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Cover: British 78<sup>th</sup> Foot Grenadiers, Battle of Sillery, Quebec, 1760.

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## Review and Outlook

The issue brings together two theaters of the Seven Years' War, Europe and North America. The North American theater is up first with an article by John Pezzola on the battle of Sillery, a significant engagement, but one not often discussed.

John served in the U.S. Army from 1992-2003. He is a graduate of American Military University, where he now serves as an adjunct professor of Military History. He also teaches Seventh Grade U.S. History in New York State.

In the European context, we have another fine submission from Katrin and Sascha Mobius. This time, they challenge some of the ideas of galeophobia attached to the history of the battle of Rossbach. Professors Katrin and Sascha Möbius. Katrin and Sascha Möbius are historians specialising in the history of organized violence, political repression and power structures from the late middle ages to contemporary history. Their publications include several books and articles on 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century warfare in English, German and Spanish journals and anthologies. Their most recent book is: *Prussian Army Soldiers and the Seven Years War. The Psychology of Honour* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).

In addition to these two fine articles, I have included a report on the War College of the Seven Years War, held annually in the spring at Fort Ticonderoga, New York, at which I had the pleasure to present this year. I will be attending another conference on the period, this time at Fort Plain, New York in October. Expect a report on that as well in an upcoming issue.

In other news, I continue to edit and post the Orders of Battle so graciously donated by George Nafziger. Currently, I am focused on the War of the Spanish Succession materials. If you have not been to the Journal's website in a while, you may want to check out that page.

## Call for Submissions

The *Journal of the Seven Years' War Association* needs you! In order to continue publishing the journal and keep it as a vital organ of communication for our members, I need your input. If you have articles, ideas, or even ideas for ideas concerning any aspect of eighteenth century warfare, please get in touch with me. While preference will be accorded to works pertaining to the Seven Years' War in particular, conflicts in Europe, the Americas and Asia are welcomed. Likewise, reviews of miniatures, games, and books are welcomed as well. The editor may be contacted at: [mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org](mailto:mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org).

Below, I have included the submission guidelines for articles. I hope to hear from you soon!

## Article Submission Guidelines

Articles submitted for publication in the *Journal of the Seven Years' War Association Journal* remain the property of the author. Articles on the middle third of the eighteenth century (1740-1775) are encouraged, though some that fall outside these parameters will be considered on a case by case basis. Format should be Times New Roman, 12 pt. font.

It is the responsibility of the author to secure permissions for any copyrighted illustrations used in an article that is published. Illustrations included with an article submitted for publication will be assumed to have secured permissions.

The *Journal* retains the right not to publish an article submitted. In addition, it may return the piece to the author with requests for revisions.

To submit an article for potential publication in the *Journal*, send it as an e-mail attachment to [mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org](mailto:mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org).

# The Battle of Sainte Foy, 1760: A Study in Strategy and Tactics

By John Pezzola

The light infantry was immediately ordered to clear the front and regain the right; but in attempting this, they were charged, thrown into confusion, retired to the rear, and never again could be up during the action.<sup>1</sup>

Following the Battle of the Plains of Abraham on September 13, 1759, the British had captured the capital of New France, Quebec City. It was apparent that if Quebec remained in the hands of the British, New France would fall. Along with the fall of Quebec, the French suffered other setbacks such as the capture of Forts Duquesne, Carillon and Niagara. At the same time, if the French could retake the city of Quebec and hold it, perhaps they would not lose New France in its entirety. The fate of New France would be decided outside the walls of Quebec during the Battle of Sainte Foy (Sillery), in 1760.

Following the death of General Marquis de Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham, the French army was still intact and able to engage on the field of battle. In an effort to regain the capital, Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville made a forlorn hope in attempting reinforce and resupply the city of Quebec however, it was an effort in vain for the French surrendered to Brigadier-General George Townshend who succeeded Major-General James Wolfe who was mortally wounded during the battle fought outside of Quebec. The British did not capitalize on their victory however and allowed the French force to remain intact. The failure to act and capture and destroy the French force below the Charles River would have significant repercussions. England was able to obtain the nerve center of the New France. To take the prize (Quebec) was one thing, to keep it would be a whole other matter.

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<sup>1</sup> General James Murray, *Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1760* (Quebec, CA: Middleton and Dawson, 1871): 63.




Figure 1: An Authentic Plan of the River St. Lawrence from Sillery, to the Fall of Montmorenci, with the Operations of the Siege of Quebec under the Command of Vice-Adml. Saunders & Major General James Wolfe Don to the 5th of September 1759.

As seasons began to change, winter was on its way and it was apparent that the mouth of the St. Lawrence River which opens up to the Atlantic, would become ice-locked thereby not allowing the flow of supplies and reinforcements in to New France. Therefore, the Royal Navy withdrew in a rather hasty manner from the river leaving their newly acquired possession of Quebec without naval support. Commanding British held Quebec was Brigadier-General James Murray. Murray was now given the task of holding his possession with an abandoned garrison minus support from the Royal Navy. Murray would have to wait until spring before he could expect any type of reinforcements.<sup>2</sup>

In the interim, Major-General Francois de Gaston Chevalier de Levis, had to rebuild the remnants of Montcalm's Army which quickly retreated from the Plains of Abraham during the 1759 battle. Montcalm's forces were decimated, particularly the Regiments of de Bern and de Guyenne which lost many of their rank-and-file as well as members of their officer corps.

<sup>2</sup> Stuart Reid, *British Redcoat versus French Fusilier: North America 1755 - 63*. (London: Osprey Publishing, 2016): 84. Stuart Reid, *Quebec 1759: The Battle that won Canada*. (London: Osprey Publishing, 2008): 58. Murray, *Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1760*, 40 – 43.

Between the two regiments, they lost a little over two hundred men killed and wounded including officers. In order to strengthen the French, detached elements were to be reunited with their parent regiments thereby, bringing them up to full strength. Despite prisoner exchanges from previous engagements between the French and British, Levis utilized militia to supplement his depleted regiments of Bearn and Guyenne. The militia elements would act as light infantry and sharpshooters in a close support role for the regular line infantry. Levis was preparing his assault against the city of Quebec, and by spring he was ready to take to the field.<sup>3</sup> It was imperative that Levis launch an attack to regain the city before the Royal Navy reappeared.

Levis' force landed at Pointe aux Trembles with the hopes of possibly cutting the British advance piquette post at Lorette as well as that at St. Foy in a surprise move. At this point, Levis' army was in Montreal about one hundred and seventy miles from Quebec City. Levis' force began their journey to Quebec City on the 20<sup>th</sup> of April, 1760. The army was transported via schooners and by way of *bateaux*. Levis force landed at Saint-Augustin on the 26<sup>th</sup> of April and made their way across Cap-Rouge River and occupied an English outpost at L'Ancienne-Lorette. According to Lieutenant Malcom Fraser of the 78<sup>th</sup> Highlanders (Fraser's Highlanders), he "went on to command Lorette, one of the out-posts established in November. The French have a post at St. Augustin, about three miles distant, I returned 30<sup>th</sup> January, nothing extraordinary while at Lorette, a few deserters came into us from the French posts."<sup>4</sup>

The English were aware of the French presence and upon learning of a larger French force moving on Lorette, the English abandoned the outpost and made their way to Sainte-Foy, while dispatching a notification to Brigadier General James Murray. Skirmishing did occur between the two sides which included the presence of the French Cavallerie (the French cavalry donned a blue coat and bearskin headgear reminiscence of the Grenadiers).

Murray needed to gather further information so that he could properly assess the situation, therefore he dispatched a detachment to move forward in order preform a reconnaissance. Murray wrote the Secretary of State for the Southern Department on May 25, 1760 after he had located the French force. Murray stated that he was:

In possession of all the woods from Lorette to St. Foix and just entering the plain. However, they declined to attack me in the advantageous position I had taken; but, finding their numbers increasing, and endeavoring to get round me by the woods, the weather very bad, and having received intelligence while I was out of a report that two French ships were at the Traverse, I

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<sup>3</sup> Reid, *British Redcoat*, 84. David Blackmore, *Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642 – 1765* (London: Frontline Books, 2014): 164. Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755 – 1763* (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University, 2002): 255 – 257. Malcolm Fraser, *Extract From A Manuscript Journal, Relating to The Operations Before Quebec in 1759* (London: Forgotten Books): 27 – 30. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 58 – 60.

<sup>4</sup> Fraser, *Extract From A Manuscript Journal*, 27 – 30.

thought it proper to retreat to the town.<sup>5</sup>



French Cavalry Corps Canada circa 1750's - 1760s.

Elements of Murray's command, such as the 58th Regiment of Foot, were put on alert. However, the encounter with the French never occurred. This would change in the coming days. Murray had to make a tactical decision, sortie out the walls of Quebec and fight an open engagement just as Wolfe and Montcalm did in 1759 or hunker down behind the walls and endure a siege. The defenses of the city were precarious at best with crumbling walls and poor designing in some places which influenced Murray's decision to fight out in the open. According to Historian Renee Chartrand, "there was little or no provision for counter-battery fire—a defect all the more glaring given the defenses were completely dominated by the Buttes a Neveu." Lieutenant Malcolm Fraser of the 78th Highlander's stated that on April 27<sup>th</sup>, 1760, "The Governor (Murray) marched a force out of Quebec City consisting of Grenadiers as well as piquet's in order to support the light infantry elements that were originally dispatched to Cape Rouge. The light infantry was pulled back with the appearance of Levis advance force."<sup>6</sup> Murray,

thought it necessary to withdraw the Light Infantry and all the other outposts, and retire to Town; and for that purpose he sent orders to the 28<sup>th</sup>, 47<sup>th</sup> and 58<sup>th</sup> and Colonel Fraser's Regiment to march out to St. Foy and cover his retreat;

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<sup>5</sup> Fraser, *Extract From A Manuscript Journal*, 27 – 31. Ian M. McCulloch, "From April battles and Murray generals good lord deliver me!" *The Battle of Sillery, 29 April 1760. In Graves Donald. More Fighting in Canada Five Battles, 1760 – 1944* (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2000): 19 – 22. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 84. (a bateaux is a light flat-bottomed rivercraft used in the eastern and central parts of North America).

