, but there will be solid comfort, in laying up for the close of life this reflection, that at a juncture which I thought a crisis in the fate of my country I took a decided part, and voluntarily, without a complaint of hardship or anger against any man or power, relinquished a splendid, a profitable, and in many respects a pleasing professional station, to pursue my parliamentary duty in connection with those men, and in support of those principles, by which alone I believed my country would be redeemed.

“Upon these motives, my Lord, I found my present application. I place a great reliance in your Lordship, when representing the substance of them to His Majesty, to add in my name the most fervent expressions of respect and duty as a soldier and a subject

“His Majesty, in placing me in my late high and important trust, restored me conspicuously to my profession, gratified my honour, and opened to my hopes and to my zeal the prospect of useful services. I received

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those distinguished marks of the Royal grace with the deepest gratitude, and in laying my commission at His Majesty's feet I retain the same impressions without the diminution of a thought.

"I have, &c.

"J. BURGOYNE."

"BATH, 4th Jannary, 1784."

The florid style in which Burgoyne clothes so practical a communication as an official letter of resignation may provoke a smile, but the sacrifice of interest to duty was not the less real because of an exaggerated mode of expression, and the correspondence which follows shows but too plainly how much it had cost Burgoyne to give up position and income at this time. A few weeks after his resignation he writes thus to his tried and faithful friend Mr. Day:¹—

"MY DEAR SIR,

"A sense of the obligation I am under to you² might dissuade me in one point of view from an application to increase it; in another, I consider a friendship so generous and so well proved as yours to be the properest to have recourse to in a matter of some delicacy.

"It is entirely unnecessary to enter into any reasoning upon the part I have taken in publick and political life

¹ Their friendship was of old date, for the name of Nathaniel Day appears in the army list of 1763, among the Cornets of the 16th Light Dragoons. Mr. Day afterwards joined the Commissariat Service, and was Commissary General in Canada during the greater part of the American War.

² This previous obligation is referred to by Burgoyne in his will, where he bequeaths £2,000 to Mr. Day, "in remembrance of his generous present when I resigned my Commission in 1779."

for some years past. You will have too good an opinion of my understanding not to believe I plainly discerned where my interest lay, and had knowledge enough of courts and parties to have prosecuted it to effect all the time I have been acting against it. I have steadily sacrificed fortune to principle. The trial has been severe but I cannot repent it. I am ready to acknowledge that strict consistency of character required a conformity of expenditure to this voluntary reduction of income. Let a little allowance be granted me for the habits of splendid situation and an ample purse, and the difficulty of conquering at once what I had been so often and so long used to. A very little allowance on that head and I *have* maintained the doctrine of retrenchment with the resolution that became me.

“I shall have, nevertheless, a call for £500 on the 13th of this month. I seek not to borrow it, even from a friend, without positive security, but this is of a nature that, however irreproachable to borrower or lender, I would not willingly offer to a stranger. I would take the money for six months certain, or optionally for twelve, and I propose, besides the common security of a bond, to lodge in your hands my diamond, the gift of the King of Portugal, valued upon occasions when large jewels are in demand at about £1000, but certainly marketable at any time for much more than the sum proposed,—more valuable infinitely to me as a pledge of honour to be transmitted to those who would preserve my memory, and therefore sure to be redeemed, and not to be trusted in any hands where the deposit would not be sanctioned by integrity and confidence.”

The copy of this letter is endorsed in the handwriting of his son, the Field-Marshal, “From General

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B. to Mr. Day, his *grateful* friend, of whom he had few ;" and the reply deserves to be recorded :—

"MY DEAR SIR,

"The continuance of your good health gives me infinite pleasure, and being able to accommodate you with the sum you mention makes me truly happy ; but it must be accepted *without* that which you have mentioned. I shall do myself the honour of waiting upon you on Saturday next, and remain, with the greatest gratitude,

"Yours, &c. &c.

"NATHANIEL DAY."

"*Stephen Street, Wednesday.*"

In Parliament Burgoyne continued to show his interest in Indian affairs. The indulgence extended to Lord Clive had entirely failed to operate as a warning to English officials in the East, whose oppressive proceedings had been repeatedly brought under the notice of Parliament. In December, '83, Mr. Fox brought in his India Bill, when Burgoyne justified the sweeping charges of corruption and barbarity which Burke had brought against the agents of the company :—

"It had been stated that his right honourable friend had given a deep colouring to the enormities perpetrated, but all the powers of language which he possessed and the amazing copiousness of imagery which distinguished him above every other man, were unable to heighten, or even to come up to, the reality ;" and here he felicitously quoted and applied the passage in the *Sixth Æneid* which describes the descent of Æneas into Tartarus, beginning with :—

"Vendidit hic auro patriam, dominumque potentem
Imposuit."

The King appears to have resented Burgoyne's resignation, looking upon it, as he was probably justified in doing, as a determination on his part to throw in his lot more emphatically with the party in opposition to the Royal councils; although Burgoyne, as will have been gathered from his correspondence, continued to endeavour by all means to reconcile his political conduct with the most scrupulous respect to the person of the sovereign. In a letter written to Lord Sidney from Bath on the 29th of October, '84, he says :—

“Since I had the honour of writing, I had reflected that a misconstruction may be put, even by my friends, upon my not appearing at court on this occasion. Permit me, in the belief that I may write confidentially without giving you umbrage, to explain very shortly my sentiments upon that subject. Conscious of the principles upon which my political conduct was founded, and wishing to mark that it did not interfere with the profoundest respect and attachment to His Majesty's person, I went to the *levée* after my resignation. I had the mortification to perceive a different countenance from that which I had used to be honoured with. Let it be imputed not to unjustifiable pride or improper spirit if I, from that time, forbore from paying my duty in person, but to the motive that it was the part of due respect not to intrude myself upon the Royal displeasure.”

In 1785 the King appointed a “Board of Land and Sea Officers” to investigate and report upon the proper system of defence against foreign invasion, and on the expedience and efficacy of the proposed plans for better securing His Majesty's dockyards at Portsmouth and Plymouth. The Duke of Richmond, Master-General of the ordnance, was President of the Board, and General Burgoyne one of its twenty-three members.

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In the instructions which are supposed to have been drawn up by the Duke of Richmond, certain data were assumed, and these are interesting as showing the then prevailing views with respect to the danger of invasion. The Board, in its deliberations, accordingly started with the propositions that :—

- 1st.—The enemy might be very superior to us at sea.
- 2nd.—That the protection of our foreign possessions might require the absence from our own shores of the whole fleet.
- 3rd.—That a disaster at sea might render our whole fleet unable to act for two or three months.
- 4th.—That the fleet on our own shores might be diverted to one point while a descent was made upon another.

From these data, the corollaries deduced were :—

- 1st.—That it was necessary to provide for the protection of the dockyards by fortification, as the absence of the fleet might be assumed.
- 2nd.—That the fact of such absence might fairly be assumed, since, during the last war, the whole fleet was actually absent for sixty-eight days in 1781, and sixty-four days in 1782.
- 3rd.—That in the event of the enemy having the command of the sea for three months, he could bring over in two embarkations an army of 30,000 men, with proportionate artillery.
- 4th and 5th.—That 22,000 would be available for the defence of Portsmouth and Plymouth in the event of an attack upon either, and that it would require two months for the collection of such a force

from other parts of the country to defeat such an attempt.

The Board displayed an extraordinary divergence of opinion which, however, was but to be expected, since its members were at liberty to dispute the data which formed the groundwork of their deliberations.¹ Lord Cornwallis, who was a member of the Commission, thus describes their action:—

“Suppose the utmost of human misery and your supposition must fall greatly short of our condition. God only knows when our misfortunes will end.

“The Board sat from six this morning till four in the afternoon, and again from seven p.m. till ten p.m.; the intermediate time being filled by a most disagreeable dinner of three hours.”

Again, on the following Sunday, he writes:—

“I passed ten and a half hours at the Board both Friday and Saturday; to-day is a holiday. Our proceedings are the most extraordinary and tiresome you can conceive. The King's instructions drawn up, of course, by the Duke, contain about a thousand questions, nineteen out of twenty of which are nearly self-evident propositions, but few of them so clearly drawn as not to admit of some cavilling. Carleton and Grey never will admit the intended works are strong enough, and would agree to erect twenty forts here and as many at Plymouth, each as strong as Bergen-op-Zoon. Sir D. Lindsay is of the same opinion. The only two who oppose all fortifications are Percy and Burgoyne.”²

¹ This mistake was avoided seventy-five years later in the instructions to the Royal Commission on the defences of the country, drawn up by the late F. M. Sir John Fox Burgoyne in 1860, which were so framed as to elicit only direct conclusions from admitted facts and principles.

² Correspondence of Lord Cornwallis, by Ross.

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On the appointment of a Royal Commission on the National Defences in 1860, search was made at the War Office for the report of the proceedings of the Duke of Richmond's Board, but no trace of this document could be discovered. The discussions in Parliament, however, and the rough drafts found among General Burgoyne's papers, would appear to indicate that the recommendations of the majority were similar in character to those made by the Commission in 1860, when it was unanimously submitted that "new works should be erected, not only to keep an enemy at a distance, and as much as possible out of reach of bombarding your Majesty's dockyard at Portsmouth, but also to prevent his taking the place, and that a system of detached forts is the most proper for this purpose."

The specific points proposed by the Board to be fortified appear to have nearly coincided with those on which temporary fortifications were raised in great haste on the outbreak of the great Revolutionary War a few years afterwards.

Many of these works, such as the fortifications of the Isle of Portsea, Fort Cumberland, and the Lines at Hilsea and those of Gosport, have been retained in the system of defence adopted by the Royal Commission of 1860.

At Plymouth the Board appear to have recommended a line of detached works on the Maker Heights, to cover the dockyard and ships at anchor in the Sound from bombardment from the west. Field redoubts were erected on this line at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, but have since been superseded by permanent works thrown up further in advance of them.

The following protest was appended to the Report on

the Portsmouth Fortifications by General Burgoyne, Earl Percy, and Captain Sir J. Jervis:¹—

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“In signing the Report, we humbly beg leave to submit to your Majesty that our proceedings have been founded upon the supposition of the whole fleet being absent for three months as mentioned in the second datum, and therefore that the enemy may bring over an army of 30,000 men, with an artillery proportionate, to an attack on Portsmouth and Plymouth, having three months to act in, uninterrupted by the British fleet, as mentioned in the third datum.

“The bare possibility of such an event we do not pretend to deny, but how far it is probable that the whole British fleet may be sent on any service requiring three months’ absence at a time when the enemy is prepared to invade the country with such a force as that mentioned in the third datum we must humbly leave to your Majesty’s superior wisdom, and therefore whether it is necessary, in consequence of such a supposition, to erect works of so expensive a nature as those proposed, and which require such large garrisons to defend them.”

On the 27th of January, 1786, Mr. Pitt brought the Report of the Board before the House, with a proposed expenditure of £765,000 for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth. The project was vigorously opposed by the Whig party. Burgoyne spoke against the measure, urging that the works recommended would employ more men than the army could afford without weakening it in other and equally important points, and that we should mainly rely upon maritime defence for the protection of our dockyards.

On a renewal of the debate on the 20th of March, he

¹ Afterwards Lord St. Vincent.

