

The Seven Years' War Association

# Prince Henry, Brother of Frederick the Great

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*Figure 1 Prince Henry by J.H. Tischbein, 1769.*

## Translator's Introduction

What follows is a translation of Ulrich von Crousaz's biography of Prince Henry of Prussia, originally published in Berlin in 1876. It is, therefore, indicative of the German nationalist school of historiography, praising the leadership and masculine virtues of the house of Hohenzollern. While there is much of nationalist propaganda in Crousaz's work, which is to be expected, the new German Empire was only five years old when it was published, there is a solid though brief account of Henry's life as well.

I embarked on this project for two reasons. First, Prince Henry is an under-investigated figure in the history of Prussia, and especially in the Seven Years' War. He often commanded very small forces yet managed to keep numerically superior opponents off balance. Henry proved himself an expert at maneuver and choosing excellent defensive positions.

Second, I performed a significant amount of translating of eighteenth century German sources for my biography of the Hessian Jäger commander and theorist Johann von Ewald and did not want the skills developed to atrophy. The answer seemed to keep practicing and honing the skills already developed. Prince Henry appealed as a figure who is definitely under-represented in the literature on the period. It is my hope that the following biography, while definitely a product of its time, will spur further research into the life and military career of Prince Henry.

Finally, a note on the translation. I have not attempted to provide a literal rendering of the German text. This would prove quite unwieldy in English, as many sentences were quite long, divided only by semi-colons. In many instances, to enhance the clarity of the text, I divided these lengthy sentences into smaller ones.

## Prince Henry, Brother of Frederick the Great

Important people shape the laws of posterity more than the ordinary ones. Every superior has an originality that belongs only to him, and each one has his outer limitations and levers designed differently. All in all, his position in the world of posterity and the material world was formed by his attributes. If providence made it clear to him, history and tradition also celebrate him; If it has been clothed by her in more difficult forms, reduced to a less illuminated and comprehensible life, then, in spite of his most serious efforts, only a deeper knowledge will penetrate to his point of view.

In this latter category belongs the hero with whom we deal here: a lighter, next to a still brighter star; a general like Fabius, whose value and effect was more profound than broad, more inwardly powerful, than of extraordinary brilliance; a fluid subject in his labor, but by providence had no nimbus of poetry, and had no popular communication with anyone.

Prince Henry has hitherto been neglected by history and has been limited by it to the indispensable duty of subordinate. If Zieten and Seidlitz, Schwerin and Winterfeld are popular figures, then this intellectual hero, to whom the fatherland has even more to thank than the latter, is quite outside the horizon of the people; if Frederick II's fame is proclaimed endlessly, then no German biographer has yet been found a worthy subject in Prince Henry, who was Frederick's martial supporter, and whom he himself set so high. Henry lacked the poetic impulse, the German rudeness and the worldly side of it, the peacetime age, the simple house, the strict breeding of Incurggus as father and warlord, round about the soldier Puritans, one braid like the other, German to the core, but of a sober nature; and then, when Henry was barely over fourteen

years of age, a thunderclap transforming the whole situation! -The former sinks into the earth, the genius ascends to the throne, and all the arts accompany it. Philosophy and humanity come into action; while the French education advances, the German spirit makes its progress; while one pays homage to the muses, the war is declared. Surprising facts throng, miracles and wonders emerge, every apparent paradox conquers the ground of truth.

Under such intercessions Henry completed his boyhood and apprenticeship; the First and Second Silesian War made him a youth, in the ensuing peace time he became a man. The Seven-Years War devastated his talents and his male worth, and afterwards, in Frederick's remaining government, he remained a great talent and important aid.

But how did our hero come into being through investment in education? Life experience?  
- Did he show himself in his perfection, and what was his spiritual relation with the king?

Henry's outward appearance, where he was a stranger, created as a whole no particular impressions. With barely a medium-sized figure, gait, posture, and intellect were not exactly what distinguished him, and he could, according to his behavior, be considered too serious. With him, as with his big brother, the inner matter expressed itself only in individual parts of the outer being. His high-brow had to be appreciated by every phrenologist; in his big blue eyes lay a similar fire as in that of Frederick; and whoever understood such things easily made it clear that from these windows in the dense fog we could see through to his intricacies. He lacked the poetic impulse, the German rudeness and the only theoretical and the secondary things, in practice on the other hand, always noble, devoted, precise and indefatigable - that is how Prince Henry showed himself throughout, mostly in the age of the Seven Years' War. If he would sometimes be uncomfortable with these qualities to the great king in small circumstances-the heart and eye of the observer of the latter has nevertheless appreciated him immeasurably. One recognizes this

already from just after the death of Winterfeld's, on 17 September 1757 in Kirschleben with Erfurt in written letters by Friedrichs to the Margravine of Bayreuth, in which it says: "I have to wish my brother Henry luck; As a soldier, he got himself an angel and a brother very well against me." An ode Friedrich composed at Eckartsberg, not far from Merseburg, on October 6, 1757, addresses himself to Prince Henry, and enthusiastically segregates him as the point of support and helper of the hard-pressed homeland. When he claimed Saxony in the unfortunate year of 1759 and held Daun at bay, the king said, approvingly: "Prince Henry is the only general who made no mistake in this campaign"; and on the occasion of the victory of Freiberg said that great, in his eulogies otherwise frugal connoisseurs of military deeds: "The most beautiful praise that can be attached to Prince Henry is the account of his deeds; Connoisseurs will easily notice in this the happy mixture of sublime and boldness that goes with making a perfect and great war hero."

These are only a few of the key points that emerge from the stories, but they would already erect a memorial to Prince Henry. The consideration given by them to great facts, which Frederick dedicated to this brother, has always remained unchanged; It honored both, and has been recorded by history not only as a pleasing one, but also as a fruitful one to the Prussian state.

Prince Henry was not as versatile, as interesting and as popular as Frederick. He had no strings playing with his sword, he did not read Horace, while he struck his enemies, went with miserly boots, and lacked the generous thoughts of his Royal Brother; but he had more caution and correctness for the individual, understood the art of waiting, and did not rush. If Frederick's monstrous activity at work sometimes made him stumble, then Prince Henry in his narrower lines has always been as infallible as a human being can be. Not aggressive, Frederick, but

usually defending and averse to the venture, he nevertheless persuaded, in special circumstances, to shake off great struggles from his sleeve.

History seldom shows such extraordinary brothers beside each other; where Providence unites so much art and genius, as it is based on these two, on a single point, it always ends in a special purpose. This is most true of their reciprocity in the Seven Years War. There, just because of their differences, they very happily complemented each other. Prince Henry alone would not have been universal enough to wage a seven-year war at all; Frederick alone, without his brother, would not have been able to carry this fight against the European powers up to the culmination of Hubertusburg.

The king needed in this war a point at which the line of his operative power was ascertained, which, while describing his circles, his blows, wanted to remain fixed. The scene was in Saxony, and Prince Henry succeeded there by his perseverance and his genius. As Frederick wheeled around, retreating and rebounding, his invisible brother covered his back, engaged the Austrians, and prepared a base and held his ground. What would Frederick have become, if he had not had this base ?!

Henry was a wise general, to be put in the same line as Frederick Henry of Orange, Catinat, and Montecuculi; in one point he reminded more of this, and in the other more of that master of rational warfare. He led the most admirable war of defense, one which often leads to decisive offense; While he presented Fabius for the most part, he was always in wait for the moment to strike. His defensive strength did not stick to coherent entrenchment lines, but to groups of separate positions, to heights and behind rivers, which were always well chosen and in mutual support. The same was very cleverly thought out for the role of war which assigned him,

and the counterpart with whom he had been engaged; where the situation changed, his keen intellect immediately resorted to finding another and always appropriate method.

When the first Silesian war broke out, Prince Henry was barely fifteen years old, and in him was a fugitive who was shaking off the school and dust of the book shelf, and is now to watch, wander, and learn. He will learn more in a year of the practice of war than in all his previous life; he is not yet properly suited to the first Silesian war, but this must be very much for him. As a volunteer alongside the warlord, he found the most opportunity to observe and absorb the image and nature of the war. His high point of view gave him all the information, and his keen eye would have let little escape from the flashes of genius, the decisive actions, the other defects that favored and those which remained to be desired on our part. Out of this ignorance, for which Henry was already mature enough, a pedestal of that state of war-time formed, which later made him a leader.

The two-year calm after the peace of Berlin allowed the prince to mentally process what he learned during the war. How satisfied the King was with him was shown in 1744 by the donation made to Prince Heinrich by the castle of Rheinsberg, from which Frederick's most beautiful reminiscences emanated, and which was, as it were, a piece of his heart. That the Chronicle of Rheinsberg nevertheless remain under the monarchy of Frederick, and would put Prince Henry in the shade, even after many years of command of the castle, the King could not see in his donation.

The second Silesian war shows Prince Henry mostly as a recipient. He already strived to be warlike, but only attempts and preliminary exercises are found; he does come here and there into the light, but one cannot follow his footprint in the context. When Prague was taken in 1744,



and the Prussian operation was in swing after southern Bohemia, the ill Prince Henry had to be left in waiting, and here Nadasti was attentive to him with a corps of light cavalry. If this coup had succeeded, the king would probably have been able to buy back his favorite brother only with the offer of travel; but the prince was already recovering at that time, and Colonel von Kalnein, who stood by his side, rejected the enemy with bloody heads.

