


THE JOURNAL OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR ASSOCIATION

VOLUME XVIII, NO.2 HISTORICAL PUBLICATION FALL 2013



Front Cover: The title page of M. De Jeney's *Le Partisan ou L'Art de Fair Petite-Guerre*, 1759 French edition. Book is the property of the Society of the Cincinnati Library Washington D.C. Picture property of Jim Mc Intyre

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Review and Outlook

This second issue of the resurrected *Journal of the Seven Years' War Association* comes out later than its planned date, and so I must begin with an apology. I thank all of you for your patience and continued support.

Next year, I do hope to return to the four issue per year format. The Journal now has a website at <http://www.sevenyearswarassn.org>. Readers may also contact me using a new e-mail account: mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org.

The lead article in this issue is one of my own, and traces the development of thinking on the use of light infantry and partisan troops across the eighteenth century. It goes beyond the usual temporal confines of the Journal, but I wanted to tell the whole story. I hope readers will find it enjoyable. In addition, this issue includes some pictures of and a brief report on this years' convention in South Bend.

Finally, our next issue will feature an article on the Pandour leader Baron von Trenck, as well as pieces on light infantry, and Robert Rogers.

Sincerely,

Jim Mc Intyre

Enlightened Rogues: Light Infantry and Partisan Theorists of the Eighteenth Century, 1740-1800

By

James R. Mc Intyre

It was an act borne out of absolute desperation. In 1740, with Prussian troops overrunning her province of Silesia, Maria Theresa made the decision to call on the semi-barbaric forces from the military frontier to defend the heartland of her empire.¹ These troops, known as Pandours, would earn a reputation for outstanding service as light troops against the Prussians in both the War of the Austria Succession and the Seven Years' War. In fact, through the middle of the eighteenth century, the Austrians were considered by most European authorities to be the best practitioners of the art of irregular warfare.² They would likewise acquire a reputation for atrocity that made their mere mention a byword for excess in much of eighteenth century Europe. The reason for placing reliance on these troops resided in the simple fact that regular troops were ill-suited for taking part in this type of warfare.³ The type of warfare in question being referred to as *petite guerre*, literally small war, or the war of posts. Tactically, this form of warfare encompassed patrols, attacks on enemy logistics, raids and intelligence gathering. It was often performed by small units detached from the main forces of the belligerents -and acting semi-independently of them. This autonomy on the part of forces engaged in *petite guerre* contributed to the propensity of many of the troops engaged in these activities to commit depredations on civilians. It is noteworthy, as well, that a number of scholars recognize that irregular troops had existed long before the eighteenth century, but had generally fallen out of use in the seventeenth.⁴ Still, it was the success of the Pandours at irregular war, or *petite guerre*, which garnered for them the attention of the leading military reformers of the day.

The observations of these thinkers, many of whom served simultaneously as commanders of light forces, on the most appropriate use of light and/or irregular troops will serve as the primary focus of the following pages. What will emerge from the following inquiry is that over the course of the eighteenth century, just as the military organizations sought to integrate these forces into the more traditional standing armies of the period without losing their tactical

¹ On the Austrian military border, see Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. There is some debate as to which state first raised irregulars. David Gates has France as possessing troops such as these in 1692. Still, most other authorities give premier status to the Austrians. See David Gates, *The British Light Infantry Arm c. 1790-1815*. London: B.T. Batsford Ltd. 1987,

² Duffy, *Instrument of War vol. 1 The Austrian Army in the Seven Years' War*. Chicago, IL: The Emperor's Press, 2000, 395. This view clearly influenced later historians of their exploits as well.

³ David Gates, *British Light Infantry*, 10.

⁴ Gates, *British Light Infantry*, 10. See also, Jean Colin, *The Transformations of War*. L.H.R. Pope-Hennessy, trans. Westport, CT:Greenwood Press, 1977 reprint of 1912 original, 22.

effectiveness, the partisan theorists sought to integrate these irregular forces into their conceptions of warfare.

The following will examine the ideas of military theorists, and connect them back to the wars following which many of these thinkers set down their ideas. Prior to launching this investigation, several notes of caution are in order. First, it is always difficult to clearly connect the thoughts of one man to the actions of another. In many instances, therefore, the reader will have to be satisfied with provisional conclusions. Second, it is important to be clear that diverse types of troops possessed of varied levels of training and discipline will be under examination at different points in the century, as the forces fielded in the wars of the period transformed in organization and employment over time.

Prior to examining the manner in which military theorists conceived of the uses of irregulars on the battlefield, then, it is first necessary to draw out some important distinctions. Partisans were irregular troops, initially raised in frontier areas of Europe, primarily the borderlands between the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. In their home districts, these troops encompassed the main source of local defense and policing against bandits. In fact, Baron Franciscus von der Trenck first raised his famous Pandours in order to suppress banditry in his district.⁵ The partisan fighters were often less disciplined than their regular army counterparts.⁶ By the same token, they fell outside of the dominant military system of the state. These troops were often called upon in circumstances such as those that brought Trenck into the service of Maria Theresa, where they were recruited only for the duration of a particular conflict, or even for a particular campaign. Their officers, however, often viewed the recruiting of these forces as an opportunity for personal gain, both in the immediate and the long terms future. Immediate gain came in the form of pillage and exactions from the local inhabitants these forces came into contact with. The potential for long-term gain derived from the possibility of earning a place on the regular national military establishment for their forces. In addition, they often existed outside the general rules of supply and promotion. Tactically, the partisans relied upon such devices as ambushes, raids and so forth. They were essentially contracted for by the government of the state from their leaders. This point has led some historians to describe them as mercenaries, though this designation should be accepted only in a very narrow sense.⁷ While these troops certainly fought for monetary gain in the form of plunder, unlike the mercenary forces of the sixteenth century they did maintain a basic allegiance to the state for which they fought.

The success of the Austria irregulars led to emulation on the part of other European states such as the Prussians and French. The troops raised by these and other western European states were referred to as either Jägers or chasseurs, depending upon their country of origin. As their designations suggest, they were raised from the game wardens of their respective states. As a

⁵ Oskar Teichman, *Pandour Trenck: An Account of the Life of Baron Franciscus von der Trenck, 1710-1749*. London: John Murray, 1927, 26-37.

⁶ Johann Ewald, *A Treatise of Light Infantry*, 10.

⁷ Rink, Martin "The Partisan's Metamorphosis: From Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German Freedom Fighter, 1740-1815." in *War in History*. 17(1): 6-36 expresses caution on this point as well.

result, they generally retained the green uniforms of their previous occupations.⁸ The Jägers were raised by various states as a part of their military establishment, and were therefore commanded by regular officers. They likewise fell within the military hierarchy of the state to a greater degree than the partisans.

Light infantry, on the other hand, which developed in many European military establishments after the Seven Years' War, were troops that states maintained on the regular establishment. They were part of the armies of the nations that fielded them. Tactically, they were trained to fight in more open order, and to engage the enemy forces in skirmishing activity as the precursor to a major battle.⁹ Therefore, they could be seen as constituting a hybrid between the partisan forces described above and the regular infantry of the line. In essence, the light infantry can and should be viewed as a means to domesticate the partisans and make them a part of the regular military establishment.¹⁰ The standardization of irregular forces was a process that occurred across much of the eighteenth century, and will be discussed, where pertinent, below.

One final type of soldier requires mention in connection with the partisans and light infantry. These were the Frei-Corps or Freikorps. Initially raised from deserters, prisoners and foreigners by Frederick the Great in order to make up for his lack of troops in the latter period of the Seven Years War, these troops were to act independently and harass the communications of the enemy, gain intelligence on their movements, and deny them intelligence concerning the Prussians. Considering the material from which these units were composed, it should come as little surprise that the consensus view holds that they were not very useful, and may even have served as a detriment to Prussian effectiveness. This particular type of soldier will not receive any further treatment here, as the military thinkers of the period did not comment on their use.¹¹

⁸ Gates, *British Light Infantry*, 12.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰ There is some debate on the foregoing among various historians of these forces. On the controversy concerning light infantry versus partisans, see Fuller asserts that the Austrians did not use their Croats and Pandours as true light infantry at this time, J.F.C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925, 44. Christopher Duffy, *Instrument of War: The Austrian Army in the Seven Years' War*. Vol. 1 Rosemont, IL: The Emperor's Press, 2000, 240. Duffy implies at least a relationship between light infantry and partisans, noting how the formers supplanted the latter as they grew less effective during the Seven Years' War. In his previous work, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1715-1789*, Duffy points out some general trends concerning the various light infantry and irregular formations employed by Prussia, Austria and France describing all as "light troops". See Duffy *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason 1715-1789* New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987, 275-76. Likewise, Martin Rink notes the manner in which irregular troops were nationalized over the course of the eighteenth century, a significant part of which was their greater incorporation in the regular military establishments of the states which fielded them. See Rink, Martin "The Partisan's Metamorphosis: From Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German Freedom Fighter, 1740-1815." in *War in History*. 17(1):10. David Gates, however, implies that this sort of service called for troops with a distinctly different skill set than that inculcated in the regular units of the period. See Gates, *British Light Infantry*, 10-12. Finally, it is worth noting that there is no real distinction in any of the works of contemporaries on this point, the phrases "light troops" or troops on "detached service" are those that appear most commonly in the works consulted herein.