<sup>6</sup> Fraser, *Extract From A Manuscript Journal*, 27 – 31. Ian M. McCulloch, "From April battles and Murray generals good lord deliver me!" *The Battle of Sillery, 29 April 1760. In Graves Donald. More Fighting in Canada Five Battles, 1760 – 1944* (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2000): 19 – 22. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 84. (a bateaux is a light flat-bottomed rivercraft used in the eastern and central parts of North America).



the 35<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Royal Americans having been detached in the morning to prevent the enemy, in case they attempted to land at Sillery or any other place near the Town. The retreat was accordingly effected without any loss, tho' the enemy were so nigh as to skirmish with our rear till we got within half a league of the ramparts.<sup>7</sup>

Murray saw no alternative but to engage the French out in the open. According to Murray,

The enemy was greatly superior in numbers it is true; but when I considered that our little army was in the habit of beating the enemy, and had a very fine train of artillery, that shutting up ourselves at once within the walls was putting all upon the single chance of holding out for a considerable time. I resolved to give them battle, and if the event was not prosperous, to hold out to the last extremity, and then to retreat to the Isle of *Orleans* or *Coudres* with what was left of the garrison to wait for reinforcements. This night the necessary orders were given.<sup>8</sup>

On the morning of April 28, 1760, Levis' vanguard completed their mopping up operations of the various British outposts along the Plains of Abraham and even obtained a blockhouse that was constructed by the British situated above *I'Anse – au – Foulon*. Levis had his supplies brought forward and proceeded to *Buttes a Neveu* which is of a piece high ground overlooking Quebec, and an important strategic position. Unfortunately for Levis, Murray had sortied forward during the overnight hours and took possession of the Buttes and was preparing to entrench and even issued his men entrenching tools. However, due to the freezing of the ground and in some places a mix of melting ice and slush, Murray's plan to entrenching never came to fruition.<sup>9</sup> Murray scrapped up every man available from his garrison and the hospital in order to take on Levis force.

Given that it was now late April in which these two armies were to meet to do battle, the terrain needed to be taken into account for the ground was waterlogged due to the melting ice and snow from the preceding winter. It must be mentioned that Murray's army suffered from scurvy, hunger, and overall difficult living conditions.

Murray's Order of Battle consisted of the following; two brigades consisting of four battalions each, eight battalions in total.

Right Brigade: Lieutenant – Colonel Ralph Burton:

48<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

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<sup>7</sup> C. P. Stacey, *Quebec, 1759: The Siege and The Battle* (Montmagny, Quebec: Robin Brass Studio, 2002): 167.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Stacey, *Quebec, 1759: The Siege and The Battle*, 167 – 168.

15<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

2/60<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

Left Brigade: Colonel Simon Fraser:

43<sup>rd</sup> Regiment of Foot

47<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

78<sup>th</sup> Highland Regiment

28<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

Reserve: Brigadier – General James Murray:

35<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

3/60<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot

The right flank was covered by the Corps of Light Infantry and the left was covered by two companies of Rangers. The artillery consisting of about twenty-five field pieces and two howitzers taken from the fortress walls was dispersed amongst the battalions. In total, Murray had about 3,866 combatants. Major General Francois de Gaston Chevalier de Levis' Order of Battle is as follows:

Six Brigades:

Royal Roussillon: Royal Roussillon Regiment Guyenne

La Reine: La Reine Languedoc

Berry: Two Battalion

Montreal Militia: One Battalion

La Marine: Two Battalions

La Sarre: Bearn La Sarre

First Nation Allies

Cavallerie (Cavalry)<sup>10</sup>

Levis' force totaled six thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine personnel. It is important to note that many of the French commander's rank and file were supplemented with militia.

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<sup>10</sup> Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 13 and 17.

It was around 6:30 a.m. on the morning of April 28, 1760, when Murray sallied out to take command of the Buttes. Levis having been surprised by this move was proceeding very cautiously along the road leading to St Foy. Colonel Fraser states that the “Whole Garrison, exclusive of the Guards, was drawn up on the parade, and about nine o’clock we marched out of Town with twenty pieces of Field Artillery, that is, two to each regiment.”<sup>11</sup> Fraser goes on to say that as Murray’s forces marched out of Quebec City, they began to see the advance party of Levis’s forces. Just past 9:00 a.m., when Levis’ advanced guard began to deploy at Sillery while waiting for their rest of their contingent. The advanced guard was deploying to the right of the road where Levis planned for two of his brigades to be positioned. The position that was being occupied was also the spot of some blockhouses that were constructed by Murray at the beginning of the *Foulon* Road to the extreme right. Levis’s left was forming up and it was comprised of five grenadier companies positioned to the left of the St. Foy Road with some of the companies occupying the Dumont Windmill and other structures. Between the two flanks was Levis center which was sparsely held, for many of his command were still moving up the Sillery road through the woods that were at least a mile to the rear. As stated earlier, Murray was apprehensive about entrenching on the cold muddy ground with a command that was not in the best of health. Murray therefore, decided to take the opportunity and launch an attack while his adversary was still deploying onto the field. Murray’s aggressive move allowed him to dominate the high ground on the Buttes as he began to deploy his forces. On the right of the St. Foy Road, Murray placed the 48<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot and on the 48<sup>th</sup>’s left he placed the 15<sup>th</sup>, 58<sup>th</sup> and 2/60<sup>th</sup> Regiments of Foot. To the left of the 2/60<sup>th</sup>, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Burton, were the 43<sup>rd</sup>, 47<sup>th</sup> and the 28<sup>th</sup> Regiments of Foot. In reserve, were the 35<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot as well as the 3/60 Regiment of Foot. Murray was sure to cover his flanks and thereby, placed on the right the light infantry under the command of Major John Dalling and on the left flank some additional light infantry as well as Rangers under the command of Captain Moses Hazen and Captain Donald MacDonald (78<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot). Murray’s line of battle was thin and spread out with wide intervals between the battalions, however the field pieces (mostly six pounders commanded by Major John Goodwin) were placed in between the battalions thereby providing additional fire support and compensation to the battalions.<sup>12</sup>

As the engagement commenced, Levis was caught off guard by Murray’s attack. Levis called for a general retreat along the line of advance back to the Sillery Woods eastern fringe. The light infantry of the 58<sup>th</sup> Foot under Major Darling, smashed into the French Grenadiers and removed them from the windmill defense. Lieutenant-Colonel d’Alquier commanded the Bearn Brigade which launched a counter - attack that succeeded in driving back Darling’s light infantry. Murray stated in his journal “Major Dalling, with great spirit, forced their [French] corps of

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<sup>11</sup> Fraser, *Extract From a Manuscript Journal*, 27 – 31. “From April battles,” 22-24. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 84. Reid, *British Redcoat*, 84 – 86. Murray, *Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1760*, 63-66.

<sup>12</sup> James Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*. 3 vols. Aberdeen: Wyllie and Sep. 1914. p. 3; 6 Ian McPherson McCulloch, *Highlander in The French and Indian War: 1756 – 67*. London: Osprey Publishing, 2008. p. 52 – 53. Fraser, *Extract From A Manuscript Journal*, 30 - 31. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 88.

grenadiers from a house they occupied to cover their left. Here he and several of his officers were wounded; his men, however, pursued the fugitives to the second line."<sup>13</sup> Murray goes on to state that it was at this point that the French counterattacked. Major Dalling was wounded in the action and his light infantry corps sustained two hundred and eighteen killed and wounded which perhaps accounted for their rather dismal withdrawal. As the light companies were retreating, Murray decided to deal with the precarious nature of events and moved forward the 35th Regiment of Foot. The 35th was placed to the right and able to bring stability to the situation.<sup>14</sup> James Johnstone who was a Jacobite officer serving on Levis staff stated the following:

The battle began with an attack upon a fort, which lay upon our right flank and our left, which was maintained a long time with fierceness and obstinacy, by five companies of grenadiers, against as many Scotch Highlanders, both armies vying with each other seize upon it. These two antagonists, worthy the one of each other, were no sooner out by the windows, then they returned to the charge, and broke open the doors. In this murderous conflict, they were not provided with other arms, then the Highlanders with their dirks and the grenadiers with their bayonets, using them with might and main. The grenadiers were reduced to forty men per company, and there would not have remained either Highlander or grenadier of the two armies if they had not, as by tacit and reciprocal agreement, abandoned the desire of occupying the fort.<sup>15</sup>

The fortified area that Johnstone refers to was the windmill and nearby dwelling. With the short reprieve that occurred, Lieutenant Colonel d'Alquier and the rest of the Regiment de Bearn conducted a charge which routed the light infantry from the fortified position. Pierre Pouchet though not a participant in the engagement, stated that there were two battalions of the Regiment Bearn and Regiment de Guyenne whose Grenadiers were able to drive the British light infantry from the defensive position. Levis, however states that despite the removal of the light troops, that it was Regiment La Sarre who participated in the action with Regiment Bearn as opposed to Regiment de Guyenne.<sup>16</sup> Levis began to move on his right against Hazen's Rangers who took up a position in two blockhouses. Hazen had about one-hundred Rangers at his

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<sup>13</sup> Murray, *Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1760*, 64 – 65.