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repeated his objections to the fortification of the dock-yards on both military and financial grounds, and complained that the Duke of Richmond's taste for engineering would prove a very costly amusement :—

“ His Grace had applied himself with peculiar ardour to the science of fortification, and was a most diligent scholar ; it was natural for him in proportion to his improvement to correct his errors, but the noble Duke's studies had cost the country a great deal of money, more especially as he was always changing his plans ; *diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundo.*”

On a division the numbers were even, when the measure was defeated by the casting vote of the Speaker ; a vote “ the consequences of which,” to use the words of the highest living authority in 1860, “ has been felt ever since in increasing our sense of insecurity to meet emergencies that may arise at any time on any short warning.”¹

As far back as in the early part of '77 the King had expressed an intention of conferring a pension of £1,000 on the wife and sons of Sir Guy Carleton ; on that officer submitting his resignation, however, the matter was, at the instance of Lord George Germain it is said, allowed to drop, but was again brought before the House in 1786, when Burgoyne, mindful of his obligations to his former chief, warmly and generously supported the proposal :—

“ In '77 I went to Canada in consequence of His Majesty's orders that I should be put at the head of Sir Guy's troops in an expedition which he considered that he ought to have commanded in person. Whatever might have been the cause of the misfortunes attending that expedition, no blame could possibly be imputed to

¹ See Col. Wrottesley's *Life of Sir J. Burgoyne*, vol. ii., page 399.

Sir Guy Carleton. On the contrary, I should consider myself as most dishonourable and criminal if I did not take every occasion to declare that had Sir Guy Carleton been personally employed in that important command, he could not have fitted it out with more assiduity, more liberality and zeal, than, disappointed, displeased, and resentful against the King's servants, he employed to prepare it for a junior officer. He mentioned this not only in praise of personal honour, but as a great example of military principle."

When, in '87, the motion for impeaching Warren Hastings for malpractices committed by him in his capacity of Governor-General of India was carried, and a Committee of Management was formed to represent the prosecution, Burgoyne was included in that list of brilliant names which comprised, among others, those of Burke, Fox, Sheridan, Windham, and Charles Grey (afterwards Earl Grey), but although he took an active part as a working member in the collation of evidence and the examination of witnesses,¹ he made no speech during the trial, of which he did not live to see the termination.²

The two following letters from the Chairman of the Committee of Management relate to this subject :—

¹ It is noteworthy that whereas on the impeachment of Clive, Burgoyne's most active opponent was Mr. Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General, while Thurlow lent him his full support, so now Wedderburn was eloquent on the side of the accusers of Warren Hastings, while Thurlow's powerful aid was actively employed in his defence.

² The trial, it will be remembered, lasted through seven sessions of Parliament, from February 1788 to April 1795 ; but although protracted over so long a period, the Court held only 118 sittings, or at the rate of seventeen sittings in each year. Horace Walpole remarks upon this that "it could hardly be expected that noble lords should give up their pheasants to preserve India."

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THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE TO GENERAL
BURGOYNE.

"I am very thankful to you for your letter from Bath. It is just what I should expect in a letter of yours upon such business ; full of politeness, full of kindness to your friends, and full of publick principle. I was in town when it arrived here. My call was to ascertain the time, manner, and place of our proceedings, some of which remained in doubt for a few days. But events which have left other matters a little more clouded than before have cleared up the obscurity in which ours were involved. We cannot now proceed until after the holidays. I think the mode and time after that will be left pretty much to ourselves. Westminster Hall will be granted ; at least, without a direct and positive declaration, I look upon it that I have an assurance that is tantamount to it, and that leaves no great uneasiness upon my mind with relation to the point upon which I was by far the most anxious. Our success will in a great measure depend upon the publicity of our proceedings. Shut us up in a little chamber, and our cause is damned from the beginning. Nobody can bear witness to the procedure whilst it is going on, and its voluminous nature will prevent all sort of interest in it afterwards. It could neither be heard nor read.

"Since you are so good as to devote your returning health to this cause, the parts which your friends who met here some days ago recommend to you are the twelfth and thirteenth articles. The evidence in support of these articles of charge will be sent to you as soon as you have time to communicate them in the manner in which they stand. These articles have so close a rela-

tion to the whole State of Oude, that I wish you to read with some attention all the parts relative to that country, both in the articles as presented at the Bar of the House of Lords and in those which were originally laid before the House of Commons. It forms the background to your picture.

“Adieu. May the Bath do everything that can be done to give you the means necessary for the execution of your talents in a cause that I think is worthy of them, and of the virtue that in you will always guide and direct them. Ever with most sincere respect and affection,

“Your most faithful servant,

“EDM. BURKE.”

“BECONSFIELD, *November 7th, 1787.*”

“It must always be a matter of concern to me to find that any of our associates in our honourable undertaking are in any degree dissatisfied. It must be particularly so to discover that Mr. Grey is out of humour, not only because the interest of this prosecution must be materially affected by the loss of so much admirable eloquence, but that the general cause must always suffer by whatever tends to keep back the display of the splendid talents that support it. It is evident that for some time Mr. Grey has seemed to be of opinion that the prosecution was proceeding to a length and an expense, neither of which the publick would be disposed to countenance, and, if I understood him rightly, he seemed to be of opinion that it would be more prudent to abandon the rest of the charges. Though the blame of any failure will rest solely on me, I must certainly abide by the sense of the Committee. As this objection is radical (suppose it founded), and goes to the whole plan, it

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ought to be settled on the general principle of the plan before it is worth while to go into the merits of each article separately. We must be conscious that we have to deal with partial judges, unwilling and prevaricating witnesses, mangled records, a reluctant House of Commons, and an indifferent publick. All these things are inseparable from our cause and our situation, and therefore the qualities which we stand in need of, and for which we must make a strong call upon ourselves, are patience and perseverance. I know that the article which we abandon, be that article what it may, will be supposed not to have been relinquished from want of time, but from our own conviction that we had brought forward an unfounded and malicious charge, and which would not stand the test of judicial enquiry. To this imputation I confess I do not feel myself disposed to submit. Therefore, for one, my unalterable opinion is that we cannot abandon one material charge with safety, until we can have some rational indication that the Lords consider the charges actually brought before them to be well proved, and that they contain matters of high criminality. But, as I have said, I must be subject to the sense of the Committee.

“If Mr. Grey should continue in his disgust, great as the disappointment will be, it were better that he should be left freely to choose any other object (occupied or not occupied) than to be fixed down to one he does not like. For my part, I should recommend to those who are zealous in our cause to please him at any rate or by any sacrifice. Whatever he undertakes with dislike is sure not to call out the utmost exertion of his faculties, and if he should happen in his speech to drop the least insinuation of doubt concerning the validity of his proofs, it would do irreparable mischief to the cause.

Besides, the enemy, whose partizans are disseminated everywhere, the moment they find discontent in any of our members, will be sure, as politicians always do, to inflame it by every art. I really proposed this part to Mr. Grey because I thought he wished (and I am sure *I* wished it) to come forward early. I thought he liked it, and I well remember when he saw Holt's and Edwards' evidence, he seemed to think it weighty and decisive.

"There seem to me but these choices : 1, to postpone this charge, and to bring forward some other which may be in the greatest readiness ; 2, that if this charge cannot be postponed (surely it ought not), you may get some other friend to make a short opening, and reserve to yourself the observations on the evidence ; or 3, that you may yourself succinctly open and then go to evidence, closing the whole with more full and more elaborate observations.

"I am much against your calling Impey and Middleton to the Committee before I can see your communication on the subject. They are dangerous persons ; one of them has already been examined, and nothing has been got out of him. The enemy will get acquainted with our proceedings before we can profit by them. At any rate, an examination will be a matter of great delicacy.

"As to Marsac, that he is ——¹ there can be no doubt. Which of them on all sides, except Gardiner, is not ? We must use them notwithstanding. The publick begins to feel our situation with regard to witnesses, and to allow for it. Marsac's evidence is to be confirmed on every point in which it can be met,

¹ This word is illegible in the letter, but its purport may be inferred from the context.

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by other testimony ; in the rest it therefore deserves credit. His demand on Hastings was unseasonable and suspicious, and that is the most that can be made of it. Compare this with Gardiner's and Williams' to the contrary ; robbers of Hannay's own gangs. Pray don't call on Middleton and Impey till I see you. We'll have time enough.

"My hoarseness gets better, but it is not gone off. I am always unhappy to be disappointed of seeing you, but if you are detained in a cause more dear to me than all other satisfactions, I must put up with my loss. I am ever, with most sincere affection and real respect,

"Your most faithful, &c.

"EDM. BURKE.

"BECONSFIELD, *Sunday Night, May 4th, 1788.*"

The following playful letter, without date, from Fox, appears to belong to this period :—

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I have only a moment's time to thank you for your three letters, which I will answer in a few days. I am very happy indeed to hear the D. of P. is so well and so clear of danger ; pray remember me to him in the kindest manner possible. I had just heard that Richard and you had both given up all public concerns (political concerns might possibly be a more correct expression) for Mrs. B. and Miss P., and was going to write you both a grave remonstrance upon your follies ; but I find you expected it, and therefore thought to prevent it by an ill-founded attack upon me ; but do not think I shall let you off so. I advise you both to read that stanza in the canto of the *Fairy Queen* which

contains the Bower of Bliss, and begins with this line—

“ His warlike arms, the idle instruments—”¹

and there you will see yourselves. Shame upon you !
Shame upon you !

“ Yours affectionately,

“ C. T. F.

60, ST. JAMES'S STREET, 20th August.”

The claim asserted by the Spanish Government in 1788-89 to an exclusive right to trade with China, and their seizure of some English vessels engaged in that business, led to a general apprehension of war being declared on the part of Great Britain, and Burgoyne—whose ruling passion was aroused by the prospect of once more bearing arms in the cause of his country—tendered his services to Mr. Pitt in a letter which may here be quoted, if only because it is the last public document under his hand which is preserved among his papers, and because it records, in the language of truth and candour, those principles and sentiments which had directed all the actions of his public life :—

“ SIR,

“ Fully persuaded of the justice and liberality of your sentiments, and conscious of the truth of my own, I address you freely, but I trust respectfully, upon the subject nearest my heart. The circumstances of the time have brought it there, and on the circumstances of my personal situation must rest the propriety, and my apology for laying it before you.

“ I intend, Sir, to take an early opportunity to make

¹ Book ii. Canto xii. lxxx.

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to the King in person a humble tender of service in the ensuing war.

"I have been honoured with great and important commands, and have known the vicissitudes of military life in their extremes: successes, the gracious reception of which by His Majesty highly gratified ambition; reverses, followed by severe persecution of his ministers—extremes in both cases undeserved. I will presume, therefore, upon no merits; I will defend no faults. Let me be permitted only to cover them under a great example, that of the late General Wolfe, who, when a confidential friend expressed to him an apprehension that the miscarriage of one of his attempts would be called an error: 'They perhaps may reason right who call it so,' replied that gallant ingenuous spirit, 'and I may commit a hundred more before my experience is ripe and I am a General so fit for the confidence of my King and country as I aspire to be.'

"These and these only are the topics I shall dare to touch in His Majesty's presence. To enter there into any discussion of conduct in Parliament, as conceiving it possible to be considered of import to military preference,¹ I should think unconstitutional, and consequently the highest disrespect I could be guilty of. It is to you, Sir, that, with great personal consideration, I beg leave to explain myself upon that head, and should I succeed in doing it satisfactorily, it is to you that I confide the use and end of my explanation—a support of my pretensions for employment.

"I had the honour, Sir, to receive from your father many obligations. To him I was indebted for my Regiment of Dragoons; to him I was indebted for a

¹ The irony of this passage can hardly have been unintentional.

more distinguished honour, his applause for my services at the head of it. In regard to yourself, Sir, independently of these obligations to your family, I saw your entrance into public life with a predilection for your talents, and an opinion of your virtues, that your near friends could hardly have exceeded.