¹¹ On the raising and employment of Frei-Corps, see Duffy, *Army of Frederick the Great*, 133-38. For some ideas on the various uniform patterns adopted by these troops, see Bruce Bassett-Powell, *Freikorps of the Seven Years War: Hanover and Prussia*. Weatherford, TX: Uniformology, 2008.

As noted above, the first use of modern partisans in eighteenth century Europe occurred during the War of the Austrian Succession.¹² These troops, under the leadership of the commanders who raised them, such as Baron von Trenck, hearkened back to the more traditional Friekorps of the preceding century. These forces so bedeviled the supply lines of Frederick II of Prussia during his campaign in Silesia that he was eventually forced to develop troops of his own. These troops helped, in some respect, to mollify the effectiveness of the Austrian irregulars. Prior to Frederick's creation of his own light troops, the Prussians stood at a distinct disadvantage. As Christopher Duffy summarizes, "Almost every regiment owned a horror story of some episode when it had been caught at a disadvantage by the Croats."¹³ The troops Frederick raised were the Jägers described above. The Jägers were drawn from the huntsmen of Frederick's kingdom, and their primary weapon was a short rifle of the same name.¹⁴ Thus, the policy adopted by Maria Theresa out of desperation initiated a trend in warfare during the middle of the eighteenth century.

Each conflict provides its own share of military thinkers and the War of the Austrian Succession was no exception. Usually, these commentators were veterans of the war and the works they produced not only recounted what they perceived as successes, but following in the tradition of the Enlightenment, suggested areas for improvement and reform.

In the aftermath of the War of the Austrian Succession, a number of authors examined the recent contributions of these new irregular troops on the battlefields of Europe and argued in their respective works for the development of a place for irregular troops in the military organizations of the various states of Europe.

First and foremost among those who sought to distill the experience of partisan troops in the late war stood Baron von Trenck himself. He produced an autobiography in the years following the Peace of Aix-la-Chappelle, while imprisoned on charges stemming from his exploits during the conflict.¹⁵ While many aspects of the work are quite self-serving, the author does provide numerous examples of the sort of activities in which partisan forces engaged. One such incident took place in 1741 after Trenck and his Pandours were recruited into the service of the Austrian crown. It is worth relating in detail in order to provide an example of Trenck's methods in practicing irregular warfare. Trenck had spent the winter months in Vienna, defending his reputation, seeking to ingratiate himself at the court of Maria Theresa, and enjoying the comforts offered by Viennese social life. As the campaign season opened, he left the capital to rejoin his troops. Once he rejoined his men, Trenck immediately initiated operations against the Prussians.

I set out forthwith from *Vienna*, and used such expedition in pursuit of the enemy that I came up with them where they were [sic] incamped by *Stremberg*, within

¹² The adjective modern is consciously applied here to differentiate these troops from those of previous ages.

¹³ Christopher Duffy, *The Army of Frederick the Great*, 131.

¹⁴ On the Jägers, see Duffy, *Army of Frederick*, . On the development of the rifle, see, James R. McIntyre "On the Origins and Development of the Pennsylvania-American Longrifle, 1500-1700." in *Seven Years War Association Journal*. Vol. 14, no.1 Fall, 2005, 40-55.

¹⁵ A full biographical article on Trenck is forthcoming in the next issue. The editor.

two miles of *Vienna*. I slipped under the favor of the night thro' a wood, just close up to their camp where having been disappointed of sport, I continued to wait till the next morning, when the whole army was to break up their camp. I saw them march off with only 40 *Hussars* in their rear guard. As my *Pandours* were on foot, I did not think proper to attack the *Hussars* in the open field, where their horses would give them advantage; but I let them ride quietly into the little city of *Stremberg*. I followed them into the city and found them standing before an inn. Whereat I fired at them at about 20 steps distance, and they thinking I had a large body of men with me, immediately took flight. I pursued them close till we came up to a blacksmith's shop from whence a *Hussar* was just stepping out with some money in his hand, whom I immediately fired at and shot dead on the spot.¹⁶

While Trenck describes many of the useful tactics of the partisan, such as the use of night to conceal movements, careful observation of the enemy, and selection of terrain in order to make the most effective use of the forces at his disposal. Such assessments, however, are where Trenck's work itself falls short. He never analyzed what he was doing and why, much less present any conclusions to his readers. Still, the account, while flawed, particularly by the author's self-aggrandizement, does offer some insights into the activities of a partisan leader. It should be remembered that Trenck's work was only one of drop in a veritable flood of works to come out in the aftermath of the War of the Austrian Succession, many of them dedicating at least a portion to exploring the role of partisans.



Jean Charles Chevalier de Folard

¹⁶ Francis Baron Trenck *Memoirs of the Illustrious Francis Baron Trenck*. London: W. Owen, Jim Mitchell ed. and ill. Of 2000 reprint of 1747 original, 62. Italics in original.

In discussing the first wave writing on partisan troops, and light forces in general it is important to understand that much of this work not only derived from the experience of the conflict, but developed in opposition to the ideas of Jean Charles Chevalier Folard (February 13, 1669-1752).

Folard has been described as “an experienced, if eccentric officer.”¹⁷ He has been noted as a supporter of the development of light troops, however, even a cursory reading of his most significant work *Nouvelles Decouvertes sur la guerres dans une dissertation de Polybe* calls this assessment into question.¹⁸ In fact, Folard called for the use of heavy infantry based on his own experiences of war in the early part of the eighteenth century. He had served predominantly in the Italian theater under the duc de Vendome during the War of the Spanish Succession. While serving there in 1702, he became a captain and served as an aide-de-camp of the duc. In 1705, while serving in Italy under Vendome’s brother, Folard won the Cross of St. Louis. After the conclusion of that conflict, he served under Charles XII of Sweden, and briefly under the duke of Berwick during the short war between England and Spain in 1719.

Folard saw Charles XII of Sweden as the greatest military leader of the age, and began to formulate his ideas on military reform while in his service to the northern European monarch. He developed these concepts while working on a translation of the works of the ancient Greek author Polybus. Folard’s system was first published in his *Nouvelles Decouvertes sur la guerres dans une dissertation de Polybe* (1724). Later, he expanded on his original concepts in *Histoire de Polybe traduite par...de Thuillier avec une commentaire de M. de Folard, Chevalier de l’Ordre de St. Louis* (1727-1730).¹⁹

As a means of bolstering the credibility for his new military system, Folard hearkened back to the systems of the Greeks and Romans, with an emphasis on the methods of the Greeks. Folard’s penchant for the tactics of the ancient Greeks came across clearly in his advocacy of the heavy infantry column, which, like the Hoplite phalanx, was to advance rigidly against the line of the enemy.²⁰

Folard spent the remainder of his life defending the ideas he described in the two works cited above against the attacks of numerous critics. He died in obscurity in 1752. Still, his ideas did exert a positive influence on some, most notably, Maurice de Saxe.

¹⁷ Brent Nosworthy, *The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990, 147-163. See also, Robert S. Quimby, *The Background on Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Century France*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, 80-90.

¹⁸ Fuller, *British Light Infantry*, 49.

¹⁹ Folard is definitely in need of a more thorough treatment. Currently, there are two biographies of him, both in French. Charles de Coynart, *Le Chevalier de Folard*. Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1914, and Jean Chagniot, *Le Chevalier de folard: la strategie de l’incertitude*. Paris: Ed. du Rocher, 1997. His theories are discussed at some length in Quimby, Robert S. *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth-Century France*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, 26-41. See also Nosworthy, *Anatomy of Victory*, 148-151.