During the subsequent retreat to Silesia Henry was again with the king; In 1745, however, we see our pupil of the generals' school near Hohenfriedberg, and precisely where the battle came to a crisis, in the greatest diligence. The cavalry of the Prussian left wing was only partially over the Striegauer water, then the bridge collapsed; the operation faltered, the Austrians, if they were attentive, could have overturned our left wing. The moment was critical, but the young monarch remained calm, and this impression electrifies Prince Henry. And so he, a cool, towering spirit, in the midst of a thunderous battle, where his pulse determined the fate of the country and its people. The adjutants fly in all directions and Henry stands out among them. One overcomes the difficulty, and the Prussian cavalry penetrated to an incomparable victory.

What the Prince Henry continued to learn and do until 1756 belongs more to his inner life than to his outward history; it always forms a chapter of his biography, but the one who only wants to give a memorial sheet merely measures it according to his fruits which have been handed down to the succeeding period.

After the Battle of Hohenfreidberg, Prince Henry received a promotion to Major General. In Rheinsberg, on the training field and in the interactions with Frederick, through all the processes of his physical and mental progress, Henry reached his full strength and the normal life-line. When the Seven Years War began, his third decade was already complete; he had

trained as a soldier and could be a troop commander soon able to demonstrate his competence as a general.

The Seven Years War unlocked and at the same time showcased Henry's talents; it made him famous and formed the main part of his life. When he arrived in Saxony, he was already lieutenant general. He received a field command already in 1757, after the Battle of Rossbach in part, and yet he was not promoted to General of the Infantry until 1758. If a misunderstanding of its fraternal relationship and gradual progression was already expressed here, it subsequently became even greater. In fact, he no longer heard of the military degree he received in 1758, but his weighing, working, and succeeding showed a steady growth during the war. He reached his ostentatious climax so near the end of the conflict, as the winner of Freiberg; However, rational critics who look into their innermost affairs credited him even higher with his campaign of 1761.

Prince Henry did not play a major role in 1756. When the Prussian army moved in April 1757 with a main division from Silesia and four other armies from Saxony to Bohemia, he commanded the advance of the Neustädtel column. When the king took his battle line early on May 6 near Prague, Henry was with the troops of the Prussian right wing, which, in the circumstances, were not destined to strike for the time being. The right wing was seized by the Prussian left wing, the enemy infantry drew too far to the right, and thus a gap of the battle order on the other side arose, into which the troops of our center invaded immediately. In connections with this, our whole right wing was engaged, and the Prince Henry and the Duke of Braunschweig did the most in the action. They stormed a main hill at the height of Hloupetin, and now the enemy line could be rolled from their left to the right wing. Prince Henry took seven

hills in the violent rain of the bullets, then jumped off the horse as he stomped on the terrain, and, with his enemy always on his heels, waded through a swampy brook at the head of the infantry regiment of Itzenplitz. His behavior in this battle recalled the action of Leopold von Dessau; This whole roll-up operation, in which Henry played such an important part, the victory at Prague was chiefly owed.

When the Austrian army was already expelled from the field of battle, Prince Henry met the king, and a brief conversation took place. This must have been determined by a very high and yet very serious mood. They enjoyed great success, but what losses, what an unkempt horizon, what a long series of further tasks! Prince Henry had contributed a great deal to the decision of the Prague battle, and Frederick first recognized his brother's military prowess and heroic spirit in full light; He already wanted to consult with him on how to use this number in the right way. Such qualities, as Henry showed them, require only great authority in order to perform miracles; such a special steward of his own blood must, as a detached lord, be invaluable to the king. Frederick makes only general considerations, but they prepare a further war program.

At Rossbach Prince Henry was slightly wounded by a patrol; he had the same fate with Seydlitz, the hero of the day, and both were engaged in this battle, where the Prussian victory was so great and the loss so small, and in only in beating some minor forces did Frederick's two great subordinates come to be wounded. The king writes, with regard to the Rossbach affair, still on 5 November, from Abwehr at Meissenfels, to the Margravine of Bayreuth:

It was a battle for mountain. I have, thank God, not a hundred dead; the only seriously wounded general is Meinecke; my brother Henry and General von Seydlitz have slight injuries on their arms.

After the Rossbach battle, new allies became apparent, but new mouths joined forces. When a new English-Hanoverian allied army formed, headed by the Duke of Brunswick, and

when the Russians were attacked by the illness of Empress Elizabeth, failures in Silesia became apparent. Winterfeld had remained with Mons, the Duke of Bevern had been forced back to Breslau, and Frederick's presence in Silesia was necessary. This created a new strategy and brought about the decision of Frederick concerning the detachment of Prince Henry. The king left Leipzig on 13 November 1757 and initially marched only 14,000 men to Görlitz. Keith was sent to Bohemia via Chemnitz with an equally strong detachment. Frederick already learned about the loss of Schweidnitz to Görlitz; Furthermore, he encountered the bad news of the Breslau defeat; but on 2 December his genius succeeded in uniting himself with the remnants of Bevern's army behind the Lohe, and then reconquering Silesia with the magic of Leuthen.

As for Prince Henry, the King left him with 18,000 men on the Saale, so that he would hold on to Saxony and would like to parry any shots of the still intact French army which stood in Hanover. Frederick's line of war was fastened to Silesia, and Prince Henry was caught in his Saxony.

While the King did so extraordinarily in Silesia, Henry could and should only launch demonstrations for the time being. In the actual winter, accordingly the time of the rebuilding, the troops rested. With the first awakening of nature in the new year we became all the more active on all points. Ferdinand von Brunswick opened the campaign of 1758 opposite the French. Prince Henry, whose corps had been reinforced, initially supported him here, but then had to drive out the Austrians and imperial troops in Saxony. When Frederick was considering his own plans during his time, he expected his brother, giving him full scope and placing him, as in himself, the standard of genius, scarcely less. "You are my 'alter ego' in Saxony, act according to circumstances, consider only military advice with yourself, and immediately the first priority is

to disperse the Reichsarmee, which want to join forces. If I have taken Olmütz, you will go over the Erzgebirge and conquer Prague."

Prince Henry complied with this instruction, which he heard, or guessed, or carried in himself, as circumstances permitted. His diversions into the Franconian territory were executed in numerous and skillful ways, but they were nevertheless unable to hinder the accumulation of a considerable army of the Reich, under the prince of Zweibrücken, with whom an Austrian corps fused under Hadick. Facing 80,000 with scarcely 30,000 men, in July 1758 he moved into a well-defended camp near Zschoppau, and from here led a war of skirmishing by detachments against the enemy coming from Bohemia, which gave the opposing masses no scope and the superior Prussian art of war brought to perfection. An Austrian corps, which went to Zwickau to cover Henry's right flank, was repulsed, and when the Reichsarmee advanced from Teplitz towards Dresden, the prince took up his position at Dippoldiswalde, and commanded both, with this and his detachments flanks, the whole terrain between the Elbe and Freiburger Mulde.

While this happened until mid-August, Frederick, who had besieged Dimuetz fruitlessly and then gone to Bohemia, received the news there that the Russian army under Fermor had penetrated through the Neumark to the Oder, and was already standing in front of Cüstrin. That was a knife at the throat, which had to be warded off. The king set out for the Oder, and when this happened he wrote from Grüssau on 18 August a very characteristic letter to Henry. In it he says:

I'm marching against Russians tomorrow. Since the events of war can lead to all sorts of results, and it is easy for me to kill myself, it is my duty to inform you of what you have to do in this case, the more so as you guardian of our Nesse, the Son of the prince of Prussia with unlimited authority. As second in command of the armies you are, at the moment when I am killed, to take the oath upon my nephews, and our action shall remain so vigorously underway that the enemy can perceive no changes in the command.

Henry was deserving of the trust which this letter had given him, and if Frederick had succumbed at Zorndorf, he would certainly have done everything in his power to uphold the eagle of Prussia. Of course, then he would have pushed between Fermor, Daun and the Reichsarmee, had a bad state, and it remains after all questionable whether in this case a breakthrough was possible. He lacked the universal genius and the wartime speculation of Frederick; he was unsurpassable in his present war role, but, as the highest warlord and all the great powers, he could not have done the same as Frederick.

With grief over what was now going to be his burden, Prince Henry now had to continue his duties in Saxony.

The movements of the enemy compelled him to move into a camp near Sedelitz, not far from Pirna, from which he, however, he at night, prowled nearer on the heights of Samig He stood here, about three hours south of Dresden, almost untouchable, and could not be endangered as long as the capital was untouched. His mastery in the choice of fixed positions was quite extraordinary. Detachments were advanced on all sides and taken into smaller fortified camps: eastwards to the Elbe, where redoubts were made, westward to Kesselsdorf, northwards to the suburbs of Dresden; the whole front line was safe, only an attack from the north could have been effective.