<sup>14</sup> James Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*. vol. 3. (Aberdeen: Wyllie and Sep. 1914) 63. Reid, *British Redcoat*, 67. McCulloch, *Highlander in The French and Indian War: 1756 – 67*, 52. Fraser, *Extract from A Manuscript Journal*, London: Forgotten Books, p. 30 - 31. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 88. Pierre Pouchot, *Memoir Upon the Late War in North America, Between the French and English, 1755 – 60*. (Roxbury, MZ W.E. Woodward, 1866) 254.

<sup>15</sup>Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*, 3, 63.

<sup>16</sup> Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*, 63. Reid, *British Redcoat*, 67 - 68. McCulloch, *Highlander in The French and Indian War: 1756 – 67*, 52. Fraser, *Extract from A Manuscript Journal, Relating to The Operations Before Quebec in 1759*, 30 - 31. Reid, *Quebec 1759: The Battle that won Canada*, 88. Pouchot, *Memoir Upon the Late War in North America, Between The French and English, 1755 – 60*, 254.

disposal. In the course of the action, Hazen was wounded and his Rangers were routed. Murray moved his reserve battalion forward the 3/60th Regiment of Foot, which was followed by a reconfiguration of the line by moving the 43rd Regiment of Foot in support of the 3/60th. It was at this point, that Levis launched an attack on both flanks utilizing column formations. The 78th Regiment of Foot was suffering sever casualties and their grenadier company was about to collapse. Yet, they stood steadfast with bayonets fixed. The snow was bloodstained as both English and French soldiers were engaged in a three-hour firefight. French marksmen were positioned in the tree line of Sillery Woods to the right of the 78th. A sergeant James Thompson moved forward to try to add stability to a line that was faltering and saw many of their officers lying on the ground either dead or wounded. Thompson states, "It was my lot to act as covering sergeant to Captain Fraser," he recalled, but moved forward when his company commander Capt. Alexander Fraser of Culduthel" received a shot in the temple and, as not an inch of ground was to be lost. I had to move up into line which I could not do without resting one foot on his body."<sup>17</sup>

As the engagement between the French and British forces became more arduous, British artillery placed between the battalions began to open up delivering grape shot against their foe. The artillery was doing its job, stopping the French movement for a time. However, it would not be long till the French moved forward against the British left forcing them to fall back. The British were witnessing their flanks beginning to cave in and needed reinforce them. It was around 10:30 a.m., when the 35<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot redeployed at a right angle in order to hold the British right flank. They faced the regiment La Sarre. On the left, after having redeployed the 3/60th from a reserve position, the 3/60th held the left flank with the 43<sup>rd</sup> Regiment to its right having been redeployed from the center. An officer from Franches de la Marine stated the following:

Our left, which was in a hollow, and distant from the English about thirty paces was swept by their artillery, which they fired with grape shot. M. Levis perceiving their bad position, and wishing to remedy it, by making our army fall back to occupy the eminence parallel to that where the English were, sent M. Pause, an officer of regiment Guyenne, who acted as his aid-de-camp.<sup>18</sup>

It is unclear at this point if M. Pause misinterpreted Levis' order but nonetheless, began calling for a general retreat. As the British ranks advanced, they found themselves in swampy ground where they at times were knee deep in melted snow, water and mud, making it impossible to advance the artillery and ammunition. Seeing this, Lieutenant Colonel Jean de Servian d' Alquier who commanded Regiment de Bearn, decided to ignore the orders to retreat, and instead, launched a counter-attack. Dalquier was positioned to the left of the French line and as soon as Pause delivered Levis order to retreat, Alquier told his men to face the enemy. Alquier

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<sup>17</sup> McCulloch, *Highlander in The French and Indian War: 1756 – 67*, 52-53.

<sup>18</sup> Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*, 3: 63- 66. Reid, *British Redcoat*, 67-68.

goes on to state the following, "at twenty paces from the enemy, my boys, there is no time to retreat; bayonets to the mouth of your muskets; strike upon the enemy: that is best."<sup>19</sup> The French charged from their position on the left with vigor and crashed into the British right line capturing English artillery as they moved. Dalquier "[advanced] against the enemy, in place of retreating like the other regiments, he made, on the instant the wheel of a quarter circle, to the left, to fall upon the left flank of the English, which he outflanked with his regiment [Royal Roussillon] and Canadians."<sup>20</sup> Levis actually had intentions of counter-attacking with both the brigades of La Reine and Royal-Roussillon, but for a second-time there was a miscommunication with the disseminating of orders. With the British artillery out of action, the British line was beginning to falter. A corporal of the 58th Regiment of Foot, stated the following:

As soon as they [French] found our Artillery ceased, and that our Musketry was so very light, that they Advanced boldly upon us, which in a little time forced us to give way; and which we gradually did for some time, keeping a good front towards them; but through the smallness of our number, and the quantity of ground we had to cover, to secure the flanks of our line, the intervals between the Battalions, so excessively large, and the Cannon ceased firing, which used to cover those intervals, they advanced and broke in hastily upon us, like a hasty torrent from lofty precipice and got into our front through those intervals, and which obliged us to retire in confusion.<sup>21</sup>

Even though Murray's field artillery compensated for his numerically inferior army, the gun crews were experiencing a tremendous amount of trouble trying to move their pieces and replenish their ammunition due to the melting ice and slush and later found themselves in pits of snow and slush. Murray's gunners were forced to spike their guns and leave them in the field. Murray came to grips with the fact that the tables were turning on his sickly but valiant army and decided to withdraw back into the walls of Quebec. Levis was unable to capitalize on his success due to poor communications. Captain La Pause was constantly moving between regiments which was ineffective in trying to properly communicate on the battlefield. Historian Stuart Reid accredits this to Murray's movement on Dumont's Mill which "disrupted Levis deployment, and his attempts to regain control," and properly communicate.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*, 3:63-64. Reid, *British Redcoat vs. French Fusilier: North America 1755 – 63*. p. 67 - 68. CAPT. John D. Knox, *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North – America, for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760: Containing the Most Remarkable Occurrences of That Period: Particularly the two Sieges of Quebec, and c. And c., the Orders of the Admirals and General Officers*. (1914 reprint of 1778 original): 1: 394.

<sup>20</sup> Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*. 3: 63-64. Reid, *British Redcoat*, 67 - 68.

<sup>21</sup> A. Doughty and G.W. Parmalee, *The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham*. 5 vols. (Quebec: Dussault and Proulx, 1901). 5: 121 in Reid, *British Redcoat*, 72.

<sup>22</sup> Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Chevalier de Johnstone*, 3: 63-64. Reid, Stuart. *British Redcoat*, 67-68. Knox, *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North – America*, 394. Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 88.

Murray claims that he lost thirteen officers killed and seventy-eight wounded. In terms of the enlisted men, there were about two-hundred and seventy-nine killed as well as seven-hundred and fifty-nine wounded. Finally, there were about fifty personnel taken prisoner.<sup>23</sup>

The French victory came at a heavy price. Their losses were twenty-eight officers killed and another sixty-eight wounded. In terms of rank and file, the French sustained one-hundred and sixty-five men killed as well as five-hundred and seventy-two wounded. Critics have stated that the Battle of Sillery did not go well in terms of Levis's artillery. The French were limited to one twenty-four pounder. However, despite knowing where to concentrate their fire, such as on the Glaciere Bastion; the British had created fresh embrasures and performed well in terms of counter-battery fire. As a result, Levis was restricted in terms of his use of artillery during the course of the battle. In order to turn the tide, the British would need the aid of the Royal Navy and the French would reinforce their forces in the field. By mid-May, British warships began to appear in the St. Lawrence. Levis, began to realize that it was futile to try to hold out and began to pull back his forces. It was now only a matter of time before France would capitulate. On September 8, 1760, the French formally surrendered their colony of New France over to the English.