²⁰ The preceding is based on my own reading of Jean Charles Chealier de Folard *Nouvelles Decouvertes sur la guerres dans une dissertation de Polybe*. Paris, 1724 as well as a very good synopsis of this work in Quimby, *Background to Napoleonic Warfare*, 26-41.



Maurice de Saxe as he would have appeared around the time he composed his *Reveries*.

Among chief authors of the period following the War of the Austrian Succession was Maurice de Saxe of France. Born on October 28, 1696, Saxe was the eldest son of the elector of Saxony and King of Poland Frederick Augustus, who himself claimed to have fathered over three hundred children. Saxe served under Eugene of Savoy, one of the great captains of the latter period of Louis XIV's reign, against the Turks in 1717. It was likely in this campaign that Saxe gained his first awareness of light troops.²¹ J.F. C. Fuller credits Folard with inspiring Saxe to reach the conclusion that the irregulars he had seen in action while fighting the Turks, if properly trained and disciplined, could form a useful corps of light infantry.²²

Saxe is most famous for his work, *Reveries on the Art of War*, composed while the author lay in recovery from an illness, as Christopher Duffy describes, "in the course of thirteen sleepless nights in 1732."²³ As such, the author framed his ruminations as a sort of dream of what an army could be. They were only published posthumously in 1757. This has generated waves of both approbation and criticism from contemporaries as well as later historians. Thomas Carlyle, for instance, called them, "a strange Military Farrago, dictated, I should think, under opium."²⁴ Still, the work was read widely in the Europe of the eighteenth century, and is

²¹ Biographical data on Saxe is culled from several sources. Among the most useful are: Brent Nosworthy, *The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990, 147-163. See also

²² Fuller, J.F. C. *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925, 49.

²³ Duffy, *Military Experience*, viii. In the passage from which the above is drawn, the author laments the practice of jumping from one well-known historian of the period to the next. On Saxe, see also

²⁴ Thomas Carlyle, quoted in Maurice De Saxe, *Reveries on the Art of War*. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, trans and ed. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2007 reprint of 1944 original, 11.

recognized as one of the more influential compositions of the period by both contemporaries and later scholars.²⁵

Several themes emerge from his writings. First, there is a great concern for the types of troops that should be recruited into these formations. As will be seen below, this theme was of much concern for a number of the authors surveyed in the present work. As Saxe points out, “The light-armed foot are in like manner to be chosen in their regiments, the centurions selecting the youngest and most active.”²⁶

In addition to the types of troops to be recruited into his new light formations, Saxe also displayed great concern for the manner in which the men should be equipped. His suggestions in this realm stood as a harbinger of things to come. “Their arms must consist of nothing more than a fowling-piece and bayonet with a handle to it. The fowling-piece is to be made so as to open and receive the charge at the breech, so that it will not need to be rammed.”²⁷ Consider Saxe’s ideas on this point in relation to the later creation and advocacy of breech-loading rifles by British Major Patrick Ferguson during the American War of Independence.²⁸

In so far as the equipment of his light troops was concerned, Saxe stressed that it must also be as light as possible. By far the most controversial point for contemporaries contained in this section of the *Reveries* concerned the selection of officers. They were to be chosen in the same manner as the men, through merit, without regard to seniority. The men, for their part, were to be drilled frequently, as well as exercised in jumping and running. The most important aspect of training for the men was practice in aimed fire at marks up to three hundred yards distant.²⁹ It is clear from the preceding that Saxe’s system for the use of light infantry was based on the notion that fire must precede shock action.³⁰

Finally, in setting out his plan for light forces, Saxe asserted that “A body of infantry organized according to this plan and thoroughly trained, can march everywhere with the cavalry and, I am confident, will be capable of giving great service.”³¹

Writing after Saxe and Trenck was Thomas Auguste Le Roy de Grandmaison (1715-1801). Grandmaison was the scion of a family descended from the old nobility of France, who had seen service in the War of the Austrian Succession. His *La Petite Guerre or Traite des Troupes legeres en Campagne* first appeared in 1756, just at the outset of the Seven Years’ War.

²⁵ Maurice de Saxe ‘s *Reveries on the Art of War* is one of the most often mentioned text concerning eighteenth century warfare.

²⁶ Maurice de Saxe, *Reveries on the Art of War*, 40.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ On Patrick Ferguson, see Marianne McLeod Gilchrist, *Patrick Ferguson: A Man of Some Genius*. Edinburgh, Scotland: NMS Publishing, 2003. This is currently the most recent biography of Ferguson of which I am aware, though it is biased in some sections. On British use of rifles, see DeWitt Bailey, *British Military Flintlock Rifles, 1740-1840*. Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray Publishers, 2002.

²⁹ Saxe, *Reveries*, 41

³⁰ Fuller, *British Light Infantry*, 52.

³¹ Saxe, *Reveries*, 40-41.

In describing the raising and employment of light troops, Grandmaison laid stress on the importance of the commander chosen to lead such formations.³² He goes on to explain,

Si au contraire, le merite est prefere, il ne regard que les gens de reputation, d'experience, et de conduit. On sent aisement la difference qu'un chef doit mettre entre les premiers et les deniers; son advancement, sa gloire, sa reputation, et celle de son regiment, est in dependant.³³

The light or irregular forces were not the same as the regular ground forces of the period, at least in the minds of those who wrote about their employment. Grandmaison, like Saxe, advocated the selection of officers based on merit for his light forces at a time when command usually went to those with the social connections, wealth, or both, to attain it. In addition, Grandmaison called for the use of men with experience and a reputation for success in partisan warfare, noting that the reputation of the regiment is dependent on this quality.

With the coming of the Seven Years' War, the initial set of reforms to the irregulars endured their first major tests under the conditions of combat. As Gunther Rothenberg observed, the Grenzer, still referred to as Croats in contemporary sources, were now better disciplined and paid on a more regular basis by the Austrian government. Under leaders such as Baron Beck and Ernst Gideon Baron Loudon, they provided valuable services to the government of Maria Theresa. Still, they did plunder on occasion.³⁴ In order to offset the irregulars' penchant for plunder, efforts were set in motion to further domesticate these troops. For instance, J.F.C. Fuller reports that in 1758, Loudon sought for and was granted permission to permanently attach a battalion of grenadiers to his Croats. This would have placed the troops under a more consistent system of discipline than that which they had previously known. Before much could be done with this new hybrid regiment, however, he was assigned to another unit.³⁵

Tactically, they were still employed as scouts and on raids as they had been in previous conflicts. Now, however, they were also utilized for tasks that had been standard for regular troops, especially in terrain where the line would be handicapped, such as woods and hills or in the defense of villages. Still, the Grenzer retained the ability to provide an almost impenetrable screen around the main forces of the army, and to conduct raids against the rear areas of the opposing forces.³⁶

The instruments of war had changed somewhat as well, with the sharpshooters being armed with a double barreled carbine. The upper barrel was rifled, while the lower one was

³² Grandmaison, *La Petite Guerre or Traite des Troupes legeres en Campagne*, Paris, 1756, 28.

³³ Ibid, 29. Translation: "If on the contrary, merit is preferred, he only considers people of reputation, of experience, and of (good) behavior. One easily feels the difference that a leader must place between the former and the latter; his advancement, his glory, his reputation, and that of his regiment, are dependent on it." I would like to thank my colleagues in the Communications, Language and Literature Department at Moraine Valley Community College for reviewing the translation for me.

³⁴ Rothenberg, 40.

³⁵ J.F. C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925, 67-8.

³⁶ Ibid, 40-41.

smooth bore. The upper barrel was to be used in sniping while the other allowed for a greater rapidity of fire, reducing, to some extent, the vulnerability of these troops.³⁷

It is worth pointing out that while the numbers of light troops in most European militaries increased over the course of the eighteenth century, in many instances the differences between these men and those of the regular line units was purely superficial. As one historian points out, they were “Jägers in name only.” The most clear cut example of troops meeting the above description were those of the Russian Army after the Seven Years War.³⁸ In contrast, most scholars believe that the Austrians possessed the best irregular troops on the continent of Europe for much of the period in question.³⁹ To a degree, this was due to the fact, as pointed out by Martin Rink, that by the end of the Seven Years War the partisan leaders in most European forces had been reduced to the role of tactically independent detachment commanders. The tactics employed by such units had also become somewhat more standardized.⁴⁰ To some extent, Rink overstates his case, however, as he refers to a number of the partisan units being carried on the regular establishment where a number of contemporaries called for just such an action on the part of their respective governments in order to maintain these forces and not have to rebuild them from scratch at the outset of the next conflict.⁴¹

The initial stages of the conflict witnessed the publication of several new writings on the use of irregular forces. The most significant of these was certainly the work of Mihaly Lajos Jeney (1723-1797), also known as Louis Michel de Jeney in French. Jeney was a Hungarian officer who served in the Austrian Army as a mapmaker. His major contribution to the art of war, however, was a work titled *The Partisan: Or the Art of Making War in Detachments* as translated in English. It first appeared in French in 1759, with an English translation appearing shortly thereafter in 1763. This work quickly claimed a wide appeal in Europe and was suggested by Washington to some of his officers in the Continental Army as well.⁴²

³⁷ Ibid, 45. Such a reform is very noteworthy when it is considered that the low rate of fire is often singled out as one of the two main liabilities of riflemen in the American War of Independence.