The Reichsarmee developed, this position opposite, and on 5 September took the castle belonging to Pirna Sonnenstein; Daun himself went to Lusatia, and seemed to be heading for Meisen from there, wanting to win a position between Henry and the King, but then renounced it when he learned of Fermor's defeat at Zorndorf. Nevertheless, Henry was still very much at risk, and if Daun, as was his intention, had crossed the Elbe near Pillnitz, he would have had been in the prince's rear, and thus forced Henry between two fires. The adversaries already believed in

the reconquest of Saxony and were sure that they could take Silesia, but Prince Henry saw through it and immediately informed the king. Frederick received this information on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September, and since his task was accomplished in the north, he immediately moved in rapid marches south-west, and arrived at Grossenhain on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September, where Keith and Margraf Carl joined him. On the 12<sup>th</sup>, the brothers met in Dresden; a quick agreement was reached, and the king's army moved to Weiig on the same day, which drove Daun from the Elbe. The two Prussian armies now communicated with each other, but soon rejoined, as Prince Henry, in his position by Gaming, remained with the Reichsarmee but the king had to operate against Daun. The latter camped at the beginning of October on the heights between Löbau and Spremberg, with Kittlitz, but Friedrich took over his position at Hochkirch. After the well-known attack of Daun had taken place here on October 14, and the king had retired to a camp near Klein-Bautzen, Prince Henry got much new work, for it was at once the utmost importance to provide Frederick with all the war supplies, and his wounded and sick to decrease. Henry did not hesitate to step himself to the head of the detachment of troops, which he brought to his brother as an accomplishment; In his place, General von Finck was first given the command of Saxony, and the lieutenant-general Count von Dohna was ordered to go from Pummeln to support Finck in Saxony.

Frederick bypassed Daun, and the former marched to Silesia and shocked Neisse. Prince Henry stopped at Landshut. In Saxony the Reichsarmee made an advance against Leipzig, but was driven back by Count Dohna, and then went into winter quarters at Hof and Bayreuth. Daun was attentive to Dresden, but retired to Bohemia in the middle of November, when this failed and Frederick reappeared on the horizon. The king arrived in Dresden on the 20<sup>th</sup> of November and laid the defense of Saxony in Henry's hands. Dohna returned to Pomerania. The king left

Saxony and took up his winter quarters in Breslau; the territory he claimed was the same as the year before. How much of this came as a result of Prince Henry and his defensive operations with Zschoppau, Dippoldiswalde, and Gamig, and by his efforts after the battle of Hochkirch, is probably unrecognizable.

The campaign of 1759 was opened by Duke Ferdinand and did not go favorably for the time being. Two French armies joined forces and occupied Westphalia and Hesse, only Ferdinand's victory at Minden retook this lost terrain.

While this happened in the north-west, Prince Henry operated very successfully, from Saxony to Bohemia and Franconia. Already in April 1757, he invaded Bohemia with two columns, drove back the Austrians and destroyed their magazines in Teplitz, Aussig, Budin, Leitmeritz, Komotau and Saatz; Their ships in the Elbe were also burned, and here and there were given little checks, but all of this happened at lightning speed; they had only started to move on the 15th of April, and they were back on the 23rd.

But Henry was not satisfied with these minor actions. An impression had to be made on the opposing side as well, to mitigate the first impulses of the people of the Reich. Concentrated on this second expedition near Zwickau, on the twenty-eighth of April, the Prince was the lieutenant general von Finck, with a column in the east, after Udorf. A little later he marched to Hof, and directed Major General von Knobloch furthest west, on Kronach. Finck, for his part, reached the level plateau of the Fichtelgebirge and drove the Austrian General Mac Guire, who wanted to reinforce the Reichsarmee, back to the Oberpfaltz. Henry himself came to Bayreuth and his column to Bamberg. Everywhere enemy parties were destroyed, small blows distributed and contributions increased. All of Upper Franconia was now in Henry's hands, and since the Reichsarmee had retreated to Nuremberg and no enemy was left in the front, the expedition had



fulfilled its purpose, and they went back to Saxony. On 1 June, Prince Henry was back on Saxon territory, this whole diversion to Franconia had hardly taken 4 weeks.

In the meantime, the king, remaining by Daun, stood near Landshut, issuing diversions into Poland, Moravia, and Bohemia. There he stayed until the end of June; but when at that time the Russians approached the Oder, Frederick moved south of Lowenberg near Schmottseifen a firm camp and wrote from there to Henry:

"Congratulations on the wonderful success you have had. Their prisoners amount, I am told, to 3,000; the outrage and confusion in the Reich Army is described as enormous, and those rich people will take a good two months before they are able to show themselves again. "

Daun then detached Laudon and Hadick, with strong army detachments, to reach out to Soltikov's army. The General-Lieutenant von Wedell, who was appointed dictator, was to implement this order, but on July 23 he had an accident at Züllichau and Kan, and the former took place. Frankfurt fled into the hands of its allies, Berlin was under threat, and the king had to go to the Oder for a decisive battle. The latter marched with him north-westward, united with the remains of the Wedell corps, and went to meet the catastrophe of Kunersdorf; Prince Henry, however, took over the supreme command of the army of Schmottseifen. While here he devoted himself to the most attentive observation, on the 8th of August he received the news of the victory at the battle of Minden, and eight days later the news concerning the Kunnersdorf loss. The latter increased his sense of obligation; He wanted and had to help the cause of Frederick, but in these circumstances, it was very difficult to do anything important but to avoid any mistake. A battle did not seem advisable. If they played their last trump card and, in the event of their failure, left themselves to a complete ruin: Daun's keeping away from Brandenburg and the Russians was the next task. As his adversary now proceeded on Priebus, Prince Henry took his

position at Sagan, and from here he moved to destroy Daun's Magazine, and moved very cleverly against Görlitz.

The Prussian cause was now lagging, for the king was far away, and yet not in his power; Dresden passed to control of the Reichs Army on 4 September, Loudon and Soltikov, if they had agreed, and engaged in a quick operation, would have been able to win everything. Daun, too, wanted to do something decisive, and lay waiting for his moment with Bautzen; but again 14 days went by and in this time circumstances changed a great deal. Solitkov, separated from Loudon, approached Glogau; Friedrich, now again at the head of a prepared corps of troops, followed his movements, pushing him from both Glogau and Breslau; When Daun prepared his attack on the prince, the right moment was already over. This attack was to take place on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September, separating Henry from Saxony, but the latter being made the arsenal and base of operations of Prussia's opponents; that was a bad project, which had to be thwarted.

As soon as Daun's intention was recognized by Prince Henry, he immediately made a bold decision and executed it with the utmost skill. Already on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September he noiselessly abandoned his camp at Görlitz, marched first northward to Rothenburg, then went to Hoverswerda, and on the 25th of September threw himself surprisingly on General V., who belonged to the Reichs Army. Mehla, who had been active in the siege of Dresden, was now detached to Hoverswerda with 3,000 men. He was caught with that part of his corps which did not dwell on destruction; the Reichs Army again had the stake as a mate, and the illusions concerning Saxony were greatly disturbed.

When Daun, whose left flank had been cleverly bypassed, found the prince no longer in position on September 23, he believed that Henry had marched off to Glogau, and began to search for him in that direction; It was not until the 25th that he learned of the real condition,

returned to Bautzen, and soon turned to Dresden, in order to secure this capital, united with the imperial troops.

Prince Henry, on the other hand, whose numbers rose to 40,000 men by the arrival of a Prussian detachment, was nevertheless forced back to Torgau by Daun and the army of the Reich; but when he was strengthened by General von Rülisen, who came from Scheleften, he was able to advance again to near Meissen. Soon afterwards Frederick arrived and met with Prince Henry in Castle Hirschtein near Lommatsch. Daun now retreated towards Dresden and was vigorously pursued. As he occupied a position in Milsdruf which was not attackable at the front, Frederick took the disastrous decision to detach the general lieutenant von Finck, with whom he wanted to avoid Daun's left flank, with 15,000 men. Finck also really got into the back of the enemy army and came to Maxen but was mastered there on November 21 by a force three times his number and caught. Prince Henry tried to moderate the persecution of his Royal Brother, but in vain, if the command had been in his hands at the time, the catastrophe of Maxen would have been avoided. The campaign of 1759 ended here had been mostly unhappy. The defeats of Kay, Kunersdorf, and Maxen, as well as the loss of Dresden, would have overwhelmed the king if he had not had two such powerful helpers in Henry and Ferdinand, and if he had had enough leeway for the Austrians and Russians.<sup>1</sup> The fact that Frederick attributed this year's losses to himself is already indirectly implied by his admission: "that Prince Henry is the only general who made no mistake in this campaign."

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<sup>1</sup> Translator's note: The battle of Kay (July 23, 1759) is also known as the battle of Paltzig.

Dresden remained in the possession of the enemy; Frederick stood opposite the position of Wilsdruf for some time, and then, when both parties entered into winter quarters, took his quarters to Freiberg.<sup>2</sup>

For the campaign of 1760, the circle in which one operated had been condoned, and the means of war which were still in hand had, after all that had happened, not only numerically, but also in real terms, diminished. The generals now had less to work with themselves; a clever defensive became more and more inevitable, and such qualities, as dealt with by Prince Henry, rise daily in price.