“Under such a bias of mind, judge whether a man of honour was likely, upon slight motives, to take the line of opposition when you became the leading minister. As little likelihood was there that a self-interested man should take that part, and pursue it by a voluntary surrender of dignified station, emolument, and power, as high in each instance as he could look for in any possible arrangement of Government. I was no novice in resignations and their consequences. In June, 1779, upon the impulse of honour, accompanied, I own, with a sense of indignation, I had resigned all the professional attainments of my life, and not without having means (had I thought those means honourable) of preserving them. I suffered the effects of that measure (if contented poverty can be called suffering) several years. My restoration to favour had been comparatively short, when I again thought myself called upon to relinquish the fruits of it, and to exercise the other essential duties with which my country entrusted me, again under impoverishment and in retired life. It was the call of principle. It was my conviction upon tenets from which you differed, and which others gloriously maintained. Be assured I did not take this step any more than the former one without clearly discerning that my interest, present and prospective, lay directly the contrary way. Nor was I blind to a middle course (and not as in the former apprehension, a dishonourable one), by which then also

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I could have preserved my situation : I mean retiring from Parliament. I had sacrificed to honour in 1779. I sacrificed to honour and to my attachments in 1784. You will pardon me, Sir, if I continue a frankness that means you no disrespect : I acknowledge that my partiality gave way to the ideas I conceived in common with most of the opponents of your administration, upon the principles of its formation, the composition of its parts, and the dangerous effects derived from those causes. I acknowledge also the strength of my attachments—the result of reason as well as affection—to the men whom you and your friends superseded in office. I will go further : I should betray truth, which is the basis of this address, if I withheld the avowal that to these men I shall invariably adhere, because I think the principles they possess to be those in which the British Constitution can only find permanent security.

“These opinions are irrevocable, but they do not imply any diffidence in the integrity or capacity of the present Government to uphold the dignity and the rights of the Crown and the nation against a foreign enemy ; nor will I admit that they render anything I have said incompatible with the warmest zeal for a share of service under their direction.

“No man will assent more readily than I shall do (and perhaps I may be allowed to be a competent judge of the question) to the necessity of reciprocal confidence between a minister and an officer employed to execute his plans. I will venture to state that of the two, perhaps the employed risks more than the employer. And to speak individually, I hope, Sir, you will accept it as one sentiment of respect that the man who has smarted under the ungrateful abandonment of a former ministry, whom he had endeavoured to serve in every

line, comes a volunteer to your military banners, and in confessed impenitence for his political sins, is ready, through the chances and changes of war, to commit his professional honour to the trust of your justice.

“The point I would mark distinctly is this: Precluded by the part I have taken from any general claim to the patronage of the King’s servants, I am truly sensible of the slight I might invite were I asking for indolent employment. My suit is of a very different nature. I ask a favour to my feelings, it is true, but it is one with which—should the call for General officers be greater than those of superior pretensions can supply—the service of the State is connected.

“Considered in another point of view, it is one which an enemy (were I so unhappy to think you such) might grant: an opportunity to devote to my country probably my last powers for actual service. My time of life, and approaching infirmities, cannot give me to expect another war. God forbid it should not be remote. I hope then it will not be construed a professional rant, or appear in any degree a forced sentiment in an old soldier to say that should his period in the destination of Providence be near, he would rather meet it in the duties of the field than amidst the sorrows and afflictions of a sick bed.

“To conclude: that I am actuated in this application by a faithful, animated, and devoted zeal for the King’s service I am sure; that His Majesty will credit and deign to accept my sincerity I venture to hope and to expect; and that such a disposition in the Royal mind will not be fostered and sustained by the councils of a minister of magnanimity I will never believe.”

The threatened hostilities were, however, averted. The firm attitude assumed by the British minister

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induced the Spanish Government to make the fullest reparation, and to withdraw the assertion of any claim to a monopoly of commerce. The question of Burgoyne's employment was not, accordingly, brought under ministerial consideration.

Among other assertions of the Royal prerogative, George the Third had assumed a position of irresponsible authority over the management and patronage of the army, and had, without remonstrance, given an interpretation to (or it might be said, shown a disregard for) the principles of the Mutiny Act which would have surprised its framers a century earlier. The Secretary at War did, it is true, hold the office of a minister responsible to Parliament in military affairs, but his actual powers were extremely limited, and at this time, indeed, extended to little more than those of a financial agent for moving the estimates in the House of Commons and controlling the expenditure of sums voted for the maintenance of the land forces. The Colonial minister, again, was entrusted with the direction and conduct of foreign wars; but while the King was actually administrator and Commander-in-Chief of the army, exercising its entire patronage, and interfering in the minutest details of its internal economy, the minister's personal responsibility in military affairs was very restricted.¹ A Board of General Officers nominated by the King conducted the business of the army under his orders, but a council so constituted could be accountable for their acts only to their Royal master.

In December, '87, Colonel Fitzpatrick (at one time Secretary for Ireland) had moved for the appointment of

¹ Mr. Pitt, on assuming office in '83, made it a condition that he should have the full and undivided direction of English wars in all parts of the globe.

a Commander-in-Chief to be held responsible to Parliament, and Burgoyne had strongly supported the motion, which was, however, defeated. During the next session (17th of March, '89), an animated debate took place upon the removal from his command in the army of the Marquis of Lothian for having voted against Government;¹ in the course of which Burgoyne spoke at length upon the necessity of a responsible minister at the head of the army :—

“ There ought to be in the military department some person who should be considered as the military minister, some ostensible person responsible for every step taken in the military department, and that person ought, in his mind, to be Commander-in-Chief. The military minister would, in point of patronage, be of important use. He would be the informant of the King as to the propriety of every promotion; he would be the man to bring military merit to the foot of the throne, and to draw it forth from the places where ministers now never looked for it—namely, from the field of actual service.”

The Secretary at War (Sir George Younge) rejoined that, although not professionally bred, he did not hesitate to say that he was *in some sort* officially responsible for every measure taken in the military department, and that a Commander-in-Chief was unnecessary, as it was the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to appoint and dismiss officers in the army as the Crown should think proper; and if any appointment or dismissal was to be made the subject of parliamentary notice, the prerogative might as well not exist.

Mr. Fox “admitted the prerogative of the Crown to dismiss officers, but urged that the exercise of such a

¹ See *ante*, p. 94.

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power should be jealously watched.¹ He condemned the removal of an officer for such a cause, for instance, as displaying attachment to the Prince of Wales. He was glad to hear, for the first time, that the Secretary at War considered himself a responsible military minister, but thought if we were really to have such a person, he ought to be the Commander-in-Chief, and that no one was so fit to fill that post as a member of the Royal family. He was quite aware, however, that such a recommendation would not be entertained by ministers who never failed to represent the Royal Princes to the King as his bitterest enemies."

It is not clear by what means it was intended to impose ministerial and parliamentary responsibility upon a member of the Royal family, and it could hardly have been expected that the King should forego his pretensions to the direct command of the army in favour of one of his sons, who had openly thrown himself into the arms of the party opposed to the ministers of the Crown. The discussion, however, is of interest as showing that

¹ In the present day we not unfrequently hear discussions in Parliament upon questions of military detail deprecated as a modern encroachment on the part of the House of Commons; but such interference is by no means of recent date. A strong instance of the claim of Parliament to control in matters of internal economy was afforded when in 1809 Lord Burgersh, aide-de-camp to the Duke of Wellington, was promoted to the rank of Major and Lieutenant-Colonel before having completed the term of service prescribed by regulation to entitle him to either rank, and when Lord Castlereagh urged against the objections raised in the House of Commons, that although these promotions were contrary to regulation, yet that it was "part of His Majesty's prerogative as the undoubted head of the army to dispense with his own regulations when he thought proper." Lord Temple replied that, "he would allow everything that was reasonable to the prerogative of the Crown in the disposal of military preferment, but that the House of Commons had over that, as well as over every other branch of the Royal power, a privilege to inquire and control." Lord Castlereagh refusing to recede from his position, the House divided, and the Government was defeated, and compelled to cancel the objectionable promotion.

seventy years before we actually introduced the system of parliamentary government for the army by the creation of a Cabinet Minister as its responsible head, the want had made itself felt, partly from a desire to check military abuses, but in a great measure upon abstract constitutional grounds, connected with the exercise of the Royal prerogative.¹

Although Burgoyne did not speak in Westminster Hall during the trial of Warren Hastings, he took part in several discussions on matters connected with it in the House of Commons.

One of these related to the illegal execution of the Rajah Mustapha Cawn² by a Captain Williams, who pleaded having acted under the orders of a military superior. Upon this Burgoyne said (15h of March, '90):—

“It has often been remarked that the military establishment of Britain never lost its reference to the law of the land. Its limitation to obedience in the Mutiny Act is to *lawful* commands. No man will confound this

¹ With the growth of parliamentary power frequent conflicts arose between the Secretary at War and the King's representative at the head of the Army. In 1812 Sir David Dundas, Commander in Chief, made a formal complaint against Lord Palmerston, then Secretary at War, for having assumed pretensions “derogatory to the dignity of the Crown, and subversive of military discipline,”—while the latter maintained that his position made it incumbent upon him, “to form a barrier between the liberties of the people and the officer in command of the army.” Many years later the Duke of Wellington complained that he could not move a Corporal's Guard without the permission of the Secretary at War, which was, however, only an extreme mode of expressing that he could not initiate military measures which involved expense without the sanction of Parliament.

² The order ran thus:—“If you deem that there is even the risk of a rescue, let that murderous villain Mustapha Cawn be hanged.” Captain Williams appears to have shown mistaken zeal in two respects; he did not wait to make the execution conditional upon the risk, and he cut off the prisoner's head instead of hanging him.

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limitation with the real, fair operations of war, with actual conflict of arms; commands consonant to the nature of war as practised by civilized nations are imperative. There is another law upon which the military establishment of this country has also the glory to stand: the law of humanity, without which valour is a crime and a curse, without which an army is the heaviest infliction that can fall upon a people—an instrument for the destruction of our species or the desolation of countries. That law has ever distinguished the British arms.

“No man shall go further than I do in maintaining obedience to orders. Considered as a general principle, it is the vital essence of the military system, which cannot exist without it. If in real service I receive orders which I think absurd, I am bound to obey, and have only secretly to lament that I am under an absurd commander. If I am ordered to march to inevitable destruction I must obey, because it may be expedient to sacrifice a part to save a far greater part, when no other means will do it;¹ but if I receive an order in which the service of a soldier is debased, an order that my conscience revolts at, that strikes at that sense which God has planted in my breast to excite my duty to Him through the medium of my duty to my fellow creatures, here my idea of obedience ceases, and gives place to a principle more forcible and more just. I beg leave to repeat a short passage of what I maintained on an occasion affecting me personally—not from any partiality for my own words, but to show that my opinion is not the result of the present case, but was formed by me long since upon mature deliberation, and under acute personal feeling, and this continues to be my

¹ The speaker here evidently had his own fatal campaign in his mind.

professional creed :—‘ The man who obeys at the expense of his fortune, his comfort, his health, or his life, is a soldier ; he who obeys at the expense of his honour is a slave.’ ”¹

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In May, '90, Major Scott, the agent of Warren Hastings, made a violent attack in Parliament upon Mr. Burke and the managers of the impeachment, whom he charged with being actuated by malignant and interested motives. Burgoyne charged him with a libel and breach of privilege, and succeeded, against a formidable opposition, in carrying a vote of censure upon him.

In the early part of '91, Burgoyne had received what he believed to be a promise from his old friend, Sir Joshua Reynolds, for the admission of a picture, by an artist in whom he was interested, into the exhibition at the Royal Academy of that year. Whether the work was not deemed worthy of the honour or the great painter had forgotten his engagement, does not appear, but Burgoyne wrote an indignant remonstrance of five pages, and, after having kept the letter by him for several days, despatched it with the following postscript appended :—

“ DEAR SIR JOSHUA,

“ After having kept this letter for five days unfinished, I now confess I wrote it in just anger, but upon reflection, I set too high a value on your talents and your virtues not to be placable, and I have the honour to be

“ Your most obedient humble servant,

“ J. BURGOYNE.”²

¹ This passage occurs in the concluding part of Burgoyne's address to the Committee of the House of Commons in '79. See *State of the Expedition from Canada*, page 136.