³⁸ Gates, *British Light Infantry*, 18-19.

³⁹ On the superiority of Austrian irregulars, see Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason 1715-1789* New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987 and *Instrument of War vol. 1 The Austrian Army in the Seven Years' War*. Chicago, IL: The Emperor's Press, 2000. See also Gates, *British Light Infantry*, 11.

⁴⁰ Martin Rink, “The Partisan’s Metamorphosis: From Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German Freedom Fighter, 1740-1815.” in *War in History*. 17(1): 14.

⁴¹ On the need for retention of irregular formations and light troops, and especially their officers in peacetime, see Johann von Ewald below. See also Andreas Emmerich, *The Partisan in War or the Use of Light Troops in an Army*. London : Printed by H. Reynell for J. Debrett, 1789, 2.

⁴² On Washington’s reading of Jeney, see Donald Stoker and Michael W, Jones, “Colonial Military Strategy.” in Donald Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan, and Michael T. Mc Master, *Strategy in the American War of Independence: A Global Approach*. London: Routledge, 2010, 14-15. Concerning Washington’s understanding of irregular forces, see John W. Hall, “Washington’s Irregulars.” in Edward G. Lengel, ed. *A Companion to George Washington*. West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2012, 320-43.



Detail from the frontispiece of the French edition of De Jeney's *The Partisan* from the collection of the Society for the Cincinnati Library, Washington, D.C.

De Jeney began his work by defining his own perception of irregular warfare or *petit guerre*,

The *petite guerre* may not improperly be deemed a kind of miniature portrait of the great Art of War. The same Deceptions, Maneuvers and Stratagems, are frequently used by the Commander of an Army; the Writer therefore who

instructs the former, may possibly be found not unworthy the Perusal of the latter.⁴³

The author then goes on to describe his ideal as to the composition of a partisan corps. This force he depicts as consisting of between one hundred and two thousand men, though he stresses that it should be close to a thousand in number to be really useful. He goes on to assert that this force should be composed of both infantry and cavalry. His reason being that, “we have frequently found that by uniting the two last they have, through Emulation, been mutually excited to Deeds of wonderful intrepidity.”⁴⁴ Jeney goes on to advocate that the commanders of these units be allowed to select their junior officers.⁴⁵ Again, in some ways this call echoes that already made by Saxe and Grandmaison. For Jeney, such freedom would allow the leaders of partisan forces choose subordinates who understand to role of the unit and who could work to instill discipline in the men.

The instilling of a proper sense of discipline in the troops stands as a major concern for De Jeney. As he explains,

It is surprising that Troops destined for the most important Employment should be so frequently suffered to neglect their Duty, and to run into Excesses which are shocking to Humanity, without the least Care being taken to reform Abuses so prejudicial to the Glory and Interest of Princes.⁴⁶

After delineating his concern over the conduct of partisans, De Jeney asserts, “There is no military Employment that requires more extraordinary Talents than that of a Partisan.”⁴⁷ The reasons underlying this claim grow clear as he describes the ideal type of partisan leader.

He should be blessed with an Imagination fruitful in Projects, Strategems, and Resources. A penetrating Mind, capable of combining instantly, every Circumstance of an Action, a Heart that cannot shrink at the appearance of Danger, a Countenance so steadfast and assured, as not to discover the least sign of Confusion or Disquietude, a Memory so happy as never to mistake the Names of Persons or things, a Disposition so indefatigable and alert as to give life to every Part, and to every Action, an Eye so quick and strong as to perceive in a moment every defect, Advantage, Obstacle, or Danger that may arise; Such Sentiments as to inspire Respect, Confidence, and Attachment throughout his whole Corps.⁴⁸

⁴³ M. de Jeney, *The Partisan: Or the Art of Making War in Detachments* (English edition, 1760), v.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 1-2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 4.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 4-5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 6-7.

This description of leadership encompasses a very tall order. Still, it is not exhaustive of the traits that de Jeney would want in his partisan leader. They must also be conversant in various languages, especially French, German and Latin. Furthermore, he should understand the use of light troops both by his army and by that of the enemy, and possess and be able to properly read an accurate map of the theater in which he is operating. Finally, he should go to great pains to collect and decipher any and all intelligence of his foes that he can.⁴⁹

Concerning the obstacles that block an officer from service as an able partisan leader, De Jeney observes that “There is nothing more dangerous than for a Partisan to be, in the least degree, attached to Women, Wine, or Wealth.” He perceives these things as dangers as “The first will make him neglect his Duty, and will frequently expose him to Treachery and Destruction, the second is the cause of perilous Indiscretions, and always draws Contempt, the third leads the way to crimes without Number and Blasts all our Laurels.”⁵⁰

Building upon his introduction, which describes the composition of a Partisan corps and the traits that should appear in its leaders, Jeney spends much of his works discussing the practices that a Partisan force is most often engaged in, and how to perform these duties successfully. In doing so, he provides a fairly comprehensive introduction to the work of the partisan. He gives practical guidelines on the handling of troops, such as “When your Troops want Refreshment in the Day-time you are to halt in a wood, and in the Night in the open field, but never near a House or in a village, if it can be avoided.”⁵¹ This is to reduce the interaction between the troops and the civilian inhabitants of the region, thus reducing the allure of plunder, and conversely the temptation on the part of some of the soldiery toward desertion. Likewise, he asserts that “The best Season for secret Marches is the depth of Winter.” This is because “At this time, both the Peasants and their Dogs keep within Doors, and the Enemy think more of guarding against the Cold...than of securing themselves against any Attempt upon their Lines or garrisons.”⁵² While certainly many of the methods of fighting wars have altered drastically at the tactical level since De Jeney’s time, this is one of the points in his work where he touches on advice suitable for all times and places. At the same time, it is interesting that De Jeney is thorough enough to consider the significance of dogs in giving the alarm and thus exposing night marches.

Throughout the work, de Jeney reinforces the importance of discipline and subordination among the troops, asserting in one passage that

When a Corps is properly exercised and disciplined, Order and Regularity is maintained with the greatest facility: the Soul of the Commander extends through every Member: His Prudence, his Courage, his Ability is visible in every Individual, and his Power is raised to its greatest possible Height.⁵³

⁴⁹ Ibid, 7-8.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 9

⁵¹ Ibid, 43-44.

⁵² Ibid, 45.

⁵³ Ibid, 22.

The fact that de Jeney defines the work of a partisan in war with great precision is what sets his work apart from that of many contemporaries. For instance, when dealing with ambushes, he first defines what they are: “An Ambuscade is a body of Men concealed in a Wood, or otherwise, with an intention to surprise the enemy.” He goes on to note that “There are no stratagems of War which afford a Partisan better Opportunities of displaying his Genius and resolution.”⁵⁴

One facet of partisan warfare de Jeney laid particular emphasis on was the relationship of the commander to his troops. He states that, “The bed of a partisan is the same with that of his Troops, viz. his Cloak, and a little Straw.”⁵⁵

From the preceding, De Jeney’s *The Partisan* stood as one of the key works on irregular warfare to emerge during the Seven Years’ War. In fact, his was the last major work to publish in Europe during the conflict.⁵⁶ This hiatus in military publishing is understandable, as the actual prosecution of the war occupied all the time of the military professionals.

In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, it is clear that light troops were becoming a more accepted part of European armies. On March 1, 1763, an ordnance appeared in the French army, calling for the retention of five regiments or legions of light infantry. The composition of each of these formations was to be one company of grenadiers, eight of fusiliers, and one of dragoons.⁵⁷ While these developments were occurring on the European continent, It is important to recall that North America served as a significant spawning ground for ideas concerning irregular warfare as well.