### **Appendix A: British Infantry Tactics:**

The British army that fought at Sillery, was made-up various infantry components such as line, light and grenadier as well as artillery. Line Infantrymen were trained to fire their weapons in compact formations. The theory behind this was two-fold: due to the inaccuracy of the smoothbore musket, which had a range of about 80-100 yards, military theorists believed that by firing in volleys, it would enable infantrymen to deliver a wall of lead towards their opponent thereby depleting the formation of manpower. It was also the understanding that by allowing soldiers to move independently it would hinder firepower and thereby impeded field commanders' command and control over his formations, leading to utter chaos on the battlefield. Therefore, it became the standard practice to keep soldiers in rigid linear formations thereby, maximizing their firepower. According to Chapter VI, Article IV, of Humphrey Bland's *Military Discipline*, 1762 edition, infantry formations would be arranged in three ranks. "To fire by ranks, is meant, to fire only one rank of the Battalion at a time, beginning [first] with the rear rank, then the center rank, and, [lastly], the front rank."<sup>24</sup> However, it is unclear whether or not any of the formations at Sillery were exposed to this drill method. There was a strong chance that the line

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Humphrey Bland, *Bland's Military Discipline 1762*. (Uckfield, East Sussex, England: The Naval & Military Press Ltd) quoted in Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in Americas, 1755 – 1763* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 255-57.

companies were deployed in three ranks with the flank being loosely tied to the second.<sup>25</sup> The tactical theory at that time was based on an infantry unit delivering a constant wall of lead at its adversary while closing the range between themselves and the enemy. Once the opponent's ability to fight was stymied, the approaching line would chase their opponents off the field with the point of the bayonet. In terms of firing sequence, Brigadier – General James Wolfe, prescribed a firing method known as “alternative fire.”<sup>26</sup> Company formations would be considered sub-divisions; which meant there would be ten subdivisions as opposed to the original eighteen. The subdivisions would be numbered so that they could fire their muskets accordingly. This method allowed units to be loaded and ready to fire at all times, this type of method or tactic. At Sillery, Murray had light infantry under the command of Major John Dalling as well as rangers under the command of Captain Moses Hazen. The light infantry and rangers used their innate ability in utilizing open-order tactics, as well the ability to act as a reconnaissance force. Although, it must be said that the ranger elements were basically recruited amongst the colonials whereas, the light infantry were born out of the British regulars.

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<sup>25</sup> Houlding, J. A. *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715 – 1795* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1981). Brumwell, *Redcoats*, 255-57.

<sup>26</sup> Reid, *Quebec 1759*, 88 and Reid, *British Redcoat*, 23-4.



# *Putting Words into Soldiers' Mouths*

## **Anecdotes and Poems as Proof of Ordinary Soldiers' Hate-Crimes and Jingoism during the Seven Years War?**

Katrin and Sascha Möbius

On 5 November 1757, a small Prussian army of 22,000 men defeated a combined French and Imperial army of about 40,000 men in less than one and a half hours. The allied army was not only defeated but completely routed, losing about a quarter of its men.<sup>1</sup> For contemporary Europeans, Roßbach was the most remarkable battle of the war.<sup>2</sup> This was due to the imbalance of numbers and the decisiveness of the encounter and the fact that Prussia had completely humiliated the leading military power of the continent.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of the relatively low number of deaths, Roßbach had been a hard-fought and brutal battle. It had been no funny affair, no “hare hunt”<sup>4</sup>, but a Prussian elite force had beaten a numerically superior, qualitatively inferior but still respectable<sup>5</sup> enemy led by an experienced and courageous commander. Our tactical analysis of the battle has above all shown that the alleged massacre of fleeing Frenchmen by nationally infuriated Prussians is a myth.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> On the Battle of Roßbach: Johann Elieser Theodor Wiltsch, *Die Schlacht von und nicht bei Roßbach oder Die Schlacht auf den Feldern von und bei Reichardtswerben den 5. November 1757, und was ihr voranging, und nachfolgte* (Reichardtswerben: Anton'sche Sortiments-Buchhandlung, 1858); Thomas Nicklas, “Die Schlacht von Roßbach (1757) zwischen Wahrnehmung und Deutung”, in *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 12 (2002): 35-51; Sascha Möbius, “‘Haß gegen alles, was nur den Namen eines Franzosen führet’? Die Schlacht bei Rossbach und nationale Stereotype in der deutschsprachigen Militärliteratur der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts”, in *Gallophobie im 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. J. Häsler and A. Meier (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2005), 123 – 158; Thomas Nicklas, “Rossbach: du lieu de violence au lieu de l’imagination”, in *Les voyageurs européens sur les Chemins de la guerre et la paix du temps des Lumières au début du XIXe siècle*, eds. F. Knopper and A. Ruiz (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires, 2006), 197-203; Alexander Querengässer (ed.), *Die Schlacht bei Roßbach* (Berlin: Zeughausverlag, 2017); Joachim Rees, “Krieg und Querelle. Zum Wandel des militärischen Ereignisbildes seit 1756”, in *Der Siebenjährige Krieg (1756-1763)*, ed. Sven Externbrink (Berlin: Akademie, 2011), 197 – 244.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. the battle was the only Battle of the Seven Years War for which the contemporaries erected a monument. Frank Zielsdorf, *Militärische Erinnerungskulturen in Preußen im 18. Jahrhundert. Akteure – Medien – Dynamiken* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016), 196 fn. 725.

<sup>3</sup> France had won all major battles during the War of the Austrian Succession in the Netherlands (Reed Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 206-213 (Fontenoy), 282-286 (Rocoux), 313-317 (Laffeld).) French armies had been commanded by one of the great captains of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Marechal de Saxe.

<sup>4</sup> Manfred Heinecker and Heiner Wajemann (eds.), *Ein Leben zwischen Schule und Pfarre, Die Memoiren des Schneverdingen Pastoren Johann Christian Meier 1732-1815* (Hermannsburg: Ludwig-Harms-Haus, 2011), 89-90, quoted after Marian Füssel, *Der Preis des Ruhms. Eine Weltgeschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2019), 165-166.

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. Dennis Showalter's remarks on the French army. Dennis Showalter, *Frederick the Great. A Military Life*, kindle edition (1996; London: Frontline Books, 2012), pos. 2996-3105.

<sup>6</sup> Katrin and Sascha Möbius, “They imbibed their hate of the French with their mothers' milk...” The Battle of Roßbach and mid-18<sup>th</sup> century Gallophobia”, *Journal of the Seven Years War Association* 23, no. 2 (2020), 23-24.

We challenge the assumption of recent research that the native Prussian *Kantonisten* (draftees) had been motivated to fight and sacrifice themselves by Gallophobia and a Prussian patriotism. By a careful analysis of soldiers' ego-documents we can show that national and religious stereotypes existed but that these were directed against Austrians and Russians but not the French. Even more important, we can show that anti-French chauvinism existed amongst the learned elites in Prussia while the soldiers' minds were still dominated by the religious worldview of the late Medieval and Renaissance ages.

We will start with the critical examination of several anecdotes, which were presented by Prussian historians who had been officers in the army of Frederick II and who were thus considered credible witnesses.

The question of anti-French and nationalist sentiments around this battle goes far beyond the analysis of more or less funny anecdotes, songs, or even 18<sup>th</sup> century national stereotypes. It is an important part of the debate on the general long-term development of German nationalism and the Prussian /German *Sonderweg* leading to the Second World War and the Nazi genocide.<sup>7</sup> If Prussian soldiers were imbued by Gallophobia and German nationalism, this would strengthen the argument that German nationalism was especially xenophobic and based on "blood and iron".<sup>8</sup>

### Debates in scientific literature

The motivation and mentalities of Prussian soldiers have been a constant subject for historians dealing with the battle.

Tim Blanning stresses that anti-French sentiments were widespread amongst the population and soldiery of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and that Roßbach was welcomed by all of them.<sup>9</sup> He does not explicitly mention Gallophobic sentiments amongst the Prussian soldiers, but claims that the fleeing French were slaughtered by the Prussian cavalry.<sup>10</sup> Franz Szabo states that confessional and national hatred of the French was widespread amongst all Germans, so that Frederick not only 'became a Protestant hero but a German one as well.'<sup>11</sup> According to Szabo, the Prussian cavalry had been "gleefully slaughtering" the French and Imperials, thus inflicting more casualties on the defenseless fugitives than during combat.<sup>12</sup> Christopher Duffy explicitly underlines the hatred of "the native Prussian private soldiers' against the French," quoting Gaudi.<sup>13</sup> Dennis Showalter is more in line with his German colleagues when he denies a "significant bandwagon effect in Frederick's favour

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947* (London: Penguin, 2007), Introduction; Martin Winter, *Untertanengeist durch Militärpflicht? Das preußische Kantonsystem in brandenburgischen Städten im 18. Jahrhundert* (Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 2005), 15-18.

<sup>8</sup> Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 535 and 619.

<sup>9</sup> Tim Blanning, *Frederick the Great. King of Prussia* (London: Penguin, 2015), 220.

<sup>10</sup> Blanning, *Frederick*, 119.

<sup>11</sup> Franz A. J. Szabo, *The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763* (London: Pearson Education, 2008), 98. Concerning Roßbach, Szabo bases himself on distinguished English language military historians Duffy and Showalter and an obscure German expert on WW II Wehrmacht cavalry, but neglects all modern German scientific literature on Rossbach.

<sup>12</sup> Szabo, *Seven Years War*, 97.

<sup>13</sup> Christopher Duffy, *Frederick the Great. A Military Life* (London and New York: Routledge, 1985), 144.

among the lesser German states” and concludes: “It seems more accurate to stress the pleasure generated by seeing the French having to swallow their own boasting. Rossbach was a sweet revenge for French behavior in the Rhineland and the Palatinate during the reign of Louis XIV.”<sup>14</sup>

A detailed analysis of the “mentality of the soldiers” at Roßbach and during the Seven Years War was provided by the German scholar Robert Riemer. He strongly speaks against any confessional motivation and stresses, quoting Christopher Clark, the “young men’s readiness to sacrifice themselves” knowing the risk of battle and the high casualty rates.<sup>15</sup> According to Riemer, another decisive factor was the soldiers’ and officers’ “fundamental belief in their own and their king’s abilities to finally lead them to victory.”<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, Riemer has misread Clark’s paragraph, which actually stated that the Prussian *nobility*, the *Junkers*, showed a remarkable readiness to sacrifice its young men *in order to defend its central position* in the social order of the Prussian state. Clark said nothing about the common soldiers and NCOs.<sup>17</sup>

### ***The Battle of Roßbach***

We will leave out a description of the battle as it has been told and retold many times and we have also described it in our article in this journal (vol 23/2).<sup>18</sup> It shall suffice to note that the alleged massacre of the fleeing French and the Gallophobic motivation of the Prussian soldiers was the product of stories and anecdotes by Prussian/German writers. These people had either been at Roßbach or at least members of the Prussian army and were – with the exception of Archenholz – renowned military writers and historians.