² See *Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds* by Tom Taylor.

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Reynolds accepted the *amende* with his accustomed good-nature, remarking that the body of the letter came from the gout, and the postscript from his friend.

The gout had indeed by this time taken a firm hold of Burgoyne. Although naturally of a strong constitution, the disappointments and persecution which he had suffered had told upon him severely. It had been remarked among his friends that with all that *insouciance* which had enabled him cheerfully to battle with the trials of his life, he had never quite rallied from the effects of Saratoga. Thackeray, in his *Lives of the Georges*, when describing fashionable life in London during the end of the eighteenth century, speaks, harshly enough, of Burgoyne "tripping down St. James's Street on his way to beat the Americans, and slinking back to his club crestfallen after his defeat." The writer of a notice on his works previously referred to,¹ says of him more feelingly :—

"His after services are well known ; especially the unfortunate termination of his military career at Saratoga, which, though it tarnished not his honour, cast a shade over his brow ever afterwards, conspicuous to the physiognomical eye."

No serious uneasiness, however, existed at this time with regard to his health. In the session of 1792 he attended the House of Commons with his usual assiduity, but in the summer he was seized with a sudden attack of gout, under which he sank. He died at his house in Hertford Street on the 4th of August.

His last speech in Parliament had, appropriately enough, been a plea for the English army.

On the estimates being moved in February, '92,

¹ *Morning Herald*, 25th September, 1823. See page 7.

an addition was proposed to the soldiers' pay, when Burgoyne said :—

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"I applaud the allowance to the common soldier as equally humane and wise, and I am sure that whoever planned it must be a military man. I only wish that the situation of the subaltern officers had been considered at the same time. They are still obliged to subsist on their scanty pittance, although every article of subsistence is at least 30 per cent. dearer than when their pay was originally settled."¹

General Burgoyne's Will, which, with the codicil, fills seventeen closely written folio pages in his own handwriting, is characteristic, and a few passages deserve to be quoted :—

"Although it is my intention in the general wording of this Will and Testament to dispense with such form as shall not appear to be necessary to establish the validity of the several desires and bequests, yet I esteem a profession of my religious faith to be a proper introduction to the solemn act I am performing.

"I therefore declare that from my youth I have lived, and I trust I shall die, in the fullest conviction and truth of the efficacy of the Gospel dispensation ; I esteem it a system immediately from God ; and I rely upon the merits and the oblation of Jesus Christ, as understood by the Church of England, as the only means of salvation.

"During a life too frequently blemished by the indulgence of one predominant passion, it has been a comfort to me to hope that my sensualities have never injured, nor interrupted the peace of, others. Of the

¹ These words were spoken eighty-three years ago ; since when the prices of the necessities of life have at least doubled, yet the pay of our regimental officers remains pretty nearly what it was then.

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greater crimes that originate in the forgetfulness of God, or injustice, or malevolence towards my fellow creatures, my heart is innocent, and upon that ground, though with the deepest consciousness how little my best actions deserve when set against my offences, I commit my soul to the mercy of its Creator."

"Whenever I may happen to die, it is my desire that my body may be interred in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey, as near as may be to the remains of my late inestimable wife, Lady Charlotte Burgoyne. Should I die at a distance, the body to be conveyed to Westminster at the cheapest rate that decency will permit, namely, if a convenient mode should not offer by sea for the whole way to the River Thames, I would have a hearse drawn by four horses only, and attended by one coach only with the same number of horses, for the conveyance of my menservants out of livery and my housekeeper, and no attendants on horseback except my footman, George Gosling, or should he not be in my service, the footman who shall have been longest in my service at the time of my decease. I desire that my funeral may be equally private."

He then proceeds to leave various mementos to his relatives, including his two nieces (Lady Horton and Miss Warburton), to Sir John Burgoyne, as the head of his family, to his executors, and to his two aides-de-camp, with the hope that "trifling as they are in value, they will be acceptable to the several friends to whom I have bequeathed them as testimonies of my affection." To each of his servants he leaves a sum of money, warmly acknowledging their faithful services, and recommending them to the favour of his executors for their future advancement. His diamond ring, the gift of the King

of Portugal, he bequeaths to Lord Derby, and the sum of £2,000, as before stated, to his friend Mr. Day.

The bulk of his property he leaves to Miss Susan Caulfield with reversion to "her son John,¹ born in Queen Street, Soho, about the 25th of July, 1782, for his maintenance and education, until he shall attain the age of fifteen years, or when he shall engage in the King's naval service, to which I strongly recommend it to his mother and my executors to lead his early education as much as in them lies; I recommend the naval profession upon conviction that it is the most proper, the most honourable, and the most promising that a young man in his circumstances can choose, but I would by no means have his inclination forced."

This disposition had been made while Burgoyne still held the office of Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, but his resignation shortly afterwards so greatly reduced his income that at the time of his death his small private fortune had almost completely dwindled away, and but very little was left after the payment of his liabilities. Thanks to the friendship and rare generosity of Lord Derby, however, the wishes expressed by Burgoyne in favour of those he had left after him were not disregarded.²

The following announcement appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for August, 1792:—

"Died on the 4th of August, at his house in Hertford Street, Mayfair, the Right Honourable John Burgoyne, a Privy Councillor, Lieutenant-General in the army, Colonel of the 4th Regiment of Foot, M.P. for Preston,

¹ The late Field-Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Bart. In the interval between the date of this will (1783) and the year 1788, three more children were born, and by a codicil dated in the latter year, they are made to share equally in the provision originally made for the eldest son only.

² See Colonel Wrottesley's *Life of Sir John Fox Burgoyne*, vol. i. p. 3.

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
and author of the much celebrated comedy entitled the *Heiress*. The regret for his death will be extended and lasting. He has died richer in esteem than in money; in the saving or securing of that he had no talent. Of all the gay, the witty, and the fashionable, who eagerly sought his acquaintance, and whose minds were impressed by the elegance of his conversation, and the variety of his talents, very few were present to drop the tear over departed genius. One coach only attended with four gentlemen; a lady was likewise present, whose convulsive agitation showed her to have that within which passeth show."

The writer of this tribute was not aware that the strict privacy of the funeral was in accordance with the expressed wishes of the dead. The reproach applies so far however, that no friendly hand was extended to mark with his name the slab which covers the remains of General Burgoyne in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey.¹

¹ Dean Stanley in his *Historical Monuments of Westminster Abbey* states, that General Burgoyne lies "buried in the cloisters without a name." The omission would have been supplied by his children when they came of an age to pay this act of respect to the father whose memory they honoured, but the spot in which he was buried could not then be identified.

The Burial Register of the cathedral simply records his having been interred in the north cloister on 13th August, 1792, aged seventy years.

APPENDICES.



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FREDERIC THE GREAT.

COPIE DE LA LETTRE QUE LE ROI DE PRUSSE A ECRIT AU
GENERAL FOUQUET EN LUI ENVOYANT SES REFLEXIONS SUR
LA TACTIQUE ET SUR QUELQUES PARTIES DE LA GUERRE.

“BRESLAU, *ce* 23 Dec. 1758.

“ Je vous envoie, mon cher ami, l'obole de veuve écervelée d'aussi bon cœur que je vous l'ai destinée; ce sera un petit secours dont vous pourriez avoir besoin dans ces temps calamiteux. Je vous envoie en même temps quelques réflexions, qui sont tous les fruits que j'ai recueilli de ma dernière campagne. Selon les apparences, nos quartiers d'hiver seront tranquilles : l'ennemi ne fait aucunes démonstrations de vouloir nous troubler. Je ne crois pas qu'il en soit de même du Prince Ferdinand ; mais laissons l'avenir sous le voile où la Providence a voulu le cacher, et pour parler du présent, soyez persuadé de l'amitié et de l'estime que je vous conserverai jusqu'à la fin de mes jours.

“ FREDERIC.”

REFLEXIONS SUR QUELQUES CHANGEMENS DANS LA FACON DE
FAIRE LA GUERRE.

“ Qu'importe de vivre, si on ne fait que végéter?—qu'importe de voir, si ce n'est que pour entasser des faits dans la mémoire?—qu'importe en un mot, l'expérience, si elle n'est digérée par la réflexion? Végèce dit, que la guerre doit être une étude,

et la paix une exercice, et il a raison. La pensée seule, ou pour mieux m'expliquer, la faculté de combiner les idées est ce qui distingue les hommes des bêtes de somme ; un mulet qui aura fait dix campagnes sous le Prince Eugène, n'en sera pas meilleur tacticien, et il faut avouer à la honte de l'humanité, que sur l'article de cette paresseuse stupidité, beaucoup de vieux officiers ne valent pas mieux que ce mulet. Suivre la routine du service, s'occuper de sa pâture et de son couvert, mâcher quand on mange, se battre quand tout le monde se bat, voilà ce qui pour le plus grand nombre s'appelle avoir fait la campagne, et être blanchi sous le harnois. De là vient ce nombre de militaires rouillés dans la médiocrité, et qui ne connaissent, ni s'embarrassent de connaître, les causes de leurs triomphes ou de leurs défaites. Ces causes sont cependant très réelles. Ce sévère critique, le judicieux et rigide Feuquière, nous a montré par les censures qu'il a fait des militaires de son temps, la route que nous devons tenir pour nous éclairer. Depuis son siècle, la guerre s'est raffinée. Des usages nouveaux et meurtriers l'ont rendue plus difficile. Il est juste de la détailler, afin qu'ayant bien examiné le système de nos ennemis, et les difficultés qu'ils nous présentent, nous choisissions des moyens propres pour les surmonter.

“Je ne vous entretiens pas des projets de nos ennemis, fondés sur le nombre et la puissance de leurs alliés, dont la multitude devrait écraser, non seulement la Prusse, mais tout Prince qui seul voudrait lui résister. Il n'est pas besoin de vous faire remarquer la maxime qu'ils ont adoptée généralement, d'attirer par diversion, nos forces d'un côté, pour frapper un grand coup à l'endroit où ils sont, sans trouver aucune résistance ; de se tenir sur la défensive vis-à-vis d'un corps assez fort pour leur tenir tête, et d'employer la vigueur contre celui que sa faiblesse oblige de céder.

“Je ne vous rappellerai point non plus la méthode dont je me suis servi pour me soutenir contre ce colosse qui menaçait de m'accabler. Cette méthode, qui ne s'est trouvée bonne que par les fautes de mes ennemis, par leur lenteur qui a secondé mon activité, par leur indolence à ne jamais profiter de l'occasion, ne se doit point proposer pour modèle. La loi impérieuse de la nécessité m'a obligé à donner beaucoup au hasard. La

conduite d'un pilote qui se livre au caprice du vent plus qu'aux indications de sa boussole, ne peut jamais servir de règle. Il est question de se faire une juste idée du système que les Autrichiens suivent dans cette guerre. Je m'attache à eux comme à ceux de nos ennemis qui ont mis le plus d'art et de perfection dans ce métier. Je passe sous silence les Français, quoiqu'ils soient avisés et entendus, parceque leur inconséquence et leur esprit de légèreté renversent d'un jour à l'autre, ce que leur habileté pourrait leur procurer d'avantages. Pour les Russes, aussi féroces qu'ineptes, ils ne méritent pas qu'on les nomme.