The North American continent, a land mass soaked in the blood of both Europeans and the native inhabitants, served as a laboratory for tactical changes as well. From the last decade of the seventeenth century until the Peace of Paris in 1763, North America was a theater for conflicts between Great Britain and France. In order to complement their meager forces of colonists and regulars, both sides actively sought out the services of Native American auxiliaries. The use of these indigenous auxiliaries exerted a profound effect upon the thinking of some European officers, both French and English. While irregular warfare already possessed a lengthy history in North America, it was during the French and Indian War (1764-1763) that the practices employed there first came into contact with officers trained in the European school of war. Europeans derived inspiration for military reforms from Native American practices, such as the raiding party, and complemented it with their own doctrine. As a result, a new hybrid form of warfare developed.⁵⁸

For instance, Fuller observes how officers steeped in the European military doctrines of the period such as George Augustus Howe, Henry Bouquet and George Washington all, at times,

⁵⁴ Ibid, 106.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 60.

⁵⁶ Duffy, *Military Experience*, 269.

⁵⁷ Quimby, *Background to Napoleonic*, 98.

⁵⁸ On the early history of warfare in North America, the classic work is Douglas Edward Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. On irregular warfare in North American in particular, see John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American Warmaking on the Frontier*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

entertained the idea of clothing their men in Indian garb.⁵⁹ By the same token, in many ways, the practices of both sides resembled those employed by European partisans. The preferred tactical methods in this type of conflict were the surprise raid on an enemy outpost or column, and the ambush.

Certainly the most well known practitioner of the tactics described above, but by no means the only, was Robert Rogers. Rogers was born in Methuen, Massachusetts November 7, 1731. Soon thereafter, his family moved to Great Meadow in what was becoming the colony of New Hampshire. Rogers experienced numerous adventures as a youth and tried his hand at a number of different vocations, including counterfeiting. It was in frontier warfare, however, that Rogers discovered something at which he excelled.⁶⁰

During the French and Indian War, he raised, equipped and commanded a unit known as Rogers' Rangers, who specialized in irregular warfare. In addition, Rogers trained numerous British officers in his wilderness military techniques. As a result of these activities, Rogers developed a set of principles, known as *Rogers Rules of Ranging*, and written sometime in later 1757.⁶¹ The memorization of these precepts remains a part of the training of U.S. Army Rangers. While some of the rules are clearly set in the precepts of eighteenth century warfare, others remain useful in their fundamentals in any military context.

Among those rules that describe Rogers' notions of warfare on the eighteenth century North American frontier, the following provides a clear idea of his approach to wilderness warfare,

In general, when pushed upon by the enemy, reserve your fire till they approach very near, which will then put them into the greatest surprise and consternation, and give you an opportunity of rushing upon them with your hatchets and cutlasses to the better advantage.⁶²

Reserving the first fire, often seen as the most useful as it was prepared at leisure in weapon that was clean both conserved the element of surprise in a unit waiting in ambush, and allowed them to unleash a devastating opening volley. The reliance on a charge with edged weapons then allowed the men to make the best use of the confusion generated with the opening volley.

In so far as elements of the rules that continue to possess utility, the following examples from Rules II and VIII respectively, demonstrate fundamentals of war that hold universal applicability.

⁵⁹ Fuller, *British Light Infantry*, 88.

⁶⁰ The most recent biography of Rogers, from which this material is drawn, is John F. Ross, *War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America's First Frontier*. New York: Random House, Inc., 2009.

⁶¹ Ross, *War on the Run*, 143-145.

⁶² Rule XIII. There are numerous sources for Rogers' Rules of Ranging. The one utilized here is from *A "Plan of Discipline" extracted from the Journals of Robert Rogers*. Internet source <http://www.rogersrangers.org/rules/index.html> . Last accessed, 10/12/13.

Whenever you are ordered out to the enemies' forts or frontiers for discoveries, if your number be small, march in a single file, keeping at such distance from each other as to prevent one shot from killing two men, sending one man, or more, forward, and the like on each side, at the distance of twenty yards from the main body, if the ground you march over will admit of it, to give the signal to the officer of the approach of an enemy, and of their numbers &c.⁶³

Spacing men out, though for somewhat different reasons, remains a basic practice of small unit patrols down to the present day. While Rogers was certainly not the first to make use of such a practice, he was among the first to write down what he was doing and why. Along the same lines, Rule VIII cautions men against being caught in an ambush,

If you oblige your enemy to retreat, be careful, in your pursuit of them, to keep out your flanking parties and prevent them from gaining eminences or rising grounds, in which case they would perhaps be able to rally and repulse in their turn.⁶⁴

Thus, Rogers adroitly points out how the pursuit of a retreating foe can turn on the pursuers and inflict significant damage on them. Rogers demonstrates an appreciation of small unit tactics and open order that came to epitomize light infantry units. The standard interpretation runs that once the above methods were learned by European troops serving in North America, true light infantry came into existence. It should come as no surprise, then, that the North American theater is often seen as the birthplace of the light infantry.

As Stephen Brumwell observes concerning the development of light infantry in the North American context, "Many of the British officers who saw service in North America in the 1750s and 1760s were already familiar with both the theory and practice of 'irregular' warfare as waged in Europe."⁶⁵ Perhaps their experience and awareness of the trends in irregular warfare in Europe allowed these men to approach the challenges of wilderness warfare in North America with a more open mind and instilled in them a greater willingness to try the unorthodox. Such traits clearly mark the next two individuals in the continuum of light infantry/partisan development.

A major innovator, though one who did not leave any writings on his ideas was Brigadier General George Augustus Howe of the British Army.⁶⁶ Howe trained with Robert Rogers, and

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Stephen Brumwell, "'A Service Truly Critical': The British Army and Warfare with the North American Indians, 1755-1764." in *War in History*. 5, 2 (1998): 151. In the article, Brumwell contends that the British troops did learn many of the lessons of wilderness warfare and that while these allowed them to succeed in some engagements against their French and Native American foes, they never became as competent in this form of warfare as their adversaries. Additional information on the British development of light troops in North America can be found in Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions." in *The Army Quarterly*. 63,2 (1952) 209-222.

⁶⁶ It should be noted that Howe's ranks was purely local, in that he held it in North America only.

brought back many of the ideas he learned from the ranger leader to his own regiments. As J.F.C. Fuller summarizes, “He cut the skirts off their coats, and the hair off their heads, browned the barrels of their muskets, gave them leggings, emptied the knapsacks of pomatums, greases and powders, and filled them with thirty pounds of meal.” Howe, who died in the 1758 attack on Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) in New York, is credited with being the officer to introduce light infantry to the British Army.⁶⁷

The last major figure to contribute to the discussion of irregular warfare in North America was the Swiss-born British officer, Henry Bouquet (1719- 1765) created a crack unit designated as the British 60th of Foot, or the Royal Americans. Bouquet was born into a family of moderate means in the town of Rolle in the Swiss Confederacy. He entered the military at age 17. As was common for officers during this period, Bouquet served in the militaries of several states. Bouquet first served in the army of the Dutch republic, then in that of the Kingdom of Sardinia. In 1756, Bouquet entered into the British army with the rank of lieutenant colonel.⁶⁸

Bouquet’s most famous contribution came in the raising and equipping of the Royal Americans. Commenting on this work, Fuller ascribes to Bouquet the desire to create a unit of what he referred to as “hunters.”⁶⁹ These were to be men capable of fighting in open order as well as possessing the various other skills collectively referred to as woodcraft. The question then becomes whether or not Bouquet ever set down his ideas on irregular warfare in print. Nothing can be said definitively on this point, however, there is one work, a short book titled *An Historical Account of the expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764*, by William Smith. The book contains a section titled “Reflections on the War with the Savages of North America” which, according to Brumwell, was likely authored by Bouquet.⁷⁰ In it, the author sets out his reflections concerning fighting against the native forces of North America. In describing the tactical abilities of the Native Americans, the author makes clear that in his opinion, it is best to avoid further conflicts with them. Still, admitting the pragmatic stance that this is highly unlikely, he goes on to assert that in order to beat them, European soldiers must be trained to fight in the same manner as the Indians,

⁶⁷ Fuller, *British Light Infantry*, 87-88. A number of authors have commented on the development of light infantry in the British Army as a result of its experience in the French and Indian War. Some of the major contributors in this field include: Steven Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Ian McCulloch, “‘Within Ourselves...’ The Development of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years War.” in *Canadian Military History*. 7, 2 (Spring 1998): 41-55. See also Gates, *British Light Infantry*,

⁶⁸ Much of the biographical material on Bouquet present above derives from Butler, Lt. Col. Lewis *Annals of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps; “The Royal Americans,” 1755-1802*. 2 vols. London: J. Murray 1913. Some material on him may be found in Kenneth P. Stuart *Defenders of the Frontier: Colonel Henry Bouquet and the Officers and Men of the Royal American Regiment, 1763-1764*. Westminster, MD. Heritage Books, 2007, reviewed in the last issue.