### **Nationalist Anecdotes and soldiers’ ego-documents**

#### *Gaudi*

The chief witness for the Prussian hatred of the French was Frederick II’s *aide de camp*, Friedrich Willhelm von Gaudi, who wrote a detailed *Journal of the Seven Years War* in the time between the events and 1778, and was present at the battle.<sup>19</sup> Gaudi was a first-rate military

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<sup>14</sup> During the Dutch War (1672-1678) and the War of the League of Augsburg / Nine Years War (1689-1697), French troops had deliberately devastated the Rhineland and the Palatinate and committed many atrocities. Showalter, *Frederick*, pos. 3393; Christopher Clark stresses the enthusiasm for the king as a special form of *Prussian* patriotism. Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 224-225.

<sup>15</sup> Robert Riemer, “Die Schlacht bei Roßbach”, in *Die Schlacht bei Roßbach*, Alexander Querengässer (ed.), 123-148 (Berlin: Zeughausverlag, 2017), 139.

<sup>16</sup> Riemer, *Roßbach*, 140.

<sup>17</sup> There is another misunderstanding in Riemer’s article. He ascribes a passage from the autobiography of Ulrich Bräker to the soldier Franz Reiß, two very distinct persons serving in different regiments.

<sup>18</sup> See fn. 1 and Blanning, *Frederick*, 217-220; Duffy, *Frederick*, 138-143; Showalter, *Frederick*, 3296-3389.

<sup>19</sup> Curt Jany, *Das Gaudische Journal des Siebenjährigen Krieges. Feldzüge 1756 und 1757* (Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preußischen Heeres, 3) (Berlin: Mittler, 1901), 57.

historian and his *Journal* was the backbone of many later histories of the Seven Years War.<sup>20</sup> He was also well-read and a friend of one of Prussia's leading poets, Johann Ludwig Wilhelm Gleim, as well as of the poet-officer, Ewald-Christian von Kleist.<sup>21</sup> According to Gaudi, the inhabitants of the heartlands of the Brandenburg monarchy, Pomerania, Magdeburg and the Margraviate of Brandenburg, "imbibed this hatred [of the French] with their mothers' milk" and this hatred showed itself during the massacre of French infantrymen by Prussian troopers:<sup>22</sup>

[One reason for the victory at Roßbach was] the natural hatred of the common man in Germany, namely the Magdeburgers, men from the Margraviate of Brandenburg and Pomeranians, who harbor hatred against everyone who even happens to bear the name of a Frenchman in the depth of their hearts and which they imbibe with their mothers' milk. They do not know the reason for this and only when you urge them to state one, they say that a Frenchman does not even speak German. That this hatred did in fact exist, became obviously evident during today's battle, because our troops had not been content with doing their duty by advancing heartily against the enemy, but everybody who paid attention must have seen that they fought with real anger. This was most obvious in the actions of the cavalry, when it cut up the enemy infantry, as the officers had major trouble to make the common man give quarter [spare surrendering Frenchmen].<sup>23</sup>

#### *Archenholz*

The other key witness for not only *Prussian*, but distinctly *pan-German* hatred against the French on the field of Roßbach was Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, who served in the Prussian army between December 1758 and May 1763<sup>24</sup> and wrote the first popular history of the Seven Years War.<sup>25</sup> Archenholz, who was not present at the battle, presented the following anecdote to underline his image of Roßbach as a German national triumph:

A Prussian trooper, who was trying to capture a French horseman and about to lay his hand on him, when he suddenly saw an Austrian cuirassier appear behind his back, who was wielding his sword over his head. 'German brother!' shouted

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<sup>20</sup> Jürgen Ziechmann, *Journal vom Siebenjährigen Kriege von Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Freiherr von Gaudi*, vol. 10 (Buchholz: LTR, 2012), 11-14. Most of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century debates on Gaudi evolved around his criticism of Frederick II's handling of the Battle of Kolin. Official Prussian historians attacked Gaudi for his allegation that it was Frederick himself, who bore responsibility for the defeat and not one of his generals. (Ziechmann, *Journal*, 23.).

<sup>21</sup> Kleist to Gleim, 12th June 1747, in *Kleist's Werke*, 350.

<sup>22</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm von Gaudi, *Abschriften des Journals vom 7jährigen Kriege von von Gaudi, 1757/* part III, 668-669.

<sup>23</sup> Gaudi, *Journal*, vol. III, 668-669.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Munke, 'Archenholz (Archenholtz), Johann Wilhelm von', in *Sächsische Biografie*, ed. Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V. Online-Ausgabe: <http://www.isgv.de/saebi/> (26.3.2020) [http://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Johann\\_Wilhelm\\_von\\_Archenholz\\_\(1743-1812\)](http://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Johann_Wilhelm_von_Archenholz_(1743-1812)) (accessed 03/26/2020)

<sup>25</sup> On the Battle of Roßbach, both the editions of 1788 and 1793 have to be used as Archenholz added important parts to the 1793 edition. Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, *Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland von 1756 bis 1763* (Mannheim: Schwann und Götz, 1788), 57-58; Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, *Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland von 1756 bis 1763* (Berlin: Haude und Spener, 1793), vol. I, 170-182.

the Prussian, ‘leave the Frenchman to me!’ ‘Take him!’ answered the Austrian and sped away.<sup>26</sup>

In the 1793 edition, Archenholz added another anecdote:

Before the battle, the Prussian soldiers had been told by their officers that the French had boasted to take their quarters in Brandenburg after their expected victory over the Prussian army. During the rout, the fleeing Frenchmen cried out *Quartier!* the old German cry for mercy, when the Prussian cuirassiers went after them. The Prussians mistook this for mockery, alluding to the presumed French goal to take their *quarters* in Brandenburg as their officers had told them before, and cut down the fleeing French without mercy. The carnage ended when the French became aware of their mistake and began to shout „Pardon!“ The Prussians understood this and stopped cutting them down.<sup>27</sup>

There is no way of sugar-coating the finding that this anecdote is nothing more than an invention, made up to make the French look foolish and please his German, non-military readers in a cozy *salon*. *Quartier* was a usual German (!) cry for asking a victorious enemy to spare one’s life.<sup>28</sup> The entire communicative process portrayed by Archenholz is so twisted that even the most well-meaning reader cannot believe that it had been happening during the chaotic rout of an entire army. Had Archenholz read Gaudi,<sup>29</sup> his anecdote could have been a puffed-up version of Gaudi’s story, that Prussian soldiers hated the French, “because they did not even speak German”.<sup>30</sup> Be that as it may, it is certain that it is part of a set of anti-French anecdotes surrounding the battle of Roßbach.

### *Tempelhof*

Another prominent German historian of the Seven Years War, Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof, wrote in his famous *History of the Seven Years War* in 1783, well before the publication of Archenholz’ book:

At Roßbach, a regiment ran towards the French, I do not know if they were Pomeranians or men from the Margraviate [of Brandenburg], and they shouted at each other in Low-German ‘*Bröderken, gah toh!*’ (little brother, go on / charge!) As the low German ‘*gah toh*’ sounds like the French word for cake - *gateau*, a French officer from the regiment which was overrun by the

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<sup>26</sup> Archenholz, *Geschichte* (1788), 58; Archenholz, *Geschichte* (1793), 181-182.

<sup>27</sup> Archenholz, *Geschichte* (1793), 173-174.

<sup>28</sup> *Zedler’s Universal Lexicon*, 30 (1741), 103.

<sup>29</sup> Excerpts of Gaudi’s Journal had been published in the military journal *Bellona* in 1781 ([Friedrich Wilhelm von Gaudi], ‘Tagebuch eines Kön. Preußischen Offiowers über die Feldzüge von 1756. und 1757’, *Bellona* 2 (1781), 22.), but the evaluation of the common man’s hatred against the French is missing. As it would have led too far for this article, we abstained from analyzing the different versions of Gaudi’s journal. Jürgen Ziechmann (ed.), *Journal vom Siebenjährigen Kriege von Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Freiherr von Gaudi*, vol. 10 (Buchholz: LTR, 2012), 14, 18-20.

<sup>30</sup> Jürgen Ziechmann, editor of Gaudi’s journal, wrote that Gaudi’s description of Roßbach had been so vivid, that it became the role model for numerous anecdotes. Ziechmann, *Journal*, vol. X, 39.

Prussians wrote in a letter: ‘There was a regiment of cakes, which lost us the battle.’ In Paris, people admired the impetuosity of the charge of the ‘regiment of cakes’.<sup>31</sup>

Obviously, the anecdote is another silly invention, but it highlights the literary fashion of German writers to make up anecdotes which indulge in language-shaming of the French:

- Gaudi’s soldiers scorn the general French inability to speak German;
- Archenholz surrendering French mix up the appropriate terms when they want to sue for mercy;
- Tempelhof’s anonymous French officer and his Paris audience are weird enough to suppose that there is a Prussian cake-regiment.