“Les principaux changemens que je remarque dans la conduite des généraux Autrichiens dans cette guerre, consistent dans leurs campemens, dans leurs marches, et dans cette prodigieuse artillerie, qui exécutée, sans être soutenue d'une armée, serait presque suffisante pour détruire une armée qui viendrait l'attaquer.

“L'on a pris de bons camps dans les anciennes guerres, témoins ceux de Fribourg et de Nordlingen de M. de Merci, témoin un camp que prit le Prince Eugène, si je ne me trompe, sur l'Adige, où il arrêta l'armée Française, commandée par M. de Villeroy ; témoin le fameux camp de Heilbron, celui de Cyrk, en Flandre, et d'autres que je n'ai pas besoin de citer. Mais que l'on voie si jamais généraux ont formé une ordonnance aussi formidable que les Autrichiens le font à présent ; où a-t-on vu 400 canons rangés sur des hauteurs, avec l'avantage d'atteindre de loin, et de pouvoir fournir en même temps un feu rasant. Un camp Autrichien forme un front redoutable, et son derrière est rempli d'embuscades ; à la vérité, la grande supériorité de monde qui leur permet de se mettre sur plusieurs lignes, sans craindre d'être débordés, leur donne la facilité de fournir à tout, les troupes ne leur manquant pas.

“Si nous descendons ensuite dans un plus grand détail, vous trouverez que les principes sur lesquels les généraux Autrichiens font la guerre, sont une suite d'une longue méditation. Beaucoup d'art dans leur tactique, une circonspection extrême dans le choix de leurs camps, une grande connaissance du terrain, des dispositions soutenues et une sagesse à ne rien entreprendre

qu'avec une certitude de réussir aussi grande que la guerre permet de l'avoir. Ne jamais se laisser forcer à se battre malgré soi, voilà la première maxime de tout général et dont leur système est une suite ; de là la recherche des camps forts, des hauteurs, des montagnes. Les Autrichiens n'ont rien qui leur soit particulier dans les choix des postes, sinon qu'on ne les trouve presque jamais dans une mauvaise situation, et qu'ils ont une attention essentielle à se placer sans cesse dans les terrains inattaquables. Leurs flancs sont constamment appuyés à des ravins, des précipices, des marais, des rivières, ou des villes ; mais où ils se distinguent les plus des anciens, c'est dans l'ordonnance qu'ils donnent à leurs troupes, pour tirer parti de tous les avantages du terrain. Ils ont un soin extrême de placer chaque armée dans le lieu qui lui est propre ; ils ajoutent la ruse à tant d'art, et vous présentent des corps de cavalerie pour séduire le général qui leur est opposé, à faire de fausses dispositions. Je me suis cependant aperçu dans plus d'une occasion, que toutes les fois qu'ils rangent leur cavalerie en ligne contiguë, ce n'est pas leur intention de la faire combattre, et qu'ils ne s'en veulent servir effectivement que lorsqu'ils la forment en echiquier. Remarquez encore, s'il vous plaît, que si vous faites charger cette cavalerie au commencement de l'action, la vôtre la battra sûrement ; mais donnera, pour peu qu'elle la poursuive dans une embuscade d'infanterie, où elle sera détruite. Il ensuit qu'en attaquant cet ennemi dans une poste, il faut refuser sa cavalerie du commencement, s'il se peut même la tenir hors du feu, pour l'employer dans des occasions, soit à réparer le combat, soit à profiter de la poursuite.

“ L'armée Autrichienne a, pendant cette guerre, toujours été rangée sur trois lignes, soutenue de cette prodigieuse artillerie. Leur première ligne se forme au pied des collines, où le terrain est moins âpre, et descend en douce pente en forme de glacis, du côté d'où l'ennemi peut venir. Cette méthode est sage ; c'est le fruit de l'expérience, qui montre qu'un feu rasant est plus formidable qu'un feu plongeant. De plus, le soldat sur la crête du glacis a tout l'avantage de la hauteur, sans en éprouver les inconvénients : l'attaquant lui est découvert, et ne peut lui nuire par son feu ; au lieu qu'il peut le détruire, avant que

l'autre puisse l'approcher. De plus, si cette infanterie force celle qui l'attaque de céder, elle peut profiter de son avantage. Le terrain s'y prête et la seconde, au lieu que si elle se trouvait sur un terrain trop élevé ou trop escarpé, elle n'oserait en descendre, crainte de se rompre ; et le feu qu'elle ferait de cette hauteur, n'atteignant pas l'attaquant partout, celui-ci en marchant avec vigueur, se trouverait bientôt sous son canon et les petites armes. De sorte que, les Autrichiens réservent cette position d'amphithéâtre à leur seconde ligne, entrelacée de canons comme la première. Cette seconde ligne, qui renferme quelques corps de cavalerie, est destinée à soutenir la première. Si l'ennemi qui attaque plie, la cavalerie est à portée de le charger ; si la première ligne plie, l'ennemi qui avance trouve, après un combat d'infanterie, un poste terrible qu'il faut attaquer de nouveau, il est dérangé par les charges précédentes, et obligé de marcher à des gens frais, bien rangés, et secondés par la force du terrain. La troisième ligne, qui leur sert en même temps de réserve, est destinée à renforcer l'endroit de leurs postes où l'assailant se propose de percer. Leurs flancs sont garnis de canons comme une citadelle ; ils profitent de tous les petits saillans du terrain pour y mettre des pièces, qui tirent en écharpe, afin d'avoir d'autant plus de feux croisés : de sorte que de donner l'assaut à une place dont les défenses ne sont pas ruinées, ou d'attaquer une armée qui s'est ainsi préparée dans son terrain, c'est la même chose. Non contents de tant de précautions, les Autrichiens tâchent encore de couvrir leur front par des marais, des chemins creux, profonds, et impraticables, des ruisseaux, en un mot des défilés, et ne se fiant pas aux appuis qu'ils ont donnés à leurs flancs, ils ont de gros détachemens sur leur droite et sur leur gauche, qu'ils font camper à deux mille pas de leurs ailes, ou environ dans des lieux inabordables, pour observer l'ennemi ; et s'il venait attaquer inconsidérément, la grande armée pourrait lui tomber à dos et en flanc, et déranger les mesures de manière à l'obliger peut-être après un premier effort infructueux à se retirer. Comment engager une affaire, dira-t-on, avec des gens si bien préparés ? Serait-ce donc que ces troupes, si souvent battues, seraient devenues invincibles ? Assurément non ; c'est de quoi je ne conviendrai jamais. Je ne conseille donc à personne de

prendre une résolution précipitée et d'aller insulter une armée qui s'est procurée de si grands avantages ; mais comme il est impossible à la longue, pendant la durée d'une campagne, que tous les terrains se trouvent également avantageux, que ceux qui ont l'intendance de poster les troupes ne commettent pas quelque faute ; j'approuve fort que l'on profite de ces occasions sans avoir égard au nombre, pourvu qu'on ait un peu au delà de la moitié du monde de ce qu'a l'ennemi. Les fautes de l'ennemi dont on peut profiter sont lorsqu'il laisse quelque hauteur devant ou à côté de son camp ; si son flanc ne se trouve pas bien appuyé, ou qu'il détache loin de l'armée un de ces corps qui veillent sur son aile ; si les hauteurs où il est ne sont guère considérables, surtout si aucun défilé n'empêche d'aller à lui, je proposerai dans ce cas de se saisir incontinent des hauteurs, et d'y placer autant de canons qu'elles ne peuvent contenir. J'ai vu dans plus d'une occasion que les Autrichiens, tant cavalerie qu'infanterie, ne résistent point à l'artillerie ; mais il faut ou des hauteurs ou une plaine pour vous en servir. Les bouches à feu et les petites armes ne font point d'effet du bas en haut. Attaquer l'ennemi sans les avantages du feu, c'est se vouloir battre contre des armes avec des bâtons blancs, et cela est impossible. Je reviens à l'attaque. Je conseille qu'on propose un point, pour faire un plus puissant effort de ce côté-là ; que l'on forme plusieurs lignes pour se soutenir, étant probable que vos premières troupes seront repoussées. Je déconseille les attaques générales, parcequ'elles sont risquées et, qu'en engageant qu'une aile ou qu'une section de l'armée, en cas de malheur vous gardez le gros pour couvrir votre retraite, et vous ne pouvez jamais être totalement battu. Considérez encore, qu'en ne vous attachant qu'à une partie de l'armée de l'ennemi, vous ne pouvez jamais perdre autant de monde qu'en rendant l'affaire générale, et que si vous réussissez, vous pouvez détruire également votre ennemi, s'il ne se trouve pas avoir un défilé trop près du champ de bataille, où quelque corps de son armée puisse protéger sa retraite. Il me paraît encore que vous pouvez employer la partie de vos troupes que vous refusez à l'ennemi, à en faire ostentation, on la montrant sans cesse vis-à-vis de lui, dans un terrain qu'il n'osera quitter pour fortifier celui de l'armée que vous contenez en respect.

Si vous avez des troupes suffisantes, il arrivera peut-être que l'ennemi s'affaiblira d'un côté pour accourir au secours de l'autre ; voilà de quoi vous pouvez profiter encore si vous vous apercevez à temps de ses mouvemens.

“ D'ailleurs il faut imiter, sans doute, ce qu'on trouve de bon dans la méthode des ennemis. Les Romains, en s'appropriant les armes avantageuses des nations contre lesquelles ils avaient combattu, rendirent leur troupes invincibles. On doit certainement adopter la façon de se camper des Autrichiens, de contenter en tout cas d'un front plus étroit, pour gagner sur la profondeur, et prendre un grand soin de bien placer et d'assurer ses ailes. Il faut se conformer au système des nombreuses artilleries, quelque embarrassant qu'il soit ; j'ai fait augmenter considérablement la nôtre, qui pourra subvenir au défaut de notre infanterie, qui ne peut qu'empirer à mesure que la guerre devient plus longue et plus meurtrière. Ainsi prendre des mesures avec plus de justesse et d'attention qu'on ne le faisait autrefois, c'est se conformer à cet ancien principe de l'art, de *ne jamais être obligé de combattre malgré soi*.

“ Tant de difficultés pour attaquer l'ennemi dans son poste, font naître l'idée de l'attaquer en marche, de profiter de ses dérangemens, et d'engager des affaires d'arrière-garde, à l'exemple de celle de Lens, ou de celle de Seneff. Mais c'est à quoi les Autrichiens ont également pourvu, en ne faisant la guerre que dans des pays coupés ou fourrés, et en se préparant d'avance des chemins, soit au travers des forêts, ou les terrains marécageux, ou suivant la route des vallées derrière les montagnes, qu'ils ont l'attention de faire garnir d'avance par des détachemens. Le nombre des troupes légères va se poster dans les bois sur les cimes des montagnes, couvre leur marche, masque leurs mouvemens, et leur procure une entière sûreté jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient atteint un autre camp fort, où l'on ne peut, sans être inconsideré, les entamer.