The king now took over the supreme command in Saxony himself, Fouqué occupied the Landshut mountain pass, and Prince Henry was sent to the Oder to meet the Russians there. While they crossed the Vistula towards the end of May, and then continued in June, Henry concentrated with 35,000 men at Frankfurt, and was now anxious to prevent a new union of Soltikov with Laudon. He marched up to Cüstrin, watched closely, and behaved expectantly; his floating sword of Damocles could only fall down at the most decisive moment. From Cüstrin he moved, always with purpose, against Landesberg. But the king did not satisfy this presumptuous conduct of the war, and he became more and more unbending the more the tribulations which he suffered intermittently stimulated his desire for satisfaction.

Fouqué's corps fell on 23 June 1760 at Landshut into death and captivity, Laudon stormed on Glatz 26 July and then turned against Wroclaw. The king had to give up the siege of Dresden, which he had begun, and at the beginning of August he began his famous and dangerous march to Silesia, where he was led by Daun and Lacy's superior forces, and constantly

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<sup>2</sup> Translator's Note: Wilsdruf is actually the modern town of Wilsdruff. Wilsdruff is a town in the Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge, in the free state of Saxony. It is situated 14 km west of Dresden center.

troubled. In the meantime, he urged Prince Henry to a more aggressive operation, and Henry finally responded to him at the end of July:

The siege of Dresden has failed, I should keep the Russians out of Frankfurt, cover Glogau and prevent a siege of Wroclaw - this is an overwhelming task, which I would like to leave to someone who is more capable than me.

The king replied to him:

I beg you not to view things in the darkest way, that's it, your mind was filled with indecision. Better make a decision, whatever it may be, and persist in it; better a bad one than none at all.

To be sure, this was not quite a medicine for Henry's irritable temperament, and although the King was not mistaken about Henry's pessimism, the conclusion drawn from it was entirely refuted by the facts. Henry, before he received this warning, led a winged march to Glogau, which he arrived before on August 5, near Deutsch-Lissa, and thereby compelled Laudon, who stood before Breslau, to give up the siege of that capital. This was a free resolution, a bold action and a significant achievement, despite all the pessimism; especially at this time, however, when Henry's brought this year's campaign its flower and fulfillment. His thinking was muddled for a time, in the light of an illness working in his mind, in such a way that he asked the king to be released from his command. Hereupon Frederick responded from the camp at Hohendorf on the Katzbach, on the 9th of August:

It is not difficult, my dear brother, to find people who serve the state in easy and happy times; but good citizens are only those whose activity is devoted to him in evil days and on decision points. So, I do not think that what you write to me is your true belief. Certainly you and I, if we did all that was in our power, will be conscious of not being responsible for the consequences of the present situation; Our conscience will then, as well as public opinion, do justice to us. As far as the present state of my affairs is concerned, it will, it seems, be decided within a few days. We will fight for honor and for the Fatherland; all the world will find it impossible for us to penetrate, but I am not deterred by any superiority, and in spite of all the difficulties I do not renounce success, etc.

Frederick wrote this while he was in the most difficult situation, for Laudon had united with Daun after the siege of Wroclaw was given up by him, and the Prussian army, consisting of only 30,000 men, now stood against 90,000 Austrians, who at every moment might possibly form a union of the Russian Army on the right bank of the Oder. A merger with Henry could not now be completed, owing to the intervening water lines and close proximity of the enemy. To maintain such composure in such distress, to make known such a feeling as the letter above stated, only a great man could do. The whole affair was treated as cleverly as nobly, and the means employed could not fail.

In the meantime, Prince Henry, in spite of his request for removal, had remained on active duty. When Laudon had been forced to leave Breslau, Henry turned against the Russians in full front, and Soltikov, who arrived at Hundsfeld on the 8th of August, was very surprised that instead of Laudon, with whom he wanted to unite himself, he met the Prussian eagle. Frederick's letter soon overcame the misunderstanding of the prince and gave him back the king's full confidence. Soltikov made a retrograde movement, and Prince Henry followed him at a measured pace, and always with an ordinary disposition, crossing the countryside, to Trebnitz.

In the meantime, the King entered the crisis which had chafed at him since his letter to Henry, and the brilliant victory which he won at Liegnitz on August 15 made him new master of Silesia.

Prince Henry had accomplished his task this year. Wroclaw had been rescued by him, the Russian operation thwarted, and the King's right flank along the Oder had been cleaned up. When the time came, the tension was followed by a reaction, and the illness, already felt by Henry at the time, reached a peak. The prince went to Glogau to interdict the foraging, and in that year could no longer be warlike. The King, who was still in the field until winter quarters,

probably missed him very badly. He now drew up the greater part of the army under Henry's command, and only Lieutenant General Goltz remained with 10,000 men against the Russians. While Frederick watched Daun's army at Landshut, after crossing the Bartsch, Soltikov turned northwest towards Frankfurt, and then pushed 20,000 men towards Berlin, with whom 15,000 Austrians and Saxons joined from the other side. Berlin was now occupied for eight days, but when Frederick approached, the capital was freed again, and even the Russian army went back through the Neumark to Poland.

The king soon turned against Torgau, and the victory which he won against Daun on the 3rd of November restored to him the greater part of Saxony. The campaign of 1760 was hereby completed, and Frederick took his winter quarters near Leipzig.

At the beginning of May 1761, the king, with 36,000 men, moved to Silesia and initially camped between Freiberg and Nimptsch, while, opposite him, at Braunau, Laudon was entrenched. Prince Henry, who now came back into action after a long siege, received the heavy task of defending Saxony against the superior powers of Daun and of the Reichs Armee, and of preparing for the protection of Berlin. His attention simultaneously directed at the same time both north and south. His war policy could only be based on waiting, maneuvering and skirmishing, on the most restrained self-control with constant repartee. His dispositions remained optional, only the king demanded that if Daun should go to Silesia, he should be shadowed by Henry with the largest part of his army.

When the campaign began in 1761, Prince Henry was at Meissen, Daun at Dippoldswalde, and the Reichs Armee between Hof and Plauen. For the time being the imperial general remained in subservience. His only concern at the time was directed at restraining the intercourse between Henry and the King, and he therefore detached a military division under

Lasch in the region of Grossenhahn. This measure took a toll on the classification of a new assassination attempt on the Kurmark, or an intended union of Daun's with the Russians reappearing at the eastern horizon, on the other hand, the Prince, if Daun marched off to Schleft, could be stopped by Lasch with regard to his pursuit, so he concentrated a part of his troops in the neighborhood of Strella, and put an observation post to Torgau; It was always more difficult to get to the north; one took a day's march in that direction, and Lasch could, on a march to Schlesein, avoid the loss of time. In the meantime, Henry worked incessantly to harm the enemy by setting out numerous detachments. Thus, here in the Saxon theater of war operations were raids carried on until August, and the offensive movements which the Prince made at this time followed his defensive succession, they became more and more important, and each of them more effective than the last.

The Reichs Armee as a whole did not move until the end of August. It advanced considerably at that time, and could, with sufficient speed and energy, have avoided Henry's positions. If Daun's cooperation had taken place, the prince would have been in the worst possible position. But Daun did not move, and the Reichs Armee was without a point and edge. Seydlitz, who, after his recuperation from the Kunersdorf wound, was now with Prince Henry, was able to scare the whole Reichs Armee back with 5 battalions and 18 squadrons, and this in turn went back to the court and the Reich.

In Silesia, the king had been unable to prevent the new Russian commander-in-chief, Count Butturlin, from uniting with Strassau and Laudon. Frederick, standing with 50,000 against 130,000 men, adhered to the strictest defense, moved into his fortified camp at Bunzelwitz, and declared himself in it from the 25<sup>th</sup> of August to the 13<sup>th</sup> of September; in the end he was released from it by a separation of hostile armies caused by the jealousy of the generals.



When Butturlin set out for Bunzelwitz Prince Henry, after the experience of the previous year, prepared for a renewed attempt by the Russians against Berlin, and on the other hand made his arrangements; but when Frederick came out of the Bunzelwitz enclosure, he immediately had the Russian magazines destroyed in Poland, it was necessary for Count Butturlin to be mindful of his retreat, and Henry's attention turned again to the south. Daun only awoke from his somnolence when he had lost all attachment, the Reich's Armee had disappeared from Saxony, and the Russian army had crossed the Oder. Hadick now sat down at Freiberg, the Prussian side positions were disturbed and a general frontal attack of Henry's position at Meissen was finally held on 5 November, without, however, bring about a success. But Hadik succeeded in proceeding against the hollow, and on Felbiger, favored by the hilly terrain, to take positions in the case of the Doebel, the Rosswein, and the Rossen. Since the surrounding area was dominated by these and the Prussian right flank was threatened, their withdrawal would have been in the interests of the world. Henry's warlike wisdom waived for now. His forces were too small, and the sacrifices of such a firm too great, for his position in Saxony to be rendered untenable; Henry went retreated safely and would rather hold a small terrain, as lose everything in an uncertain lottery game. His present positions were thus fortified even more, in order to be stable in the winter, and he succeeded so well that the advances from the hollow all rebounded, and Hadik's position in the Prussian right flank remained without injurious consequences.

After all that had happened, it was admirable that Prince Henry still stood in Saxony now, possessed freedom of movement, and with scarcely 30,000 men was able to maintain this position, which he had held at the beginning of the campaign, even with the outcome of the campaign in constant jeopardy. It was not a conspicuous, but significant, success in the field. If the layman misses the great and brilliant action, the connoisseur will feel all the more

apprehensive of his chess game and of Henry's never-failing calculation, which ruled here.