We want to stress that Tempelhof and Archenholz were no ordinary soldiers but officers belonging to the European intellectual literary elite, the *République de Lettres*. Their anecdotes are so twisted and obviously invented that they can be dismissed as proof of anti-French hatred amongst the rank-and-file of the Prussian army. As an anecdote is a short text, which claims to be real, and which is used to characterize persons or groups of persons. It is meant to be funny, like Tempelhof’s cake-regiment. Less funny and very serious are the intentions of the author, which can be highlighted by a close look at Tempelhof’s strange regiment.

The French are depicted as arrogant and stupid at the same time by Tempelhof’s language-shaming.<sup>32</sup> They are so stupid and in love with their own language that they do not recognize that other people speak other languages. Otherwise, they would have noticed that Prussian troopers do not shout the French word *gâteau!* The anecdote also plays with the culture of naming French regiments and the use of these names. French regiments were named after the region they were stationed in, e.g. *Régiment de Touraine* or *Régiment de Gâtinais*, and French soldiers could use the name of their regiment /region as a battle cry.<sup>33</sup> Using the stereotype of French addictedness to good food and the use of regional names for certain types of food,<sup>34</sup> Tempelhof could use this to make fun of the French readiness to believe that a Prussian cake regiment actually existed.

Tempelhof uses all of this to make a point for professional military readers, which he explains before the anecdote. He criticizes French military thinkers, who build their theories on the idea of the *impétuosité du choc*, the impetuosity of the charge. In short, it means that a furious charge with levelled bayonets or drawn sabers can drive the enemy off the field and that it works better than skillful maneuvers and tedious fire-drill.<sup>35</sup> Behind this is a perceived

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<sup>31</sup> Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof, *Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland zwischen dem Könige von Preußen und der Kaiserin Königin mit ihren Alliierten*, vol. I (Berlin: Unger, 1783), 69.

<sup>32</sup> See Ruth Florack, “Nationalcharakter als ästhetisches Argument”, in *Gallophobie im 18. Jahrhundert*, 33-48, here 45.

<sup>33</sup> There is another famous story concerning the Battle of Kloster Kampen (1760), where a French sentinel sacrificed himself in the face of an allied surprise attack by crying out “A moi Auvergne, [= Régiment de Auvergne] voilà l’ennemi!” The allied soldiers killed him but he bought precious time for his comrades to grasp their arms and fight back. Friedrich Michels, *Geschichte und Beschreibung der ehemaligen Abteil Camp bei Rheinberg* (Crefeld: Funk’sche Buchhandlung, 1832), 118.

<sup>34</sup> Like the naming of good wines after the region they were grown in.

<sup>35</sup> Tempelhof, *Geschichte*, vol. I, 68-69.

difference of national character shared by all enlightened military writers: The French are hot-blooded and thus more suited for furious attacks, while the Germans are cold-blooded and thus more suited for cool maneuvers and complicated but effective fire.<sup>36</sup> The anecdote is meant to underline the silly belief of the French in the omnipotence of a furious charge with cold steel and at the same time the superiority of German tactics. The French are so in love with the idea of the *impetuosité du choc*, that they believe a silly story like the one of the “cake regiment.”

While Tempelhof’s anecdote is meant to amuse military professionals, Archenholz’ anecdotes work with an audience of armchair generals not familiar with military habits. Yet, both authors want to “describe the spirit of the belligerent peoples.”<sup>37</sup>

Gaudi’s work has to be understood differently, as it was meant to be read by highly educated professional soldiers who could have easily uncovered silly inventions and his aim was to write operational history and not to intervene in a discussion on various national characters. Yet, it also poses some questions. We have already answered the question, why some Prussian eyewitnesses had perceived a massacre, in Gaudi’s case, the “cutting up” of the French infantry. Secondly, his description of the common soldiers and their reason for hating the French is dubious. French atrocities on the days before the battle<sup>38</sup> would have been reason enough to cut them down without mercy according to the 18<sup>th</sup> century custom of war.<sup>39</sup> Why then should the soldiers explain their hatred of the French by pointing to their insufficient knowledge of the German language?

A comparison of the anecdotes with ego-documents by junior officers and privates clearly contradicts the idea that xenophobia and nationalism were part and parcel of the Prussian soldiers’ mentality.

The memoirs of lieutenant von Hülsen seem to underline the chauvinist fervor of the Prussians but the text is not authentic, as either Hülsen or, more likely, his 19<sup>th</sup> century editor had “copy-pasted” Archenholz’ description of Roßbach.<sup>40</sup>

The ensign Ernst Friedrich von Barsewisch gave a short description of the battle in his private memoirs written for his children. He (wrongly) claimed that the Swiss foreign regiments of the French army had put up some resistance, formed a “phalanx”-like column but were shot up by the Prussian infantry, leaving behind many thousands of dead. It is exactly his mistaken praise for the Swiss regiments in French service which makes Barswisch’s description a valuable cultural source.

The Swiss regiments of the French army were clearly distinguishable from the French regiments, which had in fact attacked the Prussians. The Swiss regiments wore red coats while the French wore white coats. But it seems that Barsewisch was so convinced that the Swiss were the best regiments of the French army, that for him it could only have been them who put up

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<sup>36</sup> [N.N.], *Commentaires sur les Institutions militaires de Vegéze; par M. le Comte Turpin de Crissé Lieutenant-General etc. Paris, 1783. II. Tomes en 4. Der erste Band 466 Seiten und 7 große Kupfer. Der 2te 426 Seiten und 13 Kupfer*, in *Bibliothek für Officiere*, vol.1 (1785), 109. On national stereotypes: Duffy, *The Military Experience*, 204.

<sup>37</sup> Archenholz, *Geschichte* (1788), 6.

<sup>38</sup> Blanning, *Frederick*, 220; *Geschichte des Freyregiments von Hard, von dessen Stiftung an bis zu der 1763 erfolgten Reduktion*, in *Sammlung*, vol. 5, 108.

<sup>39</sup> The real and alleged Russian atrocities in the Neumark were reason enough for Frederick II to forbid his troops to offer quarter to the Russian army when he engaged it at Zorndorf. Prittwitz, *Ich bin ein Preuße*, 93; Hülsen, *Unter Friedrich dem Großen*, 86.

<sup>40</sup> Carl von Hülsen, *Unter Friedrich dem Großen*, 53-59.

some resistance amidst the overall confusion. Later he wrote that the French fled the field with their “typical light-heartedness” and that the “world-famous” French artillery men seemed to have forgotten how to aim their cannon.

Barsewisch shows no hatred of the French but he is making fun of the French using typical 18<sup>th</sup> century stereotypes like French lightheartedness and the good reputation of the French artillery.<sup>41</sup>

The cavalry officer Warnery produced a professional account of the battle analyzing the tactical situation and mentioned that general von Seydlitz characterized the French as “brave” but “very badly led”.<sup>42</sup> Maximilian von Bornstedt, author of his grenadier battalion’s journal does not mention any anti-French feelings, only the religious sentiments of the Prussian soldiers: “It was remarkable that nearly all regiments and battalions [grenadier-battalions] intoned, as they had every reason to do, songs of praise and thanksgiving. Only a fiend could have remained untouched by this and not have been urged to thank our merciful God together with them. It shall not be forgotten that his Highness, Prince Maurice [of Anhalt-Dessau] showed himself as a very religious man on this occasion.”<sup>43</sup> The other journals do not contain any hints at anti-French sentiments.<sup>44</sup> The history of the Free-regiment von Hard, written by a general officer,<sup>45</sup> which was founded after the battle, gives a vivid description of the French advance after the crossing of the Rhine in April 1757: “They flooded Hesse, Westphalia, Hanover and Halberstadt like a torrential river. They appeared in the Altmark and threatened to burn down everything when they were not paid. The French who are normally so civilized, went on a rampage like barbarian peoples in the provinces they had conquered.”<sup>46</sup> Concerning Roßbach, only the French commander in chief is mentioned and mildly ironized: “The flight of the enemies was very disordered. The Prince of Soubise had not imagined to be received in such a manner.”<sup>47</sup>

Thus, of the texts of Prussian officers, which were written during or shortly after the Seven Years War, only the Journal of the Free Regiment von Hard shows Gallophobia as it calls the French barbarous. But all other texts don’t show any hatred of the French.

This is even more true for the soldiers. Musketeer Dominicus from infantry regiment no 9, one of the few which actually exchanged fire with the French at Roßbach, does not

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<sup>41</sup> Ernst Friedrich Rudolf von Barsewisch, *Von Rossbach bis Freiberg 1757-1763. Tagebuchblätter eines friderizianischen Fahnenjunkers und Offiziers*, ed. Jürgen Olmes (Krefeld: Hermann Rühl, 1959), 24-25.

<sup>42</sup> Charles Etienne Warnery, *Feldzüge Friedrichs des Zweyten*, p. 1, 218-221.

<sup>43</sup> Maximilian von Bornstädt, ‘Tagebuch des Majors Maximilian von Bornstädt, Kommandeur eines Grenadierbataillons, über die Campagnen von 1756, 1757, 1758 bis zu Anfang 1759’, in *Sammlung* 4 (1784), 25.