“ Je dois à cette occasion vous faire remarquer qu'un des moyens dont nos ennemis se servent est de faire reconnaître d'avance le terrain qu'ils veulent occuper par des ingénieurs de campagne, qui le levent, qui l'examinent ; et que ce n'est qu'après une mûre délibération que le terrain est choisi, et que leur défense est réglée. Les détachemens des Autrichiens sont

fortes, et ils en font beaucoup ; les plus faibles ne sont pas au-dessous de trois mille hommes ; je leur en ai compté quelquefois cinq ou six, qui se trouvaient en même temps en campagne. Le nombre de leurs troupes Hongroises est assez considérable ; si elles se trouvaient rassemblées, elles pourraient former un gros corps d'armée, de sorte que vous avez deux armées à combattre, la pesante et la légère. Les officiers qu'ils employent pour leur confier ces détachemens sont habiles, surtout dans la connaissance du terrain ; ils se campent souvent près de nos armées, cependant avec l'utile circonspection de se mettre sur la cime des montagnes, dans des forêts épaisses, ou derrière de doubles ou triples défilés. De cette espèce de repaire, ils envoient des parties, qui agissent selon occasion, et le corps ne se montre pas à moins de pouvoir tenter quelque coup. La force de ces détachemens leur permet de s'approcher de près de nos armées, de les entourer même ; et il est très fâcheux de manquer du nombre égal de cette espèce de troupes. Nos bataillons francs, formés de déserteurs, mal composés et faibles, n'osent souvent se montrer d'avant eux ; nos généraux n'osent pas les aventurer en avant, sans risquer de les perdre, ce qui donne le moyen aux ennemis d'approcher de nos camps, de nous inquiéter, et de nous alarmer de nuit et de jour. Nos officiers s'accoutument à la fin à ces echos fourrés ; ils leur donnent lieu de les mépriser, et malheureusement ils en contractent l'habitude d'une sécurité qui nous est devenue funeste à Hoch Kirchen, où beaucoup prirent pour l'escarmouche des troupes irrégulières, l'attaque qu'à notre droite les Autrichiens firent avec toute leur armée. Je crois cependant, pour ne vous rien cacher, que Monsieur de Daun pourrait se servir mieux qu'il ne le fait de son armée Hongroise. Elle ne nous cause pas le mal qu'elle pourrait. Pourquoi ses généraux détachés n'ont-ils rien tenté contre nos fourrages ?—pourquoi n'ont-ils point essayé d'emporter de mauvaises villes, où nous avons nos dépôts de vivres ?—pourquoi, au lieu d'alarmer nos camps de nuit, et par de faibles détachemens, n'ont-ils pas essayé de les attaquer en forme, et de prendre à dos notre seconde ligne ? Ce qui les aurait menés à des objets bien autrement importants et décisifs pour le succès de la guerre. Sans doute qu'ils manquent comme nous d'officiers entreprenans, les seuls cependant

qui parmi cette horde de gens arnés et timides, méritent de parvenir au grade de généraux.

“Voilà en peu de mots l'idée des principes sur lesquels les Autrichiens font la guerre présente ; ils l'ont beaucoup perfectionnée ; cela même n'empêche pas qu'on ne puisse reprendre sur eux une entière supériorité : l'art dont ils se servent avec habilité pour se défendre, nous fournit des moyens par les attaquer.

“J'ai hasardé quelques idées sur la manière d'engager avec eux des combats. Je dois y ajouter deux choses, que je crois avoir omises, dont l'un est de bien appuyer ce corps qui attaque ou il lui arrivera d'être lui même pris en flanc, au lieu d'y prendre l'ennemi ; la seconde est une grande attention que doivent avoir les chefs des troupes à ne leur point permettre de se débander, surtout lorsqu'ils poussent l'ennemi, d'où il résulte qu'un faible corps de cavalerie qui tombe sur eux dans un moment de dérangement, se trouve en état de les détruire, quelque précaution que prenne un général.

“Il reste toujours beaucoup de hazards à courir dans l'attaque de postes difficiles, et dans toutes les batailles. La meilleure infanterie de l'univers peut être repoussée et battue dans des lieux où elle a à combattre le terrain, l'ennemi, et le canon. La nôtre à présent abâtardie par les pertes trop fréquentes, ne doit point être commise à des entreprises difficiles ; sa valeur intrinsèque n'est plus comparable à ce qu'elle était, et ce serait la mettre à de trop grandes épreuves que de la risquer à des attaques qui demandent une constance et une fermeté inébranlable. Le sort des états dépend souvent d'une affaire décisive ; autant qu'on doit l'engager, si l'on trouve ses avantages, autant faut il l'éviter si le risque que l'on y court surpasse le bien qu'on en espère.

“Il-y-a plus qu'un chemin à suivre qui mènent tous au même but ; on doit s'appliquer ensemble à détruire l'ennemi en détail ; qu'importe de quels moyens on se serve pourvu que l'on gagne la supériorité. L'ennemi fait nombre de détachemens ; les généraux qui les mènent ne sont ni également prudents, ni ne sont circonspects tous les jours, il faut se proposer de ruiner ces détachemens l'un après l'autre. Il ne faut point traiter ces expéditions en bagatelles, mais y marcher en force, y donner de

bons coups de collier, et traiter ces petits combats aussi sérieusement que s'il s'agissait d'affaires décisives. L'avantage que vous en retirez, si vous réussissez deux fois à écraser de ces corps séparés, sera de réduire l'ennemi sur la défensive ; à force de circonspection il se tiendra rassemblé, et vous fournira peut-être les occasions de lui enlever des canons, ou peut-être d'entreprendre avec succès sur sa grande armée. Il s'offre encore à l'esprit d'autres idées que celle-ci ; j'ose à peine les proposer dans les conjonctures présentes, où accablés par le poids de toute l'Europe, contraints de courir la poste avec des armées pour arriver à temps, soit pour défendre une frontière, soit pour voler au secours d'une autre province, nous nous trouvons forcés de recevoir la loi de nos ennemis au lieu de la leur donner, et de régler nos opérations sur les leurs. Cependant, comme les situations violentes ne sont pas de durée, et qu'un seul événement peut apporter un changement considérable dans les affaires, je crois vous devoir découvrir ma pensée sur la façon d'établir le théâtre de la guerre.

“ Tant que nous n'attirerons pas l'ennemi dans les plaines, nous ne devons pas nous flatter d'emporter sur lui de grands avantages ; mais dès que nous pourrons le priver de ses montagnes, de ses forêts, et terrains coupés, dont il tire une si grande utilité, ses troupes ne pourront plus résister aux nôtres. Mais où trouver ces plaines ? me direz-vous—sera-ce en Moravie ? en Bohême ? à Goerlitz, à Zittau, à Freyberg ? Je vous réponds que non, mais que ces terrains se trouvent dans la Basse Silésie, et que l'insatiable ardeur avec laquelle la Cour de Vienne désire de reconquérir ce Duché, l'engagera tôt ou tard à y envoyer ses troupes. C'est alors qu'obligés de quitter leurs postes, la force de leur ordonnance et l'attirail imposant de leur canon se réduiront à peu de chose. Si leur armée entre dans la plaine au commencement d'une campagne, leur témérité pourra entraîner leur ruine, et dès lors toutes les opérations des armées Prussiennes, soit en Bohême, soit en Moravie, réussiront sans peine. C'est un expédient fâcheux, me direz-vous, que celui d'attirer l'ennemi dans le pays ; j'en conviens ; et cependant c'est l'unique, parcequ'il n'a pas plu à la nature de faire des plaines en Bohême et en Moravie, mais de les charger de bois et de montagnes. Il ne nous reste qu'à

choisir ce terrain avantageux où il est, sans nous embarrasser d'autres choses.

"Si je loue la tactique des Autrichiens, je ne puis que les blâmer de leur projets de campagne, et de leur conduite dans les grandes parties de la guerre. Il n'est pas permis avec des forces aussi supérieures, avec autant d'alliés que cette puissance tient à sa disposition, d'en tirer un si petit avantage. Je ne saurais assez m'étonner du manque de concert dans les opérations de tant d'armées qui, si elles faisaient un effort général, écraseraient les troupes Prussiennes toutes en même temps. Que de lenteur dans l'exécution de leurs projets ! Combien d'occasions n'ont-ils pas laissé échapper ! En un mot, que de fautes énormes auxquelles jusqu'à présent nous devons notre salut ! Voilà tout le fruit que j'ai retiré de cette campagne ; l'empreinte encore vive de ces images m'a fourni lieu de faire quelques réflexions ; je croirai le temps que j'ai mis à les recueillir utilement employé, si elles vous donnent lieu à des méditations et à la production de vos pensées, qui vaudront mieux que les miennes.

Signé "FREDERIC.

"A BRESLAU, ce 21 de Décembre, 1758.

"A MON LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DE LA MOTTE FOUQUET."

COPIE DE LA REPOSE DE M. FOUQUET AU ROI, AU SUJET DES
REFLEXIONS CI-DESSUS.

SIRE,

"Il est étonnant, Sire, et il paraît même surnaturel de voir suffire votre Majesté à tant de différentes occupations d'un détail infini ; aussi vous êtes, Sire, l'unique dans ce monde qui puissiez y satisfaire. Sans contredit, celles de la guerre sont les plus pressantes et nécessaires.

"Il semble, Sire, qu'en me communiquant vos réflexions sur la tactique, et quelques parties de la guerre, votre Majesté approuve, ou plutôt m'ordonne de lui dire mon sentiment ; ce qui est proprement demander la leçon à son écolier. J'obéis, Sire, en me flattant même de courir aucun risque, puisque la

sincérité de mes sentimens vous est connue, aussi bien que mon attachement pour votre service, et mon zèle pour votre auguste personne. J'espère et me flatte que si la guerre continue, votre Majesté n'aura plus tant d'armées ennemies sur le bras, et qu'il s'en détraquera des parties ; car si ce concert continue sur le même pied, naturellement nous devons succomber.

“ Les remarques auxquelles votre Majesté a donné le plus de son attention, se fondent principalement sur trois points : la manière de camper des Autrichiens, tant sur leur front que sur leur flanc. Je crois qu'il ne serait à propos de les imiter que lorsqu'on aurait pour objet de leur défendre un passage ou l'entrée d'un pays, de couvrir une place, ou (supposé que notre armée leur fut de beaucoup inférieure) pour éviter le combat. Deux armées qui auraient le même but vis-à-vis l'une de l'autre, courraient fort risque de passer une campagne à ne rien faire de considerable, ce qui ne convient pas à notre but ; et c'est certainement aussi ce qui n'arrivera pas, car il se fera des détachemens de part et d'autre, qui conduiront à d'autres positions d'armées, qui pourront donner occasion à des combats.

“ Je pense qu'un camp nous conviendrait, qui aurait ses ailes bien appuyées pour ne pouvoir être tourné, et dont le front serait uni sans avantage réel de part et d'autre, ce qui pourrait tenter les Autrichiens de venir à nous, et nous donnerait la facilité de marcher à leur rencontre. Il ne s'agirait alors que de trouver des camps dont les appuis côtoyeraient les ailes et les flancs.

“ Rien de plus solide, Sire, de mieux pensé, ni de plus désirable que le projet d'attirer les ennemis dans la plaine. Il est vrai que cela ne se peut que par le sacrifice d'une grande partie du pays ; mais d'une autre côté, cela pourrait conduire au but, qu'il ne serait question alors que de bien pourvoir les places frontières. Je ne sais si ma conjecture est juste, qui est, qu'en examinant la conduite du Général Daun dans la dernière campagne, je ne répondrai pas que si le vieux renard conserve le commandement de l'armée, vous réussissiez à le faire sortir de ses tanières. Il me semble que ce général se soit fait un système tout opposé. Les batailles de Striegau et de Leuthen sont trop présentes à leur mémoire. Si ce projet a lieu, il nous conduira à deux choses ; nous avons toujours prévenu nos

ennemis par l'ouverture des campagnes ; il faudrait en ce cas leur céder le premier pas et les marches.

“ Quant au second point, qui est celui d'attaquer leur armée en marche, elle est en effet, comme votre Majesté le remarque, si bien conduite et masquée par le nombre de leur troupes légères, qu'on ne doit guère s'attendre à y emporter quelques avantages réels. Il en est de même de l'attaque de leur postes, qui sont forts et inabordables ; ce serait y sacrifier une infinité de monde et le succès en serait incertain. Si le post est mauvais, ils l'abandonnerait aussitôt, dont leurs généraux ont donné, devant nous de différentes preuves. Nonobstant ces difficultés, il serait bien fâcheux si dans une campagne, il ne se présentait pas une occasion à les trouver en défaut.