Emperor Napoleon I, who after all was himself a master of the art of war, and his judgments on the art of war as those of others must be taken seriously, remarks in regard to this campaign of Henry:

The campaign of 1761 is the one in which this prince really showed superior talents. (Montholon, *Memories of Napoleon*, VII, 324)

The king was comtrained even more in 1761 in Silesia than Prince Henry in Saxony. He lost Schweidnitz, escaped the threatening to Moselwitz. Berhängniffe only by accident, and was deprived of the southern half of Silesia. The whole war situation worsened when Golberg was conquered by the Russians in December. The campaign of 1761 remained undecided, but Frederick's all-round affliction was of such a nature that he could only be saved by extraordinary gifts of fate.

But the same came to his aid at the very beginning of 1762. His force was now limited to about 60,000 men. One half of them he himself commanded in northern Silesia; the other half were with Prince Henry in Saxony. Frederick's attention was already directed at the program of bringing these divisions into a large column of assassins and attempting with them a breakthrough through the single ring, which forced him to try. But the Empress Elisabeth died on 5 January 1762. Her successor, Peter III, Frederick's admirer, immediately ended the Russians' hostility to Prussia and returned the prisoners. His rear was liberated, his communications with Pomerania and Prussia restored, the officers and soldiers returning from Russian captivity rejoined, and the moral repercussion of such a reinforcement had to be very important, here in an elevating and there in a depressing sense. The peace of St. Petersburg confirmed on 5 May the same initial truce, yes Peter III even made a deal with Frederick; and had 20,000 men under the chief commander join him. Sweden made peace with Hamburg on May 20; The French held

Duke Ferdinand at bay, so Frederick had now relinquished it as a theater of war; Daun stood in Silesia; the king and the Field Marshal Serbelloni, as well as Prince Stolberg, stood in front of Prince Henry in Saxony.

Prince Henry had to open the campaign in 1762, and there was a breakthrough of the enemy cordon spread out before his front and right flank, partly supported by very strong positions. Henry's corps had recovered and strengthened somewhat during the winter; Seydlitz and Hülsen were with him, and the prince had such good partisans, Kleist and Belling. Here, too, the general beating of the Prussian war situation had an impulsive effect, and Henry's genius was more than ever in bloom-there was something significant going on. For the time being he sought to gain the appearance of various troop movements as if he wanted to do something westward against Penig and Altenburg; but when he did, by a brigade approaching from Pomerania, under Colonel v. Billerbeck, reinforced. He advanced on May 11, 1762 with 21 battalions and 35 squadrons, formed in four columns, in the direction of Rosswein and surrounding area, against the hollow. Through a hidden night march to this stream, the attack of an Austrian division posted here, which was covered by terrain and entrenchments and could be quickly supported by Waldheim and Freiburg, prepared very carefully, and this came early on the 12<sup>th</sup> so happily executed that General von Zettwitz was arrested with 2,000 men and seized this entire section. When General Macquire, who had command of Freiberg, learned of what had happened at Rosswein, he withdrew to Dipplodswalde. Prince Henry, however, took his camp near Freiberg on May 14 and at Pretschendorf on the 16<sup>th</sup>, whereupon he advanced to all sides of the detachment and completely seized the Muldegege. The general lieutenant of Canitz was detached against the Reichs Armeé, who had reached Chemnitz, and took a fixed position at Dederau. Forces allied to Henry's were on the far front line, and where nature gave them no defensive

points, they covered themselves by means of ramparts and interlocks. An advance which took place at the beginning of June, and which the Austrians made from Dippoldiswalde against Henry's advanced detachments, remained largely unsuccessful; But when, on 18 June, Major-General von Belling had now escaped from Pomerania and joined the army of the Prince, the latter was also able to attack the Reichs Armee offensively. This was done by Seydlitz, who advanced against Penig and then against Zwickau, and thus forced the Prince Stolberg to return to Annaburg via Chemnitz, and finally to leave the Saxon territory altogether.

At the end of June, Serbelloni made another attack on Henry's positions; yet only the advanced divisions were engaged, and the enemy, having been vigorously resisted, and having suffered considerable losses, returned. If the campaign in Saxony had been so far in the main, still undecided, Henry's scope had widened. If he made only the attacks necessary for the safety of his defensive until July, he now intended to move on to a fuller offensive. This was to be manifested in the first place by incursions in Bohemia, which wished to injure the base and supplementary posts of the Austrian army, and Kleist in this sense already alarmed the Saazer district in July, and drove back a detachment of the Reichs Armee, which wanted to join the Austrians. This example was followed by a larger company. Prince Henry wanted to win Teplitz in order to get in the way of the main Austrian position of Dippoldiswalde; Seydlitz, to whom this expedition was entrusted, however, fell in with him, and wounded both by this coup, undertaken at the end of July, and by Belling's expeditions of Kleist's in August, carried off by the damage inflicted in Bohemia, only having achieved the purpose binding of the Reichs Army with the Austrians. Since Stolberg was unable to do this directly and as soon as possible, but she nevertheless remained the goal of his wishes, he had to seek her by detours and with loss of time. He then proceeded via Eger to Carlsbad, then, after a long march through northern Bohemia,

turned left to return to Saxony, and on the 6<sup>th</sup> of September, south of Dresden, to join the Imperial Army.

The Prussian offensive had not made much progress since Tull, where it was planned; but the Prussian armies were nevertheless in the Vorthiel, and the Viennese court had to be very displeased to see its great armed forces operating so fruitlessly against one small Prussian corps.

Serbelloni, to whom the mistake was attributed, not altogether erroneously, lost his uppermost command in September, and General Hadick was replaced. He was indeed more circumspect than energetic, and the catastrophe of a great collision, which would decide on the Saxon command, now seemed close.

In the meantime, the results had been wonderfully contradictory on the main battlefield, but in the end still in favor of Frederick. Frederick, after the Russians turned into allies, wanted Colberg to return to his possession, and he had gotten rid of the Swedes. First, he had to get Schweidenitz, and for this Daun's army had to protect his position at Burkersdorf, and was to be expelled from that fortress. When, for this purpose, the chief of the company arrived with his auxiliaries, the news arrived on July 19 that Peter III had been dethroned and died, and Catherine II had ascended the throne, and with this Russia was again looking to change sides. Ezernitschef concealed this message for three days in the name of Frederick and remained suspended as a spectator during the Battle of Burkersdorf, which took place on 21 July. The Empress Catherine confirmed the peace of St. Petersburg, but withdrew from the alliance with Prussia, and recalled her troops from the battlefield. Frederick was now quite free and in a favorable position in Silesia, but the Austrian army still demanded his attention, and the siege of Schweidnitz, which lasted until October 9, claimed so much strength and effort that Frederick still maintained that he could not support Prince Henry at that time.

Haddick now assembled at Dresen, in order to start his new command vigorously, in the last third of September, 68 battalions and 126 squadrons; besides, he still had considerable reserves at Altenburg and Teplitz, and such a force could be taken on board. A general attack on the Prussian positions, which began on September 27, compelled Prince Henry to leave his camp at Pretschendorfer, and set himself up on September 31 near Teplitz and on the left bank of the Mulde. At the same time, he advanced detachments to the north and south, and, with 14 battalions, had taken up positions at Meissen, in order to defend the line of the river Trübitsch. On the whole, the terrain to be defended was too extensive for Henry's forces, and yet the whole situation did not allow him to miss any point which he occupied. The evil lay only in its too small size and of the enemy's important forces. The prince had barely 20,000 men at Freiburg and his opponent had there more than twice that number. A quick forward motion of the latter would have embarrassed him. But such was not the character of the Austrian conduct of warfare. Henry remained untouched for another 14 days, and with sufficient workforce he could have made good use of this time. Of course, this could not be done, and when at last on the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> October there were serious battles at Freiberg, these had to be unfavorable to the prince, just as the disproportion of power was. He now returned northwest to a position between Reichenbach and Gross-Voigtsberg, and stayed here, only 1 1/2 miles from Freiberg, waiting for his moment.

Prince Henry had to admit that Schweidnitz had been taken on 9 October and Frederick had stooped to succor in Saxony. Actually, the general lieutenant, Count Wied, marched to Neuweif with a Prussian corps of 10,000 men on Bautzen, and then made his way to the Elbe, in order to cross it and join Henry. On the one hand, this operation divided the attention of the

Austrians, and always encouraged a fraction of their armed forces; on the other hand, the prince was impulsively stimulated to renewed action.