<sup>44</sup> [N.N.], *Tagebuch eines Offiziers vom Alt-Schwerinschen Infanterieregiment, welches die Feldzüge von 1756 bis 1763 enthält*, in: *Sammlung*, T. 1 (1782), S. 473; [N.N.], *Journal des Füselierregiments von Jung-Braunschweig (jetzo Möllendorf) vom Junius 1756 bis März 1763*, in: *Sammlung*, T. 2 (1782), 147; [N.N.], *Tagebuch eines Preußische Offiziers über die Feldzüge von 1756 bis 1763*, in: *Sammlung*, T. 2 (1782), 356; [N.N.], *Nachrichten von den Feldzügen, den das jetzige Czetteritzsche Husarenregiment von 1740 bis 1763 beygewohnt*, in: *Sammlung*, T. 4 (1784), 492; [N.N.], *Geschichte des Königl. Generallieutenants, Herzog Friedrich von Braunschweig Durchl. Infanterieregiments, seit der Stiftung vom Jahr 1702 bis 1763*, in: *Sammlung*, T. 4 (1784), 549; [N.N.], *Tagebuch eines Kön. Preußischen Offiziers über die Feldzüge von 1756 und 1757*, in: *Bellona*, T. 2 (1781), 20-22.

<sup>45</sup> [N.N.], *Geschichte des Freyregiments von Hard, von dessen Stiftung an bis zu der 1763 erfolgten Reduktion*, in: *Sammlung*, vol. 5 (1785), 113.

<sup>46</sup> *Geschichte des Freyregiments von Hard*, 108.

<sup>47</sup> *Geschichte des Freyregiments von Hard*, 113.



mention any anti-French sentiments but focuses on danger and his fears: “We had to follow our cannon, there was a small hill, which covered us very well. What terrorized us most: as soon as we had passed them [the artillery], one of our powder wagons was incinerated and seven died and three were wounded. We wheeled into attack position and ran towards them, forced them back and night fell. The cavalry had to get after them, which cut down and captured many of them.”<sup>48</sup> Dominicus is not free of ethnic prejudices. He writes about the extinction of the Jewish population of the town of Judenburg and blames it on a Jewish conspiracy against the Christians thus repeating a common antisemitic stereotype.<sup>49</sup> This is more than ample proof that Dominicus did not harbor any anti-French feelings. As his regiment was among the few infantry units, which actually exchanged some volleys with the French<sup>50</sup>, this finding is especially important. Dominicus was in the midst of the fray and fighting next to one of the units consisting of Magdeburgers, regiment Alt-Braunschweig.<sup>51</sup> It was exactly this regiment, which Gaudi had thought to be especially anti-French.

The authors of the most extensive collection of soldiers’ letters from the Prussian army during the Seven Years War, Christian Friedrich and Johann Dietrich Zander from Brandenburg, uncle and nephew serving in the infantry regiment von Itzenplitz (no. 13), had been present at the Battle of Roßbach.<sup>52</sup> Unfortunately, their letters dealing with the battle itself have been lost.<sup>53</sup> They were from the heartlands of the Prussian monarchy and as Brandenburgers amongst those men, whom Gaudi described as especially Gallophobic. Yet, their letters do not contain any hints at anti-French sentiments. This is also the case in a letter by lieutenant Seiler of the Meinicke Dragoons (no. 3) from 8 November 1757 to his mother.<sup>54</sup> He belonged to a unit recruited from Pomerania, another area which Gaudi had claimed to be especially Gallophobic.<sup>55</sup> In addition, this letter is remarkable, because he was among those troopers who had been blamed of massacring the fleeing French.<sup>56</sup>

These testimonies prove that the allegation of an inborn hatred of the French on the side of ordinary Prussian soldiers and commoners from the heartlands of the Brandenburg monarchy is simply wrong. It is interesting to note that even a soldier from the Brunswick contingent fighting the French over the entire course of the war does not show any signs of Gallophobia. Johann Ludwig Grotehenn served as an infantryman and was just eager to get home unharmed. Especially interesting is the comparison with the memoirs of the sergeant of the Hessian Jaegers, Georg Beß, also serving in the duke of Brunswick’s army which defended the Prussian Western flank and Hannover against the French. Unlike the

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<sup>48</sup> *Aus dem Siebenjährigen Krieg. Tagebuch des preußischen Musketiers Dominicus*, ed. Dietrich Kerler (München: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1891), 32.

<sup>49</sup> *Tagebuch Dominicus*, 83.

<sup>50</sup> Duffy, *Frederick*, 143.

<sup>51</sup> Duffy, *Frederick*, 143. The Chef of the regiment was Ferdinand von Braunschweig and it was stationed in Magdeburg.

<sup>52</sup> Christian F. Zander, *Fundstücke – Dokumente und Briefe einer preußischen Bauernfamilie (1747-1953)* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2015), 15-113.

<sup>53</sup> Zander, *Fundstücke*, 15-16.

<sup>54</sup> Letter by Lt. Seiler, in *Soldatenbriefe*, 35–7.

<sup>55</sup> Gieraths, *Kampfhandlungen*, 236.

<sup>56</sup> His regiment was instrumental in the defeat of the Austrian cuirassier regiments of Bretlach and Trautmannsdorf. Bericht des Herzogs von Hildburghausen an den Kaiser, in *Quellenstücke*, ed. Brodrück, 303, fn 2. Duffy, *Frederick*, 128. See also: Tempelhof, *Geschichte*, vol. 1, 218.

Prussian Kantonisten and Grotehenn, Beß was no draftee but a professional volunteer soldier and was engaging the French on a day to day basis. Unlike the Prussian draftees, he had no problems killing enemy soldiers, but even made fun of it, when he called his shooting them “laying them asleep”. Yet, Beß’ description of the French is that of tough enemies and not of disrespectable cowards.

In our book “Prussian Army Soldiers and the Seven Years War”, we have shown that Prussian soldiers hated the Austrians and Russians much more than the French.

How then did Gaudi’s, Archenholz’ and Tempelhoff’s anecdotes come about?

It is Archenholz, who gives the decisive hint to explain Gaudi’s description. Explaining the anti-French sentiments in Germany after Roßbach, he wrote in his second edition from 1793:

All German tribes, large and small, regardless of their alignment, Imperial recesses and their own interest, were satisfied with this victory against the French, which they viewed as a national triumph. The reason for this sentiment amongst the [German] populace was not only the normal hatred between bordering peoples, which is rooted in different forms of government, different laws and mores, countless peculiarities and even more the continuous wars and which is more or less shared by all European nations, even those located far away from France. The Germans had much more reason for this national hatred, which drove other peoples: The Frenchmen’s common and loud contempt of the German name, German merit and German mind and of the German language; the enchantment of German rulers, great and small, by ignorant French babblers, who pushed into the cabinets of these Princes, became their counselors and often enough the scourge of their states; for some generations, this had sewn the fertile seed of hatred, which was bound to root itself even into the [heart of] the most gentle and noble person ... Even inside the armies of a people [the German, K&SM], which had been able to win without any foreign aid for millennia and which, among all great nations of the earth had never been conquered, the French were often preferred. The German *Pöbel*,<sup>57</sup> unacquainted with the merits of the French nation, just looked at this preference of their rulers, the differing mores of the French and the common complaints of all German provinces. This naturally led to hatred coupled with the greatest contempt. But the enlightened Germans from all estates, depending on their level of knowledge, did not show any trace of this contempt, but highest esteem for the culture of this great people; but they were even more hurt by the Frenchmen’s undeserved abasement [of all things German] and above all other things, this was the source of their hatred.”<sup>58</sup>

The real problem was not with the lower classes of the German-speaking realms but with the intellectuals. The relationship of educated Germans towards the French was a very ambiguous love-hate relationship. French cultural supremacy in Europe was evident and much envied by the Germans, who would have liked to be in the place of the French.

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<sup>57</sup> The German term *Pöbel*, means *non-educated common man* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. It is not as pejorative as *rabble* but not as neutral as *populace*.

<sup>58</sup> Archenholz, *Geschichte* (1793), vol. I, 179-181. See also Hildebrandt, *Mobilisierung*, 1.

Admiration and hatred were especially near when it came to the noble officer corps. The French still set the mark for noble behavior, French was the *lingua franca* of all educated Europe and at the same time, especially the Prussians were eager to throw the French from the winner's rostrum of Europe's number one military power. And it is even more important that when learned 18<sup>th</sup> century Germans expressed this Gallophobia, they presented it mainly as a lower-class-phenomenon and the result of French arrogance. As intellectuals and members of the *République de Lettres* were supposed to have no national bias,<sup>59</sup> they put words, they themselves were not allowed to say, into the mouth of the common man, or in this case, common soldiers. Learned men, who had issues with the French, like those in the quote from Archenholz, make the common man the messenger of these issues. This is made possible by a social construct of the *Pöbel* or "the uneducated"<sup>60</sup> by enlightenment thinkers such as Archenholz'. One key element of this construct is that of the "common man" being ruled by his bad emotions, which can only be tamed by discipline and subordination.<sup>61</sup> This is reflected in Gaudi's claim that the officers had major trouble preventing their men from killing the surrendering French. It's a typical claim by learned officers, who often blamed massacres on the "common soldiers" when their noble officer comrades had in fact been involved in the illegal killings, too.<sup>62</sup> Another element of this construct is the idea that culture means multi-language capabilities, at least the ability to understand French as a prerequisite for obtaining an enlightened understanding of the world.<sup>63</sup> This is underlined by Archenholz' idea that the common man in Germany was unaware of the tremendous achievements of the French. Here the answer to Gaudi's story that the Prussian soldiers had slaughtered the French, "because they don't speak German", can be found:

It seems that the limited slaughter of fleeing and surrendering French soldiers at the Battle of Roßbach had called for some justification because it had been members of the leading cultural nation of Europe. The officers had blamed their men for this and learned people like Gaudi had been willing to see the common man as full of anti-French sentiments and thus as the source of the alleged atrocities, because the common soldier had not been able to see their distinguished position according to the perception of enlightened Europeans like Gaudi.