⁶⁹ Fuller, 108. This could be a connection to Bouquet’s Swiss-German background, as that is English meaning of the word Jäger.

⁷⁰ Stephen Brumwell, “‘Service Truly Critical,’” 162. The author argues that in the introduction, Smith asserts that the “reflections” were based on the papers of an officer who served at the battle of Bushy Run. Likewise, he notes that the “Reflections” advocate in favor of tactics much like those employed by Bouquet at Bushy Run. For a short but thorough account of Bushy Run, see Niles Anderson *The Battle of Bushy Run*. Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, PA, 2001. See also, William R. Nester, “*Haughty Conquerors*”: *Amherst and the Great Indian Uprising of 1763*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000, 140-43.

Experience has convinced us that it is not our interest to be at war with them; but if after having tried all means to avoid it, they force us to it, (which in all probability will often happen) we should endeavor to fight them upon more equal terms, and regulate our Maneuvers upon those of the enemy we are to engage and the nature of the country we are acting in.⁷¹

In addition, he contends that several defeats at the hands of Europeans would likely undermine the confidence of the Native Americans, but laments, “this cannot reasonably be expected until we have troops trained to fight them in their own way.”⁷² The inability of European troops to defeat Native Americans on their own ground stems from the fact that while the regulars possess the courage and zeal necessary to defeat the Indians, they are too heavy in their equipment, and too valuable a commodity in North America to be risked alone on such service. Therefore, “they require the assistance of lighter corps, whose dress, arms, and exercises, should be adapted to this new kind of war.”⁷³

Bouquet goes on to support the ideas laid out above with reference to the works of Julius Caesar and others, to emphasize the importance of adaptation to new tactical conditions. He concludes,

An European, to be a proper judge of this kind of war, must have lived sometime in the vast forests of America; otherwise he will hardly be able to conceive a continuity of woods without end. In spite of his endeavors, his imagination will betray him into an expectation of open and clear grounds, and he will be apt to calculate his Maneuvers accordingly, too much upon the principles of war in Europe.⁷⁴

A significant point emerges in Bouquet’s caution to officers serving in North America to accept their situation as something fundamentally different from what they have previously encountered, and to not fall back on standard European practices. Here, he is advising his peers to maintain an open mind and be willing to adapt what is useful from the techniques they observe in use rather than attempting to force European norms onto the conditions of North America, a fault often ascribed to British officers by generations of American historians.

By the latter years of the eighteenth century, light troops were becoming an accepted feature of European forces. Such an assessment is evidenced in the description given them by Thomas Bell in his *A Short Essay on Military First Principles*, “Light Troops are the Eyes of a General, and Givers of Sleep and Safety to the Army.” Bell’s work appeared in London on the eve of the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1770, and contains much of the digested experience of the Seven Years’ War. For instance, the author expounds on the

⁷¹ Henry Bouquet, *An Historical Account of the expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764*. Philadelphia: William Bradford, 1765, 40.

⁷² *Ibid*, 41.

⁷³ *Ibid*.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 44.

composition of light forces, “wherever there is found Light Cavalry, there should be Light Infantry;” asserting that “they are Twins, both born at a Birth, and should never be separated.”⁷⁵

Like Jeney, Bell stresses the importance of training to the creation of a successful light infantry force, stating,

There is no Corps at all that requires longer training than a really good Light Infantry one, and therefore their training must be the Work of Peace; for a Corps formed without any can never answer the Purposes of a trained Corps.⁷⁶

Bell, similarly, laid stress on the importance of marksmanship, for as he notes, “in Light Infantry War, it is a good deal either hit or be killed.” Not only should these troops be good shots, they should be able to swim and move quickly on land in order to seize objectives faster than their opponents as well.⁷⁷

An interesting aspect of Bell’s work is a section he presents that offers the importance of speech in command. Here he states, “The Man who commands other Men, and is in general to command them by the Voice, must often be under Necessity to speak more than the bare words of Command.” He continues, “that Art, that Power, which can, in singular and critical Occasions, so animate the Spirit of Man, as to cause it to give an Elasticity, a Strength, a Velocity, to the Corporeal Matter of the Being, which unanimated, it would be incapable of doing, such Art, such Power, must be ever a necessity to a Leader of Soldiers.”⁷⁸

Little information is available on the author of this work, however, it seems apparent that Bell’s *Short Essay* contains some fairly refined ideas on the role and expectations of light infantry. Likewise, his work included only one section on light infantry; it was not dedicated wholly to the topic. Bell’s *Short Essay* seems to have been published as a sort of basic text for junior officers. Such was the case regarding the next author whose work will be examined.

Little information is available concerning the life of Thomas Simes or his qualification as a military author. Still, he was quite active in this role between 1757 and 1780, producing a number of instructional works for the officers of the period.⁷⁹ Simes produced his *Military Guide for Young Officers* as a work for young gentlemen to consult as they learned the profession of arms. Professional military education, at this time, consisted in periods of study of military manuals and treatises enhanced by discussions and service at the side of more experienced officers.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Thomas A. Bell, *A Short Essay on Military First Principles*. London: Printed for T. Becket and P.A. De Hondt, 1770, 197.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 198-99.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 199-200.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 203.

⁷⁹ Among the other works written by Sims are, *The Military Medley* (1767), *The Military Instructor*, (1779) and *A Treatise on Military Science*, (1780)

⁸⁰ On the above “tutorial method,” see Son Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985, 14-15. The only army of the period in which the reading habits of the officers have received substantial attention is the British. On this point, see Ira D. Gruber, *Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.

In the *Guide*, Simes had this to say concerning the leadership of detached parties or regular troops serving as irregulars, “An Officer who commands one should be acquainted with roads, defiles, &c.” He adds the qualification, “If deficient in that respect, an able guide should be provided.”⁸¹ He further comments,

An Officer should avoid being seen or heard in the night or day, till he had executed his orders; after which he should return by a different road from that he took, lest the enemy lay wait to intercept him.⁸²

Finally, in much the same vein as Jeney, he warns officers to keep their men away from towns, villages and even single houses.⁸³

The Seven Years’ War undoubtedly stimulated a great deal of thinking and activity regarding the use of partisans and light infantry. In the aftermath of the conflict numerous authors were busily codifying the ideas developed on the battlefields not just of Europe, but of North America as well.

Not only were there changes in the methods of warfighting that occurred on the North American continent that were considered in Europe, there were technological developments as well. Chief among these was the development of the Pennsylvania longrifle. This weapon grew out of the German Jaeger and the English fowling piece. It was first manufactured in the Lancaster area of Pennsylvania by German and Swiss immigrants in the 1720s. It proliferated down the eastern seaboard of North America and was known as far south as Georgia by the 1760s at the latest.⁸⁴

With greater ranges and accuracy far superior to the other weapons available at the time, the longrifle served as an excellent tool for supplementing the diets of frontiersmen and a formidable weapon in times of war. There were units of men armed with longrifles recruited in the French and Indian War, and to deal with the Native American uprising known as Pontiac’s rebellion.⁸⁵ In addition, one of the first acts of the Second Continental Congress in regards to forming an American Army was the raising of four companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania and two each from Maryland and Virginia respectively. Other colonies, including Georgia and South Carolina, also recruited contingents of riflemen, primarily for local defense.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Thomas Simes, *The military guide for young officers, containing a system of the art of war; parade, camp, field duty; manoeuvres, standing and general orders; warrants, regulations, returns; tables, forms, extracts from military acts; battles, sieges, forts, ports, military dictionary, &c., with twenty-five maps and copper plates*. 2nd ed. London: J. Millan, 1776, 40