At present Prince Henry had only 29 battalions and 60 squadrons at Reichenbach, but the decision point was there. Honor, the good of the state and even self-preservation, now demanded a major blow, and it was all about anticipating the enemy. As a result, during the night from October 28 to October 29 he began to march against the Spittelwälder and Michelsberge near Freiberg, and now went to a similar decision point, as Leopold von Dessau had 17 years earlier at Kesselsdorf. His left wing leaned on October 29 at Groß-Schirma on the Freiburger Mulde, his right bumped at Hennersdorf, and the enemy stood opposite between the Mulde and the Spittelwalde. The prince attacked the enemy's left wing mostly. Here and at the foot of Michelsberge, on the west and southwest side of Freiberg, the main battle took place. The enemy lines were broken everywhere, and Seydlitz talents shone very brightly. Freiberg was open, and the Reichs Armee was taken in the rear when the Spittelwald was taken; the entire enemy army, of which a large part had not yet hit, retreated, after considerable losses, westwards to Frankenstein. The whole battle lasted only three hours, and this victory, which only a small Prussian force wrested from the much larger enemy force, cost Prince Henry only 1400 wounded and dead. Immediately after the Battle of Freiberg, Prince Henry wrote to the king about it; this letter, which was characteristic of its brevity and precision, was conveyed to the king by the general adjutant, then Lieutenant-Colonel Count Kalreuth. It says in this letter:

I marched on Wegefurth last night, leaving the Spittelwald on the left to take possession of the Michelsberge when I met the hostile army. I made two real and two bogus attacks; the enemy stubbornly resisted, but after three hours of fighting they had to retreat everywhere. The number of prisoners we made amounts to about 4,000; the imperial army has few casualties, the main blow hit the Austrians. Seydlitz did the highest service; In a place inaccessible to cavalry, he came to the head of the infantry and distinguished himself in a brilliant manner. Belling and Kleist did their best; the whole infantry fought admirably and no

battalion was driven back. My adjutant Kalreuth was commissioned to take part in directing the attack on the Spittelwald and behaved well; his advancement is being encouraged. Similar recommendations will be made with regard to many other officers who excelled.

On this, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November, Frederick wrote from Löwenberg:

The arrival of Kalreuth with your letter has made me 20 years old again. I thank God that everything went so well. They obeyed the good maxim: to attack those who intended an attack against you, and by their good arrangements overcame all the hardships of a strong and brave opposition. The service which you have rendered to the state is so important that I can not express my gratitude sufficiently, and I was willing to do it in person. If fortune favors our intentions on Dresden, there will undoubtedly be peace, this winter or next spring, and we will emerge honorably from a dangerous situation that has for the time being brought us to the verge of ruin. By what you have done now, the honor alone will be due to you, to the last push of the Austrian obstinacy, and to having laid the foundation of public happiness, which will be the result of peace.

This was once again an excellent tribute to Henry, and the great King had to be able to fully rejoice that in his own consciousness and in his glory and reputation he could be fully rewarded. With what could the king have rewarded him externally?—Through the elevation to field marshal—It was contrary to Frederick's principles to raise a prince of his house to this rank, and if this had not been so, Henry would have achieved no higher union. His historical prestige was based on his deed, his outward reputation in the world was based on the high birth order, both independent of the place he held.

On the 4<sup>th</sup> of November Frederick met Henry in Meissen, on the 9<sup>th</sup> in Freiberg, and, led by the Prince, surveyed the battlefield. If the above letter gave the victor of Freiberg great credit, it was now all the more due to the verbal word of Frederick. Henry received his most important crown of honor, however, with the literary utterance of his Royal Brother, which was tied to the victory of Freiberg, and which was initially co-sponsored. It was the genius always valued by genius; no general of the last century has been so intelligent and praised by a greatest master of the art of war as Prince Henry.



The next consequence of the Freiberg victory was that the Reichs Armee separated from the Austrians. The former returned to Bohemia, but Hadick concentrated at Dresden to await reinforcements from Daun. Two days after the battle at Freiberg, Wied also arrived at Prince Henry, and the latter, though he was ambitious, would have been desirous of having won the victory completely, even without that reinforcement. Now that Henry had been strengthened and Hadick so reduced in his forces, the latter could scarcely expect even a considerable defensive. Austria was tired of his defeat, and on 24 November concluded a truce with Frederick; the empire tore itself away from Austria and was in and of itself powerless and abandoned. The peace congress began in December 1761. The peace treaty between Prussia and Austria was signed on 15 February 1763 at Hubertusburg Castle.

As far as the French were concerned, Duke Ferdinand had defended Westphalia and Neidersachsen against them in 1762, and they had only come into possession of Hessen. Finally, Ferdinand conquered back Cassel; The peace preliminaries between France and England, which arrived at the beginning of November, also ended the hostilities of the English and Hanoverians against the French army in Germany. The peace treaty of Paris, ratified on February 10, 1762, ended the Seven Years' War even later the West.

Concerning that fifteen-year peacetime, which lies between Hubertusburg and the War of the Bavarian Succession, Henry's military work cannot be considered here. A general of his position stands only where the iron dice fall, in the full light. The real biography may also go into the details of his practice of peace, but here, where it applies only to the main points, the impressions of this would be damaged. On the other hand, some political facts of this period are so obvious that they must be mentioned here for the universal identification of our hero. For the time being it was very original that in September 1764 a party of Polish patriots asked Prince

Henry for the royal throne at Warsaw. The Saxon Kurhaus saw itself displaced by this, after the death of August III; Poland was disintegrated and anarchic, and from Russia, Count Stanislaus August Poniatowski, favored by Catherine, was intended as king. While this was in progress, a Polish Deputation to Potsdam appeared in the summer of 1764, petitioning the Great King with the plea: "Give us Prince Henry as our King," but was short-circuited by Frederick, requesting a complete silence on this matter rejected.

The justification and expediency of such a behavior is too clear for it to form a wrong opinion.

Frederick would not only have granted his enlightened and much-beloved brother a happy throne, but, in appropriate circumstances, would have paved the way for him to such a throne. Here, however, it was an object that could only be reached by marching along neck-breaking paths, and then, after all, was only a fake and a crown of thorns. The Polish King's throne, since Poland became an electorate, it could only be considered a temporary reward; the parties and passions dragged it back and forth and it stood on the powder mine. Henry's correct nature and the Polish confusion were in stark contradiction. If Henry were not, as was the case, only of a Polish party, but the circumstances were such that this road could only be entered at the utmost endangerment of our Prussian fatherland. If Frederick now had his brother summoned to the Polish throne, Russia's intentions contradicted in such a manner as was bound to bring about his break with Prussia.

Then the barely closed Janus temple opened again. Austria was still resentful, and perhaps would have seized the opportunity to appear again against us; England could not expect a peace now, and then they were back in the old place. Their finances were exhausted. The land and the people were thirsting for recovery, but a new war would have ruined them. one would

have put an actual golden crown at risk for that phantom - that absolutely was not possible. Prince Henry, when he learned of the matter only later, must have felt bitter that this fateful question had been dismissed without his knowledge. He was keen enough to see the necessity of denying his own negation, so that his upset should not be misunderstood. Poniatowski was recognized on September 7, 1764, by Russia, and as such by all European powers; Prussia preserved peace, and Prince Henry was saved from the greatest danger that might threaten him in that time. In August 1769, Prince Henry was present at Frederick's, after all, a meaningful gathering with Emperor Joseph II, which was at the end of the day in Neisse, and here he was in the middle of a world beyond the height of its zenith. Frederick was 57 at this time, Joseph 28, Henry 43 years old; the emperor was standing in the company of a majestic pair of brothers, which impressed all peoples, shook the old imperial soil, terrified the imperial family, and had, after all, rattled it to admiration.

The emperor was born during the first Silesian war, and had spent his life partly during the Austro-Prussian war tensions, partly under the influence of political tension between Habsburg and Hohenzollern; -the more beautiful that he now took a step forward, to wipe out the old grudge. Genius gravitated to genius; -there were three extraordinary men, who here, sharply illuminated, stood together, and by their meeting seemed to be shaping a firm peace of Germany.

In September 1770, Prince Henry, while his Royal brother returned to the Emperor's previous visit to Moravian New Town, went to Sweden to visit his sister Louise Ulricke, who had been betrothed to King Adolph Frederick of Sweden. He had not seen her since his boyhood, and what was all between now and then! The events of 26 years were overflowing, times and

people were changed. Ulricke had not been able to prevent the new war against her old fatherland, her animosity against her brothers.

Prince Henry found his sister aged early; She had succumbed to the difficulties of the then internal politics of Sweden and to her side of a monarch, but she had proud and strong sons and a thriving daughter. A turning point in her life in which her eldest son (Gustav III) was to ascend the throne of Sweden, claiming for himself the active spirit inherited from his mother, was quite near at that time. Henry remained in Sweden until mid-October, probably under mixed impressions, and then went to Petersburg, where Czarina Catherine had invited him. That his visit to Sweden with him, and that in Russia was determined only for political reasons, is unmistakable. The whole horizon of our previous antagonism was directly recognized, while diplomatic traffic always made it indirect. Frederick immediately communicated with the young head of Austria. He was able to model his own and his politics after those of Russian and Sweden. Certainly, Henry's journey to St. Petersburg, apart from this general policy, was based on the more specific motive of practicing mediation in the Swedish war between Russia and Turkey; -but it is just as clear that the Czarina's first suggestions for a project related to Poland. A question of this kind was vetted between her and Prince Henry; the latter reported to the king, and he took the matter into consideration. However, the first division of Poland, which took place in 1773, was developing. as is always the case with such a large catastrophic forces, from relations and combinations of peoples' lives, to which the drivers of the States are subordinate, but as far as the drives can be ascribed to such overpowering individual persons and moments, this deeply penetrating empathy must be the basic motive in the discussions sought between Heinrich and the Czarina.