“ L'article de l'artillerie, sans doute, est capital. Toute l'artillerie de votre Majesté convient des points suivans : que l'artillerie des Autrichiens est de beaucoup supérieure à la nôtre ; qu'elle est mieux servie, et qu'elle atteint de plus loin par la bonté de la poudre, et la charge ordinaire qu'ils y donnent.

“ C'est la seule et unique source, Sire, des remarques que votre Majesté vient de faire sur la valeur intrinsèque de notre infanterie présente. Les Romains adoptèrent les épées de bonne trempe des Gaulois, et vainquirent même ceux qui les avaient vaincus les premiers.

“ Suivons leur exemple, comme votre Majesté l'a fort bien résolu ; opposez canon à canon avec la proportion des artilleurs, et vous ferez, Sire, de votre armée autant de bataillons sacrés des Thébains. Il n'y-a que cette supériorité d'artillerie dont ils ont senti les effets, qui a ralenti leur ardeur naturelle.

“ Je suis, Sire,

“ De votre Majesté

“ Le très humble et obéissant serviteur,

Signé “ FOUQUET.”

REPONSE DU ROI.

“ Je vous remercie de ce que vous m'écrivez au sujet des réflexions militaires que je vous ai envoyées. Je pense comme vous—mais il ne faut pas sonner mot de ceci.

“Les Turcs ne resteront pas le printemps les bras croisés. Le Roi d’Espagne est mourant, voilà qui donnera de l’ouvrage à ces lâches conjurés qui travaillent à ma ruine. Si le gens qui ne portent point de chapeaux se tournent vers les barbares, toute cette horde disparaltra, et la Suède quittera la partie ; par contre, s’ils se tournent vers ces insolens voisins, ils ne pourront pas s’opposer vigoureusement à moi et au circonsis en même temps ; et si par-dessus tout cela le Roi d’Espagne meurt, voilà une guerre qui s’allumera aussitôt en Italie, et ces fols et étourdis compatriotes seront obligés de se brouiller avec les insolens et fiers tyrans de l’Allemagne. Tout cela empêche de former à présent un plan d’opération ; il faut que le temps nous révèle ce qui doit arriver, que l’on voie les mesures que prendront nos ennemis, alors on pourra se déterminer sur ce qui sera convenable de faire.

“Adieu, mon cher ami, je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur, en vous assurant de ma tendresse et de mon estime, qui ne finiront qu’avec ma vie.

Signé “FREDERIC.

“BRESLAU, *ce 9 Janvier, 1759.*

“A MON LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BARON LA MOTTE FOUQUET.”

B.—p. 211.

EVACUATION OF BOSTON.

EXTRACTS FROM A DESPATCH OF GENERAL HOWE TO THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH DATED FROM ON BOARD H. M. SHIP CHATHAM, NANTASKET ROAD 21 MARCH 1776.

“THE Rebels about the latter end of January erected new works and batteries on a point of land opposite to West Boston at a place known by the name of Phipp’s farm which lying under cover of their strongest fort was not to be prevented. . . . On the 2nd inst. at night they began a cannonade upon the town, the same was repeated on the evening of the 3rd and 4th. On the 5th in the morning it was discovered that the enemy had thrown up three very extensive works with

strong abattie's on the commanding hills on Dorchester Neck which must have been the employment of at least 12,000 men. In a situation so critical I determined upon immediate attack; the ardour of the troops encouraged me in this hazardous enterprise, and regiments were expeditiously embarked on board transports to fall down the harbour; but the wind unfortunately coming contrary and blowing very hard the ships were not able to get to their destination. . . .

The weather continuing boisterous the next day and night gave the enemy time to improve their works, to bring up their cannon, and to put themselves into such a state of defence that I could promise myself little success by attacking them under such disadvantages; wherefore I judged it most advisable to prepare for the evacuation of the town. . . . This operation was effected on the 7th and all the rear guard embarked at 9 o'clock in the morning, without the least loss, irregularity or accident."

C.—p. 229.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL BURGOWNE'S PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN
FROM THE SIDE OF CANADA WITH THE REMARKS THEREON
OF GEORGE THE THIRD.

"As the present means to form effectual plans is to lay down every possible difficulty, I will suppose the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga; the different works there are capable of admitting twelve thousand men.

"I will suppose him also to occupy Lake George with a considerable naval strength, in order to secure his retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign; and it is natural to expect that he will take measures to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by the way of Skenesborough, by fortifying the strong ground at different places, and thereby obliging the King's army to carry a weight of artillery with it, and by felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though he should not have power or spirit finally to resist, its progress.

"The enemy thus disposed upon the side of Canada, it is to be considered what troops will be necessary, and what disposition of them will be most proper to prosecute the campaign with vigour and effect.

"I humbly conceive the operating army (I mean exclusively of the troops left for the security of Canada) ought not to consist of less than eight thousand regulars, rank and file. The artillery required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of waterman, two thousand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, and one thousand or more savages.

"The navigation of Lake Champlain, secured by the superiority of our naval force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines so established as to make the execution certain, I would not lose a day to take possession of Crown Point with Brigadier Fraser's corps, a large body of savages, a body of Canadians, both for scouts and works, and the best of our engineers and artificers well supplied with intrenching tools.

"If due exertion is made in the preparations stated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will be reduced early in the summer, and it will then become a more proper place for arms than Crown Point.

"The next measure must depend upon those taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that General Howe's old forces should act upon Hudson's River, and to the southward of it, and that the only object of the Canada army be to effect a junction with that force, the immediate possession of Lake George would be of great consequence, as the most expeditious and the most commodious route to Albany; and should the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort should be tried, by throwing savages and light troops round it, to oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should those efforts fail, the route by South Bay and Skenesborough might be attempted, but considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily choaked up and rendered impassable, and at best there will be a necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provision, &c., which can only be

supplied from Canada. In case of success also by that route, and the enemy not removed from Lake George, it will be necessary to leave a chain of posts, as the army proceeds, for the securities of your communication, which may too much weaken so small an army.

“Lest all these attempts should unavoidably fail, and it become indispensably necessary to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outset should be provided with carriages, implements and artificers, for conveying armed vessels from Ticonderoga to the lake.

“These ideas are formed upon the supposition, that it be the sole purpose of the Canada army to effect a junction with General Howe, or after co-operating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication to New York, to remain upon the Hudson’s River, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the southward.

“But should the strength of the main American army be such as to admit of the corps of troops now at Rhode Island remaining there during the winter, and acting separately in the spring, it may be highly worthy consideration, *whether the most important purpose to which the Canada army could be employed, supposing it in possession of Ticonderoga, would not be to gain the Connecticut River.*

“To avoid breaking in upon other matter, I omitted in the beginning of these papers to state the idea of an expedition at the outset of the campaign by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk River, which, as a diversion to facilitate every proposed operation, would be highly desirable, provided the army should be reinforced sufficiently to afford it.

“It may at first appear, from a view of the present strength of the army, that it may bear the sort of detachment proposed by myself last year for this purpose ; but it is to be considered that at that time the utmost object of the campaign, from the advanced season and unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes, being the reduction of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unless the success of my expedition had opened the road to Albany, no greater numbers were necessary than for those first operations. The case in the present year differs ; because the season of the year affording a prospect of very extensive

operations, and necessitating consequently the establishment of many posts, patrols, &c. *the army ought to be in a state of numbers to bear those drains, and still remain sufficient to attack any thing that probably can be opposed to it.*

"Should it appear upon examination of the really effective numbers of the Canada army, that the force is not sufficient for proceeding upon the above ideas with a fair prospect of success, the alternative remains of embarking the army at Quebec, in order to effect a junction with General Howe by sea, or to be employed separately to co-operate with the main designs, by such means as should be within their strength upon other parts of the continent. And though the army, upon examination of the numbers from the returns here, and the reinforcements designed, should appear adequate, it is humbly submitted, as a security against the possibility of its remaining inactive, whether it might not be expedient to entrust the latitude of embarking the army by sea to the commander-in-chief, provided any accidents during the winter, and unknown here, should have diminished the numbers considerably, or that the enemy, from any winter success to the southward, should have been able to draw such forces towards the frontiers of Canada, and take up their ground with such precaution as to render the intended measure impracticable or too hazardous. But in that case it must be considered that more force would be required to be left behind for the security of Canada, than is supposed to be necessary when an army is beyond the lakes; and I do not conceive any expedition from the sea can be so formidable to the enemy, or so effectual to close the war, as an invasion from Canada by Ticonderoga."

"REMARKS ON '*The Conduct of the War from Canada.*'"

FROM THE ORIGINAL MS. IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM IN THE
HANDWRITING OF GEORGE THE THIRD.

"The outlines of the plan seem to be on a proper foundation. The rank and file of the army in Canada (including the 11th of British, McClean's corps, the Brunswicks and Hanover) amount to 10,527; add the eleven additional companies and 400 Hanover Chasseurs, the total will be 11,443.

"As sickness and other contingencies must be expected, I should think not above 7,000 effectives can be spared over Lake Champlain, for it would be highly imprudent to run any risk in Canada.

"The fixing of stations of those left in the province may not be quite right, though the plan proposed may be recommended. Indians must be employed, and this measure must be avowedly directed. . . .

"As Sir William Howe does not think of acting from Rhode Island into Massachusetts, *the force from Canada must join him at Albany.*

"The diversion on the Mohawk River ought, at least, to be strengthened by the addition of 400 Hanover Chasseurs.

"The provisions ought to be calculated for a third more than the effective soldiery, and the General ordered to avoid delivering these when the army can be subsisted from the country.

"Burgoyne certainly greatly undervalues the German recruits.

"The idea of carrying the army by sea to Sir William Howe would certainly require the leaving a much larger part of it in Canada, as in that case the rebel army would divide that province from the immense one under Sir W. Howe. I greatly dislike that idea.

"GEORGE R."

Burgoyne's plan, modified by this memorandum, became ultimately the groundwork of the campaign, clearly leaving the Commander no option but to force his way to Albany.

D.—p. 240.

FORCE EMPLOYED UNDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGOYNE IN
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1777.

The army which took the field in July, 1777, consisted of seven battalions of British Infantry; viz. 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 47th, 53rd, and 62nd Regiments, of each of which (as also of three regiments left in Canada) the flank companies were

detached to form a corps of Grenadiers and Light Infantry, under Majors Ackland and the Earl of Balcarres. The German troops consisted of Hessian Rifles, a corps of dismounted Dragoons, and a mixed force of Brunswickers. The artillery was composed of 511 rank and file, including 100 Germans, with a large number of guns, the greater part of which, however, were employed only on the Lakes. The ordnance which accompanied the force on the line of march consisted of thirty-eight pieces of light artillery attached to columns, and a pair of six twenty-four pounders, six twelve-pounders, and four howitzers.

This little army was divided into three brigades under Major-General Phillips,¹ of the Royal Artillery, and Brigadier-Generals Fraser and Hamilton. The German troops were distributed among the three brigades, with one corps of reserve under Colonel Breymann, and were immediately commanded by Major-General Reidesel. Colonel Kingston and Captain Money acted as Adjutant and Quarter-Master General, and Sir James Clerke (killed at Saratoga) and Lord Petersham (afterwards Earl of Harrington) were aides-de-camp to General Burgoyne.

The total force was :—

British	4,135	
German	3,116	
Canadian Militia	148	Rank and file.
Indians	503	
Total	<u>7,902</u>	

Of these numbers General Burgoyne was obliged to detach nearly 1,000 men to garrison Ticonderoga before he crossed the Hudson.