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ James R. Mc Intyre, “On the Origins and Development of the Pennsylvania-American Longrifle, 1500-1700.” in *Seven Years War Association Journal*. Vol. 14, no.1 Fall, 2005, 40-55.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ The longrifle was essentially unknown north of Pennsylvania prior to the war. During the 1777 campaign in upstate New York, Colonel Daniel Morgan’s Corps of riflemen were dispatched into the region, and some stayed to provide frontier defense in the aftermath of the fighting. On these troops, see Richard B. LaCrosse *Revolutionary Rangers Daniel Morgan’s Riflemen and their Role on the Northern Frontier, 1778-1783*. with an introduction by Harry Kels Swan, Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, Inc., 2002. On the riflemen in the Carolinas, see David Cole, *The*



Johann von Ewald as a Danish General

With the use of rifles by both sides in the American War of Independence, it should come as no surprise that the most significant theorist to emerge from the American War of Independence was Johann von Ewald (1744-1813), a captain in the Hesse-Cassel Jaeger Corps. Ewald first served Hesse-Cassel in the Seven Years' War. In 1774, Ewald wrote *Gedanken eines hessischen Officiers uber das, was man bey Fuhrung eines Detachments im Felde zuthen hat* (thoughts of a Hessian Officer on the Leadership of a Detachment in the Field). This work demonstrates that Ewald already possessed an interest in small unit actions.⁸⁷ In 1776 he came to North America as commander of the Jaeger Corps of the Hessian Lieb Regiment. The first action Ewald participated in was the Battle of White Plains on October 26, 1776. He was among those captured in the surrender of Yorktown in October 1781. Ewald kept a diary of his services during the War of American Independence, and it is clear that Ewald's experiences in this conflict which demonstrates his abilities as a critical observer of the events in which he took part.⁸⁸ While others left accounts of their services with partisan formations, Ewald later distilled his

Organization and Administration of the South Carolina Militia System 1670-1783. PhD dissertation. University of South Carolina, 1953.

⁸⁷ Johann von Ewald, *Gedanken eines hessischen Officiers uber das, was man bey Fuhrung eines Detachments im Felde zuthen hat*. Cassel: Johann Jacob Cramer, 1774.

⁸⁸ John von Ewald, *Diary of the American War*. Joseph P. Tustin, ed and trans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979.

experiences into a well considered treatise on the use of light troops.⁸⁹ Immediately upon his return from America in 1784, Ewald began his *Abhandlung uber des kleinen Krieg* or Treatise of Little War (petite guerre). Later, in 1790, he wrote *Abhandlung von deinst der leichten Truppen* or *Treatise of Light Infantry*. While Ewald claims in the introduction that this is simply a revised and expanded version of his earlier work, it is actually a very different text.⁹⁰ Ewald begins his *Treatise* by declaring that

The necessity of light troops in war is completely understood; one knows they are necessary for the safety of armies, that an army without them cannot survive against an army which is well equipped with light troops—but nevertheless little consideration is given to the selection of officers for such a corps.⁹¹

In approaching the topic in this manner, Ewald departs from many of the other works that preceded his which focus much of their attention on the selection of the soldiers that should serve in these forces. In describing the type of officer who should command light troops, Ewald states that “Every army officer who shows interest in this part of war, and who has prepared himself through the reading of good books for it, should be allowed to serve with light troops during a war.” He goes on to stress that “such corps demand the most agile, skillful and valiant officers.”⁹²

When it comes to the creation and training of the unit, Ewald stresses the importance of non-commissioned officers, as well as drill. He emphasizes, “Here it is also very necessary that the commander of such a corps be not casual about the selection of his privates, otherwise you will get a very bad rabble.”⁹³ It is clear then, that the role of the officer in this type of corps is much more active at the level of recruiting than was often the standard in eighteenth century military establishments, or at least Ewald strongly felt that it should be. He even believed that the age of the men be between 16 and 30, as the physical endurance of younger men stood as a significant factor in this type of service.⁹⁴

In newly raised formations, Ewald laid stress upon discipline and orderliness, even in minor cases. “Not the slightest infringement upon discipline, orderliness and service must be

⁸⁹ The other leaders of partisan forces were John Graves Simcoe, who later composed *Simcoe's Military Journal*. New York: Bartlett and Welford, 1844. Likewise, there was Banastre Tarleton's *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America*. Dublin: Colles, Exshaw, White, H. Whitestone, Burton, Byrne, Moore, Jones, and Dornin, 1787. Both of these works consisted of accounts of the actions of the various formations they covered, though these do yield some insights into how these units functioned in the theater. To the preceding could certainly be added, Robert E. Lee, ed. *The Revolutionary War Memoirs of General Henry Lee*. New York, De Capo Press, 1998.

⁹⁰ Ewald, *Treatise*, 2-3.

⁹¹ Ewald, *Ibid*, 67

⁹² *Ibid*, 67-68.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 67. The full discussion runs along the following lines, It is necessary that during their establishment such corps receive a quota of capable non-commissioned officers and privates, which have to be drawn from the line regiments, so that these corps can be drilled to the utmost, and that the day to day service will be introduced right from the start with the greatest order.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 68-9.

tolerated, especially not in the beginning.” He justified this attention stating, “A commanding officer can never be too strict with gang composed of people gathered from all corners of the world.”⁹⁵ Furthermore, he cautions officers, “Do not believe that you can gain the love of a soldier through an unpermissible [sic] kindness and indulgence at the expense of the poor peasant and by a policy contrary to human nature.”⁹⁶

While he made the above observations, Ewald was in no delusion as to their actual implementation in the armies of his time. “One sees with surprise, once a war breaks out, how many officers try to serve with the light troops. However, they do not consider how much skill is demanded from an officer who wants to do his part with the light troops. In this part of the war, an officer is often left to himself, has to do on a small scale what a general does on a large scale.”⁹⁷

His experiences in the American War of Independence, with the various forces organized on the legionary model, manifested in his *Treatise* as well, “It is most important that such a corps be composed of cavalry and infantry since the strength of these arms consists in the mutual support of one through the other.”⁹⁸

Ewald continues advocating in favor of the legionary organization, further detailing his ideas on its structure and composition:

If anything is to be achieved, such corps must never be much less than a thousand men, at least a third of which have to be cavalry, because if it is weaker he who is entrusted with such a corps will not be able to perform any great and brilliant enterprises. Since it constantly has to be close to the enemy, it can easily happen that such a corps will suffer considerable losses through which it can be forced into inactivity for a whole campaign.⁹⁹

Specifically concerning the riflemen or Jäger, Ewald asserts, “With the Jäger one cannot worry about the height but more important has to ensure that they are hunters by trade, good shots, and young people.”¹⁰⁰

Seeing advancement denied in the service of Hesse-Cassel, Ewald joined the Danish Army in 1788, where he reached the rank of lieutenant general. In addition, he served as governor general of Holstein during the Napoleonic Wars.

One last theorist whose views on warfare were shaped by the eighteenth century was Andreas Emmerich. Born in 1737 near the village of Kilianstaedten in Hanau, his first work was not with the army but with the foresters of the Isenburg family. About 1760, he was commissioned a Lieutenant, possibly in the Jäger corps of Graf von Schulenburg, but the records

⁹⁵ Ibid, 69.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 64.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 71.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 71-72.

are unclear. In the final months of the Seven Years War, he entered the Prussian Army. Even with this affiliation, he was able to travel to England with Lord Granby, who found for him a position as Deputy Survey General of the King's Forests. After some time, Emmerich returned to the continent and to the Hessian service.¹⁰¹

With the outbreak of hostilities in North America, he sought and obtained a Lieutenant-Colonel's commission, along with the permission to raise a corps of light troops. This unit, Emmrich chasseurs, served throughout the American War of Independence. He later joined the Hessian army and was sent to England in 1776 with the corps commanded by General Graf Christian von Isenburg.¹⁰²

Following the end of the American war, Emmerich returned to the continent. About 1794, he decided to write and publish his autobiography, but he never completed the work. He did, however, leave a work detailing the exploits of his unit in the American war.