Five years later, in April 1776, Prince Henry reappeared at the time when Czarvitsch Paul lost his first wife in Petersburg. The Czarina and Prince Henry agreed that a second marriage of the Russian heir apparent was desirable; The choice of the last was governed by Henry's influence on the Princess Sophie Dorothea of Württemberg, and the Grand Duke then met with him in October 1777. Since the Princess in question was Frederick's second-degree niece, and Prince Henry had on this occasion fulfilled the coin of Czarina, and at the same time had settled an upset between her and the successor to the throne, she gave Prussia a friendly alliance with Russia as well. Henry's mediation, therefore, presents itself as his far-reaching political act, by which the Prussian great power was in a certain sense guaranteed; if Prussia and Russia remained united, Austria alone could threaten our country. Twenty years after their marriage, Paul and Sophie Dorothea ascend the Russian Emperor's throne, and from this union the czars of the nineteenth century passed. The harmony between Russia and Prussia, established under Catherine II, has really and truly not been disturbed in the centuries since then, for the interlude of 1812 was enforced only by foreigners, of short duration, and a passage leading to a firmer union. History shows only such a lasting and solid friendship with the state as that which, since Frederick's last decade, has existed between Prussia and Russia. Further, if one becomes aware of the general and special advantages which have arisen from it, then Prince Henry must be considered the original designer of the successful relationship, and this point can be looked back on with filial piety.

The War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-79) placed prince Henry once again in the role of military commander as opposed to diplomat. Now, when the fifth centennial of life had begun, he made his last contribution to the profession of arms. His generalship demonstrated no difficulties of old age, such as later a Brunswick and Möllendorf.

It was now seen that the policy of Austria was not yet to be trusted, that the Emperor Joseph, just for the sake of his genius and deed, was also inclined to political riots. When, with regard to the banishing inheritance law, which Austria wished to follow, could not reach its agreement with Prussia, the mobilization of our armed forces took place as early as April 1778, and Frederick formed two armies, from which he took over the Silesian himself, and that one in Saxony again entrusted to the prince Henry. The old generals stood, but fought enemies, back in their former territories, but now they had larger forces and only the Austrians in front. They harbored larger projects and did much smaller warfare than at the time of the Seven Years War. "Frederick is to move from Silesia and Prince Henry in Saxony into the land of the upper Elbe and Moldavia; the army that meets the main enemy will fall on the defensive, the other will act more offensively. One finds the point of union, wins in a main battle, conquers Prague, wins Brünn and then Danube. " This program of Frederick's remained a theory at that time and it was only 88 years later, but then very precisely and quickly executed.

The second Prussian army, commanded by Prince Henry, included the Westphalian, Magdeburg, and partly the Prussian regiments; It amounted to between 73,000 men and 85,000 men as early as 5 July, at first directed to Nachod, then invaded Bohemia. As for the Austrians, they were estimated to have 116,000 men, the chief army, commanded by the Emperor Joseph himself, against Frederick's in northeastern Bohemia, near the remotest part of the Weider; the now-elderly Laudon stood with 59,000 mounted troops towards the Elbe and threatened Upper Lusatia. Finally, a body of observation of only twelve thousand men was detached to Moravia. In the armed forces at 187,000 men, and they faced only 158,000 Prussians, who were reinforced by a Saxon relief corps of 18,000 men to 176,000. If there was a fair balance of external forces, then the stopping points for Austria, which in Bohemia offered its own land and people, fell

rather heavily into the defenses with the fixed positions prepared there; but much more was Frederick's spirit and strength, the superior Prussian leadership, school, and discipline.

Prince Henry set out from Dresden on the 19<sup>th</sup> of July, and turned southeastward towards the Lusatian mountain range, which he crossed on July 28, in several columns, and overcoming extreme difficulties. He circumvented and drove the enemy out of their posts to Rumburg and Fork, left the Saxons behind at Gabel, which was fortified, and appeared, as a "deus ex machina," before the front of Laudon. Henry's ascent over a mountain range which was quite impassable and never before trodden by operating troops, was a masterpiece of the war, and can, however, in its much narrower framework, be somewhat compared with the much-admired Alpine crossings of Hannibal and Bonaparte; even the prudent Laudon would have expected anything but such an experiment by his opponent.

Laudon stood in the middle of July, with his main force at Niemes, and spread out westwards and southwestwards with his detachments, so that Leitmeritz, Aussig, and Peterswalde were also occupied by his troops, and so he dominated both banks of the Elbe, all the way to Saxon border. However, when Prince Henry took Sabel, Laudon went south to the area of Jung-Bunzlau, while on the other hand the left bank of the Elbe was evacuated. The Lieutenant-General von Möllendorf, who formed the extreme right wing of Henry's line of operations on the Elbe, took Leitmeritz on August 8, where important stores of war fell into his hands; on the 9th, Prince Henry himself moved into the position of Niemes left by the Austrians. His whole position was now based on Reichenberg, Niemes, and Leitmeritz, and the campaign had been brilliantly opened by him.

Meanwhile, what happened to the main army, where the king personally confronted the Emperor Joseph? The army of the latter occupied a very strong position from the right bank of

the upper Elbe, for instance between Jarmirz and Koniggratz, while the northwestern Elbe crossroads were also occupied by his detachments.

His whole front turned eastwards, while Laudon at Jung-Bunzlau returned his to the northwest, and the two Austrian armies were actually back to back. For the king, who was encamped at Welsdorf, there was a direct avenue of attack on the Austrian army, at its fixed position, scarcely advisable; but as the means of subsistence of his troops, and in the close union of the two Austrian armies, were in the least in the way, something very serious had to happen to them. In this sense Frederick intended to gain the Elbe crossings at Arnau and Hohenelbe. On the latter point, then Prince Henry, as was his intention, shook hands with Frederick, and when the Prussian armies were united earlier than the two Austrian ones, an overwhelming offensive could be expected. The execution of this project was, however, delayed by new and yet again unacceptable peace proposals, which the Emperor offered until 15 August; but at that time the army of Joseph had concentrated in such a manner toward his left wing that the intended advances against Arnau and Hohenelbe no longer seem feasible.

Prince Henry was scarcely better off than the king. He, too, was confronted by a severely superior enemy, whom he could not afford to confront, and his army, too, being limited to the same territory several times a week, could scarcely be beaten by the latter. However, the prince was stirring, but only with detachments. He sought the feeling of being at home. Belling stalked the Iser and there were minor cavalry engagements. From Möllendorf's right wing column some detachments came along the left bank of the Elbe, to the vicinity of Prague, but the skilled commander Laudon's strong Austrian positions at Arnau and Hohenelbe thwarted thorough-going successes. By and large, as long as the Prussian main army did not advance, nothing could



be done here. It was a very embarrassing military situation for Henry, and his ill-humor increased daily.

The food of both Prussian armies finally became so difficult that the king decided to return to Silesia. The retreat of our main army began on the 6<sup>th</sup> of September over the Uupa, and as the terrain was difficult and the Austrians engaged in a lively pursuit, it required great energy and skill. Both were fully manifest. The Old Prussian discipline became very brilliant during this retrograde movement, and many units of the troops excelled more than ever. The Major General, Prince of Prussia, who was only 34 years old at the time, led his division, which was swarmed all over by Austrians, so heroically and masterfully to the height of Pilnikau, that the King greatly praised him; the enemy was repulsed everywhere with bloody heads, and Frederick did not clear the Bohemian theater until mid-October.

The army of Prince Henry could not remain in position while the main army retreated. He marched on the 10<sup>th</sup> of September, and proceeded northwest, to Lowositz, while the Austrians reentered their position of Niemes, and endeavored to endanger the retreat of Henry, especially his right flank. The prince pushed detachments forward against the Eger. They skirmished a lot and the Prussian arms always had the advantage. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of September the army concentrated at Tschjeischkowitz, south of Lowositz, and remained there until the 24<sup>th</sup>, when it reached the Saxon border on 28 September, under the stare of rearguard fighting. Prince Henry now took his cantonment in Saxony, and there occurred in this region of the theater of war, after Laudon had given the supreme command to Hadick, an almost complete ceasefire.

Even Henry's retreat, like that of his Royal Brother, was much praised and admired even by the enemy. Where the layman believes he has only blank pages of military history, the connoisseur finds in these supposed gaps high examples and golden rules. It has been said to the

great king that in this campaign of spirit and strength he was no longer the same as before; but that can not be rightfully deduced from what happened here. His Bohemian Operation of 1744 had much more in it than the present one, and yet it was followed by the anniversary of Hohenfreidberg, when Frederick's genius was already in its prime. Prince Henry began this campaign of 1778 with his masterful mountain crossing, and ended it with a no less famous retreat; that a retreat was necessary at all was apparent from the whole unalterable state of affairs.

There was still much lively commotion in the Prussian main army. Both his and his enemy's troops in Upper Silesia were strengthened, and there were many conflicts in store in the east of Silesia. The king went to Breslau and prepared for the next campaign; his detachments advanced from Lusatia to the Oppa against Austria also skirmished during the winter, and in the county of Glatz they fought with varying degrees of fortune.

As early as November 1778, Prince Henry took his winter-quarters to Dresden, and if arms were here long rested by the Western Army, their activity was not completely finished until February 1779, by a successful move which Möllendorf made against Freiburger von Freiberg.

After the peace treaty negotiations had finally been seriously begun, a full cease-fire occurred on the whole in early March 1779. The definitive peace agreement did not take place until 13 May at Teschen.