¹ The employment of artillery officers in command of Infantry brigades was at that time contrary to regulation, and General Burgoyne, in a letter to General Hervey of 11 July, '77, excuses himself for having made this arrangement by the statement that "the service must suffer in the most material degree if the talents of General Phillips were not suffered to extend beyond the artillery, and I hold myself fully justified in continuing this great use."

F.—p. 242.

EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURGOYNE TO THE INDIANS ASSEMBLED AT THE CAMP UPON THE RIVER BOUQUET, JUNE 21, 1777.

“THE clemency of your father has been abused, the offers of his mercy have been despised, and his further patience would, in his eyes, become culpable, inasmuch as it would withhold redress from the most grievous oppressions in the provinces that ever disgraced the history of mankind. It therefore remains for me, the General of one of His Majesty’s armies and in this Council his representative, to release you from those bonds which your obedience imposed.

“Warriors, you are free! Go forth in the might of your valour and your cause; strike at the common enemies of Great Britain and America—disturbers of public order, peace, and happiness—destroyers of commerce, parricides of the State.

“The circle around you, the chiefs of His Majesty’s European forces and of the Princes his allies, esteem you as brothers in the war. . . . Be it our task, from the dictates of our religion, the laws of our warfare, and the principles and interests of our policy, to regulate your passions when they overbear, to point out where it is nobler to spare than to revenge, to discriminate the degrees of guilt, to suspend the uplifted stroke, to chastise and not to destroy. . . .

“I positively forbid bloodshed when you are not opposed in arms.

“Aged men, women, children, and prisoners must be held secure from the knife or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict.

“You shall receive compensation for the prisoners you take, but you will be called to account for scalps.

“In conformity and indulgence to your customs, which have affixed an idea of honour to such badges of victory, you will

be allowed to take the scalps of the dead when killed by your fire or in fair opposition, but on no account or pretence or subtilty or prevarication are they to be taken from the wounded or even from the dying, and still less pardonable will it be held to kill men in that condition. . . . Should the enemy on their part dare to countenance acts of barbarity towards those who fall into their hands, it shall be yours also to retaliate, but till severity shall be thus compelled, bear immovable in your hearts this solid maxim : that the sincerity of your zeal to the King, your father and never-failing protector, will be examined and judged upon the test only of your steady and uniform adherence to the orders and counsels of those to whom His Majesty has entrusted the direction and the honour of his arms."

F.—p. 256.

"BY JOHN BURGOYNE, ESQ., LIEUTENANT-GENERAL OF HIS MAJESTY'S ARMIES IN AMERICA, COLONEL OF THE QUEEN'S REGIMENT OF LIGHT DRAGOONS, GOVERNOR OF FORT GEORGE IN NORTH-BRITAIN, ONE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONS OF GREAT-BRITAIN IN PARLIAMENT, AND COMMANDING AN ARMY AND FLEET EMPLOYED ON AN EXPEDITION FROM CANADA, &c. &c. &c.

"THE Troops united to my command are designed to act in concert, and upon a common principle, with the numerous armies and fleets which already display in every quarter of America, the power, the justice, and, when properly met, the mercy of the King.

"The cause in which the British Arms are thus exerted applies to the most affecting interests of the human heart : and the faithful servants of the Crown, at first called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights of the Constitution, now combine with love of their Country, and duty to their Sovereign, the other extensive incitements which spring from

a due sense of the general privileges of Mankind. To the eyes and ears of the temperate part of the public, and to the breasts of Suffering Thousands in the provinces, be the melancholy appeal whether the present unnatural rebellion has not been made a foundation for the completest system of Tyranny that ever God in his displeasure suffered for a time to be exercised over a froward and stubborn generation.

“Arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, persecution and torture, unprecedented in the inquisitions of the Romish church, are among the palpable enormities that verify the affirmative. These are inflicted by assemblies and committees, who dare to profess themselves friends to Liberty, upon the most quiet subjects, without distinction of age or sex, for the sole crime, often for the sole suspicion, of having adhered in principle to the Government under which they were born, and to which by every tie divine and human they owe allegiance. To consummate these shocking proceedings the profanation of religion is added to the most profligate prostitution of common reason; the consciences of men are set at nought; and multitudes are compelled not only to bear arms, but also to swear subjection to an usurpation they abhor.

“Animated by these considerations; at the head of troops in the full powers of health, discipline, and valour; determined to strike where necessary, and anxious to spare where possible, I by these presents invite and exhort all persons, in all places where the progress of this army may point—and by the blessing of God I will extend it far—to maintain such a conduct as may justify me in protecting their lands, habitations, and family. The intention of this address is to hold forth security not depredation to the country.

“To those whom spirit and principle may induce to partake the glorious task of redeeming their Countrymen from dungeons, and reestablishing the blessings of legal government, I offer encouragement and employment; and upon the first intelligence of their associations I will find means to assist their undertakings. The domestic, the industrious, the infirm, and even the timid inhabitants I am desirous to protect pro-

vided they remain quietly at their houses, that they do not suffer their cattle to be removed, nor their corn or forage to be secreted or destroyed ; that they do not break up their bridges or roads ; nor by any other acts directly or indirectly endeavour to obstruct the operations of the King's troops, or supply or assist those of the Enemy.

" Every species of provision brought to my camp will be paid for at an equitable rate and in solid Coin.

"In consciousness of Christianity, my Royal Master's clemency, and the honour of soldiership, I have dwelt upon this invitation, and wished for more persuasive terms to give it impression : And let not people be led to disregard it by considering their distance from the immediate situation of my camp—— I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the hardened enemies of Great-Britain and America, and I consider them the same, wherever they may lurk.

"If notwithstanding these endeavours, and sincere inclinations to effect them, the phrensy of hostility should remain, I trust I shall stand acquitted in the eyes of God and men in denouncing and executing the vengeance of the State against the wilful outcasts——The messengers of justice and of wrath await them in the field ; and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return.¹

" J. BURGOYNE.

" By order of

" HIS EXCELLENCY THE LT.-GENERAL

" ROBT. KINGSTON, *Secretary*.

" CAMP AT TICONDEROGA,

" 30th June, 1777."

¹ For a parody upon the two concluding paragraphs, see *ante*, p. 256.

G.—p. 310.

GENERAL GATES' ARMY AT SARATOGA.

THE Return furnished by General Gates, and published under his signature in *The State of the Expedition*, quotes the total rank and file of his army as amounting to 18,624. These numbers are, however, stated to include 1,353 sick and wounded and 180 on furlough, so that the effective numbers present at the time of the capitulation were 17,091 rank and file.

On the subject of the losses sustained by the Colonists in this campaign, American writers display a very remarkable diversity of opinion. Probably in the then unformed state of the military staff and departments, returns were imperfectly rendered. Their casualties, more especially at Huberton and at Freeman's Farm, must have been very severe.

H.—p. 355.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE (AFTERWARDS GERMAIN).

AT the battle of Minden (1st August, 1759) Lord George Sackville was in command of the English forces, and on the enemy being thrown into confusion he was ordered by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the Commander-in-Chief, to charge the retreating French columns with his cavalry. This order was successively delivered by three aides-de-camp,¹ but Lord George could not be induced to comply with it.

In his general orders promulgated on the conclusion of the battle, Prince Ferdinand omitted all mention of the English Commander-in-Chief, but gave high praise to his second in command, the Marquis of Granby, who had on his own responsibility attempted to retrieve the conduct of his superior by

¹ Colonel Mauvillon, who was then serving on the staff of Prince Ferdinand, states from his personal knowledge that the order sent to Lord George Sackville was to "advance and charge" (*Vorrücken und einhauen*), and openly charges him with cowardice in having declined to obey.—See his *Campaigns of Prince Ferdinand*.

leading the charge, although the delay incurred prevented it from having the desired effect.

As soon as the English King heard of the misconduct of his General, he struck his name off the list of the army, and of the Privy Council, and dismissed him from his post of Master-General of the Ordnance.¹ Lord George thereupon demanded a court-martial, a claim which gave rise to the question, whether one who had ceased to belong to the army could be held amenable to a military tribunal. It was ruled by the law officers that a person did remain subject to the operations of the Mutiny Act for offences which he had committed while in the army, even though he had ceased to hold any military appointment or commission.² It is said that the King, who keenly felt the slur which had been cast upon his army,³ wished the extreme penalty to be inflicted upon Lord George Sackville ;⁴ but that the powerful influence of the house of Dorset was exerted to save his life, and the charge against him was accordingly qualified into a disobedience of orders. It was probably due to the same family influence that the established terms of the sentence were departed from, inasmuch as the accused was declared incapacitated *from military employment*, and not, as usually expressed, from any employment under the Crown *civil or military*. Had not this exception been made in favour of Lord George Sackville he could never have obtained a seat in the Cabinet, and our differences with the American Colonies might have had a different issue.

In approving the sentence of dismissal the King appended the following remarks :—

“It is His Majesty’s pleasure that the above sentence be given out in public orders, that officers, being convinced that neither high birth nor great employment can shelter offences of such a nature, and that, seeing that they are subject to censure

¹ To mark his displeasure more emphatically, the King conferred this office upon Lord Granby.

² The case is quoted in *Simmons on Courts-Martial*.

³ His Majesty was desirous of expelling Lord George from the House of Commons, and on Pitt resisting such a proposal, said, “I wish Pitt joy of the company he wishes to keep.”

⁴ Only three years earlier he had approved the sentence of death passed upon a gallant sailor for an alleged “error of judgment.”

much worse than death to a man who has any sense of honour, they may avoid the fatal consequences arising from disobedience of orders."

Lord George affected to attribute the imputations made upon his character to personal feeling on the part of Prince Ferdinand, but the tribunal before which he was arraigned was composed of British officers, interested in removing the slur upon the honour of their service, if such were possible, and the witnesses upon whose evidence he was mainly convicted were the members of his own staff and his personal friends.¹

A famous contemporary, Lord Shelburne, asserted that this want of physical courage was not confined to one member of the family, but that Lord George's elder brother, early in life, when ordered to proceed on active service, refused to embark, and had to leave the army in consequence, and that on hearing of Lord George's conduct at Minden, he remarked, "I always told you that my brother was no better than myself."

We have it on the same authority, that while Lord George, during his boyhood, was living in the house of Mr. Carter, the Master of the Rolls for Ireland, that gentleman saw enough of his character in his intercourse with boys of his own age to induce him to advise the Duke of Dorset "never to put his son into the army."²

The absence of physical courage in a man is as a rule accompanied by other moral defects of a peculiarly degrading character, and we may, therefore, accept without surprise the statement of Lord Shelburne, when he tells us that he was informed by officers belonging to the regiment which Lord George Sackville commanded, that they had frequently found their colonel listening outside their tents, to hear what was said of him.

¹ Colonel Fitzroy states that he was still urging the command for the charge when Captain Ligonier arrived with a similar pressing order; that Lord George "appeared to be under some disorder that he took pains to conceal," that "his voice faltered as he spoke;" and finally, in reply to a direct question by the Court, he said: "I cannot conceive what other motives he could have had except fear." The evidence of Lord George's aides-de-camp was even more conclusive.

² See the *Life of Lord Shelburne*, by Lord E. Fitzmaurice, 1874.

Nor was it at Minden that he first gave public proof of his want of personal courage, which had become so conspicuous on the occasion of his taking part in one of the expeditions to the coast of France in the early part of the Seven Years' War, that the event was commemorated in the newspapers of the time by a squib, in which the following lines occur :—

“ All pale and trembling on the Gallic shore,
His lordship gave the word and—nothing more !
’Twixt life and scandal, honour and the grave,
Quickly deciding which ’twas best to save,
Back to the ship he ploughed the swelling wave.”

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