A learned guess would be that Gaudi had asked some of the troopers about the reasons for their ferocity and the men had chosen the easiest answer: "How could we know that they wanted to surrender, we cannot understand them, they do not speak German." Gaudi interpreted this simple excuse as proof of the soldiers' chauvinism.

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<sup>59</sup> Gleim to Kleist, 25th July 1757, in *Kleist's Werke*, 723.

<sup>60</sup> This kind of constructs can also be observed in modern societies, e.g. when it comes to justifying cuts of welfare benefits. Karl August Chassé, *Konstruktionen zur Unterschicht und ihre Bedeutung. Beitrag zur Ad-Hoc-Gruppe "Hartz IV als Stigma? – Zur Zuschreibung individuell verantworteter Unzulänglichkeit"* (2017 Congress of the German Sociological Society)

[http://publikationen.sozioologie.de/index.php/kongressband\\_2016/article/view/543](http://publikationen.sozioologie.de/index.php/kongressband_2016/article/view/543) (accessed 01 July 2020)

<sup>61</sup> *Zelders Universal Lexicon*, 63 (1750), 999. Zedler claims, that an army without discipline is a "bunch of bad knaves".

<sup>62</sup> Carl von Hülsen, *Unter Friedrich dem Großen*, 88; F. A. Retzow, *Charakteristik*, p. 1, 328; Christian Wilhelm von Prittwitz, 'Ich bin ein Preuße...', 93-94.

<sup>63</sup> The Berlin Academy chose French as its language and introduced international prize contests. Avi Lifschitz, *Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 87 and 65. Gaudi himself wrote the first two versions of his *Journal* in French. Ziechmann, *Journal*, 18-19.

Gaudi did not lie but the paragraph shows how a set of cultural constructs and biases led to an interpretation of the battle, which was to have major repercussions in the dawn of the German nation state.

# Conference Report: Twenty-Sixth Annual War College of the Seven Years' War

May 20-22, 2022



*Figure 2 View from the main entrance to the site which emphasizes the works done in the style of Vauban.*

Before wrapping up this issue, I wanted to take a few moments to inform the readership about a truly amazing conference I had the opportunity to take part in this conference for the first, and hopefully not the last, May 20-21. Family commitments prevented my attendance for the full weekend. One thing should be emphasized from the outset, for anyone with an interest in the Seven Years' War or eighteenth century history more broadly conceived, this is a site and an event that must not be missed! As many can no-doubt attest, finding a conference in North America geared primarily to conflict in the eighteenth century is a difficult proposition to begin with. A conference that focuses primarily on the Seven Years War/French and Indian War is something truly exceptional. The following will provide a short overview of the conference and the site.

The event opened Friday with a reception. Held in the Pavilion, which features a garden patterned after the styles popular during the reign of George II. The event provided an excellent venue for presenters, attendees and staff members to mix and network.

Saturday, the War College convened in earnest. Beginning with a presentation from Stuart Lillie, the Vice President of Public History at the fort which covered the diet of the garrisons of the site in 1759. He described in stark detail, based on meticulous research, the diet of the garrison over the course of the year. Likewise, he detailed the various crops raised at the fort for the consumption of the garrison. The presentation made clear the diminution of the soldiers' daily rations as the post became increasingly isolated over the course of 1759.

Next came Adrian Finucane of Florida Atlantic University, providing a glimpse at her current research on the captivity practices of Native Americans in the southeast. The focus in her account fell on the period of the War of Jenkins' Ear. Professor Finucane adroitly described the nuanced world of Native American captivity of Europeans, the fates of members from other tribes, and the efforts of the European belligerent to impose their cultural practices on those of the Native Americans. Her presentation constitutes part of a larger book project. If the talk is any indication, the book will prove a valuable contribution to our understanding of the often complex and confusing interactions between Europeans and Native American in conflict.

Greg Rogers, followed with his research on various actors in the borderlands between the British and French zones of influence during the French and Indian War. This material demonstrated how the areas between the French and British zones in North America constituted places in which those fleeing various things could hide out. At the same time, since these fugitives often interacted with people on both sides, at times serving as valuable intermediaries. Thus, people who had run afoul of the law, or were generally outcasts from their own groups could at times find redemption.

The next presentation followed quite logically. Ryan Langton at doctoral student at Temple University presented a portion of his research on frontier intermediaries during the French and Indian War. His work focuses the politics of competing diplomatic networks in the Ohio Country. It therefore examines interactions between the various indigenous groups, and the manner in which these were layered into relations between Britain and France.

Itai Apter then gave a preview of his work on the political-judicial issues associated with the interpretation of treaties in the eighteenth century. This constituted perhaps the most wide-ranging presentation of the day, as it looked at burgeoning concepts of international law and just war theory. Once again, his presentation encompasses part of a larger research agenda. The larger project attempts to connect the experiences of actors in the Seven Years' War with contemporary international crises.

From this very broad approach, the next presentation, by Joseph Gagné focused on the experiences of women at Carillon. In essence, the presenter sought to connect theory with the lived-experiences of women at the post. Much of this presentation highlighted the reported numbers of women at the post, though by his own admission, this is often hard to pin down with anything approaching exactitude. Likewise, Gagné drew out the differing perspectives on women with the army held by the British and the French, as well as the provincial units.

The final seminar presentation of the day brought the European dimension of the conflict into sharp focus, with Jim Mc Intyre giving a presentation of the partisan and author

on *petite guerre*, Johann Ewald's formative experiences in the Seven Years' War in Europe. The talk emphasized some of the Ewald's experiences in the conflict, as well as how they shaped his perspectives on the conduct of the war of posts. This presentation, as well, forms part of a larger project, a biography of Ewald

The Saturday program ended with a demonstration and discussion, "...*from all the embrasures...*": *French Artillery at Carillon in 1759*, led by Stuart Lillie. Clearly, the event, held at dusk, highlighted the forts impressive collection of eighteenth century replica artillery. This portion of the conference was both dazzling and informative, and gave an impressive display of the potential of the guns that once defended Fort Ticonderoga or Fort Carillon as it was known under the French.

Sunday's presentations revolved around the battle of Carillon, fought on July 9, 1758.

The morning session began with Fort Ticonderoga Museum Curator, Matthew Keagle, presenting an overview of the battle of Carillon on July 9, 1758. This was far from a rehearsal of well-known facts. Dr. Keagle did an excellent job synthesizing materials gleaned from the fort's extensive archives which served to further illuminate the reasons why the battle developed as it did. His presentation emphasized the contingency of the battle, noting repeatedly that there were numerous points in the 1758 battle at which things could have gone very differently.

Dr. Keagle's presentation was followed by a report of the ongoing archeological efforts at the site given by the Margaret Staudter, the fort's Director of Archeology. Surveys with various types of ground penetrating radar have revealed the remains of structures which have been matched to manuscript maps in the forts collection, driving forward additional investigations on the site.

Finally, Stuart Lillie returned to podium to tie together how these different efforts manifest in the ongoing efforts to present a full and accurate story of the fort through various living history presentations.

Finally, anyone with an interesting in the French and Indian War/Seven Years War or eighteenth century more broadly owes it to themselves to attend at least one of these conferences. As the themes/ topics and presenters vary from year to year, attendees will always find new information and points of interest. All of this is not to undervalue the site itself. Attendees are literally surrounded by the eighteenth century in the walls of the fort. The conference center, is, however, situated underground so that it does not disrupt the appearance of the site itself. In addition, the remains of several other sites are within easy driving distance of the fort. The earthworks and shells of the barracks remain at Crown Point. Still, it is easy to discern the strategic importance of the site as a choke point along the shores of Lake Champlain. At the same location, one can view the remnants of Fort Saint-Frédéric. Further inland, but still within reach is the site of Fort Anne, famous for the battle which occurred there during the 1777 campaign. It is worth noting that planning is already underway for the Twenty-Seventh Annual War College of the Seven Years' War.



*Figure 3 View looking out onto Lake Champlain from the fort.*



## **Items of Interest**

### **Upcoming Events**

#### **Seven Years War Association Convention 2023**

The 39<sup>th</sup> Annual SYW Convention will be held in late March/early April. Anyone interested in presenting at the Convention's Krieges Akademie should contact the Journal staff. Anyone interested in putting on a game should contact Alex Burns at [johanvonhuelsen52@gmail.com](mailto:johanvonhuelsen52@gmail.com) as soon as possible.

#### **Fort Ticonderoga 2023**

TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL WAR COLLEGE OF THE SEVEN YEARS'  
WAR

May 19-21, 2023

Deborah Clarke Mars Education Center

(Our own Jim Mc Intyre will be presenting)

#### **Sir William Johnson and the Wars for Empire Conference**

October 21-23, 2022, Fort Plain, New York

[American Revolution Conference - The Fort Plain Museum and Historical Park](#)

#### **Society for Military History**

The Society for Military History will hold their annual meeting March 23-26, 2023 in San Diego, California.

### **Subscriptions**

Subscriptions come in two forms, electronic, which is a downloadable PDF file. The going rate for this is \$15 per year. The other format is traditional paper copy, which is \$30 per year. This covers postage and handling as well. Both of these formats are available through PayPal. Other arrangements can be made by contacting the editor at [mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org](mailto:mcintyrej@sevenyearswarassn.org).

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