In his account of the War of Independence, Emmerich, worked to distill his experience of war in North America. He stresses the importance of light troops from the opening of his work, "In war, no army can act without light troops. Its operations and even its existence depends upon them."¹⁰³

He continues,

Such light troops ought properly to be composed of select chasseurs with rifles, light infantry with bayonets, and light dragoons or hussars; though sometimes, and particularly by the English, the light infantry of different regiments are formed into battalions, and supported by grenadiers.¹⁰⁴

Interestingly, in the above is the fact that Emmerich differentiates his light infantry from chasseurs or riflemen. The latter, armed with bayonets could in theory provide some protection to the former during the longer time it took them to reload. This is in keeping with the assessment provided by Christopher Duffy that by the second half of the eighteenth century "light troops had become an established feature of warfare."¹⁰⁵

After the French invaded and conquered Hesse-Kassel, establishing the Kingdom of Westphalia, Emmerich became involved in a planned insurrection to oust the French. Near the end of June, 1809, he was captured leading a small unit of men, tried and executed by a firing squad at age seventy-two.¹⁰⁶

Over the course of the eighteenth century, as first partisans, and later light infantry were added to the military institutions of Europe, an attempt was made by the military thinkers of the

¹⁰¹ For Biographical information on Emmerich, see Andreas Emmerich and Emmerich's Chasseurs <http://www.loyalamericanregiment.org/emmerick.htm> Internet source. Last accessed October 15, 2013.

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Emmerich, *The Partisan in War or the Use of Light Troops in an Army*. London : Printed by H. Reynell for J. Debrett, 1789, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Duffy, *Military Experience*, 264.

¹⁰⁶ Andreas Emmerich and Emmerich's Chasseurs

period to ascertain their place in the military establishment. The work of these thinkers laid a great deal of stress on several categories that were interrelated. They sought troops who were young and agile and possessed of the ability to act independently of close supervision. At the same time, successful partisan and light infantry units should be led by commanders who sought after the position, and saw it as a means to enhance their reputation. These men should be daring and willing to take risks for the reputation of their regiment, and not of themselves. Interesting in their examination of the development of light infantry and partisan forces of the period is the stress placed by several authors, including Saxe and Grandmaison, on the importance of merit in the selection of officers. In neither of their writings does the idea of jettisoning nobility as a qualification for leadership emerge, there is rather a certain depreciation of the significance of seniority in rank as a prerequisite for command in favor of merit. Still, the selection of officers, as noted by Jeney, stands as a key factor in the development of a successful partisan force. As Martin Rink observed, "Little war in the eighteenth century was not only a seedbed for unbridled cruelty, but also set an example for fundamental limits on warfare. Here the organizational-theoretical dichotomy between the principles of 'autonomy' and 'coordination' became manifest."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Rink, "Partisan's Metamorphosis," 18.

Convention Report

On April 5-6, 2013 the Seven Years war Association held their annual convention at the Magnuson Grand Hotel in South Bend, Indiana. This marked the 30th annual meeting of the Seven Years' War Association, an impressive milestone. There were two days of excellent games, and a number of dealers in attendance. Saturday night, there was a talk by Professor Christopher Duffy on the development of the divisional system during the Seven Years' War.

Yet again, the Convention was held in the Magnusson Hotel in downtown South Bend. The convention saw some very well organized and executed games. All theaters of the Seven Years War were represented. North America was amazingly depicted in a version of the assault on Quebec by Jim Purkey and Bill Protz. The European aspects of the conflict were well represented with a scenario on the battle of Sandershausen by Alex Burns and Dean West, as well as a Russia versus Prussia game hosted by Jude Becker. Warfare at sea was well represented in Hughs v. Suffren: In the Bay of Bengal by Jeff Knudson. The Indian Theater was far from neglected as there was the Battle of Bungwash put on by Juergen Olk, which ran Friday night and Saturday morning. Even the Jacobite Uprising of 1745 received attention with Prestopans put on by Dale Woods. Finally, the Jim Mitchell Memorial Cup was awarded to Jim Purky for the Revolutionary War Game he hosted on Friday evening.

Professor Duffy gave an excellent talk on the attempts by numerous officers in the War of the Austrian Succession as well as the Seven Years' War to more rationally organize their armies, which, as the professor pointed out, were still in the process of evolving from the medieval forebears. He pointed out that the result of these attempts were organizations that came to resemble more and more closely the divisional organizations that armies began to adopt with the Napoleonic Wars.



Figure 1 Some pictures of Jim Purky's award winning Revolutionary War game. Photos by Michael





Figure 2 Details from the battle of Bungwash by Juergen Olk. Photos by Michael


New Work on the French and Indian War



This book will be an overview of the French and Indian War (1754-63) in North Carolina, the colony's struggles to participate in the conflict, and North Carolina's contributions to the war effort in other theatres. The North American phase of this war is known as the French and Indian War, which started in 1754 in the wilderness of western Pennsylvania over the control of the Ohio River Valley, a region claimed by France, Great Britain, and Native Americans. Most of the American campaigns in this nine-year struggle took place in Canada, northern New York, and western Pennsylvania, and included the more famous battles associated with the war: Fort Duquesne, Fort Ticonderoga, Fort William Henry, the siege of Louisbourg, and Quebec. Contrary to popular belief, however, Britain's southern colonies were also involved in the conflict, including North Carolina. The colony mobilized troops, raised money, built forts, and participated in several military campaigns during the war. While North Carolina had limited resources, a widely dispersed and contentious population, and was not the scene of any major military campaigns during the imperial contest, the French and Indian War nonetheless had a significant impact on North Carolina. The dramatic conflict between the colonial governor and the colonial legislature during the war made for great difficulties and high tensions, and led to an increasing sense of independence from Britain among many colonists.

This book is available through [Amazon.com](https://www.amazon.com)

Book Reviews



Smith, Digby George *Armies of the Seven Years' War: Commanders, Equipment, Uniforms and Strategies of the 'First World War'*. (Stroud: Spellmount, 2012). Price: \$39.99 (£30.00)
Pages: 320

In his 2012 book, *Armies of the Seven Years War*, Digby Smith attempts to give his readers a guide to the commanders, equipment, uniforms and strategies of the “First World War.” Unfortunately for the readers, Smith attempts to do too much with too little. The book attempts to cover all of the aspects of the Seven Years War: naval, military and political. In addition, Smith’s book examines the entire scope of the Seven Years War, including combat in North America, India, and Europe. Smith organized the book into three main segments. The first segment, composed of three introductory chapters, addresses the political background of the war, and the state of military science in both land and naval warfare during this period.

The second, comprising the majority of the book describes the uniforms of the Seven Years War. Smith sets up these seventeen chapters alphabetically, with no regard to which side of the war the respective armies fought on. While these chapters give excellent information regarding uniforms, the unit lists fail to include service histories for each unit, greatly weakening the overall utility of the book. In the acknowledgments, Smith mentions the Canadian website [Kronoskaf](#). Readers might almost view this book as a cliff’s notes version of that website.

Smith closes the book with three appendices, covering “key” battles, places, and people. In determining the contents of this section, the author’s definition of “key” remains unclear, and many of these key items are relegated to Europe, negating Smith’s global emphasis. The book’s

bibliography leaves much to be desired, barely filling one page, and ignoring much of the secondary scholarship written in the past fifty years.

For a book that argues that the Seven Years' War was the "first world war," Smith fails to address the global nature of the conflict. Native Americans and soldiers from the sub-continent of India receive precious little attention. Finally, Smith fails to explain how this war differed from the other conflicts of the 18th century, such as the War of Spanish Succession.

The lack of historical context within this work is most apparent in the second chapter, entitled: *Military Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment*, where Smith spends more time discussing breech loading rifles, which played no significant part in the Seven Years War, then he does discussing the *kleiner krieg*, a developing concept during this period. The book does shine in the area of artillery information; giving unfamiliar readers a clear introduction into artillery practices of the time. However, he spends a lot of time discussing breach-loading cannon, which never saw use in truly significant numbers in this period.

Smith's book will excite wargamers looking for painting guides, or students needing quick reference guide to the war, but unfortunately, Smith does not give much else in terms of original scholarship. For individuals interested in the uniforms of the period, the book may prove useful, but for a summary of combat operations, military life, and why the Seven Years War took on a global aspect in the first place, Christopher Duffy's *By Force of Arms*, and *Military Experience in the Age of Reason* and Fred Anderson's *Crucible of War* remain the best works covering the period.

Ball State University

Alexander Burns

Back Issues

Back issues of the Journal are available for order. Please see <http://www.sevenyearswarassn.org/> for a complete list. The proceeds from all issues prior to volume 18, number 1 go to the widow of Jim Mitchell.

Items of Interest

Seven Years War Convention-Friday and Saturday-March 28-29, 2014 at the Magnuson Hotel, in South Bend Indiana. (Hotel to be renamed soon). For reservations, call, 574-232-3941.

Society for Military History April 3-6, 2014 Kansas City, MO.

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