The peace of Teschen forms the last phase of Prince Henry's martial career. One can say even more: the whole period of his public work here was essentially already over.

Strictly speaking, Prince Henry, after thirty years of preparation, was only twenty-two on the public stage, and this relatively short period of work was followed by a twenty-four-year-long evening of frost until his death. If this breakdown of instruction, work, and rest were not

correct in ordinary existence, yet for the exceptional man in question and his time, a different standard is needed. The thirty-year period, which must be considered for Henry's development, since it was mostly determined by what he absorbed; contained, if one wants to take a closer look, more action than can be found in the generality of many ordinary curriculum vitae. At Henry's twenty-two-year working hour, that was pressing for action. In it, Herculean works were shortened and in some hours years were packed. The spiritual competed with the external effort, and the political one equated itself with the martial achievement. These 22 years of our hero are full of substance and spirit, work and success, sorrow and satisfaction; in them large fruit trees were planted, which did works of half a century. Everything was depth and quintessence; the prince with these early after-hours, and at the evening of his life preferred to occupy himself with his great memories than with the public life of a mankind alien to him.

If Prince Henry refused graduation to French education and society, in the summer of 1784 undertook a trip to France, which bound him several months to the court of Louis XVI, further gave him insights into the first character of the revolutionary storm.

As long as the great king lived, Prince Henry still remained in some kind of interaction with the court and the affairs of state; he did not really love this brother, but he bowed to his extraordinary character and respected him. When Frederick died in 1786, Henry's relations with the state, the army and politics, from which he now retired completely, changed completely. Partly this was his free wish and will, partly he was forced into this position from above.

King Frederick William II, Henry's nephew, had always had to regard this uncle as an authority before taking office. He could not rid himself of the fear now that he had ascended the throne, that a hero so superior in age, experience, spirit, and fame as Prince Henry would obscure him and jeopardize his high authority. That this was so was already clear from the question asked

by Friedrich Wilhelm to General von Möllendorf: "Is there much talk of my uncle?" It was apparently not intended to explore anything new, but merely to express a feeling and to challenge one's expression of opinion. The king had to speak a great deal about Prince Henry, and he was put by public opinion at the head of the patriotic warfare; his injured sense of self sought expression, and the question which he posed was really only the pursuit of some consolation. That Frederick II sought to preserve his authority was in itself correct, but that, for fear of forgiving himself of the least, he kept his well-deserved uncle quite aloof and left his just wishes unfulfilled, can only be deeply regretted.

On New Year's Day of 1781 the Duke of Brunswick, and in 1793 also the General von Möllendorf Field Marshal; but the hero of the Seven Years' War remained without promotion. Moreover, uncle and nephew were of two very heterogeneous natures. The latter lacked the genius, which was his primary weakness. He was closed-minded and obtuse, which made him the diametric opposite of Henry. One could only be an artist in peace and war, and the other only a man of enjoyment and a hoax. Of course, two such opposite repelled each other. The nephew avoided his uncle, out of fear of his superiority and unfulfilled ambition. The uncle, out of distressed self-esteem, out of aversion to his way of life, and out of disapproval of the government's maxims. But the nephew was king, and uncle now only a private citizen; the latter had no choice but to retreat into his inner world and into his Rheinsberg solitude. No longer desired his service, and went to field in 1792, without somehow considering the only great general who commanded. Prince Henry have hardly accepted the command in the Rhine campaign if he had been offered it, for he did not approve of this war, and he did not want to draw the sword that had once been scabbarded in the evening and for new and uncertain undertakings. He could scarcely have subordinated himself to the present warlord, whom he

towered so much above, and he was not obliged to find any real relation with Brunswick and Möllendorf, who were still deeply below him and now field marshals.

On his green island, at Rheinsberg, while terrible storms raged all around, for 16 years (1786-1802) Prince Henry led a purely refined and illustrious hermit life. His mornings were devoted to his work, namely his occupation with military science and fine literature. The works of the French philosophers and poets occupied him vividly. He himself wrote verse and conducted an extended correspondence. His military records have not been released to the public. Of the heroes of the Wars of the French Revolution, only Moreau interested him. Bonaparte's great triumphal career was no longer experienced by Henry; but if that had been so, he would certainly have admired his happiness more than his merits.

The afternoon and evening were filled around the table at Rheinsberg with conversation. There were concerts and theater performances as well. Henry loved neither women nor wine; the entertainment of his circle was, with inner freedom, mostly concerned with art, science and politics. Henry was too proud to guide the conversation to his own deeds. However, he was not reluctant to accept it when this was done by others in his manner.

The regular life cycle was varied from time to time by visits one received, or by excursions and festivities. The princess Amalie and the prince Ferdinand appeared east in the Rheinsberg castle, and with special love Henry always received his nephew, the bare and dashing Louis Ferdinand who died tragically 4 years after his great uncle. Prince Henry almost never came to Berlin. His trips were mostly limited to the immediate vicinity. Every festivity that took place at Rheinsberg had an inner and spiritual motive. The anniversary of the battle of Freiberg was celebrated annually, and on May 6, 1787, Prince Henry, to commemorate the battle of Prague, gave a brilliant celebration to all officers and men of the Itzenplitz Infantry Regiment,

which had distinguished itself there under his leadership. On July 4, 1791, the large obelisk, which Henry had built opposite the Rheinsberg castle and on the other side of the lake in memory of his brother August Wilhelm, was inaugurated. The great king had pushed that prince away, and Henry celebrated him monumentally. Frederick William II, the son of the one who was celebrated here, used it to collect some glowing coals on his head from the retired uncle.

The main characters who surrounded our hero at Rheinsberg in the earlier period were: Baron Franz Carl von dem Knesebeck, Count Ludwig von Wreech and Bogislav Von Tauentzein, later Count Tauetzein von Wittenberg, son of the defender of Breslau, the latter as adjutant. From 1769 onwards, Knesebeck, although he remained present, ceased to serve, and apart from him only court-marshal Count Roeder and adjutant Count La Roche-Anmon belonged to the closest circle. The latter, an emigre adjutant, enjoyed such recognition that the prince's "final dispositions" emphasized him. This officer again wrote, under the title: "Vie privée, politique et militaire due Prince Henri de Prusse, Frère de Frederic II. (Paris 1809)," the only eligible biography of Henry's. He made it up to major general in Prussian military service, excelled as a horseman and military writer, and died in France in 1849.

After the Basel Peace (1795), Prince Henry entered into a more comfortable relationship with the king and reappeared in Berlin, but only rarely, briefly and without preference. No one would have believed that he would still survive Frederick's successor and go beyond the boundaries of a new century. When Frederick William II died in 1797, he was 71 and 74 when he struck the first hour of the nineteenth century; nothing more can be said about his relationships with King Frederick William III.

This famous prince, the last bearer of the Friderician age, died on August 3, 1802, and was buried in the pyramid tomb of the Rheinsberger Park, which he had built. The epitaph he wrote, translated from German:

Born into the vortex, this empty haze, which ordinary people call glory and greatness, but the void knows how to recognize; in the prose of all human evils tormented by the passions of others, and excited by his own; often exposed to defamation and injustice; bent by the loss of dear relatives, reliable and loyal friends, but also often comforted by friendship; happy in the collection of his thoughts, even happier when his services could benefit the fatherland or suffering humanity:

this is the demolition of Friedrich Heinrich Ludwig's, son of King Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, and Sophie Dorothea, daughter of George I of Great Britain. Temporary! remember that there is no perfection on earth. If I couldn't be the best of people, I wasn't bad. Praise and blame no longer affect those who rest in eternity; but hope fills the last moments of the one who has done his duty. She is with me in my hour of death.

This epitaph represents an autobiography. It contains a lot of wisdom and high minded ideals, a lot of betterness and a lot of self-knowledge. It says more with little words than entire books could say and gives extraordinary thoughts. If there is no actual religious word in it, this must not be misunderstood. Prince Henry, like the great king, averse to pietistic religious beliefs and religious forms, was at the innermost of his death, facing the setting sun, on which Sansouci said on the terrace: "Soon I will be closer to you," Henry thought of him here glory in eternity and hope in the hour of death. Who could he hope for in this, as for God the Lord, and for what, for the otherworldly reward of fidelity ?!

Prince Henry, next to the same description of Count La Roch-Anmon, was celebrated by Heinrich von Bulow's "Critical History of His Campaigns" (Berlin 1805, 2 parts) and was discussed in general works.

His monumental celebration also leaves something to be desired. Count Ludwig von Wreech auf Tamsler, Henry's chamberlain and loyal follower, had an altar built in the Tamsler Schloßparke with the busts of the Great Elector and Prince Henry, and the lives of these two princes are short specified by a German, a French and a Latin inscription —a small, but at least original, monument! —At the base of Frederick's Berlin monument which previously belonged to Prince Ferdinand, was a bronze bust of Henry's, but was stolen and could not be brought back.

May the victor of Freiberg, the Fabius of the Seven Years' War, the ambitious thinker and statesman, who was not just Frederick's favorite brother, but also his warlike and intellectual twin, Prince Henry, who helped to achieve and consolidate Prussia's great position, in writing, lore and tradition, achieve and maintain the post of glory he so thoroughly deserves!